GONI v CASeptember 23,1986 representatives of the estate/deceased person.
representatives of the estate/deceased person. Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify
DOCTRINE:
Disqualification by reason of interest is anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification
Rule or Dead Man Statute. The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to
the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard
to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party
defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the
deceased. But in this case, such provision is inapplicable since such protection was effectively waived when counsel for
petitioners cross-examined Vicente. A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate
or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime.
FACTS:
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (TABACLERA) owned 3 haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre
de Maria in Bais, Negros Occidental. Praxedes Villanueva wanted to but the haciendas but did not have sufficient funds to pay the
price so, with the consent of TABACLERA, he offered the haciendas to Santiago Villegas, later substituted by Joaquin Villegas.
Gaspar Vicente stood as the guarantor in a document “Escritura de Taspaso de Cuenta” since TABLACLERA did not agree to the
transaction without a guaranty. The amount realized from the transaction between Villegas and Villanueva was not enough so
Villanueva contracted or promised to sell fields no. 3, 4, 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre for P13,807 to Vicente. The amount of
P12,460.24 was the amount debited from Vicente since it was the amount needed to complete the purchase price. Villanueva was
able to raise funders by selling a property in Ayungon Negros Occidental so he went to Vicente to rescind the contract/promise to sell
but since the amount was already debited, this was not possible. They agreed that lots 4 and 13 would be leased to Vincent for 5
years starting 1950-1951 at annual rental of 15% of the gross income, rent to be deducted from money advanced by Vicente.
In 1949, TABACLERA executed formal deed of sale of the 3 haciendas in favor of Villanueva, including fields 3,4,and 13 which were
registered in the latter’s name. These fields were mortgaged to the Rehailitation and Finance Corporation later transferred to PNB for
total indebtedness of P334,400. Meanwhile, fields 3 and 13 were delivered to Vicente. Villanueva additionally executed a
“Documento de la Venta Definitive” in favor of Villegas covering Lot 314 of Hacienda Sarria. In 1951, Villanueva died. Included in the
inventory for intestate proceedings were fields nos. 3 and 4 (listed as lot 257 of inventory) and 13 (listed as lot no. 723). Vicente
instituted an action for recovery of property and damages against Goni in his capacity as administrator of the estate. Vicente sought
to recover field no. 3 by virtue of the contract/promise to sell. Gonie filed an answer with counterclaim for accounting of the produce of
fields 4 and 13 and surrender thereof at the end of the 5 th crop year in 1955 plus moral damages, atty. fees. Vicente filed an amended
complaint to include a prayer for damages representing produce of field no. 3 until delivery thereof to him. He later amended to
include as parties-defendants heirs of Villanueva.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts agreeing on the costs of production and produce of the 3 fields. There were two
witnesses for Vicente: Vicente himself who testified on the facts occurring before the death of Villanueva and Epifanio Equio a clerk of
TABACLERA Agency I Bais Sugar Central. Defendants on the other hand presented GOni who testified on the alleged verbal lease
agreement.
TRIAL COURT: judgment in favor of Vicente, that the heirs should deliver filed no. 3 to the former and to execute a formal deed of
sale covering the 3 fields. It ordered the heirs to pay Vicente actual or compensatory damages.
Both parties appealed.
CA: affirmed TC decision
ISSUE: WON Gaspar Vicente may testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva which constitutes a claim or
demand upon his estate in violation of Rule 130 Sec. 20 par. A? YES
RULING:
Under ordinary circumstances, Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the
Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on
the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving
testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove
from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. This case remains
within the ambit of the protection because the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because
they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation
that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have
made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.
Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined Vicente. "A waiver occurs when
plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as
to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. Also, the heirs presented a counterclaim against Vicente. When Vicente thus took the
witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for
accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying
as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or
to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases
in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions
or communications which were had with the agent. The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as
attorney-in- fact of Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could
either confirm or deny any allegations made by Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided
by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the
other because death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that Goñi
could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and
13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. Thus, judicial administrator of the estate of private respondent Gaspar Vicente and/or his
successors-in-interest are hereby ordered to: a) surrender possession of fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria
to petitioners.
US v. Antipolo March 6, 1918
FACTS:
Antipolo was charged with the Murder of Fortunato Dinal. Trial Court convicted him of Homicide. The Trial Judge refused to permit
Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man whom the Antipolo is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the
defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations. She was asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" The fiscal objected
on the following ground: "I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified that she is the widow of the deceased,
Fortunato Dinal, and that being so I believe that she is not competent to testify under the Rules of Procedure in either civil or criminal
cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is
disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party." Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was
competent, arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of
one of the parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and the
accused; that, furthermore, the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no longer
his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of marriage. The testimony is further insisted as it is
sufficient at this time to say some of them would be both material and relevant, to such a degree that if proven to the satisfaction of
the court, they might have lead to the acquittal of the accused, as they purported to relate to the dying declarations of the deceased,
concerning the cause of his death, the general purport being that his injuries were due to a fall and not to the acts imputed to the
accused.
ISSUE: WON Susana Ezpeleta, widow of the victim, should be allowed to testify – YES
RULING:
According to Greenleaf, the rationale for the rule that neither the husband nor the wife can testify for or against the other in a
proceeding is to secure domestic happiness by placing the protecting seal of the law upon all confidential communications between
husband and wife; and whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the hallowed confidence which that relation
inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony even through the other party be no longer living. However, this case does not fall
with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of the rule is to protect accused persons against
statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential
communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a
person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received
those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the
express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause
of his death. The rule relates only to cases when one the spouses is a party to the case. The word “afterwards” refers as to when a
marriage has been dissolved otherwise than by the death of one of the spouses — as, for instance, by decree of annulment or
divorce. The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death, concerning the circumstances
leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of the person charged with killing the declarant.
PEOPLE v. CARLOS March 6, 1943
DOCTRINE: If documents were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they are privileged; but if they were obtained
surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's consent, the privilege should cease. The testimony of a third person as to a
conversation between husband and wife is admissible.
FACTS:
It appears from the evidence that the victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, performed a surgical operation upon the
defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments. After her release from the hospital she was required to go several times
to the clinic of Doctor Sityar, for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she was
accompanied by her husband, the defendant. The defendant states that on one of the visits, Doctor Sityar sent him out on an errand
to buy some medicine, and that while defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the wife. The defendant further
states that his wife informed him of the outrage shortly after leaving the clinic. Notwithstanding this it nevertheless appears that he
again went there on March 28th to consult the deceased about some lung trouble from which he, the defendant, was suffering.. He
was given some medical treatment and appears to have made at least one more visit to the clinic without revealing any special
resentment. On May 12, 1924, the defendant, suffering from some stomach trouble, entered the Philippine General Hospital where he
remained until May 18, 1924, and where he was under the care of two other physicians. While in the hospital her received a letter
(Exhibit 5) from Doctor Sityar asking the immediate settlement of the account for the professional services rendered his wife. Shortly
after his release from the hospital the defendant sought an interview with Doctor Sityar and went to the latter's office several times
without finding him in. On one of these occasions he was asked by an employee of the office, the nurse Cabañera, if he had come to
settle his account, to which the defendant answered that he did not believe he owed the doctor anything. In the afternoon of May 26th
the defendant again went to the office of the deceased and found him there alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, the
defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. The
deceased made an effort to escape but the defendant pursued him and overtaking him in the hall outside the office, inflicted another
wound upon him and as a consequence if the three wounds he died within a few minutes. The defendants made his escape but
surrendered himself in the evening of the following day.
TRIAL COURT: convicted of Murder because committed with premeditation. Took into consideration, Exhibit L, a letter written to the
defendant by his wife and siezed by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated May 25, 1924, two days
before the commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical violence in
dealing with the deceased.
RULING: The sentence appealed from is therefore modified by reducing the penalty to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties and with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
ISSUE: WON the letter is inadmissible as evidence? YES.
RULING:
The defendant argues that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore not admissible in evidence. However, the
numerical weight of authority is to the effect that where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands
of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is
thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible Such is the view of the majority of this
court. Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows: For documents of communication coming into the possession of a third person, a
distinction should obtain, analogous to that already indicated for a client's communications (ante, par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they were
obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged (for otherwise the privilege could by collusion be
practically nullified for written communications); but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's consent,
the privilege should cease. The letter in question was obtained through a search for which no warrant appears to have been issued.
Moreover, the defendant argues that the documents obtained by illegal searches of the defendant's effects are not admissible in
evidence in a criminal case. This has no merit. In Weeks vs. United States, which reverted to the original doctrine of Boyd v. United
States, but with a condition, viz., that the illegality of the search and seizure should first have been directly litigated and established by
a motion, made before trial, for the return of the things seized; so that, after such a motion, and then only, the illegality would be
noticed in the main trial and the evidence thus obtained would be excluded. Here the illegality of the search and seizure was not
"directly litigated and established by a motion, made before trial, for the return of the things seized."
But the letter Exhibit L must be excluded for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant
and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-
stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent
to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the
letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its
admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the
prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no difference between an ordinary
communication and one originally privileged.
Conversations between husband and wife
The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband
and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which
both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by
his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter.
The Attorney-General in support of the contrary view quotes Wigmore, as follows:
“. . . Express communication is always a proper mode of evidencing knowledge or belief. Communication to a husband or
wife is always receivable to show probable knowledge by the other (except where they are living apart or are not in good terms),
because, while it is not certain that the one will tell the other, and while the probability is less upon some subjects than upon others,
still there is always some probability, — which is all that can be fairly asked for admissibility.”
This may possibly be good law, though Wigmore cites no authority in support of his assertion, but as far as we can see it has little or
nothing to do with the present case. The prosecution maintains that the crime was committed with alevosia. This contention is based
principally on the fact that one of the wounds received by the deceased showed a downward direction indicating that the deceased
was sitting down when the wound was inflicted. We do not think this fact is sufficient proof. The direction of the wound would depend
largely upon the manner in which the knife was held. For the reasons stated, the defendant is found guilty of simple homicide, without
aggravating or extenuating circumstances.
CAYETANO v MONSOD September 3, 1991
FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the
appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice.
Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
1. WON Monsod has established that he has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years? YES
RULING:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other
works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs.
Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to
consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge
or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers
nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their
specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are
involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from
1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of
the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-
manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc. Hence, it more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman
wherein the respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is
dismissed.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan September 20, 1996
The matters raised in the present case are an offshoot of the institution of the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of
the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the several corporations in
PCGG Case No. 33, entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.” Petitioners in this case are all partners in
ACCRA: Regala, Angara, Cruz, Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta and Hayudini (ACCRA LAWYERS). Likewise, private
respondent ROCO is also a partner in ACCRA. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among
others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services
where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. The complaint in PCGG Case No. 0033 alleged that the
ACCRA LAWYERS and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the
holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The
PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the
monies to the subscription payment; hence, ACCRA LAWYERS acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves,
among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute
gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of
the Republic of the Philippines.
On August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint” which EXCLUDED private respondent ROCO from
the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, whereas ACCRA LAWYERS still were included still as defendants. ACCRA
LAWYERS subsequently filed their Comment/Opposition with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same
treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent ROCO. PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude
the ACCRA LAWYERS on the ff conditions: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating
the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments ACCRA LAWYERS executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
SANDIGANBAYAN RULING: Denied the exclusion of ACCRA LAWYERS in PCGG Case No. 33 for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG.
ACCRA LAWYERS argue they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary
duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
ISSUE: WON the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei) may be asserted in refusing to disclose the identity of clients (name of
ACCRA LAWYERS' clients) under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case? YES, it may refuse on the basis of
fiduciary duty.
RULING:
The general rule in our jurisdiction is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
The exceptions to this rule are:
(1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
(2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
(3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name
would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is
privileged.
Other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule:
(a)Content of any client communication to a lawyer relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance.
(b) Where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be
confidential, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client’s
name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. In the case at bar, the instant
case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. (KP: Exception 1 & 3 above)
People v. Honorable Sandiganbayan July 16, 1997
FACTS:
The case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao, respondent Ceferino Paredes, Jr., who was formerly the Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and Congressman. During his stint, Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent over a vast
tract of land. However, it was cancelled because apparently, it has already been designated and reserved as a school site. The court
found that Paredes had obtained title thereto through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application, and somebody came forward
and filed a case of perjury against him. However, the same was dismissed on the ground of prescription. Then again, another case
was filed against him for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for patent. In all these cases,
Paredes was represented by respondent Atty. Sansaet, a practicing attorney. Paredes, as defense, contends that he has already
been charged under the same set of facts and the same evidence where such complaint (perjury case where he was already
arraigned) has already been dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has already attached. In support hereof, Paredes presented court
records and transcripts as proof of his arraignment in the perjury case.
However, the documents were found to be falsified, in conspiracy with Paredes’ counsel and the clerk of court where the perjury case
was filed. One Teofilo Gelacio claims that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. Hence,
another case was filed for falsification of judicial records. It was then that respondent Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness
against his client Paredes, claiming that the latter contrived and induced him to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double
jeopardy by having him and co-respondent prepare and falsify the subject documents.
SANDIGANBAYAN: denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege since the lawyer could not testify against his own
client. In view of such relationship, confidential matters must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his
lawyer, in his professional capacity, and therefore privileged.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by attorney-client privilege? NO
RULING:
There is no privileged communication rule to talk about. The privilege applies only if the information was relayed by the client to the
lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning point is when the communication was given, not when the lawyer was made to testify.
The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases as the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute
an exception to the rule. It may be correctly assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in
connection with the criminal cases since the latter served as his counsel therein. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by other means. IOW, including
physical acts. The acts and words of the parties, therefore, during the period when the documents were being falsified were
necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except
under conditions of secrecy and confidence. However, the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications are concerned, those crimes
were necessarily committed in the past. But for the privilege to apply, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime
intended to be committed in the future. IOW, if the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime which he has already
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney
without the client’s consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime a client intends to
commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s advice.
Here, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or
accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada were about to falsify the documents. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not
yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having
been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. It is well
settled that communication between a lawyer and his client, to be privileged, must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful
end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, the prosecution of the honorable relation of
attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain
circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis
of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one
of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
Mercado v. Vitriolo May 26, 2005
FACTS:
Mercado filed a complaint against Atty. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment for maliciously instituting a case for falsification of public
document against her based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship. Mercado's husband filed a civil
case for annulment of their marriage with RTC which was dismissed. Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, then counsel of Mercado, died so
Atty. Vitriolo entered his appearance as collaborating counsel. It also appears that Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal action against Mercado
for falsification of public document for false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children. Mercado denied using any other
name than Rosa F. Mercado and insisted that she has gotten married only once. Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint
disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by the lawyer as her counsel so that
the lawyer is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship. Atty. Vitriolo maintains that his filing of the
criminal complaint does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases are the two
certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during his engagement as
counsel.
The IBP Board of Governors: approved the report finding the lawyer guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. Upon receiving a copy of the IBP
report and recommendation, Mercado wrote CJ Davide a letter of desistance however, the court said that the letter imparting
forgiveness is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client? NO
RULING:
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly
personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by
necessity and public interest. On the rule on attorney-client privilege. the factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege.
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that
the client made the communication. (2) The client made the communication in confidence. (3) The legal advice must be sought from
the attorney in his professional capacity. Applying all these rules to the case at bar, the evidence on record fails to substantiate
complainant’s allegations. Mercado did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed. All her claims were
couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when
he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating
to the civil case for annulment then handled by the lawyer but did not spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove. Indeed,
Mercado failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged
without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication.
Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the
party asserting the privilege. Thus, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is dismissed.
HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA
Facts:
Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda. She disclosed confidential information during that period.
However, after the confidential information was given by Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another lawyer. Hadjula filed a
complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming the lawyer just wanted to hear her secrets. In answering the complaint,
Atty. Madianda filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public documents and immorality – using the disclosures
as basis for the charges.
Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?
RULING:
Reprimanded. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda should have kept the information secret and confidential, under the attorney-
client privilege rule. However, the seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that Atty. Madianda acted with ill-will. It appears that she was actuated by the urge to
retaliate without perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule of
confidentiality.
UY v. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES March 30, 2004
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After
confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared,
finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court. When the petition was about to be filed,
respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left
his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the
petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer
certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed. Respondent claims that he
gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should
get another lawyer to file the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant; that there was
no longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document;
that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the
Office of the Register of Deeds.
The IBP: found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and recommended for his
suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE: WON? respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR? NO
RULING:
Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by respondent against
complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to
hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly, there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their
personal transaction. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional
capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the
complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent
was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein
complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to
protect his personal or proprietary interests. Thus, petition is dismissed.
FERNANDEZ v PEOPLE Sept. 28, 2000
FACTS:
 Petitioner Fernandez together with Olesco and Gatchalian, Jr. were charged with the crime of estafa through falsification
of public document.
 They defraud Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products, Inc. (MELALE) represented by Atty. Oscar P. Beltran by their false
manifestation and fraudulent representation that they have the power and capacity to secure a defendant counterbond for
the lifting of a writ of preliminary attachment wherein Sta. Ines was the defendant in a civil case.
 Upon arraignment, they entered a plea of not guilty with the assistance of counsel. Thereafter, trial ensued. The case
against Gatchalian was dismissed due to his death during the pendency of the trial.
 At the trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses Atty. Beltran, De Castro, Deputy Sheriff, Cruz, a helper-assistant of
insurance agent Reyes, San Juan and Atty. Mendoza, legal counsel of the First Integrated Bonding and Insurance
Company, Inc.
 The prosecution also offered in evidence Official Receipt No. 157 in the amount of P50,000.00 issued by Hexagon Surety
Services, Inc. signed by accused Olesco.
According to the evidence presented:
 RTC Butuan issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of private complainant MELALE defendant in a
pending civil case filed by Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation.
 Atty. Beltran called up his friend Mr. De Castro as the Deputy Sheriff and requested him to look for a bonding company
which can issue a counter attachment bond for his company.
 De Castro obliged and went down to see Manuel Boy Reyes, an insurance agent. Unfortunately, Reyes was not around at
that time so it was Melencio Cruz, a compadre and helper-assistant of Reyes, who attended to him and with whom De
Castro talked about the request of Atty. Beltran.
 Cruz then told De Castro that he had to ask Olesco, known to him as a Branch Manager of Interworld Assurance
Corporation. When Cruz returned, he had with him an application form and indemnity agreement form for a counter
attachment bond from Interworld Insurance which according to him, was given to him by Olesco.
 Cruz gave the blank form to De Castro who in turn brought the form to Beltran who accomplished the same. Later, Olesco
and Cruz handed to De Castro Counterbond No. JCR 00300 in the amount of P500,000.00 issued by the First Integrated
Bonding and Insurance Company and not by Interworld Insurance Company, signed by Eduardo V. Gadi and notarized by
Notary Public Benito Salandanan of Manila.
 In return, De Castro handed Olesco the amount of P50,000.00 as premium payment for the bond.
 When asked by De Castro why the Counterbond is a First Integrated Insurance Company bond and not an Interworld
Insurance bond, Olesco allegedly answered that Interworld Insurance Company branch in Butuan City was already
closed. He added that in procuring the bond, he asked the help of Roberto Fernandez and Nicanor Gatchalian, Jr. for the
issuance of the bond.
 Olesco acknowledged receipt of the amount of P50,000.00 by issuing Hexagon Surety Services, Inc. Official Receipt No.
157 which Cruz also signed as witness that Olesco actually received the P50,000.00.
 Thereafter, Beltran filed the counterbond with the RTC of Agusan del Norte to support MELALE’s pending motion to quash
the writ of preliminary attachment earlier issued against it.
 However, Beltran learned that Atty. Rogelio Mendoza, Legal Counsel of First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company,
Inc., filed a Manifestation and Motion denying the issuance by First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc. of
the aforementioned counterbond for the reason that the same was spurious or fake inasmuch as the First Integrated
Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc. had no officer or employee by the name of Eduardo Gadi and that the counterbond
does not have the letter head of the First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company.
 RTC Makati: found petitioner and his co-accused Olesco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa through
falsification of public document.
 Only Fernandez appealed to CA, wherein it affirmed RTC’s decision.
 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence the instant petition for review.
 Petitioner’s contention: He should be acquitted of the crime charged since no direct evidence linking him to the offense
charged. He claims that the CA relied on the mere imputations of his guilt made by Beltan in his testimony in violation of
the res inter alios acta and the hearsay rules. Moreover, considering that there was no positive and conclusive evidence
adduced by the prosecution to prove the conspiracy, the alleged conspiracy between petitioner and co-accused Olesco
was based on mere conjecture.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of committing the crime of estafa through falsification of public document in conspiracy with Olesco?
NO.
RULING:
The evidence is not sufficient to form a basis for petitioner’s conviction. First of all, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
linking Fernandez to the commission of the crime are all hearsay in nature for they are not based on the witnesses own personal
knowledge.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception x x x. Thus, any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if
its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand.
In the present case, neither De Castro nor Cruz, the prosecution’s main witnesses, had personal knowledge that petitioner
in any way helped or aided Olesco in the facilitation or the procurement of the counter bond. In fact, De Castro dmitted that he did not
know if Olesco was able to secure the help of Fernandez and Gatchalian. And even assuming that De Castro could testify to the
alleged statements made by Olesco implicating Fernandez in the commission of the crime, said statements may still not be utilized
against Fernandez, who never had the opportunity to cross-examine Olesco, for being violative of the res inter alios rule which
ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.
Secondly, although a conspiracy was alleged in the information, there is no evidence to prove that a conspiracy existed
between Fernandez and Olesco. As a manner of incurring criminal liability, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime
is required to establish a finding of criminal conspiracy, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove that
Olesco conspired and/or connived with the petitioner or vice versa both in the procurement, preparation and facilitation in the
issuance of the spurious counterbond and in defrauding private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00. Thus, petitioner is
acquitted.
TAMARGO v AWINGAN January 19, 2010
FACTS:
 Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed.
 The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until Reynaldo Geron executed an affidavit and states that a
certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda
and that Columna was the one who did the killing.
 Columna admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan as the
gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda.
 When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as
private prosecutor.
 Petitioner (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila.
 Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate for mayor and that the
case was instituted by his political opponents in order to derail his candidacy.
 The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty post Atty. Tamargo had been defeated
twice by Lloyd and once by Licerio.
  Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against  She also issued her own Filmanbank Check No. 065314, to the order of Queao, for the amount of P95,000.00. The
Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections and proceeds of these checks were to constitute the loan granted by Naguiat to Queao.
Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan  To secure the loan, Queao executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Naguiat, and surrendered to the latter the
 Licerio presented Columna’s unsolicited handwritten letter to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna’s jail. In the letter, owner’s duplicates of the titles covering the mortgaged properties.
Columna disowned the contents of his affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial  On the same day, the mortgage deed was notarized, and Queao issued to Naguiat a promissory note for the amount of
confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings. P200,000.00, with interest at 12% per annum.
 Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his  Queao also issued a Security Bank and Trust Company check, postdated, for the amount of P200,000.00 and payable to
handwritten letter. the order of Naguiat.
 Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the affidavit and  However, upon presentment on its maturity date, the Security Bank check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.  Queao requested Security Bank to stop payment of her postdated check, but the bank rejected the request pursuant to its
 The investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was approved by the city policy not to honor such requests if the check is drawn against insufficient funds.
prosecutor.  Thereafter, Queao received a letter from Naguiat’s lawyer, demanding settlement of the loan. Later, Queao and
 Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against Ruebenfeldt met with Naguiat wherein Queao told Naguiat that she did not receive the proceeds of the loan, adding that
respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. the checks were retained by Ruebenfeldt, who purportedly was Naguiats agent.
 Petitioner filed an appeal to DOJ. The DOJ reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for  Naguiat applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage with the Sheriff, who then scheduled the foreclosure sale.
murder. He opined that the extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and that Three days before the scheduled sale, Queao filed the case before the Pasay City RTC, seeking the annulment of the
there was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents. mortgage deed. The trial court eventually stopped the auction sale.
 However, upon motion for recondsideration filed by the Antipordas, DOJ directed the withdrawal of the
Informations. This time, he declared that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents  RTC: declared the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage null and void, and ordering Naguiat to return to Queao the owner’s
and that, even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. duplicates of her titles to the mortgaged lots.


RTC: granted the motion to withdraw the Informations.
CA: ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she held that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was
 CA: affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Issues: WON the admissibility of various representations and pronouncements of Ruebenfeldt is binding on her on the ground res
not admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of
inter alia acta alteri nocere non debet rule? YES.
evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made only after
Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
RULING:
Since Ruebenfeldt was an authorized representative or agent of Naguiat the situation falls under a recognized exception to the rule.
ISSUE: WON Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his affidavit is admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule
The existence of an agency relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt is supported by ample evidence. Naguiat instructed
on res inter alios acta? NO.
Ruebenfeldt to withhold from Queao the checks she issued or indorsed to Queao, pending delivery by the latter of additional
collateral. Ruebenfeldt served as agent of Naguiat on the loan application of Queaos friend, Marilou Farralese, and it was in
RULING:
connection with that transaction that Queao came to know Naguiat. It was also Ruebenfeldt who accompanied Queao in her meeting
Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter
with Naguiat and on that occasion, on her own and without Queao asking for it, Reubenfeldt actually drew a check for the sum of
alios acta.
P220,000.00 payable to Naguiat, to cover for Queaos alleged liability to Naguiat under the loan agreement.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by
In this case, the CA recognized the existence of an agency by estoppel citing Article 1873 of the Civil Code. Apparently, it considered
an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
that at the very least, as a consequence of the interaction between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt, Queao got the impression that
admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.
Ruebenfeldt was the agent of Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to correct Queaos impression. In that situation, the rule is clear. One
who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such, cannot be permitted to deny the
The reason for this rule is that: on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and
authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith, and in the
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
honest belief that he is what he appears to be. CA is correct in invoking the said rule on agency by estoppel.
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
More fundamentally, whatever was the true relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt is irrelevant in the face of the fact that the
checks issued or indorsed to Queao were never encashed or deposited to her account of Naguiat.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
PEOPLE v RAQUEL Dec. 2, 1996
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
FACTS:
declaration.
 At midnight of July 4, 1986, Agapito Gambalan attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial  His wife, Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband’s lifeless while a man took her
confession. husband’s gun and left hurriedly.
 She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while 2 other men ran away.
Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the  George Jovillano responded to Juliets plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victims house. He was identified as Amado
been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co- Ponce.
conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.  Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution  Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled
Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them. immediately after the shooting incident.
 Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. However, appellants relied on alibi as their defense.
Naguiat v. CA Oct. 3, 2003  According to Valeriano Raquel, he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He
Facts: stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother.
 Queao applied with Naguiat for a loan in the amount of P200,000.00, which Naguiat granted. Naguiat then indorsed to  Together with Madriaga and Corpuz, he harvested palay. Then while he was still asleep, police authorities accompanied
Queao Associated Bank Check No. 090990 for the amount of P95,000.00, which was earlier issued to her by the by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail.
Corporate Resources Financing Corporation.
  Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that he was at home when his son Valeriano told him that he was going to Tunggol,
Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On the same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to
leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian.
 That several policemen came over to his house, looking for his 2 sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even
accompanied them to Tunggol where they arrested his son Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp. 3-26)
 T/Sgt. Zafra, testified that on the day of the incident, he was assigned in the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division,
Maria Cristina, Iligan City wherein Sabas Raquel was under his division then, and was on duty.
 Thereafter, Raquel brothers were indicted for robbery with homicide before RTC Kabacan, Cotabato. Upon arraignment
thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and before he could give his testimony,
accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail.
 RTC: found accused-appellants Raquel brothers and accused Ponce guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
ISSUE: WON trial court erred in convicting Raquel brothers of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating
them as the perpetrators of the crime? YES.
RULING:
A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. Even the corroborating witness, George
Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito Gambalan.
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based
chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated,
the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated
in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is
elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused.That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of
appellants, in the case at bar.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is
that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him.
So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be
bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their
acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
 Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of their constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer
explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity and voluntary
execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their signatures on the affidavits.
 In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two
brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions.
 The testimony of Gina Quidato, wife of accused, against the latter was also not admitted as evidence under the marital
disqualification rule.
 RTC: found accused guilty of Parricide
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confessions of the Malita brothers are admissible as evidence against the accused-appellant? NO.
RULING:
The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in
the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence.
In People v. Compil , “[T]he belated arrival of a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect (of lack of counsel) for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory
statements from accused-appellant . . .
In People vs. De Jesus (213 SCRA 345 [1992]) we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of
counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.
The failure to present the Malita brothers on trial gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the
affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial
proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence
against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.
The Solicitor General, in advocating the admissibility of the sworn statements of the Malita brothers, cites Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court which provides that
"[t]he act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration."
The inapplicability of this provision is clearly apparent. The confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the
consummation of the crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or declarations made during the
conspiracy's existence.

Hence, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants to the
crime. Without the positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption
of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them. Thus, Raquel brothers are acquitted.

PEOPLE v. QUIDATO, JR. Oct. 1, 1998

DOCTRINE: The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in
writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence.
FACTS:
 Bernardo Quidato, Sr., father of accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato, a widower, lived alone in his
house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He owned sixteen hectares of coconut land in the area.
 Bernardo, accompanied by his son, and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41
sacks of copra. After selling the copra, Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left.
 At around 6:00 p.m. of September 17, 1988, accused-appellant asked Reynaldo and Eddie to come to the former's house
and proposed that they rob and kill his father.
 They went to Bernardo's house only at 10:00 p.m. Upon reaching the house, accused-appellant knocked on the door,
asking his father to let them in. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man down.
Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Accused-appellant and Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador
looking for money but they found none so the three of them left. Bernardo Sr. was found dead the following day.
 Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were the ones
responsible for Bernardo's death. The two including accused-appellant were arrested by the police and brought to the
police station.
 In the absence of counsel, Patrolman Mara interrogated and took down the confession of the Malita brothers but refrained
from requiring then to sign their affidavits.
 Mara then escorted them to Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO lawyer,
Jonathan Jocom.