Aung Aung, the Commander, 33rd Light Infantry Division, Brigadier-General;

Than Oo, the Commander, 99th Light Infantry Division, Brigadier-General.

Brigadier General Than Oo is the Commander of the 99th Light Infantry Division of the Myanmar Armed
Forces (Tatmadaw). In that context, he is responsible for the atrocities and serious human rights
violations committed against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State in the second half of 2017 by the
99th Light Infantry Division. These include unlawful killings, sexual violence and the systematic burning
of Rohingya houses and buildings..1

Brigadier General Than Oo, Commander of the 99th

LID during the material period – Amnesty International believes that Brig. Gen. Than Oo should
face judicial proceedings for command responsibility for the crimes against humanity of
murder, deportation, torture, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, and other inhumane
acts, as detailed in this report, as well as be investigated for direct responsibility for these
crimes. A unit under his command carried out the massacre, torture, and rape and other sexual
violence in Min Gyi on 30 August 2017 (see Chapters 4 and 5). They burned other Rohingya
villages in northern Maungdaw Township. Amnesty International believes that all of the
elements of command or other superior responsibility have been met for Brig. Gen. Than Oo.
He was acting as a commander; had a relationship of effective control or authority over units
who committed crimes against humanity; knew or should have known of the subordinates’
actions, based on the strict reporting requirements of units’ movements and activities (see
Chapter 10) and the public reporting about crimes committed by these units in several
locations; failed to prevent or stop the commission of crimes; and failed to punish subordinates
for crimes, based on the military’s published information about investigations, which do not
include mention of Min Gyi (see Chapters 4 and 10). Amnesty International believes that at
least some of the crimes committed were due to the failure of Brig. Gen. Than Oo to properly
exercise his control to prevent, stop, and punish crimes by those under his command. In late
May 2018, The Irrawaddy reported that Brig. Gen. Than Oo had been “transferred to the
auxiliary force”. 1037 The Myanmar military does not appear to have officially announced the
transfer, nor that Brig. Gen. Than Oo had been removed from his command. The Irrawaddy
linked the decision to pressure from the UN Security Council over the atrocities committed
during the northern Rakhine State operations, 1038 but none of the published military
investigations to date, including those that have identified legal and administrative actions
taken in response to the operations, have mentioned Brig. Gen. Than Oo or the 99 th LID (see
Chapter 10). Even if Brig. Gen. Than Oo’s removal is associated with crimes committed by his
soldiers under his command, such action is nowhere near an adequate form of accountability
given credible allegations that he is implicated in crimes under international law.

1
http://www.onpcsb.ro/pdf/Decicion%201126%20-%202018,%20Myanmar-Burma.pdf
Brigadier General Aung Aung, Commander of the 33rdLight Infantry Division
(LID) –
Amnesty International believes that Brig. Gen. Aung Aung should face judicial
proceedings for command responsibility for the crimes against humanity of
murder, deportation, torture, rape and other sexual violence, persecution,
enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts, as detailed in this report, as
well as be investigated for direct responsibility for these crimes. Units under his
command carried out the massacre, torture, and rape and other sexual violence
in Chut Pyin on 27 August 2017 (see Chapters 4 and 5). They also carried out
unlawful killings in Inn Din, Koe Tan Kauk, and Chein Kar Li, and burned Rohingya
villages in Rathedaung Township and southern Maungdaw Township (see Chapter
4). The threats made by Maj. Aung Tho Myu to Rohingya leaders in Chut Pyin (see
below), as well as the systematic, consistent nature of the crimes in villages across
northern Rakhine State where the 33rd LID operated, including extrajudicial
executions and targeted burning, strongly suggest higher order and planning. At
minimum, however, Amnesty International believes that all of the elements of
command or other superior responsibility have been met for Brig. Gen. Aung
Aung. He was acting as a commander; had a relationship of effective control or
authority over units who committed crimes against humanity; knew or should
have known of the subordinates’ actions, based on the strict reporting
requirements of units’ movements and activities (see Chapter 10) and the public
reporting about crimes committed by these units in several locations; failed to
prevent or stop the commission of crimes; and failed to punish subordinates for
crimes, based on the military’s published information about investigations, which
do not include mention of Chut Pyin, Koe Tan Kauk, and Chein Kar Li, among other
places where 33rd LID soldiers committed crimes (see Chapters 4 and 10).
Amnesty International believes that at least some of the crimes committed were
due to the failure of Brig. Gen. Aung Aung to properly exercise his control to
prevent, stop, and punish crimes by those under his command. Amnesty
International documented war crimes by the 33rd LID in northern Shan State in
2016 and early 2017, before battalions from that division were moved to
northern Rakhine State, where they committed similar crimes on an even greater
scale.
Kha Maung Seik massacre
ASRA

Chut Pyin massacre

Aung Aung 33rdLID
“Chopyin outpost in Region-11” was attacked on 26 August “with homemade bombs,”

Gu Dar Pyin massacre

Maung Nu massacre
Battalion 564

Tula Toli/Min Gyi massacre

Than Oo 99th LID
ARSA attacked an outpost in Net Chaung, a village near Min Gyi, at around 3:35 a.m. on 25 August. 75 They further
allege that on 26 August ARSA destroyed a deserted police outpost in Wet Kyein, across the river from Min Gyi, and
that fighting continued nearby through 29 August.7

Inn Din massacre

Aung Aung 33rdLID
In the pre-dawn hours of 25 August, ARSA also attacked police outposts in Tha Win Chaung and Thin Baw Kwea,
villages located directly to the south and north, respectively, of the ethnically mixed village of Inn Din.62 Amnesty
International interviewed seven Rohingya residents of Inn Din, which is located in the far south of Maungdaw
Township.63 In response to the ARSA attacks, Myanmar soldiers, working with BGP and local vigilantes, committed
a similar pattern of violations over the course of several days.