The Estonia Disaster Sep 1994 - Explanation

On Ro-Ro ships, Unlike the old-fashioned cargo ship, the cargo space is open from
bow to stern without any transverse bulkheads. They are extremely popular with
holidaymakers and hauliers because of the speed with which they can be loaded and
offloaded. Nevertheless, ro-ro ferries do have problems. Constructed with cargo
doors at both ends, especially vulnerable to wear and tear when used as vehicle
ramps, and without internal transverse bulkheads, they are vulnerable if an accident
occurs. When flooding happens, either through the cargo doors or through the hull
being pierced, there is nothing to stop water flowing rapidly onto the car deck. This
can cause the ro-ro to list, the cargo shifts, and the ro-ro quickly capsizes. As a
safeguard against this, modern ro-ros have bows which hinge upwards and a
secondary door inside. This acts as both a collision bulkhead and a ramp which is
attached to a Linkspan.
Estonia – Officer’s View from Bridge
Example of Bow Visor & Bow Ramp Operations
Sequence of Damages to Visor & Ramp leading to sinking of Estonia

With all Locks fully secured, everytime there was a wave action on bow visor (vertical upward
load P -generally buoyancy minus visor weight), there would be :

- Transfer (to hull )of tensile horizontal force 1.25P via the Atlantic lock
- Transfer (to hull )of compressive horizontal force 0.625P via each of the two the side
locks

- Depending on the clearances of the three locks and the clearance of the deck hinges some
of the vertical load acting on the visor may be transmitted to the hull via the deck hinges.
Then the load on the locks is reduced. However, for all practical purposes the only
function of the deck hinges was to enable to open/close the visor.
Sequence:

1) A high amplitude, transient impact load (360 tonnes ) on the visor (Slamming) first ripped
apart the Atlantic lock. This is estimated to have taken place at 01:00 hrs.
2) Immediately after the Atlantic lock failed, the load transmission between visor and hull
changed. A vertical load on the visor could now only be transmitted via the side locks and
via the deck hinges.

3) After the alleged side locks failure, the visor was only held in place by the deck hinges.
However, the visor lifting arms were connected to the hydraulic lifting pistons and it is now
assumed that the pistons restrained the motion of the visor. If the visor had not been
restrained by the hydraulic pistons, a vertical wave load with enough energy exceeding the
visor potential energy would of course have swung the visor around the hinge points, and the
visor would have ended up upside down on the focsle deck in front of the deck house! This
did not happen.

It is alleged that the visor was now flipping up and down around the hinge points, when big
vertical wave loads acted on the visor, and that there were heavy noises.

4) When the deck hinges had failed and the lifting pistons were loose, it is alleged that the
visor moved forward and rested on the inner ramp and tried to push open the inner ramp
from aft.

5) It is alleged that the recess of the ramp at the top of the visor now pushed forward the ramp,
which then was dislodged from two hooks and four side locking pins/bolts. This is estimated
to have been taken place at about 01.13 hrs.

6) After the ramp had been dislodged from its locks, it is alleged that the ramp shifted forward
to a partly open position and little water flowed in. The time for this alleged event is at 01.15
hrs, when it was observed by 3/E on the VDU of the garage in the ECR.

7) Soon thereafter the visor was lost and the ramp was pulled fully open. A lot of water could
now enter the car deck.

8) The garage filled up with 300-600 tonnes of water per minute and after a couple of minutes
the ship heeled 20° (when there was 1 000 tonnes of water on the car deck).

9) This led to the sinking & eventual loss of M.V.Estonia.

Herald of Free Enterprise – March 1987

In March 1987 the roll-on/roll-off passenger ferry Herald of Free Enterprise

capsized and sank shortly after leaving Zeebrugge in Belgium. The
accident occurred because the bow door was left open when the ship left
port allowing water to enter and flood the car deck. The accident resulted in
the deaths of 193 passengers and crew members.
Shortly after the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987, the United
Kingdom came to IMO with a request that a series of emergency measures
by considered for adoption.

Extract from formal Investigation & court ruling

On the 6th March 1987 the Roll on/Roll off passenger and freight ferry HERALD OF FREE
ENTERPRISE under the command of Captain David Lewry sailed from Number 12 berth in
the inner harbour at Zeebrugge at 18.05 G.M.T. The HERALD was manned by a crew of 80
hands all told and was laden with 81 cars, 47 freight vehicles and three other vehicles.
Approximately 459 passengers had embarked for the voyage to Dover, which they expected
to be completed without incident in the prevailing good weather. There was a light easterly
breeze and very little sea or swell. The HERALD passed the outer mole at 18.24. She
capsized about four minutes later. During the final moments the HERALD turned rapidly to
starboard and was prevented from sinking totally by reason only that her port side took the
ground in shallow water. The HERALD came to rest on a heading of 136o with her starboard
side above the surface. Water rapidly filled the ship below the surface level with the result
that not less than 150 passengers and 38 members of the crew lost their lives. Many others
were injured, The position in which the HERALD came to rest was less than 7 cables from
the harbour entrance and was latitude 22 o 28.5' North, longitude 3 o 11.4' East.
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned
shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Report, that the capsizing of the HERALD
OF FREE ENTERPRISE was partly caused or contributed to by serious negligence in the
discharge of their duties by Captain David Lewry (Master), Mr. Leslie Sabel (Chief Officer) and
Mr. Mark Victor Stanley (Assistant bosun), and partly caused or contributed to by the fault of
Townsend Car Ferries Limited (the Owners).
The court suspends the certificate of the said Captain David Lewry for a period of one year
from the 24th July 1987. The Court suspends the certificate of the said Mr. Leslie Sabel for a
period of two years from the 24th July 1987.

Solas Amendments following the Herald of Free Enterprise Disaster in

March 1987
The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) adopted the first package of amendments
to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in April
1988. Following amendments have been made as a result of this & some further
meetings in this regard:
1)A new regulation requiring indicators on the navigating bridge for all doors
which, if left open, could lead to major flooding of a special category space or a ro-
ro cargo space, as well as means such as monitoring to detect water leakage.
(Chapter II-1 Reg 23-2)
2) Another new regulation required monitoring of special category and ro-ro spaces
to detect undue movement of vehicles in adverse weather, fire, the presence of
water or unauthorized access by passengers whilst the ship is underway. (Chapter
II-1 Reg 23-2)
3) Another amendment dealt with provision of supplementary emergency lighting
for ro-ro passenger ships. (Chapter II-1 Reg 42-1)

The amendments entered into force on 22 October 1989, 18 months after adoption,
the minimum time period allowed under SOLAS.
Further amendments were adopted in October 1988 at a
special MSC session requested and paid for by the United
Kingdom. The amendments adopted entered into force on 29 April
1990 and have become known as the "SOLAS 90" standard,
relating to the stability of passenger ships in the damaged
condition.

1) The amendment applied to ships built after 29 April 1990 and stipulated that the
maximum angle of heel after flooding but before equalization shall not exceed 15
degrees. (Chapter II-1 Reg 8)

2) A further amendment addressed intact stability, requiring masters to be supplied

with data necessary to maintain sufficient intact stability, including information
showing the influence of various trims, taking into account operational limits.
(Chapter II-1 Reg 8)
3) Another amendment added a new regulation requiring cargo loading doors to be
locked before the ship proceeds on any voyage and to remain closed until the ship
is at its next berth. (Chapter II-1 Reg 20-1)
4) Another amendment required a lightweight survey must be carried out to
passenger ships to verify any changes in lightweight displacement and the
longitudinal centre of gravity, at periods not exceeding five years.
(Chapter II-1 Reg 22)
Further amendments to SOLAS
1)From 1 February 1992 new ships have had to be equipped with power-operated
sliding doors, except in specific cases, which must be capable of being closed from
a console on the bridge in not more than 60 seconds. All watertight doors must be
kept closed except in exceptional circumstances. (Chapter II-1 Reg 15)
2) In May 1990, new amendments relating to the subdivision and damage stability
of cargo ships (including freight-only ro-ro ships) were adopted, applying to ships
of 100 metres or more in length built after 1 February 1992. The amendments were
based upon the so-called "probabilistic" concept of survival, originally developed
through study of data relating to collisions collected by IMO. (Chapter II-1 Reg 25-
1 , IMO res A684(17))
3) A series of amendments relating to safe stowage and securing of cargoes were
adopted in May 1991, with a revised SOLAS chapter VI Carriage of cargoes
entering into force on 1 January 1994. The new chapter refers to the Code of Safe
Practice for Cargo Stowage and Securing, which includes a number of annexes
dealing with such "problem" cargoes as wheel-based cargoes and unit loads, both
of which are carried on ro-ro ships. (Chapter VI Reg 5)

SOLAS AMENDMENT CONCERNING COLLISION BULKHEAD ON RO RO SHIPS

IN RESPONSE TO ESTONIA DISASTER (Chapter II-1 Reg 10)

A)Where a long forward superstructure is fitted, the collision bulkhead

should be extended weathertight to the deck next above the bulkhead deck.

B)The extension need not be fitted directly above the bulkhead below
provided that all parts of the extension, including any part
of the ramp attached to it are located within the limits prescribed, so that
the part of the deck which forms the step is made effectively weathertight.

C)The extension should be so arranged as to preclude the possibility of the

bow door or ramp, where fitted, causing damage to it in the case of
damage to, or detachment of, a bow door or any part of the ramp.

D) Ramps not meeting the above requirements shall be disregarded as an

extension of the collision bulkhead.