PENALTIES

LEO ECHEGARAY VS SEC. OF JUSTICE

Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12,

1998
Per Curiam

Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-
old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH
BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED
BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the
grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive
or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that
R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice,
Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as
Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged
similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation
of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

RULING:
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal
injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s
into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the
execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause
the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or
mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;
but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and
expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and
date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner
already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and
10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of
notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in
conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from
the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to
the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict
is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty
became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal
and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the
choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise
only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or
ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such
task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty
will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and
since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are
cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished."
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method
of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant
to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General
Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits,
map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically
requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the
sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further,
"the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be
administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also
mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to
the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by
requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense,
but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177
is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is,
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.

ART. 22

LACSON VS. EXEC SECRETARY

Facts:

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate
involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task
Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for
multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did
not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the
phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides
that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.

RULING:

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof
which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun
as of the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that:

Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit
the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners cases were under, namely, that trial
had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will
no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as
the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation
and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047
23057 to procedural due process

Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their right to procedural due
process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under
R.A. 7975.

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.[46] R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;[47] or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606
as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.[49] Not being a
penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not
partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come
within the prohibition.[52] Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It
has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the
time of their passage

ARTICLE 27 RECLUSION PERPETUA

PEOPLE VS. LUCAS

Prior to R.A. No. 7659, 36 the presence of modifying circumstances would not affect the penalty
of reclusion perpetua prescribed for the crime of rape because such a penalty was then indivisible
and under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty,
it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the deed. However, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659,
which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetuahas now a defined
duration, i.e., from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. There is, however, no
corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the same Code for the purpose of converting reclusion
perpetua into a divisible penalty with three specific
period — minimum, medium, and maximum — and including it in the table provided therein showing
the duration and the time included in each of the periods.

It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua, it did not
make explicit its intention to convert it into a divisible penalty. In any event, Article 65 of the Code
which provides:

Art. 65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In
cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the
courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three
equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of
each of the three portions.

may be applied. Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua (twenty
[20] years and one [1] days to forty [40] years) can be divided into three equal portions, with
each composing a period. The periods of reclusion perpetua would then be as follows:

minimum — 20 years and 1 day to 26

years and 8 months

medium — 26 years, 8
months and 1 day to
33 years and 4 months

maximum — 34 years, 4 months and

1 day to 40 years

Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18465, the accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion perpetua.

Considering again such aggravating circumstance, the accused may be sentenced in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18466 to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum as maximum.
ARTICLE 36 PARDON ITS EFFECTS

PEOPLE VS ORILLA

The trial court was so revolted by the perversity of appellants crime that it
was moved to include this proposal in the dispositive portion of its decision:

xxx in the event that upon automatic review by the Honorable Supreme Court, that the
penalty of Death is not imposed but that of Reclusion Perpetua, this Honorable Court
recommends that accused should not be granted pardon within the period of thirty
(30) years.

Incestuous rape is indeed reprehensible. It deserves our full condemnation.

However, the recommendation by the trial court is improper. It is the [62]

Presidents prerogative whether or not to grant a pardon subject to the

limitations imposed by the Constitution. [63]

ARTICLE 47 AUTOMATIC REVIEW OF DEATH PENALTY

PEOPLE VS MATEO

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme

Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an
intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the
Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review
by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine
his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the
evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the
Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm
the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then
render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances
so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records
of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.[15]
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-
making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of
Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate
review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the
case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a
procedural matter.

ARTCLE 48 SINGLE PENALTY FOR MULTIPLE CRIMES

PEOPLE VS. CATROMERO

In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, we
stress the settled principle that a person who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of
danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other person may
consequently suffer.[32] In this case, Josephine jumped from a window of her house to escape
from Appellant Castromero; as a result, she suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a
broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. This
being the case, the court a quo correctly convicted Appellant Castromero of the complex crime
of rape with serious physical injuries.
PEOPLE VS. COMADRE

The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with
multiple attempted murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period.

The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code,

which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing
a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that
the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates
lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and
several criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively
constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these
component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law
on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a
single criminal impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity. [41]

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of
modifying circumstances, including the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery in this case. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum
[42]
penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court, therefore,
correctly imposed the death penalty.
PEOPLE VS ROBIOS

Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties,

as in the present case for parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one
shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating circumstances. Hence, the
imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not death.
Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties,
as in the present case for parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one
shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating circumstances. Hence, the
imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not death.

PEOPLE VS BODOL

This is an appeal from a sentence of the Court of First Instance of

Samar convicting the appellant of double murder and sentencing
him to suffer life imprisonment .
The crime committed by the appellant was double murder, defined
and penalized in article 248, in relation to article 48, of the Revised
Penal Code. Article 48 provides that when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Since under article 48 this penalty must
be applied in its maximum period, the appellant should be
sentenced to death. However, in view of the lack of the necessary
number of votes to impose the death penalty, we are constrained to
apply the penalty next lower in degree, which is life imprisonment. c

PEOPLE VS MACAGCALING

Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the
imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law
provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug
involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of
three distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional,prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a
situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the
minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20, however, is
its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the
drug subject of the criminal transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code
and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid
component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity
of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since
each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as
determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix
the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.

It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid
disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the
drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and
double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately
among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved
is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499
grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60

Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty
of prision correccional is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue
has first to be resolved.

4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it
consists of three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76
of the Code. The question is whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here
to be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating,
aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for
offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised
Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases,
however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own
specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or
with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special
laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main
function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the
Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws,
since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished
under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its
technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the
system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and
absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.

For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period
thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of
the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties
in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the
accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also,
the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce
the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68
should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second
paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have
been contemplated by the legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not
specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy
therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be
imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many
penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since
the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and
public censure remain in the scale.

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine
the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case
should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty
should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be
adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution
cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.

6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now
before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed
any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does
not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved
will exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The more important aspect, however, is how the
indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under
the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a
special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised
Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the "offense is
punished" under that law.

There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses
under special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said
laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code,
hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties
in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last
examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but
an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.69

We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their
technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said
sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense,
although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal
Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section
1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposedunder the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)

It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the
benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71
of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6
months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. The difference,
which could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest
in the judicial teapot.

PEOPLE VS. SANCHEZ

However, we disagree with the trial court that the accused committed a single complex crime
of double murder. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of committing
the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed.
The question is whether the act of shooting the victims using armalites in automatic firing
mode constitutes a single act and, thus, the felonies resulting therefrom are considered as complex
crimes. We rule in the negative.
 In People v. Vargas, Jr., we ruled that several shots from a Thompson sub-machine, in view
of its special mechanism causing several deaths, although caused by a single act of pressing the
trigger, are considered several acts. Although each burst of shots was caused by one single act of
pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, in view of its special mechanism the person firing it
has only to keep pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger and it would fire
continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing
the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.[34] In the instant case,
Malabanan testified that he heard three bursts of gunfire from the two armalites used by accused
Corcolon and Peradillas. Thus, the accused are criminally liable for as many offenses resulting
from pressing the trigger of the armalites. Therefore, accused are liable for two counts of murder
committed against the victims, Nelson and Rickson Pealosa, instead of the complex crime of
double murder.

DOCTRINE OF ABSORPTION

ENRILE VS. AMIN

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the
same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part
and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery,
kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant
case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine
itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance
of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan
is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same
act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of
conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must
now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in
Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor

the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v.
Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and
convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the
accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the
crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a
separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in
the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further
now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the
Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an
alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash
the information, the petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the
doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING
CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED
FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the
rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this
case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866
because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must
make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the
rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D.
1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it
prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that
there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not
charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a
friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed
with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form
part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

ENRILE VS. SALAZAR

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.

COMPLEX CRIME PROPER

PEOPLE VS SAVILLA

Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the Information with "Robbery with Serious Physical
Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention ("Art. 295, par. 3, in conjunction with Art. 267, RPC )and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We agree with the Trial Court that a complex crime under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code has been committed such that the penalty for the more serious
offense of Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267, Revised Penal Code), or "reclusion perpetua to death,"
is to be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries (Art.
294 (3), which is reclusion temporal.

Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other." The term "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did then the
offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter
and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime
is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol.
I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case,
the crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary means" as it was selected by Appellant
and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery.

The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29 April
1987, 149 SCRA 325) where the accused were convicted of Robbery but acquitted in the case for
Serious Illegal Detention and where it was held that "the detention is absorbed in the crime of
robbery." For one, in Astor, there were two (2) separate Informations filed, one for Robbery and
another for Serious Illegal Detention. In the present case, only one Information was filed charging
the complex offense. For another, in Astor, the robbery had already been consummated and the
detention was merely to forestall the capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case, where
the detention was availed of as a means of insuring the consummation of the robbery. Further,
in Astor, the detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VS. PEOPLE

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned
therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows
that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.[

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged
not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents.

The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable
for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.

True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is the ruling
in Gonzaludo v. People.[46] It means that the prosecution must establish that the
accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to
commit the crime of estafa.

However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of

the Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate
exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held
criminally liable for simple estafaby virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.

The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes
against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by
the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory
cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes
of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime
is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to
mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component
crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate
charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the
single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document.

Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold
the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by
the offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject
only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach
of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public
documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the
property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.

In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the
component crimes separately from each other. While there may be two component
crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and
result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal
liability.[48] That is the concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are
two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
 As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is
violated (e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right
to property),[49] a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or
interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself.[50] Since
only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component
crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the
correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality
of crimes where the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes
constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal liability. [51] (The
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls under this
category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where
different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the accused
incurs criminal liability.[52] The latter category is covered neither by the concept of
complex crimes nor by Article 48.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes
(concursus delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal
liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:

Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more

crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed
and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently
termed as component crimes.[53] (emphasis supplied)

∞∞∞
 In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well
as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal
intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one.[54]

For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public
document requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not
mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered
independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification
of public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single
complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.

Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the

complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for
estafa should be considered separately from the liability for falsification of public
document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime and
contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would
wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as
it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are
considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.

FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE

A NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING ESTAFA
EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A])

The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows:
 (1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;

(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;

(3) the offended party personally signed the document and

(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.

While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does
not require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not
mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary
means to commit the estafa under that provision.

The phrase necessary means does not connote indispensable means for if it
did, then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.[55] In People
v. Salvilla,[56] the phrase necessary means merely signifies that one crime is
committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other.[57] In this case, the
crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a necessary means as
it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design
to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay
properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.

When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of

falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary
means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes
form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.[58] The falsification of a
public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official
or commercial document.[59] In other words, the crime of falsification was
committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.[60] Actually utilizing
the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is
estafa.[61] The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document.[62]

Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information
show that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato
presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her
intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated
upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when
Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold
and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita
was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the
property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by
the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public
document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa.
LONTOK VS GREGORIO
The issue is whether Lontok, over his objection, can be tried by the municipal court on an
information charging the complex crime of damage to property in the sum of p780 and lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence.

We hold that he should be tried only for damage to property through reckless imprudence, which,
being punished by a maximum fine of P2,340, a correctional penalty, is a less grave felony (Arts. 9,
25 and 26 and 365, Revised Penal Code). As such, it cannot be complexed with the light offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence which, as correctly contended by Lontok, had already
prescribed since that crime prescribes in sixty days.
There is a complex crime when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or
when a grave or less grave offense is a means of committing another grave or less grave offense.

As originally enacted, article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provided that the crime is complex when
a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when an offense is a necessary means of committing
the other. Commonwealth Act No. 4000 amended article 48 by substituting the words "grave or less
grave felonies" for the word "crimes" in the original version, thus eliminating a light felony as a
component part of a complex crime.

Parenthetically, it may be noted in passing that the concept of complex crime was applied in criminal
negligence or quasi offenses (People vs. Lara, 75 Phil. 786 and People vs. Agito, 103 Phil. 526,
regarding multiple homicide through reckless imprudence; People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294,
regarding malversation through falsification by reckless negligence; Samson vs. Court of Appeals,
103 Phil. 277, regarding estafa through falsification by reckless negligence; Angeles vs. Jose, 96
Phil. 151; Lapuz vs. Court of Appeals, 94 Phil, 710 and People vs. Vendiola, 115 Phil. 122, regarding
homicide, grave physical injuries and grave damage to property, all through reckless imprudence.).

In all the foregoing cases, it is assumed that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but is simply
a way of committing a crime and it merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability. Negligence
becomes a punishable act when it results in a crime (People vs. Faller 67 Phil. 529).

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light. there is no complex crime. The resulting
offenses may be treated as a separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony.
Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single
act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information.
They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People
vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).

CONTINUOUS OR CONTINUING CRIME

PEOPLE VS LUCENA
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered

the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina;

the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed

and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping

motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite

the three successful penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred

that the accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful

desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed

that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was obviously

motivated by a single criminal intent.

The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here, we quote with
approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts of rape. It
appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of
[AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein
the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when
the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA],
he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his
conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).

This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA were in
satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for three counts of
rape is proper.

ARTICLE 61
PEOPLE VS. TEMPORADA
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount
defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The
minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional minimum
and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC
correctly fixed the minimum term for the five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prisión
correccional since this is within the range of prisión correccional minimum and medium.

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of
imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not
exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is not prisión mayor minimum as apparently
assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time
each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6517 of the RPC.
Following this procedure, the maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.18 The incremental penalty, when
proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the
discretion of the court.19

In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by P22,000.00, and
the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done
starting with the case of People v. Pabalan20 in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall
be construed liberally in favor of the accused. The doctrine enunciated in People v.
Benemerito21 insofar as the fraction of a year was utilized in computing the total incremental penalty
should, thus, be modified. In accordance with the above procedure, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentences imposed by the RTC should be as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, where the amount defrauded was P57,600.00, the RTC sentenced
the accused to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as
minimum, to 9 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum. Since the amount defrauded exceeds
P22,000.00 by P35,600.00, 3 years shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty
(or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court).
The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be validly imposed is 9 years, 8 months and 21 days
of prisión mayor, and not 9 years and 1 day of prisión mayor.

In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, where the amounts defrauded were
P66,520.00, P69,520.00, and P69,520.00, respectively, the accused was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 10 years and 1
day of prisión mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases. Since the amounts
defrauded exceed P22,000.00 by P44,520.00, P47,520.00, and P47,520.00, respectively, 4 years
shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term,
therefore, that can be validly imposed is 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor, and not
10 years and 1 day of prisión mayor.

Finally, in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, where the amount defrauded was P88,520.00, the accused
was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as
minimum, to 11 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum. Since the amount defrauded
exceeds P22,000.00 by P66,520.00, 6 years shall be added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the
discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be validly imposed is 12
years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusión temporal, and not 11 years and 1 day of prisión mayor.

######
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies defined therein
which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty."
For instance, under Article 24922 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusión
temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code
provides for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the commission of a felony
affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is
referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one
ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under
the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the
court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually
imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.

Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,23 a pre-ISL case, the accused was found guilty of homicide with a
prescribed penalty of reclusión temporal. Since there was one ordinary aggravating circumstance
and no mitigating circumstances in this case, the imposable penalty is reclusión temporal in its
maximum period, i.e., from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. The court then had the
discretion to impose any prison term provided it is within said period, so that the penalty actually
imposed on the accused was set at 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal,24 which is a
single fixed penalty, with no minimum or maximum term.

Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed under the pre-ISL regime
became the maximum term under the ISL regime. Upon the other hand, the minimum term shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. To illustrate, if the case
of Saadlucap was decided under the ISL regime, then the maximum term would be 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusión temporal and the minimum term could be anywhere within the range
of prisión mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) which is the penalty next lower to reclusión
temporal. Consequently, an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prisión mayor as minimum to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal as maximum could have possibly been imposed.

ARTICLE 62

PEOPLE VS ABUYEN

Manuel Abuyen y Elais appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in which he was convicted of the crime of
frustrated qualified theft, having confessed, and sentenced to one month
and one day arresto mayor, and to the additional penalty of ten years, for
habitual delinquency, with the accessories of the law, and the costs of the
action.

Touching the second assignment of error, the information alleges that the
defendant has been thrice convicted of the crime of theft, and that he is an
habitual delinquent in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3397.
Section 1 of said law defines who an habitual delinquent is and reads as
follows: "Any person who within a period of ten years from the date of his
release or of his last conviction by the courts of this country of the crimes
of robo, hurto, estafa, embezzlement, or forgery, or of a violation of the
laws against vagrancy or prostitution, is found guilty of any of said crimes a
third time, or oftener." As this is a definition of the law, it is presumed the
defendant knew it, and in pleading guilty to the crime charged in the
information, though frustrated, he admitted all the facts alleged therein and
relieved the prosecution of the obligation of proving that he had thrice been
convicted of the crime of theft, and that for the fourth time he has
committed the same crime of theft within the period of ten years from the
date when he was set at liberty, or since his last conviction of said crime by
the courts of this country.

The crime committed by the defendant-appellant is frustrated qualified theft

defined in the first paragraph of article 517, and punished in paragraph 5 of
article 518, as amended by Act No. 3244 in connection with article 520,
paragraph 3, of the Penal Code, the culprit having been a recidivist more than
twice. The penalty provided by article 518, paragraph 5, of the Penal Code for
the consummated crime of theft, is arresto mayor in its full extent. And for
the frustrated crime, the penalty next lower in degree, i. e., a fine, should be
imposed in accordance with the provision of article 65 of the same Code.
Inasmuch as the defendant-appellant has been twice a recidivist, the penalty
next higher in degree to the fine, i. e., arresto mayor in its full extent, must
be imposed in accordance with the aforecited article 520 of the said Code. As
there is no circumstance to be considered which modifies the criminal
liability, said penalty must be imposed in its medium degree, i. e., two
months and one day to four months arresto mayor.
By virtue whereof, and in accordance with the recommendation of the
Attorney-General, the defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to two
months and one day arresto mayor, and to the additional penalty of ten
years, in accordance with Act No. 3397, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
ARTICLE 64

PEOPLE VS ALLEN MONTALABA

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority[39] can now be

appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the
minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty
should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion
temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW),
the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which
is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor
aggravating circumstance.[40] The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because
the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to
death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion
temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.

ISLAW

PEOPLE VS GARIN

We do not agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court. The
mitigating circumstance of minority, being favorable to the appellant, all doubts
should be resolved in his favor.[90]The Court notes that the birth certificate
adduced in evidence by the appellant to prove his minority is that of Noe Garing.
Hence, the said certificate does not prove the appellants minority when he
committed the crime. However, when he testified on April 6, 1999, he stated
that he was only seventeen years old.[91] No contradictory evidence was
presented by the prosecution. Thus, when the crime was committed on April 3,
1997, the appellant was about sixteen years of age. As such, the appellant is
entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under the second
paragraph of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Calpito,[92] a case on all fours with the issue of this case, we
held that the minority of the appellant may be proved by his own declaration
before the trial court:

At the outset, it must be borne in mind that in assessing the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this court has
appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused
regarding his age.

This Court emphasizes that while the submitted birth certificate is not entirely
satisfactory, a careful review of the records reveals other evidence of appellants
minority. In the December 19, 1994 hearing, upon being asked by the trial court,
appellant declared that he was 20 years old, consequently indicating that on
November 21, 1990, he must have been only 16 years old ... This Court held that the
claim of minority by an appellant will be upheld even without any proof to
corroborate his testimony, especially so when coupled by the fact that the prosecution
failed to present contradictory evidence thereto. In this case, the prosecution only
questioned the submitted birth certificate, but did not adduce any evidence to disprove
appellants claim of minority when he committed the crime. Accordingly, the
mitigating circumstance of minority should, as a matter of fairness, be appreciated in
favor of appellant, especially in light of the compassionate liberality this Court has
granted to minors involved in serious crimes.

Parenthetically, inasmuch as the appellant is now almost twenty-three years

old, he is no longer entitled to a suspended sentence under Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Court Act of 1997.
In People v. Clores, Jr.,[93] we said

We are not impervious of Section 5, Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as the
Family Courts Law, which took effect on November 23, 1997. It provides that the
sentence of the youthful offender shall be suspended without need of application
pursuant to P.D. No. 603:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of
age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a
minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor, if
found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability
which the accused may have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended
without need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code;

As a general rule, the said provision may be applied retroactively, considering that it
is favorable to the accused. However, we can no longer do so because the appellant is
by now, more than twenty-four (24) years old.

Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following
rules shall be observed:

...

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Murder is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Because the
killing of Eleazar Galang, although qualified by treachery, was not attended by
any other aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. Considering the privileged minority of the appellant, the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, which is the penalty next lower than
that prescribed. There being no other modifying circumstances attendant to the
crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, the duration of which is from fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty
shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor, the penalty next lower in
degree to reclusion temporal, the duration of which is from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 127, in Criminal Case No. C-54178 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The appellant, Nio Garin, is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder qualified by treachery, defined in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. There being a privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority in his favor, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of from nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Eleazar Galang, Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity ex delicto; Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000) as moral damages; Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000) as
temperate damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000) as
exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.

ARTICLE 69

ROSAL JUBILLA VS PEOPLE

Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not correctly imposing the
penalty, and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the
mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the findings of fact by the lower
courts as well as his conviction, and limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1) whether or
not the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into consideration the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised Penal Codeand Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate
Sentence Law); (2) whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of
sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the penalty of imprisonment
contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other international agreements.

Ruling of the Court

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporalfor homicide.
Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17
years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000,8 such
minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.9

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional
(i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision
mayor in its medium period – eight years and one day to 10 years – was proper because there were
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles
in the trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found in
Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of
the child shall be limited to the minimum.11Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the
CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and
appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling
the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.

Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,12 which disqualifies from probation an
offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner
could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case
to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.

Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in
conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child
offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.– If the court finds that the objective
of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or
if the child in conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the
court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide
by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible
or permissible.

Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a
child inconflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements. A 1avv phi 1

review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in
conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows
on children in conflict with the law the rightnot to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty;
imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on
the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last
resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of
time.Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No.
9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was
imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the
suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortestduration permitted
by the law.

Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his
sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender child’s
best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

ARTICLE 70 SUCCESSIVE SERVICE OF SENTENCE

MEJORADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and contrary to the three-fold
rule as provided for by Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code;

The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which
totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8) days of imprisonment. Petitioner impugns this as contrary to
the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty
(40) years.

Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in
connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677 [1957]).
Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted".
Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides
that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties
the maximum of which is forty years.

The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties for the eight
informations filed against the accused-petitioner. As We pointed out in the case of People v. Peralta,
(No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 783-784):

... Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose as many
penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual
crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an
outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to
impose the appropriate penal sanctions.

In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the penalty imposed upon him as harsh,
cruel and unusual

RA 9344

PEOPLE VS HALIL GAMBAO, ET. AL.

Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of
R.A. No. 9344,65 a determination of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary.
Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance,
but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid
provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of
only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This
leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled
that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of the
equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the
penalty one degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to
Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law (Reclusion
Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty,
which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision
Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent
any aggravating circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court
imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.

As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in

accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto70 that the age of the
child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What
matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court,
however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian’s actual
served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For such reason, she may
be immediately released from detention.

ARTICLE 87 DESTIERRO

PEOPLE VS ABARCA

There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in
the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate
outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.
The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.

Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually
shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or
both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that
he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind
impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-
product of the accused's rage.

It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v.
Araque, 6 we said:

xxx xxx xxx

As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-
quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to
a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in
the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
 injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous
provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be
criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical
injury, as the case may be — is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere
banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of the accused
than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries
other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect,
therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to
an exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is
inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A
different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make
the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer
to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation
would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an exempting
circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or
omissons . . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or
information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the
accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense charged-but a
matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be
pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)

That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we
consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the
General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There
can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could
not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.

xxx xxx xxx

We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define
and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for
the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the
circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7

xxx xxx xxx

Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for
his protection. 8

It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a
punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.

The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by
Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant
shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the
accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we
disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a
rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes
that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder
when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is
not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados.

This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility.
Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he
uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries
sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second
paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold
Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her
injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her
recovery period.) 12

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13

EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

ARTICLE 89 HOW CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS TOTALLY EXTINGUISHED

PEOPLE VS AMISTOSO

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished: cra lawlib rary

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]

In People v. Bayotas,18 the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: cralawlib rary

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. (Citations omitted.)

Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.19 cralaw virtualaw l ibra ry

Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision
on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and
unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his
death.

Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though
affirming Amistoso’s conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become
final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.

ARTICLE 90 PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES

DIONGZON VS CA

Before us is a petition seeking a review of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. No. 08094 affirming the conviction of herein petitioner of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.

PEOPLE VS RELOVA

The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he
filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already
prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of
the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted
the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light
felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that
the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged
in February 1975.

Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this
time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the
Revised Penal Code.

It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of
the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to
an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription
of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court,
an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense. 15
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this
case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit
by stealing from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because
an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense
which he should have known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the
fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the
private respondent in this case.

The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both
before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of
criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged.

ARTICLE 91

CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOVERY

PEOPLE VS REYES

The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 [Art. 172,
Revised Penal Code (RPC)]. Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime prescribes in ten
(10) years [Art. 90, par. 3 (RPC)]. The ten (10) year prescriptive period commences to run "from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ." [Art.
91, (RCP)]. In the instant case, the public document allegedly falsified was a notarized deed of sale
registered on May 26, 1961 with the Register of Deeds in the name of the accused, private
respondent herein, Mizpah R. Reyes. The two informations for falsification of a public document
subject matter of the controversy were, however, filed only on October 18, 1984. The complainants
claim that they discovered the falsified notarized deed of sale in June 1983. The Court is tasked with
determining whether the crime has prescribed which hinges on whether or not its discovery may be
deemed to have taken place from the time the document was registered with the Register of Deeds,
consistent with the rule on constructive notice.

The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The
record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains

Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that a purchaser of registered land is presumed to be charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record. The Court, in explaining the nature of the rule on
constructive notice and the presumption arising therefrom stated in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-
21953, March 28 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, that:

xxx

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice
of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein ...

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
 every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such
presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the
public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

xxx

It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased was
executed by some of his heirs, the registration of the instrument of partition with the Register of
Deeds is constructive notice that said heirs have repudiated the fiduciary relationship between them
and the other heirs vis-a-vis the property in question. The heirs who were not included in the deed of
partition are deemed to have notice of its existence from the time it was registered with the Register
of Deeds [De la Cerna v. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-28838, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 514]. Likewise,
the rule on constructive notice has been applied in the interpretation of a provision in the Civil Code
on the prescription of actions for annulment of contracts which is parallel to Art. 91 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Civil Code provision states:

Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.

This period shall begin:

xxx

In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same [Emphasis
supplied].

In Armentia v. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-18210, December 29, 1966,18 SCRA 1253, where a notarial
document recorded with the Registry of Deeds was sought to be annulled, the Court, interpreting the
phrase "from the time of the discovery" found in the aforequoted provision of the Civil Code, ruled
that "in legal contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the
document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice
to the whole world . . .

It is evident that there is merit in petitioner's claim that the law on prescription of civil suits is founded
on different policy considerations from that of the law on prescription of criminal actions. However,
the Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and rules of interpretation used
in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive notice, can not be applied in
criminal actions.

The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits are based mainly on practical and
equitable grounds. The lapse of a considerably long period of time obscures the surrounding
circumstances of a particular claim or right and erodes the integrity of whatever evidence may be
presented in support of an action to enforce or contest such claim or right. Moreover, where a
particular right has accrued in favor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left on a
precarious balance, always susceptible to possible challenge by an adverse party. After a certain
period of time fixed by law, the right enjoyed by a party must be accorded respect by prohibiting
adverse claims the factual basis of which can no longer be verified with certainty. Hence, the law on
prescription of civil suits is properly called a statute of repose.
The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best evidence that can be obtained is also a major
consideration in criminal trials. However, the law on prescription of crimes rests on a more
fundamental principle. Being more than a statute of repose, it is an act of grace whereby the state,
after the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal
act. While the law on prescription of civil suits is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter
between two contending parties, the law on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality
on the part of the state in favor of the offender [People v. Moran, supra, at p. 405]. Hence, in the
interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to
be adopted [People v. Moran, supra; People v. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil.
725 (1956)]. The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the
Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period
of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was
recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on
May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only
on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the
accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible
error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.

ACTUAL DELIVERY

SERMONIA VS CA

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.1 Bigamy carries
with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime
prescribes in fifteen (15) years.2 The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . .3

That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted.4 At least, it is not
expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is already
time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from the time the
offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the
subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive
notice.

While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in
criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant,8 we agree with the view
expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the
possibility of its being more favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly explains —

Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be applied
in the case at bar, principally citing in support of his stand, the cases of People
v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People v.Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).

This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be
applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from
the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is
generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married
person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.
 In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right or
interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said property
is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the
transactions involving the said property can easily be made by any interested party.
In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended person or the
authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person.

Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive
notice was applied, involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly,
marriage is not property.

The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is

not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed
liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of
bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders
thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be
said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is
not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the
existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is
still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is
not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under
which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite
difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for
the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).

Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the

prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of
registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense would almost
be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless
violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. 9

To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census
Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or even
third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too
formidable a task to even contemplate.

More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the time of such registering,
filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to
the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the documents
registered in the Civil Register.

Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his
marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and sundry
for inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate in the marriage
contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or for that
matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in Marikina so that
everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no priest or minister
would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment
under the Marriage Law.10 Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to his first
spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any third party would ever go to the local
civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple expedience of having the second
marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set into motion the running of the fifteen-year
prescriptive period against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.

OFFENSES PUNISHED BY SPECIAL LAWS

PRESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES IS GOVERNED BY ACT 3326

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS VS. HON. LIDUA

The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged
against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural
rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326,
as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special
laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the
law does not provide any other distinction.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1)
the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run;
and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the
offense charged under City OrdinancE.

The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code reads:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner
on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

B. Criminal Cases:
 (1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)

Section 11 of the Rules provides that:

Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall
be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in
Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense
cannot be prosecuted de officio.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.

In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar
facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990.
The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner,
which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section
1 of Rule 110.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both
parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that
the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court
and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of
the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special
law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is
not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.30

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who
then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The
recent People v. Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as
special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well.
However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.

There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed
the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and
institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct
of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the
violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents
were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission
of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the
period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he
ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents.

Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:

SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under
the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:

a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the
Office of the Ombudsman; or

b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes
of preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.

However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.

xxxx

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall
be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied). 1âw phi1

Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff and
established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were
assigned centers for particular regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that
the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra,
Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio,
Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.

The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the
Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended. 1âwphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the
dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is
applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the
Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of
its ruling:

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint
is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the
necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their
plain language.

The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the
problem here sought to be corrected.

ARTICLE 93 COMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES

PANGAN VS HON. GATBALITE

HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE DATE
WHEN THE CULPRIT SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF SENTENCE IN
ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ON THE COMPUTATION OF
THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES BE CONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE
DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF PENALTIES
BEGIN TO RUN? [

The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation
of liberty, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be
captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no
extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period
of prescription.

Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the prescription
of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who
are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation
of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never
suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a
consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the
period for prescription never began.

ARTICLE 95 OBLIGATION INCURRED BY A PERSON GRANTED CONDITIONAL

PARDON

TORRES VS GONZALES
The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a
court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the
terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee
for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved
is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would "not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the
remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we here deal with are the
consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional
pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment
of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty
for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before
he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159. 1avv phi 1

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i)
to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed
against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision
correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen
to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

ARTICLE 96 EFFECT OF COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE

ALMERO VS PEOPLE

Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State,
and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests
solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially
rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and
save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the
element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch"
thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.1

Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the
treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically
opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the
judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the
crime which led to the judgment of conviction.18 This was the reason why the Probation Law was
amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even if
the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the
probation only if the accused fails in his bid.19

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment,
or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.20 While he did not
file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a
petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D.
No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies.

SUYAN VS PEOPLE

ISSUE

The sole issue to be resolved inthe instant case is whether the probation was validly revoked. THE
COURT’S RULING

We rule that the probation ofpetitioner was validly revoked.

On the procedural grounds, we do notsubscribe to his contention that his right to due process was
violatedafter the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in
compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample opportunity to refute the
allegations contained in the Violation Report.

The essence of due process is thata party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in
support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to
be heard.31 When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard
and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his
cry for due process must fail.32

We adopt the ruling of the CA inthat petitioner squandered his own opportunity when, instead of
rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of any
such report when his probation was first revoked.

On substantive grounds, we believe that there was sufficient justification for the revocation of his
probation.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense
1âwphi1

is a direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order,33 and the effects are clearly outlined in
Section 11 of the Probation Law.

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the
probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:

Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at
which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his
failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another
offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.
(Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the probation of petitioner and ordering him
to serve the penalty for the offense for which he was placed on probation.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the
terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this
privilege.34 Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside
prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of his violation.35 The Court's discretion to grant
probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused.36 Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has
the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.37

CIVIL LIABILITY

ARTICLE 100

Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;12 and 2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law;13 the intentional torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action.16 Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender.17

Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action
for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action
chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its
employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the
employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.18

Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be
governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 217720 and of the pertinent provision of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the
obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort.
The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or
complaint,21 and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of
action or lack of it based on the defendant's perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a
claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of
such employee.22

Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by the
negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the
negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence, if
exercised, would have prevented said accident."

Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable
doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant
petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the
principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.23 Since there was no conviction in the
criminal case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the
criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and
primary liability based on quasi-delict.

Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with Compulsory Counter-
Claim,24 repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on
their allegation that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their]
employees." The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the petitioners
acknowledged the private respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.

All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to
recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or
industry.

ARTICLE 103 SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY OF OTHER PERSONS

PANGONOROM VS PEOPLE

Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the

employees civil liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidence
establishing (1) that he is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2)
that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the employee committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution against the
employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[31]
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102
and 103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are
applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.[32]
The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal action.[33] In the present case, there exists an
employer-employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in
the transportation industry,[34] and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a
wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties.[35] However, there is no proof here of Olimpios insolvency. The judgment
of conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This being so, no writ of
execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of
the accused-employees insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer
be enforced.[36]
 In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employers
subsidiary civil liability unless it appears that the accused-employees primary
liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact
cannot be known until some time after the verdict of conviction shall have
become final. And even if it appears prima facie that execution against the
employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as
a matter of course.[37] The procedure for the enforcement of a judgment will
have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes
final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is
returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ
of execution be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for that precise
purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-
employee considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpios insolvency.

YONAHA VS COURT OF APPEALS

The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article

103 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned the
[5]

enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which

the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and
[6]

merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution
against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves
the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and
resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and
propriety of the employers liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it
appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be
satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth
in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some
kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches
while in the performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the
employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency. [7]

The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any
exculpatory facts in her motion to stay and recall, as well as in her motion for
reconsideration, which could save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile
and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer must be given his full day
in court.
To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee
relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that
the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any
offense he commits while in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said
employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course,
concludes the employer and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the
[8]

same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should
hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by
law

PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES VS. HEIRS OF MANGAWING

Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as
driver of one of its passenger buses. On July 23, 1993, an Information was filed with the
RTC of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, charging Ancheta with reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide.

The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal
from the said decision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the said
case. While the subsidiary liability provided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in substance and, in
effect, it is not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of
the RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA.
Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual
participation in the defense of its employee, Ancheta, by providing him with
counsel. It cannot leave its employee to his own fate because his failure is its
failure. The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, would thereby be
[17]

apprised of the progress of the case and the outcome thereof from time to time
through the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise the petitioner
of the progress of the case is thus not equivalent to lack of due process. The
pronouncement of the Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc. is [18]

instructive on this score:

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case
instituted against his employee but in substance and, in effect, he is considering the
subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his concern, as well as of his
employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking
virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own
fate because his failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the
employee is convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard
to complain, if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he
was not given his day in court. It was not without purpose that this Court sounded the
following stern warning:

It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees,
taking real and deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action
brought against them by reason of or as a result of the performance of their duties, if
only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and, consequently, doing away
with the practices of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American rule
requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied. (Martinez v.
Barredo, supra.) [19]

In Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula, the Court explained the effect of a judgment

[20]

of conviction against the employee on the subsidiary liability of the employer,

as follows:

To be sure, the correctness of the legal principles cited by the Court a quo cannot be
gainsaid. A person criminally liable is also civilly liable; and upon the institution of
the criminal action, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from
the crime is also impliedly instituted unless waived, or the filing of a separate action
therefor is reserved. The employer is subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated civil
liability ex delicto of his employee in the event of the latters insolvency; and the
judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the employee to be also civilly liable is
conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of that liability but also as to
its amount. [21]

Since the petitioner was not a party in the RTC and in the CA on the appeal
of its employee (Ancheta), the petitioner cannot justifiably claim that it was
deprived of its right to due process. As explained by this Court in Martinez v.
Barredo: [22]

The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the
situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability
under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought of a
subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his drivers criminal
negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In
other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his drivers
conviction and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal
wipes out not only the employees primary civil liability but also his employers
subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. (Almeida, et al. v. Abaroa, 8 Phil.
178, affirmed in 218 U.S. 476; 54 Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314,
320; Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos Sur v. Tolentino, G.R. No.
34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.) [23]
 Besides, as gleaned from the brief of the petitioner, as appellant in the CA,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 78149, it sought the reversal of the decision of the RTC and
the acquittal of its employee. In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
People, this Court held that such an appeal would be impermissible for the
[24]

following reasons:

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the
appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. This is the risk involved
when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts
have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to
increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.

If the present appeal is given [due] course, the whole case against the accused-
employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that
which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him.
Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the
judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent. [25]

Indeed, to allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal

case via an appeal from the decision of the RTC would be to annul, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. [26]

The Court cannot second guess whether Anchetas failure to file his brief as
appellant in the CA was through the negligence of his counsel or because of
the belief that, indeed, he was guilty of the crime charged and it was
purposeless and futile for him to still file such brief.
We agree with the contention of the OSG that the right of the petitioner as
the employer of the accused to due process occurs during the hearing of the
motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, on the basis of the sheriffs
return that the writ of execution issued by the court for the enforcement of its
decision on the civil liability of the accused was not satisfied because of the
latters insolvency, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in the name
of the accused. Such return is prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the
accused. [27]

ARTICLE 107 INDEMNIFICATION

HRS OF CASTRO VS BUSTOS

In the instant case, recovery of such damages is being sought in the criminal proceedings but even if
it were claimed otherwise, the indemnity and damages would be the same, for generally, the items of
damages are identical in both procedures, except with respect to attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation which can be awarded only when a separate civil action is instituted. (Art. 2208, Civil Code)
With the clarifications We are making herein, at least the writer of this opinion expects that litigations
regarding the aspects of the law herein passed upon may be minimized.

As a start, it is to be noted that in the matter of damages, the original decision of the Court of
Appeals, while correct in making a particularization in the award of indemnity and damages,
nonetheless, still failed to comply strictly with the constitutional requirement that all decisions of
courts of record must state both the facts and the law on which they are based.

As can be seen, no legal or factual basis is stated therein for the award of indemnity and damages to
petitioners; worse, the impression is given that the said award is purely a matter of discretion on the
part of the court. Clearly, this is not in accordance with the law. Indeed, it must have been this failure
to refer to the pertinent legal provisions which induced the appellate court, at the mere invocation by
respondent of Art. 2204 of the Civil Code, to commit the error of readily eliminating in the amended
decision the items on moral damages and compensation for loss of earning of the decedent which its
original decision had correctly contained. Having held that it had discretion in the premises, the court
easily yielded to the argument that simply because it had credited the respondent with two mitigating
circumstances, it was already justified in eliminating the items of damages already adverted to,
presumably having in mind said Art. 2204 which provides that:

In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened

according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Of course, this was clear error, inasmuch as construed literally or otherwise, the quoted provision
does not warrant a complete deletion of said items of damages. In any event the court evidently
failed to take into account that several other provisions can come into play considering the
circumstances in this case.

When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom are governed
by the penal laws, "... subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating
damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)

Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civily liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code).
This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes indemnification for consequential
damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn include "... those suffered by his
family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107, i

When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides thus:

The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by law of testate or intestate
 succession may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased

ARTICLE 110 SEVERAL AND SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF PRNCIPALS, ACCOMMPLICES AND ACCESSORIES OF
FELONY

PEOPLE VS MONTESCLAROS

The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly
and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L."[64] The Court of Appeals, however, did not award any
civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and exemplary damages. We deem
it necessary and proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct
from moral damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof,
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling
the victim to such award.[65]

Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled
to an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as
moral damages. [66] However, Tampus civil indemnity ex delicto has been
extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.[67] Thus, the amount of civil indemnity which
remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.

It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is
liable when they have different degrees of responsibility in the commission of the
crime and, consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a crime is committed
by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of the crime and though all
the persons who took part in the commission of the crime are liable, the liability is
not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as principal,
accomplice or accessory.

The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature
and degree of his participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the
principal in a consummated felony.[68] The accomplice is only given the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the crime committed [69] and an
accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees.[70] However, a felon is not only
criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. [71] Apart from the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to
make whole the damage caused by his act or omission through the payment of civil
indemnity and damages.

Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike
criminal liabilityin which the Revised Penal Code specifically states the
corresponding penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessorythe share
of each accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The
courts have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity
which the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without
guidelines with respect to the basis of the allotment.

Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [i]f there are two or more
persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which
each must respond. Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of
the principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall
also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other
classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [t]he principals,
accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable
severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those
of the other persons liable.[72]

As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability,
previous decisions dealing with this matter have been grossly inconsistent.

In People v. Galapin,[73] People v. Continente,[74] United States v.

Lasada,[75] People v. Mobe,[76] People v. Irinea,[77] People v. Rillorta,[78] People
v. Cagalingan,[79] People v. Villanueva,[80] People v. Magno,[81] People v. del
Rosario,[82] People v. Yrat,[83] People v. Saul,[84] and People v. Tamayo,[85] the
principal and accomplice were ordered to pay jointly and severally the entire amount
of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,[86] the accomplice
was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity imposed by the trial court,
while the principal was liable for the other half. In People v. Toring,[87] the
principal, accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and severally liable for
the entire amount of the civil indemnity.

In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal
shares of the civil indemnity. This makes the accomplice who had less participation
in the commission of the crime equally liable with the principal for the civil
indemnity. The degree of their participation in the crime was not taken into account
in the apportionment of the amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the
principle behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible for felonies,
i.e., that the liability must be commensurate with the degree of participation of the
accused in the crime committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just
cooperated in the execution of the offense but whose participation is not
indispensable to the commission of the crime is made to pay the same amount of
civil indemnity as the principal by direct participation who took a direct part in the
execution of the criminal act. It is an injustice when the penalty and liability imposed
are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender; for criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants should be
liable only for the acts actually committed by him.[88] The proportion of this
individual liability must be graduated not only according to the nature of the crime
committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the degree and nature of
participation of the individual offender.

In Garces v. People,[89] People v. Flores,[90] People v. Barbosa,[91] People v.

Ragundiaz,[92] People v. Bato,[93] and People v. Garalde,[94] the accomplice was
held to be solidarily liable with the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the amount
adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for
half of the civil indemnity ex delicto but was made to pay the moral damages
of P50,000.00 separately from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato,
and Garalde, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the combined
amounts of the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral damages. In Ragundiaz, the
accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the principal for half of the actual
damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held solidarily liable with the
principal for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil and moral damages.

In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the
principal for only half of the amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages, only
for purposes of the enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the offended
party. When the liability in solidum has been enforced, as when payment has been
made, the person by whom payment has been made shall have a right of action
against the other persons liable for the amount of their respective shares. [95] As
against each other, whoever made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only
the share that corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made.[96] In
these cases, therefore, payment is made by either the principal or the accomplice, the
one who made the payment to the victim could demand payment of the part of the
debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the principal paid the victim the
entire amount of the civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-
fourth (1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and damages. The principal was
primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the total amount of civil indemnity and he
was solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other half. Since the principal paid
for the half which the accomplice is solidarily liable with, he could claim one-half
(1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would have become
ultimately liable for three-fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and
damages, while the accomplice would have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of
such amount.
In People v. Cortes,[97] People v. Budol,[98] People v. Nulla,[99] and People v.
Madali,[100] the principal was ordered to pay twice the share of the accomplice in the
civil indemnity. In Nulla, the Court determined the respective amounts for which
the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable for. The principal was ordered
to pay P20,000.00, the accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the accessory
was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited above where the principal and
accomplice were held solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity
or half of it, in Nulla, the court particularly determined the amount for which each
shall respond. This is consistent with Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code, which require that the courts should determine the amount for which
the principals, accomplices and accessories must respond to and upon specifying this
amount, the principals are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the
accomplices are solidarily liable among themselves for their quota and the
accessories are solidarily liable for their quota. If any one of the classes is unable to
pay for its respective quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other
classes, which shall be enforced first against the property of the principals; next,
against that of the accomplices; and lastly, against that of the accessories.[101]

There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the
amount that the accomplice is liable for. In Lumiguis v. People,[102] the civil liability
of P6,000.00 was apportioned as follows: the sole principal was primarily liable
for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily liable in solidum among
themselves for the other half of the indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice
was answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth (1/8) of the entire
amount of civil indemnity, which is P750.00.

Similarly in People v. Bantagan,[103] the principal was required to indemnify the

heirs of the deceased in the amount of P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three
accomplices should be jointly and severally liable. The three accomplices were
jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and in case of their insolvency the
principal was secondarily liable for such amount.
In People v. Castillo,[104] the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the
amount of the civil indemnity, while the principal was liable for the remaining three-
fourths (3/4).

In People v. Cariaga,[105] the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the
heirs of the victim amounted to P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to
pay P101,000.00 which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire civil indemnity, while
the two principals were ordered to pay the rest of the indemnity and damages
amounting to P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares
of the civil indemnity and damages among the principal, accomplice and accessory
is determined. Though the responsibility to decide the respective shares of persons
liable for a felony is left to the courts, this does not mean that this amount can be
decided arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the courts to grant indemnity
and damages demands factual, legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to
speculation and caprice.

The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual
damages, should be apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the
commission of the crime according to the degree of their liability, respective
responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act. Salvador Viada, an
authority in criminal law, is of the opinion that there are no fixed rules which are
applicable in all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil liability
among two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, either because there are
different degrees of culpability of offenders, or because of the inequality of their
financial capabilities.[106] On this note, he states in his commentaries on the 1870
Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the determination of the amount of
respective liabilities to the discretion of the courts.[107] The courts have the
competence to determine the exact participation of the principal, accomplice, and
accessory in the commission of the crime relative to the other classes because they
are able to directly consider the evidence presented and the unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses.

We must stress, however, that the courts discretion should not be untrammelled and
must be guided by the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying
roles in the commission of the crime. The person with greater participation in the
commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those
who played a minor role in the crime or those who had no participation in the crime
but merely profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a greater share
in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each
accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory.
Care should also be taken in considering the number of principals versus that of
accomplices and accessories. If for instance, there are four principals and only one
accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court
cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals and
one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the principals, as a class, have a
greater share in the liability as against the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3)
of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) ofP6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when
the civil liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends up
to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share
of the principalsor P4,000.00is still divided among all the four principals, and thus
every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.

In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the
principal for the entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an
erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into
account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the
principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Idas previous acts of cooperation
include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still
raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have
the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to
civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the
apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members
of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only
subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does
not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial
court in the case at bar.

Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and
accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total
amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be
ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was
correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of
damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is
liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable
for P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into
civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since
the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his
liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before
the final judgment.[108] His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be
passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus share of the civil liability has
been extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of this
decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil
indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished, Idas subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated,
following the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus obligation
to pay P66,666.67 his quota of the civil indemnity is the principal obligation, for
which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment of the principal
obligation, there is no longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus,
the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.

On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were

incorrectly awarded by the Court of Appeals.

In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the
civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[109] Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and
as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured
or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.[110] Exemplary damages may
be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the
information and proved during the trial.[111]

In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against

Ida. Although, the minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is
the parent of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the presence
of these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages
since the relationship of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the
Information.[112] The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the
offender must both be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order
to be appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance.[113] While the
information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident,
there was no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC
and appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary damages is not
warranted.

ARTICLE 113 OBLIGATION TO SATISFY CIVIL LIABILITY

PEOPLE VS RELOVA
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both
before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of
criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case, as we noted
earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen electric current through the installation
and use of unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he
did not deny having appropriated electric power. However, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City Court and by the Court of First Instance
(from which dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have appealed 17) before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related
civil action which has not been waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for
reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of
judgment conformably with such evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related
civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as
indicated above. No pronouncement as to costs.