Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
VIII.C
• VIUDA DE CAMILO V. ARANIO, L-15653, SEPTEMBER
29, 1961MARCELO
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; INTERPLEADER; NO
CONFLICTING CLAIMS; COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER
WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION. — It appearing that there is no
conflicting claims among the defendants — their respective
claims being separate and distinct from the other — and
that the plaintiffs have interest (the prolongation of their
occupancy or possession of the portions encroached upon
by them), the requirements for an action to interplead do not
exist, and consequently, the complaint of interpleader in
question is without cause of action.
2. COURTS; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; JURISDICTION;
ACTION INVOLVE TITLE TO REALTY; SUBJECT-MATTER
INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION. — As the action
for interpleader would necessarily involve title to or
possession of real property or any interest therein, and
that the subject-matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation
(there being no showing that rentals were asked by the
petitioners from the respondents), the case would come
under the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
(Sec 44, pars. (a) and (b), Judiciary Act).
FACTS:
Petitioner Petra Carpio Vda. de Camilo, had been by herself
and predecessors-in-interest in peaceful, open and adverse
possession of a parcel of public foreshore land, wherein a
commercial building stood.
The other petitioners, Severino Estrada, Felisa, Susana,
Antonio and the minors Isabelo, Rene and Ruben, all
surnamed Francisco, the said minors represented by their
mother Susana, had also been in possession in common
peaceful, open and adverse, of a parcel of public foreshore
land is adjoining that land occupied by de Camilo. There is also
a commercial building here erected by the Franciscos.
Respondent Ong Peng Kee was a lessee of one of the
apartments of said commercial building of Petra.
Arthur Evert Bannister filed an unlawful detainer case against
both De Camilo and Ong Peng Kee with the Justice of Peace
(JP). Bannister was declared in default and P100.00 was
awarded to De Camilo on her counterclaim.
The two commercial buildings were burned down. Thereafter,
respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong, constructed a
building of their own. The building, however, was so built that
portions of the lands previously occupied by petitioners (De
Camilo and the Franciscos) were encroached upon.
De Camilo filed a civil action for Forcible Entry against Ong
Peng Kee and Adelia Ong with the Justice of Peace (JP) of
Malangas, with respect to the portion belonging to her
wherein the building of Ong Peng Kee was erected.
Severino Estrada and the Franciscos filed a similar case
Pending trial of the two cases, the respondents Ong Peng Kee
and Adelia Ong filed a complaint for Interpleader against De
Camilo, Severino Estrada, the Franciscos, Arthur Evert
Bannister, the Mayor and Treasurer of Malangas.
Ong Peng Kee alleges that the filing of the three cases (by
Bannister, de Camilo, and Francisco), indicated that the
defendants (in the Interpleader) had conflicting interests,
since they all claimed to be entitled to the possession of the
lot in question and they (Peng Kee and Adelia), could not
determine without hazard to themselves who of the
defendants was entitled to the possession. Interpleader
plaintiffs further alleged that they had no interest in the
property other than as mere lessees.
Motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners alleging, inter
alia, that the Interpleader case lacks of cause of action.
JP denied the motion. Appeal was made with the CFI.
ISSUES:
a. WON the interpleader lacks a cause of action
b. Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the Interpleader case.
HELD:
Cause of Action.
Yes.
The petitioners claimed the possession of the respective
portion of the lands belonging to them on which the
respondents had erected their house after the fire which
destroyed petitioners' buildings. This being the case, the
contention of petitioners-appellants that the complaint to
interplead, lacked cause of action, is correct.
Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides —
"Interpleader when proper . — Whenever conflicting claims
upon the same subject-matter are or may be made against
a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject-
matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  1

disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate
their several claims among themselves."
The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the
respondents. Their respective claim was separate and
distinct from the other. De Camilo only wanted the
respondents to vacate that portion of her property which was
encroached upon by them when they erected their building.
The same is true with Estrada and the Franciscos. They
claimed possession of two different parcels of land, of
different areas, adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not
true that respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong did not
have any interest, in the subject-matter. Their interest was the
prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the portions
encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the
requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not exist.
Jurisdiction
No.
The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead, practically
took the case out of the jurisdiction of the JP court, because
the action would then necessarily "involve the title to or
possession of real property or any interest therein" over
which the CFI has original jurisdiction (par. [b], sec. 44,
Judiciary Act, as amended). Then also, the subject-matter of
the complaint (interpleader) would come under the original
jurisdiction of the CFI, because it would not be capable of
pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, par. [a], Judiciary Act), there
having been no showing that rentals were asked by the
petitioners from respondents.
BAR TYPE QUESTION:
A owns a parcel of land with a commercial building with B as
lessee. C and D also owns a parcel of land adjoining than of A.
Fire burned both the commercial buildings. B, thereafter
erected his own building on the lands previously occupied by
A, C and D.
A, C, and D subsequently filed for forcible entry with respect
to land belonging to them where B built his building. B filed
an action for interpleader alleging A, C and D have conflicting
interest over the parcel of land.
If you are the judge. How will you settle the case? (W.W.J.D.)
• WACK-WACK GOLF V. LEE WON, L-23851, MARCH 26,
1976 VALDEZ
Doctrine:
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
The interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Petitioner
had already been made independently liable in Civil Case No.
26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader
would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment
in the said civil case.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is
too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against
him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially
where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment
was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is
obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the
latter.
LONG DIGEST
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, in civil case 7656, dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's
complaint of interpleader upon the grounds of failure to state
a cause of action and res judicata.
In its amended and supplemental complaint, the Wack Wack
Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic
corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines,
with principal office in Mandaluyong, Rizal, alleged, for its
first cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims
ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of
the decision rendered in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila
and also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no.
1478 issued by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy clerk of court of
the said CFI of Manila, for and in behalf of the president and
the secretary of the Corporation and of the People's Bank &
Trust Company as transfer agent of the said Corporation; that
the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to
be lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate
201 by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no.
1199 issued to him pursuant to an assignment made in his
favor by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and
holder of membership fee certificate 201; that it has no means
of determining who of the two defendants is the lawful owner
thereof; that it is without power to issue two separate
certificates for the same membership fee certificate 201, or to
issue another membership fee certificate to the defendant
Lee, without violating its articles of incorporation and by-
laws; and that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no.
1199 held by the defendant Tan and the membership fee
certificate 201-serial No. 1478 issued to the defendant Lee
proceed from the same membership fee certificate 201,
originally issued in the name of "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz".
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  2

For its second cause of action. it alleged that the membership
fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk
of court of court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the
Corporation is null and void because it is issued in violation of
its by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of
the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before
issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate
duly signed by its president and secretary, aside from the fact
that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 is not
binding upon the defendant Tan.
The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring
Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims;
and (b) judgment be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of
the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201,
and ordering the surrender and cancellation of membership
fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.
In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription.
These motions were duly opposed by the Corporation.
Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment and failure to
state a cause of action well taken, the trial court dismissed the
complaint, with costs against the Corporation.
In this appeal, the Corporation contends that the court a quo
erred (1) in finding that the allegations in its amended and
supplemental complaint do not constitute a valid ground for
an action of interpleader, and in holding that "the principal
motive for the present action is to reopen the Manila Case and
collaterally attack the decision of the said Court"; (2) in
finding that the decision in civil case 26044 of the CFI of
Manila constitutes res judicata and bars its present action;
and (3) in dismissing its action instead of compelling the
appellees to interplead and litigate between themselves their
respective claims.
On the other hand, the appellees argue that the trial court
properly dismissed the complaint, because, having the effect
of reopening civil case 26044, the present action is barred by
res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the interpleader suit will prosper.
Ruling:
No.
The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has
personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either,
comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
personal property or who consider themselves entitled to
demand compliance with the obligation, be required to
litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who
is entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is afforded to
protect a person not against double liability but against
double vexation in respect of one liability. The procedure
under the Rules of Court is the same as that under the Code of
Civil Procedure, except that under the former the remedy of
interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the
subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter
an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the
controversy is personal property or relates to the
performance of an obligation.
There is no question that the subject matter of the present
controversy, i.e., the membership fee certificate 201, is proper
for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety
and timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and
circumstances obtaining.
A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the
contending claimants to court. He need not await actual
institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill
of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within
a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting
to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise,
he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts
with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental
circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view
of all the circumstances, such that it may properly invoke the
remedy of interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of
the conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the
membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present
interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful
owner thereof. It was sued by Lee who also claimed the same
membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It
preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and
to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was
rendered against it and said judgment has already been
executed. It is not therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy
of interpleader.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is
too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against
him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially
where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment
was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  3

obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the
latter.
The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it
did not file an application for interpleader in civil case 26044
to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves
their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse
final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of
interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late,
because to he entitled to this remedy the applicant must be
able to show that lie has not been made independently liable
to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already
liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader
suit is clearly improper and unavailing.
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be
in a position to ask for an order of intrepleader, he must be
prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not
become independently liable to any of the claimants. 25 Tex.
Jur. p. 52, Sec. 3; 30 Am. Jur. p. 218, Section 8.
It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too
late when it is filed after judgment has been rendered in favor
of one of the claimants of the fund, this being especially true
when the holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting
claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and had an
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in
which the judgment was rendered. United Procedures Pipe
Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v.
McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S.W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223, Sec.
11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108 A.L.R., note 5, p. 275. 16
Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the
adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final
judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the
litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand,
the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final
judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its
failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual
situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper
because it was filed much too late.
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the
latter's successful establishment of his rights in civil case
26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase
instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of the
purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that
the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment.
This cannot be done because having elected to take its
chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full
knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to the
consequences of defeat
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because
the Corporation had already been made independently liable
in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for
interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had
already established his rights to membership fee certificate
201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader
suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and
thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one
of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility
that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case
might eventually be taken away from him; and because the
Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the
said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late,
for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
QUICK DIGEST
Facts:
Lee Won claims ownership of a membership fee certificate at
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club. By virtue of a civil case, he
was issued such certificate. On the other hand, Bienvenido
Tan also claims ownership over such certificate pursuant to
an assignment made by the alleged true owner of the same
certificate. Thus, Wack Wack filed a complaint to compel Won
and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.
Defendants filed their separate motion to dismiss the
complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure to state a
cause of action and bar by prescription.Trial court dismissed
the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the interpleader suit will prosper.
Ruling:
No.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is
too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against
him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially
where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment
was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is
obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the
latter.
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because
the Corporation had already been made independently liable
in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for
interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  4

final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had
already established his rights to membership fee certificate
201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader
suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and
thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one
of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility
that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case
might eventually be taken away from him; and because the
Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the
said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late,
for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
• RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION V.
METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 127913,
SEPTEMBER 13, 2001 VILLAGANAS
PRINCIPLE:
A party who initiates an interpleader action may not be
compelled to pursue the interpleader case when the
reason for the interpleader action ceased.
FACTS:
(X) LEYCON contracted a loan from (Y) RCBC which was
secured by a real estate mortgage. Having failed to settle
obligation, a foreclosure took place with (Y) RCBC as the
highest bidder.
(X) LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against (Z)
METROCAN, lessee of the property, docket as civil case no.
6202.
(Z) METROCAN filed the interpleader action (Civil Case No.
4398-V-94) because it was unsure which between (X)
LEYCON and (Y) RCBC was entitled to receive the payment of
monthly rentals on the subject property. (Y) LEYCON was
claiming payment of the rentals as lessor of the property
while (X) RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the
consolidation of the title of the property in its name.
Thereafter, the court in civil case no. 6202 dismissed the
complaint in view of an amicable settlement they entered and
ordered (Z) METROCAN to pay (X) LEYCON whatever rentals
due on the subject premises.
And so in this case, (Z) METROCAN moved for the dismissal of
the interpleader action (civil case no. 4398-V-94) because
there is no need to pursue such cause of action because it is
already moot and academic.
(Y) RCBC on the other hand wants to prove his claim in the
interpleader action filed, thus, compelling (Z) METROCAN to
pursue the interpleader case.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
ISSUE:
Whether or not a party who initiates an interpleader action
may be compelled to pursue the interpleader case when the
reason for the interpleader action ceased.
RULING:
NO.
The reason for the interpleader action ceased when in Civil
Case No. 6202 the court directed (Z) METROCAN to pay (X)
LEYCON "whatever rentals due on the subject premises x x x."
While (Y) RCBC, not being a party to Civil Case No. 6202, could
not be bound by the judgment therein, (Z) METROCAN is
bound by the decision. When the decision in Civil Case No.
6202 became final and executory, (Z) METROCAN has no
other alternative left but to pay the rentals to (X) LEYCON.
Precisely because there was already a judicial fiat to (Z)
METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue with Civil
Case No. 4398-V-94. Thus, METROCAN moved for the
dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is no longer
interested but because there is no more need for it to pursue
such cause of action.
It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is
afforded to protect a person not against double liability but
against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires,
as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-
in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants. The decision in Civil Case No. 6202
resolved the conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals
was concerned.
(Y) Petitioner is correct in saying that it is not bound by the
decision in Civil Case No. 6202. It is not a party thereto.
However, it could not compel (Z) METROCAN to pursue Civil
Case No. 4398-V-94. (Y) RCBC has other avenues to prove its
claim. Is not bereft of other legal remedies. In fact, the issue of
ownership can very well be threshed out in Civil Case No.
4037-V-93, the case for Nullification of Extrajudicial
Foreclosure Sale and Damages filed by (X) LEYCON against (Y)
RCBC.
SHORT DIGEST:
(X) LEYCON contracted a loan from (Y) RCBC which was
secured by a real estate mortgage. Failure to pay, it was
foreclosed with (Y) RCBC as the highest bidder.
(X) LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against (Z)
METROCAN, lessee of the property. The court dismissed the
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  5
 Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished

action in view of an amicable settlement they entered and matter) who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter
ordered (Z) METROCAN to pay (X) LEYCON whatever rentals or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
due on the subject premises. claimants.

Prior to the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case, (Z) FACTS:

METROCAN filed the interpleader action because it was
unsure which between (X) LEYCON and (Y) RCBC was entitled RCBC was the registered owner of 7 Central Bank Bills (CB b)
to receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject with a total face value of 70M.
property.
RCBC sold these CB b to Bank of Commerce (BOC).
And so in this case, (Z) METROCAN moved for the dismissal of
BOC sold these CB b yo Planters Development Bank (PDB)
the interpleader action (civil case no. 4398-V-94) because
there is no need to pursue such cause of action because it is PDB sold to BOC treasury bills (TB) worth 70M, however
already moot and academic. instead of delivering the TB, the PFB delivered the 7 CB b with
the note substitution in lieu of 6-29-94 which refers to the TB
ISSUE:
BOC sold it back to PDB 3 CB b
Whether or not a party who initiates an interpleader action
may be compelled to pursue the interpleader case when the PDB – Bancap
reason for the interpleader action ceased.
However BOC bought it back from Bancap
RULING:
BOC reacquired the 3 CB b
NO.
BOC sold the remaining 4 CB b to Capital 1 Equities
The reason for the interpleader action ceased when Corporation
in Civil Case No. 6202 the court directed (Z) METROCAN to
pay (X) LEYCON "whatever rentals due on the subject Capital 1 – ALL asia
premises x x x." While (Y) RCBC, not being a party to Civil Case
No. 6202, could not be bound by the judgment therein, (Z) ALL asia – RCBC
METROCAN is bound by the decision.
RCBC – ALL asia only 1 CB b
It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is
When BSP refused to relase the amount of the CB b, BOC
afforded to protect a person not against double liability but
purchase this 1 CB b from all asia.
against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires,
as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the For the remaining 3 CB bills
same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-
in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the RCBC – IVI Capital and insular savings bank
subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants. The decision in Civil Case No. 6202 When BSP refused to release the amount of this bill on
resolved the conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals maturity, RCBC paid back its transferee, and reacquired these
was concerned. 3 CB b and sold it to BOC

• BANK OF COMMERCE V. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT All in all the BOC acquired the 7 CB b.
BANK, G.R. NO. 154470-71, 24 SEPTEMBER 2012
Second Set of CB b
GUANTERO
RCBC, registered owner sold 2 CB b worth 20M
PRINICIPLE:
PDB- Bancap – Al Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the
The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect
Phils – BOC.
a person against double vexation in respect of a single
liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that PDB move against the transfer of the first and second set of CB
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be b.
made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject

It’s not a PROVREM 2015  6


Upon learning of the transfers involving the CB Bills, the PDB
informed the officer-in-charge of the BSP’s Government
Securities Deparment of the PDB’s claim over these CB bills,
based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. The
requests of PDB were denied by the officer-in-charge which
prompted the petitioner to file an action so as to compel the
BSP to determine the party legally entitled to the proceeds of
the subject CB bills.
The BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between
and among the claimants to the subject CB bills on the position
that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face
value, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the
rightful owner.
The PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative response for an
interpleader.
PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead
and substantiate their respective claims on the subject CB
bills. However, the total face value of the subject CB bills
should be deposited in escrow with a private bank to be
disposed of only upon order of the RTC.
What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate
the interpleader suit through an original complaint but
through its Answer.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not a complaint for interpleader in the
case at bar is proper?
2. ) Whether or not a complaint for interpleader through an
answer is proper?
RULING:
1.
“SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be
made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate
their several claims among themselves.”
The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect
a person against double vexation in respect of a single
liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be
made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject
matter) who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
claimants.1
Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing
claimants in a single proceeding to determine conflicting
claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of
having to pay more than once on a single liability.
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, in reality a new action arises, where the claims of
the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the
stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of
initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when
proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims
on the same subject matter to be threshed out in an action
2.
The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is
primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the
Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to
ordinary civil actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly
authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of,
although separate and independent from, the answer.
Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-
interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an objection
that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in
a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the
BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs
counter to general procedures.
Apart from a pleading, the rules, allow a party to seek an
affirmative relief from the court through the procedural
device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter
complaint/cross-claim for interpleader," the RTC understood
this as in the nature of a motion, seeking relief which
essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to
litigate with each other so that "payment is made to the
rightful or legitimate owner" of the subject CB bills.
The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be
considered as a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that
is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby
rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally
entitled to payment.
Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of
particular rules to govern the uniqueness of its application
and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court,
governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  7

a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-
party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an
interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be
contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the
conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different
from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-
complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par.
2 of Rule 62.
• OCAMPO V. TIRONA, G.R. NO. 147812, 6 APRIL 2005
TORREJOS
Principle:
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who
has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or
an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming
any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to
court and asks that the persons who claim the said property
or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance
with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves,
in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the
other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person
against a double liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that
the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in
reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders,
and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is
called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
In this case, an action for interpleader is proper when the
lessee (TIRONA) does not know who between OCAMPO and
Maria Lourdes Mendiola should he give the rentals due to
conflicting claims on the property.
FACTS:
Ocampo alleged that he owns a parcel of land (subject land)
described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 134359,
with an approximate area of 500 square meters, located at
Alvarez Street, Pasay City. Ocampo acquired the subject land
from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject lands registered
owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Possession and administration of
the subject land are claimed to be already in Ocampos
management even though the TCT is not yet in his name.
Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of
the subject land. Tirona recognized the ownership of Ocampo
by paying some monthly rentals. On July 5, 1995, Ocampo
received a letter from Callejo Law Office stating among
others, that, in view of the fact that the subject premises was
declared under area for priority development, Tirona is
invoking her right of first refusal and in connection thereto
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Tirona will temporarily stop paying her monthly rentals until
and unless the National Housing Authority have processed the
pertinent papers as regards the amount due to Ocampo by
reason of the implementation of the law. Ocampo demanded
payment for the rentals in arrears. Despite receipt of said
letter, Tirona failed and refused and still fails and refuses to
heed the demands. A complaint for unlawful detainer with
damages was filed. The MTC ruled in favour of respondent.
The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The
appellate court considered partition of the estate of Alipio
Breton as a prerequisite to Ocampo’s action. The appellate
court ruled that until the partition of the estate is ordered by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in the pending partition
proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by
metes and bounds, Ocampo cannot rightfully claim that what
he bought is part of the property occupied by Tirona.
ISSUE:
Whether an action for interpleader is proper in the
instant case?
HELD:
Yes. In this case, an action for interpleader is proper
when the lessee (TIRONA) does not know who between
OCAMPO and Maria Lourdes Mendiola should he give the
rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her
preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a
stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in
hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not
have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against
her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the
person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the
property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who
has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or
an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming
any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to
court and asks that the persons who claim the said property
or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance
with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves,
in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the
other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person
against a double liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that
the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in
reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders,
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  8

and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is
called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All
the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to
prosper are present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he
purchased the subject land from Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s
continued occupation of the subject land amounted to
acquiescence to Ocampo’s terms. However, Tirona eventually
refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
QUICK DIGEST:
Ocampo owns a parcel of land 500 square meters acquired
from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject lands registered
owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Possession and administration of
the subject land are claimed to be already in Ocampos
management even though the TCT is not yet in his name.
Tirona is a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land.
Tirona recognized the ownership of Ocampo by paying some
monthly rentals. Tirona temporarily stop paying her monthly
rentals until and unless the National Housing Authority have
processed the pertinent papers as regards the amount due to
Ocampo by reason of the implementation of the law. Ocampo
demanded payment for the rentals in arrears. Tirona failed
and refused and still fails and refuses to heed the demands. A
complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed. In his
answer, Tirona averred that the land is owned by the Breton
and that she kept on paying rental to them. The MTC ruled in
favour of petitioner. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of
the MTC. The Supreme Court ruled otherwise.
• PASRICHA V. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC. G.R. NO.
136409, 14 MARCH 2008 BITANGJOL
Principle:
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee
does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made
due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person
against double liability but to protect him against double
vexation in respect of one liability.
Long Digest
Facts:
Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and
petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease whereby the
former, as lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Petitioners were, likewise, required to pay for the
cost of electric consumption, water bills and the use of
telephone cables.
The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize
leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of the
lease contracts. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners
dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager
of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by
Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista). Petitioners religiously paid
the monthly rentals until May 1992.
After that, however, despite repeated demands,
petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent.
Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for
ejectment was filed by private respondent through its
representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the
stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until
November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified
because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to
the person authorized to receive payment. To further justify
their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged that they were
prevented from using the units (rooms) subject matter of the
lease contract, except Room 35.
To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents,
petitioners alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for
their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.
The MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint for ejectment. It considered petitioners’ non-
payment of rentals as unjustified. The court held that mere
willingness to pay the rent did not amount to payment of the
obligation; petitioners should have deposited their payment
in the name of respondent company. The court, however,
dismissed the complaint because of Ms. Bautista’s alleged lack
of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation.
RTC reversed the MeTC’s decision. It upheld Ms.
Bautista’s authority to represent respondent notwithstanding
the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her
authority was implied from her power as a general
manager/treasurer of the company.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Interpleader is the proper remedy
when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  9

should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or
on the right to collect).
Ruling:
Yes. Interpleader or consignation is the proper
remedy. (Consignation is another remedy in case of
conflicting rights to collect the rent. You may not read the
discussion on Consignation)
The Court’s discussion:
What was, clearly established by the evidence was
petitioners’ non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they
did not know to whom payment should be made. However,
this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were
the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have
availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines
on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on
interpleader.
Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has
been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor
shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of
the thing or sum due.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the
following cases:
xxxx
(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;
x x x x.
Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the
disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of
payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the
announcement of the consignation in other cases.
In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced
the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for
consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation
becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not
imputable to him. Petitioners claim that they made a written
tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their
monthly rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a valid
tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender,
still, it would not constitute payment for want of consignation
of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment
must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects
of payment may be produced.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be
made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate
their several claims among themselves.
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper
when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or
on the right to collect) The remedy is afforded not to protect
a person against double liability but to protect him against
double vexation in respect of one liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners
opted to refrain from making payments.
Short Digest
Facts:
Petitioner (Pasricha) and respondent (Don Luis Dison Realty
Inc.) executed two contract of Lease.
Despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously
refused to pay the stipulated rent. Because petitioners still
refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by
private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for
the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but
claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal
squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized
to receive payment.
To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents,
petitioners alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for
their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.
Issue:
Whether or not Interpleader is the proper remedy
when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or
on the right to collect).
Ruling:
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee
does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made
due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  10

collect) The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against
double liability but to protect him against double vexation in
respect of one liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners
opted to refrain from making payments.
VIII.H
MAGLENTE V. HON. BALTAZAR-PADILLA, G.R. NO.
148182, MARCH 7, 2007 ESPARAGOZA
VIII.H Determination.
Section 6. Determination. — After the pleadings of the
conflicting claimants have been filed, and pre-trial has been
conducted in accordance with the Rules, the court shall
proceed to determine their respective rights and adjudicate
their several claims.
Doctrine:
A party is not automatically entitled to a writ of possession
after being adjudged in the interpleader case as the proper
parties to buy a subject property; it is only when the right of
possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case
directly relating to either that writ of possession complements
the writ of execution.
Facts:
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of a parcel of
entered into a contract of lease for three years with one of the
petitioners, Ursula Maglente. In the contract, it was stated
that, if PRC were to sell the leased property, Maglente would
be given the first priority (right of first refusal) to buy it. Both
parties likewise agreed that the lessee was prohibited from
subleasing any portion of the property without the consent of
the lessor. However, after the execution of the lease contract,
petitioner Maglente subleased portions of the property to
respondents.
When the lease contract was about to expire, PRC sent a
written offer to sell the leased property to Maglente. PRC
received a letter from respondents expressing their desire to
purchase the same property.
PRC filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC against both
petitioners and respondents so they could litigate among
themselves on who had the right to purchase the property.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared
them as the rightful parties to purchase PRC's property.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
On motion of petitioners, a writ of execution was later issued
by the RTC directing PRC to execute the contract of
sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
As ordered, PRC executed a "deed of sale" in favor of
petitioners. The latter then filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession but respondents (who were occupying the
property) objected on the ground that the trial court's
decision on the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners'
right to purchase the leased property but did not declare them
as the owners entitled to possession. The trial court sustained
respondents' argument and denied petitioners' motion.
Issue:
Whether or not they are entitled to a writ of possession after
being adjudged (in the interpleader case) as the proper
parties to buy the subject property, considering that a "deed
of sale" has already been executed in their favor.
Ruling:
No.
The trial court's decision in the interpleader case merely
resolved the question of whom, between petitioners and
respondents had the right to purchase PRC's property.
The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary
contract in favor of petitioners as the winning parties, nothing
else.
It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the
owners of the property. The execution of the "deed of sale" in
their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition
of the property. Although the contract of sale between
petitioners and PRC had already been perfected, we refrained
from declaring them the owners since, pending the execution
of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had
yet to transfer to them at that time.
A writ of possession complements the writ of
execution only when the right of possession or ownership has
been validly determined in a case directly relating to either.
The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.
We thus cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ
of possession to petitioners as its issuance would not be in
conformity with the trial court's judgment in the interpleader
case.
Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property
via a mere motion. They must file the appropriate action in
court against respondents to recover possession. While this
remedy can delay their recovery, this Court cannot permit an
abbreviated method without subverting the rules and
processes established for the orderly administration of
justice.
IX.C
• Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014
VILLAMANTE
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  11

Basic Principle:
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that
most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so
the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
Facts:
This is a consolidated petition which assails the
constitutionality of , Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.
Petitioners argue that the assailed law violates various
constitutional provisions which includes but not limited to
these grounds:
a. The right to life
b. The right to health,
c. The right to protection against hazardous
substances
d. The right to religious freedom
e. The right against involuntary servitude
f. The right to due process
g. The right to family
h. The right to privacy
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive
arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual
case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe
for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing
to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitions assailing the constitutionality of
the RH Law partakes of a declaratory relief over which this
court has no Jurisdiction.
Held:
No.
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where
the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65.
• Malana v. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009
BRAGAT
C. Where to file (§1)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against
respondents. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they
are the owners of a parcel of land.
Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted
that they owned the subject property and presented
documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.
According to petitioners, respondents’ documents were
highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latter’s
claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless,
they created a cloud upon petitioners’ title to the property.
Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a
Complaint to remove such cloud from their title.
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an
Order dismissing petitioners’ Complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691,
amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC
with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the
subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence,
petitioners’ action to recover the same was outside the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  12
 Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished

RTC denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. It Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its
reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant second paragraph that:
to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where
the assessed value of real property does not exceed
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title
P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per
to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action
ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be
involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
brought under this Rule.

Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as

Motion, in which they prayed that the RTC Orders dismissing
their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier
argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states
that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing petitioners’ Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
RULING:
NO.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of
an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the
Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles
476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate
ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale
with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are
considered similar to declaratory relief because they also
result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants,
often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into
effect.

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the

Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction between
the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions
identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with
those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,

describes the general circumstances in which a person may
file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit: It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet
title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may"
– that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
[the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an
Court to determine any question of construction or validity
opportunity or an option.
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall"
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for
and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or
63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00.

It’s not a PROVREM 2015  13


As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject
property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only
P410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving title to
and possession of the said property is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
• OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. IBAY, G. R. NO.
137538, SEPTEMBER 3, 2001 ROLLAN
Principle: The Supreme Court has held that the special civil
action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. It is not among the
actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
even if only questions of law are involved.
Facts: Petitioner conducted an investigation on the alleged
scam on the Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation. The alleged anomaly was
committed through the issuance of checks which were
subsequently deposited in several financial institutions.
Petitioner issued an Order directing private respondent
Lourdes Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank of the
Philippines branch at Julia Vargas Avenue, Pasig City, to
produce several bank documents for inspection relative to the
accounts reportedly maintained in the said bank. Private
respondent failed to comply with petitioners order. Petitioner
reminded private respondent that her acts constitute
disobedience or resistance to a lawful order and is punishable
as indirect contempt and might also constitute willful
obstruction of the lawful exercise of the functions of the
Ombudsman. Instead of complying with the order of
petitioner, private respondent filed a petition for declaratory
relief with an application for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 135, presided by respondent Judge
Francisco Ibay. Public respondent issued an order declaring
that it has jurisdiction over the case since it is an action for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: whether or not public respondent acted without
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the cited petition for declaratory relief.
Ruling: No.
The Supreme Court has held that the special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts. It is not among the actions within the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only
questions of law are involved.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
In this case, the public respondent has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief. Nor can it be
said that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in
doing so.
Other principles:
1. The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
SC ruling: In this case, the controversy concerns the extent of
the power of petitioner to examine bank accounts under
Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 vis--vis the duty of banks under
Republic Act 1405 not to divulge any information relative to
deposits of whatever nature. The interests of the parties are
adverse considering the antagonistic assertion of a legal right
on one hand, that is the power of Ombudsman to examine
bank deposits, and on the other, the denial thereof apparently
by private respondent who refused to allow petitioner to
inspect in camera certain bank accounts. The party seeking
relief, private respondent herein, asserts a legal interest in the
controversy. The issue invoked is ripe for judicial
determination as litigation is inevitable. Note that petitioner
has threatened private respondent with indirect contempt
and obstruction charges should the latter not comply with its
order.
2. Before an in camerainspection of bank accounts may be
allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly
identified, and the inspection limited to the subject matter of
the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified
to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may
cover only the account identified in the pending case
(Marquez vs. Desierto).
SC ruling: In the present case, since there is no pending
litigation yet before a court of competent authority, but only
an investigation by the Ombudsman on the so-called scam,
any order for the opening of the bank account for inspection
is clearly premature and legally unjustified.
• DELA LLANA V. ALBA, L-57883, MARCH 12, 1982 GIME
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  14

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed an erroneously entitled Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition in the supreme
court seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of
Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which
mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the
CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by
such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It
is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners
justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the
security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been
ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Does the supreme court have the jurisdiction to decide on the
Declaratory Relief ?
RULING:
No, according to the opinion of justice aquino "The petition
should have been dismissed outright because this Court has
no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief and prohibition is
not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law.
the petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is
involved."
Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They
have no personality to assail the constitutionality of the said
law even as taxpayers.The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la
Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 filed a petition for declaratory
relief assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called for
a referendum. De la Llana his Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no
cause of action for prohibition. He is not being removed from
his position.
Short digest:
X files a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition
in the supreme court seeking to enjoin the Minister of the
Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the
Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP
129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts
from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary. Can a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and/or for Prohibition can be files in the supreme court?
Ans:
No.
The law provides, Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.(Rule 63, Sec. 1).
In the case at bar, the petition will be dismissed because a
Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition should
be files in the RTCs.
IX.D
• ALMEDA V. BATHALA MARKETING, G.R. NO. 150806,
JANUARY 28, 2008 ALTERADO
DOCTRINE: As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief
should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate
action for unlawful detainer. In this case, however, the trial
court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case
during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact,
the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal,
initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the
resolution of the action for declaratory relief
Requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof
are doubtful and require judicial construction;
3) there must have been no breach of the documents in
question;
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
ripening seeds of one between persons whose
interests are adverse;
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other means
or other forms of action or proceeding.
FACTS:
Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc. (respondents), as lessee,
renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda
(Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and
father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract,
Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound
for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner
terminated as provided in the contract.
The contract of lease contained the following pertinent
provisions which gave rise to the instant case:
SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the
rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment
on the property, and that in case the assessment should
hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be
imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased
premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein
provided becomes due, the additional rental or charge
corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however,
that in the event that the present assessment or tax on said
property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to
reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the
portion leased by him;
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  15

SEVENTH In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of
Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine
peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be
the basis of payment;
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano
died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with
petitioners. Petitioners then advised respondent that they
shall assess and collect VAT on its monthly rentals.
Respondent, however, contended that VAT may not be
imposed, as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were
supposed to include the VAT therein. Subsequently,
petitioners informed respondent that its monthly rental shall
be increased by 73% pursuant to their contract (SEVENTH
clause) and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent
opposed to such increase contending that there was no
extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article
1250.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as
demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated
amount set forth in their contract. Respondent then instituted
an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining
the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the
lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice.
In turn, petitioners filed an action for ejectment, rescission
and damages against respondent for failure of the latter to
vacate the premises after the demand made by the former.
Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the declaratory
relief case for being an improper remedy considering that
respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that
the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of
the parties.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent denying to the
petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of
paying the VAT. The court, likewise, denied their right to
collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no
extraordinary inflation or devaluation as provided for in the
(seventh clause) contract.
Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed with modification the RTC decision. Hence
this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Declaratory relief is proper since respondent
was in breach when the petition for Declaratory relief was
filed before the trial court.
HELD:
YES.
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for
declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3)
there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
ripening seeds of one between persons whose interests are
adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination;
and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.
Petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the
contract when the petition was filed, thus, respondent is
barred from filing an action for declaratory relief. However,
after petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and
in the months that followed, respondent complied with the
terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by
paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously
fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the
pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that
respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the
subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred
from instituting before the trial court the petition for
declaratory relief.
Petitioners further claim that the instant petition is not
proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and
damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the
construction of the subject contractual provisions should be
ventilated in the same forum.
As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be
dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for
unlawful detainer. In this case, however, the trial court had
not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the
pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial
court, where the rescission case was on appeal, initiated the
suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the
action for declaratory relief.
SHORT DIGEST:
A contract of lease entered was entered into by P (Ponciano
Almeda) and B (Bathala). In the said contract, P agreed to
lease a portion of the Almeda Compund to B. It was renewed
by B, as lessee, with P as lessor, husband of petitioner P1
(Eufemia) and father of petitioner P2 (Romel). During the
effectivity of the contract, P died. P1 & P2 advised B that they
shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly
rentals and that the monthly rental should be increased by
73%. However B refused to pay the VAT and the increase of
rentals.
B then instituted an action for declaratory relief for the
purposes of determining the correct interpretation of the
lease contract and to prevent damage and prejudice. P1 & P2
then filed an action for ejectment, recission and damages and
moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief because
there was already a breach of the obligation. The RTC ruled in
favor of the respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC with modifications.
Hence the instant petition.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  16

• EDADES V. EDADES, 99 PHIL. 675 GOMBA
An action for declaratory relief is proper when any person is
interested “under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance” in order to determine any question of construction
or validity arising under the instrument or statute, or to
declare his rights or duties thereunder
action should be predicated on the following conditions
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest
are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy;
(4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial
determination.
Facts
Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan seeking a declaratory judgment on his
hereditary rights in the property of his alleged father and
incidentally the recognition of his status as an illegitimate son
of Emigdio Edades.
In his complaint, he alleges that he is an illegitimate son of
Emigdio Edades with Maria de Venecia, having been born
when said Emigdio Edades was legally married to Maxima
Edades as such illegitimate child he is entitled to share in the
inheritance of his father under the law; that as the legitimate
children of his father will deny, as in fact they have denied his
right to inherit.
Defendants, instead of answering, filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
Issue: won the plaintiff is entitled for declaratory relief
Ruling: no. Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is
proper when any person is interested “under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute or ordinance” in order to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument or statute, or to declare his rights or duties
thereunder (section 1, Rule 66). Moreover, the action should
be predicated on the following conditions
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest
are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy;
(4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial
determination.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
The present case does not come within the purview of the law
authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither
concerns a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or
validity of which is involved. Nor is it predicated on any
justiciable controversy for admittedly the alleged rights of
inheritance which Plaintiff desires to assert against the
Defendants as basis of the relief he is seeking for have not yet
accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father Emigdio
Edades has not yet died. In fact, he is one of the herein
Defendants. And the law is clear that “the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent” (Article 777, new Civil Code). Up to that
moment, the right to succession is merely speculative for, in
the meantime, the law may change, the will of the testator may
vary, or the circumstances may be modified to such an extent
that he who expects to receive property may be deprived of it.
Indeed, the moment of death is the determining point when
an heir acquires a definite right to the inheritance (5 Manresa,
5th ed., 324). This action therefore cannot be maintained if
considered strictly as one for declaratory relief.
Bar question
X an illegitimate child filed an action for declaratory relief
against his father, seeking recognition of his right to inherit to
the estate of the latter.
May the court validly issue the same Based on the said
ground?
No,present case does not come within the purview of the law
authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither
concerns a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or
validity of which is involved. Nor is it predicated on any
justiciable controversy for admittedly the alleged rights of
inheritance which Plaintiff desires to assert has not yet
accrued since his alleged father has not yet died.
• TOLENTINO V. BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, 90 PHIL. 83
GARBANZOS
PRINCIPLE: The requisites for an action for declaratory relief
may be entertained are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory
relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
FACTS:
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  17

Plaintiff Hilario Tolentino is a certified public accountant.
Respondents, the Board of Accountancy is an administrative
body created by law and vested with the power and authority
to regulate and supervise the practice of the profession of
accountancy in the Philippines, and that the defendants
Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans Hausamann are foreigners, the
former being a British subject and the latter a Swiss subject,
both admitted to the practice of accountancy in the
Philippines.
An action for declaratory relief was filed by Plaintiff in the CFI
of Manila for the purpose of testing the Constitutionality of
Section 16 of Commonwealth Act No. 3105 otherwise known
as the Philippine Accountancy Law, as amended by
Commonwealth Act 3105 on the ground that it is a class
legislation since by its terms it excludes persons engaged in
other callings or professions from adopting, acquiring or
using a trade name in connection with the practice of such
callings or professions. The action is addressed against the
Board of Accountancy, Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans
Hausamann and notice thereof has been served on the
Solicitor General under section 4 of rule 66 of the Rules of
Court; but the Board of Accountancy did not answer the
complaint, nor has the Solicitor General intervened. Only
Ferguson and Hausamann appeared and answered through
counsel.
The case was submitted on judgment on the pleadings and the
Court dismissed it holding that the disputed law is
constitutional. From that decision, plaintiff appealed to this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff has established the requisite facts
to entitle him to an action for declaratory relief.
RULING:
NO.
The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for
declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated
on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for
judicial determination. These requisite facts are wanting and,
therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient cause
of action.
Justiciability; its requisites. — Except that accomplished
physical wrong need not be alleged in a petition for
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
declaratory relief, a case of such nature must exhibit all the
usual conditions of an ordinary action. There must be (1) real
parties in interest (2) asserting adverse claims and (3)
presenting a ripe issue. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
summarized its exhaustive opinion on the requisites of
justiciability of an action for declaratory relief by saying that
the court must be "satisfied that an actual controversy, or the
ripening seeds of one, exists between parties, all of whom are
sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought
will be a practical help in ending the controversy." Justice
Brandeis thought that "the fact that the plaintiff's desires are
thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others does not
confer a cause of action." But the doubt becomes a justiciable
controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is
actually contested.
SHORT DIGEST:
Mr. CPA is a certified public accountant. He filed an action for
declaratory relief against the Board of Accountancy (BOA),
Mr. Fergie and Mr.Haus, foreigners who are practicing
accountant in the country. The purpose of the action is to test
the constitutionality of Section 16 of Commonealth Act No.
3105 known as the Accountancy Law on the ground that it is
a class legislation since by its terms it excludes persons
engaged in other callings or professions from adopting,
acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the
practice of such callings or professions. Notices were served
upon the respondents but the BOA did not answer, nor has the
solicitor general intervened. Only Mr.Fergie and Mr. Haus
appeared and answered through counsel.
The case was submitted on judgment on the pleadings and the
Court dismissed it holding that the disputed law is
constitutional. From that decision, plaintiff appealed to this
Court.
X.A
• MACABAGO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 152163, 18
NOVEMBER 2002 CHUA
PRINCIPLES:
1. Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to judgments or
final orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. The rule does NOT apply to interlocutory
orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions or to its administrative orders.
2. As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC
is not a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari.
But when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  18

jurisdiction in issuing such an order, the aggrieved party may
seek redress from the SC via a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules.
FACTS:
Petitioner Macabago was proclaimed by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers as the winning candidate for the position of
Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. over his
adversary, private respondent Salacop.
Private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC to
annul the elections and the proclamation of candidates
alleging that there was a massive substitution of voters,
rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures in
several precincts.
Petitioner alleged that the grounds relied upon by private
respondent would be proper in an election protest but not in
a pre-proclamation controversy.
The COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and
issued an order directing the Election Officer to bring to and
produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original
VRRs of the questioned precincts for technical examination.
In the same order, the COMELEC characterized the petition as
one for the annulment of the election or declaration of failure
of election in the municipality and concluded that there was
convincing proof of massive fraud in the conduct of the
elections.
Petitioner filed with this Court the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 praying for the reversal of the
order of the COMELEC EN BANC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to SC under Rule 65 is
in order.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the petition of private respondent and in
issuing the assailed Order.
HELD:
1. Yes.
Rule 64 of the Rules applies only to judgments or final orders
of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
The rule does not apply to interlocutory orders of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions or to
its administrative orders.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
In this case, the assailed order of the COMELEC declaring
private respondents petition to be one for annulment of the
elections or for a declaration of a failure of elections in the
municipality and ordering the production of the original
copies of the VRRs for the technical examination is
administrative in nature. Rule 64, a procedural device for the
review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the
COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court under
Rule 65 from administrative orders of said Commission
issued in the exercise of its administrative function.
2. Yes.
As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is
not a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. But
when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing such an order, the aggrieved party may
seek redress from this Court via a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.
The grounds alleged by private respondent in his petition
before the COMELEC are those for a regular election protest
and are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; nor is
such petition one for annulment of the elections or for a
declaration of failure of elections. The COMELEC should have
ordered the dismissal of the petition instead of issuing the
assailed order. The COMELEC thus committed a grave abuse
of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the same. The error is correctible by the special civil
action for certiorari.
• CAGAS V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 194139, 24 JANUARY
2012 CUEVAS
Principle:
GR: A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an
election protest may not directly assail the order in the SC
through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to
seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal
of the decision of the Division in due course.
Exception:
The Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being
made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically
provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the
matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider,
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  19

or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the
Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc.
Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the
Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum
in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory
order can be reviewed.
Facts:
Respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the
position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur where
petitioner Cagas was proclaimed winner during the May 2010
automated national and local elections. Bautista filed an
electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities,
vote-buying and violations of election laws. The protest was
raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner averred as his special defense that Bautista did not
make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did
not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions
complained of. The COMELEC denied its affirmative defenses
and its subsequent motion for reconsideration. COMELEC
held that petitioner’s prayer to elevate the Motion for
reconsideration to the Commission en banc is merely
interlocutory and does not dispose of the instant case with
finality.
Not satisfied, petitioner commenced the special civil action
directly to SC arguing that Section 9,21 Rule 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804 obliged the COMELEC First Division to
summarily dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form
and content; and that the insufficiency in substance arose
from the failure of the protest to: (a) specifically state how the
various irregularities and anomalies had affected the results
of the elections; (b) indicate in which of the protested
precincts were pre-shaded bogus-ballots used; (c) identify the
precincts where the PCOS machines had failed to accurately
account for the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d) allege with
particularity how many additional votes Bautista stood to
receive for each of the grounds he protested. He concludes
that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion
in allowing the protest of Bautista despite its insufficiency.
Issue:
Can an interlocutory order issue by a Division of the COMELEC
in an election protest be assailed in the Supreme Court
through a special civil action for certiorari?
Held:
NO.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to
review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits
such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued
by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has
no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari
assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the
special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper
remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First
Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the
result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special
affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the
other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject
controversy is one of the cases specifically provided under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may
sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the present controversy a
case where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation
wherein the members of the First Division unanimously voted
to refer the subject case to the Commission en banc. Clearly,
the Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown
above, cannot be the proper forum which the matter
concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred
to.
Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take
cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review
an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not
appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc
may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  20

the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the
COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can
directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is
not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the
assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed.
However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has
no application herein, because the COMELEC First Division
had the competence to determine the lack of detailed
specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as
required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal
of the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested in the
COMELEC broad powers involving not only the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections but also the resolution and determination
of election controversies. The breadth of such powers
encompasses the authority to determine the sufficiency of
allegations contained in every election protest and to decide
based on such allegations whether to admit the protest and
proceed with the hearing or to outrightly dismiss the protest
in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804.
Quick Digest:
Respondent X contested the position of Governor of the
Province of Davao del Sur where petitioner Y was proclaimed
winner during the May 2010 automated national and local
elections. X filed an electoral protest alleging fraud,
anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of
election laws which was raffled to the COMELEC First
Division.
Y moved to dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form
and content stating that the requisite cash deposit was not
made on time; and that it did not render a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of.
COMELEC denied Y’s defenses and subsequent motion for
reconsideration on the ground that X has complied
substantially with the requirements. Y then filed for a petition
for certiorari directly with the SC.
Question:
Can an interlocutory order issue by a Division of the COMELEC
in an election protest be assailed in the Supreme Court
through a special civil action for certiorari?
Answer:
NO
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an
election protest may not directly assail the order in the SC
through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to
seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal
of the decision of the Division in due course.
The COMELEC First Division had the competence to
determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or
omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called
for the outright dismissal of the protest. For sure, the 1987
Constitution vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving
not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections but also the
resolution and determination of election controversies. The
breadth of such powers encompasses the authority to
determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in every
election protest and to decide based on such allegations
whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or
to outright dismiss the protest in accordance with Section 9,
Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
• REYNA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. NO. 167219, 8
FEBRUARY 2011 ECNEROL
Doctrine: It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded
respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by
substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the
specific matters under their jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioners Ruben Reyna (Reyna) and Lloyd Soria (Soria) are
Senior Field Operations Specialist and Loans and Credit
Analyst II, respectively, of the Land Bank’s branch in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur. Ipil Branch received loan applications
from four farmers’ cooperatives under the bank’s cattle
financing program. To process the applications, each
cooperative accomplished a Credit Facility Proposal (CFP),
which required that they execute a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with their proposed cattle supplier, Remad
Livestock Corporation (Remad). Consequently, after approval
of the loan applications, the Ipil Branch issued to Remad
advance payment for the cattle to be released. But, because of
foot-and-mouth disease that broke out among its herds,
Remad failed to make the deliveries when they fell due.
During a post audit, the Land Bank resident auditor, Belen
Oranu-Lu, disallowed the advance payment under CSB 95-005
and Notices of Disallowance. She pointed out that the Ipil
Branch paid for the cattle in advance in violation of the Land
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  21

Bank Manual on Field Office Group (FOG) Lending Operations
and Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations.
However, such disallowance was not on account of evidence
of dishonest connivance with the farmers’ cooperatives and
their cattle supplier.
The bank branch’s resident auditor held Reyna and Soria,
together with four other employees of the Ipil Branch,
personally liable for the disallowed advances. This led to the
filing of a criminal complaint against the bank officers and
employees with the Office of the Ombudsman for gross
negligence, violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the bank,
and giving unwarranted benefits to persons, causing undue
injury
COA Regional Office - affirmed the findings of the auditor.
Ombudsman - dismissed the charges against the Ipil Branch
officers and employees for lack of sufficient evidence to
support a finding of probable cause against them regarding
the charges.
COA – affirmed the findings of the local auditor and held that
the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the charges against the
Land Bank officers and employees did not affect the
validity of the disallowance which had already become
final and executory. Also, it ruled that the criminal case
before the Ombudsman was distinct and separate from the
disallowance case which was civil in nature.
ISSUES:
WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in
the contract between the bank and Remad proscribed by
section 103 of the state audit code of the Philippines.
RULING:
To emphasize, the Auditor noted that “nowhere in the
documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme
with REMAD.” It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded
respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by
substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the
specific matters under their jurisdiction.
If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners
should have produced the document to prove such fact as
alleged by them in the present petition. However, as stated
before, even this Court is
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was
authorized as a review of the document (CATTLE BREEDING
AND BUY BACK MARKETING AGREEMENT ) to which
petitioners base their authority to make advance payments,
does not contain such a stipulation or provision. Highlighted
also is the fact that petitioners clearly violated the procedure
in releasing loans found in the Manual on Lending Operations
which provides that payments to the dealer shall only be
made after presentation of reimbursement documents
acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative that the
same has been delivered.
Based on the foregoing, the COA should, therefore, not be
faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the commission
of the irregular transaction. The evidence they presented
before the COA was insufficient to prove their case. So also,
even this Court is at a loss as to the truthfulness and veracity
of petitioners' allegations as they did not even present before
this Court the documents that would serve as the basis for
their claims.
Short Digest:
FACTS:
Petitioners Ruben Reyna (Reyna) and Lloyd Soria (Soria) are
Senior Field Operations Specialist and Loans and Credit
Analyst II, respectively, of the Land Bank’s branch in Ipil
which received loan applications from four farmers’
cooperatives under the bank’s cattle financing program.
Consequently, after approval of the loan applications, the Ipil
Branch issued to Remad Livestock Corporation (Remad)
advance payment for the cattle to be released. But, because of
foot-and-mouth disease that broke out among its herds,
Remad failed to make the deliveries when they fell due.
During a post audit, the Land Bank resident auditor, Belen
Oranu-Lu, disallowed the advance payment in view of non-
delivery of the cattle. She pointed out that the Ipil Branch paid
for the cattle in advance in violation of the Land Bank Manual
on Field Office Group (FOG) Lending Operations and
Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations.
The bank branch’s resident auditor held Reyna and Soria,
together with four other employees of the Ipil Branch,
personally liable for the disallowed advances. This led to the
filing of a criminal complaint against the bank officers and
employees with the Office of the Ombudsman for gross
negligence, violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the bank,
and giving unwarranted benefits to persons, causing undue
injury
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  22

COA – affirmed the findings of the local auditor and held that
the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the charges against the
Land Bank officers and employees did not affect the
validity of the disallowance which had already become
final and executory.
ISSUES:
WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in
the contract between the bank and Remad proscribed by
section 103 of the state audit code of the Philippines.
RULING:
To emphasize, the Auditor noted that “nowhere in the
documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme
with REMAD.” It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded
respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by
substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the
specific matters under their jurisdiction.
If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners
should have produced the document to prove such fact as
alleged by them in the present petition. However, as stated
before, even this Court is at a loss as to whether the
prepayment scheme was authorized as a review of the
document (CATTLE
BREEDING AND BUY BACK MARKETING AGREEMENT ) to
which petitioners base their authority to make advance
payments, does not contain such a stipulation or provision.
Highlighted also is the fact that petitioners clearly violated the
procedure in releasing loans found in the Manual on Lending
Operations which provides that payments to the dealer shall
only be made after presentation of reimbursement
documents acknowledged by the authorized LBP
representative that the same has been delivered.
Based on the foregoing, the COA should, therefore, not be
faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the commission
of the irregular transaction. The evidence they presented
before the COA was insufficient to prove their case. So also,
even this Court is at a loss as to the truthfulness and veracity
of petitioners' allegations as they did not even present before
this Court the documents that would serve as the basis for
their claims.
X.B
• IBRAHIM V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 192289, 8 JANUARY
2013 LAMBAN
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
PRINCIPLE:
Resolutions issued by COMELEC en banc can be reviewed by
way of filing before the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari.
FACTS:
-Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy to run as Vice-Mayor
of Datu-Unsay in the May 10, 2010 elections.
-respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election
Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELEC’s
Law Department (Law Department) the names of 20
candidates who were not registered voters therein. The list5
included Ibrahim’s name
-COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed December 22,
2009 Resolution:
a. disqualifying the foregoing candidates for not being
registered voters of the respective municipalities where they
seek to be elected without prejudice to their filing of an
opposition within two (2) days from publication hereof; and
b. Filing of election offense cases against said candidates for
violation of Sec. 74 in relation to Sec. 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
-Ibrahim and 50 candidates filed their Petition/Opposition
but was denied anchored on the certification which was
issued in the performance of official duty, hence, the
presumption of regularity attached to it in the absence of
contrary evidence. Ibrahim and company failed to adduce
evidence proving their allegations of registration and
residence.
-In the May 10, 2010 elections, during which time the
Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained finality,
Ibrahim obtained 446 votes, the highest number cast for the
Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay; However, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by
Buagas, suspended Ibrahim’s proclamation on the basis of
Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
- the instant Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC
to suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation and of the COMELEC en
banc to issue the assailed resolutions.
ISSUE:
WON certiorari is the proper action in questioning the
authority of:
a. MBOC in suspending wining candidate's proclamation and
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  23

b. COMELEC to issue resolution disqualifyig a candidate.
HELD:
Positive.
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part
substantially provides that any decision, order or ruling of any
of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review
to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from
receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions
rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and
made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power.
Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it
shall govern the review of final judgments and orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated
December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with finality
by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed by way of
filing before us a petition for certiorari. Besides, the issues
raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation
of the election returns or to the composition and proceedings
of the board of canvassers. What the instant Petition
challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahim’s
proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the
assailed resolutions which can be assailed via certiorari.
ADDITIONAL INFO:(DILI NA NI PROVREM)
WON THE RESOLUTION AND SUSPENSION IS VALID.
HELD:
Negative.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due
notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve
the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC
which the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in
this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not
from a petition but from a report of the election officer
regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the
barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the
proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a
division because it denies due process to the candidate.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein
assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahim’s disqualification even
when no complaint or petition was filed against him yet. Let it
be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a
petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which
should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering that
his allegedly being an unregistered voter of Datu Unsay
disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed
misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling
within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even
if we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the
COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it took cognizance of a matter, which by both
constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration,
instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.
The MBOC has no authority to suspend Ibrahim’s
proclamation especially since the herein assailed resolutions,
upon which the suspension was anchored, were issued by the
COMELEC en banc outside the ambit of its jurisdiction.
Mastura v. COMELEC41 is emphatic that:
(T)he board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is enjoined
by law to canvass all votes on election returns submitted to it
in due form. It has been said, and properly, that its powers are
limited generally to the mechanical or mathematical function
of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the
election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each
candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them,
and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained. x x
x.42 (Italics ours)
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to
ascertain and declare the apparent result of the voting while
all other questions are to be tried before the court or other
tribunal for contesting elections or in quo warranto
proceedings.43
In the case at bar, the MBOC motu propio suspended Ibrahim’s
proclamation when the issue of the latter’s eligibility is a
matter which the board has no authority to resolve. Further,
under Section 644 of R.A. 6646, the COMELEC and not the
MBOC has the authority to order the suspension of a winning
candidates’s proclamation. Such suspension can only be
ordered upon the motion of a complainant or intervenor
relative to a case for disqualification, or a petition to deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy pending before the
COMELEC, and only when the evidence of the winning
candidate’s guilt is strong. Besides, the COMELEC en banc
itself could not have properly ordered Ibrahim’s
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  24

disqualification because in taking cognizance of the matter, it
had already exceeded its jurisdiction.
• REBLORA V. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
NO. 195842, 18 JUNE 2013 CABUENAS
Principle(s):
Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by
Supreme Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution,19 is clear on this:
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter
provided.
The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special
civil action under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 is the
difference of one to the other with respect to the permissible
scope of inquiry in each. Indeed, by restricting the review of
judgments or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil
action for certiorari, the Constitution and the Rules of Court
precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such cases
only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple
errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be
reviewed—even by Supreme Court.
LONG DIGEST:
Facts:
This is an appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
assailing the Decision of the Commission on Audit (COA),
which denied the petitioner’s claim for additional retirement
benefit.
Petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy born on
May 22, 1944. Prior to entering military service, he rendered
civilian government service as a Barrio Development Worker
at the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) from 6 January 1969 to 20 July 1974. He entered
military service as a Probationary Ensign in the Philippine
Navy and was called to active duty effective August 26, 1974.
On 1996, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officially
confirmed the incorporation of petitioner’s civilian
government service at the DILG with his length of active
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
service in the military pursuant to Section 3 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1638,9 as amended by PD No. 1650 which
provides:
Section 3. For purposes of this Decree active service of a military
person shall mean active service rendered by him as a
commissioned officer, enlisted man, cadet, probationary officer,
trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
service rendered by him as a civilian official or employee in the
Philippine government prior to the date of his separation or
retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for which
military and/or civilian service he shall have received pay from
the Philippine Government and/or such others as may hereafter
be prescribed by law as active service; Provided, That for
purposes of retirement, he shall have rendered at least ten (10)
years of active service as an officer or enlisted man in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; and Provided further, That no period
of such civilian government service longer than his active
military service shall be credited for purposes of retirement.
On 2003, at the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34)
years of active service, the petitioner was compulsorily
retired from the military. He was, at that time, already ranked
as a Commander in the Philippine Navy. Petitioner chose to
avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to receive
in advance and in lump sum an amount equivalent to three (3)
years worth thereof for the first three years after his
retirement.
The AFP granted petitioner’s claim of retirement benefits and
immediately paid the latter the sum of P722,297.16 as
advance lump, however, the AFP did not include petitioner’s
civilian government service at the DILG. The AFP only
considered petitioner’s actual military service i.e., covering
the period between May 21, 1973 up to May 22, 2003 or a
period of only thirty (30) years.
Petitioner disagreed and insisted that the computation of his
retirement benefit should include the period of his civilian
government service at the DILG immediately before he
entered military service
for a total of four (4) years and five (5) months. It is argued
that the computation of the AFP does not reflect the true
length of his military service of thirty-four (34) years and that
it is, in fact, a full four (4) years short. Petitioner thus claims
that he is entitled to P135, 991.81 in additional retirement
benefit.
After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion
from the AFP Judge Advocate General, the petitioner
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  25

requested assistance from the COA for the collection of his
claimed additional retirement benefit. The COA rendered a
Decision denying petitioner’s claim. COA agreed with the
petitioner that his civilian service at the DILG should and
ought to be included as part of his active service in the military
for purposes of computing his retirement benefits under PD
No. 1638. However, since his civilian service should be
included as part of his active service in the military, the COA
opined that petitioner should also have been considered as
compulsorily retired on 22 May 2000 and not on 22 May 2003.
The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has
already reached the age of fifty-six (56) with a total of thirty-
one (31) years in active service, inclusive of his four years in
the DILG, which fulfilled the conditions for compulsory
retirement under Section 5(a) of PD No. 1638, as amended.
Verily, the COA found that, applying the provisions of PD No.
1638 as amended, petitioner was not actually underpaid but
was rather overpaid his retirement benefit in the amount of
P77,807.16.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the COA
remained steadfast on their resolution. Aggrieved, petitioner
questioned the Decision and Resolution of the COA via the
present Rule 45 petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. WON the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by
Supreme Court via Rule 45.
2. WON COA’s computation of retirement benefit is
correct?
HELD:
1. The Court dismissed the instant petition on account
of it being the wrong remedy. Decisions and
resolutions of the COA are reviewable by Supreme
Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
as is the present petition, but thru a special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which
implements the mandate of Section 7 of Article IX-A
of the Constitution,19 is clear on this:
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter
provided.
The Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the
permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors of
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment
committed by the COA cannot be reviewed by Supreme Court.
2. The Court finds that the computation of COA is the
one that is supported by PD No. 1638. Sections 5 and
7 of PD No. 1638, as amended, identifies the instances
of compulsory retirement in the military service:
Section 5 (a). Upon attaining fifty-six (56) years of age or upon
accumulation of thirty (30) years of satisfactory active service,
whichever is later, an officer or enlisted man shall be
compulsorily retired; Provided, That such officer or enlisted-
man who shall have attained fifty-six (56) years of age with at
least twenty (20) years of active service shall be allowed to
complete thirty (30) years of service but not beyond his sixtieth
(60th) birthday; xxxx
This Court discerns that the COA was correct in holding that
petitioner should be considered as compulsorily retired on
May 2000 for purposes of computing his retirement benefits
under the same law. COA correctly held that for purposes of
computing his retirement benefits under PD No 1638, as
amended, petitioner should have been considered
compulsorily retired as of 22 May 2000 per Section 5(a) of the
same law.20 This is so because it was on 22 May 2000 that
petitioner reached the age of fifty-six (56) after a total of
thirty-one (31) years in active service—fulfilling thereby the
conditions for compulsory retirement under the said
section.21 In coming up with such a conclusion, COA most
certainly reckoned the beginning of petitioner’s active service
in the military from his stint as civilian worker at the DILG.
The inclusion of petitioner’s civilian government service at
the DILG in the computation of his length of active service in
the military, on the other hand, is only but proper in light of
Section 3 of PD No. 1638, as amended.
SHORT DIGEST:
Facts:
X, a retired Philippine Navy, questioned the judgment or
decision made by COA with regards to his retirement benefit
computation. Instead of 34 years length of service as X’s
alleged, COA discern that X has only 31 years length of active
service reckoned at the beginning of petitioner’s active
service in the military from his stint as civilian worker at the
DILG.
X filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to
question said decision of COA.
Issue:
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  26

WON the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by Supreme
Court via Rule 45.
Held:
The Court dismissed the instant petition on account of it being
the wrong remedy. Decisions and resolutions of the COA are
reviewable by Supreme Court, not via an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45, as is the present petition, but thru a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter
provided.
• SAHALI V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 201796, 15 JANUARY
2013 SURRALTA
Doctrine: (1) "A party agrieved by an interlocutory order
issued by a division of the Comelec in an election protest may
not directly assail the order to the Court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the
Division in due course; (2) The power of the Court to review
election cases falling within the original eclusive jurisdiction
of the Comelec only extends to final decisions or resolutions
of the COMELEC EN BANC, not to interlocutory order issued
by a Division thereof."
FACTS:
Petitioner Sahali and private respondent Matba were
candidates for governor in the province of Tawi-Tawi in the
2010 Automated Elections. The provincial board of
canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected
governor of the province. Alleging that said elections in the
province were attended by massive and wide scale
irregularities, private respondent filed an election protest
with the Comelec and moved for a technical examination of
the Election Day Computer's Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters
Registration Records (VRR), and the Book of Voters for the
contested precincts in the province of Tawi-Tawi by
comparing the signatures and the thumbmarks appearing on
the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and Book
of Voters.
The comelec first division issued an order which granted the
motion and thus directed its Election Records and Statistics
Department to conduct the said technical examination. The
petitioner filed with the Comelec first division a Motion for
Reconsideration of said order granting the technical
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
examination. However, the Comelec First division issued an
order (interlocutory) denying the motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved by such order, petitioner went directly to the
Supreme Court via certiorari assailing the interlocutory order
issued by the Comelec first division.
Is petitioner correct in resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari to question an interlocutory order issued by the
Comelec first division?
Answer:
NO.
A party agrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
division of the Comelec in an election protest may not directly
assail the order to the Court through a special civil action for
certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the
Division in due course.
The power of the Court to review election cases falling within
the original eclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends
to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC EN BANC, not
to interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof.
BAR EXAM QUESTION
Jun Lacobo, a defeated candidate in the 2010 governatorial
elections for the Province of Bundok Tralala, filed with the
COMELEC an election protest against the duly elected
governor, Elsie Lacsa, and moved for recounting of election
returns. The Comelec first division issued an order granting
the motion and directed its concern officers to conduct the
recount. Elsie Lacsa filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order granting recount to which the Comelec first division
denied.
Can she assail the interlocutory order issued by a division of
the Comelec directly to the Supreme Court via certiorari?
Answer:
No.
A party agrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
division of the Comelec in an election protest may not directly
assail the order to the Court through a special civil action for
certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the
Division in due course.
The power of the Court to review election cases falling within
the original eclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  27

to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC EN BANC, not
to interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof.
Optional Readings:
• LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC, G.R. NOS. 178831-32/G.R.
NO. 179120/G.R. NOS. 179132-33/G.R. NOS. 179240-41,
APRIL 1, 2009 CANETE
Principle:
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications,
and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation
does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.
Facts:
March 26, 2007 - Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy for a position of a Representative of
the First District of Negros Oriental.
April 4, and April 11, 2007 - Napoleon Camero and Renald F.
Villando, respectively, registered voters of filed the petition
for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked the
citizenship requirement of a Member of the House of
Representatives, claiming that when Limkaichong was born,
her parents are Chinese Citizens as the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained
finality due to procedural and substantial defects. The Office
of the Solicitor General was deprived of its participation in all
the stages of the proceedings therein, as required under
Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised Naturalization
Law and Republic Act No. 530, An Act Making Additional
Provisions for Naturalization. The OSG, being the counsel for
the government, has to participate in all the proceedings so
that it could be bound by what has transpired therein. Lacking
the participation of this indispensable party to the same, the
proceedings are null and void and, hence, no rights could arise
therefrom.
LImkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since
she was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-
born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as such
due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her
birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already
passed after her father took his Oath of Allegiance on October
21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of
Naturalization on the same day.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
May 14, 2007 – The National and Local Elections were
conducted and the disqualification case remained pending
After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said
elections, Limkaichong emerged as the winner with Olivia
Paras as the second.
May 15, 2007 - Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Suspend the
Proclamation of Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the
First District of Negros Oriental
May 17, 2007 - COMELEC Second Division granted the
petitions in the disqualification cases, disqualified
Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative of the First
District of Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervisor
of the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of eligible
candidates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC)
to suspend her proclamation as winning candidate, if any,
until this decision has become final.
Evening of the same day, the Provincial Board of Canvassers
received the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
and suspended the proclamation of Limkaichong.
May 18, 2007 - COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8062
adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved
cases.
May 20, 2007 – Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of May 17, 2007
and Urgent Motion to Lift the Order Suspending Proclamation
May 22, 2007 - Limkaichong filed another motion for the
lifting of the directive suspending her proclamation, insisting
that she should be proclaimed as the winner in the
congressional race pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
8062
May 25, 2007- the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and proclaimed
Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the First District of Negros Oriental
May 30, 2007 - Paras filed with the COMELEC Fist Divisiona
Petition to Nullify and/or Annul the Proclamation of Jocelyn
Sy-Limkaichong as First District Representative of Negros
Oriental in relation to the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division but was dismissed ratiocinating
that the disqualification cases were not yet final when
Limkaichong was proclaimed. Accordingly, her proclamation
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  28

which was valid or legal, effectively divested the COMELEC of
its jurisdiction over the cases.
Paras moved for a reconsideration.
June 29, 2007 – COMELEC en banc , on 3:3 vote , denied
Limkaichong's motion for reconsideration of the Joint
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in the
disqualification cases which reads:
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rule that the
Commission has jurisdiction to rule on Respondent
Limkaichong's Motion for Reconsideration
notwithstanding her proclamation as it is only this
Commission, and not the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which has jurisdiction to review
resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by
a division or en banc.
July 3, 2007 - Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases
against her a Manifestation and Motion for Clarification
and/or To Declare the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance
with Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Despite Limkaichong's repeated pleas for the resolution of her
manifestation and motion for clarification, the COMELEC did
not resolve the same.
August 1, 2007 - filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure praying for the annulment of the May 17, 2007
Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and the June
29, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in the
disqualification cases for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. She averred
that since she was already proclaimed on May 25, 2007 as
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental, had
assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had started to perform
her duties and functions as such, the COMELEC had lost its
jurisdiction and it is now the HRET which has jurisdiction
over any issue involving her qualifications for the said office.
August 16, 2007 - the COMELEC En Banc ruled on
Limkaichong's manifestation and motion for clarification and
resolves that all pending incidents relating to the
qualifications of Limkaichong as Member of the House of
Representatives should now be determined by the HRET.
ISSUE:
WON a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to
Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by
Limkaichong proper
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
HELD:
YES
The petitioner’s proclamation was valid. When she timely
filed her motion for reconsideration and lifting the order
suspending her proclamation on May 20, 2007, it effectively
suspends the execution of the May 17, 2007 Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division, Thus, there is no impediment to
proclaim her as the winner.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. ' A
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of
a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends
the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution,
order and ruling.
and
Section 13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. - x x x
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases, a decision or
resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court.
The May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division disqualifying Limkaichong and suspending her
proclamation cannot yet be implemented considering that she
timely filed a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 18 and Section 2 Rule 19
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Joint Resolution has
not yet attained finality for it to be implemented.
Notably, the seeming impropriety of the Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc dated June 29, 2007 has since been
remedied by the promulgation of its Resolution dated August
16, 2007, recognizing that it no longer has jurisdiction over
the disqualification cases following the valid proclamation of
Limkaichong and her assumption of office as a Member of the
House of Representatives.
• LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC, RESOLUTION, G.R. NOS.
178831-32/G.R. NO. 179120/G.R. NOS. 179132-33/G.R.
NOS. 179240-41, JULY 30, 2009 PAGAPONG
Principle:
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  29

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications,
and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation
does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.
Long digest:
Facts:
(These are consolidated cases)
Limkaichong filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental.
In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her
disqualification were instituted before the COMELEC on the
ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement because
her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth.
In her Answers to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she
is a natural-born Filipino since she was born to a naturalized
Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother.
The case was pending before the COMELEC until the election
and proclamation of Limkaichong.
In a Joint Resolution, the COMELEC dismissed the cases on the
ground that Limkaichong’s subsequent election and
assumption of office divest the COMELEC jurisdiction and
transfer it to HRET.
Thus, these cases ( petition for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus) against COMELEC were filed.
(actually, one of the actions i.e. certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, was filled by Limkaichong herself assailing
COMELEC’s jurisdiction)
The petitioners (in one of the cases) argue that the issue
concerning Limkaichong’s disqualification is still within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc to resolve
because when Limkaichong was proclaimed the matter was
still pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.
Issue:
Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET,
instead of the COMELEC, should assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification cases.
Ruling: HRET
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should
now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET,
the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a
case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with
respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in
the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, as
amended, which states:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives.
In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her
subsequent assumption of office, it is ruled that all pending
incidents relating to the qualifications of Limkaichong should
now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted provision of
the Constitution.
Short digest:
X’s filling of COC for congressional seat was opposed on the
ground that X is not a natural-born citizen, being born before
her parents were naturalized.
Pending the action before the COMELEC, X was allowed to run,
where she won and was subsequently proclaimed and
assumed office.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  30

With this, the COMELEC dismissed the action ratiocinating
that X’s subsequent proclamation and assumption of office
divest its jurisdiction. The petitioners however contended
that COMELEC’s prior jurisdiction is not affected with the
subsequent proclamation of X. Decide.
(First sentence: yes! Hahaha)
X.C
• PATES V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 184915, 30 JUNE 2009
DACUA
Time to File Petition:
Rule 64, Sec. 3. Time to file petition. The petition shall be filed
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or
final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules
of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period
herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall
not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from
notice of denial.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30
days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules
of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically
applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the
application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari,
subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.
Rule 64, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it
expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules
for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the
most patent difference between the two i.e., the exception
that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3 which provides
for a special period for the filing of petitions
for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en
banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or
ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with
the intervening period used for the filing of any motion
for reconsideration deductible from the originally-
granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days
that Rule 65 provides).
FACTS:
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
- February 1, 2008 The COMELEC First Division issued its
Resolution (assailed in the petition);
- February 4, 2008 The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates
(petitioner) received a copy of the February 1,
2008 Resolution;
- February 8, 2008 The petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration (MR) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4
days from receipt of the February 1, 2008 Resolution)
- September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying the petitioners MR (also assailed in the
petition).
- September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the
COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008
Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition
for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final COMELEC
Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the
petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his
petition, after using up 4 days in preparing and filing his
Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing
was October 20, 2008 the following Monday or the first
working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his
petition with us on October 22, 2008 or two days late; hence,
our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008.
The petitioner asks us in his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration with Reiteration for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order to reverse the dismissal of his
petition, arguing that the petition was seasonably filed under
the fresh period rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in a
number of cases decided beginning the year 2005. The fresh
period refers to the original period provided under the Rules
of Court counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for
reconsideration by the tribunal below, without deducting the
period for the preparation and filing of the motion for
reconsideration.
He claims that, historically, the fresh period rule was the
prevailing rule in filing petitions for certiorari. This Court, he
continues, changed this rule when it promulgated the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and Circular No. 39-98, which both
provided for the filing of petitions within the remainder of the
original period, the remainder being the original period less
the days used up in preparing and filing a motion for
reconsideration. He then points out that on September 1,
2000 or only three years after, this Court promulgated A.M.
No. 00-02-03-SC bringing back the fresh period rule.
Arguments of parties:
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  31

Petitioner said that the SC has consistently held that the order
or resolution denying the motion for reconsideration or new
trial is considered as the final order finally disposing of the
case, and the date of its receipt by a party is the correct
reckoning point for counting the period for appellate review.
Respondent countered in her comment stating that: (1) we
are absolutely correct in concluding that the petition was filed
out of time; and (2) the petitioners reliance on Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 00-02-03-
SC) is totally misplaced, as Rule 64, not Rule 65, is the vehicle
for review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
COMELEC. Respondent Almirante points out that Rule 64 and
Rule 65 are different; Rule 65 provides for a 60-day period for
filing petitions for certiorari, while Rule 64 provides for 30
days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the time for filing the petitioner for
certiorari from the decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en
banc is reckoned 30 days from notice of its decision or ruling
based on Rule 64 and not the fresh period of 60 days based on
Rule 65.
RULING: Yes.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that
unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this
reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule
(Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule
expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a
petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause except
as hereinafter provided.
Rule 64, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it
expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules
for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the
most patent difference between the two i.e., the exception
that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3 which
provides for a special period for the filing of petitions
for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the
COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of
the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65
provides), with the intervening period used for the filing
of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the
originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of
60 days that Rule 65 provides).
General Rule is strict compliance of the rules.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Exception is the liberal interpretation and application of the
rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and
under justifiable causes and circumstances. exceptional
circumstances or compelling reasons may have existed in the
past when we either suspended the operation of the Rules or
exempted a particular case from their application.
Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional
circumstance or any compelling reason to warrant the non-
application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to
explain why his filing was late. Other than his appeal to
history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why
we should adopt and apply the fresh period rule to an election
case.
QUICK DIGEST:
- February 1, 2008 The COMELEC First Division issued its
Resolution (assailed in the petition);
- February 4, 2008 The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates
(petitioner) received a copy of the February 1,
2008 Resolution;
- February 8, 2008 The petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration (MR) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4
days from receipt of the February 1, 2008 Resolution)
- September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying the petitioners MR (also assailed in the
petition).
- September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the
COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008
Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition
for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final COMELEC
Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the
petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his
petition, after using up 4 days in preparing and filing his
Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing
was October 20, 2008 the following Monday or the first
working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his
petition with us on October 22, 2008 or two days late; hence,
our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008.
Petitioner argued that under Rule 65, it should be the fresh
period rule of 60 days that is to be applied for the filing of
petition for certiorari.
Respondent to the contrary also argued that it should be 30
days from the notice of decision or ruling of the COMELEC that
must be applied for the filing of petitioner for certiorari.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  32

Hence, resolution of dismissal is correct because of
petitioner’s late filing.
Rule on the motion. (99.9%)
• Osmena v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 188818, 31
May 2011 SITOY
| City of Cebu hosted the Palarong Pambansa, as part
of the preparation, renovation of Cebu City Sports Complex is
necessary and contracted WT Construction and DAcay
Construction. City Council of Cebu made an ordinance for
allocation of funds for the renovoation. However, as Mayor
Tomas sees it necessary, the latter issued an Change/extra
work to the contractor but such was not covered by the
supplemental budget. When the contractor claimed the
amount of payment, the City did not pay because it was not in
the supplemental budget. Hence, 2 Contractors sued Mayor
Tom and the City Council at the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of
the contractors and during appeal it was affirmed.
During the execution of judgment the City Auditor
issued two notices containing that the City is not liable to pay
the judgment award but Mayor and Sangunian Members are
personally liable. The decision of the City Auditor was
affirmed by the Regional Director of COA and the national
office of COA.
Osmea received a copy of the Decision on May 23,
2008. Eighteen days after or on June 10, 2008, Osmea filed a
motion for reconsideration of the May 6, 2008 COA Decision.
The COA denied Osmeas motion via a Resolution
dated June 8, 2009.1[13] The Office of the Mayor of Cebu
City received the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA on June
29, 2009. A day before, however, Osmea left for the United
States of America for his check-up after his cancer surgery in
April 2009 and returned to his office only on July 15, 2009.
Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that Osmea filed the present
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to assail the COAs
Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution of June 8, 2009.
Issue:
Whether the Petition of Mayor Tom was timely based on Rule
64 in the rules of Court?
Ruling:
YES.
Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at
least be accompanied by an explanation of why the party-
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
litigant failed to comply with the Rules and by a
justification for the requested liberal construction. Where
strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in
the petition, this Court may relax the strict application of the
rules of procedure in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction.
In the foregoing case, The High Court find Osmena’s
reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules.
Although the service of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA
was validly made on June 29, 2009 through the notice sent to
the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City, we consider July 15, 2009
the date he reported back to office as the effective date when
he was actually notified of the resolution, and the reckoning
date of the period to appeal. If we were to rule otherwise,
we would be denying Osmea of his right to appeal the
Decision of the COA, despite the merits of his case.
Bar Question:
X (Mayor) was adjudged by COA to be personally
liable in erroneously disbusing funds of the City. X
received the copy of decision on May 23, 2008. Eighteen
days after or on June 10, 2008, X filed a motion for
reconsideration of the May 6, 2008 COA Decision.
The COA denied X motion via a Resolution dated
June 8, 2009.2 The Office of the Mayor X received the June 8,
2009 Resolution of the COA on June 29, 2009. A day before,
however, X left for the United States of America for his check-
up after his cancer surgery in April 2009 and returned to his
office only on July 15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009
that X filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to
assail the COAs Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution of June
8, 2009.
Note: Apply the issue above and the ruling
XI.A.1 • ARAULLO V. AQUINO, G.R NO. 209287, 1 JULY
2014 10/13 AMORES SEE XI. B
PRINCIPLES
Certiorari - The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Prohibition – A preventive remedy issued to restrain future
action, and is directed to the court itself.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  33

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Doctrine of Operative Fact – recognizes the legal effect of an
act prior to it being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court
LONG DIGEST
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the
funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what
happens under the DAP was that if a certain government is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and
portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed
funds from the General Appropriation Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriation made by
Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada made an expose’ claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for
voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the
Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out
that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive.
It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also
funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
National Liberation Front), Php700M for the Quezon
Province, Php50 – 100M for certain Senators each, Php10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson
of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme
Court questioning the validity of DAP. Among their
contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law”.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on
certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25 (5), Art VI of the Constitution
(power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUE:
WON certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances
allegedly implementing the DAP.
HELD:
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies.
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil
actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These
are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and
both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy for certiorari
exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable
only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of
certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos
Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
In the common law, from which the remedy of
certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of
Chancery, or the King’s Bench, commanding agents or officers
of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending
before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy
justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to
determine from an inspection of the record whether the
inferior court’s judgment was rendered without authority.
The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they
would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom
no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  34

without authority, the record was then revised and corrected
in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in
which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its
jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential
requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or
quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial
system remains much the same as it has been in the common
law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to
issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down
the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a
superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior
court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
compelling provides the requirements for the purpose, viz:
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to
act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal
or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in
a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for
want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished
from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used
for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal,
and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court
and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventive
remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the
court itself. The Court expounded on the nature and function
of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc v. Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper
remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-
legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice
in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to
afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior
court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary
course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the
principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’
remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action
which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that
“respondents are performing or threatening to perform
functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction” may
appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
injunction or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope
and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by
a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1,
to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all
precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge
was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The
Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary
implication with both the duty and the obligation of
determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent
with the Republican system of checks and balances.
OTHER ISSUES
I. WON the DAP violates the principle “no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  35

appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
II. WON the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
III. WON the DAP realignments/transfers are
constitutional.
IV. WON the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the
DAP is constitutional.
V. WON the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did
not violate the Constitutional provision cited in
Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by
law would have been required. Funds which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the
DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not
happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment
in the case at bar because what’s involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to
make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made
“within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-
border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated
because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the
Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also
contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the
GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within
the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the
GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to
them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because
they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings” these DAP transfers are not
“savings” contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not
refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the
transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end
of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and
then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly
by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot
be used as money source for the DAP because
under the law, such funds may only be used if
there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In
this case, no such certification was secured
before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which
recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP,
then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP
effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they
relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable
to the authors, implementers, and proponents of
the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that
they have not acted in good faith.
QUICK DIGEST
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  36

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office the then
Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad came up with a
program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP) to speed up the funding of government projects.
However, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made
an expose’ claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor
of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona
which was taken from the DAP. It turns out that the DAP does
not only realign funds within the Executive but some non-
Executive projects were also funded. This prompted Maria
Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of DAP.
ISSUE:
WON certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances
allegedly implementing the DAP.
HELD:
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies. The present
Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining
and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for
certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65.
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this
regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the
issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Although
similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition
by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-
examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is
directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not
to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventive remedy
issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
itself. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.
XI. B. Distinguished from each other
ARAULLO, id
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this
regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the
issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said
entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or
person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but
not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a
lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to
maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by
which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact
that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of
some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the
cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court
itself, while prohibition is a preventive remedy issuing to
restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  37

The writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
• TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES, INC V. PNB-REPUBLIC BANK,
G.R. NO. 151007, JULY 17, 2006 RAVENS
LONG DIGEST
Principles:
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at law. The writ may be issued
only where it is convincingly proved that the lower court
committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation
of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.
While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedy
to assail an interlocutory order in cases where the tribunal
has issued an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, it does not lie to correct every
controversial interlocutory ruling.xxx
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is
wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. The rationale of this
rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.
Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void
judgment.
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the May 29, 2001 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53033 which dismissed the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Triplex Enterprises,
Inc. for lack of merit.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Petitioner sought to annul the sale of two parcels of land
situated in Tagaytay City by PNB-Republic Bank to Solid
Builders, Inc. and to compel PNB-Republic Bank to award
instead the sale to it as the highest bidder. Petitioners claim
was rejected by PNB-Republic Bank due to the sale of the
properties to Solid Builders, Inc. After the rejection of
petitioners bid, Atty. Romeo Roque, the real estate broker
whose services were engaged by petitioner for its
negotiations with PNB-Republic Bank concerning the
Tagaytay properties, obtained a legal opinion from the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)xxx
During the pre-trial conference, petitioner marked the
December 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC as Exhibit C and
offered the matter of its existence for stipulation between the
parties. Respondents admitted the existence of the opinion
but manifested their disagreement with its contents.
During trial, petitioner called Atty. Roque to testify.
When Roques testimony was offered specifically with respect
to the legal opinion of the OGCC, counsels for respondents
objected to its admission for being violative of the rule on
attorney-client privilege between the OGCC and PNB-
Republic Bank. The trial court sustained the objection.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the court a quos
refusal to admit its evidence but it was denied in an order
dated February 26, 1999. The order disallowed the
presentation and admission in evidence of any testimony
referring to the December 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC. The
prohibition was based on the ground that the testimony was
in violation of the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client, i.e., the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
disallowing the presentation and admission in evidence of
Roques testimony.
Ruling: NO
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of
the defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and
the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be
corrected only by appeal. The determination made by the trial
court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an
exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  38

perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in
judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that
rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on
admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are
interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a
separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken
from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of
the case.
Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing
the admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the
opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of
discretion could be imputed to the trial court. Furthermore,
the said order was not an error of jurisdiction. Even assuming
that it was erroneous, the mistake was an error in judgment
not correctable by the writ of certiorari.
SHORT DIGEST
Facts:
The case stemmed from an action for annulment of contract,
mandamus and damages filed by petitioner against Leverage
& Services Group, Inc. and respondents PNB-Republic Bank
and Solid Builders, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 153. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
64941.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the court a quos
refusal to admit its evidence but it was denied in an order
dated February 26, 1999. The order disallowed the
presentation and admission in evidence of any testimony
referring to the December 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC. The
prohibition was based on the ground that the testimony was
in violation of the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client, i.e., the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
disallowing the presentation and admission in evidence of
Roques testimony.
Ruling: NO
Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing
the admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of
discretion could be imputed to the trial court. Furthermore,
the said order was not an error of jurisdiction. Even assuming
that it was erroneous, the mistake was an error in judgment
not correctable by the writ of certiorari.
XI.A.2 • DAVID V. RIVERA, G.R. NOS. 139913 & 140159,
JANUARY 16, 2004 CORTES
Principle: It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper
remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance
the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by
the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Facts: Claiming to be the owner of an eighteen thousand
(18,000)- square meter portion (hereafter, "subject land") of
Lot No. 38-B,1 a five (5)-hectare lot situated at MacArthur
Highway, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, herein respondent
Agustin Rivera filed on May 10, 1994 a Complaint 2 for
"Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction" before the
Provincial Adjudication Board (PARAB) of San Fernando,
Pampanga against petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino and
Consolacion David. The respondent averred that the
petitioners had been harassing him for the purpose of making
him vacate the subject land although it had already been given
to him sometime in 1957 by the parents of the petitioners as
"disturbance compensation", in consideration of his
renunciation of his tenurial rights over the original eighteen
(18)-hectare farmholding.
For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint for ejectment
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat
and Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the respondent
was occupying the subject land without paying rentals
therefor. The petitioners also averred that they need the
subject land for their personal use but the respondent refused
to vacate it despite repeated demands.
On September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered its Decision
ordering the respondent to vacate the subject land. The court
found that there was a dearth of evidence supportive of the
respondent‘s claim that the land is agricultural or that it is
devoted to agricultural production. Further, it ruled that the
petitioners as the registered owners have a better right to
possession of the subject land.
Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within the period
to appeal, the respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City a Petition for prohibition with
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  39

preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
seeking the nullification of the MCTC Decision. The thrust of
the petition was that the MCTC had no jurisdiction as the issue
before it was agrarian in nature.
On February 25, 1998, the RTC issued an Order denying the
motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the motion, which was
filed after the presentation of the plaintiff‘s evidence, partakes
of a demurrer to evidence which under Section 1, Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court, may be granted only upon a showing that
the plaintiff has shown no right to the relief prayed for. Noting
that "the evidence presented by the petitioner establishes an
issue which is addressed to [the] court for resolution. . .
whether or not the respondent court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case filed before it", the RTC ruled that
the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper. The petitioners
moved for reconsideration but such was denied in an Order
dated June 23, 1998.
ISSUES: 1. WON there was usurpation or erroneous
assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC?
2. WON Petition for Prohibition was a proper remedy?
RULING:
1. YES. There was erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction by the MCTC since jurisdiction is
expressly vested DAR.
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition
to correct what he perceived was an erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction by the MCTC. Indeed, the propriety of the
recourse to the RTC for a writ of prohibition is beyond cavil in
view of the following considerations:
The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, where two
tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the
same subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimately
rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for
prohibition. The MCTC manifestly took cognizance of the case
for ejectment pursuant to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Blg.129, as amended. On the other hand, the ratiocination of
the DARAB, which the respondent echoes, is that the case falls
squarely within its jurisdiction as it arose out of, or was
connected with, agrarian relations. The respondent also
points out that his right to possess the land, as a registered
tenant, was submitted for determination before the PARAB
prior to the filing of the case for ejectment. Executive Order
No. 129-A created the DARAB to assume the powers and
functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases. Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure
enumerates the cases falling within the primary and exclusive
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
jurisdiction of the DARAB, which is quoted hereunder in so far
as pertinent to the issue at bar:
Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. The board shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
under Republic Act no. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229,
and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws
and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically,
such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases
involving the following:
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or
juridical engaged in the management, cultivation and use of
all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian
laws;
...
g) Those cases previously falling under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian
Relations under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946,
except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree No.
815.
It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or
petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.
As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reform
matters is now expressly vested in the DAR, through the
DARAB.
2. YES. Petition for prohibition was the proper remedy
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of
jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has availed of the
proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special civil
action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the
proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its
cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such
relief can be obtained. The purpose of a writ of prohibition is
to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in
order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
channels. While appeal is the recognized remedy to question
the judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract from
the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition to
restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  40

proceeding further on the ground that it heard and decided
the case without jurisdiction. Since the right to prohibition is
defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a
remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the
remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate.
QUICK DIGEST:
Facts: Agustin Rivera(claiming to be the owner of an 18,000
SQM which is part of Lot No. 38-B, a 5 hectar lot) filed a
Complaint for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with
Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction"
before PARAB against petitioners heirs of Spouses David. The
respondent averred that the petitioners have been harassing
him for the purpose of making him vacate the land. Spouses
David filed a complaint for ejectment before MCTC, which
ordered Agustin Rivera to vacate the land and ruled that
Spouses David as registered owners. Rivera, without
appealing, filed a Petition for Prohibition with the RTC
seeking to annul the MCTC’s decision. David filed a motion to
dismiss but denied by the court. Subsequently, the petitioners
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the
motion to dismiss.
Issue: WON Petition for Prohibition was the proper remedy
(Filed by Augusto Rivera)?
Ruling: YES
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by
which such relief can be obtained.
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition
to correct what he perceived was an erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction by the MCTC. While appeal is the recognized
remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court, this
does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue
a writ of prohibition to restrain the inferior court, among
other instances, from proceeding further on the ground that it
heard and decided the case without jurisdiction. Since the
right to prohibition is defeated not by the existence, but by the
adequacy, of a remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be
granted where the remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or
adequate.
• ESQUIVEL V. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 137237,
SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 TIU
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
In certiorari, the grave abuse of discretion must be
established.
A writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself,
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction
to which it has no legal claim. As an extraordinary
remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the
ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are
adequate and available. Prohibition is granted only
where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford
redress.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and
not a discretionary duty. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
LONG DIGEST:
FACTS:2 policemen, Eduardo and catacutan, filed a complaint
in the PNP for illegal arrest, arbitrary detention,
maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats against
herein petitioners Antonio, municipal mayor, and mark ,
barangay captain.
Eduardo alleged in his affidavit that on his way to the house of
his mother, the petitioners arrived and disarmed him. He was
asked to board the vehicle and was brought to the municipal
hall.
Eduardo told the PNP that Eduardo was most likely
maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and padua and
the mayor thinks that Eduardo was one of those who raided
the said activities.
After the investigation of the PNP, the record was forwarded
to the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.
Later on, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a
resolution recommending that both the mayor and the Brgy
Captain be indicted for the crime of less serious physical
injury and the mayor only for grave threats.
After the Ombudsman approved the resolution, the criminal
cases for less serious physical injuries against the mayor and
the captain and grave threats against the mayor were filed in
the Sandiganbayan.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was
however denied.
Hence, the petitioners elevated the matters to the SC alleging
GAD on the part of the public respondents in rendering the
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  41

resolution and order. They also plea for the issuance of TRO
directing the public respondents to refrain from prosecuting
the said cases.
ISSUE:
1.) WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in directing the filing of the informations against
petitioners?
(2) WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos.
24777 and 24778?
HELD:
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion when he failed to consider the exculpatory
evidence in their favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo
that he was in good physical condition when he left the police
station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija. With such admission, PO2
Eduardo is now estopped from claiming that he was injured
since it is conclusive evidence against him and need not be
proven in any other proceeding.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court
will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise
of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good
and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the disputed resolution and order.
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman, much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2
Eduardo’s admission that he was in good physical condition
when he was released from the police headquarters. Such
admission was never brought up during the preliminary
investigation. The records show that no such averment was
made in petitioners’ counter-affidavit nor was there any
document purporting to be the exculpatory statement
attached therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only
raised this issue in their motion for reconsideration.
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper
remedy.
2. Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over
their persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
No. 7975. As the positions of municipal mayors
and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim
they are not covered by said law under the principle
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs.
Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal mayors fall
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No.
8249, provides that it is only in cases where "none of the
accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher" that "exclusive
original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended."
Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor
Esquivel has a salary grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain
Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of
Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27,
the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over
Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the
writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.
Extra ruling of the SC:
For the same reason, petitioners’ prayer for a writ of
prohibition must also be denied.
First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court
itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a
jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. As earlier discussed,
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos.
24777-78 is clearly founded on law.
Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be
resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided
by law are adequate and available. Prohibition is granted only
where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford
redress. That the petitioners have another and complete
remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally
held sufficient reason for denying the issuance of the writ.
Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an
inferior court unless the attention of the court whose
proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the
alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction. The foundation of this
rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower court
and the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation;
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  42

Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a
discretionary duty. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment.
Short digest:
FACTS: Two police officers filed complaint-affidavits against
petitioners Antonio Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva
Ecija and his brother, Mark Anthony Esquivel, barangay
captain of Barangay Apo, Jaen, Nueva Ecija. They were
charged with illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment,
attempted murder and grave threats. After the preliminary
investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a
resolution recommending that both petitioners be indicted
for less serious physical injuries and Mayor Esquivel alone for
grave threats. The Ombudsman approved the resolution.
Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners
pleaded not guilty to the charges.
XI.A.3 MILITANTE V. CA, G.R. NO. 107040, APRIL 12,
2000 SAURA
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of three (3)
contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,590
square meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City.
In 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1315 expropriating forty (40) hectares of land in Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. Almost all of these 40 hectares had been
expropriated as early as 1979 except the 1,590 sq. m. lot of
petitioner.
The land sought to be expropriated under P.D. No. 1315 is
defined as an area "identified as a blighted area and included
in the SIR Program" which means Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program. On October 2, 1981, however, Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) Commissioner
Dizon, Jr. certified that petitioner's lot is "outside the declared
Urban Land Reform Zone."
With this certificate, petitioner asked the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting
on the request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA General
Manager, sent a letter dated October 6, 1981 to Mayor
Macario Asistio, Jr., of Caloocan City, to conduct a census of the
families occupying petitioner’s lots.
The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the
possibility of amicably settling the eviction problem and/or to
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
find out why a clearance should be issued or not for the
removal/demolition of all the illegal structures in the said
property." The squatters did not attend the meeting. In view
of their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting Division
Manager, Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum
to the Department Manager, Resettlement Department, NHA,
recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.
On January 21, 1982, NHA General Manager Tobias granted
clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal structures on
petitioner's property within three (3) months from receipt of
the order. Clearance was also granted for the relocation of the
24 families (squatters) to the Sapang Palay Resettlement
Project. The clearance was addressed to Mayor Asistio.
The demolition did not take place. In a letter dated
September 16, 1982, General Tobias inquired from Mayor
Asistio whether Caloocan City had plans of developing
petitioner's properties in the Bagong Barrio Project. On
December 13, 1982, Mayor Asistio replied that "considering
the said properties are private in character, the City has no
plans presently or in the immediate future to develop or
underwrite the development of said properties."
On September 8, 1990, petitioner, through counsel, requested
for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and relocation
of the squatters.
On January 15, 1991, NHA General Manager Monico Jacob
revalidated the demolition clearance and informed
Mayor Asistio that the NHA was making available enough
serviced home lots in Bagong Silang Resettlement Project for
the 24 families.
Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project
Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to implement the
clearance to eject the squatters on petitioner's land. At the
conference of February 13, 1991, Carangdang claimed that
petitioner’s land had already been declared expropriated by
P.D. 1315.
Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a
"Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Declaration
as Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree
No. 1315" against the NHA and Carangdang.
In a decision dated April 24, 1992, the respondent Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
WON issuance of writ of mandamus will be granted to compel
Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  43

on the subject property when there is no direct order for her
to do so.
RULING:
No. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or
he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ
of mandamus. He failed to discharge this burden. The records
show that there is no direct order from the NHA General
Manager addressed to respondent Carangdang to evict the
squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property.
The NHA demolition clearance issued by General Tobias on
January 21, 1982 was addressed to Mayor Asistio, the mayor
of Caloocan City. The clearance's revalidation by NHA General
Manager Monico Jacob was likewise addressed to Mayor
Asistio.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that
may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition
for mandamus is premature if there are administrative
remedies available to the petitioner. If superior
administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for,
special civil actions are generally not entertained. In the
instant case, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative
remedies. He may seek another demolition order from the
NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to
respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative.
#####
These are other issues in the case other than Mandamus :
On Petitioner’s petition for Prohibition:
Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks for a judgment
ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the
commission of an act perceived to be illegal.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent
Carangdang should be ordered to desist from relocating the
squatters. What petitioner challenges is respondent
Carangdang's refusal to implement the demolition clearance
issued by her administrative superiors. The remedy for a
refusal to discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
On the petition for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
P.D. 1315:
Petitioner's procedure in assailing the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1315 is flawed. His principal concern is the relocation of
the squatters on his land. If he could attain this aim, petitioner
himself admits in his Petition that "there may not be a need
for declaring P.D. No. 1315 null and void." Indeed, petitioner
assails P.D. No. 1315, purely out of pique against respondent
Carangdang who refused to implement the demolition order
of her superior. To use petitioner's own words, he has to
attack the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315 "to . . . break
respondent Carangdang's hypocrisy and pretension." We hold
that petitioner has no privilege to assail P.D. No. 1315 as
unconstitutional to serve a petty purpose.
Short digest/Principle (Atty. Acosta issue-ruling type)
Facts: P asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land.
NHA General Manager granted clearance to dismantle and
remove all illegal structures on P's property. Clearance was
also granted for the relocation of the squatters. The clearance
was addressed to Mayor A. Demolition did not take place. R,
NHA Project Manager, refused to implement the clearance to
eject the squatters on P's land.
Issue: WON issuance of writ of mandamus is proper to compel
a person to do an act when there is no direct order for that
person to do so.
Ruling: No.
Mandamus cannot be granted to compel a person to do an act
when there is no direct order for that person to do so.
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or
he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station.
XI.B • PAMANA V.CA, G.R. NO. 133033, JUNE 15, 2005
EDOMBINGO
PRINCIPLE:
The special civil action of certiorari is directed only against
a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Upon the other hand, prohibition is directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Certiorari and prohibition differ as to purpose.
Certiorari is aimed at annulling or modifying a proceeding,
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  44

prohibition is directed at commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified in the petition.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed two (2) separate complaints, both for
forcible entry in the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
against two (2) set of defendants (now, the respondents).
It was alleged that petitioner was the owner and in
lawful possession of parcels of land located at barrios Bocal
and Lecheria, Calamba, Laguna evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Titles; and that respondents by means of force,
strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied said
parcels of land and built their shanties.
Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations
of the complaints averred that the lots they are occupying are
not owned by the petitioner but owned and registered under
the name of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Corporation which give them permission to occupy.
Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaints for
petitioner’s lack of cause of action against them.
MTC tried the cases under the Rules on Summary
Procedure and rendered a joint decision ordering
respondents to vacate the premises.
Respondents went on appeal to the Regional Trial
Court at Calamba, Lagana where it initially set aside the
decision of the MTC and ordered the remand of the cases to
the latter for the reason that the suits could not have been
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure because the
defense interposed by the respondents raised the question of
ownership.
Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, RTC
set aside its decision and affirmed en toto the appealed MTC
decision. Said order become final and executory.
MTC issued a Writ of Execution commanding the
sheriff to cause respondents removal from the premises and
to restore petitioner. The order was followed by a Writ of
Demolition ordering the sheriff to destroy and demolish
respondent’s houses and constructions.
Respondents went to the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order praying to restrain the sheriff from
implementing the writ of demolition. Order of Execution, the
Writ of Execution and the Writ of Demolition are ordered to
desist from further implementing.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Petitioner’s motion for consideration having been
denied by the appellate court; hence this petition
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
when it gave due course and acted favorably on the
petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order of a final and executory decision.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
when it ruled that the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Calamba in Civil cases do not include lots 5 &
7, the premises occupied by the respondents.
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
when it prohibited the implementation of the writ of
demolition, as prohibition is a preventive remedy and
does not lie to restrain an act which is already fait
accompli.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
1. In the petition for prohibition filed by
respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 45879, they did not
seek to annul or modify the Order of Execution, Writ
of Execution and Writ of Demolition issued by the
MTC. What they there assailed was the sheriffs power
and authority to implement said writs vis--vis the lots
actually occupied by them, namely, Lot No. 5 and Lot
No. 7 of TCT Nos. T-66140 and T-61703, respectively,
registered in the name of the Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Corporation. It is as regards those lots
that they want the sheriff restrained and prohibited
from implementing said writs, more particularly the
writ of demolition. Consequently, prohibition, not
certiorari, is the appropriate remedy for them.
2. Lots 5 and 7 are never included in the
complaints for ejectment filed by the petitioner
before the MTC as it is under the name of Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Corporation. The sheriff’s
act of implementing the writs on said lots by causing
the demolition of respondents’ houses clearly
constitutes a violation of his mandate, restrainable by
prohibition.
The Sheriffs Return persuasively proved that the
demolition was effected prior to respondents filing of their
petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
having failed to prove its point, the Court of Appeals finding
must be left undisturbed. It appears undisputed that
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  45

respondents are still in occupancy of Lots 5 and 7. The
implementation of the order of demolition does not alter that
decision of the Court of Appeals from setting aside the order
of execution and writs complained of and ordering
respondents to desist from further implementing the same.
SHORT DIGEST:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed two (2) separate complaints of
forcible entry in the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
against two (2) set of defendants alleging that petitioner was
the owner and in lawful possession of parcels of land and that
respondents by means of force, strategy and stealth,
unlawfully entered and occupied said parcels of land and built
their shanties. Allegations were denied by respondents saying
that the lots they are occupying are not owned by the
petitioner and prayed for the dismissal of the complaints for
petitioner’s lack of cause of action against them. MTC and RTC
ruled in favor of petitioner but reversed by the CA. Petitioner’s
motion for consideration having been denied by the appellate
court; hence this petition
ISSUE:
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
when it gave due course and acted favorably on the
petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order of a final and executory decision.
5. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
when it ruled that the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Calamba in Civil cases do not include lots 5 &
7, the premises occupied by the respondents.
6. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
when it prohibited the implementation of the writ of
demolition, as prohibition is a preventive remedy and
does not lie to restrain an act which is already fait
accompli.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
3. In the petition for prohibition filed by
respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 45879, they did not
seek to annul or modify the Order of Execution, Writ
of Execution and Writ of Demolition issued by the
MTC. What they there assailed was the sheriffs power
and authority to implement said writs vis--vis the lots
actually occupied by them, namely, Lot No. 5 and Lot
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
No. 7 of TCT Nos. T-66140 and T-61703, respectively,
registered in the name of the Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Corporation. It is as regards those lots
that they want the sheriff restrained and prohibited
from implementing said writs, more particularly the
writ of demolition. Consequently, prohibition, not
certiorari, is the appropriate remedy for them.
4. Lots 5 and 7 are never included in the
complaints for ejectment filed by the petitioner
before the MTC as it is under the name of Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Corporation. The sheriff’s
act of implementing the writs on said lots by causing
the demolition of respondents’ houses clearly
constitutes a violation of his mandate, restrainable by
prohibition.
The Sheriffs Return persuasively proved that the
demolition was effected prior to respondents filing of their
petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
having failed to prove its point, the Court of Appeals finding
must be left undisturbed. It appears undisputed that
respondents are still in occupancy of Lots 5 and 7. The
implementation of the order of demolition does not alter that
decision of the Court of Appeals from setting aside the order
of execution and writs complained of and ordering
respondents to desist from further implementing the same.
• Araullo, id. AMORES
• ENRIQUEZ V. MACADAEG, G.R. NO. L-2422, SEPTEMBER
30, 1949 DAPANAS
Principle/s:
When the "venue is improperly laid", as the action sought to
be dismissed affects title to and the recovery of possession of
real property. Mandamus is not the proper remedy for
correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal
"unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or
"unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of
a right." It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in
defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action
which would not be maintained in his court.
The remedy in such case is prohibition and that remedy is
available in the present case because the order complained of,
being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not appealable.
Bar Alike Question:
X filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against Judge Y when
the latter denied their motion to dismiss the case filed by Z on
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  46
 Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished

the ground, among others, that, as the action concerned title "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of
to and possession of real estate venue was improperly laid. Is a right." It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in
the judge correct in denying the motion to dismiss? Is the writ defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action
of mandamus is the proper remedy? Rule. which would not be maintained in his court.

Facts: The remedy in such case is prohibition and that remedy is

available in the present case because the order complained of,
A petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not appealable.
judge to dismiss a civil action. In question is for the recovery
of a piece of real property situated in Negros Oriental, the Though, the SC ruled that While the petition is for mandamus,
complaint alleging that the said property had been bought by the same may well be treated as one for prohibition by
plaintiff at an execution sale but the judgment debtor, as waiving strict adherence to technicalities in the interest of a
supposed owner, subsequently mortgaged the same to the speedy administration of justice pursuant.
PNB and refused to surrender possession to plaintiff. The
latter brought suit to have himself declared owner of said Wherefore, let a writ of prohibition issue, enjoining the
property and placed in possession thereof. Before filing their respondent judge or his successor from taking cognizance of
answer, the defendants (now petitioner) in that case moved this case unless it be to dismiss the same in accordance with
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground, among the Rules. Without costs. So ordered.
others, that, as the action concerned title to and possession of
real estate situated in Negros Oriental, venue was improperly
laid in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion having
been denied, the defendants filed the present petition for
mandamus to compel the respondent judge to dismiss the
action. The respondent judge puts up the defense that the act
sought to be ordered involves the exercise of judicial
discretion and that petitioner has another adequate remedy,
which is by appeal.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the respondent judge is correct when it

denied petitioner motion for dismissal on the ground, among
others, that, as the action concerned title to and possession of
real estate situated in Negros Oriental, venue was improperly
laid in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

In relation to, whether or not the writ of mandamus is the

proper remedy for petitioner to file?

Held:

1st issue:
NO. The Rules of Court requires that actions affecting title to
or recovery of possession of real property be commenced and
tried in the province where the property lies, while the
defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion to
dismiss the action when "venue is improperly laid." In this
case, as the action sought to be dismissed affects title to and
the recovery of possession of real property situated in
Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the action was improperly
brought in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion to
dismiss was therefore proper and should have been granted.

2nd issue:
NO. While the respondent judge committed a manifest error
in denying the motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy
for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal
"unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  47