144d5- 146c6

Initial setting out of the topic and determination that Soc. will
converse with Theaet.

144d5-d7
Socrates asks Theodorus to have the boy come over and sit by him.
{ΣΩ.} Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καί μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν (5)
ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.
{ΘΕΟ.} Ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη.

144d5 τὸν ἄνδρα: cf. n. on 142c6 μειρακίῳ.

144d5 καί μοι: classify kai and figure out moi.
144d7 Ἔσται ταῦτα : cf. Ἔσται ταῦτα at Alc. 1 127e8, Hp. Mi. 365d5,
Ion 530b4, Lg. 688e2, 700a3, 842a7, Epin. 980c4, all initiating
response to a request, an imperative, or an urging. The best and only
precise contemporary or earlier parallel is Iliad 21, 221-3 ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ
καὶ ἔασον· ἄγη μ’ ἔχει ὄρχαμε λαῶν. / Τὸν δ’ ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη
πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς· / ἔσται ταῦτα Σκάμανδρε διοτρεφές, ὡς σὺ
κελεύεις.
144d7 Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη: local δεῦρο, with perhaps ἥκε
omitted (cf. 142a1): cf. R. 472b5 δεῦρο ἥκομεν. Slings-deStrycker ad
Ap. 24c9 (καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ) say δεῦρο there is not local
but rather similar to ἴθι or φέρε, while here in the Tht. it is local: the
only Platonic instance parallel to the Ap. passage which they find is
Cra. 422c2 δεῦρο αὖ συνεπίσκεψαι. Their distinction ignores the
slippery slope between the literally local use, the figurative use derived
from the local use, and the farther-from-local use they discuss (LSJ s.v. I
lists all uses accompanying imperatives under the local use). Cf. Chrm.
153c5 Δεῦρο δή, ἔφη, καθεζόμενος ἡμῖν διήγησαι, Phdr. 261a1-2 δεῦρο
αὐτοὺς παράγων ἐξέταζε, both of which would be parallel to the Ap.
passage but for the participles: perhaps Ap. loc.cit. can be interpreted
as an omitted participle. Omitted imperatives at R. 445c1 Δεῦρό νυν,
ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς … and 477d7 Δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ
ἄριστε, neither one of which are literally local.
Slings-deStrycker implies that the use is more common in
poetry: is it? is it really rare in prose?
Thesleff lists it as "colloquial."

144d8- 145b9
Theodorus having praised Theaetetus, Socrates suggests to Theaetetus that they take
Theodorus' praise seriously and examine whether he is right, because Theodorus is
qualified in matters of paideia. Thus Socrates underscores the importance of considering
the expertise of the source of information.
Starting out with Theodorus’ observation that Theaetetus and Socrates look alike,
initially, Socrates claims that he wants to see what he himself looks like via Theaetetus,
his look-alike. That is the ostensible task, but he immediately shifts to another, prior task,
namely, determining whether the claim that he and Theaetetus are look-alikes is reliable
information. The expertise that would qualify someone to pronounce Socrates and
Theaetetus look-alikes is ἡ γραφική, which Theodorus, the source of the
information, does not possess. So his claim that Theaetetus and
Socrates are look-alikes is not worthy of attention. Socrates
appreciates bodily appearances at times, but cf. Alcibiades' claim that
the truth about Socrates is that οὔτε εἴ τις καλός ἐστι μέλει αὐτῷ
οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καταφρονεῖ τοσοῦτον ὅσον οὐδ’ ἂν εἷς οἰηθείη (Symp.
216d7).
Next Socrates shifts to a different matter. Rather than physical
appearance, he asks about virtue and wisdom of the soul. By
parallelism, we expect him to examine the source of the information
here too. Socrates, however, departs from the previously established
principle that examining the source of the information is prior. For he
asks Theaetetus whether, if Theodorus praised someone's soul for
virtue and wisdom, it would be appropriate for the one hearing the
praise to examine the object of the praise and whether it would be
appropriate for the one being praised to put himself on show, to which
Theaetetus replies that it would be entirely appropriate. An explicit
principle justifying why it is appropriate is never given, and Theodorus'
expertise in such matters is never established or questioned. It should
be, given the explicit importance of relevant expertise in the prior
discussion about look-alikes, which is presumably simply a setup for
the more important examination of virtue and wisdom. Socrates simply
says that Theaetetus should put himself on show for Socrates to
examine, because Theodorus praised Theaetetus to him as he has
never praised anyone else ever, although Theodorus has praised many
citizens and foreigners to Socrates (which indicates that Theodorus and
Socrates have conversed about the youths of Athens prior to this
dialogue: How much? When? Perhaps just prior to the report of their
conversation that we have here, perhaps on other occasions).
Note that at 143d1-6, Socrates indicated his love of the youths of
Athens above all others. No reason is given for that provincialism.

{ΣΩ.} Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κἀγὼ ἐμαυτὸν

ἀνασκέψωμαι ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον· φησὶν γὰρ Θεό-
(e.) δωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῷν ἐχόντοιν ἑκατέρου
λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν
ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ’ ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν λέγει;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ’ ἄν.
{ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὑρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ’ ἄν, ἄμουσον (5)
δέ, ἠπιστοῦμεν;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀληθῆ.
{ΣΩ.} Νῦν δέ γ’, οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων
145.
(a.) ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὢν λέγει ἢ οὔ.
 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Δοκεῖ μοι.
{ΣΩ.} Ἦ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὔχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.
{ΣΩ.} Ἆρ’ οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός; (5)
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
{ΣΩ.} Ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικὸς
καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. (10)
{ΣΩ.} Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους φησὶν
εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν
προσέχειν.
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἴσως οὔ.
(b.) {ΣΩ.} Τί δ’ εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς ἀρετήν
τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἆρ’ οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖ-
σθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν
ἐπιδεικνύναι;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. (5)
{ΣΩ.} Ὥρα τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι,
ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ
πρός με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπῄνεσεν
ὡς σὲ νυνδή.

144d8 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: "by all means" or "agreed" works better than LSJ's
"altogether": usually in Plato (always in Xenophon) this phrase agrees
with a declarative statement preceding it or emphatically answers a
question in the affirmative. Sometimes in Plato it follows a deliberative
or hortatory subjunctive, rarely an imperative as here: Cf. 149b2-3 and
165e6, in answer to deliberative subjunctives; at 204a1-4 it affirms a
preceding 3rd person imperative. Cf. Sph. 250a4 following ὑπόμνησόν
με, Phlb. 54b8 following σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμμέτεχε, Lg. 778c3,
779d7, 790c4, 791c7, 796e9 after hortatory subjunctive, Lg. 789b4
confirming βουλοίμην ἂν, as well as R. 595c4 and Lg. 779e8 after
verbal adjectives (may be more useful in addressing whether
imperative = "should" or not: can't remember where that came up, but
it was somewhere)
Anomalous uses: At Plt. 257b6, Chrm. 175e5, and Euthd 274d5, πάνυ
μὲν οὖν is used not at the beginning of a response. At Hp.Ma.,
it's not clear what it's modifying, and it's not at the start of a
response. At Phlb. 51b9, it modifies a new departure rather
than a previous statement. At La. 194e9 and R. 376d4, it marks
not an affirmation of what precedes, but a parenthetical
approval of what Socrates is doing.
These seem like differences in the use of μὲν οὖν.
144d8 ἐμαυτὸν: proleptic.
144d9 ἀνασκέψωμαι: prefix probably not to be translated, may add
sense of strengthening or improvement (LSJ ἄνα F). At 145b3, Socrates
picks up this somewhat seldom-used verb (less that 15 uses of
ἀνασκέπτομαι/ἀνασκοπέω before 3rd c., over half Platonic, compared to
well over 100 of ἐπισκέπτομαι/ἐπισκοπέω in Plato alone, as at 144e3
and 4 below).
144d9 ποῖόν τι: τις added to ποῖός makes the question less definite
(LSJ ποῖος I4).
144d9 τὸ πρόσωπον: in apposition to ποῖόν τι, or acc. of respect.
Article = possessive pronoun (Sm. §1121). Cf. Euthd. 275e4 μειδιάσας
τῷ προσώπῳ, Lg. 854d2 ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ WHY cf. those passages?
144e1 ἀτὰρ: GP 53.
144e1-2 εἰ νῷν ἐχόντοιν ἑκατέρου λύραν ἔφη … : effectively a double
protasis, with the gen. absolute serving as protasis to ἔφη. "If we each
had a lyre (he might say X, and) if he said X, then …." The εἰ clause at
sentence end is indirect question.
144e1-2 νῷν ἐχόντοιν ἑκατέρου λύραν: logically, ἐχόντοιν should agree
with ἑκατέρου. (Parallels?)
144e3 ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ’ ἂν: present unreal imperfect
and present unreal aorist in alternative apodoses. For imperfect
protasis followed by aorist apodosis, see Sm.§2310a ("often in Plato,"
citing Euthphr. 12d, Grg. 514d (KG cites 514e), and X. An. 7.6.23).
Greek unreal conditionals are imagined in the past, when what is
referred to was still possible, and so logically the aorist fits as well as
the imperfect.
144e3and 145a1 μουσικὸς ὢν … . …γραφικὸς ὢν …: when ὢν = "in the
capacity of," it cannot be omitted (Sm.§2117c). IS it more common
to use participle or ὥς (with λέγω)?
144e5 Οὐκοῦν: GP 435.
144e5 τοιοῦτον μὲν εὑρόντες: Smyth: §2113 verbs of finding take a
participle, while §2119 says that ὤν is frequently omitted; §2135 the
infinitive is less common. Tried search: no pattern emerged.
144e7 Ἀληθῆ: Neuter plural. Occurs dozens of times as a one-word answer in Plato,
affirming what precedes, perhaps in apposition to previous statement, but perhaps an
abbreviated form of Λέγεις ἀληθῆ (169e6) or Καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀληθῆ (Grg.
510c6). Aside from Plato, Lucian and Methodius have one instance
apiece of it as a one-word answer. Cf. very emphatic Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν,
ἔφη, ἀληθῆ at R. 409d5.
144e8 δέ γ’:GP 154. Schwyzer II 561 F.4 notes that γε is usually in
second place, but comes in third place after δέ and τε (cf. GP
147?).
145a2 Δοκεῖ μοι: Stern, 36, calls this "something less than an
enthusiastic endorsement" and 145a10 Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ "somewhat
tentative" (49n.36). IS that true?
145a3 Ἦ οὖν: always marks an inferential question. 36 Platonic
instances: Euthphr. 1X, Phd. 1X, Crat. 1X, Tht. 8X, Parm. 3X, Phdr. 1X,
[?] Alc. 1 3X, [] Amat. 1X, Chrm. 4X, Euthd. 1X, Grg. 1X, [?] Hp.Ma. 1X,
R. 10X. Other than Plato, among contemporaries or earlier authors,
Xenophon has 5 X. SO, a Platonic idiom?
An example of Socrates asking a leading question to which we can
safely conclude (he and Theaetetus know Theodorus well enough) that
he knows that the answer is "no."
145a4 Οὔχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι: at Ar. Nu., Dover prints: Οὔχ ὅσον γ’ ἔμ’
εἰδέναι. The comma here marks ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι as an afterthought
("No—at least as far as I know"), whereas without a comma, as in
Nubes, ὅσον γ’ ἔμ’ εἰδέναι reinforces Οὔχ: "Not as far as I know" and
the effect is closer to an emphatic "No." Our text could have or not
have the comma, and it would change the feel slightly. With the
comma, Theaetetus is perhaps being represented explicitly as
intellectually careful. Without it, he is perhaps answering more simply
with a wordy negative.
Adverbial ὅσον (as far as) + inf. less common than + ind. (LSJ IV.1.a).
145a5 Ἆρ’ οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός: a further example of Socrates asking a
question that "expects" a "yes," but to which he knows the answer is
and will be "no."
145a7 Πάντως δήπου: sc. ὁ Θεόδωρος γεωμετρικὸς ἐστιν vel sim.
Platonic instances of Πάντως δήπου number 20, all but one of which
(R. 398c11) are responses to questions and most of which involve an
ellipse to be filled in from the preceding question. The expression is
always emphatic, but can be made more emphatic (Euthd. 285e1 adds
καὶ σφόδρα γε). While 17 out of the 19 Platonic responses that include
Πάντως δήπου agree with what precedes, Lys. 208d1 and [?] Hi.Ma.
298e5 have Πάντως δήπου disagreeing with the preceding question.
δήπου = “surely,” expecting agreement. Cf. my note ad Theages XXX
(does note there include useful info about EVERY instance of
δήπου? This note only included Πάντως δήπου, not δήπου w/o
Πάντως.
145a9 ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται: the unexpressed antecedent of ὅσα must
include ἄλλα (so Riddell §249), and perhaps πάντα. Cf. 159c1 πάντα ἅ.
A SEARCH DONE: results OK, not great.
Alternatives would have been: w/o relative clause, as Euthph. 7d5 καὶ ἐγὼ 

καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες Phd. 69b5 καὶ 
προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ 
τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, Sph. 234a4 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
συμπάντων, Prt. 238a8 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, 
or with an indefinite relative cl. Grg. 452e3 καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ 
παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται, R. 329b5 καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
πάντες ὅσοι ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας, Lg. 846a4 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἁπάντων ὅσα τις ἂν, 854a2 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων 
ὅσα
145a11 τοῦ σώματός τι: τι is acc. of respect (Sm. §1600a).
145a12 ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ ψέγων: in Plato, what one chooses to praise or
criticize reveals character as well as what one takes pleasure in or feels
pain at, and also, accurate praise and criticism requires a skill or is
dictated by good laws. Thus while ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ ψέγων seems at first
glance superfluous, by invoking a capacity for evaluating, it is a facet
of craft knowledge and fits well with what precedes and follows.
A search done: What one praises or blames reveals one’s
character, what one takes pleasure in or fells pain at, and what
to praise or blame is decided properly by a skill or laws.
145a12 οὐ πάνυ: Riddell §139 "scarcely," "hardly" and has many parallels. Cf.
149d9.
145a14 Ἴσως οὔ: "presumably not": Is Tht. being careful, because
Soc. has tried to mislead him recently? I.e does Ἴσως imply that
the speaker is not committing to an idea but rather is willing to
entertain it?
145b1 ποτέρου: indefinite “one or the other”: LSJ lists
La. 181d, Chrm. 171b, R. 499c, Phlb. 20e, and
Tht. 145b. Worth a search?
WHy not tinos?
145b1-2 τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ σοφίαν: ἐπαινῶ is usually not
accompanied by a prepositional phrase identifying the object of praise,
which is more usually found as an accusative direct object or expressed by
a participle or a clause, but when it is expressed by a prepositional phrase,
other prepositions are more common (ἐπὶ and διὰ are most common).
THat is based on a search of 600 instances of this specific verb
in D., Xen., Thuc., Antiphons, and Xenophon. I suppose
enkomiazv might be a good next step, or cast a larger net for
epainv.
145b5 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: how emphatic is this? Why does Tht. agree so
readily?
145b6-7 σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι: sc. ἄξιον ἐστι vel sim.
Socrates casts himself as examiner and Theaetetus as demonstrator, a
typical Platonic-Socratic move (cf. Hp.Ma. 286d-287b). Cf. Theodorus
at 143e4-5 (ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι).
145b7 ὡς εὖ ἴσθι: clearly explanatory. cf. R. 328d2 νῦν δέ σε χρὴ
πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι. ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ….
ὡς εὖ ἴσθι has only this Platonic parallel in Classical Greek:
many in later times (Libanius et al.).
ὡς clearly explanatory: cannot find in Smyth or LSJ with
imperative used basically as explanatory "for."
145b8 ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς: cf. 143d1-6 where Soc. inquires specifically
after Athenians. Plato frequently pairs ξένος with ἀστός (e.g. R. 613d8),
and occasionally adds μέτοικος (e.g. R. 563a1). Perhaps more to say
here.

145b10-c6
Theaetetus says Theodorus may not be serious. Socrates replies that that is not like
Theodorus and that Theaetetus must not avoid the agreed-upon procedure. Theaetetus
assents.
Cf. the distinction at 167e between the ἀγωνιζόμενος, who can play and trip up
a conversation partner, and the διαλεγόμενος, who must play it
straight.

In this brief passage, notice how Socrates and Theaetetus pass the
conversational lead back and forth. Immediately prior to this passage,
Socrates takes the lead: he gives Theaetetus the task of showing his
character while Socrates examines it to see if Theodorus was right
about it. Theaetetus accepts the task only to suggest in the next
breath that Theodorus might have been joking. If Theodorus is joking,
then Theaetetus may not have the character to show off, and so
Socrates’ task for Theaetetus may not be appropriate. Socrates rejects
Theaetetus’ suggestion and emphatically puts the task squarely on
Theaetetus’ shoulders by suggesting that shirking it would put
Theodorus in the position of having to prove his claims. Socrates
further enforces the need for Theatetus to take up the task by
suggesting that Theaetetus has agreed to do the task (Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι must
be what Socrates refers to by τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ).
The conversational lead and responsibility for the conversation's claims
is passed back and forth between Socrates and Theaetetus.

In all of this, Socrates neatly sidesteps the issue of Theodorus'

expertise at soul judging, but claiming that no one will denounce him
might be taken to mean that he is so qualified that no one will dare to
question him. This may thus be an appeal to the authority of the
crowd. It does not, however, actually say that. It couches the sidestep
in a courtroom metaphor.

Socrates is left in control of the conversation's propriety, direction, and

lead. But Theaetetus’ εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ "if it seems right to you" also gives
Theaetetus plausible deniability: thus Theaetetus emphasizes that
Socrates is the one responsible for the conversation's propriety,
direction, and lead and leaves himself room to disavow it.

{ΘΕΑΙ.} Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ’ ὅρα μὴ παίζων (10)

(c.) ἔλεγεν.
{ΣΩ.} Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου
τὰ ὡμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ
καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν—πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψετ’
αὐτῷ—ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ. (5)
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

145b10 Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι: in Classical greek, a phrase almost confined to Plato (occurring

only here, Phd. 69e5, Smp. 175d3, R. 415d3, and Mx. 249e3, which has a similar
adversative qualification following: Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι∙ ἀλλ’ ὅπως μου μὴ 
κατερεῖς... , as well as [Aristotle] Oeconomica 1345a2).
SEARCH DONE: A Lot OF WORK DONE, SO DON”T ABANDON IT, but
much remains to do
145b10-c1 ὅρα μὴ παίζων ἔλεγεν: μή + indicative after a verb of
seeing/considering vel sim. is normal (KG 2.395 cites this passage and
calls it a variety of fearing clause, but also indicates that the use of any
tense of the indicative here is like an indirect question: Sm.§2222
suggests that it may really be an indirect question with μή standing for
ἇρα μή while §2233 says indicative is normal with fears about what
actually is or was): Schwyzer II.354 calls it an indirect question with μή
forestalling a positive answer and equates this μή + indic. with that
which occurs in fearing clauses about the past). Find2ndary lit. Cf.
196b4-5 ἐνθυμοῦ μή τι τότε γίγνεται…, La. 196c1-2 ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας
οἴεταί τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγει, Sph. 235a2-3
διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ περὶ ὅσωνπερ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατὸς εἶναι, Phdr.
273a7-b1 εἰπέτω τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἡμῖν ὁ Τεισίας, μή τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ
εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν, Ly. 216c1-2 σκεψώμεθα, μὴ ἔτι μᾶλλον
ἡμᾶς λανθάνει τὸ φίλον ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν τούτων ὄν, Chrm. 163a ἀλλ’
ὅρα μὴ ἐκεῖνον κωλύει (find more: these are all from KG).
search for ὅρ- yields:
Alc. II 139d3-4 ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ταῦτ’ ἔχει
X. Cyr. 3.1.27 ὅρα μὴ ἅμα τε εὖ ποιήσεις καὶ ἅμα οὐ φίλον νομιοῦσί
σε, ibid. ὅρα μὴ ἐκείνους αὖ δεήσει σε σωφρονίζειν, 4.1.18 ὅρα μὴ
πολλῶν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν χειρῶν δεήσει καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν
Dicaearchus frag. 41 (from Plutarch Quaest. Convivales 8.2 719a) ἀλλ’
ὅρα μή τί σοι προσῆκον ὁ Πλάτων καὶ οἰκεῖον αἰνιττόμενος λέληθεν
Thuc. 1.82.5 ὁρᾶτε ὅπως μὴ αἴσχιον καὶ ἀπορώτερον τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ
πράξομεν
Hdt. 3.36 ὅρα ὅκως μή σεο ἀποστήσονται Πέρσαι
And. de Mysteriis 103 ὁρᾶτε μὴ οὐκ ἐμοὶ μάλιστα τῶν πολιτῶν
προσήκει λόγον δοῦναι τῶν γεγενημένων
E. Ion 1523-7
X. HG 5.2.15 ὁρᾶτε, ἔφη, ὅπως μὴ οὐκέτι εὐμεταχείριστα ἔσται ἐκεῖνα
ὑμῖν
X. Ag. 7.6 ὁρᾶν χρὴ μὴ οὐδ’ ἕξομεν μεθ’ ὅτου τῶν βαρβάρων
κρατήσομεν
X. Hipparchicus 3.8 ὁρᾶν χρὴ ὅπως μὴ οἱ πολέμιοι αὐτοὺς
τοῦτο δρᾶν ἀναγκάσουσιν
D. de Pace 14 ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ προαξόμεθ’
Arist. Polit. 1302b19 ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ ἐνέσονται
Thphr. Char. 1.6 Ἀλλ’ ὅρα, μὴ σὺ θᾶττον πιστεύεις
145c1 Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος: cf. Sph. 216b7 Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ
Σώκρατες, τοῦ ξένου. Nothing immediately interesting pops up
on a full corpus TLG search for οὗτος ὁ τρόπος. Plutarch, no
Xenophon!, not many contemporary parallels.
145c2-3 μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέγειν
τόνδε: Socrates lays out a ground rule of what he expects from an
interlocutor: no subterfuge, take others seriously, and abide by express
agreements.
"Playful" speech in Platonic discussion generally has negative
connotations as is seen from the results of searches for "play" next to
"say" (what would search for just “play” yield”): cf. Alcibiades'
description of Socrates at Smp. 216e4-5 εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων
πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ. Compare, however,
the description of what the wise one will write down in order to have
something to "play" with in old age and for others to follow where he
has been at Phdr. 276d-e (and yet at 277e, he says it is much better to
be serious about such matters). At 234d7-e1, Phaedrus accuses Soc. of
playing/joking. At Alc. 1 124d1-2, Alcibiades accuses Soc. of playing, to
which Socrates replies "perhaps, but I am saying the truth." At Thg.
128c1, Theages accuses Soc. of playing (i.e. not taking Theages
seriously) when he disavows knowledge. At La. 196e, Socrates, after
citing an apparently outlandish example, is careful to say he is not
playing but rather has a serious point. At Euthd. 278b, Socrates
distinguishes between the playful and the important serious part of
what Euthydemus and Dionysodorus teach, and again at 283b, there is
a contrast between joking and serious instruction/inquiry, while at
285a3, Socrates uses playfulness to try to defuse tension. Prt. 341d7
says that Prodicus is joking and testing Protagoras. Callicles asks if Soc.
is playing or serious at 481b6-7 and again at 481b10-c1, then Callicles
equates philosophy with play and says that adults should not engage
in it seriously at Grg. 485a-b. At Mx. 236c9, Socrates asks if Menexenus
will laugh at him if he seems as an old man to still play, At Hp. Ma.
300d-e, Socrates suggests Hippias is playing with him or testing him
and not being serious. And yet, at R. 536c1, Socrates characterizes the
discussion preceding as "play." At R. 539b-d, Socrates warns against
the attitude young people fall into of treating argument and philosophy
as play, a game, in which winning is most important and which is not to
be taken seriously. At R. 573d1, Adeimantus all but says Socrates is
teasing/playing with him. Lg. 688b5-6 suggests that Megillus can either
take the Athenian seriously or as playing: it is left up to him, but the
clear implication is that the serious side of what he says is the
important one. 935d6 and Epin. 992b3 have further passages which
are explicitly said to be capable of both serious and playful
interpretation. Interesting clause at Phlb. 28c2-3 σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε
Φίληβος, σεμνύνων ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἐθορύβησα.
145c3 τὰ ὡμολογημένα: refers to Socrates' questions and Theaetetus'
assents at 145b1-10. Socrates frequently uses previous
agreements to maneuver interlocutors:
145c3 σκηπτόμενος: no good Platonic parallels for this word for pretending
145c3 τόνδε: what understood masculine word does this modify?
145c4 καὶ: GP 298.
145c4-5 ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν—πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψετ’ αὐτῷ—
ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ: For the use of legal "witness" images,
cf. Grg. 472b, where Socrates says he will produce Polus as a witness
against himself as well as the legalistic terminology used with his young
interlocutor at Thg. 123b.
145c5 θαρρῶν: usually + imperative, Plato most often uses θαρρῶν to
enjoin dialectic "courage." Cf. more emphatic 157d3-4 ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν
καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου. θαρρῶν 14X in Plato (Phd.,
Phdr., Euthd., Grg., Crat., Soph., R., Lg., and Chrm. Cf. also 148c9:
Θάρρει (do search for that as well).
145c4 ἐπισκήψετ’: not used elsewhere for dialectic, but perhaps
another word of accusing is?
145c6 χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ: Theaetetus hereby accedes and
lets Socrates lay out the ground rules, direction, and procedure of the
conversation. Cf. [Thg.] 122 c5-6 (at beginning of conversational turn,
as here) Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ποιεῖν χρὴ οὕτω. And yet,
the practically causal protasis εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ lays a burden on Socrates.

145c7-d5
Socrates retains the conversational lead in this portion. The task is still
ostensibly to follow Theaetetus' agreement to put himself and his virtue
and wisdom on show. It is not clear how that is to happen. Socrates
thinks it has something to do with the knowledge Theaetetus has gained
from Theodorus.

Harking back to Theaetetus' claim that Theodorus is an expert at

geometry at 145a5f., Socrates asks after the subject matters which
Theaetetus learns from Theodorus, namely geometry, music, astronomy,
and arithmetic. Theaetetus agrees that he is currently learning
geometry and says he is for his part (γε δή) eager to learn the rest from
Theodorus. Adding "for his part" introduces a note of humility and/or
preciseness, both admirable character traits. Socrates says he too wants
to learn such things from Theodorus and adds that he wants to learn
them from any others who he thinks understand those things. Socrates
says, in effect, "I am a fellow student." By adding "any others," Socrates
generalizes his desire to learn and suggests that there might be others
who know such things, perhaps better than Theodorus. Saying that he
learns from anyone "he thinks" understand those things indicates that
those people may in fact not understand such things. It also indicates
that he himself judges them: he relies on what he can ascertain about
their areas of expertise in his choice of teacher. 144e1-145a10
suggested that Theaetetus’ and Socrates’ judgement about whether
someone is an expert in an area of expertise is sufficient to decide
whether to pay attention to that person.

Given XXXXXX passage later in dialogue where "the expert" is

examined: cf. also characterization of Protagoras as a "wise
man" at 152b1, the notion that Socrates and Theaetetus are sufficient
to judge whether a teacher knows the material is much too simple. Many
Platonic passages external to the Tht. likewise suggest that this notion is
naive.

The prose is wordy: γεωμετρίας ἄττα (=γεωμετρία?), τῶν περὶ

ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς (=ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ
ἁρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς?).

(145c7)
{ΣΩ.} Λέγε δή μοι· μανθάνεις που παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεω-
μετρίας ἄττα;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἔγωγε.
(d.) {ΣΩ.} Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ
λογισμούς;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Προθυμοῦμαί γε δή.
{ΣΩ.} Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρά τε τούτου καὶ παρ’
ἄλλων οὓς ἂν οἴωμαί τι τούτων ἐπαΐειν.

145c7 δή: δή following imperative at .... Perhaps similar, but not

after imperative at 145d3, 146b8, 147d3 ....
145d3 γε δή: GP 246. Cf. 145c7n.?
145d4 Καὶ γὰρ: GP 110.

145d5-e7

As he did earlier, Socrates turns the conversation to a prior task: determining the nature
and relation of wisdom and learning. Claiming to be moderately or tolerably (μετρίως)
clear about "the rest", Socrates says a small thing leaves him at a loss. Socrates is
bothered elsewhere in Plato by such "small things" (XXXXXXXX and in next
document too add note referring back).
Socrates now turns the conversation toward epistemology: as an answer to the question
what learning is, he offers that it is becoming wiser at what one is learning. Built into
Socrates' question are the following non-obvious ideas: 1) the basic claim that there are
such things as learning and becoming wiser; 2) the claim that becoming wiser and
learning are transitive: one does not simply learn or become wiser. Rather, one learns
some thing or becomes wiser at some thing (περὶ ὅ); 3) and there is also the claim that
there are degrees of being wise (σοφώτερον).
Theaetetus does not simply say "yes," although γάρ makes no sense unless he is
assenting. He assents by asking how it can or could not be, which is plausibly simply an
idiomatic way to say "yes" but logically more. In terms of the conversational lead and
who is responsible for what, it shifts some of the responsibility for the claim back to
Socrates (Socrates does not answer, however, which suggests that this might be 'purely'
idiomatic for "yes"). It at least implicitly asserts that Socrates offered that idea and if it is
to be a genuine question, Socrates is the one who is supposed to answer and say if there is
a reason to doubt it.
Next, Socrates asks whether the wise are wise by means of wisdom, to which Theaetetus
simply assents. The question does not have immediately obvious importance, but it
expands on claim 1) above by suggesting 1 bis) that there are wise people and there is
wisdom itself, which was not explicitly claimed before, and that 4) wisdom is what
makes wise people wise.
Then Socrates asks if Τοῦτο "this" differs from knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) in some way
or at all (τι), to which Theaetetus asks "What?" Socrates clarifies that "it" refers
to wisdom, then rephrases the question in a different way. Namely,
relying on the idea that learning and wisdom are transitive (and
slipping in the parallel idea that knowing is transitive too), he asks
whether the objects known by knowers are the same as those at which
those same people are wise. Theaetetus' reply is idiomatically
affirmative, but logically a request for more information ("what of it?"
"So, what?": is that what it means?).
Since they have agreed that the objects which knowers know are the
same as the things at which people are wise, Socrates suggests that it
logically follows (ἄρα is it always logical: what else could it be?)
that wisdom and knowledge are the same thing. Theaetetus simply
assents.

Perhaps Theaetetus should not have assented so quickly, for two

distinct, even otherwise unrelated, activities can share the same
object. What is more, it is not inconceivable or even unreasonable on
some conceptions of knowledge and wisdom to think that one might
come to know things about X without ever being wise about X or be
wise about X without knowing many or any particular things about it. It
is even conceivable that the very same facts and ideas about X might
be objects of knowledge in one way but wisdom in a different way.

A charitable way to take all of this discussion is as a laying out of

assumptions.

McDowell ad 145c7-146a1, commenting that Socrates assures Theaetetus prior

agreement that there is such a thing as knowledge, cites Arist. APo. 89b34-35 γνόντες δὲ 
ὅτι ἔστι, τί ἐστι ζητοῦμεν, οἷον τί οὖν ἐστι θεός, ἢ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; (note that Arist. 
does not use the article with the predicate terms, whereas Plato does: is that 
significant?). McDowell offers Hi.Ma. 287c1­d2, Sph. 247a2­7 as comparanda for the 
line of thought.

(145d5)
ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὰ μὲν (5)
ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, μικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ ὃ
μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καί μοι λέγε· ἆρ’ οὐ τὸ
μανθάνειν ἐστὶν τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει
τις;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; (10)
{ΣΩ.} Σοφίᾳ δέ γ’ οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί.
(e.) {ΣΩ.} Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Τὸ ποῖον;
{ΣΩ.} Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες ταῦτα καὶ
σοφοί;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Τί μήν; (5)
{ΣΩ.} Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί.

145d5-6 ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, μικρὸν δέ τι
ἀπορῶ: the main thought of this sentence is interrupted by the
contrasting τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως. So Riddell §300.
Cf. results of search in Plato for ἀλλ’ ὅμως with similar interruption of
main thought of a sentence ((is it anything to do with ἀλλ’ ὅμως, or
rather just interruption of the main thought that is at issue in
Riddell?):
Crat. 389e3-390a2 ἀλλ’ ὅμως, ἕως ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν ἀποδιδῷ, ἐάντε
ἐν ἄλλῳ σιδήρῳ, ὅμως ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον, ἐάντε ἐνθάδε ἐάντε ἐν
βαρβάροις τις ποιῇ.
Alc. II 142c4-5 ἀλλ’ ὅμως τούτων τε καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν ὁμοιοτρόπων
τούτοις οὕτω σφόδρα καταδήλων ὄντων, σπάνιον εὑρεῖν ὅστις
Chrm. 175c8-d2 ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὕτως ἡμῶν εὐηθικῶν τυχοῦσα ἡ ζήτησις
καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον εὑρεῖν δύναται τὴν ἀλήθειαν
R. 365d1-2 ἀλλ’ ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτῃ ἰτέον
R. 437a4-7 Ἀλλ’ ὅμως, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαζώμεθα πάσας τὰς
τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐπεξιόντες καὶ βεβαιούμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς
οὔσας μηκύνειν, ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν
προΐωμεν
R. 445b5-7 ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐπείπερ ἐνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν, ὅσον οἷόν τε
σαφέστατα κατιδεῖν ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάμνειν.
145d5-6 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα … περὶ αὐτὰ : pleonastic. PARALLELS.
145d7 τῶνδε : "these here" refers to a silent audience. Cf. 147c8 αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν and
147d1 τῷ σῷ ὁμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει, which implies that one member
of the audience, another Socrates, is a fellow student of geometry.
145d7-8 ἆρ’ οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶν τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ
μανθάνει τις: Socrates builds in the assumptions 1) that there is such a
thing as τὸ μανθάνειν, 2) that there is such a thing as being σοφώτερος,
3) that there are degrees of being σοφός, and 4) that τὸ μανθάνειν is
περί τι. Cf. the built-in assumptions of Socrates' opening question at
Hp.Ma. 287c1-d3 and xxxxxx. Sph. 247a9-10 is different, pace
McDowell ad 145c7-146a1, for there Socrates is asking explicitly as part
of the argument and in the middle of the argument a question which
addresses the existence of the thing under discussion, namely, whether
what can be present to or absent from a thing itself is something. Here
he is building the assumption about a thing's existence into a question
which asks about what it is.
145d8 τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι: predicate terms presented as logically
or actually identical with the subject must take the article (KG 1.592,
citing this passage, 205b1, Hipparch. 284e, Grg. 483b, 489e, Cra.
417d, Smp. 204c and other authors: Sm. §1152). Hp. Ma. 287d4-6
illustrates the difference perfectly: 
{ΙΠ.} Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν δεῖται πυθέσθαι τί ἐστι καλόν; 
(5)
  {ΣΩ.} Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, ὦ Ἱππία.
145e5 Τί μήν: μήν is emphatic; Τί is "elliptical" with ἀλλά vel sim.
understood (ARE THERE INSTANCES WHERE IT IS EXPRESSED TO
SUPPORT THIS CLAIM?); the collocation Τί μήν often indicates emphatic
assent, "of course" (GP s.v. I 4 iii b and Sm. §2921). BUT DOES IT ALSO
INDICATE THAT THE SPEAKER WANTS TO HEAR MORE, LIKE "OF
COURSE, BUT WHAT OF IT?"
This is the first instance of this phrase in the Theaetetus. The phrase is
rare outside of Plato (CHECK THAT: ALSO NEED TO SEE IF THERE IS >1
TYPE OF Τί μήν;).
145e6 Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία: Socrates secures explicit
agreement to this commonplace of Platonic dialogues: cf.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

145e8-146a8
Socrates proposes the nature of knowledge as the topic and sets out some rules of
engagement.

First Socrates explicitly formulates the question which perplexes him, namely what
knowledge is. He picks ἐπιστήμη, not σοφία, as the object of inquiry, but
the immediately preceding agreement that they are the same should
mean that his question includes σοφία. Why he speaks of what it
“happens” rather than what it is is puzzling. “Happen to be” in English
at least, often implies that it could have been something else, which
one might think ought not to be true of knowledge, but given what
Pythagoras will be made to say later in the dialogue about knowledge
being different for different people, perhaps this “happens to be” is
purposely chosen as a sort of mini-provocation to think.
Socrates then lays out a proposed procedure for the attempt to answer his question. In
laying out the procedure, Socrates asks if "we" (ἔχομεν and later ἡμῶν and ἡμᾶς)
are able to say what knowledge is and what "you (pl.)" (φατέ and later σιγᾶτε) say
it is. "You" plural opens up the conversation to include Theodorus again. The idea of
being “king” seems to open it up to potentially others too (τῶνδε at 145d7), for it
makes little sense to be king of a kingdom with but one or perhaps two
subjects, although this is modeled on a children’s game and children’s
games might not balk at that. The proposed procedure will be that some one
person says his idea, and if he errs, he will sit down as the donkey (a term from a game:
see note write the note: cf. Euthd . 291b2-4 comparison with children playing (a
game?) ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα, ἀεὶ ᾠόμεθα
ἑκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήψεσθαι, αἱ δ’ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέφευγον.), but
whoever survives without error will be king over those present and will command what
he wants to answer (is that ambiguous between “will lay down a question which he
wants answered” and “will lay down what he wants to answer as the answer”?) .

As this game is apparently designed to have more than one round and is a procedure for
continued enquiry (ὁ δὲ ἁμαρτών, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ), and as the
conversation seems to be open to anyone present, it appears that the agreement Socrates
made with Theaetetus (145b1-7) and insisted that Theaetetus should follow(145c2-3) is
abandoned here, because it is only compatible with the opening round of the game and
then only if Theaetetus begins the game by offering himself as an instance of wisdom.

As an aside, it seems too that after this point the extreme carefulness to separate out basic
assumptions which was evidenced by 145d7-e7 is likewise abandoned, for no explicit use
is made of those basic assumptions, new terms are introduced without such care, and the
conversation becomes more exclusively about ἐπιστήμη. MAKE SURE THIS IS
tRUE, or better yet, erase this.

Probably after a suitable pause, when no one volunteers to speak, Socrates asks
Theodorus if he has made a faux pas in his eagerness to get "us" discussing and
addressing each other.

{ΣΩ.} Τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι

λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ποτὲ τυγχάνει ὄν.
146.
(a.) ἆρ’ οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν
πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ ἁμαρτών, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ,
καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος· ὃς
δ’ ἂν περιγένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει
ὅτι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. τί σιγᾶτε; οὔ τί που, ὦ (5)
Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος
ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους
ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι;

145e8 τοίνυν: GP 580.

145e8 ἀπορῶ: an important word in Socratic/Platonic scholarship.NOTE
ABOUT IT GOES HERE.
145e9 λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ: ANYthing to be gleaned from an
examination of these words about what S. is looking for, what
K is, etc.? Are they equivalent to “becoming wiser”?
How much emphasis to lay on ἱκανῶς? i.e. can he grasp it, just
not sufficiently? Is this part of the “I don’t know (under one
incredibly demanding notion of knowledge) anything”
phenomenon?
Is this expression used for knowing elsewhere?
Is παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ “on my own” or “for my part,” “to my
satisfaction,” or something else?
145e9 ὅτι ποτὲ τυγχάνει ὄν: "neuter singular happens to be" has a different flavor
than "is": Plato uses the specific phrase τυγχάνει ὄν a lot, as do other
philosophers, but not many other sorts of writers.
146a1-2 ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι: what specific flavor of optative?
146a2 ἀεὶ: NOTE ABOUT ἀεὶ=”in each case,” not “always” goes
here. Cf. Theages...
146a5-6 οὔ τί που: "surely not" expecting "no." KG 2.524, citing this
passage, R. 362d-3, Alc. I 113e1 and other authors. Is Prm. 138b5 an
instance? { - } Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἕν, μήτε ἐν αὑτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ
ἐνόν. { - } Οὐκ ἔστιν. not punctuated as a question. cf. also Prm.
161b6-7. Philebus 21a1? 31e3, 64d7? Smp. 21b7. also ou with
gar (sts. ara) in statements very frequent, always implying
assent to the negation.
146a6 που: GP 492.
146a6 φιλολογίας:
146a6 ἀγροικίζομαι:
146a7-8 φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους: is this just a casual sort of
“friends and conversation partners” or is it “allies by mutual
agreement with each other”?
προσηγόρ- search in Plato yields only this use for people, and one other
of things (R. 546b7).
Plut. Quaestiones Conviviales 678d6 seems to indicate that for Plut., the
word meant “conversational” in the sense of being within earshot, but
perhaps also friendly (speaking of size of a symposium).

146b1-146c6
Theodorus assures Socrates that Socrates has not committed a faux pas. Nonetheless,
Theodorus says he is too old to play that sort of game: he is unaccustomed to it and
unable to acquire the habit. That may be a gambit to avoid possibly losing face. And yet,
it’s not implausible and Theodorus gives a further reason: such efforts befit the young,
who benefit more (investigate that verb for intellectual progress) from them, because
they are more capable of progress. Theodorus, first saying Socrates should get one of the
youths present to answer him, then urges Socrates to continue what he started and
suggests Socrates should not let go of Theaetetus in particular, but rather should keep
asking him questions.
Stern, 55, is wrong to say that Theodorus "does not see, or does not wish to see, the
existence of inherently controversial issues," or "fails to see the importance of this study
(146b3)," for Theodorus uses positive terms to describe the enterprise Socrates proposes
and says that youth can make progress, both of which indicate appreciation, not a failure
or unwillingness to see what is at stake. He simply does not wish to engage with such
questions (perhaps he respects Socrates' "expertise" and fears embarrassment), which is a
far cry from denial or failure. Theodorus' silence is not in any obvious way "deafening" to
his students, as Stern claims it is. Far from it.
Socrates accedes and, further, supposes that Theaetetus will be reluctant to disobey
Theodorus, an older wiser person, for it would not be fitting. Thus Socrates pays
deference to Theodorus (or lets him off the hook gently and "sets the hook" in
Theaetetus, depending on how one sees it).
What is more, in a world in which the ability to speaking at length or briefly on a subject
and to teach others to do so, in which speech-writing is a new career, it is not terribly
implausible that Socrates’ particular brand of quick and short chopped-up conversation
exclusively focused on testing one’s ideas, their assumptions and logic is indeed not
something an older gentleman feels comfortable with. There is no need to read into
Theodorus’ words any heavy meaning, in other words. On the surface, they appear honest
and straightforward, and there are easily available honest and straightforward
interpretations.
Socrates asks Theaetetus to say what knowledge is. Theaetetus says that since they
(plural) bid him, it is right, "because" (γάρ) they will correct him if he misses the mark a
bit. THat gar is fishy: it does not really justify what preceeds: perhaps it is
justifying THt.'s assent to answer. Socrates agrees to do so, if they are able. Note that
Theaetetus has added to the procedure: instead of merely sitting down as the "donkey," if
he misses the mark, a plural "you" will set him straight. The "you" includes at least
Socrates and Theodorus, and perhaps the audience. Thus Theaetetus insists on a mutually
supportive effort, not an eristic one.

(146b1)
(b.) {ΘΕΟ.} Ἥκιστα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη
ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι·
ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδ’ αὖ
συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω. τοῖσδε δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο
καὶ πολὺ πλέον ἐπιδιδοῖεν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν (5)
ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ’, ὥσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου
ἀλλ’ ἐρώτα.
{ΣΩ.} Ἀκούεις δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ᾧ
(c.) ἀπειθεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ
τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν.
ἀλλ’ εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη;
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλὰ χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε.
πάντως γάρ, ἄν τι καὶ ἁμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε. (5)
{ΣΩ.} Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε οἷοί τε ὦμεν.

146b2 ἀλλὰ: GP 6.
146b3 διαλέκτου: this word and its adjectival form διαλεκτικός
wavers between being an ordinary word and being a technical term for
a form of discourse: Brickhouse and Smith on "method"?
for non-technical uses, cf. Crat. 390c10-11 Τὸν δὲ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ
ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον ἄλλο τι σὺ καλεῖς ἢ διαλεκτικόν;
Smp. 203a3, ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, Ly. 211b8 and
9
For uses verging on technical, cf. Sph. 253e4-6 Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε
διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε
καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι; Plt. 285d4-6 (slightly truncated) ἡ
περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζήτησις … ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ τούτου προβέβληται
… τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικωτέροις γίγνεσθαι (287a3 also has
comparative διαλεκτικωτέρους (it's rather frequent and not
essential to this note, so pursue it later if need be); Men.
75d4-5 (perhaps this one should be under technical
"discussion" is different from disputatious discussion: one must
answer truly and in terms the interlocutor understands); R.
454a8 (quarrel is different from discussion)
For more technical uses, cf. Phlb. 17a3-4 (a distinction between
eristic and dialectic), Phdr. 266c1 διαλεκτικούς, c8 διαλεκτικὸν
(distinguished from τὸ ῥητορικόν), 276e5 τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ,
Euthd. 290c5, R. 531d9 διαλεκτικοί, 532b4 διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην
τὴν πορείαν, 533c7 ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος, 534b3 διαλεκτικὸν
καλεῖς τὸν λόγον, 534e3 ἡ διαλεκτική, 536d6 τῆς διαλεκτικῆς,
537c6 διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως, 537c7 ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς
διαλεκτικός
Not listed are several uses in [Def.] all of which are not technical.
cf. 183b6.
146b4 συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω: ἡλικίαν ἔχω + inf. normally without
article: cf. La. 187c8-d1 ἡλικίαν ἔχουσι παιδεύεσθαι, Ep. VII 350d1 οὔτ’
οὖν ἡλικίαν ἔχω συμπολεμεῖν. Cf. Arist. HA 574b14 ἡλικίαν ἔχωσι τοῦ
ὀχεύεσθαι, Politics 1336b18 τοὺς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας [ἔτι] τὴν
ἱκνουμένην (is this with article, or does the participle make the
article necessary?), Isaeus de Menecle 4 ἡλικίαν εἶχεν ἀνδρὶ
συνοικεῖν, de Cirone 8 συνοικεῖν εἶχεν ἡλικίαν.
146b5 ἐπιδιδοῖεν: do search on this and = terms (ἐπίδοσιν).
146b5 γὰρ: GP 98n.
146b6 ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει: "is capable of progress" (LSJ ἐπίδοσις IV).
146b8-c2 ᾧ ἀπειθεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν: simply
REDUNDANT? does it add to say "will be willing to disobey" instead of "will
disobey" aside from making the implicit explicit? factors: such material, wise man,
older man.
146c3 εὖ καὶ γενναίως: echoes 144d5 Γεννικὸν and echoed at 146d3
with Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως.
146c4-5 Ἀλλὰ χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ,
ἄν τι καὶ ἁμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε: note emphatic ὑμεῖς. Cf. Ly. 211b6-8
Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ποιεῖν ταῦτα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σὺ κελεύεις. ἀλλὰ ὅρα
ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, ἐάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρῇ ὁ Μενέξενος· ἢ οὐκ
οἶσθα ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐστιν;
146c5 καὶ: GP 300 and 303.