4. LAMBO (employee) vs NLRC, J.C.
Tailor Shop (PR)-employer
3. Pondoc (employee) vs. NLRC, Eulalio (PR)-employer
1. Natividad Pondoc- wife of Andres; After her death she’s substituted by Hipolito her son.
2. Eulalio- owner of business of buying and selling copra, etc.
3. Andres was employed by PR as a laborer.
4. Natividad on behalf of her husband, filed complaint for salary differential, overtime pay, 13th month pay, holiday
pay and other money claims before the Sub-Regional Arbitration of NLRC,
5. PR questioned existence of employer-employee relationship between them.
6. LA infav. of Natividad
7. On his last day to perfect an appeal, PR filed manifestation before LA praying that his liabilities be set-off against
Pondoc’s alleged indebtedness to him w/c LA denied, and LA issued a writ of execution
8. Before execution be implemented, PR was able to obtain restraining order from NLRC, where he filed Petition
for "Injunction and Damages
9. NLRC infav. of PR as it allowed compensation between Pondoc monetary award and her alleged indebtedness
to PR, hence PR is directed to pay Pondoc P3,066.65
10. Pondoc’s MR denied hence filed certiorari under Rule 65
ISSUE: W/n the 5th Div.of (NLRC) can validly defeat a final judgment of LA in favor of complainant Pondoc by: (a)
entertaining a Pet. for injunction and damages, and an appeal from LA denial of a claim for set-off based on an
alleged indebtedness of the laborer and order of execution of the final judgment; and (b) thereafter, by receiving
evidence and adjudging recovery on such indebtedness and authorizing it to offset the Labor Arbiters final award
SC: NO. 1.Proceedings before NLRC were fatally flawed.
2. NLRC should not have entertained PR independent Pet. for Injunction and Damages since it’s a scheme to defeat
or obstruct the enforcement of judgment of LA where a writ of execution had been issued.
3. Art. 218(e) of Labor Code not provide blanket authority to NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction,
while Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an Ancillary remedy in ordinary
labor disputes such as the one brought by Pondoc.
- ancillary power may be exercised by LA only as an incident to cases pending before them to preserve rights of
parties during pendency of case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout.
4. Pet. or motion for Prelim.injunction should have been filed in appeal by PR in NLRC
5. Appeal of PR in NLRC not from decision therein, but from order of LA denying the set-off hence PR admitted the
final and executory character of the judgment.
6. Set-off should be denied as there’s want of evidence that indebtedness asserted by PR against Pondoc arose
out from employer-employee relationship between them.
-LA not then have jurisdiction over the claim as per Par (a) of Art. 217 of LC, LA have exclusive and original
jurisdiction only in ULP, termination disputes, etc.
-Par (b)- NLRC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by LA. This simply means that NLRC does
not have original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Par (a) and if a claim does not fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the labor Arbiter, NLRC cannot have appellate jurisdiction thereon.
- Hence, NLRC was without jurisdiction, either original or appellate, to receive evidence on alleged indebtedness,
render judgment thereon, and direct that its award be set-off against the final judgment of LA.
7. Even assuming that claim for alleged indebtedness fell within original jurisdiction of LA, it was deemed waived
for not having been pleaded as affirmative defense or barred for not having been set up as a counterclaim before
the LA at any time prior to rendition of decision therein.
1. Pet. was employed as tailors by PR; regardless of pieces they finished in a day, they were each given a daily pay
of at least P64.00.
2. Lambo. et. Al (Pets) filed a complaint against PR for illegal dismissal and sought recovery of overtime pay, etc.
3. LA infav. of Pets. Holding PR guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered them to pay Pets. of amt. P94,719.20
4. NLRC reversed LA holding that Pets. not been dismissed but merely threatened w/ closure of business if they
insisted on their demand for straight payment of their minimum wage, holding Pets. guilty of abandonment of
work, dismissing their claims except that for 13th month pay.
5. PR invoke a compromise agreement between them and Pets. whereby in consideration of the sum of 10K, Pet.
absolved PR from liability for money claims or any other obligations.
ISSUE: W/n said compromise agreement/waiver is valid
SC: NO. 1. not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy; invalid are: (a) clear proof that waiver was
obtained from an unsuspecting person or (b) terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face
2. Since LA gave Pet. total award of P94,719.20, amt. of P10,000.00 to cover all monetary claims is clearly
unconscionable.
3. Subordinate position of employee vis-a-vis management renders him vulnerable to its importunings, and
intimidations, hence waiving benefits to which he is clearly entitled. Hence, quitclaims, waivers or releases are
looked upon w/ disfavor for being contrary to public policy
4. An employee who is merely constrained to accept wages paid to him is not precluded from recovering the
difference between amount he actually received and amount which he should have received.
Collateral Ruling:
1. Pets. were employees of PR although they were paid not on the basis of time spent on job but according to the
quantity and quality of work produced by them.
-2 kinds of employees paid by results: (a) those whose time and performance are supervised by the employer;
(b)whose time and performance are unsupervised. Pets. belong to 1st category- supervised employees.
3, PR exercised control over Pets’ work. As tailors, Pets. worked in the companys premises from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00
p.m. daily, their work as tailors was necessary or desirable in the usual business of PR, engaged in tailoring
business; (2) Pets worked for PR throughout year, (3) Pets. worked for PR for more than one year.
4. To justify a finding of abandonment of work, there must be proof of a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the
part of an employee to resume his employment. The burden of proof is on the employer, w/c PR respondents
failed to discharge; evidence shows that Pets. lost no time in filing case for illegal dismissal against PR negating any
intention on their part to sever their employment relationship; Abandonment is a matter of intention; it cannot
be inferred or presumed from equivocal acts.
5. JGB (employer) vs NLRC, Arturo (PR)- employee
1. PR was hired by JGB. for its principal, Tariq Hajj Architects, to work as draftsman in Saudi
2. Before expiration of his contract, PR was given notice by his employer that his employment was terminated
since his performance in productivity and efficiency was below average; termination of his employment took effect
on same day.
3. PR filed w/ POEA a complaint against JGB alleging illegal dismissal and seeking payment of salaries corresponding
to unexpired portion of his employment contract, salary differential, refund of S.R. 1,000 which was withheld from
him;
4. JGB Averred: PR was dismissed for neglect of duties; though no prior notice of dismissal was given to PR, he was
given a notice pay equivalent to one month salary; invoked a quitclaim signed by PR as evidence that JGB paid all
the monetary claims due PR.
5. POEA dismissed PR complaint for illegal dismissal but ordered payment of SR1,000 representing the refund
6. NLRC found dismissal illegal and ordered JGB to pay PR.
ISSUE: W/n quitclaim signed by PR a bar to filing of the complaint NLRC gravely abused its discretion in reversing
POEA and ruling that PR was illegally dismissed.
SC: NO. 1. Deed of release or quitclaim can not bar an employee from demanding what is legally due him. The
reason for this is that the employee does not really stand on an equal footing with his employer.
-PR was made to sign the deed of quitclaim in this case on the same day he was dismissed. He was in a foreign
country and he had no one to help him. In 3 days he was due for repatriation to Philippines. He had no means of
questioning his employers’ acts. He had no choice but to accept what was being offered to him. Necessitous men
are not free men.
- fact that PR had to be granted by POEA salary differential for 9 months and ordered reimbursed in amount of
1,000 Saudi Riyal belies the claim that PR had been paid everything legally due to him.
2. Employees enjoy security of tenure; they can only be dismissed for just cause and only after due process.
-PR was not only dismissed w/o cause but his dismissal was made without due process. He was informed of the
reason for his dismissal only at the time his employment was terminated. Giving him notice pay equivalent to his
one month salary in lieu of the notice in the contract of employment could not take the place of notice before
dismissal as required by law. The notice required is not a mere technicality but a requirement of due process to
6. ABS CBN SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES UNION MEMBER (Union) VS ABS CBN BROADCASTING CORP (company)
1. Union (the Company) signed and concluded a CBA with check-off provision- advance to Union a sum equivalent
to 10% of the sum total of all the salary increases and signing bonuses granted to Supervisors to cover the Unions
incidental expenses, including attorneys fees, etc.
2. Union filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, DOLE-NCR Complaint against Union Officers and Company
praying that special assessment of (10%) be declared illegal
3. Company Answer- check-off provision is in accordance w/ law as majority of Union
members individually executed a written authorization giving a blanket authority to deduct subject amount.
4. Med-Arbiter infav. of Union declaring special assessment illegal
5. DOLE Undersecretary affirmed Med-Arbiter.
6. Undersecretary B.E. Laguesma issued an Orde setting aside the Complaint of Union
ISSUE: W/n check-off provision in this case is valid
SC: YES. 1. "A check-off is a process or device whereby employer, on agreement w/ Union, recognized as proper
bargaining representative, or on prior authorization from its employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from
the latter's wages and remits them directly to the union; primarily for benefit of Union and only indirectly, for
individual employees.
-Article 222 [b] of LC- prohibited payment of atty’s fees only when it is effected thru forced contributions from
workers from their own funds as distinguished from union funds.
2. Article 241- (3) requisites for special assessment for Union's incidental expenses, attorney's fees and as
stipulated in CBA, be valid and upheld : a.) authorization by written resolution of majority of all members at the
general membership meeting duly called for purpose; (b) secretary's record of minutes of meeting;c.) individual
written authorization for check-off duly signed by the employee concerned.
-all are met in this case
- Union held its general meeting, whereat it was agreed that (10%) special assessment would be checked-off;
minutes of meeting were recorded by Union's Secretary and noted by its President
- Union held its General Membership Meeting, wherein majority of members agreed that "since Union already paid
Atty Pascual. the same must be shared by all members until this is fully liquidated.
- (85) members of Union executed individual written authorizations for check-off w/c are not under force or
compulsion, hence presumption that check-off authorizations were executed voluntarily by signatories thereto.
-Union’s contention that amount to be deducted is uncertain is not persuasive because check-off authorization
clearly stated that the sum to be deducted is equivalent to (10%) of all and whatever benefits may accrue under
the CBA. In other words, although the amount is not fixed, it is determinable.
3. Subject Article not state that general membership meeting should be called after conclusion of CBA, Assuming
that the general meeting should be held after the conclusion of CBA, such requirement was complied with since
General Membership Meeting in this case was held after conclusion of CBA
4. Prohibition against payment of attorneys fees only when it is effected through forced contributions from the
workers from their own funds a distinguished from the union funds.
-Rationale- prevent imposition on workers of duty to individually contribute their respective shares in fee to be
paid the attorney for his services on behalf of the union in its negotiations with the management
-No deductions were taken from the other workers who did not sign the resolution and so were not bound by it.
-(20) of (42) union members in this case executed as Compromise Agreement ratifying check-off provision in CBA.
5. a. ) prohibition against attorneys fees in Article 222, paragraph (b) of LC applies only when the payment of
attorneys fees is effected through forced contributions from the workers; and (b) no deductions must be taken
from workers who did not sign the check-off authorization, applies to the case under consideration.
-DOLE Undersecretary Laguesma’s decision is AFFIRMED except that no deductions shall be taken from the
workers who did not give their individual written check-off authorization.
7. DAYAG (employee) VS CANIZARES 8. PHILTRANCO VS NLRC

1. Pets. filed complaint in NCR Arbitration Branch of NLRC for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages against 1. Nieva- employed as a driver by Philtranco assigned to the Legaspi City-Pasay City route; Nieva sideswiped an
Young, a building contractor owner-type jeep, owner is a PC colonel who arrested Nieva and criminal complaint was filed against him.

-they were hired to work as tower crane operators at Young’s construction site at Metro Manila; were transferred
to Cebu City
2. Young filed motion to transfer the case to Regional Arbitration of NLRC claiming that workplace where Pets.
were regularly assigned was in Cebu City and pursuant to New Rules of Procedure of NLRC the case should have
been filed in Cebu City; submitted certificate of registration, business permit showing his companys address as
Cebu City;
3. Pets. Opposition- all of them, except one, were residents of Metro Manila and that they could not afford trips
to Cebu City; Young had its main office in Quezon City.
-Nieva obtained his release from detention by virtue of a bail bond secured by Philtranco; was re-arrested on the
ground that his bail bond was fake; advised by Philtrancos to refrain from driving until a settlement could be
reached ; Nieva reported for work, but he was requested to file a new application as he was no longer considered
an employee of Philtranco, allegedly for being absent without leave
2. Nieva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, etc. w/ NLRCs NCR Arbitration Branch in Manila,
3. Philtranco’s a position paper w/ motion to dismiss, stating,- complaint should have been lodged with NLRCs
Regional Arbitration Branch in Legaspi City, not only because Nieva was a resident thereof, but also because the
latter was hired, assigned, and based in Legaspi City

-Young’s Reply- Quezon City address was not his principal place of business, but actually his residence, 4. LA denied MTD and ruled infav. Of Nieva.

4. LA infav. of Young granted motion and ordered transmittal of case to regional arbitration branch of Region VII. 5. Philtranco’s MR denied by the NLRC
5. NLRC dismissed appeal of Pets.
ISSUE: W/n NLRCs NCR Arbitration Branch in Manila is a proper venue
6. Pet’s MR granted by NLRC w/c remanded the case to Arbitration branch of NCR
SC: YES. 1. See Dayag’s ruling
7. Young’s MR granted by NLRC directing transfer of the case to Cebu City.
2. National Capital Region Arbitration Branch was proper, Manila being considered as part of Nievas workplace by
ISSUE: is Arbitration branch of NCR proper venue reason of his plying the Legaspi City-Pasay City route.

SC: YES. 1. Even if Young’s motion to transfer venue was actually a position paper, there’s no waiver of improper
venue if party questions venue simultaneously with filing of position paper.

2. question of venue essentially pertains to trial and relates more to convenience of parties rather than upon
substance and merits of the case; uses the word may, allowing a different venue when the interests of substantial
justice demand a different one.

3. Rationale: worker, being economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant or as respondent, the

nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other
party is not to be given the choice of another competent agency sitting in another place as this will unduly burden
the former.

4. In the case at hand, the ruling specifying the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch as the venue of the
present action cannot be considered oppressive to Young. His residence in Corinthian Gardens also serves as his
correspondent office. Certainly, the filing of the suit in the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch in Manila
will not cause him as much inconvenience as it would the petitioners, who are now residents of Metro Manila, if
the same was heard in Cebu. Hearing the case in Manila would clearly expedite proceedings and bring about the
speedy resolution of instant case.
10. Session vs CA

G.R. No. 172149 February 8, 2010

SESSION DELIGHTS ICE CREAM AND FAST FOODS vs. CA

FACTS:

Adonis Flora filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Session Delights, which was ruled favourably
by the Labor Arbiter. The decision ordered Session Delights to pay Flora back wages, separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement, indemnity and attorney’s fees. Upon appeal, NLRC also ruled in favor of
complainant. CA Decision affirmed but deleted the proportional 13th month pay and the award of
indemnity (P5000) for failure to observe due process. In the course of the execution of the judgement,
the Finance Analyst submitted an updated computation of the award which included the proportionate
amount of 13th month pay. This was objected by Session, claiming that this was not consistent with the
decision but the same was denied by NLRC. The CA, however, partially granted the petition by deleting
the awarded proportionate 13th month pay.

ISSUE: WON the updated computation was proper

Held: Yes, the updated computation was proper. The issue in the case at bar is not the correctness of
the awards, the finality of the CA’s judgment, nor the petitioner’s failure to appeal. Rather, it is the
propriety of the computation of the awards made, whether this violated the principle of immutability
of final judgments.

The question is whether a re-computation in the course of execution, of the labor arbiter’s original
computation of the awards made pegged as of the time the decision was rendered and confirmed with
modification by a final CA decision, is legally proper.

The Court held that under the terms of the decision under execution, no essential change is made by
a re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of
dismissal declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an original computation, if no previous
computation has been made) is a part of the law – specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the
established jurisprudence on this provision – that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal
dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of
the Labor Code. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The
illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of the monetary consequences of this dismissal is
affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.

Assailed decision is AFFIRMED. Labor Arbiter is asked to conduct another RE-COMPUTATION to

determine actual award based on Court’s directives.
9. Leonis vs. Villameter
1. (Villamater)- hired as Chief Engineer for ship MV Nord owned by petitioner World Marine Panama, S.A., through
the services of petitioner Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. (Leonis), as the latter’s local manning agent.
2. four (4) months after his deployment, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and was given a blood transfusion;
later repatriated
3. Villamater filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the (NLRC) for payment of permanent and total
disability benefits
4. LA in favor of Villamater holding that his illness compensable, but denying moral and exemplary damages.
5. NLRC affirmed.
6. Pet’s MR denied, hence filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of Rules of Court before CA. w/c dismissed
Pet.
1. CA dismissed the petition, considering that Resolution of the NLRC had already become final and executory on
and the same was already recorded in the NLRC Book of Entries of Judgments; and that (2) the award of the Labor
Arbiter was already executed, thus, the case was closed and terminated.
2. Petitioners received the June 15, 2004 resolution of NLRC, denying their MR, on June 16, 2004. They filed their
petition for certiorari before the CA only on August 9, 2004, or 54 calendar days from the date of notice of the
June 15, 2004 resolution. Considering that the above-mentioned 10-day period had lapsed without petitioners
filing the appropriate appeal, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment dated June 28, 2004.
3. Because of finality of June 15, 2004 NLRC resolution, LA issued on July 29, 2004 a Writ of
Execution.15 Consequently, Leonis voluntarily paid Villamater’s widow, Sonia M. Villamater (Sonia) and following
the complete satisfaction of judgment award, LA issued an Order that case is CLOSED and TERMINATED.
4. Petitioners never moved for reconsideration of this Order regarding the voluntariness of their payment to Sonia,
as well as the dismissal with prejudice and the concomitant termination of the case.
5. However, Pet. argued that the finality of the case did not render the petition for certiorari before the CA moot
and academic.
SC: agree on Pet on that matter
1. judicial review of decisions of NLRC is sought via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and the petition should
be filed before the CA, following the strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. Under Rule 65, Pets are allowed
(60) days from notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Thus, although the
petition was not filed within the 10-day period, petitioners reasonably filed their petition for certiorari before the
CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.
2. Further, Pet. for certiorari does not normally include an inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation of the
evidence. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special
civil action for certiorari, which is merely confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is, thus,
incumbent upon petitioners to satisfactorily establish that the NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically in order
that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie.
-grave abuse of discretion- capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.
-CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution,
committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, disregarding evidence that is material to or
decisive of the controversy; if CA grants the petition and nullifies the decision of NLRC on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision of the NLRC is, in contemplation of
law, null and void ab initio; hence, the decision or resolution never became final and executory.
-Simply put, the execution of the final and executory decision or resolution of NLRC shall proceed despite the
pendency of a petition for certiorari, unless it is restrained by the proper court.
-In the present case, petitioners already paid Villamater’s widow, Sonia, the amount representing the total and
permanent disability award plus attorney’s fees, pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by LA. Thereafter, an
Order was issued declaring the case as "closed and terminated." However, although there was no MR of this last
Order, Sonia was estopped from claiming that the controversy had already reached its end with the issuance of
the Order closing and terminating the case. This is because the Acknowledgment Receipt she signed when she
received petitioners’ payment was without prejudice to final outcome of Pet- certiorari pending before the CA.
It is true that under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Contract, only two types of cancers are listed as
occupational diseases – (1) Cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder (papilloma of the bladder); and (2) cancer,
epithellematous or ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral
oil or paraffin,
-In the case of Villamater, it is manifest that the interplay of age, hereditary, and dietary factors contributed to the
development of colon cancer. By the time he signed his employment contract on June 4, 2002, he was already 58
years old, having been born on October 5, 1943,38 an age at which the incidence of colon cancer is more likely.39He
had a familial history of colon cancer, with a brother who succumbed to death and an uncle who underwent
surgery for the same illness.40 Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found his illness to be compensable for
permanent and total disability, because they found that his dietary provisions while at sea increased his risk of
contracting colon cancer because he had no choice of what to eat on board except those provided on the vessels
-Villamater cited that the foods provided on board the vessels were mostly meat, high in fat and high in cholesterol.
Pets. were silent when they argued that Villamater’s affliction was brought about by diet and genetics. It was only
after LA issued his Decision, finding colon cancer to be compensable because the risk was increased by the victuals
provided on board, that Pets. started claiming that the foods available on the vessels also consisted of fresh fruits
and vegetables, suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the
term of his employment.42
-SC sustained LA and the NLRC in granting total and permanent disability benefits in favor of Villamater, as it was
sufficiently shown that his having contracted colon cancer was, at the very least, aggravated by his working
conditions,43 taking into consideration his dietary provisions on board, his age, and his job as Chief Engineer, who
was primarily in charge of the technical and mechanical operations of the vessels to ensure voyage safety.
Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-
connection and not direct causal relation is required. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test
of proof in compensation proceedings.4
10. Session vs CA
G.R. No. 172149 February 8, 2010

SESSION DELIGHTS ICE CREAM AND FAST FOODS vs. CA

FACTS:

Adonis Flora filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Session Delights, which was ruled favourably
by the Labor Arbiter. The decision ordered Session Delights to pay Flora back wages, separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement, indemnity and attorney’s fees. Upon appeal, NLRC also ruled in favor of
complainant. CA Decision affirmed but deleted the proportional 13th month pay and the award of
indemnity (P5000) for failure to observe due process. In the course of the execution of the judgement,
the Finance Analyst submitted an updated computation of the award which included the proportionate
amount of 13th month pay. This was objected by Session, claiming that this was not consistent with the
decision but the same was denied by NLRC. The CA, however, partially granted the petition by deleting
the awarded proportionate 13th month pay.

ISSUE: WON the updated computation was proper

Held: Yes, the updated computation was proper. The issue in the case at bar is not the correctness of
the awards, the finality of the CA’s judgment, nor the petitioner’s failure to appeal. Rather, it is the
propriety of the computation of the awards made, whether this violated the principle of immutability
of final judgments.

The question is whether a re-computation in the course of execution, of the labor arbiter’s original
computation of the awards made pegged as of the time the decision was rendered and confirmed with
modification by a final CA decision, is legally proper.

The Court held that under the terms of the decision under execution, no essential change is made by
a re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of
dismissal declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an original computation, if no previous
computation has been made) is a part of the law – specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the
established jurisprudence on this provision – that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal
dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of
the Labor Code. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The
illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of the monetary consequences of this dismissal is
affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.

Assailed decision is AFFIRMED. Labor Arbiter is asked to conduct another RE-COMPUTATION to

determine actual award based on Court’s directives.
SESSION DELIGHTS ICE CREAM AND FAST FOODS vs. CA, NLRC, ADONIS ARMENIO FLORA(PR)
1. PR filed against Session Complaint for illegal dismissal
2. LA Feb 8 2001 Decision infav. of PR; he was illeg. dismissed; awarded backwages, sep. pay instead of
reinstatement, indemnity, and atty’s fees;
3. Session’s appeal- NLRC affirmed LA
5. No error in CA decision confirming re-computation; for pure money claim for a specific sum computation would
have continuing currency because the sum is specific and any variation may only be on interests that may run from
finality of decision ordering payment of specific sum; for claim relating to status, it’s declaratory
7. basis for computation of separation pay and backwages is Art. 279 of Labor Code- illeg. dismissed employee
entitled to monetary award from time his compensation was withheld up to time of his actual reinstatement;
separation pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement.

4. Session’s Pet. for Certiorari in CA affirmed w/ modif. NLRC decision by deleting 13th month pay and indemnity. -What Session simply disputes is re-computation of award when final CA decision did not order any re-computation
while NLRC decision that CA affirmed and LA decision the NLRC affirmed, already made a computation that on the
-CA decision became final per Entry of Judgment (July 29 2003) basis of immutability of judgment should not now be disturbed.

5. During execution of final judgment, Finance Analyst of LA held a pre-execution conference, submitted
updated computation of monetary awards in total of P235,986.00; this included additional backwages and
separation pay computed from March 1, 2001 to September 17, 2003, and 13th month pay; LA approved updated
computation
6. Session objected to re-computation and appealed LA order to NLRC as updated comput. was inconsistent w/
disp. Portion (DP) of LA decision as modified by CA; NLRC affirmed LA decision of updated comput.
7. Session filed certiortari Rule 65 w/ CA w/c partially granted Pet. by deleting 13th month pay; hence CA ordered
LA to compute only: backwages, separation pay, atty’s fees, legal interest from July 29 2003
8. Session’s Cont- amts. that accrued during pendency of Session’s recourses w/ NLRC & CA cannot be
implemented as part of final and executory judgment; DP remains directive that should be enforced
ISSUE: W/n the final and executory decision (LA decision February 8, 2001, as affirmed w/ modif. by CA) may be
enforced beyond terms decreed in its DP = YES
8. no essential change is made by re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from nature
of illegality of dismissal; re-computation is part of Art. 279 for reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction;
illegal dismissal ruling stands; only computation of monetary consequences is affected not viol. of immutability
9. Amt. Session shall now pay greatly increased as it’s the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses
against LA decision.
-Art. 279 provides consequences of illeg. Dismissal; finality of illeg. dismissal decision becomes reckoning point
instead of the reinstatement. In allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the
employment relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point;
decision becomes judgment for money from w/c there’s payment of interest in case of delay w/c CA correctly
decreed when it provided for payment of legal interest of 12% from finality of judgment
Awards: backwages, sep. pay, legal interest, atty’s fees

SC: 1. frown on delay of execution of judgment but admit that delay sometimes is unavoidable like when execution
is not in accord. w/ disp. Portion of judgment;

DP- w/c entities charged w/ execution of final judgment must enforce to ensure validity of execution

-principle of its immutability-final judgment may no longer be amended even to correct what’s erroneous
conclusion of fact or law regardless of what court of land renders it

2. LA decision already provided for computation of payable separation pay and backwages and did
not literally order computation of monetary awards up to time of finality of judgment not contested by PR;

-While PR failed to appeal LA decision, failure made awards granted to him final so that he could no longer seek
any other affirmative relief, but higher tribunals, may reverse/ affirm judgment on appeal

3. issue not correctness of the awards, nor finality of CAs judgment, but propriety of computation of awards made,
and, whether this violated the principle of immutability of final judgments.

4. LA decision w/ 2 parts: a. 1st PART- finding of illegality of dismissal and awards cannot be disputed because
confirmed w/finality; b.) 2nd PART- computation of awards w/c is time-bound and can be re-computed.