Case 41-53 PDF

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013
CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS,

SOLEDAD A. FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan, Bataan.1 n
4 September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid ₱35,000.000
for all the lots that would be sold in the subdivision.2For that purpose, they executed a
Pecial Power of Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into all agreements concerning the
parcels of land and to sign those agreements on their behalf.3
Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and failed
to accout for the titles to the subdivided land.4 Complainants also found that he had sold
a number of parcels to third parties, but that he did not turn the proceeds over to them.
Neither were complainants invited to the ceremonial opening of the subdivision project.5
Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had
previously executed in his favor.6
Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of ₱10,000,000,
but the latter again failed to pay them.7
Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of

assisting them in the preparation of a settlement agreement.8
Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions

against Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then signed a contract
of legal services,9 in which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and
appearance fees to respondent, but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the
parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay respondent 50% of whatever would
be recovered of the properties. In preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal,
respondent prepared and notarized an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate
the claim of complainants to at least 195 titles in the possession of Fevidal.10
A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of Adverse
Claim to the Register of Deeds of Bataan.11
The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Unknown to
him, the adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and
convinced complainants to agree to another settlement.12
Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter dated
10 July 2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and revalidation
of titles, and damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan on
13 October 2006.13
Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they terminated
the services of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint against Fevidal on 9
June 2007, and finalized their amicable settlement with him on 5 July 2007.14
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition15 dated 20 July 2007 before the RTC,
alleging that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been
done with the intent of defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a Motion for
Recording of Attorney’s Charging Lien in the Records of the Above-Captioned Cases.16
When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint,17 he filed a Manifestation and
Motion for Reconsideration.18
After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter denying
the former’s allegation of collusion,19 complainants sought the suspension/disbarment of
respondent through a Complaint20 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on 14 November 2007. Complainants alleged that they were uneducated and
underprivileged, and could not taste the fruits of their properties because the disposition
thereof was "now clothed with legal problems" brought about by respondent.21
In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons

1.01,22 1.03,23 1.04,24 12.02,25 15.05,26 18.04,27and 20.0428 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation29 of the investigating
commissioner. It suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year
for entering into a champertous agreement.30
On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012, this
Court noted the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as
respondent’s second motion for reconsideration. We find that respondent did not violate
any of the canons cited by complainants. In fact, we have reason to believe that
complainants only filed the instant complaint against him at the prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against Fevidal
to recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of ₱10,000,000 – a
measly amount compared to that in the original agreement, under which Fevidal
undertook to pay complainants the amount of ₱35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty
and responsibility to protect the interest of any prospective client and pursue the ends of
justice.31
Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under
the circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a
lawyer only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. The claim of
complainants that they were not informed of the status of the case is more appropriately
laid at their door rather than at that of respondent. He was never informed that they had
held in abeyance the filing of the adverse claim. Neither was he informed of the brewing
amicable settlement between complainants and Fevidal. We also find it very hard to
believe that while complainants received various amounts as loans from respondent from
August 2006 to June 2007,32 they could not spare even a few minutes to ask about the
status of the case. We shall discuss this more below. As regards the claim that
respondent refused to "patch up" with Fevidal despite the pleas of complainants, we note
the latter’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in which they admitted that
they could not convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to a settlement.33
Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording of his
attorney’s charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them from enjoying the fruits
of their property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to
intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation.
According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments
for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by
the client. We recently upheld the right of counsel to intervene in proceedings for the
recording of their charging lien. In Malvar v. KFPI,34 we granted counsel’s motion to
intervene in the case after petitioner therein terminated his services without justifiable
cause. Furthermore, after finding that petitioner and respondent had colluded in order to
deprive counsel of his fees, we ordered the parties to jointly and severally pay counsel
the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the determination of whether respondent is entitled
to the charging lien is based on the discretion of the court before which the lien is
presented. The compensation of lawyers for professional services rendered is subject to
the supervision of the court, not only to guarantee that the fees they charge remain
reasonable and commensurate with the services they have actually rendered, but to
maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession as well.35
In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his

services.36
That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable for
disciplinary action.1âwphi1Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without
fault. Indeed, we find that the contract for legal services he has executed with
complainants is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement whereby an
attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights
in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute.37
Such contracts are contrary to public policy38 and are thus void or inexistent.39
They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of
justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for
the client. A reading of the contract for legal services40 shows that respondent agreed to
pay for at least half of the expense for the docket fees. He also paid for the whole
amount needed for the recording of complainants’ adverse claim. While lawyers may
advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling in order to safeguard
their client’s rights, it is imperative that the advances be subject to
reimbrusement.41 The purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer acquires a
personal stake in the clients cause. Regrettably, nowhere in the contract for legal services
is it stated that the expenses of litigation advanced by respondents shall be subject to
reimbursement by complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and
transportation allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client relationship. In
fact, he admits that the cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he
extended to complainants.42
Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients
interests with the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding
circumstances in this case, an admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire
the needs of the clients, a lawyer must always avoid any appearance of impropriety to
preserve the integrity of the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the
litigation expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without providing for terms
of reimbursement and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He us sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severly.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Bañez, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 176425
HEIRS OF MANUEL UY EK LIONG, represented by BELEN LIM VDA. DE

UY, Petitioners,
vs.
MAURICIA MEER CASTILLO, HEIRS OF BUENAFLOR C. UMALI, represented by
NANCY UMALI, VICTORIA H. CASTILLO, BERTILLA C. RADA, MARIETTA C.
CAVANEZ, LEOVINA C. JALBUENA and PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision1dated 23 January 2007 rendered by the Fifteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84687,2 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed January 27, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 59, in Civil Case No. 93-176, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring the AGREEMENT and the
KASUNDUAN void ab initio for being contrary to law and public policy, without prejudice
to the attorney’s filing a proper action for collection of reasonable attorney’s fees based
on quantum meruit and without prejudice also to administrative charges being filed
against counsel for counsel’s openly entering into such an illegal AGREEMENT in violation
of the Canons of Professional Responsibility which action may be instituted with the
Supreme Court which has exclusive jurisdiction to impose such penalties on members of
the bar.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3 (Italics and Underscore Ours)
The Facts
Alongside her husband, Felipe Castillo, respondent Mauricia Meer Castillo was the owner
of four parcels of land with an aggregate area of 53,307 square meters, situated in
Silangan Mayao, Lucena City and registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-42104, T-32227, T-31752 and T-42103. With the death of Felipe, a
deed of extrajudicial partition over his estate was executed by his heirs, namely,
Mauricia, Buenaflor Umali and respondents Victoria Castillo, Bertilla Rada, Marietta
Cavanez, Leovina Jalbuena and Philip Castillo. Utilized as security for the payment of a
tractor purchased by Mauricia’s nephew, Santiago Rivera, from Bormaheco, Inc., it
appears, however, that the subject properties were subsequently sold at a public auction
where Insurance Corporation of the Philippines (ICP) tendered the highest bid. Having
consolidated its title, ICP likewise sold said parcels in favor of Philippine Machinery Parts
Manufacturing Co., Inc. (PMPMCI) which, in turn, caused the same to be titled in its
name.4
On 29 September 1976, respondents and Buenaflor instituted Civil Case No. 8085 before
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Quezon, for the purpose of seeking the
annulment of the transactions and/or proceedings involving the subject parcels, as well
as the TCTs procured by PMPMCI.5 Encountering financial difficulties in the prosecution of
Civil Case No. 8085, respondents and Buenaflor entered into an Agreement dated 20
September 1978 whereby they procured the legal services of Atty. Edmundo Zepeda and
the assistance of Manuel Uy Ek Liong who, as financier, agreed to underwrite the
litigation expenses entailed by the case. In exchange, it was stipulated in the notarized
Agreement that, in the event of a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 8085, Atty. Zepeda
and Manuel would be entitled to "a share of forty (40%) percent of all the realties and/or
monetary benefits, gratuities or damages" which may be adjudicated in favor of
respondents.6
On the same date, respondents and Buenaflor entered into another notarized agreement
denominated as a Kasunduan whereby they agreed to sell their remaining sixty (60%)
percent share in the subject parcels in favor of Manuel for the sum of ₱180,000.00. The
parties stipulated that Manuel would pay a downpayment in the sum of ₱1,000.00 upon
the execution of the Kasunduan and that respondents and Buenaflor would retain and
remain the owners of a 1,750-square meter portion of said real properties. It was
likewise agreed that any party violating the Kasunduan would pay the aggrieved party a
penalty fixed in the sum of ₱50,000.00, together with the attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses incurred should a case be subsequently filed in court. The parties likewise
agreed to further enter into such other stipulations as would be necessary to ensure that
the sale would push through and/or in the event of illegality or impossibility of any part
of the Kasunduan.7
With his death on 19 August 1989,8 Manuel was survived by petitioners, Heirs of Manuel
Uy Ek Liong, who were later represented in the negotiations regarding the subject parcels
and in this suit by petitioner BelenLim Vda. de Uy. The record also shows that the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 8085 culminated in this Court’s rendition of a 13 September
1990 Decision in G.R. No. 895619 in favor of respondents and Buenaflor.10 Subsequent
to the finality of the Court’s Decision,11 it appears that the subject parcels were
subdivided in accordance with the Agreement, with sixty (60%) percent thereof
consisting of 31,983 square meters equally apportioned among and registered in the
names of respondents and Buenaflor under TCT Nos. T-72027, T-72028, T-72029, T-
72030, T-72031, T-72032 and T-72033.12 Consisting of 21,324 square meters, the
remaining forty (40%) percent was, in turn, registered in the names of petitioners and
Atty. Zepeda under TCT No. T-72026.13
Supposedly acting on the advice of Atty. Zepeda, respondents wrote petitioners a letter
dated 22 March 1993, essentially informing petitioners that respondents were willing to
sell their sixty (60%) percent share in the subject parcels for the consideration of
₱500.00 per square meter.14 Insisting on the price agreed upon in the Kasunduan,
however, petitioners sent a letter dated 19 May 1993, requesting respondents to execute
within 15 days from notice the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale over their 60% share as
aforesaid, excluding the 1,750-square meter portion specified in their agreement with
Manuel. Informed that petitioners were ready to pay the remaining ₱179,000.00 balance
of the agreed price,15 respondents wrote a 28 May 1993 reply, reminding the former of
their purported refusal of earlier offers to sell the shares of Leovina and of Buenaflor who
had, in the meantime, died.16 In a letter dated 1 June 1993, respondents also called
petitioners’ attention to the fact, among others, that their right to ask for an additional
consideration for the sale was recognized under the Kasunduan.17
On 6 October 1993, petitioners commenced the instant suit with the filing of their
complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondents and respondent
Heirs of Buenaflor, as then represented by Menardo Umali. Faulting respondents with
unjustified refusal to comply with their obligation under the Kasunduan, petitioners
prayed that the former be ordered to execute the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale over
their shares in the subject parcels, with indemnities for moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and the costs of the suit.18 Served with
summons, respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to File Third
Party Complaint on 3 December 1993. Maintaining that the Agreement and the
Kasunduan were illegal for being unconscionable and contrary to public policy,
respondents averred that Atty. Zepeda was an indispensable party to the case. Together
with the dismissal of the complaint and the annulment of said contracts and TCT No. T-
72026, respondents sought the grant of their counterclaims for moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.19
The issues thereby joined, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Lucena City,
proveeded to conduct the mandatory preliminary conference in the case.20 After initially
granting respondents’ motion to file a third party complaint against Atty. Zepeda,21 the
RTC, upon petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,22 went on to issue the 18 July 1997
Order disallowing the filing of said pleading on the ground that the validity of the
Agreement and the cause of action against Atty. Zepeda, whose whereabouts were then
unknown, would be better threshed out in a separate action.23 The denial24 of their
motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order25 prompted respondents to file a notice
of appeal26 which was, however, denied due course by the RTC on the ground that the
orders sought to be appealed were non-appealable.27 On 14 December 1997, Menardo
died28 and was substituted by his daughter Nancy as representative of respondent Heirs
of Buenaflor.29
In the ensuing trial of the case on the merits, petitioners called to the witness stand
Samuel Lim Uy Ek Liong30whose testimony was refuted by Philip31 and
Leovina32 during the presentation of the defense evidence. On 27 January 2005, the RTC
rendered a decision finding the Kasunduan valid and binding between respondents and
petitioners who had the right to demand its fulfillment as Manuel’s successors-in-interest.
Brushing aside Philip’s testimony that respondents were forced to sign the Kasunduan,
the RTC ruled that said contract became effective upon the finality of this Court’s 13
September 1990 Decision in G.R. No. 89561 which served as a suspensive condition
therefor. Having benefited from the legal services rendered by Atty. Zepeda and the
financial assistance extended by Manuel, respondents were also declared estopped from
questioning the validity of the Agreement, Kasunduan and TCT No. T-72026. With the
Kasunduan upheld as the law between the contracting parties and their privies,33 the
RTC disposed of the case in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds for the petitioners and hereby:
1. Orders the respondents to execute and deliver a Deed of Conveyance in favor of

the petitioners covering the 60% of the properties formerly covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-3175, 42104, T-42103, T-32227 and T-42104 which are
now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-72027, T-72028, T-72029, T-
72030, T-72031, T-72032, T-72033 and T-72026, all of the Registry of Deeds of
Lucena City, for and in consideration of the amount of ₱180,000.00 in accordance
with the provisions of the KASUNDUAN, and
2. Orders the petitioners to pay and deliver to the respondents upon the latter’s
execution of the Deed of Conveyance mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the
amount of ₱179,000.00 representing the balance of the purchase price as provided
in the KASUNDUAN, and
3. Orders the respondents to pay the petitioners the following amounts:
a). ₱50,000.00 as and for moral damages;
b). ₱50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and
c). ₱50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.34
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s decision, both petitioners35 and respondents perfected their
appeals36 which were docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. CV No. 84687. While
petitioners prayed for the increase of the monetary awards adjudicated a quo, as well as
the further grant of liquidated damages in their favor,37 respondents sought the
complete reversal of the appealed decision on the ground that the Agreement and the
Kasunduan were null and void.38 On 23 January 2007, the CA rendered the herein
assailed decision, setting aside the RTC’s decision, upon the following findings and
conclusions, to wit: (a) the Agreement and Kasunduan are byproducts of the partnership
between Atty. Zepeda and Manuel who, as a non-lawyer, was not authorized to practice
law; (b) the Agreement is void under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which prohibits lawyers from acquiring properties which are the objects of the litigation in
which they have taken part; (c) jointly designed to completely deprive respondents of
the subject parcels, the Agreement and the Kasunduan are invalid and unconscionable;
and (d) without prejudice to his liability for violation of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Zepeda can file an action to collect attorney’s fees based on quantum
meruit.39
The Issue
Petitioners seek the reversal of the CA’s decision on the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTEENTH DIVISION,

COMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION
OF THE RTC BRANCH 59, LUCENA CITY, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 93-176 DECLARING THE
AGREEMENT AND KASUNDUAN VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF ART. 1491 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.40
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition impressed with partial merit.
At the outset, it bears pointing out that the complaint for specific performance filed
before the RTC sought only the enforcement of petitioners’ rights and respondents’
obligation under the Kasunduan. Although the answer filed by respondents also assailed
the validity of the Agreement and TCT No. T-72026, the record shows that the RTC, in its
order dated 18 July 1997, disallowed the filing of a third-party complaint against Atty.
Zepeda on the ground that the causes of action in respect to said contract and title would
be better threshed out in a separate action. As Atty. Zepeda’s whereabouts were then
unknown, the RTC also ruled that, far from contributing to the expeditious settlement of
the case, the grant of respondents’ motion to file a third-party complaint would only
delay the proceedings in the case.41 With the 1 October 1998 denial of their motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing order, respondents subsequently filed a notice of appeal
which was, however, denied due course on the ground that the orders denying their
motion to file a third-party complaint and their motion for reconsideration were
interlocutory and non-appealable.42
Absent a showing that the RTC’s ruling on the foregoing issues was reversed and set
aside, we find that the CA reversibly erred in ruling on the validity of the Agreement
which respondents executed not only with petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Manuel,
but also with Atty. Zepeda. Since it is generally accepted that no man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger,43 the rule is settled that a court must first
acquire jurisdiction over a party – either through valid service of summons or voluntary
appearance – for the latter to be bound by a court decision.44 The fact that Atty. Zepeda
was not properly impleaded in the suit and given a chance to present his side of the
controversy before the RTC should have dissuaded the CA from invalidating the
Agreement and holding that attorney’s fees should, instead, be computed on a quantum
meruit basis. Admittedly, Article 1491 (5)45 of the Civil Code prohibits lawyers from
acquiring by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object
of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession. The CA lost sight of
the fact, however, that the prohibition applies only during the pendency of the suit46 and
generally does not cover contracts for contingent fees where the transfer takes effect
only after the finality of a favorable judgment.47
Although executed on the same day, it cannot likewise be gainsaid that the Agreement
and the Kasunduan are independent contracts, with parties, objects and causes different
from that of the other. Defined as a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby
one binds himself, with respect to the other to give something or to render some
service,48 a contract requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) consent of
the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
and, (c) cause of the obligation which is established.49 Executed in exchange for the
legal services of Atty. Zepeda and the financial assistance to be extended by Manuel, the
Agreement concerned respondents’ transfer of 40% of the avails of the suit, in the event
of a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 8085. While concededly subject to the same
suspensive condition, the Kasunduan was, in contrast, concluded by respondents with
Manuel alone, for the purpose of selling in favor of the latter 60% of their share in the
subject parcels for the agreed price of ₱180,000.00. Given these clear distinctions,
petitioners correctly argue that the CA reversibly erred in not determining the validity of
the Kasunduan independent from that of the Agreement.
Viewed in the light of the autonomous nature of contracts enunciated under Article
130650 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, we find that the Kasunduan was correctly
found by the RTC to be a valid and binding contract between the parties. Already partially
executed with respondents’ receipt of ₱1,000.00 from Manuel upon the execution thereof,
the Kasunduan simply concerned the sale of the former’s 60% share in the subject
parcel, less the 1,750-square meter portion to be retained, for the agreed consideration
of ₱180,000.00. As a notarized document that carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution,51 the Kasunduan was shown to have been
signed by respondents with full knowledge of its contents, as may be gleaned from the
testimonies elicited from Philip52 and Leovina.53
Although Philip had repeatedly claimed that respondents had been forced to sign the
Agreement and the Kasunduan, his testimony does not show such vitiation of consent as
would warrant the avoidance of the contract. He simply meant that respondents felt
constrained to accede to the stipulations insisted upon by Atty. Zepeda and Manuel who
were not otherwise willing to push through with said contracts.54
At any rate, our perusal of the record shows that respondents’ main objection to the
enforcement of the Kasunduan was the perceived inadequacy of the ₱180,000.00 which
the parties had fixed as consideration for 60% of the subject parcels. Rather than
claiming vitiation of their consent in the answer they filed a quo, respondents, in fact,
distinctly averred that the Kasunduan was tantamount to unjust enrichment and "a clear
source of speculative profit" at their expense since their remaining share in said
properties had "a current market value of ₱9,594,900.00, more or less."55 In their 22
March 1993 letter to petitioners, respondents also cited prices then prevailing for the sale
of properties in the area and offered to sell their 60% share for the price of ₱500.00 per
square meter56 or a total of ₱15,991,500.00. In response to petitioners’ insistence on
the price originally agreed upon by the parties,57respondents even invoked the last
paragraph58 of the Kasunduan to the effect that the parties agreed to enter into such
other stipulations as would be necessary to ensure the fruition of the sale.59
In the absence of any showing, however, that the parties were able to agree on new
stipulations that would modify their agreement, we find that petitioners and respondents
are bound by the original terms embodied in the Kasunduan. Obligations arising from
contracts, after all, have the force of law between the contracting parties60 who are
expected to abide in good faith with their contractual commitments, not weasel out of
them.61 Moreover, when the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, the rule is settled that the literal meaning of its
stipulations should govern. In such cases, courts have no authority to alter a contract by
construction or to make a new contract for the parties. Since their duty is confined to the
interpretation of the one which the parties have made for themselves without regard to
its wisdom or folly, it has been ruled that courts cannot supply material stipulations or
read into the contract words it does not contain.62 Indeed, courts will not relieve a party
from the adverse effects of an unwise or unfavorable contract freely entered into.63
Our perusal of the Kasunduan also shows that it contains a penal clause64 which
provides that a party who violates any of its provisions shall be liable to pay the
aggrieved party a penalty fixed at ₱50,000.00, together with the attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses incurred by the latter should judicial resolution of the matter becomes
necessary.65 An accessory undertaking to assume greater liability on the part of the
obligor in case of breach of an obligation, the foregoing stipulation is a penal clause
which serves to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and provides for liquidated
damages for such breach.66 "The obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated
indemnity without the necessity of proof of the existence and the measure of damages
caused by the breach."67Articles 1226 and 1227 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity
for damages and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no
stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to
pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.
The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.
Art. 1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself from the performance of the obligation by
paying the penalty, save in the case where this right has been expressly reserved for
him. Neither can the creditor demand the fulfillment of the obligation and the satisfaction
of the penalty at the same time, unless this right has been clearly granted to him.
However, if after the creditor has decided to require the fulfillment of the obligation, the
performance thereof should become impossible without his fault, the penalty may be
enforced."
In the absence of a showing that they expressly reserved the right to pay the penalty in
lieu of the performance of their obligation under the Kasunduan, respondents were
correctly ordered by the RTC to execute and deliver a deed of conveyance over their 60%
share in the subject parcels in favor of petitiOners. Considering that the Kasunduan
stipulated that respondents would retain a portion of their share consisting of 1,750
square meters, said disposition should, however, be modified to give full effect to the
intention of the contracting parties. Since the parties also fixed liquidated damages in the
sum of ₱50,000.00 in case of breach, we find that said amount should suffice as
petitioners' indemnity, without further need of compensation for moral and exemplary
damages. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty generally substitutes the
indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-
compliance.68 Usually incorporated to create an effective deterrent against breach of the
obligation by making the consequences of such breach as onerous as it may be possible,
the rule is settled that a penal clause is not limited to actual and compensatory
damages69
The RTC's award of attorney's fees in the sum of ₱50,000.00 is, however,
proper.1âwphi1 Aside from the fact that the penal clause included a liability for said
award in the event of litigation over a breach of the Kasunduan, petitioners were able to
prove that they incurred said sum in engaging the services of their lawyer to pursue their
rights and protect their interests.70
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals' assailed 23 January 2007

Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the RTC's 27 January 2005
Decision is REINSTATED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the exclusion of a
1,750-square meter portion from the 60% share in the subject parcel respondents were
ordered to convey in favor of petitioners; and (b) the deletion of the awards of moral and
exemplary damages. The rights of the parties under the Agreement may be determined
in a separate litigation.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN**
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 8383 December 11, 2012
AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. RAÑESES, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Rañeses filed on
March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, and subsequently
Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez- de los Reyes, conducted the fact-finding investigation
on the complaint.
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation2 dated

September 29, 2008 to the IBP Board of Governors which approved it in a resolution
dated December 11, 2008.
In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
transmitted to the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of
Resolution4 and the records of the case.
Factual Antecedents
In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to
represent her in Civil Case No. 777. In consideration for his services, Bueno
paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him
P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer
fee paid.
Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings. On
several occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late.
Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00. This
amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing Civil
Case No. 777, so that they would not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno not to tell
anyone about the matter. She immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the
demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Rañeses.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December
1988, because the amount she had previously given was inadequate. Bueno then sold
her sala set and colored television to raise the demanded amount, which she again
delivered to Atty. Rañeses.
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment on the
adverse party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case, but Atty.
Rañeses failed to comply with the court’s directive. According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses
concealed this development from her. In fact, she was shocked when a court sheriff
arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute the decision against them.
Bueno went to Atty. Rañeses’ office to ask him about what happened to the case. Atty.
Rañeses told her that he had not received any decision. Bueno later discovered from
court records that Atty. Rañeses actually received a copy of the decision on December 3,
1990. When she confronted Atty. Rañeses about her discovery and showed him a court-
issued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply denied any knowledge of the decision.
In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked his
client for money to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Rañeses allegedly asked
her to deliver a telegram from Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals to her aunt, Socorro
Bello. He told her to tell Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an amount that Justice Buena
purportedly asked for in relation to Criminal Case No. T-1909 that was then on appeal
with the Court of Appeals.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses went to Bello’s residence two weeks later. In her
(Bueno’s) presence, Bello paid Atty. Rañeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a receipt but
Atty. Rañeses refused to issue one, telling her that none of his clients ever dared to
demand a receipt for sums received from them.
Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed to
attend the hearings scheduled by Commissioner Gonzaga on March 20, 2000,[7] on May
11, 20008 and on October 2, 2000.9 During the hearing on October 2, 2000,
Commissioner Gonzaga issued an Order10 declaring Atty. Rañeses in default. Bueno
presented her evidence and was directed to file a formal offer.
On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies of
the Complaint and Supporting Papers"11 (dated September 30, 2000) filed by Atty.
Rañeses. Atty. Rañeses asked in his motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be reset
to sometime in December 2000, as he had prior commitments on the scheduled day. He
also asked for copies of the complaint and of the supporting papers, claiming that he had
not been furnished with these. In the interest of substantial justice, Commissioner
Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory hearing on November 16, 200012
Atty. Rañeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same hearing,
Commissioner Gonzaga noted that the registry return card refuted Atty. Rañeses’ claim
that he did not receive a copy of the complaint. Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled
another clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2001. He stated that if Atty. Rañeses failed
to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant
submits her memorandum.13
Atty. Rañeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day,
Commissioner Gonzaga declared the case deemed submitted for resolution after the
complainant’s submission of her memorandum.14
At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who scheduled
another hearing on March 14, 2003.15 During the hearing, only Bueno and her counsel
were present. The Commissioner noted that the IBP-CBD received a telegram from Atty.
Rañeses asking for the hearing’s resetting because he had prior commitments. The
records, however, showed that Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer and the case had
already been submitted for resolution. Thus, Commissioner De los Reyes issued an
Order16 directing Bueno to submit her formal offer of evidence and her documentary
evidence, together with her memorandum.
The IBP-CBD received Bueno’s Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not file any
formal offer, nor did she submit any of the documentary evidence indicated as
attachments to her complaint.
The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended

that Atty. Rañeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but found him guilty of
soliciting money to bribe a judge.
Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and
certifications that she indicated as attachments to her complaint. These would have
proven that Atty. Rañeses had indeed been negligent in pursuing her case. Without these
documents, which are not difficult to procure from the courts, Commissioner Limpingco
concluded that he would only be left with Bueno’s bare allegations which could not
support a finding of negligence.
Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses solicited
money to bribe judges to be credible. According to Commissioner Limpingco, the act of
soliciting money to bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in secret. He observed that
Bueno had consistently affirmed her statements in her affidavit, while Atty. Rañeses did
nothing to refute them.
Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Rañeses even made a false claim before
the investigating commissioners, as he alleged in his "Time Motion and Request for
Copies of the Complaint and Supporting Papers" that he did not receive the complaint
against him, a fact belied by the registry receipt card evidencing his receipt.
Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be disbarred for failure
to maintain his personal integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension from the
practice of law.19
The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from the
practice of law in accordance with Commissioner Limpingco’s recommendation and based
on our own observations and findings in the case.
The charge of negligence
According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve

their clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.02 provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Rule 18.03, on
the other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable."
"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them."20 A client is
entitled to the benefit of all remedies and defenses authorized by law, and is expected to
rely on his lawyer to avail of these remedies or defenses.21
In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an
appellant’s brief amounts to inexcusable negligence.22 In Garcia v. Bala,23 the Court
even found the respondent lawyer guilty of negligence after availing of an erroneous
mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, instead
of filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Because of his error, the
prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing his clients.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s offer
of evidence and to submit the required memorandum would have amounted to
negligence. However, as noted by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support her
allegations with court documents that she could have easily procured. This omission
leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are insufficient to prove Atty. Rañeses’
negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on this point.
The charge of soliciting money

In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get
a favorable decision for his client. He visited the judge’s office several times and
persistently called his residence to convince him to inhibit from his client’s case. The
Court found that the respondent lawyer therein violated Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility – the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain from any
impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of influencing,
the court. The respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the practice of law for one
year.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he
committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and the
Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the
investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its processes and even lied to one of
the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the case.
While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the Investigating
Commissioner found her testimony to be credible. The Court supports the Investigating
Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed:
By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily
take place in secrecy with only respondent Atty. Rañeses and complainant Bueno privy to
it. Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily affirmed
her allegations in this regard in hearings held before the IBP Investigating
Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his part, has not even seen it fit to file
any answer to the complaint against him, much less appear in any hearings scheduled in
this investigation.25
Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners reveals
his propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno’s
affidavits depict him to be.
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court
believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of
disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his
acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer’s relations to the
client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and
fraudulent.1âwphi1 It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses
in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was
the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the
impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means – a
decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly
disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the
"take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court
cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a
signal to one and all – to all lawyers, their clients and the general public – that the Court
will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the
public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these
are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is

hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Costs against the respondent.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, be notified of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

(ON LEAVE)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

(ON LEAVE)
MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 4549 December 2, 2013
NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE, ASUNCION

FELIPE-DOMINGO, MILAGROS FELIPE CABIGTING, and RODOLFO V.
FELIPE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On March 5, 1996, a Petition1 for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Ciriaco
A. Macapagal, docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolution2 dated June 19, 1996, we
required respondent to comment. Respondent received a copy of the Resolution on July
16, 1996.3 On August 15, 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For
Extension Of Tme To File Comment.4 He requested for additional period of 30 days within
which to file his comment citing numerous professional commitments. We granted said
request in our October 2, 1996 Resolution.5 The extended deadline passed sans
respondent’s comment. Thus on January 29, 1997, complainants file an Urgent Motion To
Submit The Administrative Case For Resolution Without Comment Of
Respondent6 claiming the respondent is deemed to have waived his right to file
comment.
On February 24, 1997, we referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.7
The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth Hermosisima-

Palma who set the hearing on October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.8
The Minutes of the Hearing9 showed that both parties were present.1âwphi1 The next
hearing was set on November 6, 199710 but was postponed upon request of the
complainants' counsel.11
Noting that more than five months had lapsed after the postponement of the last
hearing, complainants moved to calendar the case.12
The new Investigating Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing of the case
on January 12, 1999.13
During the scheduled hearing, complainants appeared and were directed to submit their
Position Paper.1âwphi1Respondent failed to attend despite receipt of notice.14
Complainants submitted their Position Paper15 on January 28, 1999.16
It took 11 years, more particularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP, thru
Investigating Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and
Recommendation.17
In his Report, the Investigating Commissioner quoted verbatim the allegations in the
Petition; he then narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP. Unfortunately, no
discussion was made regarding the merits of the complaint. However, it was
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month.
In Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In
their Petition, complainants alleged that they are co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906 pending before Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City while
respondent is the counsel for the defendants therein; that respondent committed
dishonesty when he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that
the parties therein are strangers to each other despite knowing that the defendants are
half-brothers and half-sisters of complainants; and that they filed a criminal case for
Perjury [against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] docketed as Criminal Case
No. 41667 pending before Branch 36 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Complainants also alleged that respondent introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage
as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and that they filed another Perjury
charge [against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A. Next, complainants
averred that respondent knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent
Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction; that said pleading
is not in accordance with the rules of procedure; that the said filing delayed the
proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and that they filed a Vigorous Opposition to
the said pleading. Complainants insisted that by the foregoing actuations, respondent
violated his duty as a lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and ordered to pay
complainants the amount of ₱500,000 representing the damages that they suffered. In
fine, complainants charged respondent with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the
defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to
each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his
evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he knowingly filed a totally
baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in the same case. At the outset, we note that in order to
determine whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty, we will have to delve into the issue
of whether the complainants are indeed related to the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906 being half-brothers and half-sisters. We would also be tasked to make an
assessment on the authenticity of the Certificate of Marriage which respondent submitted
in the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Similarly, we will have to make a ruling
on whether the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction which respondent filed was indeed baseless and irrelevant to the proceedings
in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Clearly, these prerequisites cannot be accomplished in this
administrative case. The resolution of whether the parties are related to each other
appears to be one of the issues brought up in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 which is a
complaint for Partition, Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Damages.
The complainants claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Gregorio V.
Felipe, Sr. This was rebutted by the defendants therein, as represented by the
respondent, who denied their filiation with the complainants. Clearly, the issue of filiation
must be settled in those proceedings, and not in this administrative case. The same is
true with regard to the issue of authenticity of the Marriage Certificate which was
submitted in evidence as well as the relevance of the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Besides, as complainants have asserted, a criminal case for Perjury had already been
filed against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 and docketed as Criminal Case
No. 41667 pending before Branch 36 of the Manila MeTC for their alleged "untruthful"
statement that they are strangers to each other. They had also filed another Perjury
charge against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A for allegedly submitting in
evidence a falsified Marriage Certificate. Moreover, they already filed a Vigorous
Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction filed by the respondent. In fine, these issues are proper subjects of and must
be threshed out in a judicial action. We held in Anacta v. Resurreccion18 that -
x x x it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary
authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against
lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then
it falls within the Court's disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts
which carry civil or criminal liablity, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the
moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action
which is understandably outside the purview of the Court's disciplinary authority. x x x19
Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz:
While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to
remain as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the
Court, in this instance, however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed
committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of
the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual matters that are subject of the
aforementioned civil cases, x x x. As a matter of prudence and so as not to preempt the
conclusions that will be drawn by the court where the case is pending, the Court deems it
wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the filing of another one, depending
on the final outcome of the civil case.21 Thus, pursuant to the above pronouncements,
the Petition filed by complainants must be dismissed without prejudice. However, we
cannot end our discussion here. It has not escaped our notice that despite receipt of our
directive, respondent did not file his comment. Neither did he file his Position Paper as
ordered by the IBP. And for this, he must be sanctioned.
Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not
only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon
to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with
court directives being themselves officers of the court. As an officer of the court,
respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but
an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the
orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against
lawyers.22
Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the

infraction committed by the respondent.23
ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED for failing to

give due respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He is WARNED
that commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Resolution No.
XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET
ASIDE. A.C. No. 4549 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Let a copy of this Resolution be
entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO D. CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
-------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 153031 December 14, 2006
PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING MARINE TRANSPORT

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and STEVE RUSEL, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 18, 2001 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59976, which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) dated March 22, 2000 in NLRC NCR CA No. 018120-99; and the Resolution of the
CA dated April 10, 2002, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.2
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as GP/AB seaman by manning agency, PCL
Shipping Philippines, Inc. (PCL Shipping) for and in behalf of its foreign principal,
U-Ming Marine Transport Corporation (U-Ming Marine). Rusel thereby joined the
vessel MV Cemtex General (MV Cemtex) for the contract period of twelve (12)
months with a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00,
fixed overtime rate of US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00
per month and special allowance of US$175.00.
On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as
a consequence thereof, he suffered a broken and/or sprained ankle on his left foot.
A request for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel.
On August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the
vessel using a life jacket and swam to shore. He was brought to a hospital where
he was confined for eight (8) days.
On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was
required to board a plane bound for the Philippines.
On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages
against PCL Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC.
In their answer, the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping
off the vessel.
On July 21, 1998, the labor arbiter rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Wherefore, above premises duly considered we find the respondent liable for
unjust repatriation of the complainant.
Accordingly, the following award is hereby adjudged against the respondent:
1. The amount of $2,625.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment

representing three (3) months salary of the complainant due to his illegal
dismissal.
2. The amount of $1,600.00 or its peso equivalent, representing sick wage

benefits.
3. The amount of $550.00 or its peso equivalent, representing living

allowance, overtime pay and special allowance for two (2) months.
4. The amount of $641.66 or its peso equivalent, representing unpaid wages

from August 11 to 22, 1996.
5. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Aggrieved by the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, herein petitioners appealed to the NLRC.
In its Decision dated March 22, 2000, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter
but modified the appealed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is as it is hereby ordered

MODIFIED in that the amount representing three months salary of the complainant
due to his illegal dismissal is reduced to US$1,620.00. Further the award of sick
wage benefit is deleted.
All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its
Decision of May 3, 2000.5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.6 In its Decision dated December 18,
2001, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC Decision.7
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated April 10, 2002.8
Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:
I. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent was illegally
dismissed from employment.
xxxx
II. Likewise, the Court of Appeals erred in not upholding petitioners' right to pre-
terminate private respondent's employment.
xxxx
III. The private respondent is not entitled to other money claims, particularly as to
the award of attorney's fees.9
As to their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the
findings of the NLRC that Rusel's act of jumping ship does not establish any intent on his
part to abandon his job and never return. Petitioners argue that Rusel's very act of
jumping from the vessel and swimming to shore is evidence of highest degree that he
has no intention of returning to his job. Petitioners further contend that if Rusel was
indeed suffering from unbearable and unmitigated pain, it is unlikely that he is able to
swim two (2) nautical miles, which is the distance between their ship and the shore,
considering that he needed to use his limbs in swimming. Petitioners further assert that it
is error on the part of the CA to disregard the entries contained in the logbook and in the
Marine Note Protest evidencing Rusels' offense of desertion because while these pieces of
evidence were belatedly presented, the settled rule is that additional evidence may be
admitted on appeal in labor cases. Petitioners also contend that Rusel's act of desertion is
a grave and serious offense and considering the nature and situs of employment as well
as the nationality of the employer, the twin requirements of notice and hearing before an
employee can be validly terminated may be dispensed with.
As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming, for the sake of
argument, that Rusel is not guilty of desertion, they invoked the alternative defense that
the termination of his employment was validly made pursuant to petitioners' right to
exercise their prerogative to pre-terminate such employment in accordance with Section
19(C) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which provision was incorporated in Rusel's
Contract of Employment with petitioners. Petitioners assert that despite the fact that this
issue was raised before the CA, the appellate court failed to resolve the same.
Anent the last assigned error, petitioners argue that it is error on the part of the CA to
affirm the award of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for
two months because Rusel failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that he is
entitled to these awards. Petitioners further argue that these money claims, particularly
the claim for living allowance, should not be granted because they partake of the nature
of earned benefits for services rendered by a seafarer. Petitioners also contend that the
balance of Rusel's wages from August 11-22, 1996 should be applied for the payment of
the costs of his repatriation, considering that under Section 19(E) of the Standard Terms
and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going
Vessels, when a seafarer is discharged for any just cause, the employer shall have the
right to recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation from the seafarer's wages
and other earnings. Lastly, petitioners argue that the award of attorney's fees should be
deleted because there is nothing in the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC which
states the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded.
In his Comment, private respondent contends that petitioners are raising issues of fact
which have already been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA. Private
respondent argues that, aside from the fact that the issues raised were already decided
by three tribunals against petitioners' favor, it is a settled rule that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
While there are exceptions to this rule, private respondent contends that the instant case
does not fall under any of these exceptions. Private respondent asserts that petitioners
failed to substantiate their claim that the former is guilty of desertion. Private respondent
further contends that the right to due process is available to local and overseas workers
alike, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution on labor and equal protection as well
as the declared policy contained in the Labor Code. Private respondent argues that
petitioners' act of invoking the provisions of Section 19(C) of the POEA Contract as an
alternative defense is misplaced and is inconsistent with their primary defense that
private respondent was dismissed on the ground of desertion. As to the award of
attorney's fees, private respondent contends that since petitioners' act compelled the
former to incur expenses to protect his interest and enforce his lawful claims, and
because petitioners acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy private
respondent's lawful claims, it is only proper that attorney's fees be awarded in favor of
the latter. Anent the other monetary awards, private respondent argues that these
awards are all premised on the findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that
private respondent's dismissal was improper and illegal.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
Anent the first assigned error, it is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be raised in this Court.10 Judicial review by this Court does
not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper
labor tribunal has based its determination.11 Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a
trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases.12 Factual issues may be
considered and resolved only when the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the
Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the CA.13 The reason for this
is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like the Arbitration Board and the NLRC, have acquired
a unique expertise because their jurisdiction are confined to specific matters.14 In the
present case, the question of whether private respondent is guilty of desertion is factual.
The Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA are unanimous in their findings that private
respondent is not guilty of desertion and that he has been illegally terminated from his
employment. After a review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from the findings of these tribunals.
Petitioners assert that the entries in the logbook of MV Cemtex General15 and in the
Marine Note Protest16 which they submitted to the NLRC confirm the fact that private
respondent abandoned the vessel in which he was assigned. However, the genuineness of
the Marine Note Protest as well as the entries in the logbook are put in doubt because
aside from the fact that they were presented only during petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the NLRC, both the Marine Note Protest and the entry in the
logbook which were prepared by the officers of the vessel were neither notarized nor
authenticated by the proper authorities. Moreover, a reading of these entries simply
shows that private respondent was presumed to have deserted his post on the sole basis
that he was found missing while the MV Cemtex General was anchored at the port of
Takehara, Japan. Hence, without any corroborative evidence, these documents cannot be
used as bases for concluding that private respondent was guilty of desertion.
Petitioners also question the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
that what caused private respondent in jumping overboard was the unmitigated pain he
was suffering which was compounded by the inattention of the vessel's captain to provide
him with the necessary treatment inspite of the fact that the ship was moored for about
two weeks at the anchorage of Takehara, Japan; and, that private respondent's act was a
desperate move to protect himself and to seek relief for his physical suffering. Petitioners
contend that the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which were
affirmed by the CA are based on conjecture because there is no evidence to prove that,
at the time he jumped ship, private respondent was really suffering from an ankle injury.
It is true that no substantial evidence was presented to prove that the cause of private
respondent's confinement in a hospital in Takehara, Japan was his ankle injury. The Court
may not rely on the letter marked as Annex "B" and attached to private respondent's
Position Paper because it was unsigned and it was not established who executed the
same.17 However, the result of the x-ray examination conducted by the LLN Medical
Services, Inc. on August 26, 1996, right after private respondent was repatriated to the
Philippines, clearly showed that there is a soft-tissue swelling around his ankle
joint.18 This evidence is consistent with private respondent's claim that he was then
suffering from an ankle injury which caused him to jump off the ship.
As to petitioners' contention that private respondent could not have traversed the
distance between the ship and the shore if he was indeed suffering from unbearable pain
by reason of his ankle injury, suffice it to say that private respondent is an able-bodied
seaman and that with the full use of both his arms and the help of a life jacket, was able
to reach the shore.
As correctly defined by petitioners, desertion, in maritime law is:
The act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel, in which he had
engaged to perform a voyage, before the expiration of his time, and without leave.
By desertion, in maritime law, is meant, not a mere unauthorized absence from
the ship, without leave, but an unauthorized absence from the ship with an
intention not to return to her service; or as it is often expressed, animo non
revertendi, that is, with an intention to desert.19 (emphasis supplied)
Hence, for a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be

evidence to prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to perform
a voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his duty and of not returning to the
ship or vessel. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to present clear and
convincing proof to show that when private respondent jumped ship, he no longer had
the intention of returning. The fact alone that he jumped off the ship where he was
stationed, swam to shore and sought medical assistance for the injury he sustained is not
a sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude that he had the intention of deserting his
post. Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause.20 The case of the
employer must stand or fall on its own merits and not on the weakness of the employee's
defense.21 In the present case, since petitioners failed to discharge their burden of
proving that private respondent is guilty of desertion, the Court finds no reason to depart
from the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondent's
dismissal is illegal.
In their second assigned error, petitioners cite Section 19(C) of POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 055-9622 known as the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels as their
alternative basis in terminating the employment of private respondent. Said Section
provides as follows:
Section 19. REPATRIATION
xxxx
C. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three months before
the expiration of his contract, the master/ employer may repatriate the seafarer
from such port provided that the seafarer shall be paid all his earned wages. In
addition, the seafarer shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period
plus a termination pay equivalent to one (1) month of his basic pay, provided,
however, that this mode of termination may only be exercised by the
master/employer if the original contract period of the seafarer is at least ten (10)
months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode of termination shall
not apply to dismissal for cause.
The Court is not persuaded. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 took effect on
January 1, 1997 while the contract of employment entered into by and between private
respondent and petitioners was executed on April 10, 1996. Hence, it is wrong for
petitioners to cite this particular Memorandum because at the time of petitioners' and
private respondent's execution of their contract of employment Memorandum Circular No.
055-96 was not yet effective.
What was in effect at the time private respondent's Contract of Employment was
executed was POEA Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989. It is clearly provided
under the second paragraph of private respondent's Contract of Employment that the
terms and conditions provided under Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 shall
be strictly and faithfully observed. Hence, it is Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of
1989 which governs private respondent's contract of employment.
Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum Circular No. 41, which has almost identical
provisions with Section 19 (C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, provides as follows:
SECTION H. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
xxxx
6. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months
before the expiration of the Contract, the master/employer may repatriate the
seaman from such port provided that the seaman shall be paid all his earned
wages. In addition, the seaman shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire
contract period plus a termination pay equivalent to one (1) month of his basic
pay, provided, however, that this mode of termination may only be exercised by
the master/employer if the original contact period of the seaman is at least ten
(10) months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode of termination
shall not apply to dismissal for cause.
The Court agrees with private respondent's contention that petitioners' arguments are
misplaced. Petitioners may not use the above-quoted provision as basis for terminating
private respondent's employment because it is incongruent with their primary defense
that the latter's dismissal from employment was for cause. Petitioners may not claim that
they ended private respondent's services because he is guilty of desertion and at the
same time argue that they exercised their option to prematurely terminate his
employment, even without cause, simply because they have the right to do so under
their contract. These grounds for termination are inconsistent with each other such that
the use of one necessarily negates resort to the other. Besides, it appears from the
records that petitioners' alternative defense was pleaded merely as an afterthought
because it was only in their appeal with the NLRC that they raised this defense. The only
defense raised by petitioners in their Answer with Counterclaim filed with the office of the
Labor Arbiter is that private respondent was dismissed from employment by reason of
desertion.23Under the Rules of Court,24 which is applicable in a suppletory character in
labor cases before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC pursuant to Section 3, Rule I of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC25, defenses which are not raised either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.26
Granting, for the sake of argument, that petitioners may use Section H (6), Part I of
Memorandum Circular No. 41 or Section 19(C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 as
basis for terminating private respondent's employment, it is clear that one of the
conditions before any of these provisions becomes applicable is when the vessel arrives
at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the expiration of the
contract of employment. In the present case, private respondent's contract was executed
on April 10, 1996 for a duration of twelve months. He was deployed aboard MV Cemtex
General on June 25, 1996 and repatriated to the Philippines on August 22, 1996. Hence,
it is clear that petitioners did not meet this condition because private respondent's
termination was not within a period of three months before the expiration of his contract
of employment.
Moreover, the Court finds nothing in the records to show that petitioners complied with
the other conditions enumerated therein, such as the payment of all of private
respondent's earned wages together with his leave pay for the entire contract period as
well as termination pay equivalent to his one month salary.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges
against him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity
to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and
hearing applies strictly only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these
need not be strictly observed in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code
which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the
Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place
where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction.27 In the present case, it is not
disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into by and between petitioners and
private respondent was executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together
with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case.28 Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and hearing in the case of a
seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a number of cases that before a seaman can be
dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required that he be given a written notice
regarding the charges against him and that he be afforded a formal investigation where
he could defend himself personally or through a representative.29 Hence, the employer
should strictly comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing without regard to
the nature and situs of employment or the nationality of the employer. Petitioners failed
to comply with these twin requirements.
Petitioners also contend that the wages of private respondent from August 11-22, 1996
were applied to the costs of his repatriation. Petitioners argue that the off-setting of the
costs of his repatriation against his wages for the aforementioned period is allowed under
the provisions of Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 which provides that
when the seafarer is discharged for any just cause, the employer shall have the right to
recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation from the seafarer's wages and
other earnings.
The Court does not agree. Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 has its
counterpart provision under Section H (2), Part II of Memorandum Circular No. 41, to
wit:
SECTION H. REPATRIATION
xxxx
2. When the seaman is discharged for disciplinary reasons, the employer shall
have the right to recover the costs of maintenance and repatriation from the
seaman's balance of wages and other earnings.
xxxx
It is clear under the above-quoted provision that the employer shall have the right to
recover the cost of repatriation from the seaman's wages and other earnings only if the
concerned seaman is validly discharged for disciplinary measures. In the present case,
since petitioners failed to prove that private respondent was validly terminated from
employment on the ground of desertion, it only follows that they do not have the right to
deduct the costs of private respondent's repatriation from his wages and other earnings.
Lastly, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the private respondent
is not entitled to his money claims representing his living allowance, overtime pay,
vacation pay and special allowance as well as attorney's fees because he failed to present
any proof to show that he is entitled to these awards.
However, the Court finds that the monetary award representing private respondent's
three months salary as well as the award representing his living allowance, overtime pay,
vacation pay and special allowance should be modified.
The Court finds no basis in the NLRC's act of including private respondent's living
allowance as part of the three months salary to which he is entitled under Section 10 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995." The pertinent provisions of the said Act provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims –
xxxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized

cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxxx
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what is included in the computation of
the amount due to the overseas worker are only his salaries. Allowances are excluded. In
the present case, since private respondent received a basic monthly salary of US$400.00,
he is, therefore, entitled to receive a sum of US$1200.00, representing three months of
said salary.
As to the awards of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance, it
is clearly provided under private respondent's Contract of Employment that he is entitled
to these benefits as follows: living allowance of US$140.00/month; vacation leave with
pay equivalent to US$40.00/month; overtime rate of US$120.00/month; and, special
allowance of US$175.00/month.30
With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in determining
whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board
and can not leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they
actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours.31 In the present case, the
Court finds that private respondent is not entitled to overtime pay because he failed to
present any evidence to prove that he rendered service in excess of the regular eight
working hours a day.
On the basis of the foregoing, the remaining benefits to which the private respondent is
entitled is the living allowance of US$140.00/month, which was removed in the
computation of private respondent's salary, special allowance of US$175.00/month and
vacation leave with pay amounting to US$40.00/month. Since private respondent
rendered service for two months these benefits should be doubled, giving a total of
US$710.00.
As to the award of attorney's fees, this Court ruled in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,32 as
follows:
x x x [T]here are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-
called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he
has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his
employment by and his agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept,
attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid
by the losing party in a litigation. The instances where these may be awarded are
those enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof which
pertains to actions for recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to
the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof. The extraordinary concept of attorney's
fees is the one contemplated in Article 111 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Art. 111. Attorney's fees. – (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages,

the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent
of the amount of wages recovered x x x
The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of

strict construction in the awarding of attorney's fees. Although an express
finding of facts and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the award,
there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in
bad faith when it withheld the wages. There need only be a showing that
the lawful wages were not paid accordingly, as in this case.
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing
regulations, the employee's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the
liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor
Code which states that "[a]ll doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
the provisions of [the Labor] Code including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor", and Article 1702 of the Civil Code
which provides that "[i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts
shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the
laborer."33 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, it is true that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC failed to state the
reasons why attorney's fees are being awarded. However, it is clear that private
respondent was illegally terminated from his employment and that his wages and other
benefits were withheld from him without any valid and legal basis. As a consequence, he
is compelled to file an action for the recovery of his lawful wages and other benefits and,
in the process, incurred expenses. On these bases, the Court finds that he is entitled to
attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated
December 18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the award of US$1620.00
representing private respondent's three months salary is reduced to US$1200.00. The
award of US$550.00 representing private respondent's living allowance, overtime pay,
vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted and in lieu thereof, an
award of US$710.00 is granted representing private respondent's living allowance,
special allowance and vacation leave with pay for the same period.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Working Chairperson), Callejo Sr., and Chico-Nazario JJ., concur.

Panganiban, C.J., Retired as of December 7, 2006.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014

[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON

COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into
certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing
indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the
Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary.1
Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government
funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the
money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members
of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest
actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon
Committee), the names of certain government officials and other individuals were
mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind,
Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities
identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles'
parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory
S. Ong, herein respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the
Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of
double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous
transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly
tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but
instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties
and other special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our
office or join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla,
Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza,
Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos,
Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty.
Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that
that case could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang
ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na
meron na siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim
Napoles called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her,
that we should stay together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko,
susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."
xxxx
38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the
NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim
Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin
ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang
pera."3(Emphasis supplied.)
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo
entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph
of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in
the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had
interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the
photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator
Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the
ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he
insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one
advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases
where she was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the
Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice.4
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay

"5 wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement,
alleged to have visited their office or attended their events, thus:
63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang

29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa
inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special occacions si JANET
NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko
at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga
pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?
S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang

mga taong nabanggit ko:
xxxx
w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa

2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET
NAPOLES sa conference room.
x x x x6
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula
was asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas
yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –
THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised
questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision
rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which
convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator
Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier.
He explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been
rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the
party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or
social event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our
court, or while she already had a pending case with our court, or at any time afterwards.
I have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been
advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs.
Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the
case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided
on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the
ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief
Justice such that even without being required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily did
so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution
from unfair and malicious innuendos."
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the
testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the
malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim
Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the
intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi
napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan
SEN. ANGARA. Okay.

xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya
"Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa
huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxxx
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA. Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
Xxxx8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu
proprio under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the
judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were
alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books
with Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations
[NGOs] involved in the scam).9
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to
submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the
affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's
Comment.10 Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases
and explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.
On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal
knowledge whether respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her.
Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs.
Napoles actually made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of
massive media coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the
consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman and
later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula and
others involved in their business operation that she would not leave or abandon them
and that she would do all that she can to help them just so they would not turn their
backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles made
misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she only had to do
so in order to convince Sula and her co-employees that the cases to be filed against
them would be "fixed."
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs.
Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent
said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph
was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which the
miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was
mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo
Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon.
Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was undergoing
treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape the
Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a
fragrant ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this
day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of
such favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank
her. Respondent stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her
supplemental affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at
the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have
personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her, considering that she no
longer had any pending case with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other division
of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation of his
Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as
sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution
was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-
DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within
a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C.
Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with
the resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original
records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is
no more need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other
reports on the supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos.
26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report
with the following findings and conclusions:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
1. THE KEVLAR CASE

Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case
No. 26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation
of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged were several members of Philippine Marine
Corps and civilian employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother
Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna
Marie Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same -
the questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the
amount of ₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the
payment although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are
mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an
Order issued by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.
Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser
crime of Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to
pay PS,000.00. They all underwent probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in
question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited,
this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the crimes charged x x x."
xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION
xxxx
I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins.
After passing the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in
the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was
in charge of disbursements of her personal funds and those of her office. He was also in
charge of government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily
business activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him
the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that
court who would help her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning
the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is
respondent, thus:
Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote,
"Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory,
Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas po." And then
going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi
ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka
alam ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang
matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that question being asked from you?
xxxx
A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that
Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were
talking about, if you remember?
Witness Luy
A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.
Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan?
A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So
kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung
ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap niya si
Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was
promulgated, Napoles and respondent were already communicating with each other
(nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in her favor:
Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?
A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.
Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?
A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms.
Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice
Gregory Ong.
Q That was after the decision was promulgated?
A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na

po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po
yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator
Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the
Sandiganbayan:
"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar
case). Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."
Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan."
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of
the Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million
pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such amount considering that what was
involved in the Kevlar case was only ₱3.8 million. She explained that she gave various
amounts to different people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten
years. And before the decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to
respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.
Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko
inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated
that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you mean, "Alam ko
inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean by that "inayos"?
A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni

Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang
pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko
na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni
Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...
xxx
Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si
madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si
Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she
never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx
Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).
Q To you?
A Yes, madam.
Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?
A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms.
Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.
xxx
Justice Gutierrez
Continue counsel.
Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya.
Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang ₱3.8 lang na
PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang nagastos mo?"
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it
spent?
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang
staggered. May ₱5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng
ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay
Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to
Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On
the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other employees.
Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so
much money being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles called
Benhur telling him that respondent would like to avail of such interest for his BDO check
of ₱25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just deposit
respondent's ₱25.5 million in her personal account with Metro bank. Then she would
issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 as
monthly interest, or a total of ₱3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon Justice
Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the
corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:
Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?
Witness Luy
A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms.
Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin.
Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang madarni
na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o
nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles,
si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan
niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit
money?
A Opo.
Q So he could get 13% interest?

A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang
opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa
po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms.
Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po
nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?
A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay ₱25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check
na inissue ...
Q That belongs to Justice Ong?
A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang
ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin
yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the meantime, mag-iissue
ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in
madam, ₱25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas ₱282,000.00
or ₱283,000.00 or ₱281,000.00 po madam kasi naground off kami sa ₱282,000.00. So,
ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin. Kung
hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat
at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na
naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay
to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang
₱25.5 million na amount sa kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke
na ₱282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or
August or mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro
tapos na.
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the
bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay
Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the
arrangement? Do you understand me?
A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung ₱25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account
ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.
On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation.
She ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's)
favorite.
On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did
not mention respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the
Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued ₱282,000.00 (the amount stated in each
of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of the payee upon instruction of his
lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to respondent.
II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her
duties included the formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for
business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and others.
Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice
sometime in 2012.
Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the
hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas
yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?
xxx
Ms. Sula
Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.
The Chairman
Gregory Ong?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Sa Sandiganbayan?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.
Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the
Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is
filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other employees not to worry
because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:
Q Not the illegal detention case?
Witness Sula
A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Okay, again?
A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so
hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na
tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Yung PDAF?
A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO
billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam,
paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa
Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron
naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa
Sandiganbayan.
Q Is that in your affidavit?
A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit
ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.
Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?
A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.
Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she
would say that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:
Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si
Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix
(aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her
acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi
masyadong mataas ang talent fee."
xxxx
III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the
photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is
shielded by law and he has to protect his source.
When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members
of the division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that
picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical standards, I
immediately sensed though that a Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be
going to a party or be in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under
his Division. He should not be in a situation that would compromise the integrity of his
office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his
side about the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him.
Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during one of the
parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the
woman in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the
Kevlar case; and that such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when
a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.
xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the

Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the
Kevlar case;
2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case,

respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice
Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are
independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody,
not even by their peers;
3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from

Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent
deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any
proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money from Napoles
considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012,

after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what
prompted him to do so, thus:
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles
approached him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and
thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should thank
her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court found enough evidence against her, she
would have been convicted. She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese
priests, building churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests.
He was not interested though in what she was saying until she mentioned the name of
Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black
Nazarene since he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the
robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if one wears it. Then
respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment
(prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his
family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to
drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He also
received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his
body. That was a great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office
and thanked her. That was his first visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on
declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang
kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.
5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest

consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of ₱282,000.00 each and that he issued
to her his BDO check of ₱25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he claimed
that "he never issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he
does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check,
it follows that Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing
advanced interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI,
an investor can only make an initial deposit of ₱30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00
per year. The limit or ceiling is ₱3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula
testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a
case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent
fee is too high, however, both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four
things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and
4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar
case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual
basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be
pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial
body and that he never interceded on her behalf.
EVALUATION
xxxx
It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially
testified that Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the
Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.
Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses
and everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions
propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject
and issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect whether a person under
investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting,
it is indubitably improbable that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against
respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid,
straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.
In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their
testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they
did not waver or falter. The undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible
witnesses and their story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and
trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula
were lying.
. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar
case considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation.
Hence, she would avail of every possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's
belief that the two members of his Division are independent-minded Jurists remains to be
a mere allegation.
xxxx
With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and
Sula, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion
that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the consideration ... Benhur testified he kept
a ledger (already shredded) of expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles
for the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten
years; and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay,
inadmissible in evidence:
Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to
Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always their statements were ...
they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told to them by Napoles, is it possible
that we subpoena Napoles so that the truth will come out? If. ..
xxxx
Justice Gutierrez
That is your prerogative.
Justice Ong
I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just
to clear my name whether I should be hung or I should not be hung.
xxxx
Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)
Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's
suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula.
Significantly, respondent failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He
should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim
regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
x x xx
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan,

resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute
gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.
xxxx
That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to
respondent led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It
is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He gave a detailed
and lucid narration of the events, concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent ₱3,
102,000.00 as advanced interest.
According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it
possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true,
nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit, respondent could have transacted
business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest of
₱3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his
judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably
disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of
the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports
Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing
in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm
the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.
xxxx
...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her
office considering that the visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in
the Kevlar case.
Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in

violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities .
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it
possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her,
respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he
visited her again because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely
frail reason. He was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without
doubt, readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he
"fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly
perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only
while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond
reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a number of
inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted
position.
xxxx
On the photograph showing respondent
with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.
xxxx
This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from judges to promote public
confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for
reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the
same Code which provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not
present before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must
have waived her appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That court could not
have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not appear personally for arraignment.
Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been
charged administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-
Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada,
Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of
PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of
collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as
a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division adopted a different
procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the Division,
respondent was ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
xxxx
...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles.
The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that
Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the questionable purchase of the Kevlar
helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in the transaction in question and that
there was no proof of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at
such conclusion? The Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up
the processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge of the delivery of the
helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to ₱3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets
were deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-
000-2200, in the name of Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a
hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the

Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and
WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
xxxx
The Court's Ruling
This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating
Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the
charges against the respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while
it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to

the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure
("kampante")of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where
she handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total of
₱3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his ₱25.5 million BDO check she deposited
in her personal account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator

Estrada and Napoles.11
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery
during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and
socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent
failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had
actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied
with or attended any social event hosted by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden

act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."12 We agree with Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and
after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of
corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence,

i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.13
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with
respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles'
trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and
personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the
case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan
who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees.
Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted
even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced
she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by
Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to
respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no reason for them to doubt
Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the
"Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about her association
with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when
they saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in
2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no
personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them
by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles
had not just one but "contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it
could have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case,
especially since Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at
the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles even supposedly said that
respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees
to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of
any offer, promise, gift or present received.14 Ajudge who extorts money from a party-
litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has
condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been
committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering
justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.15
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant

must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what
is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of
proof required should be more than substantial.16 Concededly, the evidence in this case
is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both
Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in
exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged
bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we
find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly
indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of
anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office
on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to
Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a
collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public
disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with
Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath
by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of
the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself
acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative proceeding, their declarations
are taken in the light of the public revelations of what they know of that government
corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of
their close relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with
government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed
by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the "challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate
hearings where they first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers
would testify against the respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid, straightforward and
categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear, unequivocal,
and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their
previous testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during
cross-examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great
weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of
the witnesses as they testified.17 The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality,
to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases
applies a fortiori to administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with
respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with
Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles
talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar
as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she was referring to
respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent,
and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that
Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other
employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from Sula's testimony on direct
examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the Kevlar case:
Atty. Benipayo
Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles
regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the
problem with the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran

niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi
na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang
Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami.
Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po
dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya
at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot
din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.
Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will
answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that
right?
A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga
officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang
probation period.
xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si
Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)
As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her
mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of
public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted secure
a probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the
merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative
liability.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was
grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that
fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.20 Public confidence in the Judiciary
is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all
impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a
judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen.21
In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance
is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free
from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act
liable to create an impression of indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one
has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not
freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just
impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for
reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or
socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the
case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr.23 where this Court did not find fault with a judge who was
charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they
were both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines
Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte in the
latter's car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to
lawyers or parties with official court business, whose requests and complaints regarding
their cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency
and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to
his house on several occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his
children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently
seen eating and drinking together in public places.
We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point
was insufficient, viz.:
"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions
where Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or
thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and
litigants inside his chambers, the door to which is always open so that [the] staff could
see that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is
fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend
whenever they meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are not in any
manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics provides:
'30. Social relations

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in
retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the
completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and
that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members
at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be
scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion
that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining
his judicial course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because
Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the
Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from
malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for
judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may
raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized
in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was still
on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony
expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles'
office because at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending
and prospective litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere
suggestion of partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with
the dignity of the judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25
... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel
appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or
partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion
from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue,
time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile
endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims
and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them,
however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to
awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their
objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must
act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their
counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts
were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny,
the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion
on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association
with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy
which initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-
flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our
special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence
and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.
During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its
serious repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation
Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez
What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be
possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you
or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?
Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the
image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper
request. Why did you not do that?
Justice Ong
I don't know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are
a devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there
and had that request for you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?
Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that
conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there
is such a robe, maybe I will do that.
Justice Gutierrez
Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have
been very, very careful about your actuations. You should not have been seen in public,
you know, with a woman like her who was an accused before. You could have thanked
her simply by calling her. You could have relayed to her your true feelings that you are so
grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy
Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of going to her
office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de San Antonio in Forbes
Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the public with her
considering that she was a former accused in that case.
Justice Ong
I will heed to that advice, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that.
"That is a lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you know, with a former
respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted that? You said you learned
you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even
before you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson,
isn't it or was that the first time? That is why you associated yourself with Senator
Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....
Justice Gutierrez
Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?
Justice Ong
A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for
visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish
priest were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his
counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's
meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version.
Expectedly, respondent denied having issued a BDO check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed
by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI.
Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as previously
testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded
upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of ₱282,000.00 supposed

advance interest for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as
consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar case.1âwphi1 Such finding is
consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix"
the said case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to
Napoles office the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting
Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit,
tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding
advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would
Napoles extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her
acquittal in the Kevlar case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised
adverse public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the
honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts
of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative
investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he
vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed
to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain
omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles.
It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the
"contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one
instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in
her supplemental affidavit x x x."27).
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the
administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a
violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of

integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."28Dishonesty, being a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no
place in the Judiciary.29
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a
serious charge may be penalized as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Considering that
respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and
dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a
magistrate of the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme
penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S.

Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

(No Part)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO* Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(No Part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

See Separate Concurring Opinion

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563 September 8, 2004

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)
LUCILA TAN, complainant,
vs.
Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila,1 for
violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso
Pe Sy and pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila,
then presided by respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge
allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant. They met at Sangkalan
Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member
told her that respondent was asking for ₱150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal
of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judge’s Decisions in Criminal Cases
Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the
accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases
as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The staff member allowed complainant to
keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. Complainant, however,
did not accede to respondent’s demand because she believed that she had a very strong
case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by
respondent judge.2
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead

stated that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable
decision. She even tried to delay and to derail the promulgation of the decisions in
Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120. Complainant also sought the intervention of then
San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada
allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help complainant. The former even
called him over the phone when he was in New Zealand, persuading him to hold in
abeyance the promulgation of the Decisions in said cases. But he politely declined, telling
him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and moreover, he had
already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent
further stated that complainant kept bragging about her close relations with Mayor
Estrada who was her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she
could help him get appointed to a higher position provided he decides the suits in her
favor. Respondent judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the
downpayment of a car he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally,
respondent judge denied that a member of his staff gave complainant a copy of his draft
decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his
Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before he left for New Zealand on
study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to thereafter change the
resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any member of his staff to give
complainant copies of said Decisions.3
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and
recommendation.4
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the
administrative case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented as
documentary evidence the copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440
dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly handed to her by a member of respondent
judge’s staff.5 Respondent judge, on the other hand, presented four (4) witnesses:
Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad
Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his witnesses,6 copy of
the Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440,7 and various documents
composed of the machine copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No. 117219,
machine copy of the letter dated December 29, 1997, machine copy of Certification dated
Nov 13, 2000, front and dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated
March 31, 1998, Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and
Transaction Record, which documents were allegedly given by complainant to
respondent’s witness, Fernando B. Espuerta.8
The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
COMPLAINANT’S VERSION:
1. LUCILA TAN
Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had
a case in Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in
September 1998, she filed two cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the
Prosecutor’s Office in Pasig. After resolution, the cases were filed in the MeTC, San
Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the other one went to Branch 58, where
Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge. Judge Quilatan was the
Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a friend, she moved for consolidation
and the two cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57. Subsequently,
in view of the Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainant’s lawyer, Judge Quilatan
inhibited himself and the two cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent
Judge Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After several
hearings, the Clerk of Court, named Joyce, called up the Complainant and advised
her to talk to San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance. Joyce
gave her the phone number of the Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant then called up the Office of the Mayor
but her call was intercepted by Josie, the Mayor’s Secretary. When she told Josie
why she called, the latter asked her if she wanted to meet the Judge and when
Complainant answered in the affirmative, Josie made arrangements for
Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor sometime in November or
late October 2000 and she met the Judge on November 10. She, Josie and
Respondent Judge met at the Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page
22, Hearing of March 3, 2003). During the meeting, Complainant "told the
Judge regarding this matter, how this happened and that he will convince the
Accused to pay me as soon as possible" (TSN, page 23, Hearing of March 3,
2003). When she went to the restroom for a few minutes, Respondent Judge and
Josie were left alone. After she came back, they went home. On the way home,
Josie told her to give something to [the] Judge, "Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng
kaunti para bumilis iyong kaso mo" (TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
At first, Josie did not mention any amount but when the Complainant asked her
how much, the former mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00). Complainant
asked for a lesser amount, Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) (TSN, page 25,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie agreed, she sent the amount of
₱20,000.00 to Josie through her driver after two days (TSN, pages 26-27,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie received the money, the Clerk of Court,
Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The Clerk of Court asked her if
she sent money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court said that
Josie went there and there was money in the drawer (TSN, pages 28-29,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). After that, several hearings were on-going, and
before the resolution, Joyce called up the Complainant again around February
2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce called saying that she had an
important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant. After Complainant got back to
Manila, Joyce called her again and said that she will show Complainant something.
When they were in Complainant’s car in San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two
unsigned Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions, Complainant saw
that the cases were dismissed and that it will be dismissed if she will not accede to
Joyce’s request (TSN, pages 30-33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
claimed that Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00 for each case. "Sabi niya it [was] for
Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at that time" (TSN,
page 34, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant identified the copy of the
Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for Other Deceits, dated 23 February 2001,
which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further alleged "Sabi niya, if I will
accede to that request of ₱150,000.00 for each case then they will (sic) going to
reverse the Decision" and "Si Judge daw" will reverse the Decision. Complainant
met with Joyce around February 2001 (TSN, page 39, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant further claimed that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he
is a friend of the Judge. Complainant went again to the Office of the Mayor to seek
the Mayor’s help and she met the Mayor at his Office in San Juan. The Mayor called
up the Judge but he was not around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce
went to the Office of the Mayor and when she arrived, she said that the Judge was
out of the country (TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Mayor
asked for the phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce gave. Mayor
Estrada was able to get in touch with the Judge. While the Mayor was talking in
(sic) the phone with the Judge, Complainant was in front of the Mayor (TSN,
pages 42-43, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the Mayor
"because his voice is very loud." He said, "Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya New Zealand.
When were you coming back? I do not know what is the answer and then he said,
you help my friend naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso niya para matapos na
kasi matagal na iyan" (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003). After that
they left the Office of the Mayor and Complainant was not able to approach Mayor
Estrada again. Since the Complainant was still carrying the Decision, and being
afraid that it will be promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her friends.
The Complainant showed the decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at that
time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Prosecutor told the
Complainant that she is going to meet with the Judge when he comes back from
New Zealand. Complainant testified that, sometime in April, in Sangkalan, Quezon
City, a night life restaurant, she met Respondent Judge Rosete. She was with two
(2) Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the evening,
Judge Rosete was already in the company of several men whom she got to know
as Fernan and Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After
eating and drinking, the Complainant left at around 10:30 in the evening. While
they were inside, Complainant claimed that she did not say anything at all and it
was the Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid all the bills
which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00). When Complainant left, only
they, three (3) girls, left while the Judge and his company were still there drinking.
While Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a man came over from
behind (TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant did not
know him but she asked the Prosecutor later after the man left. The Complainant
said that the man asked if he could have an advance, which she understood as a
payment, and she told the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say that
she already talked to the Judge. The man left and went back inside the
restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant said that
when she did not give the money she was still scared because there will already be
a promulgation and she did not know whether it will be in her behalf (sic) or not.
Complainant did not give anything aside from the ₱20,000.00 because her case
was very strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she promised
them that she will give them after she was (sic) able to collect all the debts.
Complainant did not know the actual date of the promulgation but somebody from
the Office of Respondent Judge called her up in her house and told her not to go to
the promulgation. When Complainant asked why, "Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw
ako kasi alam na daw nila ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang magdedeliver
ng case ng promulgation." She received the decision when she sent her driver to
pick it up. The caller said that the decision was unfavorable to her (TSN, pages
52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
RESPONDENT’S VERSION:
1. JOSEFINA RAMOS
She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the
former Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In
2000 and 2001, she was already the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7,
Hearing of September 9, 2003). She met Lucila Tan when the latter went to the
Mayor’s Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of President Estrada, but she could
no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went to the Office, together with Tita Pat,
and they were seeking the help of Mayor Jinggoy because they have a case. She
did not know the case because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She could no
longer remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada. She did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or
how close Lucila Tan was to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9,
2003). She denied that she met Lucila Tan at the Cravings Restaurant and that
she suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Judge
Rosete to speed up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only
Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what
Lucila Tan was talking about regarding the money. There was no occasion that she
suggested or even intimated to Lucila Tan the idea of giving money to Judge
Rosete. She denied that she met with Lucila Tan and Respondent Judge at Cravings
Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila. She identified her
Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit
"1" (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that
Lucila Tan gave anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9,
2003).
2. RODOLFO CEA
He testified that his acquaintances usually call him "Buboy" and for about two
years or more he had no occupation. Two years before, he was a Clerk III at
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when
he "was still working as Clerk in San Juan, she approached me and asked if I can
introduce her to Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a favorable decision
against her case." He could not remember anymore when that was because "it was
a long time ago" (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of September 22, 2003). It was
when he was still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. He met Lucila
Tan at the corridor of the Metropolitan Trial Court when she approached him and
asked if he can introduce her to Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce Lucila Tan to
Judge Rosete but he was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete
"because aside from the introduction, she wants me to ask Judge Rosete for a
favorable decision against (sic) her case and I told her that Judge Rosete don’t
(sic) like his staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction" (TSN, pages 8-9,
Hearing of September 22, 2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with
Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court in San Juan was "the first and the last time."
When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan that he approached her and demanded
from her a sum of money to represent an advance payment for a favorable
decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he answered "I don’t
know about that, sir." (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22, 2003.) He
identified the Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed
and affirmed the truthfulness of the contents of the Affidavit, which was marked as
Exhibit "2" (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He denied
that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant around 8:30 in the evening
of an unspecified date (TSN, page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA
He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court

with the position Budget Officer III since November 9, 1981. His first job was
Casual and he became Budget Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). He recalled having met Lucila Tan sometime just before
Christmas in October or November 2000. The first time he saw Lucila Tan was in a
restaurant in Quezon City where she was introduced to him by Fiscal Reyes. He
went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete because they had
not been together for a long time and they were long time friends. They ate at the
restaurant. When he arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They
stayed in the restaurant until 11:00 [eleven] o’clock in the evening (TSN, pages
47-49, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He met Lucila Tan in that restaurant
when Fiscal Reyes pointed him to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the Supreme Court.
When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the
three (3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the
Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of September 22, 2003). They ordered and ate
but they were in a separate table. He recalled that Judge Rosete paid for their bill
because he saw him get a credit card and sign something. He did not know about
Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the waiter. The incident where
he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the incident when
she went to his Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
He could not remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he
remembers that it was nearing Christmas in 2000. "Pumunta siya sa akin parang
may ipinakiusap siya sa akin, katunayan nandito po dala ko." Lucila Tan asked him
to help her in her case with Alfonso Sy. "Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan
niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) para iabot kay Judge
Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking kaibigan. Matagal na
kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa
kanya." He told Judge Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In their
second meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, which was marked as Exhibit
"3" (TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He presented the
papers actually given to him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox copy was the
exact same document given to him by Lucila Tan when she went to his Office. The
other documents that Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his Office were
marked as Exhibit "4" and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan told him the contents of the documents and
how the case against Alfonso Sy came about. When Lucila Tan asked him, he
answered her that his friend (Respondent Judge) was not like that and they had
been together for a long time and it is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete
about that, the latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she
knew the son of the Chief Justice (TSN, pages 64-66, Hearing of September
22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give Judge Rosete so that her case will
win but he answered that his friend was not like that (TSN, pages 67-68,
Hearing of September 22, 2003).
4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ
She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew
Complainant Lucila Tan because in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She
first came to know Lucila Tan when the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio,
the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 57, who introduced Lucila Tan to her. Ellen
Sorio said, "may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni Mayor kay Judge" (TSN, pages 7-
11, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She did not say anything but Lucila Tan
asked "may tumawag na ba sa Mayor’s Office?" and she said "yes, ma’am." After
that there was a hearing and the sister of former President Estrada went to their
Office looking for Judge Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a hearing
and the former told her to tell Judge Rosete about the case of Lucila "na
pinakikiusap ni Mayor" (TSN, page 12, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She
told Judge Rosete about the things that the sister of the former President told her
and that Judge Rosete said nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant on
March 3, 2003 that, sometime in November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up
Lucila Tan by telephone and said that she saw money stuffed inside the drawer of
the Respondent in his Office and that she asked the Complainant whether the
latter was the one who sent the money stuffed inside the drawer. What she
remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if Josie went to their Office and
she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also denied that she
called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan was
the one who called her up and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her
something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision and she was surprised
when the former showed her the copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the
copy, the latter did not answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to
her (TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She immediately
went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and Mayor Jinggoy talked to her.
The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she answered that he was in
New Zealand on study leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew the telephone
number of the Judge, she gave him the telephone number in New Zealand. She
was present when the Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to him (TSN,
page 17, Hearing of September 29, 2003). "He said ‘Pare ko, ano na itong
kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo?’ I don’t know what was your answer(ed) [sic] to
him, you were talking and then he said ‘ganun ba?’ then Mayor Jinggoy said ‘o
sige, okay na’ and then we left the Office." She denied that she gave two advance
copies of the Decisions in Complainant’s two cases inside the latter’s parked car in
San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant was the one who showed
her the copy in their Office. She likewise denied the testimony of the Complainant
that she allegedly demanded Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then
pending before Branch 58, which were decided by Respondent Judge, in return for
a favorable decision (TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of September 29, 2003).
She claimed that it was the Complainant who offered to her. She identified her
Sworn Statement, subscribed and sworn to on February 5, 2003, which was
marked as Exhibit "5," and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of all the
contents thereof (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of September 29, 2003).9
The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that
respondent judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount of ₱150,000.00 for
him to render judgment in her favor in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe
Sy. Respondent judge, on the other hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted
to bribe him by offering to pay for the downpayment of the car he was planning to buy,
and she even sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to
persuade him to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility
of the parties’ evidence.
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the
documentary evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainant’s version more
trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented
during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in
Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff. Said documentary
evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainant’s staff met with her,
showed her copies of respondent judge’s draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440
and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she pays ₱150,000.00 for
the reversal of the disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for complainant to
obtain a copy of a judge’s draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the
judge himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary employee in the court
cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a case’s disposition if not assured by the judge
who drafted the decision.
The respondent’s evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note
that the testimonies of two of respondent’s witnesses contradict each other. Fernando
Espuerta confirmed complainant’s claim that she met respondent judge and his two
companions, Espuerta himself and Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in
Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand, denied that he met complainant at
Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never went out with respondent judge in non-
office functions. The Investigating Judge observed:
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent

Judge’s two witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the
incident at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that
she met Respondent Judge, a certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two
Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta testified that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant
with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while the latter (Rodolfo Cea)
denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant.10 (citations
omitted)
Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainant’s version that she met with
respondent judge and his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.
We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as
regards the dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the
Philippines. Respondent asserts that he was already in New Zealand at the time when
complainant claims that he met with her. However, the evidence he presented only shows
his New Zealand visa and the dates when he entered said country.11 He did not show to
the investigating body the dates when he left and returned to the Philippines. Apparently,
he entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We may
therefore infer that complainant was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is
consistent with complainant’s testimony, as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she
met with respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like
Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without
reason. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the
people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the
judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places
his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a
judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free
from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.12
Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show
copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office
premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be
observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office
without salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez*, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144 July 22, 1998
FLORIDE DAWA, NORALIZ L. JORGENSEN, FEMENINA LAZARO-BARRETO, complainants,
vs.
Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan

City, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1148 July 22, 1998
Clerk of Court MONA LISA A. BUENCAMINO, complainant,
vs.
Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan

City, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting executive judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, was charged with "sexual harassment and/or
acts of lasciviousness" in a letter-complaint 1 dated August 15, 1997, filed by Floride
Dawa, 2 Femenina Lazaro-Barreto 3 and Noraliz L. Jorgensen. 4 In view of the allegations
in the Complaint, this Court, in a Resolution dated December 10, 1997, placed
respondent judge under preventive suspension; and referred the case to retired Justice
Romulo S. Quimbo, a consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator, for
investigation, report and recommendation. 5
Meanwhile, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, 6 who assisted the aforementioned

complainants, also filed, on September 5, 1997, an affidavit-complaint 7 against Judge
Armando C. de Asa, for "sexual harassment under Republic Act No. 7877/ acts of
lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct, and [for] violation [of] the high standard of
moral[s] demanded by judicial
ethics . . . ." In our Resolution dated March 18, 1998, 8 we resolved to consolidate her
Complaint with the earlier one and to refer it likewise to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo for
inclusion in his investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting a thorough investigation the investigating officer submitted his Report,
dated March 16, 1998, which contained the following exhaustive and detailed summary
of the testimonies of the witnesses for both the complainants and the respondent:
1. Floride Y. Dawa is a 24 year-old single girl employed as a stenographic

reporter in Branch 52 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC for brevity) of
Caloocan City. She affirmed under oath the sworn statement (Exhibit A,
Record, pp. 2-3 of the Record) she executed August 15, 1997. She related
that on August 8, 1997, while on her way to the ladies' toilet, she had seen
respondent, Judge Armando C. De Asa, talking with a man at the backdoor
of his chamber. Out of respect for respondent, being the Acting Executive
Judge of the MeTC, she had nodded to him before entering the ladies
comfort room. When she emerged from the same, she saw that respondent
was still at the backdoor of his office although this time he was alone. Upon
seeing Dawa, respondent casually asked her whether the toilet was clean.
She answered that it was dirty. Respondent called her and she approached
him. When she neared the respondent, the latter put his arm on her
shoulder and led her into his chamber. Once inside and while she was
standing near the edge of respondent's office table, he placed his arm
around her shoulder and suddenly held her jaw and kissed her on the lips.
Dawa was taken by surprise and was shocked by the act of the respondent.
Before she could recover herself, respondent once again held her shoulder
and chin and kissed her on the lips. She forcibly pushed the respondent
away. Respondent asked her where she lived and with whom but she
hurriedly left respondent's office.
Upon Dawa's return to the staff room of Branch 52, Maria Teresa Carpio,
who also works in Branch 52, asked her what the matter was because she
noticed that Dawa looked dazed ("tulala"). She first said that nothing was
the matter but upon [Carpio's] insistent questioning, she haltingly related
her harrowing experience in respondent's office.
That same day, she related the incident to Judge Delfina Hernandez-
Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch 52 who, although [she] was then on
leave, had gone to her office on the invitation of Danilo Silverio, one of her
coworkers in Branch 52, who was celebrating his birthday. Judge Santiago,
after listening to Dawa's story, advised her to go home and relate the
incident to her parents before deciding to do anything further. Dawa went
home but did not tell her parents who were sickly. Instead, she told her
sister.
The next Tuesday (she had absented herself on Monday), Dawa went to see
Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino, the Clerk of Court, and related her story. She
was told that she was not respondent's first victim but that Noraliz
Jorgensen and the Clerk of Court herself had been objects of respondent's
amorous advances.
Dawa saw Noraliz Jorgensen. The latter assured her that if Dawa would file a
complaint, she would follow suit.
Dawa and Jorgensen decided to file charges against the respondent. Upon
the advice of Atty. Buencamino, the two complainants saw Atty. Calalang, a
city councilor. The latter advised them to go to the police and have their
complaints entered in the police blotter. Calalang brought them to the office
of Councilor Manlapig, a former police colonel. The latter called for a police
investigator and SPO2 Rey Domingo came and interviewed them. That same
afternoon, the two complainants went to the police station to have their
complaints recorded in the police blotter (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record, pp.
16-17).
Dawa came to the Supreme Court with Atty. Buencamino, Noraliz Jorgensen
and Femenina Lazaro-Barreto where they filed the letter complaint (Exhibit
"X").
Respondent personally cross-examined Dawa. She insisted on her story

although she admitted that respondent had gone to Branch 52 that same
day.
2. Noraliz L. Jorgensen is 28 years old and married to a policeman. She

affirmed under oath her sworn statement (Exhibit C, pp. 6-7 of the Record).
The following is her story:
Jorgensen was and still is a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of
Caloocan City and detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court, (OCC for
short), MeTC, Caloocan City. Among her duties was the preparation and
follow up of the payrolls for RATA and gasoline allowances of the
Metropolitan Trial Judges. Upon the approval of said payrolls, it was her duty
to receive the cash from the cashier and deliver them to the individual
judges.
Sometime on January 3, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, she

had gone to the office of respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, who
presides Branch 51 of the Court, for the purpose of securing his signature on
the payroll for the judges' allowances. Upon entering the respondent's office,
the latter approached her and suddenly kissed her on the cheek. Jorgensen
immediately left respondent's office after having secured his signature on
the payroll.
Again, on March 31, 1997, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jorgensen
had returned to the respondent's office to deliver the cash representing his
allowances for the months of January, February and March. Upon entering
the respondent's office, the latter immediately stood up, held her two arms,
and suddenly kissed her and licked her left ear, saying "I love you".
Jorgensen was surprised and afraid. She asked respondent, "Judge, what is
this", at the same time endeavoring to free herself from his hold but she
could not because his grip was strong. Respondent then said, "Don't make
noise lest we be heard outside". At the same time, respondent held her jaw
and kissed her on the lips. He said, "Open your mouth" as her continued to
hug and kiss her while she tried to free herself. He did not heed her pleas
although she was then trembling with fear.
On May 26, 1997, Jorgensen again entered respondent's office to secure his
signature on the payroll for June. Again he kissed her before he signed it.
After he had signed the payroll, respondent invited Jorgensen to eat with
him at the Max Restaurant on EDSA the next Saturday. When she asked him
why he was inviting her, he answered, "You are no longer a child, you ought
to know".
Jorgensen could only cry. She asked Atty. Buencamino not to send her again
to the respondent and she told Buencamino of what had happened to her.
Atty. Buencamino told Jorgensen that if she wanted to complain,
Buencamino would support her. Jorgensen was afraid that nothing would
come out of any complaint because respondent was a Judge and powerful.
On August 4, 1997, having delivered the allowances of all judges except the
respondent, Jorgensen tried to look for someone who could deliver the
money to him but she could find no one. So she waited until she knew that
someone else was inside respondent's office. At about 3:00 o'clock, while
Roderick Corral was inside respondent's office, she entered but respondent
immediately threw to Corral the paper he had brought for his signature, in
effect dismissing him. Corral immediately stepped out leaving Jorgensen
alone in respondent's chambers. When they were alone, respondent stood
up and held Jorgensen's jaw kissing her on her lips at the same time saying
"Open your mouth". Jorgensen immediately left respondent's office in tears.
On August 8, 1997, Jorgensen learned that Floride Dawa, a stenographer in

Branch 52, was the latest victim of the respondent. Jorgensen reported her
experience to Judge Santiago, the Executive Judge, and she informed the
good judge that she was ready to file a complaint against respondent in
order to obtain justice.
Respondent personally cross examined Jorgensen who admitted that before

August, 1997, she had gone to respondent's office with Baby Mapue in
response to his call and while there they were shown an anonymous letter
(Exhibit 2) which mentioned [the] alleged misconduct on her part.
3. Femenina Lazaro-Barreto is a thirty-year-old married woman who is a

Court Stenographer II in Branch 53 of the Caloocan City MeTC. During her
direct examination by Atty. Roberto Abad, she identified her sworn
statement (Exhibit E found on pp. 4-5 of the Record).
On July 22, 1997, she was assigned to Branch 51 because Judge Romanito
Amatong of Branch 53 was on leave. While attending the session at Branch
51, respondent dictated an "Order" in open court. Her stenographic notes
are found in Exhibit "F". She transcribed these notes (Exhibit F-1) and left
them with the Branch Clerk Gina Amatong. When she returned after lunch,
Gina told her there were some corrections so she again typed and submitted
Exhibit "F-2". After typing one more draft (Exhibit F-3), she brought the final
draft (Exhibit F-4) to respondent's office for his signature. After respondent
signed the "Order", he stood up and while Barreto was looking at the
"Order", he held her chin and kissed her. Barreto asked, "What are you
doing?" Respondent kissed her again and tapped her shoulder saying, "Sigue
na, Nina. Okay na, dismissing her. Barreto went out of the office and wiped
her lips with her hand. Margo, a stenographer in Branch 51 saw her. She did
not relate the incident to her husband but he learned about it from the
newspapers.
4. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino is an unmarried forty-year-old lawyer who

is presently the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City MeTC. Her first appointment
was on June 18, 1987 as Branch Clerk of Court for Branch 51, presided by
Judge Filemon Mendoza, now retired. After she became a lawyer in 1996,
she was promoted to her present position as Clerk of Court.
Buencamino is acquainted with the three complainants. She first came to

know Jorgensen when she assumed office as Clerk of Court because
Jorgensen was detailed to her office. She had known Barreto since 1992 or
1993 and she personally came to know Dawa when the latter, accompanied
by Jorgensen, approached her on August 12, 1997 and related her
harrowing experience in the office of respondent. Jorgensen herself related
similar experiences. Buencamino advised the two ladies that she would refer
that matter to Judge Santiago, the executive judge, who was then on leave.
She reasoned that being a woman and the executive judge, Judge Santiago
would understand the complainant's situation. Dawa and Jorgensen told
Atty. Buencamino that they had already seen Judge Santiago and the latter
had advised them to consult their families before taking any step. They
further told the Clerk of Court that they had consulted their families and
were decided to file an administrative case against respondent judge. At this
juncture, sheriff Noli Calalang informed the complainants Dawa and
Jorgensen that his brother, Councilor Gil Calalang, was willing to help them.
On August 13, 1997, at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, complainants
Dawa and Jorgensen were advised that Atty. Gil Calalang was in his office.
Buencamino and the two complainants proceeded to Calalang's office who,
after hearing their stories, advised them to report the matter to the police.
Atty. Calalang was willing to handle their case provided permission was
obtained from Mayor Malonzo. Buencamino and the two complainants were
brought to the office of Councilor Manlapig, a former police colonel, and
there they were interviewed by SPO2 Santiago. The latter asked what cases
could be filed against the judge and Atty. Buencamino answered that a case
for violation of the new "Anti-Sexual Harassment Law" or for Acts of
Lasciviousness under the Penal Code could be filed against respondent. At
5:30 o'clock that same afternoon, Dawa and Jorgensen repaired to the
Caloocan Police Station to have their complaints logged (Exhibits 7 and 7-A;
Record; pp. 46-47).
On August 14, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, accompanied by her sister,

saw Atty. Buencamino and told her that she, too, was one of respondent's
victims. Ms. Barreto decided to file an administrative charge against
respondent and requested David Maniquis, the deputy clerk of court, to
accompany her to the police station to have her complaint recorded.
(Exhibits 7-B and 7-C, Record, pp. 48-49).
Buencamino admitted that she had accompanied the three complainants to

the Office of the Court Administrator to file the present case. Upon request
of Atty. Perez of the Office of the Court Administrator, she had administered
the oaths of the three complainants and had signed the original complaint.
5. Cielito M. Mapue, 33 years old, married and employed as Clerk III, OCC,
MeTC, Caloocan City, took the stand for the complainants to corroborate
their testimonies. She declared that —
She was in charge of releasing the cash bonds to the bondsmen when they
were no longer needed. In this connection, she had to prepare the vouchers
and the breakdown of checks and she had to go to the office of the
respondent in order to secure his signature. In 1997, she remembers having
been requested once by Jorgensen to bring a payroll for the signature of
respondent. After respondent signed the documents she had brought to him,
respondent stood up, went around his table and abruptly kissed her. She
immediately left with Emily Rose Clemente, staff member of Branch 51 and
never again went to see respondent alone. Mapue admitted that she and
Jorgensen had been called by respondent in relation to a complaint of Judge
Santiago. Asked by respondent where he had kissed her, she retorted in the
vernacular, "Sa bibig, hindi mo ba natatanda-an?" Made to explain why she
had not complained, she answered that she did not want anyone to know.
As a matter of fact, her husband did not know of the incident even as she
was testifying.
6. Maria Teresa G. Carpio, 37 years old, married, a casual employee of the
City Mayor's office and detailed to Branch 52 of the MeTC had the following
to say:
She had known Floride Dawa to be a happy girl. On August 8, 1997, she was
rather in good spirits because it was the birthday of one of their officemates
and there was some sort of a party. At about 10:00 o'clock that morning,
Dawa had gone to the women's comfort room. When Dawa returned a few
minutes later, Carpio noticed that she was pale and fidgety. She kept
wringing her hands and was on the verge of tears. Carpio asked her what
the matter was but Dawa answered that nothing was the matter. After some
prodding, Carpio asked Dawa to go with her to the court room and there
asked what really the matter was as she was no longer her gay self. Dawa
cried and told the story of how the respondent had twice kissed her on the
lips.
At lunch time, Judge Delfina H. Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch 52,
came to join the birthday party. She was told by Esper Cabiling, another
stenographer in Branch 52, that Floride Dawa wanted to see her in private.
Judge Santiago brought Dawa to her private chambers.
On cross examination, Carpio admitted that respondent appeared at Branch

52 and asked if everything was okay, at which juncture, Dawa, accompanied
by Rowena Martin, went to the courtroom.
7. David Maniquiz, deputy clerk of court, Caloocan City MeTC, declared that
on August 14, 1997, he had been requested by Femenina L. Barreto, to
accompany her to police headquarters to lodge a complaint against the
respondent. Noli Calalang, Joselito Bedana, Noraliz Jorgensen and Floride
Dawa were with them in the police station.
8. Ma. Victoria Soriano-Cruz, an interpreter in respondent's court, was

originally reluctant to testify. She, however, appeared in the afternoon of
February 18, 1998, to give testimony. She declared that she knew the
complaints and that she [was] directly under the respondent who preside[d]
Branch 51. On August 12, 1997, she learned from others that Floride Dawa
was kissed by the respondent. She also learned that Jorgensen had also
been kissed by respondent. She admitted that the respondent has the
inclination for imposing fines on employees who were late or made mistakes.
She identified Exhibit "G" as an order where [sic] requiring her to pay a fine.
9. Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago the presiding judge of Branch 52,

Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, was the last witness to testify for
the complainants. The following is her story:
She had been sick and had been on leave since March of last year. For this
reason, the respondent, who had been designated Vice Executive Judge, had
to act in her stead.
Judge Santiago affirmed the contents of a verified eight-page letter (Exhibit
I, I-1 to I-7; Record, pp. 17 to 24) which she had sent to the Court
Administrator. This was submitted as her direct testimony.
In her letter, Judge Santiago stated that five ladies had unburdened
themselves to her not only in her capacity as executive judge but because
she was a woman. On Friday, August 8, 1997, she had gone to her office
because she had been invited to lunch by birthday celebrants, Danilo Silverio
and Esperancilla Kabiling. Upon her arrival, Ms. Kabiling had approached her
and told her that Floride Dawa, one of her stenographers, urgently wanted
to tell her something in confidence. Dawa entered the judge's office "red[-
]eyed, red-faced and with a shiny nose". She kept clasping and unclasping
her hands and could not stand still. She spoke in an incoherent and shaking
voice which Judge Santiago could scarcely understand. She asked Dawa to
sit down and compose herself. Dawa sat down and began to cry, so that her
story could hardly be understood. Between sobs, the judge was able to piece
out the fact that Dawa had been embraced and forcibly kissed twice on her
lips by the respondent sometime that morning.
Dawa sought Judge Santiago's help to transfer to another court and she
wanted her to talk to the respondent in order that the incident would not be
repeated. Judge Santiago could not promise Dawa but she advised her to go
home as she obviously was not herself. She further advised Dawa to think
the matter over during the weekend and to talk to her parents about it.
Judge Santiago promised to talk to Dawa again the next week.
After Dawa had left, Judge Santiago learned that Noraliz Jorgensen, a casual
employee detailed to the OCC had the same experience. To verify the truth,
the judge went to the Office of the Clerk of Court and bluntly asked Noraliz
Jorgensen whether it was true that she had been kissed by the respondent.
Noraliz blushed and became red[-]eyed and told the judge of the several
instances that the respondent had forcibly embraced and kissed her on the
lips.
Judge Santiago sought out Judge Belen Ortiz who presides Branch 49. She
related the stories of Dawa and Noraliz and asked Judge Ortiz whether she
knew of anyone from her branch who may have undergone the same
experience. Judge Ortiz asked Jean Marie Lazaro and the latter told them
that there was one instance when she and Zenaida Reyes, another employee
of the court, were seated on a bench near the door of their court and
respondent sat between them and placed his arms on their shoulders and
kissed them both on the cheeks. Jorgensen informed Judge Santiago that if
Dawa would complain, she too would file a complaint. Judge Santiago
advised her to seek the counsel of her parents and her husband and to see
her again the next week.
In the afternoon of August 13, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, a court
stenographer in Branch 53, accompanied by her sister, Jean Marie, came to
see Judge Santiago. Femenina confessed to Judge Santiago that she, too,
had been kissed and embraced by the respondent twice. In between sobs
and with her handkerchief almost torn to shreds by her shaking hands, she
related how she had harbored her shame in silence and her guilt at not
being able to tell her husband.
That same week, Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino also related her own story to
Judge Santiago — how she was forcibly embraced and kissed on the lips by
the respondent.
Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz was the last one to tell judge Santiago about the
instances that the respondent had kissed her on her cheeks. Mrs. Cruz
sought the assistance of Judge Santiago to transfer to another branch to
escape the respondent. 9
The investigating justice summarized the testimonies of respondent's witnesses in this

wise:
1. Arniel Apostol, is 38 years old, married and the sheriff in respondent's

branch. He affirmed the contents of his sworn statement (Exhibits 9 and 9-
A; Record, pp. 56-57). He declared that he had been with the MeTC,
Caloocan City, since 1980. In 1995, he was detailed to Branch 51 and later
became its permanent sheriff.
In his sworn statement, Apostol declared that the respondent was an official
who was faithful to his job. He observed office hours religiously. He was
friendly and helpful to his personnel and was very approachable whenever
they needed anything. The workers in his branch were free to enter his
office, it being always open. It [was] not soundproof such that if anything
improper happened inside, it could be heard outside.
Apostol further declared that since the respondent assumed office as judge,
he had not heard of him being guilty of any improper conduct. On the other
hand, he was the object of praise in his work even as a lawyer and as a
fiscal.
Apostol continued saying he was surprised to learn that the respondent had
been charged administratively by Nina (Femenina Barreto), Nora (Noraliz
Jorgensen) and Flor (Floride Dawa) because he had not seen the respondent
do anything indelicate to the three women. Whenever Nina came to Branch
51 to see the respondent, she would greet him with a "Hello Judge, I am
sexy now". On the other hand, whenever Noraliz brought in documents for
respondent's signature, she was always smiling going in and coming out of
respondent's office. Apostol declared that he had seen Floride Dawa go to
respondents' office only once and she was in company with other employees
of Branch 52.
On cross examination, Apostol admitted that respondent's office ha[d] a
back door and the same [was] locked with a main lock and two barrel bolts.
It was his daily chore to open this back door from the inside by unlocking
the barrel bolts. After he had done this he would go down to the street to
await the arrival of the respondent.
2. Liza Moreno, 47 years old, married, was respondent's second witness.

She is a court stenographer in Branch 51 presided by respondent. She had
been with the MeTC since January 2, 1969. She affirmed the sworn
statement consisting of two pages (Exhibits 10 and 10-A) which she had
jointly executed with Lina V. Cara, a clerk in the same branch who had been
in the service for 17 years.
She said that during the almost five years that she had been under the
respondent, no one had charged him administratively. She described him as
friendly and helpful to those working under him. His office was always open
to his subordinates. The same is not sound proof such that if anything
untoward happened inside or [if there was] any loud conversation [it] would
be noticed by those in the staff room.
During these past days she was stunned to learn that Judge de Asa had
been charged [with] sexual harassment by Nina, Nora and Flor because she
had not seen the respondent do anything indecent to these three women.
Everytime Nina saw the judge, she would smilingly greet him with such
remarks as "Hi, Judge" or sometimes "Hello, I'm sexy now".
She learned about the charges on August 8, 1997 when she [went] to the
Office of the Clerk of Court to fetch Fe Apostol. She [was] told by the
employees thereat about the incident. She said that she [went] up to Branch
51 [o]n the third floor to ask her co-workers whether they had heard the
news that the respondent had kissed someone. Those who were still in
replied that they had not.
Moreno further declared that Barreto used to come to Branch 51 to have

papers signed by respondent and sometimes she came to cut the hair of
certain employees, including the respondent himself. On the other hand, she
had seen Dawa only once when she came with her co-employees at Branch
52 to have their daily time records signed.
3. Mario Muncal, respondent's third witness is 47 years old and single. He

affirmed the contents of his sworn statement (Exhibit 11; Record p. 53).
Muncal stated that on August 7, 1997, he had gone to see the respondent
about a job in the MeTC. When he entered respondent's office, Atty.
Buencamino was with him. De Asa introduced Muncal to Buencamino telling
her about his application for a job in the court. Atty. Buencamino told Muncal
to wait for her at her office. When Muncal saw Buencamino, the latter told
him that he would have to undergo an observation period of one to two
weeks. She further told him that although he had been recommended by
respondent, she would be his direct superior and he was admonished not to
relate anywhere else whatever he heard or saw in her office.
Muncal was "taken aback" by this admonition knowing that respondent, as

executive judge, was her superior and was entitled to know everything that
happened in the clerk of court's office. He left after Buencamino had told
him to return on August 11 to begin his observation period. He returned to
the respondent to thank him for his assistance.
Muncal learned that Atty. Buencamino had another candidate for the vacant
position so that he had second thoughts about returning to her. However, on
August 16,1997, after reading in the papers that respondent was being
charged with sexual harassment upon the instigation of Atty. Buencamino,
he decided to see respondent and relate to him what had happened on
August 11, 1997.
4. Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, took the stand in the afternoon of

February 24, 1998. He affirmed his nine-page answer to the present charges
(Exhibit "12"; Record, pp. 37-45).
Respondent declared that while there [was] a back door to his private office,
the same [was] locked from the inside with two barrel bolts besides a main
lock. Every day, he would use this door for entering his office as well as
going out of it in order to avoid "ambush talks" with people. It was the duty
of Arnel Apostol to draw the barrel bolts before respondent arrived at his
office so that when he came, he could open the main lock with his key and
have no difficulty in entering the said office. Whenever Apostol was absent,
it was Fernandez who did the opening for respondent.
In his written answer to the charges, respondent claimed that all these
charges "were obviously instigated and altogether orchestrated". He accused
the Clerk of Court, Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino, as the "prime mover of this
cabal" and that aside from her there were "other people behind the
conspiracy" who ha[d] yet to be uncovered.
Respondent further claimed that "the complaints were set up, hatched and
designed, to destabilize and destroy the good image of the undersigned
created in the minds of party litigants, government, local as well as private
concerns, in Caloocan City. Although, known to be strict [in] fining lawyers,
litigants, court personnel and even himself, for unsatisfactory and
unexpected justifications for violations of court rules and procedures, he had
gained respect and admiration for his reasonable, well[-]balance[d],
compassionate and well[-]meant application of the rule of law".
As a possible reason for the animosity of Atty. Buencamino toward him, the
respondent stated in his Answer, the following:
Accordingly, as acting executive judge, work concerns and
attitudes, were honed up if not altogether dramatically
changed. Misconceptions have been straightened up. It was
emphasized that the Office of the Clerk of Court [was] not an
independent body. It must be the secretariat or unit that should
serve and cater not only to its own concern, but that of all the
administrative as well as functional requirements of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, thereat. Not because, it is called the
Office of the Clerk of Court, would mean that the clerk of court
installed, is a co-equal of the judges thereat. It was made clear
that it was for this reason why an Executive Judge/Vice
Executive Judge is designated, to fill up this impasse. Further,
as clerk of court, functionally, such a position is under the direct
control and supervision of all judges thereat. Accordingly,
except those as provided for under the rules and applicable
circulars, when a clerk of court can act independently, any
action, movement, process and exercise, taken, with national,
local as well as private agencies must bear the imprimatur of
the Executive Judge. This directive apparently was not
observed. Either it was misunderstood, taken lightly, seriously
resisted or even disregarded. But its non-observance cannot be
excused or countenanced.
Monthly meeting[s] with all clerks of court were scheduled and

designed to update and enhance their working knowledge on
assigned task[s]. Important concerns and problems of their
offices [were] supposed to be taken up.
Hours of work were strictly implemented, loitering/roaming

around during office hours was prohibited, time records of the
Clerk of Court, Clerks of Court of branches including its [sic]
personnel, with presiding judges on leave or vacant, must after,
its being authenticated, must [sic] be signed by the Executive
Judge.
Reports of immoral acts and loose moral values were received,

specifically in the office of the clerk of court. Ms. Buencamino
was apprised and directed to closely monitor such problem.
Before the staging of this hatch-up, the undersigned received
reports of its unabated occurrences. However, either these were
treated with tolerance or viewed with blind eyes.
Most importantly, for purposes of effective control, an

installation of an office for the Executive Judge was conceived.
This project was apparently disliked. It was about the last week
of July or first week of August, 1997, that Judge Santiago
informed the undersigned, that we ha[d] to implement such a
scheme. The plan was to get the room of Atty. Buencamino, to
house the Executive Judge['s] office, as its perimeter, appeared
easily organizable with least renovation and expense, for a
conference room and a library, folded into one. Buencamino, in
turn, would take the room of David Maniquis, deputy clerk of
court, who should occupy the executive table used by the
former, located outside, along with OCC personnel for proper
monitoring and active control of the affairs in the office
As related to me by Judge Santiago, she told Mona Lisa about it

and insinuated to her, to follow first before talking with me,
have the room vacated, place pertinent documents/papers, to
be signed and attended to, locked [sic] it, if the Executive
Judge, [was] not around. Atty. Buencamino approached me in
disgust, proposing an alternative. She submitted a plan for
renovation, as she insisted in maintaining her present location.
She suggested to move the Executive Judge[s] office in the
middle, the end part, housing the office of Maniquis, [to] be the
one to be converted as conference room and library. For her to
occupy David Maniquis['] office was "bad punsoy" (feng shui).
However, Judge Santiago's directive was firm. Mona Lisa, must
have to comply first. The matter of renovation, to be further
studied. The suggested sketch plan with scribblings from Judge
Delfina Santiago dated August 6, 1997, is likewise hereto
attached as annex "7". Mrs. Buencamino vacated her office,
refused David Maniquis' room and stayed [at] her table outside
with the OCC's personnel.
Also during the occasion, as there was a vacancy for the

position of a sheriff in the said office, the undersigned
recommended one Mario Muncal, Jr. y de Castro, telling Ms.
Buencamino that for the more than four (4) years that he
stayed in the office, he was not given the privilege of appointing
one of his own choice. She retorted to try Muncal as an
understudy for about one (1) to two (2) weeks. The
undersigned acceded. Mr. Muncal followed Ms. Buencamino to
her office where he was interviewed, advised and instructed by
the latter. He came back before he left and informed me of the
developments but he never showed up at the designated time.
He reappeared after reading the accounts in the newspapers
about the complaints lodged against me, with revealing
statements why he gave a second thought [about] returning or
not. His affidavit is attached as Annex "8" (pp. 3-5, Exhibit 12;
pp. 39-41 of the Record). (Emphasis supplied).
Considering the above, respondent believed that "Ms. Mona Lisa
Buencamino, took all my actions, with disdain, suspicion, more so, with
resistance. On her face, she regretted the fact of my designation as Acting
Executive Judge. She is not used to being controlled. She would want to
maintain her "madrina" and "godmother" (i.e. influential, wealthy, etc.)
image not only among the employees but also among the judges as well.
Thus, these pathos, comics." (p.5, Exhibit 12, Record, p. 41).
On the witness stand respondent vehemently denied the story of Floride

Dawa. He stated that on August 8, 1997, he had come to work between
9:30 and 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Neither Apostol nor Fernandez met
him. He found that his back door was still closed and could not be opened
with his key. For this reason he had to enter through his courtroom. He said
he did not see Floride Dawa near the comfort room that morning. He saw
her at 11:45 when he made his rounds as executive judge.
The above testimony is also in respondent's Exhibit "12" where he stated

that:
The Floride Dawa story, that she was seen by the undersigned
after coming from the public toilet located along the third floor
hallway obliquely facing the backdoor exit of the undersigned's
chamber, asking her whether said comfort room was cleaned, to
which she retorted in the negative, thereafter calling her up,
placing the judge's arm around her shoulders, led her to his
room and twice kissed her, to which she reportedly resisted.
Afterwards, conversing with him, answering questions, as the
latter sat comfortably at his seat, as though nothing had
transpired. This is quite indeed a long process to lend credence
to such prevarication. Aside from the fact, that the backdoor of
the undersigned's office was not shown to have been closed on
the date the alleged sham had happened, a verification of the
site where the reported incident took place would show that the
backdoor of the undersigned's office leads to a wide public
hallway fronting directly the stairs servicing the second and
third floor[s] of said building, where people come and go. The
circumstances of persons, time and place cannot fit under such
a frame set. (pp. 6-7, Exhibit 12; pp. 42-43 of the Record).
As regards the charges of Noraliz Jorgensen, he expressed surprise that

Buencamino believed her story. The following is what he said:
["]Surprisingly, Mona Lisa coddled Noraliz L. Jorgensen, a

casual employee, . . . detailed at the office of the Clerk of
Court, and believed her story. Ms. Jorgensen is reportedly
separated from her husband. Her credibility throughout the
court's environs appears highly questionable, especially among
her staff in the Office of the Clerk of Court. In fact, an unsigned
letter was sent not only to the undersigned but also with Judge
Santiago, divulging, her unchaste relationship with a co-
employee, also assigned in the office of the Clerk of Court. . . .
Ms. Buencamino, as her immediate superior, was advised, to
closely monitor on [sic] this. Despite thereof [sic], the illicit
relationship appeared to have continued. Nonetheless, she was
convinced by Buencamino to execute and swear to a statement,
which [was] maliciously and boldly concocted. . . . . Be that as
it may, the story of "victim" Noraliz borders the realm of illusion
and fiction. In no less than three (3) occasions, the dates of
which, to lend credibility, were fixed to coincide when the
allowances were allegedly released and given to the respective
judges, she claimed to have been licked at her ear, her mouth
forced open, and kissed by the undersigned. If one was indeed
a victim of such sexual harassment or lascivious conduct, why
would she, after the first incident (January 31, 1997) return for
the second (May 26, 1997) and third time (August 4, 1997) and
allow herself to suffer the same fate[?] This indeed, is
preposterous. It does not have the rings of truth to it. Her lame
excuse, that no one could do her assigned chore, does not have
any legal as well as factual leg to lean on. As far as the
undersigned can remember, there was Roderick Corral (Odi)
who can do it. One Baby Mapue had occasion to do the same
chore. Even others in the OCC can perform such feat. Such
signing is not the exclusive affair of Noraliz L. Jorgensen. Even
the August 4, 1977 incident, would not dissuade [sic] a person
in her right mind, that she will still allow herself to be left
behind by a co-employee (Roderick Corral) whom she saw
ahead of her inside the judge's office and be subjected to the
same alleged indignant act. This is plainly ABSURD." (pp. 5-6,
Exhibit 12, pp. 41-42 of the Record).
Regarding the story of Femenina Lazaro, respondent said the following:
["]Lastly, the Femenina Lazaro Barreto account appear[s] to be

a mere patch up. Under the principle that in numbers there is
strength, they blended another scenario consistently claiming
that they were kissed, their mouths forcibly opened. In
Barreto's version, she claimed that she went to the office of the
undersigned to have an order signed as their Presiding Judge
was then, on leave. Immediately thereafter, the judge stood up,
approached her and kissed her. This was allegedly repeated[,]
she reportedly resisted. Then she left.
The size and arrangement of the undersigned's chamber, would
rule out such hallucination. The undersigned ha[s] developed
the attitude of transparency, in his dealings with the public and
his personnel. His room [is] always open. Everybody come[s]
and go[es]. His staff can go inside, any time they wish, without
even knocking at his door, [get] cold water and even [use] his
private comfort room. How then could this be possible.
In all these instances, nothing unusual was seen or heard,

much less substantiated, except the self serving narrations of
the alleged offended parties themselves. If there was really any
commotion or resistance that occurred, the same could not
escape the ears of my personnel, whose tables are constrictedly
[sic] placed and immediately outside. In fact, even the dates
alluded to, were even tailored to fit and coincide, just to give
credence, to the presence of the complainants, in the alleged
places of incident.["] (p. 7, Exhibit 12; p. 43, Record).10
After evaluating all the pieces of evidence presented by the parties, Justice Romulo S.
Quimbo arrived at a conclusion, the salient portions of which are reproduced below:
1. There is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that respondent

committed the acts he is charged with. The testimonies of the three
complainants were not in any manner emasculated by the lengthy and
thorough cross examination personally conducted by the respondent.
Incidentally, the undersigned had to recess the investigation several times to
give complainants time to compose themselves as they invariably broke
down in tears as they were required to relate the repeated violations of their
persons and their honors by respondent.
Complainants' declarations were also fully corroborated by the persuasive

testimony of Judge Santiago who had the opportunity of hearing Dawa's
story soon after it had occurred and the uninhibited retelling by the other
complainants. Judge Santiago, on her own accord, wrote a verified letter to
the Court Administrator (Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7; Record; pp. 17-24), wherein
she narrated all that she knew of the different incident. . . . . 11
xxx xxx xxx
2. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for complainants to invent
their stories. It is highly improbable that the three complainants would
perjure themselves only to accommodate Atty. Buencamino who may have
had some real or imagined resentment against respondent. Moreover, the
reason given by respondent for the ill will that Atty. Buencamino felt against
him is too superficial to genuinely cause such malevolence, specially
because it was Judge Santiago who insisted on the relocation of Atty.
Buencamino so that her office could be used by the executive judge. 12
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the employees of the court
to perform their duties and to observe office hours and his prohibition
against loitering and idleness in the premises of the court is not enough to
motivate [the] three women into exposing themselves to ridicule and
chastisement, not to mention criminal prosecution, by relating false stories
that would also be derogatory to them.
Jorgensen may have entertained some hostility at respondent's calling her

attention to an anonymous letter which mentioned her indiscretions with
another employees of the OCC who was also married. We are not convinced
that this would move her into fabricating a story as shocking as the one she
related under oath. . . . . 13
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent may have committed an error of judgment when he misjudged

the young Floride Dawa to be fair game. Feeling perhaps that the nod Dawa
gave him, when she saw him as she was about to enter the comfort room,
was an invitation, he took advantage of the young maiden and forced
himself on her. Perhaps because Dawa was naive and innocent, she panicked
and became near hysterical prompting Carpio to question her. This broke the
dam, so to speak. When it became known that Floride Dawa was going to
file a case against respondent, a slew of indignant women surfaced also
wanting to file charges against respondent for his many indiscretions. How
many more remain who prefer to suffer their humiliation in silence, we can
only speculate.14
3. Respondent's denials cannot overcome the probative value of the positive

assertions of complainants and their witnesses. This is elementary. Neither
were the negative observations of respondent's witnesses sufficient to belie
the complainants' declarations. All his witnesses could attest to was that
they had not seen respondent do anything obscene to the complainants nor
to others. The fact that they did not see such lewd acts is not proof that
they did not occur specially so because they were all done in the privacy of
respondent's chambers. 15
xxx xxx xxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED and in line with the decisions in Junio vs. Rivera,
Jr., supra and Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, supra, we regretfully recommend
that respondent be dismissed from the service for gross misconduct and
immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government, including government
owned or controlled corporations. 16
The Court reviewed the entire record of the instant administrative case and found the
findings, conclusion and recommendation of the investigating justice to be adequately
substantiated by the evidence presented by the parties and anchored on applicable law
and jurisprudence. Thus, with no need to rehash the reprehensible indiscretions of the
respondent judge, we adopt the conclusion and recommendation of the investigating
justice.
The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of
legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. 17 More than
simply projecting an image of probity, a judge must not only appear to be a "good
judge"; he must also appear to be a "good person." 18 It is towards this sacrosanct goal
of ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates the following:
CANON 1
A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE

JUDICIARY.
RULE 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,

and independence.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPRORIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.02. — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides: "A judge's official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach."
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to
observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is
perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also through his private
morals, as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge's
personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily life, be free from
the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. 19 For this reason, "[t]he Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times." 20 This mandate has special import for municipal and
metropolitan trial court judges, like herein respondent, since they are the "front-liners" of
the judiciary who serve more people at the "grass-roots" level of society. 21
In the present case, we find totally unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge in
subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances
and acts of lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the
exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the
standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts,
which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they
necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
theemployee[s]." 22 Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and
authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is an
officer.
In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and official
responsibility over the complainants, who were his subordinates in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City, the Court concludes with moral certainty that he acted beyond
the bounds of decency, morality and propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The bench is not a place for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal
from office. 23 In resolving this administrative matter, we deem it apt to iterate our
pronouncement in Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, viz.:
Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has

behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge as a model of moral
uprightness. He has betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished
the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.
xxx xxx xxx
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that the

complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and
supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position
and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of
being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the
one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position. 24
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa is hereby DISMISSED from the

service for gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 97-2-53-RTC July 6, 2001
RE: COMPLAINT OF MRS. ROTILLA A. MARCOS AND HER CHILDREN AGAINST

JUDGE FERDINAND J. MARCOS, RTC, BR. 20, CEBU CITY.
PER CURIAM:
In a hand written letter dated December 9, 19961 addressed to the Honorable Andres
Narvasa, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos, the wife of Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos, and their children Joshua A. Marcos and Hazel Faith Marcos Barliso
complained against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 at
Cebu City, alleging that ever since Ferdinand J. Marcos was appointed judge of the
Regional Trial Court at Cebu City, Branch 20, his family had never seen nor took hold of
his cheques; that they have only been receiving a minimal amount which was insufficient
for their education and for their sustenance; that they were made to believe that he was
only receiving a small remuneration as an RTC Judge; that it was only in August 1996
when they got hold of his RATA, JDF and basic salary cheques; that these were not even
enough to pay his obligations with the CFI Community Cooperative and other private
persons; that he was enjoying his extra-ordinary allowance, local and city allowances,
bonuses, amelioration pays, and 14th month pays; that he even got his second quincena
of November direct in Manila when he was enjoying his one-week leave of absence with
his mistress.
Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children Joshua and Hazel prayed that all the remuneration
due Judge Marcos from the Supreme Court be directly released to Mrs. Marcos at the
school where she has been serving for 20 years (the Abellana National School) to prevent
his mistress from getting them. They added that Judge Marcos was still receiving local
and city allowances and a salary from the Southwestern University where he teaches in
the College of Law. They likewise stated that it would be advisable for him to resign from
the bench, as reassigning him to other judicial regions would eventually deprive them of
support for he will definitely take along his ambitious mistress, or she would follow him
and might pressure him to go into graft and corruption.
In the resolution, dated March 18, 1997, the Court required Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos to
file his comment on the complaint.2
In his comment, dated May 15, 1997,3 Judge Marcos denied his failure to support
complainants and alleged that during the first few months of assuming his job on the
bench, he faithfully and regularly gave to his wife the total amount of P15,000.00; that
he alone spent for their daily transportation and for the daily miscellaneous expenses of
their son, Joshua A. Marcos, a medical student at the time, notwithstanding the fact that
his wife also earns a salary as a public school teacher; that the amount he gave to his
wife was sufficient for her and their family's needs; that the loan contracted with the CFI
Community Cooperative did not pose a serious problem to the financial standing of his
family because it was made during his first five (5) months in the judiciary when he had
not yet received his salary; that most of the proceeds of the said loan were for the tuition
fee of their son Joshua; that said loan was payable in affordable monthly installments
and that he hoped it would be fully paid before the end of the year 1997; that he was not
indebted to any private person, not even when he was still a private law practitioner;
that he had no idea why his wife thought that he would be better off resigning from the
judiciary; that even if he were transferred to another sala his regular support to his
family will continue; that the issue of his having a mistress is not true as he has never
been linked extra-maritally with another woman; that his wife and children had already
signed a letter withdrawing their letter/complaint against him; and he had signed a letter
of undertaking to give all the checks due him from the Supreme Court to his wife. He
prayed among other things, for the dismissal of the complaint against him as they were
living in one roof as a family and as this administrative case is becoming a wedge of
hostility between them.
On July 29, 1997, this Court issued a resolution referring the matter to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.4
In his report dated October 17, 1997,5 Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis
recommended that the complaint be considered closed and terminated, it appearing that
the complaint against Judge Ferdinand Marcos was already threshed out and there being
no more compelling reason to proceed against him. He based his report on the letter-
withdrawal dated January 10, 1997 submitted by the complainants and the letter of
undertaking signed by Judge Marcos.
In their letter/withdrawal dated January 10, 1997,6 the complainants stated that they
wanted to withdraw their letter/complaint against Judge Marcos as he had made an
undertaking that Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos shall receive all the checks due him from the
Supreme Court; and that the issue of the alleged mistress grew out of unconfirmed
reports and had already been thoroughly discussed by the family council. They requested
that the matter contained in their letter/complaint be treated as a closed matter.
On the other hand, Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, in his letter of undertaking, offered no
objection to his wife getting all the checks due him from the Supreme Court and gave her
the authority to get them directly from the Supreme Court or from the Clerk of Court of
RTC, Cebu City. He strongly denied having any relationship with any woman when he
talked with his wife and children. His alleged relationship sprung from unconfirmed
reports from the media.7
As the report of DCA Abesamis was not approved by the Court Administrator and the
latter did not report the matter to the Court En Banc, the case remained suspended until
the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. reported to the Court En Banc on August
14, 2000, the scandalous incident he witnessed at the Fun Run sponsored by the
Philippine Judges Association held on August 11, 2000. Among the RTC judges who
attended and joined the Fun Run was Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos. A woman who was
reported to be his querida accompanied him. Judge Marcos and the querida joined the
Judges at the temporary place reserved for the Judges and during the latter's breakfast
thereat were seated near each other.
Chief Justice Davide pulled Judge Marcos aside to validate the facts about the latter's
illicit relationship with the woman. Judge Marcos admitted, among other things, that he
had been living with the woman, Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already, and that he
was separated from his wife. Judge Marcos was the one who supplied the name of the
woman.
In view of this admission, the Chief Justice recommended the referral of the case for
investigation to OCA Consultant, Justice Pedro Ramirez, and the suspension from office of
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos.
Adopting the recommendation of the Chief Justice, the Court issued a resolution on
August 15, 2000 ordering the suspension of Judge Marcos from office until further orders
from this Court, in view of the confirmed continuing illicit and scandalous relations
between him and a certain Mae Tacaldo and the referral of the case to Justice Pedro
Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation, report and
recommendation. But because Justice Ramirez had to leave for the United States of
America, the matter was referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator.
Justice Quimbo issued notices to the parties that the case will be heard at the Office of
the Executive Judge in Cebu City from November 13 to 15, 2000.8
On November 13, 2000, the case was called in the private chambers of the Executive
Judge of Cebu City. Only the respondent and his counsel appeared because the notices
did not arrive soon enough in Cebu City. For that reason, the Process Server of RTC,
Cebu City, Branch 18, was requested to serve the notices on the complainants.
The next day, November 14, 2000, both parties appeared at the office of the Executive
Judge. Complainant Rotilla Marcos came alone while respondent appeared with his
counsel. Complainant manifested that her counsel was unavailable due to previous
commitments. Counsel for the respondent begged to be excused as he also had personal
commitments. Thus the case was reset for the next day.
On November 15, 2000, complainants presented Judge Meinrado Paredes of Branch 13,
RTC, Cebu City. After he was discharged, complainant Rotilla Marcos took the stand
herself. Since her testimony (direct examination) was not completed the hearing was
continued the next day. Her direct testimony was completed on November 16, 2000 but
her cross-examination was deferred to December 5, 6, and 7, 2000.
On December 5, 2000, respondent appeared without his counsel and personally cross-
examined the complainant. After her testimony, complainants introduced four other
witnesses, namely: Maximo Abing, Orencio Tarongoy, Leoncio M. Balangkig, and Lerma
Eguia, all of whom appeared in obedience to subpoenas issued by the hearing officer-
designate. These witnesses were presented principally to identify certain documents that
were marked and later formally offered in writing.
Complainants' documentary evidence consisted of Exhibits "A" - picture of Maydelane

Tacaldo, the alleged mistress of the respondent; "B" - the letter/complaint received by
the Court on December 12, 1996;9 "C" - RCPI telegram directing respondent to attend a
PJA stay-in seminar on June 20-22, 1996 in Mandaluyong; "D" - Islacom Statement of
Account dated June 3, 1996; "D-1" - address of respondent at 615 ZA P. del Rosario
Extension, Cebu City; "E" - handwritten letter of one Mrs. E. Dandan, dated October 3,
1995 addressed to respondent demanding payment of the account of May in the sum of
P11 ,400; "E-1" - a portion thereof; "F" - RCPI social telegram addressed to respondent
purportedly from Mae Tacaldo; "F-1" - a portion thereof; "G" - Bankard Statement of
Account dated September 10, 1997 addressed to respondent; "G-1 " - page 2 thereof;
"H" - unsigned Certification of Tenant; "I" - Invoice issued by Paramount General
Insurance Corporation (Paramount, for brevity) for a "Toyota Revo" Model 1999 allegedly
owned in common by respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo; "I-1" - portion showing the
names and addresses of the insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J. and Tacaldo, Maydelene B.
of Rodriguez St., Zosa Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City"; "I-2" - particulars of the
vehicle insured; "J" - Order issued by respondent on January 24, 2000, in Civil Case No.
CEB-19070; "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", and "J-4" - portions thereof; "K" - October 28, 2000 issue
of "THE FREEMAN"; "K-1" and "K-2" - portions thereof; "L" - October 20, 2000 issue of
the "SUN STAR CEBU"; "L-1", "L-2", and "L-3" - portions bracketed; "M" - SUN STAR
SUPER BALITA issue of October 20, 1996; "M-1" and "M-2" - portions thereof; "N" -
October 28, 1996 issue of SUN STAR SUPER BALITA; "N-1" and "N-2" - portions thereof;
"O" - SUN STAR issue of December 18, 1996; "O-1" and "O-2" - portions thereof; "P" –
Affidavit of Bienvenido O. Marcos; "P-1" - paragraph 7 thereof; "Q" - Affidavit of Anacleta
Marcos; "Q-1 ", "Q-2", and "Q-3" - portions thereof; "R" - Resolution of the Supreme
Court En Banc dated August 15, 2000 in the present administrative matter10; "R-1" -
portion thereof; "S" - Petition filed by respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-25511 for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to complainant Rotilla C. Ares; "T" - Marriage
Contract of complainant and respondent dated December 31, 1971; "U" - Subpoena
Duces Tecum issued to PCI Leasing and Finance Inc.; "V" - Certificate of Registration No.
15676143 issued on August 4, 2000 in the name of respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo
with address at Capitol Site, Cebu City; "V-1" - portion thereof; "W" - copy of Certificate
of Registration of a "Toyota Revo" in the name of respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo with
address at B. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; "W-1 " - portion showing owners'
names; "X" - Motor Vehicle Inspection Report re: "Toyota Revo"; "X-1" - portion
regarding ownership; "Y" - Deed of Sale of one "Toyota Revo" executed by one Leticia
Cabanes; "Y-1 " - portion showing vendees being respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo;
"Y-2" - date of execution; "Z" - PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate; "Z-1 " - portion
showing purpose of certificate; "AA" - Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to Paramount; "BB"
- Invoice No. 135580 covering a "Toyota Revo"; "BB-1" - name and address of
respondent as insured; "CC"-policy schedule; "CC-1" - name and address of respondent;
"CC-2" - Private Car Policy No. CEB-PC-25687; "CC-3" - signature of Paramount's Cebu
Service Office Manager; "DD" - Paramount's Memorandum showing change of
mortgagee; "DD-1 ", "DD-2", and "DD-3" - portions of the same; "EE" - fax message
received by Paramount re: inclusion of Maydelane Tacaldo as one of the insured; "FF" -
Chattel Mortgage executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "FF-1" - page 2
thereof; "FF-2", "FF-3", "FF-4", "FF-1-A", and "FF-1-B" - portions thereof; "GG" - Motion
for inhibition of respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-19070; "GG-1", "GG-1-A", and "GG-2",
- portions bracketed; "HH" - Comment of Atty. Francis Zosa on the motion for inhibition;
"HH-1" and "HH-2" - portions of the same; "II" - Deed of Sale jointly executed by
respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a "Toyota Revo"; "II-1" and "II-2" -
portions thereof; "JJ" - correction made by Paramount as to who are the assured in CEB-
PC-25687; "JJ-1" - the assured were the respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "KK" -
Counter-Affidavit of complainant on the charge of adultery filed against her by the
respondent; "KK-1" to "KK-10" - pages 2 to 11 thereof; "KK-11 " to "KK- 23" - annexes
to Exhibit "KK"; "LL" - opposition to motion to disqualify Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-
Dalawampu as counsel for Mrs. Marcos in Civil Case No. CEB-25511; "LL-1 " -page 2
thereof; "LL-1-A" and "LL-2" - portions of the same.
From the evidence presented it appears that complainant Rotilla A. Marcos is married to
the respondent. Their marriage was celebrated on December 31, 1971 at the First Baptist
Church, Cebu City and was officiated by Asclepiades Curro, a Minister of the
Gospel.11 When they got married, Judge Marcos was waiting for the results of the Bar
exams and did not have a job. Since she was already working as a teacher in Catmon she
supported Judge Marcos. They stayed in the house of her grandparents. They have two
children: Joshua who is now 28 years old and Hazel Faith who is 26 years old.
When he became a lawyer he did not go into private practice right away so she supported
him and the children. In fact, he stayed home and looked after the children.
Judge Marcos became a member of the Judiciary in June 1993. He was appointed
presiding judge of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City. After his
appointment, she noticed a change in his conduct towards her. He became cold and no
longer performed the usual acts of a husband, referring to sexual relations, because he
was very busy. What's more they no longer slept in one room. In March 1996, they were
living in San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.
In June 1996 she was informed through an anonymous letter written in the Cebuano
dialect, about her husband's infidelity. While she could no longer produce the letter at the
time of the trial, she could still remember its contents. In English it read: "You are a
stupid wife. Until now, you have not learned that your husband has a mistress. If you
don't believe me, go to the office of the RTC, Branch 20, right now. You go there-to
Branch 20. Ask the people there if there is a convention in Manila to be participated in by
RTC judges. He already bought two plane tickets."
Immediately she went to Branch 20 to inquire about the judges' convention in Manila.
She found a telegram in Judge Marcos' attaché case from a Mario Umali designating
respondent as a participant in a "stay-in" seminar sponsored by PJA to be held at the
Mandaluyong Justice Building on June 20 - 27, 1996.12
She inquired from Atty. Monalila Tecson, the Clerk of Court of Branch 20, about the
convention (seminar). Atty. Tecson asked her if she was not informed of the convention
to which she replied in the negative. Atty. Tecson told her to ask her husband if he was
going. She asked Judge Marcos that night. He told her that he was going and that it was
exclusively for the judges. She told him not to go, as she was afraid he was going to take
along another woman. He replied that he would not go. But, at dawn, he told her that he
must leave as he had to get the supplies and equipment that would be distributed in the
Supreme Court.
She never dared to find out if her husband was indeed with a woman when he went to
attend the convention but she was sure there was a woman.
Complainant found other incriminating documents in the office of respondent. Somebody
in Branch 20 gave her a Statement of Account from Islacom.13
The Islacom Statement of Account was dated June 3, 1996. It was addressed to
Ferdinand J. Marcos at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City, and not to San Jose
Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu, where he and his family lived. They have never resided
at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City, nor had they any telecommunication
facility with Islacom. Judge Marcos neither has a cell phone nor a telephone line with
Islacom.
Complainant searched for the address given in the Statement of Account. It took her two
months to find it. She discovered that Maydelane (Mae) Tacaldo and er parents were
living in that house. A Mrs. Jennylind Enriquez gave her the information. Mrs. Enriquez,
one of her co-teachers, lives next door to the Tacaldos.
She confronted her husband in his office over the Islacom bill. He told her to stay for a
while in the office, as he will go out for 20 minutes. She wanted to go with him but he
refused to take her as the place was only near the office. He would consult somebody.
When he came back, he told her that they would go to Islacom and declare that the cell
phone was lost.
She insisted on a confrontation between her, Maydelane Tacaldo and her parents. The
confrontation took place in the Social Hall of the Capitol. Maydelane, her parents, her
brother and his wife, Rotilla Marcos, her mother, her brother Jerry and his wife, and her
sister were all present then. Rotilla Marcos asked Maydelane why the cell phone was in
the name of Ferdinand J. Marcos but the billing address was that of the Tacaldos, and
why she was using the cell phone of Judge Marcos. The latter said that they were friends.
The latter did not reply when asked why Judge Marcos paid P9,000.00 for the cell
phone's bill when they were only friends.
Complainant found inside respondent's attaché case that was in his office a yellow sheet
of paper, dated October 3, 1995, addressed to respondent. It was a bill for the payment
of P11,400.00 for "May's Acct."
As she and Judge Marcos were still living together at the time, she kept her discovery a
secret because she already had an inkling that he had a relationship with another
woman.
She found a birthday card/social telegram14 addressed to Judge Marcos inserted

between the pages of a law book on a table in the latter's office. It read, among other
things, "MT cares a lot, you know," and "It's wonderful to share my life with you." She
discovered it two weeks after his birthday, which was July 7, 1996. She kept it with the
other evidences. She did not show him the card, as it would precipitate another quarrel.
Further proof of her husband's infidelity was the Statement of Account issued by Bankard
dated September 10, 1997.15 One of the credit purchases was made at the Agencia Nina
and Jewelry. She never saw the item purchased in the said shop. Neither was it given to
her daughter. One of the "purchases" reflected in the Statement of Account was made at
Cafe Laguna. There was no occasion when she dined at Cafe Laguna with her husband.
Another item in the Statement of Account was groceries bought at Gaisano Metro. The
groceries purchased at Gaisano Metro were not for their house, as respondent was no
longer going home in 1997. Respondent judge left the conjugal home in 1997 and has
not returned since then.
Rotilla Marcos found out where Judge Marcos was staying: at the Zosa compound located
at Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. She went to the apartment he was
renting. She saw Maydelane Tacaldo there but not Judge Marcos because she did not go
inside. Maydelane Tacaldo left the apartment, in a car. She drove their (the Marcos)
family car and the station wagon, at times.
She suspected that he lives there because she saw outside one of the rooms
respondent's slippers, and empty water dispenser of a brand similar to what they have at
their own place, and the laundered clothes (pants and polo shirts) of Judge Marcos
hanging.
She asked the building administrator if her husband was living in the apartment she went
to, and the latter replied in the affirmative. Judge Marcos and Maydelane were using
aliases as the room was registered in the name of a Victorino Timol. She obtained a
Certification of Tenant from the Zomer Development Company.16 It was dated May 18,
1998, and showed that a Mr. Victorino Timol was an occupant and tenant of Amville-1
Bldg. located at Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City from
May 8, 1996 to October 14, 1997. Ma. Theresa Zosa, the General Manager of the said
company, refused to sign it as she wanted to avoid trouble.
The matter of the illicit relationship between Judge Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo was
even published in the newspapers.
Complainant offered as exhibits certain clippings from local newspapers (Exhibits "K",
"L", "M", "N", and "O") where the affair of respondent with Maydelane Tacaldo was
mentioned. In Exhibit "K" (October 28, 2000 issue of The Freeman) former Executive
Judge Priscila Agana was quoted as saying that respondent was not even discreet about
his alleged illicit relationship and that other Judges were complaining of his behavior. In
Exhibit "L" (October 28, 2000 issue of the Sun Star Cebu) Judge Agana was once more
quoted as having said that she had warned respondent that his affair was going to
destroy him and that the latter never kept his relations with the law student a secret.
After the complainants wrote a letter to the Supreme Court about Judge Marcos failure to
give them support, the latter executed an authority for them to collect his salary from
January 1997 up to January 1998. But he revoked the authority in February 1998. Since
then they no longer received any support from him.
Complainant did not know that the reason why Judge Marcos stopped her authority from
getting the checks was because he allegedly discovered that she had a paramour. She
verbally complained to Judge Priscila Agana (former Regional Trial Court Executive Judge)
about the stoppage of the checks. She did not complain to the Supreme Court because
he told her that she was just an ordinary classroom teacher with a small salary and that
he would use his power as a judge against her.
Mrs. Rotilla Marcos no longer lives in their conjugal home. The reason why she left was
because respondent judge threatened to kill her.
Judge Meinrado Paredes, when called to testify, admitted knowing Maydelane Tacaldo,
upon seeing her picture. He had seen her twice: the first time during the wake of the late
Sandiganbayan Justice German Lee, and the second time at the convention of the
Philippine Judges Association held in a hotel in Manila (Hyatt Regency) sometime in June,
1999. Both times he did not see her with a companion.
At the hotel lobby of the Hyatt Regency he saw her approaching a gathering of wives of
some RTC judges. He knew her to be a law student. He did not think that she was a
member of the Judiciary, the wife of a judge, or an employee of the court.
Complainants presented other witnesses who appeared and identified copies of

documents, the originals of which were in their possession.
Maximo Abing, an account officer of the PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI, for short),
brought a photocopy of the certificate of registration (Exhibit "V") of a Toyota Revo with
Motor No. 7K-0279834 issued by the Land Transportation Office in favor of Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo, with residence at Capitol Site, Cebu City as
joint owners.
Orencio Goles Tarongoy, an employee of the Land Transportation Office (LTO, for brevity),
Cebu City, brought to the hearing and identified the following documents: (1) the office
copy of Certificate of Registration No.59442704 (Exhibit "W") issued by the LTO in the
names of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at P. Rodriguez
St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (2) a Motor Vehicle Inspection Report (Exhibit "X") regarding
a Toyota Revo owned by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo of P.
Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (3) a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "Y") executed by one
Leticia R. Cabanes on July 27, 2000 in favor of Judge Ferdinand Javier Marcos and
Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a Model 1999 Toyota Revo; (4) a PNP Motor Vehicle
Clearance Certificate (Exhibit "Z") covering a 1999 Toyota Revo owned by Leticia
Cabanes, for the purpose of transferring the ownership thereof to Judge Ferdinand Javier
Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo.
Leoncio M. Balangkig, an employee of Paramount General Insurance Corporation brought

to the investigation copies of certain documents which he identified, to wit: Exhibit "BB"
as the invoice for the insurance coverage of a Toyota Revo issued in favor of Ferdinand
Marcos with residence at P. Rodriguez St., Zosa Comp., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit
"C" as the Policy Schedule forming part of the policy which was also issued in favor of the
insured Marcos, Ferdinand of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "DD" as an
endorsement (No. 2603748 dated October 4, 2000) of the aforementioned policy No.
CEB-PC-25687 that included the name of Maydelane B. Tacaldo as an insured party. An
earlier endorsement (Exhibit "JJ," No. 2603400 dated July 25, 2000), gave the insured as
"Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo, Maydelane B." According to the witness, this change
was made upon the advice of PCI Brokers. On cross-examination the witness reiterated
that the change was occasioned by a verbal order they received from the PCI Brokers. He
further admitted that he had no knowledge as to whether respondent was notified of the
change.
The Chattel Mortgage of the same Toyota Revo (Exhibit "FF") executed and signed by
respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo, both residing at Zosa Cmpd., P. Rodriguez St.,
Capitol Site, Cebu City, in favor of PCI Leasing was likewise presented as evidence.
Lerma Eguia of PCI Equitable Insurance Broker, formerly PCI Broker, identified the Deed
of Sale (Exhibit II) of the same Toyota Revo in favor of Amina G. Advincula. The same
document appeared to have been signed by the respondent and Miss Tacaldo, and
acknowledged by them before Notary Public Rolando C. Grapa, who entered it in his
Notarial Register as Document No.385, Page No.78, Book No.220, Series of 2000.
Another document this witness identified was Exhibit " JJ" which was an endorsement
issued by Paramount indicating therein the assured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and
Tacaldo, Maydelene B".
Upon the other hand, respondent offered his oral testimony and identified and marked
Exhibits "1" (affidavit of desistance executed by the complainants); "2" (letter of
respondent directing the Clerk of Court to deliver all his checks to complainant); "3" to
"3-Y" (savings account remittance slips to respondent's son Joshua); "4" (electric bill);
"5" (PLDT bill); "6" (credit application submitted to PCI Leasing); "6-A" (address
indicated therein); "6-B" (stamp of "closed account"); "7" to "7-TT" (postdated checks
issued by Maydelane Tacaldo ); "8" [representative (sic) complaint for adultery together
with affidavits]; "9" (reply-affidavit filed with Provincial Prosecutor); "10" (amended
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage); "11" (Order dated February 22, 2000);
"11-A" and "11-B" (portions thereof); "12" (promissory note dated August 22, 2000);
"12-A" and "12-B" (portions thereof); "13" (original complaint for declaration of nullity in
Civil Case No CE8-25511 ); "13-A" (portion thereof); "14" (letter/complaint to Provincial
Prosecutor); "14-A", "14-B", and "14-C" (affidavits supporting his complaint) and "15"
(certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla). These documents, however, were not formally
offered nor transmitted to Justice Quimbo.
Respondent declared that, contrary to complainant's testimony, he was never remiss in

the support of his family. He alleged that he had supported her and their children, except
at the time that she abandoned the conjugal home in March 1998; that he was giving her
P22,000.00, more or less, monthly; that the reason why Mrs. Marcos filed the
letter/complaint against him was because she suspected that he was not giving her the
correct amount since he did not show her the checks from the Supreme Court; that he
revoked his undertaking to give to his wife all the checks due him from the Supreme
Court because he discovered that she had a paramour, his cousin Mariano Marcos; that
he alone supported their children and her daughter's family from 1998 until the time he
was suspended; that he spent for the maintenance of their home by paying their electric
and phone bills.
He presented evidence regarding the transmittal of funds to his son Joshua who was a
medical student (Exhibits "3" to "3- Y"). While assigned in Toledo City, he stated that he
was remitting to Joshua, a medical student, the sum of P12,000.00 monthly. When his
son found a job in the year 2000, he reduced his monthly support to P4,000.00. To his
daughter Hazel Faith, he gave P1,500.00 weekly while he was in Toledo City; but when
he was transferred to Cebu City, he increased her weekly support to P2,000.00.
He averred that the jewelry he purchased at Agencia Nina in the amount of

P5,000.00 was given to his daughter Hazel Faith Marcos as a birthday gift. The groceries
bought at Gaisano Metro were bought and brought to their house in Talisay, Cebu,
especially for his granddaughter. It was his practice, even when he was still a private
practitioner, to purchase all the groceries for the needs of his family.
He never received any birthday card/social telegram because his Clerk of Court screened
all his communications. As to the birthday card found tucked between the pages of a law
book in his chambers, he denied that it came from Maydelane Tacaldo as her name did
not appear in the card - only the initials M.T. His Clerk of Court, Monalila Tecson also has
the initials M.T. but as his Clerk of Court, he didn't expect Monalila Tecson to send him a
card with the dedication "M.T. cares a lot, you know", and "It's wonderful to share my life
with you."
He disclaimed any knowledge of the note found in his office requesting payment of May's
account by a Mrs. Dandan. He replied that he did not know any Mrs. E. Dandan, nor the
Bebot to whom the payment should be given. He had never incurred any unsettled
account with anybody when he was still with Branch 20. He believed the note to be
spurious and manufactured by his complainant-wife, it being undated and because he
didn't recognize the penmanship. However, he admitted that the note was not in his
wife's handwriting but surmised that it could have been the penmanship of the person
who was asked by complainant-wife to write it.
He denied living in Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, as
he has always lived in Talisay, Cebu where his conjugal home was situated. As to the
claim that his slippers and empty plastic water container were found outside one of the
rooms in the Zosa Compound, he contended that he usually didn't wear slippers and, if
he did, his slippers were always left at home and in his chambers. There were many
consumers of mineral water in the province of Cebu: not only in Talisay but also in Cebu
City. He denied having any dealings with Techie (Ma. Teresa) Zosa of the Zosa Compound
and using the alias Victorino Timol.
With regards to the news item17 wherein Judge Agana was quoted to have said that he
was not even discreet about his alleged illicit relationship, he believed this to be not true
because Judge Agana had never investigated him for any wrongdoing.
He denied that he was the one referred to in the news item that came out in the Sun Star
Super Balita.18 He likewise denied that he and Maydelane Tacaldo lived together in
Toledo City where he was transferred from July 1997 to September 1999. When he had
to stay overnight in Toledo City he usually stayed in the house of his Process Server, an
Arthur Camonggan.
The Tacaldo family purchased the motor vehicle, Toyota Revo, as they wanted to have a
"for-hire" motor vehicle plying Cebu City and Toledo City. The Tacaldos requested him,
being a close friend, to have his name included in the registration of the motor vehicle.
Since he was a judge in Toledo City, he could help the Tacaldos get a slot in the Coop
Multi-Purpose, a cooperative that accepts motor vehicle units for plying the Toledo,
Balamban, and Cebu City routes.
As the registered owner of a motor vehicle, he was aware that if the vehicle figured in an
accident or there was a damage caused to a third party, he as the owner would be held
responsible. He averred that he felt safe because the vehicle was insured. Though the car
was insured it did not cover damages to third parties. He was likewise aware that if there
would be a foreclosure of the chattel because the chattel mortgage was not sufficient, or
if the promissory note was not paid, he would be held liable. He put himself at risk
because he wanted to accommodate the Tacaldos because they are very close family
friends.
The down payments for the purchase of the motor vehicle came from the Tacaldos. The
address at P. Rodriguez, Zosa Compound, Cebu City was the address of Miss Tacaldo. In
some of the documents, like the credit application submitted before PCI Leasing and the
promissory note he executed with the same company, he gave his address as San Jose
Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.
The address in the Deed of Sale over the Toyota Revo, Model 1999, was that of Miss
Tacaldo, not his. He and Maydelane Tacaldo did not jointly own the motor vehicle,
although it appears on paper that it was registered in both their names but he had no
hand in the preparation of the insurance policy nor of the policy schedule. Thus, he was
not aware that his address was shown to be at Zosa Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City.
He did not have it changed as it was only during the hearing that he first saw the
insurance policy.
The name of Miss Tacaldo appeared in the documents as a guarantee that the Tacaldos
have invested in said motor vehicle. In fact, Miss Tacaldo issued several checks to
guarantee payment of the balance of P300,000.00.
The plan to have the motor vehicle unit ply Toledo, Balamban to Cebu City was aborted
because after his suspension, the vehicle was shown on television. The Tacaldo family
was afraid that the motor vehicle might be involved in a case between him and the
complainants.
He denied having an illicit relationship with Miss Tacaldo. He stressed that his wife had a
paramour as early as March 1998 and he had told her that he would file the
corresponding adultery cases once he had sufficient evidence against her and her
paramour. And this he did. He filed 13 counts of adultery cases against his wife with the
Municipal Trial Court of Balamban, Cebu and 21 counts of adultery before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor. All these cases, including the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
were filed only after the Court suspended him on August 15, 2000.
He denied maltreating his wife. If he had beaten her, she would have been hospitalized,
as he has a bigger build than her.
He was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus, Type II, and he was already insulin-dependent.
He was diagnosed with diabetes in 1992. As a diabetic, most of his vital organs were
affected, especially his sexual capacity. He was already sexually impotent as early as
1993, when he was first appointed to the Judiciary. His sexual impotency was complete
and he could not have sex anymore. He was being treated for diabetes and sexual
impotency. A medical certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla, dated December 6, 2000,
stated, among others, that Judge Marcos had been under his (Dr. Tornilla) medical
professional care since September 15, 1995 up to that time, and he has been diabetic
since 1992, and was on maintenance medication.
His wife was upset with his physical condition but he could not do anything about it
because his diabetes caused his sexual impotency.
In Civil Case No. CEB-19725, a motion for inhibition was filed which was denied. In his
order dated February 22, 2000, he denied the motion for reconsideration because it was
not true that he was living in the property of Atty. Zosa.
While Maydelane Tacaldo was present during the Fun Run in Cebu City, she was not with
him. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. confronted him and asked him whether
Maydelane Tacaldo had a job and whether he had a child with her. He replied that he
didn't know if she had a job and that he didn't have a child with her. The Chief Justice
told him, "That is bad for the judiciary." Before he was able to explain the Chief Justice
had already left. The Chief Justice did not ask him whether that woman who went there
was with him.
He did not see Maydelane Tacaldo at the convention in June 1996. He first met her at a
seminar of Judges at the penthouse of the San Miguel Corporation in Mandaue City. She
was then the secretary of Judge Vestil.
He was a friend of Maydelane Tacaldo's father. The Tacaldos lived somewhere near Aznar
Coliseum but he had never visited their house.
The Islacom Statement of Account was mistakenly sent to him, as it should have been
sent to a certain Urgello. He didn't have an account with Islacom. Neither did he have a
cell phone although he had, at one point, entertained the idea of buying one. When he
went to the Islacom office regarding the allegedly erroneous billing, he did not ask as to
who the real account holder was. All he did was to execute an Affidavit of Loss, per
advice of Islacom.
Respondent admitted that a confrontation occurred between him. Maydelane Tacaldo, the
parents of Maydelane, his wife, and the brothers and sisters of his wife because of the
Islacom Statement of Account. He didn't know if Maydelane Tacaldo used the cell phone
because during the confrontation, Miss Tacaldo denied she had a cell phone. The father of
Maydelane also said he did not see his daughter with a cell phone. Miss Tacaldo expressly
denied having any relationship with him. He also told the group during the confrontation
that he was not related to her, in any way. Complainant-wife instigated the confrontation.
He never received the amount of more than P500,000.00 from the sale of the Toyota
Revo. The buyer paid P300,000.00 loan to PCI and P250,000.00 to the Tacaldos.
We agree with and therefore uphold the findings and conclusions of Justice Romulo
Quimbo, as contained in his Report. We find the details of his findings amply supported
by the evidence on record leaving us no doubt in our minds that a very special
relationship existed between Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo (a.k.a.
Mae Tacaldo) -that their illicit relationship started even before he separated from his wife
Rotilla Marcos in 1997.
Consider the following evidence:
The Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996 was addressed to Judge Marcos
not in his conjugal dwelling at San Jose village, Lawaan 3, Talisay Cebu, but at 615 ZA P.
del Rosario Ext., Cebu City that Mrs. Marcos later discovered to be the residence of
Maydelane Tacaldo. While Judge Marcos denied owning a cell phone there is an
improbability that Islacom would send a phone bill to him if he were not the real owner
thereof.
Service providers like phone companies rely on the information given by the applicant
desirous of its services. Islacom would not have sent Judge Marcos a Statement of
Account if he did not apply for a phone line nor sent it to an address he did not furnish
them.
If he did not really own the cell phone was it not expected of him, being a judge and all,
to have stood his ground and insisted that as he did not own nor lose a cell phone, it is
preposterous of him to execute an Affidavit of Loss.
Moreover, we find it hard to believe that he would have been satisfied with an
explanation that the bill was erroneously sent to him without raising hell, so to speak, in
finding out the identity of the Islacom employee who was at fault, especially so when this
Statement of Account was the catalyst in the confrontation between him, his wife Rotilla
and Ms. Tacaldo.
Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for his birthday on July 7, 1996, the
social telegram/birthday card, but was delivered on July 5, 1996. This person could be
Maydelane Tacaldo or Monalila Tecson. Although Judge Marcos' Branch Clerk of Court has
these initials we, as well as Judge Marcos, do not believe that she would send Judge
Marcos a card with the greeting -"It is wonderful to share my life with you." -and ending
it with -"MT cares a lot, you know." Only a person who is truly intimate with Judge
Marcos would send such a card.
We do not put any trust in Judge Marcos's denials that he had never seen said card. The
book was found tucked between the pages of a law book lying on top of his office table.
He is the most logical person to have inserted said card in the law book.
The Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 reflected that Judge
Marcos bought, presumably, jewelry/ies at the Agencia Nina & Jewelry, and groceries at
the Gaisano Metro, and dined at Cafe Laguna.
Mrs. Marcos denied receiving jewelry/ies and dining out with Judge Marcos at the said
restaurant. She testified that her daughter also did not receive jewelry/ies from her
father. They also did not receive any groceries from Judge Marcos, as he was no longer
going home then.
Complainant Mrs. Rotilla Marcos declared that she searched for the apartment where her
husband was staying. When she found it she saw her husband's slippers and laundered
clothes outside the place. Having been married to him for about 26 years she would have
known her husband's preferences as to wearing apparel and personal items, and would
have been able to recognize them upon seeing them.
In Civil Case No. 19070, a motion for respondent to inhibit himself was filed based on the
fact that he was residing in one of the units in the Zosa Compound that belonged to Atty.
Zosa, counsel for one of the parties. Atty. Zosa, in his comment, did not categorically
deny the allegation. Neither did respondent, in his Order denying the motion,
categorically deny the allegation.
Although the Certification of Tenant was unsigned and did not cite Judge Marcos and Ms.
Tacaldo as one of the tenants at Zosa Compound, the fact that they lived together was
apparent in the different documents they executed pertaining to the Toyota Revo, for the
address they both gave for these documents was Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City.
Zosa Compound, by the way, is located at Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City.
We are not swayed by the denials made by respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo
were the owners of a Toyota Revo.
Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle - a Toyota Revo - and had it
registered in their names as co-owners. They obtained insurance for the same vehicle
with them as joint beneficiaries. They executed a chattel mortgage over the same in
favor of PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. and when they finally sold the same vehicle on
September 18, 2000 to Amina Advincula, they both signed the Deed of Sale as joint
owners. These actions clearly indicate that they were the joint owners of the Toyota
Revo.
We are likewise not persuaded by the averment made by Judge Marcos that he
accommodated the Tacaldos in their desire to get a slot in the cooperative because they
are very close family friends. If they are indeed close, it is surprising to hear that he had
never been to the house of the Tacaldos. In fact, he was not even sure as to the exact
location of the Tacaldo residence.
Respondent judge wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor vehicle's
registration, the Tacaldos' entry in the cooperative's business of running public utility
vehicles would be assured. He went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos by
having the vehicle registered in his and Ms. Tacaldo's names.
There is nothing in the records to show that it was essential for respondent to be
registered as an owner in order that the motor vehicle could ply the Toledo City -Cebu
City routes. A simple phone call/oral request by Judge Marcos to the cooperative officers
would have been sufficient, to our mind, to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the cooperative
business of transporting passengers.
Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor
even mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not
his wife's.
We cannot gloss over the incident that happened during the Fun Run as recounted by
Chief Justice Davide. Judge Marcos candidly and frankly admitted to the Chief Justice that
he had been living with Ms. Tacaldo for the last three years as he was already separated
from his wife. Bringing Ms. Tacaldo to public functions was not in good taste considering
that Judge Marcos was still very much married even if he and his wife Rotilla were
already living separately. He had no right to flaunt Maydelane Tacaldo as if she was his
wife. This conduct is certainly unbecoming of a judge whose conduct must at all times be
beyond reproach.
As held in GALANG VS. SANTOS,19 the personal behavior of a judge should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and
in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach.
"The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of
a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is
no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The
Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we
have very recently explained, a judge's official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the subject of constant public
scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify
judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a
judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion."20
In LEYNES VS. VELOSO,21 it was held that if good moral character is required of a
lawyer, with more reason is the requirement exacted of a member of the judiciary who at
all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage
public decency.22
Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to
possess the highest standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical
standards, the confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he represents
the judiciary.
Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of
dismissal for immorality especially when it is committed openly and flagrantly, causing
scandal in the place where his court is situated.
"In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 ISCRA 493 [1981]),
the Court laid down the rationale why every judge must possess moral integrity,
thusly:
"The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be
beyond reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the people in
the administration of justice can not be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is
not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity and if he obtusely
continues to commit affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than
a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary."23
No position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an

individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all
times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and
justice.24
The Court once again reminds all those who don judicial robes to maintain good moral
character and at all times observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public
decency.25
Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the "affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife
and children.
"Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance,

especially when executed as an afterthought xxx. As held in People v. Ubina26: It
would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before
the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on
changed their mind for one reason or another; for such rule would make solemn
trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witness(es)."27
Again, in the case of IMBING VS. TIONGSON,28 the Court once more held that:
"The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case
against herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof.
Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its
jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the
complaint. The Court has an interesting the conduct of members of the Judiciary
and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that
direction may not be derailed by the complainant’s desistance from further
prosecuting the case he or she initiated."
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He

has violated the code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid the appearance of
impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
The charge of immorality proven against respondent judge demonstrates his unfitness to
remain in office and continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the severest
form of disciplinary sanction – dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge Ferdinand J. Marcos

of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice
to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government owned or
controlled corporations, and forfeiture of his retirement benefits, if he is entitled to any.
This decision is immediately executory.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Pardo, Buena, De
Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, on Official Business.
A.M. No. P-16-3541

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915-P]
SYLVIA G. CORPUZ, Complainant

vs.
CEFERINA B. RIVERA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTOF
DAVAO CITY DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. P-16-3542

PRESIDING JUDGE RUFINO S. FERRARIS, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN

CITIES OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 7, Respondent
vs.
CEFERINA B. RIVERA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
DAVAO CITY, DAV AO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. P-16-3543

IRINEO F. MARTINEZ, JR., Complainant,
vs.
CIFERINA B. RIVERA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
DAVAO CITY, DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
OCA IPI No. 14-2731-MTJ
CEFERINA B. RIVERA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

DAV AO CITY, DAV AO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Complainant,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE RUFINO S. FERRARIS, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 7, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution are four (4) consolidated administrative cases, namely: (1)
A.M. No. P-16-3541 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915-P); (2) A.M. No. P-16-3542
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-P); (3) A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-
4074-P), respectively initiated by Sylvia G. Corpuz (Corpuz), Presiding Judge Rufino S.
Ferraris, Jr. (Judge Ferraris, Jr.) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch
7, and Irineo F. Martinez, Jr. (Martinez, Jr.), against Ceferina B. Rivera (Rivera), Court
Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC), Branch 12 concerning
the latter's money-lending business; and (4) OCA IPI No. 14-2731-MTJ initiated by
Rivera against Judge Ferraris, Jr. regarding his complicity to the said money-lending
business.
The Facts
In the Complaint in A.M. No. P-16-3541 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915- P), 1 it was
alleged that in February 2011, Rivera convinced Corpuz to invest the aggregate amount
of P252,500.00 in the former's money-lending business with the promise that Corpuz will
earn a monthly interest of two and a half percent (2.5% ), which interest will be
deposited to her account at the end of each month. Rivera never fulfilled her promise,
which prompted Corpuz to verify Rivera's aforesaid business. After discovering that no
such money-lending business existed, Corpuz immediately demanded the return of her
money, and in response, Rivera gave her two (2) checks amounting to P130,000.00
each. However, the checks were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds.
After her demands for payment went unheeded, Corpuz filed two (2) counts of Esta/a
and violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 222 against Rivera, 3 as well as the instant
administrative complaint.
Similarly, the affidavit-complaints in A.M. No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-
P)4 and A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P)5 alleged that Rivera
convinced Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. to invest in her money-lending business
the respective amounts of Pl00,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 with the promise that their
money would earn monthly interest of five percent (5%). As guarantee, Rivera issued
checks to Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. corresponding to their investments in her
business. After paying Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. the agreed interest for four (4)
and three (3) months, respectively, Rivera failed to pay the succeeding interests and
even the principal amounts. Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. then tried to encash their
respective checks, but both were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account.
Ultimately, Rivera failed to pay her liabilities despite demands, thus, constraining Judge
Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. to file separate criminal cases against her.6
For her part,7 Rivera openly admitted having engaged in money-lending activities, albeit
offering the excuse that her business was done in good faith and with no intention of
blemishing the good name of her office, as the same was done mainly to augment her
meager salary and accommodate the monetary needs of other court personnel. She
likewise explained that her business took a downward spiral when majority of her
borrowers failed to pay their monthly obligations. Worse, she herself suffered financial
troubles when her family and relatives were hit by the Typhoon Pablo in 2012, which took
much of her time and financial resources in order to support them. 8 As a result, she
defaulted in her obligations to Judge Ferraris, Jr., Martinez, Jr., and Corpuz. Rivera also
averred that Judge Ferraris, Jr. went to her office several times while she was on leave
and threatened to have her killed if she did not pay up. 9 Lastly, she clarified that she
had already amicably settled her obligations with Judge Ferraris, Jr., Martinez, Jr., and
Corpuz resulting in the provisional dismissal of the criminal case Corpuz filed against
her; 10 and the affidavits of desistance executed by Judge Ferraris, Jr. 11 and Martinez,
Jr. 12 withdrawing their criminal complaints against her. 13
In view of Rivera's claim that she received threats from Judge Ferraris, Jr., the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that: (a) Rivera's counter-affidavits in A.M.
No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-P) and A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly
OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P) be treated as a separate administrative complaint against Judge
Ferraris, Jr. to determine his involvement in Rivera's money-lending business; and (b)
Judge Ferraris, Jr. be ordered to comment on the administrative case against
him. 14 Said recommendations were approved and adopted by the Court in its Resolution
dated October 8, 201415 and the counter-affidavits were, thereafter, docketed as OCA
IPI No. 14-2731-J.
Pursuant to the Court's directive, Judge Ferraris, Jr. submitted a CounterAffidavit16 dated
September 17, 2015, vehemently denying Rivera's accusation that he threatened
Rivera's life. He then clarified that after finding out that Rivera has other creditors who
were after her, he merely commented that "good that she is not in the danger of being
killed by reason of her non-payment of her account to other creditors." 17
In view of the similarities in the factual milieu of the complaints, the OCA further
recommended that the four (4) administrative cases be consolidated. 18 Thus, the Court,
in its Resolutions dated October 1, 2014, 19 October 8, 2014,20 and March 18,
2015, 21 ordered, inter alia, the consolidation of the said cases and the referral of the
same to the First Vice Executive Judge of the RTC for a joint investigation, report and
recommendation. 22
In a Report and Recommendation23 dated October 4, 2015, First Vice Executive Judge
Retrina E. Fuentes (Judge Fuentes) found both Rivera and Judge Ferraris, Jr.
administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that they be meted the penalties
of suspension of six (6) months and reprimand, respectively.
Judge Fuentes found that Rivera was indeed engaged in money-lending activities as she
herself had admitted, and as attested to by various court employees. According to Judge
Fuentes, Rivera's actions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
as her money-lending business put the image of the judiciary in a bad light, especially in
view of the fact that she performs her transactions during office hours and within the
court's premises.24
Anent Judge Ferraris, Jr., Judge Fuentes did not find any evidence that would show his
active participation in Rivera's money-lending activities or that he exploited his position
in order to gain monetary benefit therefrom. These notwithstanding, Judge Fuentes
opined that Judge Ferraris, Jr. should have known that engaging in money-lending
activities is directly prohibited under prevailing Civil Service Rules and, thus, should have
taken steps to prevent Rivera from doing such activities. On the contrary, he even
invested capital therein. Consequently, he should be reprimanded for his lack of concern
in the moneylending activity of Rivera and his act of investing therein.25
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum26 dated March 30, 2016, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that: (a)
Rivera be held administratively liable for her money-lending activities, and accordingly,
be meted the penalty of one (1)-month suspension without pay with a stem warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely; and (b) the
complaint against Judge Ferraris, Jr. be dismissed, but he be admonished for tolerating
and not taking steps to prevent Rivera from engaging in such business.27
The OCA ratiocinated that as a court employee, Rivera is required to serve with
maximum efficiency and with the highest degree of devotion to duty in order to maintain
public confidence in the judiciary. Thus, Rivera's act of engaging in her money-lending
business cannot be countenanced as it tends to distract her from devoting her entire time
to official work so as to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice.
However, considering that this was Rivera's first offense in her more than thirty-six (36)
years of government service, the OCA deemed it appropriate to impose upon her the
penalty of one (1)-month suspension without pay.28
As regards Judge Ferraris, Jr., the OCA agreed with the conclusion of Judge Fuentes that
there is not enough evidence to show that he took advantage of his position as a judge in
order to receive any monetary gain from Rivera's money lending business. This
notwithstanding, the OCA recommended that Judge Ferraris, Jr. be admonished for his
lack of concern in taking steps to prevent Rivera from conducting her trade and even
expressly supporting it by investing money therein.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not Rivera and Judge Ferraris, Jr.
may be held administratively liable for Rivera's money-lending activities.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, except as to the penalty
to be imposed on Rivera.1âwphi1
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of the public officer's official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the
office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest in the former. 29 Stated differently, if the misconduct does not involve
any of the aforesaid qualifying elements, the person charged is only liable for the lesser
offense of simple misconduct.30
In this case, Rivera ought to have known that as a public servant, she is expected at all
times to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity, as expressly commanded by
no less than Section 1, Article XI31 of the 1987 Constitution.32 Moreover, as an
employee of the Judiciary, she should be well aware that the nature of her work demands
her highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, and that she would only be able to
meet this demand by devoting her undivided time to government service. Essentially, this
is the reason why court employees have been enjoined to strictly observe official time
and to devote every second or moment of such time to serving the public so as to ensure
that undue delays in the administration of justice and in the disposition of court cases be
avoided.33
In admittedly engaging in her unauthorized business, Rivera fell short of the standard
required of Judiciary employees, let alone public servants in general. Her money-lending
activities - which were done even during office hours and within the court premises -
surely put the integrity of her office under suspicion, as it gave the impression that she
took advantage of her position and abused the confidence reposed in her in doing her
business.34 However, absent any showing that her inappropriate acts were tainted with
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, Rivera
should only be held administratively liable for Simple Misconduct.
Under Section 46 (D), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, 35 simple misconduct is a less grave offense which merits the penalty of
suspension for a period ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
for the first offense and dismissal from service for the second offense. Considering that
this is Rivera's first offense in her more than thirty-six (36) years of government
service,36 the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon her the penalty of suspension
without pay for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
As regards Judge Ferraris, Jr., suffice it to say that the OCA correctly recommended the
dismissal of the case against him as there is not enough evidence to show that he
exploited his position to receive monetary benefit from Rivera's money-lending activities.
However, he must nevertheless be admonished for his lack of concern in taking steps to
prevent Rivera from conducting her trade and, in fact, condoned it by investing money
into the same.
It is well to reiterate that "those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act
of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary
and the people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possi~le individuals in
the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would
violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the
faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its
ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient
administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public."37
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ceferina B. Rivera, Court Stenographer III of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Davao del Sur, Branch 12 GUILTY of Simple
Misconduct. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDEDwithout pay for a period of one (1)
month and one (1) day, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Further, the Court DISMISSES the administrative case against Presiding Judge Rufino S.
Ferraris, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 7, docketed as OCA
IPI No. 14-2371-MTJ, for lack of sufficient evidence. This notwithstanding, he is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more vigilant in taking steps to prevent officials and
employees of the Judiciary from engaging in prohibited activities.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
EN BANC
I.P.I. No. 16-244-CA-J, September 06, 2016
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF CATALINA Z. ALILING AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MA.

LUISA C. QUIJANO-PADILLA, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA RELATIVE TO CA-G.R. CV NO.
103042
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This resolves the verified complaint1 filed by Catalina Z. Aliling (Complainant) against
Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla (Justice Padilla) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of
Manila for gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting
violations of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint
stemmed from the Decision2 of Justice Padilla in CA-G.R. CV No. 103042.
Antecedent Facts
On 28 October 1997, Asuncion Zamora Jurado (Jurado) and Catalina Zamora Aliling
(Aliling) filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Santiago City,
Isabela for the determination of the true origin and ownership of a 7,086-square meter
parcel of land, described as Lot No. 4900. Jurado and Aliling alleged that they, together
with their deceased brother Fernando M. Zamora, are the registered owners of Lot No.
4900 covered by TCT No. T-65150 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela. They claimed to
have inherited the subject land from their father, Dominador Zamora, who holds the
property under the previous title, TCT No. T-2291, after having acquired this from the
previous owners, spouses Antonio Pariñas and Maura Balbin. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 36-2438.
Jurado and Aliling alleged that sometime in 1997, they learned that defendants in the
case were able to cause the subdivision of Lot No. 4900 into several titles in the names
of: Vicente Chai, married to Carmen Chai; Eduardo Sarmiento, married to Josefina M.
Sarmiento; Anastacio Pallermo; and Leonora Pariñas and Margarita Pariñas, married to
Melecio Pinto. Claiming absolute and lawful ownership over the subject property, plaintiffs
prayed for the nullification of the aforesaid titles.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment holding, among others, that
there was an irregularity in the reconstitution proceedings relative to OCT No. 3429 from
which defendants' titles were derived and that defendants, particularly appellants
Spouses Chai, could not be considered as purchasers in good faith.
The plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration while the defendants filed their
Motion for Reconsideration of the 25 February 2014 decision. The trial court denied both
of their motions.
On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's decision
in Civil Case No. 36-2438. It held that while it affirms the trial court's ruling on the
irregularity of the reconstitution of OCT No. 3429, it cannot sustain the finding that
appellants are not purchasers in good faith. The CA concluded that defendant Spouses
Chai exercised the due diligence required of them to be rightfully adjudged as buyers in
good faith. The decision was penned by Justice Padilla and concurred in by Associate
Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
On 7 June 2016, plaintiffs-appellees Jurado, Aliling and the heirs of their brother
Fernando M. Zamora, filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the CA decision.
Pending resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration, Aliling on 27 June 2016 filed the
instant administrative complaint against Justice Padilla.
Our Ruling
Although complainant asserted that she is not assailing the CA decision in the
administrative complaint, it is evident that the error she is attributing to respondent
Justice Padilla pertains to the latter's ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 103042. This Court has
maintained that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions
cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed
through judicial remedies.3chanrobleslaw
The assailed ruling of Justice Padilla was issued in the proper exercise of her judicial
functions, and as such, should not be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Well
entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere
errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross
ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her
part.4 Judicial officers cannot be subjected to administrative disciplinary actions for their
performance of duty in good faith.5 As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be
subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he
acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment.6chanrobleslaw
To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have
committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious.7 In her ponencia,
Justice Padilla explained, citing evidence and jurisprudence, why she arrived at her
conclusion that defendants were purchasers in good faith. Even assuming that she erred
in her ruling, still complainant failed to establish that she was moved by ill-will or
malicious intention to violate the law or jurisprudence. Moreover, it should be noted that
it was arrived at after deliberation by a collegial body, thus, not solely the ruling of the
respondent justice.
Complainant should be reminded that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous.
If she disagrees with the ruling, there are judicial remedies to be exhausted under
existing rules. As in fact, it was noted that complainant, together with the other
plaintiffs-appellees, had already filed their motion for reconsideration of the CA decision.
The CA has yet to rule on the motion when complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint.
This Court has settled the rule that administrative complaints against judges cannot be
pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the
erroneous orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither
alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such review is still
available to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been resolved with finality.8 It is
only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate
tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.9 Clearly, the subject civil
case has not yet reached its finality and the instant administrative complaint has no leg
to stand on.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative complaint
filed by Catalina Z. Aliling against Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, Court of Appeals,
Manila for ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting violations
of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Mendoza,
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., on wellness leave.

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas
City, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana

(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter
of the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate
Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The
complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel
Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the
course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the
Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation

receiver over SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the
duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external
legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he
engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as

"consultative meetings" in her Order2dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her
official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in
Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and
features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also
announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what

the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her
authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s
exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-
record so that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank
(EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss
the case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s

financial adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the
formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s
expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty.
Gabionza’s law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against

SCP, leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so

that SCP could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a
need for the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s
requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s

counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to
recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking
for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the
Rules (the court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to
amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter
in EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised
concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special
interest and personal involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he
alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal
details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She
also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that
nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated March 18,
2008, referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that
she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained
that she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation
proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation
plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative
disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were
premature because judicial remedies were still available.5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings
and conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even
encouraged in view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of
rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the
rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all
the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve
the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that
it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she only
agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would
attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended

that she approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law.
She argued that the matter of granting extension of time under Section 11,
Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she
claimed that her denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due
to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she
argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by
the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza
as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the
complainant raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she
maintained that the rest of the complainant’s allegations were not
substantiated and corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in
not issuing a subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the court may decide matters
on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations

were not proven and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also
believed that there was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the
informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the
photos she posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be
considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable
social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that
there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo
for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in
the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts
are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the

respondent’s acts of posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a
"Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules
2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the

complaints as regular administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The CA’s Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice,

conducted a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her
January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the
complaints were partly meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in
nature since these involved the respondent’s appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the
rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of
SCP’s financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings,
Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and
convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s
interests; the complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the
rule on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting
judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found

nothing irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the
parties, including SCP’s creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s
explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by
the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s
unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and
utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice
Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter
with what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct
that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to
be done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times.
Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge
Austria should be held liable.16
On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a
personal social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal
details as a magistrate in the account) – even during these changing times when social
networking websites seem to be the trend – constitutes an act of impropriety which
cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. She
explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a
manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No.
100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such
professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure,
and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her
office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the

Honorable Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-

Sison be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court,

Batangas City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for
violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of

impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act
will be dealt with more severely.19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of
gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in
the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross
incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary
action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety,
the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of
posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety
set forth by the Code.
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We
sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the
respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no
magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving
the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the
allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias
and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant
failed to establish the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely
pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by
themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is
not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication
of cases."22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions,
these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial
remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is
not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a
judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot
be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through
judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent
baseless. The truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by
simply relying on the complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be
presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and
rich.25 There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere
suspicion of partiality is not enough.26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the
circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises.
The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to
decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause.
The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the
respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the
complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of
bias and partiality must fail.
On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."28
In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23,
Rule 4 of the Rules, which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation
plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the
debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of
the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to
the modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged
that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the
functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the
respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision,
the charge of gross ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule]
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment."30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to
bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated
by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision
approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant
failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was
actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management
committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we
find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of
gross ignorance of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution
demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to
prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of the debtor-company’s assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial
to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The
rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and
conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial
proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present
its evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16,
2006 decision, found that the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to
disprove the grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount
to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without
observing the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due
care in the performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is
involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad
faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we
conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a management
committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was
tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period
On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules,
we find the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the
lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court
may grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and
compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance,
however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed
eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day
period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity
whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval
was still required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC,
the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1)
year from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is
able to secure an extension of the period from the Supreme Court.38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s
approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the
respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He
must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint.40 He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in
expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas,42 a judge

should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he
should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome
his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-
tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic
comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that
"although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his
noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out
of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and
in language."
Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her
expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide
remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow.
They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe
judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain
the decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate.
"As a judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and
perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an
appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus
violated Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the
Internet – a new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each
other.45 While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking
part in social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off
their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical
responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety
when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a
judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as
Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes
the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas
through any media regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an
exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster
is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their
activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In
particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges
must bear in mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal
matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s
opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This
is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her
family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire
she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for
public consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds
as a judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber
communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule
necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem
harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As
the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher
standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting
standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and
their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept
this standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section
11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3), but not exceeding six (6), months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by
any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00;
(2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found
liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair
and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF
THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge
Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and
to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC October 29, 2009
RE: ORDER DATED 21 DECEMBER 2006 ISSUED BY JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ

MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 275, SUSPENDING
LOIDA M. GENABE, LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. P-07-2320
JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIÑAS CITY,
BRANCH 275, Complainant,
vs.
LOIDA M. GENABE, LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT. Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This administrative matter against Loida M. Genabe (Genabe), Legal Researcher II of the
Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 275, Las Piñas City, stemmed from a Letter
dated 22 December 2006 addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed
by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda (Judge Maceda) of the same trial court. Judge Maceda
attached his Order dated 21 December 2006 suspending Genabe for 30 days by reason
of neglect of duty for attending a two-day seminar despite a pending assignment. In the
letter, Judge Maceda requested that the salary of Genabe be withheld for the period 21
December 2006 to 20 January 2007 since the suspension was immediately executory.
The Facts
On 20 November 2006, Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte (Atty. Escabarte), Branch Clerk of Court
of the same trial court, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum to Genabe referring to her
neglect, in leaving for Baguio City on 16 to17 November 2006 to attend a seminar for
legal researchers, without finishing her assigned task. The assigned task required Genabe
to summarize the statement of facts in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0059 to 03-0063 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Marvilla, et al.," set for promulgation on 21 November 2006.
Atty. Escabarte reminded Genabe that such act could not be tolerated and that similar
acts in the future would be meted an appropriate sanction.
On 22 November 2006, Genabe submitted her explanation regarding the unfinished

assigned case. She stated that she was not able to complete the summary due to lack of
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN). Genabe added that she be absolved for humane
considerations.
On 29 November 2006, Judge Maceda called a staff meeting to discuss several matters in
the agenda, including the inter-office memorandum. Allegedly, even before the staff
meeting, Genabe resented the issuance of the memorandum and became disrespectful to
the court staff, including the clerk of court. At the meeting, Genabe allegedly continued
her combative behavior in total disregard of the presence of Judge Maceda.
On 30 November 2006, Judge Maceda ordered Genabe to show cause why she should not
be cited in contempt by the court and why she should not be administratively sanctioned
for conduct unbecoming, neglect of duty and misconduct.
In her Answer dated 11 December 2006, Genabe denied that she neglected her duty and
explained with counter-charges. Genabe stated that Atty. Escabarte did not give her the
opportunity to be heard and that she was not given sufficient lead time to finish the five
consolidated informations of the criminal case assigned to her. Genabe attributed the lack
of stenographers, which was beyond her control, as the cause of the delay in the
transcriptions of the minutes of the meeting. As a counter-charge, Genabe claimed that
Judge Maceda disciplines his staff on a selective basis.1avvphi1
On the same day, Judge Maceda conducted a fact-finding investigation inside his
chambers. The agenda of the investigation focused on the charges of contempt, conduct
unbecoming, neglect of duty, and misconduct against Genabe. Judge Maceda directed all
members of the staff, including Genabe, to attend. However, Genabe did not appear
despite notice. Later, she appeared to say that she was waiving her right to be present in
the investigation.
On 21 December 2006, Judge Maceda issued the Suspension Order against Genabe for
neglect of duty.
In a Letter dated 22 December 2006, Judge Maceda furnished the Office of the Court of
Administrator (OCA) with a copy of the Order dated 21 December 2006. Judge Maceda
suspended Genabe for a period of 30 days, using as authority the power given to
appropriate supervisory officials in disciplining personnel of their respective courts as
provided in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular No. 30-91 dated 30 September 1991.
Judge Maceda declared that the suspension was to take effect immediately and would not
be stayed even if appealed to the Supreme Court. Judge Maceda then requested that
following the suspension order, Genabe’s salary be withheld for the period 21 December
2006 to 20 January 2007.
The OCA received a letter dated 12 January 2007 sent by Atty. Zandro T. Bato, Clerk of
Court VI of the same trial court, returning the salary check of Genabe following the
suspension order issued against her. On 22 January 2007, Genabe reported back to work
after serving the 30-day suspension order of Judge Maceda.
On 18 January 2007, Judge Maceda endorsed his Investigation Report and

Recommendation to the OCA, even without any directive from the latter. The report
mainly focused on the alleged unruly conduct of Genabe during the staff meeting of
Branch 275 on 29 November 2006. Judge Maceda submitted the following
recommendations:
1. Pending determination of the instant matter by the Honorable Supreme Court,

Ms. Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, be
immediately placed under preventive suspension, and thereafter dismiss her from
the service; and
2. Allow the undersigned to recommend a replacement to enable RTC Branch 275

to function normally soonest.1
In a Letter dated 18 April 2007, several staff members of the same trial court, headed by
the Branch Clerk of Court, assailed the alleged inaction of the OCA on the Investigation
Report and Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda as well
as the request for the detail of Genabe to another post.
In a Resolution dated 23 May 2007, this Court resolved to:
1. NOTE the letter dated 22 December 2006 of Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda x x x x;
2. TREAT the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio [Sanz]
Maceda as an administrative complaint against Loida M. Genabe under a separate
docket number, A.M. No. P-07-2320 x x x x;
3. DIRECT Ms. Loida M. Genabe to REPORT BACK TO WORK pending resolution of

the administrative complaint against her, unless another administrative case
directs otherwise; and
4. REQUIRE Judge Bonifacio [Sanz] Maceda to EXPLAIN, within ten (10) days from
notice, why no disciplinary sanction should be imposed against him for having
violated A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled "Guidelines on the Selection and
Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and
Duties" approved on 27 January 2004 and became effective on 15 February 2004.2
Judge Maceda submitted his Explanation dated 29 June 2007, in compliance with the
Court’s Resolution dated 23 May 2007. Judge Maceda reasoned that there were other
charges against Genabe, such as "conduct unbecoming and grave misconduct," which
called for the imposition of a higher penalty. Thus, he endorsed the determination of such
other charges to the OCA, including whether the heavier penalty of dismissal or
replacement might be warranted. Judge Maceda prayed that his explanation be
considered as sufficient compliance and that he be absolved of any disciplinary sanction.
On 22 August 2007, the Court resolved to refer to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation the (1) Order dated 21 December 2006 and (2) Explanation dated 29
June 2007, both made by Judge Maceda.
On 29 August 2007, the Court resolved to inform the staff members of the same trial
court, in consideration of the Letter dated 18 April 2007, that until Genabe has been
formally charged with "contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct," which are not
light offenses, the propriety of suspending Genabe pending investigation of the charges
against her cannot be properly evaluated, and to await the outcome of A.M. No. P-07-
2320.
On 19 November 2007, the staff members of the same trial court, headed by the Branch
Clerk of Court, filed their Manifestation dated 15 October 2007, that Genabe had been
formally charged with "contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct" as contained in
the Investigation Report and Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by
Judge Maceda to this Court.
In a Resolution dated 16 January 2008, the Court resolved to require the parties to
manifest their willingness to submit the matter for decision on the basis of the pleadings
filed. Judge Maceda and Genabe respectively filed their compliance on separate dates.
In a Resolution dated 4 June 2008, the Court resolved to:
1. APPROVE the previous recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator,

as contained in its Agenda Report dated 24 January 2007 particularly items no. 5
and 6. Accordingly, (a) the Financial Management Office is DIRECTED to pay the
salary of Ms. Loida M. Genabe pending resolution of the administrative case
against her by the Court; and (b) the Office of the Administrative Services-Leave
Division is DIRECTED not to deduct the number of absences incurred by Ms.
Genabe from her leave credits since the order of suspension is unauthorized; and
2. GRANT the application of Ms. Loida M. Genabe for leave for a period of five (5)
months starting 1 May to 30 September 2008 for purposes of taking the bar
examination, this, however, is without prejudice to the action that the Committee
of the Education Support Program may take on her application.3
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
In its Report dated 23 October 2007, the OCA found Judge Maceda’s explanation
unsatisfactory. The OCA stated that Circular No. 30-91 had been impliedly amended by
the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their
Powers, Prerogatives and Duties as contained in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which became
effective on 15 February 2004. The OCA added that it was clear from the Guidelines that
Judge Maceda had no authority to directly penalize a court employee. As an Executive
Judge, he only had the right to act upon and investigate administrative complaints
involving light offenses. The power to decide and impose a penalty, even for light
offenses, rests with the Supreme Court. Thus, the OCA recommended that Judge Maceda
be fined ₱12,000 payable immediately and be sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future would merit a severe penalty.
After a careful review of the records of the case, we find reasonable grounds to hold both
Genabe and Judge Maceda administratively liable.
In A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Genabe guilty for simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect
of duty has been defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task
expected of him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference.4
Genabe had been permitted to attend a two-day seminar in Baguio City on the premise
that no work would be left pending. She was assigned to summarize the testimonies of
three defense witnesses for a criminal case set for promulgation. The records reveal that
Genabe was only able to summarize the TSN of one witness consisting of 46 pages and
failed to finish the TSN of the other two witnesses consisting of 67 pages. Before leaving
for Baguio, Genabe had three working days to complete the task. However, the
assignment remained unfinished. When such task was assigned to another court
employee, it only took the other employee two and a half hours to complete the TSN of
the two witnesses.
Further, Judge Maceda stated that this was not the only time Genabe had been remiss in
her duties. In Criminal Case No. 98-926 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Russel
Javier, et al.," Genabe failed to include in the statement of facts the detail on the
prosecutor’s waiver of the cross examination and more importantly, neglected to include
the testimony of the accused Russel Javier upon completing his testimony. Also, in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-0713 and 02-0714, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Alberto
Ylanan," Genabe included the testimony of an alleged poseur when his testimony, upon
motion, had been stricken off the record per Order dated 29 July 2003.
From these instances, we find that Genabe’s actuations constitute simple neglect of duty.
As a first offense under civil service law, we impose the penalty of suspension without
pay for a period of one month and one day.5 The suspension imposed upon Genabe
under the Order dated 21 December 2006 shall be considered as the penalty imposed.
The remaining balance of one day suspension must be served upon finality of this
decision.
With regard to the other charges of contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct, we
find no sufficient basis to hold Genabe accountable for these offenses based on her
alleged unruly conduct at the staff meeting held on 29 November 2006. In administrative
proceedings, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint.6 Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The standard
was not met in this case. The Order dated 21 December 2006 and Investigation Report
dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda centered mainly on Genabe’s neglect
of duty in not completing her assigned task on time. The other charges had been touched
on in a sporadic manner. While the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant,
suspension, replacement or dismissal must not be resorted to unless there is substantial
evidence to merit such penalties. In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary,
Genabe cannot be held accountable for the other charges against her.
In A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find that Judge Maceda failed to observe due process in
ordering the suspension of Genabe and withholding her salary from 21 December 2006
to 20 January 2007.
Judge Maceda suspended a court personnel directly under his supervision by relying on
the authority laid down in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular No. 30-91 which
provides:
2. Lower Court Personnel
a. Light Offenses –
(1) Disciplinary matters involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service
law (Administrative Code of 1987 and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees (Rep. Act. 6713) where the penalty is
reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty days, or a fine not exceeding thirty
days' salary, and as classified in Civil Service Resolution No. 30, Series of 1989,
shall be acted upon by the appropriate supervisory official of the lower court
concerned.
(2) The appropriate supervisory officials are the Presiding Justices/Presiding Judge
of the lower collegiate courts and the Executive Judges of the trial courts with
respect to the personnel of their respective courts, except those directly under the
individual Justices and Judges, in which case, the latter shall be their appropriate
supervisory officials.
(3) The complaint for light offenses whether filed with the Court, the Office of the
Court Administrator, or the lower court shall be heard and decided by the
appropriate supervisory official concerned. x x x
The reliance of Judge Maceda on the provisions of this circular is misplaced. Judge
Maceda found Genabe to have neglected her duty in November 2006. The guidelines in
effect at that time were already those found in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which took effect in
2004 or two years before the administrative charge of neglect of duty was made against
Genabe. Judge Maceda should have applied these new guidelines and not Circular No.
30-91.
Section 1, Chapter VIII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which provides the guidelines for
administrative discipline of court employees over light offenses, states:
SECTION. 1. Disciplinary jurisdiction over light offenses.– The Executive Judge shall have
authority to act upon and investigate administrative complaints involving light offenses as
defined under the Civil Service Law and Rules (Administrative Code of 1987), and the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act
No. 6713), where the penalty is reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty (30)
days, or a fine not exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary, and as classified in pertinent Civil
Service resolutions or issuances, filed by (a) a judge against a court employee, except
lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judge’s area of
administrative supervision; or (b) a court employee against another court employee,
except lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judge’s area of
administrative supervision.
In the preceding instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the necessary
inquiry and submit to the Office of the Court Administrator the results thereof
with a recommendation as to the action to be taken thereon, including the
penalty to be imposed, if any, within thirty (30) days from termination of said
inquiry.At his/her discretion, the Executive Judge may delegate the investigation of
complaints involving light offenses to any of the Presiding Judges or court officials within
his/her area of administrative supervision.
In the case of a complaint (a) filed against court employees who are lawyers, or (b) filed
by private complainants against court employees, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, the
same shall be forwarded by the Executive Judge to the Office of the Court Administrator
for appropriate action and disposition. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline erring court
personnel, under their supervision and charged with light offenses, is limited to
conducting an inquiry only. After such inquiry, the executive judge is required to submit
to the OCA the results of the investigation and give a recommendation as to what action
should be taken. An executive judge does not have the authority to act upon the results
of the inquiry and thereafter, if the court employee is found guilty, unilaterally impose a
penalty, as in this case. It is only the Supreme Court which has the power to find the
court personnel guilty or not for the offense charged and then impose a penalty.
In the present case, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for the offense of neglect of duty.
Under Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service,7 simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense which carries a penalty of
one month and one day to six months suspension for the first offense.8 Under A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC, an executive judge may only conduct an investigation for all offenses. After
the investigation, the executive judge is mandated to refer the necessary disciplinary
action to this Court for appropriate action.9
Even under Circular No. 30-91, Judge Maceda should have referred to Section A(2)(b) of
Circular No. 30-91 which provides:
b. Grave or Less Grave Offenses
All administrative complaints for grave or less grave offenses as defined in the Codes
hereinbefore referred to shall be immediately referred to the Court En Banc for
appropriate action within 15 days from receipt by the Court Administrator if filed directly
with him, otherwise, within 15 days likewise from receipt by him from the appropriate
supervisory officials concerned.
Thus, under Circular No. 30-91, a court employee charged with a less grave offense could
not be directly penalized by an executive judge. Judge Maceda had no authority to
suspend Genabe outright for a less grave offense of simple neglect of duty even under
Circular No. 30-91. Clearly, Judge Maceda exceeded his authority when he issued the 21
December 2006 suspension order against Genabe.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives, and circulars constitutes a less serious charge in the discipline of judges
of regular courts:
Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. –
xxxx
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
xxxx
Accordingly, Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides the sanctions to be
imposed if one is found to be guilty of a less serious charge:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. –
xxxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions may
be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
(1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
xxxx
We hold that the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱12,000 is commensurate to Judge
Maceda’s violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. We sternly warn him that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, in A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher II of

the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty.
We SUSPEND her for one month and one day without pay. The 30-day suspension
imposed upon Loida M. Genabe under the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda shall be considered as a partial service of the penalty
imposed. The remaining balance of the penalty of one day suspension shall be
immediately served upon finality of this decision. Respondent Loida M. Genabe is sternly
warned that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
In A.M No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the Regional Trial Court
of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, GUILTY of violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. Accordingly,
we FINE him ₱12,000, with a stern warning that commission of similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING *
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

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Republic of the Philippines

A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013

CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS,

Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of

Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions

In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons

In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA

G.R. No. 176425

HEIRS OF MANUEL UY EK LIONG, represented by BELEN LIM VDA. DE

SO ORDERED.3 (Italics and Underscore Ours)

1. Orders the respondents to execute and deliver a Deed of Conveyance in favor of

3. Orders the respondents to pay the petitioners the following amounts:

a). ₱50,000.00 as and for moral damages;

b). ₱50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and

c). ₱50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.

and to pay the costs.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTEENTH DIVISION,

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition impressed with partial merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals' assailed 23 January 2007

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Republic of the Philippines

Adm. Case No. 8383 December 11, 2012

AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,

Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation2 dated

In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to

The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings

In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended

The Court’s Ruling

The charge of negligence

According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve

The charge of soliciting money

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Republic of the Philippines

NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE, ASUNCION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth Hermosisima-

Complainants submitted their Position Paper15 on January 28, 1999.16

Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz:

Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the

ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED for failing to

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

G.R. No. 153031 December 14, 2006

PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING MARINE TRANSPORT

The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Accordingly, the following award is hereby adjudged against the respondent:

1. The amount of $2,625.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment

2. The amount of $1,600.00 or its peso equivalent, representing sick wage

3. The amount of $550.00 or its peso equivalent, representing living

4. The amount of $641.66 or its peso equivalent, representing unpaid wages

The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is as it is hereby ordered

All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.