G.R. No.
L-19450 May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos,
Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of
Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court
of said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de
parte. The complainant in the same case was
represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance
as such, was that every time he would appear at the
trial of the case, he would be considered on official
leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City
Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by
the counsel for the accused, invoking the case
of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that
"when an attorney had been appointed to the position
of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in
private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP
Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney
Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On
December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining
the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused
presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting
as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking
Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls
under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion
by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further
stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in
private law practice. This Order was appealed to the
CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U.
Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20,
1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief.
There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the
right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her
interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court
provides that in the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule
appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as
an agent or friend of the offended party. It
does not appear that he was being paid for his
services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or
intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of
Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of
criminal cases coming from Alaminos are
handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo.
There could be no possible conflict in the duties
of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private
prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other
hand, as already pointed out, the offended
party in this criminal case had a right to be
represented by an agent or a friend to protect
her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that
Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the
offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the
Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna,
allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as
private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant
proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being
without merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned
trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we
consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense
counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32
of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing
as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
private practice. We believe that the isolated
appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation
of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance
as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. The following observation of the Solicitor General
is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or
in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the
decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001]
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs.ATTY.
MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati
City,respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent
Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested
the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo,
for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his
cousin, NarcisaNaldozaLadaga, in Criminal Case No.
84885, entitled People vs. NarcisaNaldozaLadaga for
Falsification of Public Document pending before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
40.[1] While respondents letter-request was pending
action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court
Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting
for a certification with regard to respondents authority
to appear as counsel for the accused in the said
criminal case.[2] On September 7, 1998, the Office of
the Court Administrator referred the matter to
respondent for comment.[3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998,
respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal
Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He
reasoned out that the factual circumstances
surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle
the defense of his cousin who did not have enough
resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte;
while, on the other hand, private complainant was a
member of a powerful family who was out to get even
with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his
appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his
office nor the interest of the public since he did not
take advantage of his position. In any case, his
appearances in court were covered by leave application
approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a
resolution denying respondents request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing the
Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges
against him for appearing in court without the required
authorization from the Court.[5] On January 25, 1999,
the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2)
of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws,
the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities
related thereto.- Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall
not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, Provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we
required respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he
and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who belong to
a powerless family from the impoverished town of
Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he
finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always
supported and guided him while he looked up to her as
a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close
relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and
advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No.
84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa
Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said
criminal case was to seek vengeance on her cousin. He
explained that his cousins discord with Ms. Andres
started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres,
left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms.
Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4
Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The
birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of
the falsification charge against Ms.
Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only
lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept
Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not
have enough funds to pay for the services of a
lawyer.Respondent also pointed out that in his seven
(7) years of untainted government service, initially
with the Commission on Human Rights and now with
the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty
and integrity and that it was only in this particular case
that he had been administratively charged for
extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a
free legal assistance for humanitarian purpose. He
never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of
court since the questioned appearances were made in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in
Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that
during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on
leave as shown by his approved leave applications
attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted
respondents comment and referred the administrative
matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge
Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared
as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin,
NarcisaNaldozaLadaga, an accused in Criminal Case
No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before
the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the
appearance of said respondent in said case was
without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the
occasions that the respondent appeared as such
counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on
official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case
he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro
bonocounsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-
client NarcisaLadaga herself positively declared that
the respondent did not receive a single centavo from
her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the
only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her
out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time
that respondent ever handled a case for a member of
his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared
for free and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware
of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of
this, during all the years that he has been in
government service, he has maintained his integrity
and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the
respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without
first securing permission from the court, and
considering that this is his first time to do it coupled
with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee
and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it
is hereby respectfully recommended that he be
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition
of such act would be dealt with more severely.[6]
We agree with the recommendation of the
investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants
from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec.
35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the
private practice of their profession. The said section
reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge
or other official or employee of the superior courts or
of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that private
practice of a profession, specifically the law profession
in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an
isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we
explained the meaning of the term private practice
prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City
Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice
is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,
647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is
not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The following observation of
the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for a compensation, as
a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the
isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885
does not constitute the private practice of the law
profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court
appearances did not amount to a private practice of
law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor
from the head of the Department, which is this Court
as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage
directly in anyprivate business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertakingwithout a
written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees
whose duties and responsibilities require that their
entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities,
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed
by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any
way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And
provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in
the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties,
or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management
of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors.[9]
Respondent entered his appearance and attended
court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-
15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5,
1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true
that he filed leave applications corresponding to the
dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to
obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to which
respondent is assigned is not the head of the
Department contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition
of such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
Feb
rua
ry
19,
200
8
x-----------------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a
lot[1] and the building erected thereon located at 959
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and
brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the
possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio
Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter
ignored demands for them to vacate the premises.
Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in
theLupongTagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of
the 5thDistrict of Manila[4] where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay
723, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification
for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for
ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint,[6]claiming
that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his
duties aspunong barangay was to hear complaints
referred to the barangays LupongTagapamayapa. As
such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio
against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he
performed his task with utmost objectivity, without
bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The
parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their
dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment
case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal
assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed
and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent
injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to
thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective
position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the
parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to
discipline respondent.[7]
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent
admitted that, aspunong barangay, he presided over
the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor.
Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and
Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by
Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared
and signed pleadings including the answer with
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice
of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not,
after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which
he intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent
contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of
RA 6713:[8]
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and
Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public
official ands employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other
activities related thereto. Public
officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private
practice of profession
unless authorized by the
Constitution or law,
provided that such practice
will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official
functions; xxx (emphasis
supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondents
violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD
THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND,PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD
recommended the respondents suspension from the
practice of law for one month with a stern warning that
the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.[9] This was adopted and approved
by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the
transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO
FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection with any
matter in which he intervened while in said service.
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which [they] had intervened while
in said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong
barangay at the time he committed the act complained
of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA
6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF
ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public
officials and employees, during their incumbency, from
engaging in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions. This is the general law
which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section
90 of RA 7160[12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of
Profession. (a) All governors, city and
municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging
in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local
chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may
practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during
session hours: Provided,
Thatsanggunian members who
are members of the Bar shall
not:
(1) Appear as counsel
before any court in any civil
case wherein a local
government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of
the government is the adverse
party;
(2) Appear as counsel
in any criminal case wherein
 an officer or employee of the
national or local government is
accused of an offense
committed in relation to his
office;
(3) Collect any fee for
their appearance in
administrative proceedings
involving the local government
unit of which he is an official;
and
(4) Use property and
personnel of the Government
except when
the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may
practice their profession even
during official hours of work
only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the
officials concerned do not
derive monetary compensation
therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies
specifically to the practice of profession by elective
local officials. As a special law with a definite scope
(that is, the practice of profession by elective local
officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2)
of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private
practice of profession by public officials and
employees. Lex specialibusderogatgeneralibus.[13]
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and
members of the sangguniangpanlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniangpanlungsod for cities; the
municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniangbayan for municipalities
and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of
the sangguniangkabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city
mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should
therefore devote all their time and attention to the
performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of
the sangguniangpanlalawigan, sangguniangpanlungsod
or sangguniangbayanmay practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours. In other words, they may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools outside their session hours.
Unlikegovernors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members of
thesangguniangpanlalawigan, sangguniangpanlungsod
orsangguniangbayan are required to hold regular
sessions only at least once a week.[14] Since the law
itself grants them the authority to practice their
professions, engage in any occupation or teach in
schools outside session hours, there is no longer any
need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of
these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local
elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly
subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice
their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of
the sangguniangbarangay.Expressiouniusestexclusioalt
erius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition,
the presumption is that they are allowed to practice
their profession. And this stands to reason because
they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact,
the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular
sessions only twice a month.[16]
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent
was not forbidden to practice his profession. However,
he should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT
A civil service officer or employee whose
responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private
practice of law only with the written permission of the
head of the department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or
employee shall engage directly in
any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural,
or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head
of the Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees
whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed
by the agency to the end that it will
not impair in any way the efficiency of
the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no
permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real
or apparent conflict between his
private interests and public duties, or
in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall
not take part in the management of
the enterprise or become an officer of
the board of directors. (emphasis
supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have
therefore obtained the prior written permission of the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he
entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and
Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey
the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis,
men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to
obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore
the primacy and importance of this duty, it is
enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing
the required written permission, respondent not only
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also
violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
(emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not
complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law
disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics
and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers
may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer
should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.[19]
A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney for violation
of the lawyers oath[20]and/or for breach of the ethics of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is
hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is therefore SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of
law for a period of six months effective from his
receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that
any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to
heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of
respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the
Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the
courts of the land for their information and guidance.
FIRST DIVISION
MANUEL L. LEE, A.C. No. 5281
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
A executed and actually notarized by respondent per
ZCUNA
and
LEON
ARDO
-DE
CAST
RO, J
J.
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 12, 2008
x---------------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000,
complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty.
Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law
and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his
father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed
the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will
contained the forged signatures of CayetanoNoynay
and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its
execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly
bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee,
save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente
Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and
acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965.[1] Complainant, however, pointed out that the
residence certificate[2] of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5,
1962.[3] Furthermore, the signature of the testator was
not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of
donation[4](containing his purported genuine
signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of
his deceased father in the will and in the deed of
donation were in any way (sic) entirely and
diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all
angle[s].[5]
Complainant also questioned the absence of
notation of the residence certificates of the purported
witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their
signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied
from their respective voters affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of
such purported will was on file in the archives division
of the Records Management and Archives Office of the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
In this connection, the certification of the chief of the
archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1,
Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT
executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on
June 30, 1965 and is available in
this Office[s] files.[6]
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001
claimed that the complaint against him contained false
allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the
decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in
question was fake and spurious. He alleged that
complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee,
Sr. and the last will and testament was validly
affidavit[7] of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of
Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint
affidavit[8] of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely
Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx.[9]
Respondent further stated that the complaint
was filed simply to harass him because the criminal
case filed by complainant against him in the Office of
the Ombudsman did not prosper.

Respondent did not dispute complainants
contention that no copy of the will was on file in the
archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy
of the contested will could be found there because
none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that
complainant had no valid cause of action against him
as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the
declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share
in the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[10]
In his report, the investigating commissioner found
respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of
the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised
Administrative Code. The violation constituted an
infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon
1[11] and Rule 1.01[12] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).[13] Thus, the investigating
commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the suspension of respondent for a
period of three months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution
No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering
Respondents failure to comply with the
laws in the discharge of his function as
a notary public, Atty. Regino B.
Tambago is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for one year and
Respondents notarial commission
is Revoked and
Disqualified from reappointment as
Notary Public for two (2) years.[14]
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take
effect after his death.[15] A will may either be notarial
or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that
must be followed in the execution of wills. The object
of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee
their truth and authenticity.[16]
A notarial will, as the contested will in this
case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should
be attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.[17]
The will in question was attested by only two
witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance
alone, the will must be considered void.[18] This is in
consonance with the PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE
LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE
HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT rule that acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes
their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.[19] The importance of this
requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was
segregated from the other requirements under Article
805 and embodied in a distinct and separate
provision.[20]
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It
involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signatory actually declares to the notary public that the
same is his or her own free act and deed.[21] The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold
purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long
after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be
done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment
of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially
complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of
the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the
testators old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These
omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested
will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the
formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we
held in Santiago v. Rafanan:[22]
The Notarial Law is explicit on
the obligations and duties of notaries
public. They are required to certify that
the party to every document
acknowledged before him had
presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the
residence tax); and to enter its
number, place of issue and date as
part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be
disregarded, considering the degree of importance and
evidentiary weight attached to notarized
documents.[23] A notary public, especially a
lawyer,[24] is bound to strictly observe these
elementary requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the
exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization
of a document or instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to
notation of payment of [cedula]
residence tax. Every contract, deed, or
other document acknowledged before a
notary public shall have certified
thereon that the parties thereto have
presented their proper [cedula]
residence certificate or are exempt
from the [cedula] residence tax, and
there shall be entered by the notary
public as a part of such certificate the
number, place of issue, and date of
 each [cedula] residence certificate as
aforesaid.[25]
The importance of such act was further
reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax
Act[26] which stated:
When a person liable to the taxes
prescribed in this Act acknowledges
any document before a notary public
xxx it shall be the duty of such person
xxx with whom such transaction is had
or business done, to require the
exhibition of the residence certificate
showing payment of the residence
taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the
law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of
the person to whom it is issued, as well as the
payment of residence taxes for the current year. By
having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired
residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with
the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the
Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure
to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates
of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under
the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized
will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witness. The
notary public shall not be required
to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk
of Court.(emphasis supplied)
Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the
archives division a copy of the notarized will was
therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for
having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining
to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law
required the entry of the following matters in the
notarial register, in chronological order:
1. nature of each instrument
executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him;
2. person executing, swearing to,
or acknowledging the instrument;
3. witnesses, if any, to the
signature;
4. date of execution, oath, or
acknowledgment of the
instrument;
5. fees collected by him for his
services as notary;
6. give each entry a consecutive
number; and
7. if the instrument is a contract, a
brief description of the substance
of the instrument.[27]
In an effort to prove that he had complied with
the abovementioned rule, respondent contended that
he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead
the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a
photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his
claim, he presented a photocopy of a
certification[28] stating that the archives division had no
copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It
is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable. The proponent must first prove the
existence and cause of the unavailability of the
original,[29] otherwise, the evidence presented will not
be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondents
notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the
entry of the execution of the will because it failed to
comply with the requirements for the admissibility of
secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondents attempt to
controvert the certification dated September 21,
1999[30] must fail. Not only did he present a mere
photocopy of the certification dated March 15,
2000;[31] its contents did not squarely prove the fact of
entry of the contested will in his notarial register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost
care[32] and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties, otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized
deeds will be undermined.[33]
Defects in the observance of the solemnities
prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This
carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the
importance and delicate nature of a will, considering
that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are
no longer alive to identify the instrument and to
confirm its contents.[34] Accordingly, respondent must
be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will
was seriously compromised as a consequence of his
breach of duty.[35]
In this connection, Section 249 of the old
Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission.
The following derelictions of duty on
the part of a notary public shall, in the
discretion of the proper judge of first
instance, be sufficient ground for the
revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make
the proper entry or entries in
his notarial register touching
his notarial acts in the manner
required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make
the proper notation regarding
cedula certificates.[36]
These gross violations of the law also made
respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer
and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule
138 of the Rules of Court[37] and Canon 1[38] and Rule
1.01[39] of the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the
land.[40] For a lawyer is the servant of the law and
belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted
the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice.[41]
 While the duty to uphold the Constitution and
obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen,
a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic
requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the
law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an
example for others to emulate.[42] Being a lawyer, he is
supposed to be a model in the community in so far as
respect for the law is concerned.[43]
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions.[44] A breach of these conditions justifies
disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A
disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a
finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in
professional misconduct.[45] These sanctions meted out
to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and
reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction.[46] We have held in a number of
cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution[47] and should not be decreed if any
punishment less severe such as reprimand,
suspension, or fine will accomplish the end
desired.[48] The rule then is that disbarment is meted
out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.[49]
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed
in the performance of the elementary duties of his
office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his
duties as Notary Public with due care and with due
regard to the provision of existing law and had
complied with the elementary formalities in the
performance of his duties xxx, we find that he acted
very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question.
Such recklessness warrants the less severe
punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It
is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his
commission[50] and his perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.[51]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B.
Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional
misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2)
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art.
806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old
Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
year and his notarial commissionREVOKED. Because
he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of
him as a notary public and as an officer of the court,
he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all
the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well
as made part of the personal records of respondent.
EN BANC
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232
ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant,
Present:
CORONA, C.J., Subsequently, the Audit Team made the following
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONA
RDO-
DE
CASTR
O,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA,
JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, SERENO,
Presiding Judge and Acting REYES, and
Presiding Judge of the Regional PERLAS-
BERNABE, JJ.
Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato
City and Branch 15, Shariff
Aguak, Maguindanao, respectively, Promulgated:
Respondent. April 10, 2012
x------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for gross
misconduct and dishonesty against respondent
Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj(Judge Indar), Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.
This case originated from reports by the Local Civil
Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received
an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and
orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly
issued by Judge Indar.
To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA
conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak,
Branch 15, where the Audit Team found that the list of
cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila
and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases
received, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak,
Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not
exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The
Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in
the list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars are not
within the series of case numbers recorded in the
docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-
Cotabato.
At the same time, the Audit Team followed-up
Judge Indarscompliance with Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) Jesus Edwin
A. Villasors 1st Indorsement, dated 15 February 2010,
relative to the letter1 of Ms. Miren Galloway, Manager-
Permanent Entry Unit, Australian Embassy, Manila
(Australian Embassy letter), asking confirmation on
the authenticity of Judge Indars decision, dated 23
May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581,
entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling, for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As regards this case,
the Audit Team found that Spec. Proc. No. 06-584
does not exist in the records of cases filed, pending or
disposed by RTC-ShariffAguak.
conclusions:
 1. The list in Annexes A; A-1; A-2 and
A-3 are not found in the list of cases
filed, pending or decided in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch
15, Shariff Aguak [Maguindanao] which
is based in Cotabato City, nor in the
records of the Office of the Clerk of
Court of Regional Trial
Court,Cotabato City;
2. There are apparently decisions of
cases which are spurious, as these did
not pass through the regular process
such as filing, payment of docket fees,
trial, etc. which are now circulating and
being registered in Local Civil
Registrars throughout the country, the
extent of which is any bodys guess;
3. The authenticity of the signatures
appearing thereon could only be
validated by handwriting experts of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
4. The participation of any lower court
officials and/or employees could not be
ascertained except probably through a
more thorough discreet investigation
and or entrapment; [and]
5. There is a possibility
that more of this (sic)
spurious
documents may appear
and cause damage to
the Courts Integrity.2
Meanwhile, in compliance with
DCA Villasors Indorsementand in response to the
Australian Embassy letter, Judge Indarexplained, in a
Letter dated 10 March 2010, that this court is a Court
of General Jurisdiction and can therefore act even on
cases involving Family Relations. Hence, the subject
decision rendered by this Court annulling the marriage
of your client is VALID and she is free to marry.3
In a Memorandum dated 26 April 2010, the OCA
recommended that (1) the matter be docketed as a
regular administrative matter; (2) the matter be
assigned to a Court of Appeals Justice for
Investigation, Report, and Recommendation; and (3)
JudgeIndar be preventively suspended, pending
investigation.
In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En
Banc (1) docketed this administrative matter as A.M.
No. RTJ-10-2232,4and (2) preventively suspended
Judge Indar pending investigation of this case.
The case was initially raffled to
Justice Rodil V. Zalameda of the Court of Appeals,
Manila for investigation. The case was re-raffled to
Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) of the
Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro due to its proximity
to the Regional Trial Courts involved.
Justice Gacutan set the case for hearing on several
dates and sent the corresponding notices of hearing to
Judge Indar at his known addresses, namely, his
official stations in RTC-Cotabatoand RTC-
Shariff Aguak and residence address.
The first notice of hearing dated 21 June 2010, which
was sentvia registered mail and private courier LBC,
scheduled the hearings on 14, 15, and 16 July 2010
and directed Judge Indarto submit in affidavit form his
explanation. The LBC records show that this notice,
which was delivered to Judge Indarsofficial stations,
was received by one Mustapha Randang on 28 June
2010.
The scheduled hearing was postponed and reset to 20,
21 and 22 July 2010. The notice of postponement was
sent to JudgeIndar via registered mail on 6 July 2010
to his official stations and was received again by
Mustapha Randang on 8 July 2010.
Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled
and to submit the affidavit as required. Thus, in an
Order of 23 July 2010, Justice Gacutan directed
Judge Indar to explain his non-appearance, and reset
the hearing to 10 and 11 August 2010. The Order was
sent to his residence address in M. Tan Subdivision,
Gonzalo Javier St., Rosary Heights, Cotabato City. The
LBC report indicated that the Order was received by a
certain Mrs. Asok.
Justice Gacutan also sent a letter dated 23 July 2010
addressed to
Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty. Silongan), Acting
Clerk of Court of RTC-Cotabato, directing her to serve
the notice of hearing scheduled on 10 and 11 August
2010 to Judge Indarand to report the steps taken to
effect service of the same. Atty.Silongan submitted a
Return of Service, informing that the notices sent to
Judge Indar had remained unserved, as the latter
left Cotabato City in April 2010 and his location since
then was unknown.
In a Resolution of 28 September 2010, this Court
directed Justice Gacutan to conduct further
investigation to determine the authenticity of the
questioned decisions allegedly rendered by
Judge Indar annulling certain marriages. The Court
required Justice Gacutan to ascertain whether the
cases were properly filed in court, and who are the
parties responsible for the issuance of the questioned
decisions, and to submit a report thereon within 60
days from receipt of the Resolution.
In compliance with the Courts Resolution,
Justice Gacutandirected the Local Civil Registrars of
Manila and Quezon City and Atty. Silongan to submit
certified true copies of the questioned decisions and to
testify thereon.
Only the Civil Registrars were present during the
hearings on 4 and 5 November 2010. Their testimonies
are summarized as follows:
Testimonies of
Ma. Josefina Encarnacion A. Ocampo,
City Civil Registrar of Manila
TSN, November 4, 2010
As City Civil Registrar, she is mandated
to receive all registered documents
that will affect the status of the person
like the birth, death and marriage
contract, court decrees regarding
annulment, adoption, legitimization,
the affidavit using the surname of the
father, naturalization, the selection of
citizenship, etc. The documents are
forwarded to their office after they are
being registered by the concerned
parties.
In the case of annulment of marriage,
a copy of the decision is submitted to
the Civil Registrar by the one who had
his marriage annulled. Per
administrative order, it is the duty of
the Clerk of Court to furnish them a
copy of the Decision. After the copies
of decisions are submitted to them,
they are mandated to verify the
authenticity of the decision by writing a
verification letter to the Clerk of Court
before making the annotation or
changing the parties status.
She identified the list of cases of
annulment of marriages and petitions
changing status of persons (annexes A-
1 and A-2) which all came from a court
in Cotabato. All the cases listed in A-2
have already been confirmed or
annotated in the records of the Manila
Civil Registry. She affirmed that the
said cases in the list were certified true
by the clerk of court. As their duty to
annotate the said decrees to their
records are merely ministerial, they do
not question the decrees however
peculiar they may seem.
The cases listed in the document
marked as Annex A-2 were also cases
that came from Cotabato City for their
annotation. Although these cases have
been certified true by the Clerk of
Court, their annotation and
confirmation were held in abeyance
due to the on-going investigation of
Judge Indar.
Testimony of Salvador Cario,
Chief of Records Division, City Civil
Registrar of Quezon City
TSN, November 4, 2010
He generally supervises the retrieval of
all the records or documents in their
office. He also signs certified true
copies of birth, marriage contract,
death certificate and certified true
copies of Courts decisions furnished to
them by different courts.
With regards the decisions issued by
the Court in provinces, once the Judge
issued the decision regarding the
annulment, the parties concern should
first register the decision to the Local
Civil Registrar where the court is
situated. After they receive the
decision from the Administrative
Division, they would call or write the
concerned Local Civil Registrar to
authenticate or verify the records. He
identified the cases coming from
aCotabato court that were submitted to
them for annotation.
The subject decisions listed in the
annexes which were decided by a court
in Cotabato City were already
annotated and verified. However he
could not ascertain who from the court
verified the authenticity or existence of
such decisions as he was not the one
who personally called to verify and
authenticate them from the court
where the listed Decisions/Orders
originate.5
The Civil Registrar of Manila submitted copies of
Decisions, Orders and Resolutions, all signed by
Judge Indar, in forty three (43) cases for annulment of
marriage, correction of entry and other similar cases
from RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15. All the decisions
were accompanied by the corresponding Letter of
Atty. Silongan, affirming each of the decisions as true
and authentic based on the records, while thirty six
(36) of such decisions are accompanied by
Atty. Silongans certification affirming the genuineness
of Judge Indars signature affixed on the Decisions.6
On the other hand, the Civil Registrar of Quezon City
submitted twenty five (25) Decisions, Orders, and
Resolutions issued by RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15,
which were transmitted to the Registrars office for
annotation and recording. All the Decisions were
signed by Judge Indar, and accompanied by
Certificates of Finality affirming the genuineness of
JudgeIndars signature appearing above the name of
Judge Cader P.Indar. The Certificates of Finality were
issued by Atty. Silonganand in one case, by Abie Amilil,
the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court.7
Meanwhile, Atty. Silongan, despite notice, failed to
attend the hearing. She explained in a Manifestation of
8 November 2010 that she received the Notice only on
8 November 2010 because she was on leave from 1
October 1 to 30 November 2010. Thus, the hearing
was reset to 11 and 12 January 2011. However, on the
scheduled hearing, Atty. Silongan still failed to appear.
Justice Gacutan sought the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to locate the
whereabouts of Judge Indar, as well as of
Atty. Silongan. After several exchanges of
correspondence, the NBI, in a Letter dated 22 March
2011, provided the residence addresses of both
Judge Indar and Atty.Silongan.
Meanwhile, Judge George C. Jabido (Judge Jabido),
Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch
15, was directed to verify the authenticity of the
records of the subject Decisions and to appear at the
hearing on 29 March 2011. The hearing was canceled
due to the judicial reorganization in the Court of
Appeals.
This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice
Abraham B. Borreta (Justice Borreta) since
Justice Gacutan was reassigned to Manila effective 11
April 2011. Justice Borreta set the hearing on 27 to 29
June 2011. Notices of hearing were sent to
Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan at the addresses
provided by the NBI and at their previous mailing
addresses. The registered mails addressed to
Judge Indar were returned for the following reasons:
(1) addressee out of town, move to another place and
(2) addressee unknown. The Notice sent to
Atty.Silongan was also returned and per LBC report,
the consignee has moved to an unknown address.
Judge Jabido, who was notified of the hearing, testified
that:
In compliance with the directive of the
Investigating Justice to verify the
authenticity of the records of the listed
decisions, judgments and orders, he
issued memos to the officers of the
Court, the Branch Clerk of Court, the
docket clerk, directing them to produce
and secure copies of the minutes and
other documents related therein. He
personally checked the records of the
RTC. The Records of the RTC are bereft
of evidence to show that regular and
 true proceedings were had on these
cases. There is no showing that a
docket fee has been paid for each
corresponding cases. There is also no
showing that the parties were notified
of a scheduled hearing as calendared.
There is also no record that a hearing
was conducted. No stenographic notes
of the actual proceedings were also
made. He could not also determine
when the said cases were submitted
for decision as it was not calendared
for that purpose.8
Judge Jabido also submitted a report, portions of which
read:
The undersigned took extra efforts to
locate any record of the cases involving
the parties as enumerated in the list.
The undersigned even issued
Memorandum to the Branch Clerk of
Court, the docket clerk and other
responsible officers of the Court to
produce and secure copies of any
pleading/documents related to these
cases enumerated in the list but his
efforts proved futile, hence:
a) to this Court, there is no record on
file of all the enumerated cases
contained in the list.
b) to this Court, it is bereft of any
evidence on whether the Hon.
Judge Indar conducted a hearing in
these cases.
xxxx
There is absence of any record showing
compliance of the same. It is hereby
submitted that the manner upon which
the questioned annulment and
correction cases, as contained herein in
the attached list, allegedly decided by
the Hon. Judge Indar were commenced
are clearly doubtful.
Firstly, there is no showing of
compliance on the rules prescribed.
xxxx
There is no showing that a verified
Petition was officially filed in writing
and giving (sic) an opportunity for the
Respondents to be heard by himself or
by counsel. x x x9
To support his findings, Judge Jabido submitted: (1)
copies of the Letters and Memoranda mentioned in the
report; (2) the Calendar of Cases in RTC-Cotabato,
Branch 15, on various dates from the period starting
April 2007 to 20 October 2009; and (3) the Docket
Inventory in Civil Cases, Criminal Cases and Other
Cases for the period of January to December 2009 in
RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15.
Subpoenas were sent to some of the parties in the
questioned decisions, namely: Grace Elizarde Reyes
(Special Case No. 1049), Buenaventura Mojica (Apl.
Proc. No. 08-1931), Marie Christine N. Florendo (Civil
Case No. 519), Jesse Yamson Faune, Jr. (Special Civil
Case 08-2366), Rosemarie Tongson Ramos (Special
Case No. 08-1871) and Melissa Sangan-
Demafelis (Spl. Proc. 07-2262) to determine whether
they filed the petitions for annulment of marriage and
whether proceedings were actually had before
Judge Indars sala in relation to their cases. All the
subpoenas were returned to the Court of Appeals.
In his Report dated 2 September 2011,
Justice Borreta first determined whether the
requirements of due process had been complied with
since there was no proof that Judge Indarpersonally
and actually received any of the notices sent to him in
the course of the investigation.
Justice Borreta differentiated administrative due
process with judicial due process. He stated that while
a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative
proceedings since they rest upon different principles.
Justice Borreta noted that all possible means to locate
JudgeIndar and to personally serve the court notices to
him were resorted to. The notices of hearing were sent
to Judge Indarsknown addresses, namely, his sala in
RTC-Cotabato Branch 14 and RTC-
Shariff Aguak Branch 15, and at his residence address.
However, none of the notices appeared to have been
personally received by Judge Indar.
Notwithstanding, Justice Borreta concluded that the
requirements of due process have been complied with.
JusticeBorreta stated that Judge Indar was aware of a
pending administrative case against him. The notice of
this Courts Resolution of 4 May 2010, preventively
suspending JudgeIndar, was mailed and sent to him at
his sala in RTC-ShariffAguak, Branch 15.
Justice Borreta proceeded to determine
Judge Indarsadministrative liability, and found the
latter guilty of serious misconduct and dishonesty.
According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indars act of
issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases
without complying with the stringent procedural and
substantive requirements of the Rules of Court for
such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the
annulment cases underwent trial, when the records
show no judicial proceedings occurred.
Moreover, Judge Indars act of affirming in writing
before the Australian Embassy the validity of a
decision he allegedly rendered, when in fact that case
does not appear in the courts records, constitutes
dishonesty.
Justice Borreta recommended the dismissal of
Judge Indarfrom service, and the investigation of
Atty. Silongan, who is not included as respondent in
this case, on her participation in the certification of the
authenticity of the spurious Decisions.
The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is
guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.
We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice.
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and
non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases,
clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and
evidence do not strictly apply to administrative
proceedings. Section 3, Rule I of the Uniform Rules
states:
Section 3. Technical Rules in
Administrative
Investigations. Administrative
investigations shall be conducted
without necessarily adhering strictly to
the technical rules of procedure and
 evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings.
In Cornejo v. Gabriel,10 the Court held that notice and
hearing are not indispensable in administrative
investigations, thus:
The fact should not be lost sight of that
we are dealing with an administrative
proceeding and not with a judicial
proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the
leading American writer on
constitutional Law, has well said, due
process of law is not necessarily
judicial process; much of the process
by means of which the Government is
carried on, and the order of society
maintained, is purely executive or
administrative, which is as much due
process of law, as is judicial
process. While a day in court is a
matter of right in judicial
proceedings, in administrative
proceedings it is otherwise since
they rest upon different principles.
In certain proceedings, therefore,
of an administrative character, it
may be stated, without fear of
contradiction, that the right to a
notice and hearing are not
essential to due process of
law. x x x11(Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
It is settled that technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied to administrative
proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.12 It is enough that the party is given the chance
to be heard before the case against him is
decided.13 Otherwise stated, in the application of the
principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the
denial of the opportunity to be heard.14
The Court emphasized in Cornejo15 the Constitutional
precept that public office is a public trust,16 which is
the underlying principle for the relaxation of the
requirements of due process of law in administrative
proceedings, thus:
Again, for this petition to come under
the due process of law prohibition, it
would be necessary to consider an
office as property. It is, however, well
settled in the United States, that a
public office is not property within
the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law,
but is a public trust or
agency.17 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity
to controvert the charges against him. While there is
no proof that Judge Indar personally received the
notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices,
the first two notices of hearing were received by one
Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-
Cotabato, while one of the notices was received by a
certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized
and capable to receive notices on behalf of
Judge Indar.
Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the
administrative investigation against him because aside
from the fact that the Courts Resolution suspending
him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was
reported in major national newspapers.18 Moreover,
Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to
his known addresses. Thus, there was due notice on
Judge Indar of the charges against him. However,
Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation and
appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the
investigation proceeded ex parte in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.19
Public office is a public trust.20 This constitutional
principle requires a judge, like any other public servant
and more so because of his exalted position in the
Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of
honesty and integrity.21 As the visible representation
of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge
should conduct himself at all times in a manner that
would merit the respect and confidence of the
people.22
Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these
exacting standards.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez,23 the
Courtexplained the difference between simple
misconduct and grave misconduct, thus:
The Court defines misconduct as a
transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must
be established by substantial evidence.
As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in a
charge of grave misconduct.
In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on
numerousannulment of marriage cases which do not
exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1)
proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2)
docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were
notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4)
hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were
submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team,
the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil
Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in
the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC,
Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court,Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who
had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions
on the questioned annulment of marriage cases,
without any showing that such cases underwent trial
and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential
requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly
constitutes gross misconduct.
The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of
issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without
conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance
not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-
changing consequences but likewise grossly violates
the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not
only that, Judge Indars gross misconduct greatly
undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary and
betrays public trust and confidence in the courts.
Judge Indarsutter lack of moral fitness has no place in
the Judiciary. JudgeIndar deserves nothing less than
dismissal from the service.

The Court defines dishonesty as:
x x x a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.24
In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on
numerousannulment of marriage cases when in fact he
did not conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases.
Not even the filing of the petitions occurred.
Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the
annulment cases complied with the stringent
requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict
statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding
marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
mandates that a judge perform official duties honestly.
As found by the Audit Team, the list of cases submitted
by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City
do not appear in the records of cases received,
pending, or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15,
which Judge Indar presided. The cases do not likewise
exist in the docket books of the Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC-Cotabato. The Audit Team also noted that
the case numbers in the list are not within the series of
case numbers recorded in the docket books of either
RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.
Moreover, Judge Jabido, Acting Presiding Judge of
RTC-ShariffAguak, Branch 15, verified the records of
the trial court and found nothing to show that
proceedings were had on the questioned annulment
cases. There was nothing in the records to show that
(1) petitions were filed; (2) docket fees were paid; (3)
the parties were notified of hearings; (4) hearings
were calendared and actually held; (5) stenographic
notes of the proceedings were taken; and (6) the cases
were submitted for decision.
Among the questioned annulment decrees is
Judge IndarsDecision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec.
Proc. No. 06-581, entitledChona Chanco Aguiling v.
Alan V. Aguiling. Despite the fact that no proceedings
were conducted in the case, Judge Indardeclared
categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy
letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid
and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect,
Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents
of the annulment decree, highlighting
Judge Indars appalling dishonesty.
The Court notes that this is not Judge Indars first
offense. InA.M. No. RTJ-05-1953,25 the Court imposed
on him a fine ofP10,000 for violating Section 5, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary
injunction without any hearing and prior notice to the
parties. In another case, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069,26 the
Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for
committing violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and accordingly fined him P25,000.
Since this is Judge Indars third offense, showing the
depravity of his character and aggravating27 the
serious offenses of gross misconduct and
dishonesty,28 the Court imposes on Judge Indarthe
ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service, with its
accessory penalties, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court.29
This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also
be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him
as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No.
02-9-02-SC.30This Resolution entitled Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special
Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such
Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar,
provides:
Some administrative cases
against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular
and special courts; and the court
officials who are lawyersare based on
grounds which are likewise
grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation
of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or for
such other forms of breaches of
conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline
of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances,
the administrative case shall also
be considered a disciplinary action
against the
respondent justice, judge or court
official concerned as a member of the
Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint
and show cause why he should not also
be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as a member of
the Bar. Judgment in both respects
may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution. (Emphasis
supplied)
Indisputably, Judge Indars gross misconduct and
dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the following
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD
THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful act.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.
In addition, Judge Indars dishonest act of issuing
decisions making it appear that the annulment cases
underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court,
laws, and established jurisprudence violates the
lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court. Such violation is also a ground
for disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct
 in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Samson v. Caballero,31 where the Court
automatically disbarred the respondent judge,
pursuant to the provisions ofAM. No. 02-9-02-SC, the
Court held:
Under the same rule, a respondent
may forthwith be required to comment
on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as member of the Bar. The
rule does not make it mandatory,
before respondent may be held liable
as a member of the bar, that
respondent be required to comment on
and show cause why he should not be
disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer
separately from the order for him to
comment on why he should not be held
administratively liable as a member of
the bench. In other words, an order to
comment on the complaint is an order
to give an explanation on why he
should not be held administratively
liable not only as a member of the
bench but also as a member of the bar.
This is the fair and reasonable meaning
of automatic conversion of
administrative cases against justices
and judges to disciplinary proceedings
against them as lawyers. This will also
serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-
SC to avoid the duplication or
unnecessary replication of actions by
treating an administrative complaint
filed against a member of the bench
also as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a lawyer by mere
operation of the rule. Thus, a
disciplinary proceeding as a member of
the bar is impliedly instituted with the
filing of an administrative case against
a justice of theSandiganbayan, Court of
Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a
judge of a first- or second-level court.
It cannot be denied that respondents
dishonesty did not only affect the
image of the judiciary, it also put his
moral character in serious doubt and
rendered him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. Possession of good
moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar
but also a continuing requirement to
the practice of law. If the practice of
law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals,
those counted within its ranks should
not only master its tenets and
principles but should also accord
continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral
character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public
is concerned, than the possession
of legal learning. (Emphasis
supplied)
Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross
misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of
the Lawyers Oath, and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Judge Indar deserves disbarment.
In so far as Atty. Silongan, is concerned, we adopt
JusticeBorretas recommendation to conduct an
investigation on her alleged participation in the
authentication of the questioned Decisions.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent
Judge Cader P.Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Branch 14, CotabatoCity and Acting Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Branch
15, ShariffAguak, Maguindanao, guilty of Gross
Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he
is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
benefits due him, except accrued leave benefits, if any,
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the
government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of
Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his name ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into
Judge Indars record as a member of the bar and notice
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to
investigate Atty. Umaima L. Silongan, Acting Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, on her
alleged participation in the authentication of the
questioned Decisions on the annulment of marriage
cases issued by Judge Indar.
Let copies of this Decision be forwarded to the Local
Civil Registrars of the City of Manila and Quezon City,
the same to form part of the records of Decisions of
Judge Indar on the annulment of marriages filed with
their offices.
This Decision is immediately executory.
436.
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS
HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE
COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have
been commuting to this Court for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners VenancioCastañeda and Nicetas
Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain
machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to
return the machineries or pay definite sums of money.
Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago
vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After
remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a
writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago
moved for a stay of execution but his motion was
denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots
located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised
them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved
to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago
appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the
dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family
house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the
sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the
highest bidders, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson.
Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees
Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court
of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession
to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by
his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance ofQuezon
City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on
the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon
which judgment was rendered against him in the
replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that
Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal
residential house and lots which were levied upon and
sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the
satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their
complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the
replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the
writ of execution was issued only against husband
Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her
husband's venture in the logging business which failed
and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not
benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex
parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of
Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of
sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of
title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from
carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus
arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be
done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On
November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the
Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the
respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in
favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of
possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City
court again issued a temporary restraining order which
it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the
court finally, and for the third time, lifted the
restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and
restoring of the restraining order was being fought in
the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of
May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no
merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute
resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied
on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August
2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying
for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of
Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents
then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1äwphï1.ñët We
dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on
February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of
Appeals where they filed another petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
(CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course to
the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After
hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary
injunction from enforcement of the writ
of possession on and ejectment from
the one-half share in the properties
involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago
dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the
merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and
ordering respondent Court to proceed
with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986
on the merits without unnecessary
delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners
Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for
review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may
not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can
apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately
was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the
restraining order it had previously issued against the
enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it
is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the
enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the
wife was a party in one case and the husband was a
party in another case and a levy on their conjugal
properties was upheld, the petitioners would have
Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin
judgment against her husband for which their conjugal
properties would be answerable. The case invoked is
not at par with the present case. In Comilang the
actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of
the common interest of the spouses; in the present
case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership
benefited from the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the
Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not
issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in
the property is adversely determined, the said
appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The
assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides
living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim
ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant
cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction
sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties.
Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third
person is adversely determined, but that the writ of
possession being a complement of the writ of
execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter
also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the
interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of
the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the
property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is
clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there
has been no change in the ownership of the properties
or of any interest therein from the time the writ of
execution was issued up to the time writ of possession
was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by
Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too late in
the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question
that part of the property is unleviable because it
belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife
is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the
levy was made and the properties advertised for
auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very
properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to
stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at
auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted
to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff
executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when
Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly
admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied
upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in
his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on
May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint
for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that
the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied
upon on the ground that she was not a party to the
logging business and not a party to the replevin suit.
The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the
issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore
discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them
from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review
suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of
possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in
the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago.
This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate
interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal
nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only
upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be
assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught
the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to
protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even
the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses
admittedly live together in the same house 5which is
conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of
possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but
the decision under review would prevent the ejectment
of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be
vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes
continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here;
the decision would actually separate husband and wife,
prevent them from living together, and in effect divide
their conjugal properties during coverture and before
the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the
complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil
case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted
the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist
execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and
from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme
Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their
counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries
for those who seek justice, have tried
to use them to subvert the very ends
of justice.6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty.
Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and
moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing
with candour and honesty his client's
cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and
cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of
his client's position, as in the case at
bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his
client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on
the merit or lack of merit of his case. If
he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden
duty to advise the latter to acquiesce
and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his clients propensity to
litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty
to his client; its primacy is
indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to
use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice,
and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition
of the case below which might again come up to the
appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we
have motuproprio examined the record of civil case Q-
7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find
that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than
11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even
started;
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their
answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a
supplemental complaint where they impleaded new
parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint,
the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended
supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional
new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on
this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the
admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated
April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the suspension
of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the
complaint, supplemental complaint and amended
supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the
reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the
sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses
Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied
was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business
venture that he entered into, which resulted in the
replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether
or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal
property is leviable, is the same issue that we have
already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down
the decision of the Court of Appeals granting
preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which
was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to
the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that
on January 5, 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff,
pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos
of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of
P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of
action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to
allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's
sale of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegal
and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the
Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of
P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the
properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that
there was annotated at the back of the certificates of
title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine
National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the
properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-
19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of
P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37
in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos
suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under
no obligation to require payment of the purchase price
in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the
judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been
filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does
not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23,
Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the
concern of the vendees Castañedas but did not affect
the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is
of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of
P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was
dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no
valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior
judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages
allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts
complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the
fourth cause of action derives its life from the
preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must
necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas
aver that the action was unfounded and as a
consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain
the services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that
because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction
enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the
properties to the Castañedas, they were unlawfully
deprived of the use of the properties from April 17,
1964, the value of such deprived use being 20%
annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the
unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the
pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after
the filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking
advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary
injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and
evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs,
caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of
sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold
to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land
in question; that the purchasers acquired the
properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged
the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife
also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the
Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted
in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of
additional damages caused by the defendants' bad
faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and
transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of
action of the supplemental complaint, which is, the
inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause
damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs.
Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land
they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who
acquired them also in bad faith, while
VenancioCastañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith
sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and
Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith
and with knowledge that the properties are the subject
of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the
first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and
the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of
the cause of action would depend upon the validity of
the first cause of action of the original complaint, for,
the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their
rights of ownership and possession of the properties by
reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by
the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy
and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the
sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that
the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then
the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos,
but, we have already indicated that the issue in the
first cause of action of the original complaint is barred
by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first
cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the
amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the
remaining cause of action in the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals
under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners'
counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble
costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and
Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer,
Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be
made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the
custody of the Clerk of Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS,
complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor
Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged
with malpractice for having published an advertisement
in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads
as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance &
the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of
parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance
service
12 Escolta, Manila,
Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied
having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having
caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence
and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide
himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession."
In further mitigation he alleged that the said
advertisement was published only once in
the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by
reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for
decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was
a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of
his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public.
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of
justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The
most worth and effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code
of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was
suspended from the practice of law for the period of
one month for advertising his services and soliciting
work from the public by writing circular letters. That
case, however, was more serious than this because
there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were
more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not
to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion
and so decided that the respondent should be, as he
hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo,
JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 1053 August 31, 1981
SANTA PANGAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent.
RE S O L U T I O N
DE CASTRO, J.:
On November 29, 1971, Santa Pangan filed before this
Court a verified complaint charging respondent Atty.
Dionisio Ramos with gross immorality, the latter
having misrepresented himself as still "single" when he
started courting complainant, proposed marriage to
her and finally succeeded in marrying her even with
full consciousness that his first marriage to his first
wife was still valid and subsisting. 1 (A Criminal Case
for bigamy was also filed by the complainant against
the respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXI, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15528).
In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied the
material allegations thereof for being without legal or
factual basis. He prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state cause of action against
respondent. 2
The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for report, investigation and recommendation.
On June 1, 1976, the Solicitor General submitted his
report finding respondent Ramos guilty as charged,
with a recommendation for suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years, pursuant
to Section 7, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. 3Subsequently, the corresponding complaint for
his suspension from the practice of law was filed.
On September 13, 1976, respondent filed his answer
to the complaint and moved for the appointment of a
commissioner to hear and take additional evidence in
his behalf, which, however, was denied by the Court
per its Resolution of October 6, 1976. At the hearing of
February 25, 1977, respondent, acting as counsel for
his own behalf, moved for the presentation of
additional evidence, which was, however, opposed by
complainant's counsel on the ground that respondent
is resorting to dilatory tactics. At the hearing of
September 2, 1977, complainant and respondent
appeared and the Court set the hearing of the case for
the purpose of reception of additional evidence before
its Legal Officer-Investigator.
Meanwhile, on September 7, 1979, the Court, speaking
through Justice Felix Antonio, severely REPRIMANDED
respondent Dionisio Ramos, with warning that a
repetition of the same overt act may warrant his
suspension or disbarment from the practice of
law. 4 The reprimand was administered because
respondent used the name "Pedro Dionisio Ramos" in
connection with Criminal Case No. 35906. He averred
that he had a right to do so because in his Birth
Certificate his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos," and his
parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that
the D.D. in "Pedro DD Ramos" is but an abbreviation of
"DionisioDayaw" his other given name and maternal
surname. The Court opined that respondent in effect
resorted to deception. He demonstrated "lack of candor
in dealing with the courts."
At the hearing of October 23, 1979, Solicitor Celia
Reyes appeared submitting the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, in Criminal Case
No. 15528, acquitting respondent of the charges of
bigamy on grounds of insufficiency of evidence, for
having contracted the second marriage with the
complainant.
On January 15, 1980, the Legal Officer-Investigator
submitted his report concurring in the findings of the
Solicitor General, although he recommended a penalty
of a minimum five-year suspension from the practice
of law, with prospect for the imposition of a total
disbarment from the practice of law, as the Court finds
fit and appropriate. 5
On February 27, 1981, counsel for complainant filed its
motion to expedite disposition of the case, further
alleging that respondent Ramos is still using the name
of Pedro Dionisio Ramos and PDD Ramos in two
pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, disregarding the Resolution of this Court dated
September 7, 1979. 6 Commenting, respondent
admitted the allegations of complainant's counsel but
alleged that he signed the pleadings inadvertently
because of poor eyesight.
The facts, as found by the Solicitor General who
investigated the case, and the Legal Officer-
Investigator before whom the additional evidence was
presented, are as follows: Respondent was admitted to
the Philippine Bar in 1964. He was legally married to
and living with EdithaEncarnado the marriage with her
having been celebrated on September 4, 1963. Both
complainant and respondent were officemates in the
Office of Councilor LitoPuyat, City Hall, Manila since
1967. With the convenience thus offered, respondent,
representing himself to be "single," began courting
complainant, proposed civil marriage to her to be later
followed with a church celebration after which they will
live together as husband and wife. From January 1968
to February 1971, they had carnal knowledge of each
other in various hotels in Manila, particularly the
Golden Gate Motel and Salem Motel. Sometime in June
1970, complainant informed respondent that she was
pregnant. Whereupon, both agreed to get a quick
marriage. Accordingly, complainant and respondent
filed their respective applications for a marriage license
(Exhs. "H", "H-1" and "H-2") and based thereon, they
obtained a marriage license issued on June 16, 1970
(Exh. "D") and celebrated their marriage before
Minister Isidro Dizon on June 18, 1970 (Exh. "B").
After the marriage, complainant and respondent
agreed to have a church marriage before they live
together as husband and wife, although they continued
to have sexual trysts. Respondent was invited by
complainant to meet the latter's mother to whom
respondent expressed his desire to marry complainant,
to which proposal complainant's mother agreed,
provided respondent bring his parents with him to ask
for complainant's hand. Several weeks had passed and
respondent failed to bring his parents to complainant's
home. Complainant and her mother became
suspicious. They made inquiries about the personal
status of respondent and they ultimately discovered
that respondent was already married to one
EdithaEncarnado (Exhs. "C" and "E"). After discovering
that respondent was a married man, complainant
resigned from her job as receptionist from the office of
Councilor LitoPuyat. She stopped having intimate
relationship with respondent and because of the
humiliation and embarassment she suffered before her
friends and officemates, she filed the present
disbarment case.
Upon the other-hand, respondent tried to prove,
through his affidavit subscribed before Asst. City Fiscal
PrimitivoPeñaranda of Manila, that he never
misrepresented himself to be "single" and that
complainant knew at the outset of his married status;
that it was purely complainant's wish to carry on a love
affair with him as described in his affidavit; that he
was threatened and forced to sign blank marriage
contract forms and applications for marriage license by
the brothers of the complainant who are allegedly
notorious police characters; that his signature in the
marriage contract (Exh. "B") was forged and falsified;
that the marriage contract was only celebrated as a
cover-up of the pregnancy of the complainant; and
that the disbarment proceedings were initiated by
complainant because he refused to elope with
complainant and abandon his wife EdithaEncarnado
and he stopped giving her money and avoided seeing
her again.
Upon a review of the record, We are convinced that
respondent Dionisio Ramos is guilty of grossly immoral
conduct which warrants proper action from this Court.
His own declarations in his affidavit corroborate this
imputation of immorality. Thus, in his affidavit
subscribed before Asst. Fiscal Primitive Peñaranda of
Manila on Feb. 22, 1967, respondent frankly admitted
having carnal relations with complainant for several
times. What is more, respondent claimed that he was
threatened and forced by complainant's brothers to
celebrate the marriage dated June 18, 1980, but in the
same breath, he admitted having carnal affairs with
complainant after the celebration of the marriage.
Worse still, respondent misrepresented his civil status
as "single", courted complainant, proposed marriage to
her — knowing his legal impediments to marry
complainant, respondent's motives were clearly and
grossly immoral — won her confidence and married her
while his first marriage to his present wife still validly
subsists.
In Villasanta vs. Peralta, 7 where respondent was
disbarred because he made love with complainant,
procured the preparation of a false marriage contract
and arranged a false wedding with complainant while
his first wife was still alive and their marriage still valid
and existing, this Court held: "the act of respondent of
contracting the second marriage (even his act in
making love to another woman while his first wife is
still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity."
It is of importance that members of the ancient and
learned profession of law must conform with the
highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph
29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: "The lawyer should
aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because
deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to
maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve
not only the law but also the administration of
justice." 8
Respondent, however, submits that having been
acquitted by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXI, of the charge of bigamy, the immorality
charges filed against him in this disbarment case
should be dismissed. The acquittal of respondent
Ramos upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law. Moreover, this
Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely
different capacity from that which courts assume in
trying criminal cases. 9
This Court has already severely reprimanded
respondent from using a name other than authorized
name in the "Roll of Attorneys" and was warned that a
repetition of the same overt act may warrant his
suspension of disbarment from office in the future.
Notwithstanding such reprimand and warning,
however, respondent repeated the same overt act of
using an unauthorized name in two pleadings filed
before the Court of First Instance of Manila. His
explanation that he had done so inadvertently because
of poor eyesight appears unsatisfactory. He should
have employed more caution and prudence in filing
pleadings before courts considering the fact that he
had already been warned and reprimanded by this
Court. Respondent's conduct, thus, suggests lack of
candor and respect in his dealing with this Court. He
has violated his oath of office of assuming the duty of
good faith and honorable dealings with the court, of
being respectful to it and of being obedient to its rules
and lawful orders.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent committed a grossly immoral act, as found
both by the Solicitor General and this Court's Legal
Officer-Investigator, and as recommended by the
Solicitor General, respondent is hereby suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years,
for gross immorality, and an additional one (1) year for
his willful disregard of a lawful order against his using
an unauthorized name, in serious disrespect of this
Court.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and
Guerrero, * JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR.,
LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES,
RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L.
SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG,
J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and
JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez &Pecson Law
Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in
1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin
Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from
practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a
law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent
Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten
lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7,
1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He
requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of
Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your
purpose in using the letterhead of another law office."
Not having received any reply, he filed the instant
complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law
firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the
respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie
is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30
cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being
members of the Philippine bar, practising under the
firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or
associates of Baker &Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents'
use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they
could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged
in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents'
memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is
not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E.
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from
practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Plana, J., took no part.
Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are