G.R. No.

118680 March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all
surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN
TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE,
PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M.
PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and
TIO TUAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner (Maria Elena R.
Pedrosa-the adpted child) and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of
Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents (Rodriguezes) filed an action to annul
the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein
respondent Rosalina as defendants.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the
adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of
Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into
an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of
Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of
Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered 14 parcels of land
covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among
Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by
Rosalina.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents
Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able
to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein by virtue of Deed of Sale.
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of
petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. CA dismissed the appeal but upheld the
validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, to claim their share of the properties from
the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and her daughter were not
heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
 Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint
was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to
include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the
plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already
prescribed
The RTC dismissed the complaint. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the TC. Petitioner filed a MR, which was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition" had already prescribed;
2. WON said deed is valid; and
3. WON the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been
transferred to the respondent buyers.

HELD:
1. NO. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons
who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and
in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly
complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in
the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.
Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De
Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may
be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to
have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three
years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983,
was executed, the court holds that her action against the respondents on the basis of
fraud has not yet prescribed.
 2. The Deed of extra Judicial settlemet of estate and partition is Invalid.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of
extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule
contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement
and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in
the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when
publication was done in the instant case. since Maria Elena did not participate in the said
partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is
an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant
of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate.
The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that
private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria
Elena.
The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine
heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein
or had no notice thereof
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is
imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died.
Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel
predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in
equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's estate but only
Pilar's estate. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared
invalid

3. Given the circumstances in this case, it is constrained to hold that this is not the
proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the
petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the
 doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title
can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid

Utulo v. Pasion Vda De GarciaFacts:

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate and in the proceedings instituted in the CFI Tarlac
for theadministration of his property, Leona Pasion Vda. De Garcia (surviving spouse)
wasappointed judicial administratrix. Sanchez left legitimate children, named Juan,
Patrocinioand Luz Garcia. Luz Garcia married Pablo Utulo and during the pendency of
theadministration proceedings of her father, she died. Her only forced heirs were her
motherand husband. Pablo filed a petition, which stated the following:1.

That
Luz’ only heirs were
himself and his mother-in-law2.

That the only property left by Luz consisted in the share due her from the intestateof her
father, Juan Sanchez3.

That he should be named administrator of the

Luz’
propertyLeona objected to the petition and alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased
left noindebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration. However
statedthat should the court grant administration of the property, she should be appointed
theadministratrix as she had a better right than Pablo.
Issue:
1. Whether judicial administration of the property left by Luz Garcia lies with
theconsequent appointment of an administrator2.

Whether Leona has a better right to the said office than Pablo
Held:
1. No. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property in the
PhilippineIslands, his property should be judicially administered and the competent court
shouldappoint a qualified administrator, in the order established by law, in case the
deceasedleft no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein.
Thisrule, however, is subject to the exceptions. First, when all the heirs are of lawful
ageand there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition theproperty without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointmentof an administrator. According to the second, if the property left does not
exceed sixthousand pesos , the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the
requiredpublications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after paying all he
knownobligations, to partition all the property constituting the inheritance among
themselvespursuant to law, without instituting the judicial administration and the
appointment ofan administrator.
There is no weight in the argument adduced by Pablo to the effectthat his
appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have
legalcapacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As
he wouldappear in the said intestate by the right of representation, it would suffice
for him toallege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his
deceased wifewho, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary
party if she wereliving. In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the
distribution of theproperty it is not necessary that the administration of the
property of his deceasedwife be instituted an administration, which will take up
time and occasioninconveniences and unnecessary expenses.
2. Thus, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential right to
theoffice of administrator.

Reyes vs Enriquez
G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008

Facts: Petitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the
subject parcel of land located in Talisay, Cebu, with Anacleto Cabrera. On the other hand
respondents, claim to be the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as husband and daughter of
Anacleto's daughter.

On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann Enriquez, sold 200 sq. m. out of
the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses
Fernandez), also their co-respondents in this case. When Spouses Fernandez, tried to
register their share in the subject land, they discovered that certain documents prevent
them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that
his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit
by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned ¼ of Lot No.
1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by
Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico.

Alleging that the documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a
complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. They likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject
property.

The RTC dismissed the case, but upon appeal it was reversed, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to
nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes.

Ruling: Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance.
The respondents have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property.

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and
defend an action in court. A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such interest,
to be considered a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.
[G.R. No. 120575. December 16, 1998.]

DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL, in her capacity as special administratrix of the estate of the late DON ANDRES
PASCUAL and as executrix of the testate estate of the late DOÑA ADELA S. PASCUAL, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 162; DEPUTY
SHERIFF CARLOS G. MAOG; and ATTY. JESUS I. SANTOS, respondents.

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J:
Facts:

Don Andres Pascual died intestate and survived by his widow, children of his full blood brother,
children of his half blood brother, intestate estate of his full blood brother, and acknowledged natural
children of his full blood (herein petitioners). Doña Adela (the surviving spouse) was appointed
administratrix. To assist her with said proceedings, Doña Adela hired Atty. Jesus I. Santos, herein private
respondent, as her counsel for a fee equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of the gross estate of the decedent.
While the settlement was still pending, Doña Adela died, leaving a will which named the petitioner
as the sole universal heir. Six years after Doña Adela's death Judge Padolina rendered a Decision, which
had become final and executory. Private respondent then filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution insofar as the payment of his attorney's fees was concerned. Despite opposition from the
petitioner, the motion was granted and the court directed "the issuance of a writ of execution in the
partial amount of P2,000,000.00 in favor Atty. Jose I. Santos to be implemented against the 3/4 share of
Doña Adela S. Pascual, upon payment by the movant of the prescribed docket fees for the said partial
amount." Having exhausted all remedies, petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari
challenging the Decision of the CA denying the Petition for Annulment of Judgment. They claim among
others that, without any hearing or notice to them, the judge approved and awarded the attorney's fees
of private respondent, who was purportedly his classmate and compadre. Furthermore, they allege that,
in the settlement of Doña Adela's estate, private respondent filed a similar collection case before the RTC
of Malabon, which was, however, dismissed for violating the rules against forum shopping. Private
respondent allegedly filed another collection case before the RTC of Makati wherein petitioner, in her
Answer, alleged that she had paid him approximately P8 million from the time his services were engaged,
aside from some unreported "commissions" from tenants, squatters and other businesses included in the
Pascual estate.
Issue:
Whteher or not he portion of the decision dated January 19, 1994 awarding attorney's fees is void
from the beginning because it was made after trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the attorney's client
by reason of her [client's] death.

Ruling:

NO. The death of Doña Adela did not ipso facto extinguish the monetary claim of private
respondent or require him to refile his claim with the court hearing the settlement of her estate. Had he
filed the claim against Doña Adela personally, the rule would have applied. However, he did so against the
estate of Don Andres. Thus, where an appointed administrator dies, the applicable rule is Section 2, Rule
82 of the Rules of Court, which requires the appointment of a new administrator, viz.: "Sec. 2. Court may
remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation or
removal. —. . . When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letter to someone to act with him. If
there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person."
The rule does not have the effect of divesting the intestate court of jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction
subsists because the proper party in this case is the estate of Don Andres, which is distinct and separate
from that of Doña Adela who merely served as the former's administratrix. Doña Adela was merely a
representative party, and the claim was an item of the administrative expense of Don Andres estate. It is
well-settled that a monetary claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his or her acts
of administration, in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court where a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate is pending. Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed administratrix, it was
the duty of the intestate court to determine whether the private respondent's claim was allowable as
administrative expense — if it was obtained in reference to the management of the estate; the
performance of legal services which the administratrix herself could not perform; the prosecution or
defense of actions or suits on behalf of or against the estate; or the discovery, recovery or preservation
of properties of the estate. In other words, the intestate court has a mandate to resolve whether the said
claim is a "necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate." For the same
reason, the fact that the private respondent's lien was recorded four months after the administratrix had
died is of no moment.

Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the Petition and the Omnibus Motion are hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.