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Parliamentary hereticization of the Ahmadiyya: The modern world implicated

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Parliamentary Hereticization of the

Ahmadiyya in Pakistan: The Modern
World Implicated in Islamic Crises shortened title used in running headline, please check

Ali Qadir

Although in the international spotlight especially since 2001, Pakistan has been
facing crisis after crisis since its independence from British rule and parti-
tion from India in 1947. As the country was founded explicitly on religious
grounds—a separate homeland for Muslims—these crises have unsurprisingly
revolved around the role of religion in politics. The very first, in 1949, was a
demand to declare the 60-year old Ahmadiyya community (Ahmadis) as non-
Muslim (Editorial 2008), an old issue that acquired new political significance
with regard to citizenship in the new Islamic state. Growing pressure and vio-
lent incidents ultimately led to a constitutional amendment in 1974 declaring
the Ahmadiyya non-Muslims.
The official hereticization of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan by this amendment
has led to its roughly four million adherents suffering structural discrimina-
tion and criminal violence in the country. Ahmadis are barred from calling
themselves Muslim, praying or preaching in the name of Islam, and exhibit-
ing Islamic religiosity publicly—for instance displaying Islamic symbols or
Quranic verses, distributing Islamic literature or calling their places of wor-
ship “mosques” (Mahmud 1995, Siddiq 1995, Friedmann 2003: xiii–xv, Valentine
2008, Saeed 2010). Those accused of “posing” as Muslims can be charged with
blasphemy which, under Pakistani law, is maximally punishable by death. This
has fed waves of public violence, apparently condoned by religious authori-
ties and even by state officials (Al-Islam; Idris 2008; Yusuf 2012). For instance, a
number of prominent clerics and religious political leaders in September 2013
held a nation-wide celebration of the anniversary of passing the second con-
stitutional amendment (Tanveer 2013b). Two weeks later, police succumbed to
clerical pressure and tore down minarets of an Ahmadi place of worship in a
major city in Punjab (Tanveer 2013a).
As a result of the amendment Ahmadis are not only barred from holding the
office of President or Prime Minister but are also forced to vote in elections only
for reserved minority seats, along with other non-Muslim minority populations
in Pakistan like Christians. Being avowedly Muslim, the community has boy-
cotted this categorization, which effectively leads to their disenfranchisement.
Numerous Ahmadis, including the spiritual head of their community, have

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004277793_009

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parliamentary hereticization of the ahmadiyya in pakistan 131

migrated from Pakistan, often facing discrimination and violence elsewhere in

Muslim-majority countries, for instance in Bangladesh (Correspondent 2010),
Indonesia (msa 2011, Nurbaiti 2011), and even Kyrgyzstan (rfe/rl 2011). They
have been steadfastly excluded by Muslims in representative councils and the
like in Muslim minority countries (for instance the Contact Body for Muslims
in the Netherlands, the Islamic Society of Finland, United Islamic Communities
in Sweden, or the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, to name a few). Ahmadis
also have been subject to discrimination in Saudi Arabia (Fataawa; ai 2007;
A. Khan 2008), where they have been banned from the Islamic pilgrimage to
Mecca (a religious duty of all Muslims).
The obvious disconnect between the Pakistani constitutional amendment
and international norms on human rights (e.g. A.M. Khan 2003), makes it a puz-
zle how a modern nation could justify such a step. In particular, the question
arises of how these decisions could be legitimated. Consequently, this chapter
asks how policy makers justified and legitimated the constitutional amend-
ment, analyzing what worldviews and background understandings informed
their discourses. Accordingly, I discursively analyze the arguments used in
the newly declassified parliamentary hearing of 1974. This hearing led to the
constitutional amendment declaring the Ahmadiyya heretics in Pakistan and
banning them from using Muslim symbols (Pakistan 1974). As the only public
record of a national hearing on the issue, this transcript is invaluable for under-
standing the justifications used to hereticize Ahmadiyya in Pakistan. The docu-
ment has been kept secret “in the national interest” since the hearings and was
declassified on legal petition only in 2010 (Hamdani 2012).1 The transcript, now
in the public domain, is legion: 21 volumes with over 3000 pages, mostly in Urdu.
In analyzing the proceedings I employ qualitative discourse analysis in order
to show how far the text is comprised of multiple rhetorical constructions
(Perelman 1982, Wood and Kroger 2000, Howarth and Torfing 2005). My spe-
cific aim is to identify those argumentation patterns in which the reference to
other countries and their policies is used as a means of justification, for exam-
ple as outward demarcation against post-colonial intervention as well as the
maintenance of the inward order of the world of Islam (ummah). My intention
is not to assess the legal or moral validity of the arguments but rather to probe
the implicit discursive frames by which political action is justified. In line with
fundamental principles of qualitative research, I examined the entire corpus

1 A version of the record was published earlier privately by the World Council for Protection
of the Finality of Prophethood, prefaced as part of ongoing polemics. It can now be verified
that this version differs from the official transcript. Maulana Allah Wasaiya, Parliament mein
Qadiani Shikast [Defeat of Qadianis in Parliament] (Lahore: Ilmo Irfan Publishers, 2000).
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132 qadir

of the parliamentary hearing documents and identified references beyond the

Pakistani context. These examples demonstrate how far policy makers embed-
ded international references in their ideational legitimation of Pakistani poli-
tics. I inductively categorized these references according to the context of their
occurrence. The result is a corpus of classifications that is used in justifying the
hereticization of Ahmadis in the 1974 parliamentary hearing. These relate to
(i) the British and jihad, (ii) international conspiracies, (iii) the world of Islam,
(iv) the sovereign nation, and (v) what other countries and non-governmental
organizations do.
Most accounts of the hereticizing of the Ahmadiyya are caught up in a
methodological nationalist paradigm whereby the Ahmadiyya issue is consid-
ered a Pakistani problem with peculiarly national causes, such as realpolitik,
and with local ramifications (Mahmud 1995, Siddiq 1995, Saeed 2007, A.H. Khan
2012, N. Khan 2012). Such accounts are useful in highlighting many issues
regarding the relation of religion and politics, and it is true that the nation-state
is a useful unit of analysis for many purposes. But my research demonstrates
that references to and links with the wider world are important for under-
standing the hereticizing of the Ahmadiyya. If it is assumed that the state is
a pre-analytical given entity, it is too easy to overlook the fact that the nation-
state itself is a transnational model of political organization. My research helps
to overcome this shortcoming. In fact, a careful analysis of the justifications
used when officially hereticizing Ahmadis has never been made. Thus this
chapter explicitly focuses on the discursive process of policy making in this
regard, highlighting how the wider world was brought into the national polit-
ical agenda as an exogenous horizon of legitimation. One common aspect to
this “domestication,” or taming, of institutionalized patterns is to make cross-
national comparisons in order to justify an argument and convince others. As
pointed out by Alasuutari (2011: 231), “cross-national comparisons are part and
parcel of both constructing problems and suggesting solutions to them.” His-
torical trajectories are rhetorically created in the process, both connecting an
issue with the world and yet maintaining a sense of national uniqueness of how
this is “our” problem requiring “our” solution. The contours of such construc-
tions need to be investigated qualitatively case by case, and there has been little
research on this around Islam and politics.
As Vivien Schmidt (2008) argues, both ideas and the processes of their
communication in a policy setting are crucial for understanding action in
institutional contexts. In discursive institutionalism—the approach broadly
adopted here—institutions are not static external structures whose rules peo-
ple more or less unthinkingly follow. Rather, they are simultaneously “con-
straints” and “constructs” dynamically internalized and re-molded by agents
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in a “meaning-context.” This version of discursive institutionalism is related to

sociological new institutionalism, emphasizing the norm-driven constitution
of actors in the world society (Meyer et al. 1997, Schofer et al. 2012). Drawing
on these insights from discursive institutionalism, I propose three hypothe-
ses to be tested by qualitative examination of the parliamentary justifications
for hereticization of the Ahmadiyya. First, that cross-national references are
crucial to the justification of the amendment, and not just incidental tag-
ons to other arguments. Second, that these references identify Pakistan with
“civilized” nations in the world polity, all of whom apparently protect their
“national interests” in some way. Third, that the cross-national and world-level
references build a sense of nationhood by way of exclusion, or Othering, of
the Ahmadiyya in aspects perceived as central to Pakistani nation-building.
This will be demonstrated in three steps. First, I offer a brief introduction to
the Ahmadiyyat and the 1974 parliamentary hearing. The following section
presents the key results of the research, identifying the categories of analysis.
In each category I provide an illustrative selection of quotes from the commit-
tee record that demonstrates the breadth of the justifications. Finally, by way of
conclusion, I argue that the construction of the Ahmadiyya “crisis” in Pakistan
is not a case of isolated, nationalist policy, but is rather transnationally embed-
ded. This has implications for how we understand the relationship between
nation-states, “national” policies and transnational precedents and develop-
ments.

The Ahmadiyya “Crisis” in Pakistan

Ahmadiyyat was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1889 as an Islamic reform

movement in the town of Qadian in British-ruled Punjab, now in India. The
movement quickly became controversial in the sub-continent primarily due to
Mirza Ahmad’s claim to “prophethood,” allegedly violating a deeply held belief
among Muslims that Muhammad was the last of the prophets sent by God.
The Ahmadi response to this rests on a theological point that space precludes
proper attention to here.2 Shortly after Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s death in 1908,

2 Briefly, the response rests on differentiation between “prophet” and “messenger” (reflection
of prophet), and interpretation of the Arabic word ascribed to the finality of Prophet Muham-
mad as the “seal” of the prophets. For fuller clarifications see, e.g., Friedmann (2003, chs. 2 and
6) and Valentine (2008, chs. 6 and 9). A South African Supreme Court judgment declaring
Lahori Ahmadis as Muslims provides a comprehensive and accessible summary of Ahmadi
responses. See: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat Islam Lahore (South Africa) Ismail Peck vs The
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134 qadir

a smaller organization, known as the “Lahori group,” split off from the main
community on theological differences.
Although challenges had emerged from religious clerics since 1890, popu-
lar and political opinion in the early days was not all hostile to Ahmadis. The
Indian Muslim League leader and founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jin-
nah, declared that all those calling themselves “Muslims” would be treated as
such in the new Islamic nation and, therefore, that Ahmadis were to be con-
sidered Muslims (e.g. in a statement in Srinagar, Kashmir on May 23, 1944).
After Pakistan was formed in 1947, the Ahmadiyya leader at the time, Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad’s son, led the community out of its birthplace in Qadian to
Lahore in Pakistan, and shortly thereafter to a new city planned on land pur-
chased nearby by the Ahmadiyya. The new “Islamic” republic gave space to
challenge religious claims, and in 1949 the militant Deobandi Sunni organi-
zation Ahrar mobilized its decades-old demand that Ahmadis be officially
declared heretics. After the Ahrar demand was unsuccessful an All Pakistan
Muslim Parties Convention of clerics was held in the city of Karachi in 1953,
where it was decided to take “direct action” to declare Ahmadis non-Muslims
(Friedmann 2003: 40). Shortly thereafter, demonstrations in Lahore were orga-
nized by Jamaʾat-e-Islami, the leading Islamic political party in Pakistan, and
these quickly became violent. The Lahore Riots of 1953 involved looting, arson
and murder of at least 200 Ahmadis, and eventually required three months of
martial law over the city to be brought under control.
The riots did not lead to Ahmadis being declared non-Muslims by the state,
but the 1953 crisis simmered, with growing numbers of Ahmadis being perse-
cuted across Pakistan. The crisis was revived under the rule of center-left Prime
Minister Zulfiqar Bhutto when a new constitution was prepared in 1973. In the
vividly recalled backdrop of 1953, violence burst out once more in May 1974 and
religious parties again demanded that the state hereticize the Ahmadiyya. The
government tried to postpone the matter but quickly capitulated in the face of
a general strike, and the prime minister called a special committee compris-
ing the whole parliament on June 30, 1974 to make a recommendation on the
Ahmadiyya “issue.” These proceedings were held in-camera (no public gallery
and confidential transcripts) from August 5 to September 7. The committee
delivered a unanimous recommendation on September 7, 1974 for a constitu-
tional amendment, and the National Assembly and Senate both approved it
unanimously the same day.

Muslim Judicial Council and Others. 1985. In The Light and Islamic Review, October–December
2010: The Supreme Court of South Africa, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division.
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parliamentary hereticization of the ahmadiyya in pakistan 135

The Second Constitutional Amendment of Pakistan declared the Ahmadiy-

ya non-Muslim, to be treated as non-Muslim minorities under constitutional
law, thereby invalidating Ahmadi claims to be Muslims. Informal persecu-
tion of the Ahmadiyya continued until, in 1984, the military dictator Zia-ul-
Haq promulgated Presidential Ordinance xx declaring most Ahmadi religious
activities to be criminal offences. The Ordinance gave “teeth” to the consti-
tutional amendment, allowing prosecution of Ahmadis and legal cover for
those violating Ahmadi life and property (Valentine 2008: 230). The Ordi-
nance’s legal provisions lean on the second constitutional amendment of 1974
as discussed and proposed by the special committee of the whole Assem-
bly.
The record of the special committee hearing is unique in many ways. A
close reading of the transcript shows that in the more than 3,000 pages there
is, in fact, no a debate at all: not a single dissenting voice from any member
of the special committee. The committee also summoned the leader of the
Ahmadiyya (Mirza Nasir Ahmad, grandson of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad) and wit-
ness for the Lahori group (Abdul Mannan Omar). These representatives were
cross-examined at length to defend their claims to be called Muslims. In this
format, 13 volumes of the record of the committee read like a court proceeding
with “cross-examination” of “witnesses” by the Attorney General of Pakistan,
while the last eight volumes comprise statements by committee members. Cen-
tral to the argument by all committee members and the prosecution by the
Attorney General is the “crisis” created by recent violence in May 1974 and the
Lahore Riots of 1953.
Much of this may make the hearing sound like a formality to lend pub-
lic credibility to a decision already taken politically to declare Ahmadis non-
Muslims. Yet, the justifications provided by accusers and the witnesses remain
as genuine as can be supposed in any public record. How speakers support their
arguments and the rationales through which they defend their proposal indi-
cate the frames implicit in their rhetoric. These arguments are crucial to the
narration of a violent crisis and the seemingly obvious conclusion to be drawn
from it. The committee record is thus a window into the public justifications
that remain valid even outside the confines of the hearing.

Justifying the Declaration of “Heresy”: References to Other

Countries

All 149 mentions of other nations found in the proceedings can be readily
categorized into one or more of these modes. The examples given below are
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136 qadir

not intended to prove the categorization, but are rather chosen to illustrate the
variation within each mode.

The British and Jihad

In 1974 many committee members had vivid memories of colonial rule, besides
having just emerged from an 11-year military dictatorship in Pakistan whose
explicit goal was nation-building to recover from the effects of colonial sub-
servience (as presented by the military ruler, e.g. M.A. Khan 1960: 555). Most of
the members’ references to Britain appear in the context of a charge of colo-
nial collusion by the Ahmadis to perpetuate and support British rule in India.
This is obvious in the primary statement signed by 37 members (two volumes
long) against Ahmadiyyat, for instance: “The first thing is that Mirza [Ghulam
Ahmad] and his followers are tools of European colonization … They declare
themselves without hesitation to be the seed planted by the British, to be the
family faithfuls [servants] of the British” (Pakistan 1974: 2017).3 The narrative
constructs the Ahmadiyya as a creation of the British empire to neutralize the
“fervor” of Muslim jihad [holy war] against non-Muslim rule in India and across
the world under their infamous policy of “divide and rule” (Pakistan 1974: 2019–
2025). The notion is that the Ahmadiyya do this by devaluing armed conflict
against colonizers, as well as by supporting British rule in India and by destabi-
lizing Islamic unity by challenging one of its most cherished beliefs: the finality
of prophethood with Muhammad. This criticism against the Ahmadiyya builds
on Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s use of Quranic verses and theology to lay empha-
sis on the “inner” jihad against one’s personal evils over military action against
“infidels.”
In rhetorically presenting such a unified narrative, the statement brings Pak-
istan onto the stage of world history, in this case as a victim of colonization
by Britain. Aside from this implicit invocation of the world by way of history,
speakers also relate to specific examples, such as European imperialism in the
last half of the 18th century and the British captures of Iraq and Turkey (Pak-
istan 1974: 2018, 2042). An oft-repeated charge in this context is that “when the
Turks were defeated in the first world war, when the British captured Baghdad,
there were candlelight celebrations4 in Qadian on this victory” (Pakistan 1974:
2043). This quotation from the report of the Munir Commission, established to
investigate the Lahore Riots of 1953, is used throughout the committee hearing.

3 Most of the committee text, and the quotations in this chapter, are in Urdu and have been
translated by the author.
4 A traditional form of celebration in South Asia by lighting candles and oil lamps in the night.
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parliamentary hereticization of the ahmadiyya in pakistan 137

Often by virtue of their rhetorical continuity, such narratives tend to project a

similar situation into the present and the future, implying that unless action is
taken the situation will prevail or even strengthen. An imaginative instance of
this is:

Americans themselves write [in Time magazine] that the American cia is
the illegitimate child of the British Home Department … When British
power had to leave its colonies, its captured areas … [t]he powers for
spreading political Westerness, for the supremacy of Western Europe
and Western countries and the Western hemisphere, were automatically
bequeathed from Britain to the American cia.
mp makhdoom nur muhammad, Pakistan 1974: 2816

The World Against Us: International Conspiracies

Discourses implicating the Ahmadi community as at the leading edge of inter-
national conspiracies often feature Israel and India, with whom the community
is supposed to be colluding against Muslims and Pakistan. At a superficial level
of rhetoric, some such mentions are seemingly innocuous, for instance when
the Attorney General questions the Ahmadi leader Mirza Nasir Ahmad by ask-
ing, “Supposing a Jew in Holland or Belgium is engaged by the Israelis as their
spy” to enter Mecca illegally (Pakistan 1974: 65–68).5 His purpose is to build a
protracted legal argument that government officials have a legitimate right to
probe anyone’s claim of being Muslim, but the examples he chooses are quite
suggestive.
More direct points are raised by other members, for instance in the main
joint statement by members accusing Ahmadis of conspiring with Zionists
in Africa—which is, ironically, supported by reference to a British author of
a Cambridge University history text (Pakistan 1974: 2060–2065). “Zionist” is
often equated with “Israeli” throughout the committee record. The presence
of an Ahmadi mission in Palestine since the 1940s, along with its publica-
tions in Hebrew, is taken as proof of “Zionist collusion,” for which “untold mil-
lions” of Rupees have been earned and spent to disrupt Islamic resistance to
Israel (e.g. Pakistan 1974: 2950). Another trope is to compare Ahmadis with
Israel:

These people have taken the shape of Israel, and it is worth considering
and reflecting on the fact that today you cannot erase Israel from history …

5 Non-Muslims are forbidden to enter the cities of Mecca or Medina.

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138 qadir

When the fitnaʾ [test, trial by fire] of Israel was raised, the same situation
arose at that time, they also had this same status. They had no place at
that time. Rabwaʾ [the city of Ahmadis in Pakistan] has this same status
now. Now you see, at some time Israelis demanded their own state.
mp sardar inayat, Pakistan 1974: 2707

While Israel features throughout the record as being at the center of inter-
national conspiracies that Ahmadis are supposed to be colluding with, these
are occasionally linked to other conspiracies as well, for instance led by the
Soviet Union (Pakistan 1974: 2975). A popular target is, unsurprisingly, India, as
summed up in the following quote and echoed by other members: “the com-
bined essence of India and Israel is Qadian and Rabwaʾ, and the manifestation
of Haifa and Tel Aviv” (mp Makhdoom Nur Muhammad, Pakistan 1974: 2820).
Mirza Nasir Ahmad also invokes an international conspiracy in his testimony,
this time of the Russians and Americans as enemies of each other but united
against Palestine (Pakistan 1974: 1247). By proving that this has been pointed
out first by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, he thus bolsters his claims to Islamic soli-
darity.

Imagining Ummah: The World of Islam

Many of the international conspiracies referred to above equate “insidious”
efforts against Pakistan with efforts against the “world of Islam” (ummah),
since Pakistan is often (in the committee and also generally) considered the
“fortress of Islam” (Pakistan 1974: 2820, 2919). In many of these mentions, the
world of Islam is treated as an actual sovereign entity, not just an imagined
community. For instance, Mirza Nasir Ahmad lists approving citations of the
Ahmadiyya founder’s speech in which he “invited a consensus of all Muslims
and directed their attention to concrete steps to rid Palestine of Judaism and
Zionism” (Pakistan 1974: 1248), and also mentions Ahmadiyya contributions to
solidarity in Arab countries (Pakistan 1974: 1261). On the other hand, much of
the report comprises charges that Ahmadiyyat was founded as a “subversive”
movement to disrupt solidarity in the Muslim world.
Other instances include alleged Ahmadi conspiracies against Muslim sol-
idarity in the case of Pakistan’s relationship with its “religious and cultural
neighbor” Afghanistan (Pakistan 1974: 2058–2059, 2953) or against the Ottoman
Empire (Pakistan 1974: 2057, 2485, 2622–2623, 2809, 2892). Part of this narrative
is that Ahmadis are corrupting the message of Islam in other countries, both
among Muslims and among potential converts, for instance in Africa (Pakistan
1974: 2060–2065). The presence of Ahmadi missions across the world is pre-
sented as a grave threat to the world of Islam: “Go and have a look anywhere
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parliamentary hereticization of the ahmadiyya in pakistan 139

in the world, whatever missions exist in the name of Islam, these belong to
Ahmadis” (mp Sardar Inayat, Pakistan 1974: 2708). Naming the Ahmadis heretics
constitutionally in Pakistan is thus presented as a solution so that “the Muslim
nation and the great Islamic world may be protected, which they [Ahmadis]
are bent on destroying” (mp Chaudhary Ghulam Rasool, Pakistan 1974: 2941).
Protecting the Muslims of the world from Ahmadiyyat is often used as a justi-
fication to motivate the entire amendment, for instance in the closing speech
by the Law Minister (Pakistan 1974: 3072).
The narrative of protecting the Islamic world is often reinforced with exam-
ples from Muslim history, which are intended to justify a constitutional action
in Pakistan to resolve a long-standing crisis in the world of Islam. For instance:
At this time we have reached such a sensitive juncture that the eyes of the whole
world are on us, the eyes of Muslim countries are on us, all Muslim govern-
ments and Arab governments are looking at us and waiting for our decision.
(mp Chaudhary Ghaus Hazarvi, Pakistan 1974: 2836)
Reference is also made to the exemplary politics of the prophet Muhammad
(Pakistan 1974: 2349). There are numerous historical references to Mecca and
Medina (the city in Arabia where the prophet was forced to migrate, and
where he established what most Muslims believe to be an “ideal” city-state [see,
e.g., Pakistan 1974: 342]). A representative instance combining these various
references to the Islamic world is:

As the movement for independence of India proceeded, the interests of

Hindus also aligned with [the British], that the minds of Muslims be
diverted from this unity, and be directed toward this new Kaʾaba, this
new Mecca and Medina being created here [referring to the Ahmadi
city of Rabwaʾ]. So that their [Muslims’] connection with the Arabs, with
the world of Islam, with the true Mecca and Medina, with this entire
brotherhood, be severed.
mp zafar ansari, Pakistan 1974: 2877

Another way of relating the Ahmadiyya crisis in Pakistan to the world of Islam
is by listing fatʾwas (religious clerical opinions) from Islamic clerics in other
countries collectively and individually against the Ahmadiyya in support of the
Pakistani constitutional change now (e.g. Pakistan 1974: 323, 342, 1969–1970). By
1974, such opinions had already been given from a number of forums and are
used in the committee extensively to justify the constitutional step in Pakistan,
which however was unprecedented. On the other hand, Mirza Nasir Ahmad
refers to all these fatʾwas as a justification for Ahmadis restricting contact with
other Muslim sects (Pakistan 1974: 228).
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140 qadir

The Whole World and We, the Sovereign Nation

Occasionally the Islamic world is brought in rhetorically as Islam in the whole
world (e.g. Pakistan 1974: 1295). At such times, and elsewhere, the reference
again involves a “subversive” Ahmadi conspiracy to rule the whole world:

Then they said that whichever group could establish a strong base in
[re-unified] India, nothing would be able to stop it from capturing the
entire world … Mirza Mahmood Ahmad said that if we had enough power,
or if we had control of government, then we would be stricter than Hitler
or Mussolini to force all people to bow to our principles.
mp muhammad ataullah, Pakistan 1974: 2744

Often, the whole world is invoked in abstract principles, for instance when the
Attorney General says to Mirza Nasir Ahmad: “we are concerned with freedom
of religion all over the world. You have Ahmadis there also, you have to worry
about their welfare” (Pakistan 1974: 85). The notion of Ahmadis elsewhere being
connected to Ahmadis in Pakistan pervades the speeches and statements by
members, for instance in referring to actions by Ahmadis in other countries
like England (Pakistan 1974: 151). In this connection, an important incident
discussed throughout the proceedings is of an Ahmadi “mosque” in Nigeria
reportedly bearing a misleading representation of the basic Islamic testimony
of faith (shahadah), to indicate the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (e.g.
Pakistan 1974: 310, 2706).
Although such references to the whole world or to Ahmadis elsewhere are
relatively rare and are invariably combined with other modes, they are included
in this analysis because they point to an important aspect: This is the rhetorical
image of Pakistan as a member of the comity of nations, a player (presented to
varying degrees as a crucial player) on the world stage. Such representations
are typical of policy-making at the porous border between a nation-state and
the world (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014: 5–7). In this case, also, they reinforce
the sense of a world divided into nation-states, each of which is marked by
its own unique sovereignty. For, instance, in the following quote the speaker
implicates the whole world but sets apart Pakistan as a sovereign nation within
the world:

[In the new constitution of 1973] the Pakistani Assembly has declared
Islam the national religion. Does Mirza Nasir Ahmad want to make us
servants of America and London? … In the western world, there is still
a division between black and white races. They have separated politics
from religion … Their moral condition is in ruins. They sometimes ban
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parliamentary hereticization of the ahmadiyya in pakistan 141

legal alcohol, sometimes allow it. Can we reject any part of Islam for their
sake? And will we always look to them?
mp mufti mahmood, Pakistan 1974: 2350, 2361

One interesting variation in the national sovereignty argument is to draw paral-

lels between the Ahmadi city of Rabwaʾ and Vatican City (Pakistan 1974: 2076–
2079), by which committee members imply that Ahmadis are developing a
parallel government (Pakistan 1974: 2851) or an immune state-within-a-state in
Pakistan. This issue ties in with another model of managing religion politically,
that of the extent of the sovereign right of a democratic parliament to legislate
about religion. The principal argument of Mirza Nasir Ahmad against a con-
stitutional amendment is that the parliament is not competent to legislate on
personal religious beliefs (e.g. Pakistan 1974: 88, Ahmad 2003: 1–4), an argument
contested by the Attorney-General and committee members throughout. The
scope of that important debate exceeds this chapter and must be postponed
for future analysis. However, the way in which that discussion implicates other
world actors (e.g. Ahmad 2003: 3) is entirely relevant here.

What Others Do
Speakers also justify their argument by referring to what other nations, as well
as international governmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and
INGOs), do. For instance, when “cross-examining” Mirza Nasir Ahmad and
Abdul Mannan Omar, the Attorney General argues for political limits on reli-
gious freedom in the interests of “public morality” or to protect the sensi-
bilities of the majority. Here, the Attorney General and other members draw
on many global examples, such as Indian legislation preventing unauthorized
slaughter of cows (Pakistan 1974: 81), us law against polygamy despite American
Mormon beliefs (Pakistan 1974: 27–29, 85–86), and English law against public
nudity despite the presence of “hippies” there and in Pakistan.6 One variation
is to compare Ahmadiyyat and Islam with Christianity and Judaism (e.g. Pak-
istan 1974: 1507, 2869, 3043), arguing that separation from the parent religion is
thereby justified.
Citing the clerical rulings declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims, referred to
above, is another variation in this mode of justification. Yet another is to por-

6 Hippies are referred to on a few occasions as a Christian sect and implied as promoting nudity.
The argument for hereticizing Ahmadiyya here and in some other quotes is partly justified
by referring to American state intervention against Mormon Christian beliefs. An interesting
sociological comparison may be made between Mormons in the usa and Ahmadiyya in
Pakistan (see, e.g., Jones 1986).
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142 qadir

tray constitutional hereticization as a “soft” solution compared to what other

countries have done:

We do not want to present the solution to this problem on religious

grounds that the Christians undertook to solve the problem of Jews, the
way in France, in England, in Portugal, in Spain, in Italy, in Germany and in
Russia, whatever happened under the name of this religious conflict, we
do not want to do the same … For instance, in the Australian constitution
there is this written on the occasion of elections: “Aboriginal natives
shall not be counted. No election law shall disqualify any person other
than a native.” Or, there was the government of South Africa. And in the
American constitution it is written: “Excluding Indians, not taxed.” We are
not presenting such a solution.
mp mufti mahmood, Pakistan 1974: 3056

The speakers assume that bringing in external examples is both understand-

able and effective. Finally, one variation in this mode of what others do, is to
cite international organizations. Mirza Nasir Ahmad, for instance, mentions
the un Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 in support of religious freedom
(e.g. Pakistan 1974: 38, 88) while the Attorney General refers to this and other
organizations like the International Red Cross as being obviously inadequate
support for the protection of religious sanctity (e.g. Pakistan 1974: 69). In fact,
committee members point out that relying on such international authorities
actively detracts from the distinctiveness of Islam in Pakistan (Pakistan 1974:
369, 1275–1278, 2348), and in doing so they again bring that world system into
the local discourse. For instance:

This is the first and most basic difference between Mizrahi’s [Ahmadiyya]
and Muslims. Muslims only want to make their decisions in light of the
Quran and Shariʾah [Islamic way, or religious law and moral code] …
But Mizrahi’s look to the United Nations, sometimes to international
organizations and sometimes to man-made constitutions and law.
mp mufti mahmood, Pakistan 1974: 2349

Conclusion

In this chapter I set out to find how parliamentarians relied on references to

other countries when justifying a constitutional amendment to hereticize the
Ahmadiyya in the Special Committee of the Parliament of Pakistan in 1974.
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parliamentary hereticization of the ahmadiyya in pakistan 143

I showed that the wider world was already implicated, or brought rhetori-
cally into, the arguments for this globally unprecedented step. I identified five
modes of references through which policy makers justified and legitimated the
amendment: European colonial rule, international conspiracies, the world of
Islam, the whole world, and what other countries do. I demonstrated how the
response to a seemingly national crisis already involved the rest of the world
by taking into account related, prior moves of other nation-states. These moves
were used to justify the existence of a crisis by way of threat to “real” Islam and
Muslims.
Ahmadiyyat posing a threat to “real” Islam is a consistent narrative employed
by Islamic theological bodies such as the Muslim World League, the Saudi Ara-
bian Permanent Board of Inquiry and Fatwa, and fatwa councils in Egypt, South
Africa and other countries, all of which carry considerable moral authority.
Given the weight of the opinion of such international, independent Islamic
organizations, it is remarkable that Ahmadis have not been officially declared
non-Muslim even in Muslim majority countries where they face intense dis-
crimination and violence, as in Bangladesh and Indonesia. Accounts within the
methodological nationalist paradigm interpret this as proof that this constitu-
tional move is entirely explainable by the peculiarities of Pakistani national
history and politics, so that any international references in the arguments are
incidental. But in fact, my examination of the rhetoric of arguments shows that
cross-national comparison is very much a part of the justifications, validating
the first hypothesis posed. The narrative constructing Ahmadiyyat as a real and
potential crisis for “Islamic” Pakistan relies inherently on references to how
Ahmadis are spreading an “incorrect” and “dangerous” religion in the name
of Islam. Thus, the justifications rely on frequent references to an imagined
ummah waiting for Pakistani politicians to take the step of declaring Ahmadis
constitutionally non-Muslim, even though in fact no other Muslim country fol-
lowed suit up to 40 years later.7
Even though Pakistan is the only democratic country to have constitution-
ally declared Ahmadis non-Muslim, the amendment was not justified in iso-
lation or only relying on “national interest.” Most politicians seemingly felt
compelled to refer to other countries and make comparisons, thereby lending
apparent weight to their arguments. In the discursive institutionalist perspec-
tive, this points to the very structure of the nation-state, constituted as an enact-
ment of a worldwide model of what a “civilized” nation should look like in a

7 The construction of an ummah in this case is ambiguous, neither wholly indivisible nor
entirely fragmented, but this invocation deserves separate analysis.
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144 qadir

world polity comprised of comparable nation-states. The findings clearly show

that speakers attempt to identify with the civilized comity of nations, as pro-
posed in the second hypothesis. The Attorney General particularly goes to great
lengths to demonstrate by analogy that other advanced nations likewise restrict
religious practices in certain cases. Such references illustrate that boundaries
between nation-states are porous. Furthermore, it is not just that “global” actors
such as international organizations breach these borders, but even national
actors discursively reach across borders when justifying new policies. A partic-
ular policy, such as the hereticization of the Ahmadiyya, might not get diffused,
but cross-national comparisons appear to be well-accepted elements in justi-
fying seemingly thoroughly national policies.
By the same token, an entirely national narrative is thereby constructed,
making the amendment appear naturally as a national requirement that en-
gages with civilized, independent and sovereign nations on an equal foot-
ing while combating a post-imperial West. A national historical trajectory is
constructed that, in turn, builds the “primordial authenticity” of an ethno-
religious group, as showed by Thomas (2004: 242) in the case of contentions
over religious rights. Such contests may be analytically viewed as negotiated
processes of boundary-making that are often sparked by crises. But, conversely,
boundary-making can also be used to construct crises. A crucial step in such
processes of boundary-making is the creation of constitutive friend-foe rela-
tions and radical antagonisms based on stereotyped pictures (Howarth and
Torfing 2005: 6), which results almost axiomatically in crises. The Ahmadis
have clearly been thus discursively constructed in the proceedings, being allied
conspiratorially with all possible enemies and pitted as stereotyped straw-
men against a “primordial” group of Pakistani Muslims claiming a tradition
of authenticity. Other distinctions in this supposed “primordial” group are
acknowledged but brushed aside (for instance one comment about gender dif-
ferences and two comments on Sunni-Shia differences in the proceedings). It
is thus instructive to view the 1974 amendment as an exercise in boundary-
making that not only was motivated by a crisis (1953 and 1974 violence) but
also caused and constructed crises (subsequent persecution of Ahmadis in Pak-
istan).
What is of note here are the specific modes by which this exclusion, or Other-
ing, is communicated in the policy setting of a constitutional amendment. Each
mode can be seen as crucial to the Pakistani political sense of nationhood at the
time. The nation-building project, explicitly implemented in the military rule
ending in 1969, was renewed in the new constitution made by this same par-
liament in 1973. The constitution-making exercise was guided by, among other
factors, the need to establish a genuinely sovereign nation, free from the legacy
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parliamentary hereticization of the ahmadiyya in pakistan 145

of colonial rule and imperial designs of modern global powers, and integrated
into the world of Islam as well as with “civilized” nations. Each of these imper-
atives is evident in the modes of references to other countries and the world
while excluding Ahmadis from “the” Pakistani nation. The world is indeed used
as a horizon of legitimation for hereticizing the Ahmadiyya but, as proposed in
the third hypothesis, this horizon is molded to reaffirm perceptions of nation-
hood.
The Ahmadi crisis was thus precipitated in degrees by the new constitution
of 1973, leading on from the emergence of Pakistan as a “homeland for Muslims”
and re-opening a political fault line around who is to be considered a valid
Muslim. It remains to be seen whether constitutionalism generates further
crises about Islam in Pakistan, or about the status of Ahmadis in other modern
nation-states.

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