PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO MERCADO
The commission of the crime having been commenced at
65 Phil. 665
DIAZ, J.:
This is an appeal by the prosecution from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga whereby said court declared itself without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide two criminal cases pending before it, for theft of large
cattle, against the appellee Francisco Mercado, on the ground that, although the
stolen animals were afterwards brought by the appellee to the municipality of
Candaba, Pampanga, where they were found in his possession, said crimes had
taken place and had been committed in the municipality of Gapan, of the
Province of Nueva Ecija.
The informations which gave rise to the criminal cases above-mentioned are of
the following tenor:
"That on or about the 21st day of June, 1936, in the municipality of Candaba,
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court,
the abovenamed accused, Francisco Mercado, with intent of gain, did, then and
there, voluntarily, maliciously, illegally and criminally, take, steal, and carry away
two male carabaos branded as ................ and ................ with certificates Nos.
7361553, dated at Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, on October 29, 1929, and 6993322
dated at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, on June 3, 1933, respectively, both belonging to
Pedro A. Ladores, worth sixty pesos (P60) each, and to his damage and prejudice
in the total amount of P120. The commission of the crime having been
commenced at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and consummated at the municipality of
Candaba, Pampanga, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner."
"That on or about the 21st day of June, 1936, in the municipality of Candaba,
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court,
the abovenamed accused, Francisco Mercado, with intent of gain, but without the
use of violence upon persons nor force upon things, did, then and there,
voluntarily, maliciously, illegally and criminally take, steal, and carry away a male
carabao branded as................with certificate No. 6696261, dated at Penaranda,
Nueva Ecija, on April 11, 1928, valued at ninety pesos (P90), owned by Leon
Ladores, without his knowledge and consent, and to his damage and prejudice in
the said sum of P90.
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and completed at the municipality of Candaba, Pampanga."
The foregoing informations were filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the
Court of First Instance of said province after receiving the report of the
preliminary inquiries made, upon complaint, by the justice of the peace court of
Candaba, Pampanga, where the cases originated. The appellee waived his right to
a preliminary investigation and asked that ths two cases be remanded to the
Court of First Instance for trial and final judgment.
Briefly, the question raised by the prosecution on appeal is the following:
Has the Court of First Instance of Pampanga jurisdiction to try and decide the two
cases in question, it being alleged in the informations by which they were
commenced that the accused stole the carabaos described therein in Gapan, in
the Province of Nueva Ecija, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, in order
to bring them, as he in fact did afterwards, to Candaba, Pampanga, where they
were found in his possession?
The lower court upheld the negative, being of the opinion that the appellee
committed the two thefts in question not in the Province of Pampanga over
which its jurisdiction is exclusive of the Province of Nueva Ecija, but in the latter
province.
In criminal proceedings, the rule is that one can not be held to answer for any
crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. Said
rule is based on the legal provision which prescribes the essential requisites of a
good complaint or information, one of which is the allegation that the crime was
committed within the jurisdiction of tho court where the complaint or
information is filed and that said court has authority to try it. (Sec. 6, General
Orders, No. 58.) As was said in the case of United States vs. Cunanan (26 Phil.,
376), the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands, in
criminal cases, is limited to certain well-defined territory, so that they can not
take jurisdiction of persons charged with an offense alleged to have been
committed outside of that limited territory. Appellant, however, contends that
there are crimes which are considered as continuing, as for instance those whose
commission does not terminate where the acts of execution began, or where they
are consummated for the first time, because the execution or consummation of
those crimes continues successively and uninterruptedly until stopped by a cause
independent of the will of the offender. It alleges that certain cases of abduction,
like that of United States vs. Bernabe (23 Phil., 154), partake of this nature
because they are partly executed in one province and partly in another. We can
not, in truth, find any similarity between the Bernabe case and those now under
consideration. It was held in that case that the carrying away of the offended
party took place in Manila and that the unchaste designs, an essential element of
abduction, were not made manifest or begun until the offender and his victim
were already in Rizal. For this reason, although the offense was commenced in
Manila, it was held that it was consummated only in said province. Neither do the
present cases bear any similarity with those of estafa which appear in 23 Phil.,
207 (U. S. vs. Cardell) and 27 Phil., 408 (U. S. vs. Santiago), because although the
accused in said cases appropriated their collections in Cebu and in Iloilo,
respectively, in compliance with the order which they had previously received
from their principals, however, they expressly and formally bound themselves to
render an accounting or to deliver their collections in Manila, wherefore, it could
correctly be held in said cases that the crimes committed by the accused were
triable in the City of Manila. To sustain its theory, the appellant invokes the
commentary found on pages 192 and 193 of Volume 16 of Corpus Juris and what
Wharton has to say in his Criminal Law (11th edition, page 1389), and what Clark,
in turn, states in his commentary on Criminal Law, page 366, in the following
language:
"PAR. 1116. Thief carrying goods from county to county may be convicted in
either county. Where a larceny has been committed in one county and the thief
removes the stolen property into another county (animus furandi) he is, in the
eye of the law, guilty of larceny in every county into which the subject may thus
have been carried. The rule applies as well to property which is made the subject
of larceny by statute, as to property which is made the subject of larceny by the
common law." (2 Wharton's Criminal Law, 11th ed., p. 1389.)
"Again, property may be stolen in one state, and brought into another. Can the
latter state punish the thief? It has been held from the earliest times that if a thief
steals goods in one country, and brings them into another, he may be indicted in
either, because his unlawful carrying in the second is deemed a continuance of
the unlawful taking, and so all the essential elements of larceny exist in the
second." (Clark's Criminal Law, p. 366.)
We do not believe that these American precedents, much as they are entitled to
our respect, apply to the cases in question; for, according to them, "to constitute
larceny the first essential is that the thing which is the subject of the crime should
be taken from the possession of the owner into the possession of the thief, and
be carried away by him, for until this is done there is no larceny, however definite
may be the intent of the prospective thief to commit the theft, and however
elaborate his preparations for doing so." (36 C. J., 747.)
"To constitute larceny, there must be a taking and a carrying away of personal
property with intent to steal it. Taking without carrying away is not larceny. (Com.
vs. Adams, 73 Mass., '1 Gra' 43, 44.)" This is so because their definition of larceny
is the following:
"Larceny at common law may, be defined to be the taking and carrying away from
any place, at any time, of the personal property of another, without his consent,
by a person not entitled to the possession thereof, feloniously, with intent to
deprive the owner of his property permanently, and to convert it to the use of the
taker or of some person other than the owner." (36 C. J., 734.) It may be inferred
from the foregoing definition of "larceny" that the essential elements of this
crime are in a sense distinct from those of theft as the latter offense is known in
this jurisdiction.
In larceny, except in the State of Texas (36 Corpus Juris, 748), it is not only
essential that there must be a taking away or abstracting of personal property
belonging to another, but the person taking must also carry it away. In the
aforesaid State, the last requisite is not indispensable. But in all the other States,
the courts have generally held that, "where goods are stolen in one state and
carried into another, there is a larceny in the latter, on the ground that each
moment's continuance of the trespass and felony amounts to a new taking and
asportation, and that the courts of the state into which the goods are brought
have jurisdiction to punish as for larceny in such state." (16 Corpus Juris, p. 167.)
This is also the rule in Texas because an express provision is to be found in its
procedural law which embodies it. Said provision is section 235 of its Code of
Criminal Procedure, which says:
"Where property is stolen in one county and carried off by the offender to
another, he may be prosecuted either in the county where he took the property
or in any other county through or into which he may have carried the same."
On the other hand, the elements of theft in this jurisdiction are: First, taking away
of personal property; second, that the property belongs to another; third, that
the taking must be with intent to gain; fourth, that it is done without the consent
of the owner; and fifth, that there is no violence or intimidation against persons,
or force upon things. It is not an indispensable requisite of theft that the
pickpocket or thief carry, more or less far away, the thing taken by him from its
owner. Wherefore, relying upon the provisions of article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads:
"Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter's consent," we hold that the thefts charged
in the two informations already referred to were wholly committed in Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, and that for their consummation nothing else remained to be done
from the moment that the appellee took away, with intent to gain, said animals
while they were yet in said municipality and province. It was not necessary that
there had been real or actual gain on his part or that he had removed the stolen
animals to the town of Candaba, in the Province of Pampanga, in order to make
use of or derive some benefit from them. It was enough that on taking them in
Gapan, he was then actuated by the desire or intent to gain. This opinion accords
completely with that stated in the case of United States vs. Adiao (38 Phil., 754).
In that case a Manila customs inspector took a leather belt from the baggage of a
passenger who had just landed at the port of Manila and kept it in his office desk
where the other employees found it afterwards. He was not able to make use of
said belt, but he was found guilty of theft for the reason that he had performed
all the acts of execution necessary for the consummation of the crime. Our
opinion is also in conformity with that expressed by the Supreme Court of Spain in
its decisions of December 1, 1897 and October 14, 1898, referred to in the Adiao
case, and that of the same tribunal of November 16, 1895 where it was said that
"the crime of theft consists in taking personal property belonging to another
person without his consent and it is no bar to its consummation that the offender
may not have been able to make use of the stolen articles, for it is not the gain
obtained, but his intention which, together with the other elements above-
mentioned, constitutes the crime in question." (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 662.)
Therefore, in accordance with the clear provision above-cited of section 6, No. 4,
of General Orders, No. 58, the prosecution of the appellee should have been and
should be commenced in Nueva Ecija.
Besides the foregoing, the following observations may also be made: From a
reading of the two informations in the two cases in question, it may be seen that
the appellee illegally took the carabaos from the owner thereof in Gapan because
the allegation to be found therein, particularly in one of the informations (C. F. I.
No. 5224; G. R. No. 45471), that the appellee ''did, then and there, voluntarily,
maliciously, illegally and criminally, take, steal, and carry away a male carabao
branded as ............... with certificate No. 6696261, dated at Penaranda, Nueva
Ecija, on April 11, 1928, valued at ninety pesos (P90), owned by Leon Ladores,
without his knowledge and consent, and to his damage and prejudice in the said
sum of P90. The commission of the crime having been commenced at Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, and completed at the municipality of Candaba, Pampanga," is to this
effect.
There is not a single allegation or insinuation in the two informations from which
it might be deduced that the desire to gain was not that which led the appellee to
steal the animals. It is, therefore, natural and reasonable to conclude that be took
them with intent to gain. In so holding, we adopt the same rule followed by the
Supreme Court of Spain, which we have seen applied in those cases to which its
decisions of October 14, 1898, October 18, 1899, January 10, 1900, February 6,
1902, November 15, 1894, and others relate and in which it was held that:
"The intent to gain is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of
useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator." (Decision of October 14, 1898.)
"It being stated as a proven fact in the appealed decision that the accused took
two bundles of barley from a farm, it is clear that, without a declaration as also
proven that he did so with a purpose other than to gain and with the
authorization of the owner, the elements constituting the crime of theft are
included in the word 'take.'" (Decision of October 18, 1899.)
"The act of taking figs from the tree of another without his consent constitutes
asportation in which the intent to gain is inherent, which intent is made more
manifest by the act of carrying them away." (Decision of January 10, 1900.)
"Although the asportation of a thing belonging to another without his consent
does not always imply the intent to gain on the part of the perpetrator, who
might have some other purpose in mind, when said purpose is not shown, it is
reasonable to believe that the taking was made with that essential element of the
crime of theft." (Decision of February 6, 1902.)
"Although the asportation of a thing appertaining to another without his consent
does not necessarily imply in all cases the intent to gain on the part of its author,
since his purpose might be different; when this is not shown, but on the contrary,
in order to justify his holding and free disposition of the thing taken, he alleges
title thereto by virtue of a contract of purchase and sale which he has not been
able to prove beyond doubt, it is reasonable to infer that the taking wa3 done
with intent to gain in the juridical sense which such concept has for purposes of
the crime of theft, whatever may be the class or condition of the persons doing
the illegal taking." (Decision of November 15, 1894.) (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, pp.
664, 665, 667, and 660.)
Practical reasons and considerations, however, require that no pass be opened to
the thief through which he may easily frustrate the right of the owner of a stolen
thing to recover it from him or to go after it, or which may make it difficult, if not
impossible, for him to secure the punishment of the offender. By allowing the
owner of the stolen thing to follow the thief no matter how far from the scene of
the crime the latter may have brought it, in order to have him prosecuted which,
surely, will be the effect of sustaining a contrary opinion, is to put obstacles in his
way precisely because this will result in expenses and delay. If this were done, the
thief would contrive in all cases to carry as far as possible what he may have
stolen so that he would have greater chances of getting unpunished.
In conclusion, we are of the opinion and so hold that the sole court possessing
jurisdiction over the cases against the appellee for the theft of the carabaos in
question is not that of Pampanga, but that of Nueva Ecija in which they should
have been and must be instituted.
Wherefore, the appealed order is hereby affirmed, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
125 Phil. 513
SANCHEZ, J.:
This case has its roots in a complaint lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila, by respondent Delfin Albano, quondam Congressman for the lone district
of Isabela, against petitioner Jaime Hernandez, then the Secretary of Finance and
Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank for violation of
Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code, Commonwealth Act 626[1] or Republic Act
265.[2] The complaint revolves around petitioner's alleged shareholdings in the
University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG, Inc.,
and University of Nueva Caceres; and the claim that said corporations obtained
dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during
petitioner's incumbency as presiding officer thereof. The charges involved were
docketed in the City Fiscal's Office, as
I.S. No. 11379 re petitioner's holdings in the Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres;
I.S. No. 11380 re petitioner's holdings in the University of Nueva Caceres;
I.S. No. 11381 re petitioner's holdings in the Bicol Electric Co.;
I.S. No. 11382 re petitioner's holdings in the University of the East; and
I.S. No. 11383 re petitioner's holdings in the DMG, Inc.
At the joint investigation of the foregoing charges before respondent Carlos C.
Gonzales, the investigating Fiscal, complainant moved to exclude therefrom the
alleged violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code because the
applicability of this statute was in issue in Solidum, et al., vs. Hernandez, L-16570,
at the time pending before this Court, but which had since been resolved by us
February 28, 1963 adversely to Hernandez. Fiscal Gonzales granted the motion.
Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining charges upon the
averment that (a) violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the
Constitution, punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at
the domicile of the private enterprises affected thereby; and that (b) violation of
Section 13 of Republic act 265 is not criminal in nature. Dismissal was denied;
reconsideration thereof failed.
To restrain the respondent Fiscals from continuing the investigation, petitioner
went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for preliminary injunction.[3] The decision dated October 13, 1961,
reached upon a stipulation of facts, dismissed the petition, with costs.
Petitioner appealed.
1. Stripped of inconsequential issues, the forefront question thrust upon us is
whether the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be restrained from
proceeding with the investigation of the charges levelled against petitioner.
By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are
empowered to investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial
jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an
investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office. The power to investigate
postulates-the other obligation on the part of the Fiscal to investigate promptly
and file the case as speedily. Public interest the protection of society so
demands. Agreeably to the foregoing, a rule now of long standing and frequent
application was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be
blocked by court prohibition or injunction.[4] Really, if at every turn investigation
of a crime will be halted by a court order, the administration of criminal justice
will meet with an undue setback.[5] Indeed, the investigative power of the Fiscal
may suffer such a tremendous shrinkage that it may end up in hollow sound
rather than as a part and parcel of the machinery of criminal justice.
We are not to be understood, however, as saying that the heavy hand of a
prosecutor may not be shackled under all circumstances. The rule is not an
invariable one. Extreme cases may, and actually do, exist where relief in equity
may be availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is
necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of
the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid
multiplicity of actions;[6] (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights;[7] and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional, or was "held invalid".[8]
With the foregoing guidelines, we come to grips with the legal problems of
whether
Violation of Art. VII, Section 11, Subsection (2) of the Constitution, punishable
under C.A. 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprise
affected by the violation; and
Violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is criminal in nature.
The constitutional proscription allegedly violated, Article VII, Section 11 (2),
reads:
"(2) The heads of departments and chiefs of bureaus or offices and their
assistants shall not, during their continuance in office, engage in the practice of
any profession, or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management or control
of any private enterprise which in any way may be affected by the functions of
their office; nor shall they, directly or indirectly, be financially interested in any
contract with the Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof."
Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of this
constitutional precept, i.e., a fine of not more than P5,000 or imprisonment of not
more than 2 years, or both.
The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place".[9] This principle is fundamental.[10]
Thus, where an offense is wholly committed outside the territorial limits wherein
the court operates, said court is powerless to try the case. For, "the rule is that
one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the
jurisdiction where it was committed".[11]
Similarly, the City Fiscal of Manila and his assistants as such may not investigate a
crime committed within the exclusive confines of, say, Camarines Norte. This
proposition offers no area for debate. Because, said prosecuting officers would
then be overreaching the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and, in the process,
step on the shoes of those who, by statute, are empowered and obligated to
perform that task. They cannot unlawfully encroach upon powers and
prerogatives of the Fiscals of the province aforesaid.
Petitioner seeks to bar respondent Fiscals from investigating the constitutional
violation charged. His claim is that except for his holdings in Manila's University
of the East the Manila Fiscals are powerless to investigate him. His reason is that
the essence of the crime is his possession of prohibited interests in corporations
domiciled in Naga City (Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva Caceres
and Bicol Electric Co.,) and in Mandaluyong, Rizal (DMG, Inc.); and that the place
where the crime is to be prosecuted is "the situs of such shares."
In effect, petitioner asks us to carve out an exception to the rule that said Fiscals
may not be enjoined from conducting the inquiry aforesaid. We would not
hesitate to state that, if it clearly appears that the crime or any essential
ingredient thereof was committed outside the boundaries of the City of Manila,
petitioner's argument should merit serious consideration. For, orderly
administration of justice so demands; multiplicity of criminal actions is to be
obviated; the long arm of the law cannot be used in an oppressive or vindictive
manner.
But let us take a look at the admitted facts of this case. Petitioner himself
concedes that he stands "charged with allegedly having shareholdings in the Bicol
Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva Caceres, DMG, Inc.,
and the University of the East, and that the said corporations purportedly
obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank thru the Monetary Board during
the incumbency of respondent as presiding officer thereof."[12]
Petitioner relies on Black Eagle Mining Co. vs. Conroy, et al., 221 Pac. 425, 426,
thus
"Shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal property, and are unlike other
classes of personal property in that the property right of shares of stock can only
be exercised or enforced where the corporation is organized and has its place of
business and can exist only as an incident to and connected with the corporation,
and this class of property is inseparable from the domicile of the corporation
itself."
By no stretch can the cited case be taken as germane to the controversial point
here. It speaks of property right to shares of stock which can only be enforced in
the corporation's domicile. In the case at bar, the charges are not directed
against the corporations. Not mere ownership of or title to shares is involved.
Possession of prohibited interests is but one of the essential components of the
offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of
a department Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of
department and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially
interested in the corporations aforesaid which secured the dollar allocations, and
that he had to act officially, in his dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in
Manila where he held his office.
Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or
an essential ingredient thereof took place, it stands to reason to say that the
Manila Fiscals, under the facts obtaining here, have jurisdiction to investigate the
violation complained of.
3. The other argument pressed upon us that a violation of Section 13 of Republic
Act 265 is not criminal in nature furnishes no better foundation.
Section 13 of Republic Act 265, allegedly violated by petitioner, recites:
"SEC. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. - Whenever any
person attending a meeting of the Monetary Board has a personal interest of any
sort in the discussion or resolution of any given matter, or any of his business
associates or any of his relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
second degree of affinity has such an interest, said person may not participate in
the discussion or resolution of the matter and must retire from the meeting
during the deliberations thereon. The minutes of the meeting shall note the
withdrawal of the member concerned."
The gravamen of petitioner's argument is that for a violation of Section 13 of the
law aforesaid, Section 15 of the same statute provides "only for a civil sanction"
"not a criminal sanction". Said Section 15 reads:
"SEC. 15. Responsibility. - Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or
employee of the Central Bank who wilfully violates this Act or who is guilty of
gross negligence in the performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss
or injury suffered by the Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. * * *"
The nonsequitur is at once apparent. For, Section 34 of the same Republic Act
265, in terms clear and certain and free from the taint of ambiguity, provides the
penal sanction,[13] thus
"SEC. 34. Proceedings upon violation of laws and regulations. - Whenever any
person or entity wilfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or
regulation legally issued by the Monetary Board, the person or persons
responsible for such violation shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more than five years. * * *"
But, petitioner draws attention to the fact that Sections 13 and 15 both fall under
"Article II. The Monetary Board", of Chapter I, - "Establishment and Organization
of the Central Bank of the Philippines", whereas Section 34 comes under the
heading "B. -Department of Supervision and Examination" of "Article IV.
Departments of the Central Bank". From this, petitioner puts forth the claim that
the penal provisions in Section 34 are "to be restricted to the matters
encompassed in that topic, that is, the supervision of banking institutions".[14]
We are unable to join petitioner in this ipse dixit pronouncement. And, for a
number of reasons. First, Because while Section 15 provides for the civil liability
"for any loss or injury suffered by the (Central) Bank as a result of such violation",
Section 34 prescribes the penalty for the wilful violation of "this Act", irrespective
of whether the bank suffered any loss or not. Second. The entire statute is to be
construed not in piecemeal style but as a whole. Effort should be exerted "to
make every part effective, harmonious, sensible".[15] And so construing, we find
that the one refers to the civil liability at the same time that the other specifies a
separate criminal liability. Indeed, it could well be said that the penal sanction in
Section 34 is an "additional incentive toward obedience of the mandates of the
law".[16] One does not preclude the other. Third. We observe that the penal
provisions of Republic Act 265 were placed in three successive sections thereof,
Sections 32, 33 and 34. Section 32 penalizes any owner, agent, manager or other
officer in charge of any banking institution who wilfully refuses to file the required
reports or to have the bank's affairs examined. Section 33 penalizes the making
of a false statement to the Monetary Board. Section 34 provides for the penalty
to be imposed upon any person who violates, among others, the provisions of
said Act. This grouping of penalties obviously was intended to present a clearer
picture of the liabilities which the Central Bank Act specifies, and thus avoid
confusion.[17]
All else failing, petitioner summons to his aid the congressional record on the
deliberations on House Bill 1704 (which later became Republic Act 265), to wit:
"Mr. Topacio Nueno. On page 6, Section 13 - prohibiting relatives from
transacting business. I should like to insert a punishment, a penal clause. On line
11, add the following: 'Violation of this section is punishable by dismissal and a
fine a from five thousand to ten thousand pesos.'
The Speaker. What does the Committee say?
Mr. Roy. We cannot accept the amendment.
The Speaker. When we come to the provision with regard to the penalties, the
gentleman from Manila may propose that amendment, in order that they may be
included in the same section.
Mr. Topacio Nueno. I reserve that amendment later on."
* * * * * * * off from the statute said Section 34. To do so is to sanction pointless rigidity in
"Mr. Laurel. May we be informed which of the three offenses mentioned in
Sections 32, 33 and 34 is regarded to be the most serious? I am asking this
question because I notice that the penalties imposed are not the same. Which of
the three offenses covered by the three sections I have mentioned is the most
serious?
Mr. Roy. Under Section 32, the offenses intended to be punishable are specified.
It is in Section 34 where the law is very broad. It provides: 'Whenever any person
or entity wilfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation
legally issued by the Monetary Board, * * *'. I think the court will determine the
gravity of the offense, Mr. Speaker, because there are many provisions of law;
and the rules and regulations of the Monetary Board will vary in their importance
and in the seriousness of the consequences of the violation. So we will leave to
the court the determination of the gravity of the offense. That is why the range of
penalties provided under Section 34 is not more than ten thousand pesos and by
imprisonment of not more than five years. * * *"
Congressional Record, First Congress, Third Session, Vol. 3, pp. 1259, 1281.
Petitioner notes the failure of Congressman Topacio Nueno to reiterate his
proposed amendment to Section 13 by providing therein a penal clause. Paying
full respect to the congressional intent as it may be reflected in the debates,
nonetheless it seems to us that nothing in the quoted transcript of the
congressional record may be reasonably deemed as foreclosing criminal action.
That the announced amendment was not submitted, is perfectly understandable.
There was no need therefor. For, as Congressman Roy aptly puts it (in the
aforesaid record), "Under Section 32, the offenses intended to be punishable are
specified. It is under Section 34 where the law is very broad." Which simply
means that any person and this includes the Chairman of the Monetary Board
who "wilfully violates this Act", shall be punished.
The respondent Fiscals, indeed, justifiably relied on Section 34 in pursuing their
investigation for a violation of Section 13. For, Section 15 is not intended to write
statutory construction.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, we vote to affirm the judgment under
review. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
MANUEL S. ISIP v. PEOPLE, GR NO. 170298, 2007-06-26
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII
of the RTC of Cavite City... on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines... accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1)
seven carat diamond (men's ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the... purpose of
selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return the jewelry if not sold... but the herein accused once in
possession of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud and with grave
abuse... of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use and
benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the
return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds... of the sale thereof, failed
to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the
abovestated amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Later, appellants learned that, although all the transactions were entered into in
Manila, complainant filed the cases herein before the Cavite Regional
Trial Court... accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84,
260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby
found guilty of Estafa... petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following as errors
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE CASES
AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND
THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED
THEREIN WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED
Ruling:
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
jurisdictional.[14] The place where the crime was committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.[15] It is... a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases,
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal... cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial shows that the offense... was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the
same to be in order.
Foz vs People (2009) G.R. 167764
Facts:
Petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr and Danny Fajardo were charged with the crime of
libel. Upon arraignment, they were assisted by counsel de parte and pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued, finding both of them guilty.
Petitioners moved for recon but was denied. Dissatisfied, they appealed to CA
who affirmed in toto the RTC decision. They then filed a motion for recon which
CA denied. In their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the first time the issue
that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient
to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
Issue: WON the RTC of Iloilo City had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as
charged.
Held: SC ruled on the negative. The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first
time the issue of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their
Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from
doing so.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific
rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation: The criminal action and civil
action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this
chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense:
The allegations in the Information that “Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region” only
showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable
circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first
published in Iloilo City.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by
the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information failed to allege the
venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC
of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting
petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.
People Vs Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009)
Facts:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. She was able to get hold of a
cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in
order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental
Protection, which she headed. After almost two years since she obtained the said
cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V.
Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle
her unliquidated cash advance within seventy‐two hours from receipt of the same
demand letter. The Commission on Audit, submitted an investigation report to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB‐Visayas), with the
recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain
whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Thereafter, the OMB‐Visayas, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB‐Visayas'
Resolution, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent
Amante. The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria
Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445. The case was raffled to the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a
MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION and was
opposed by The OSP. The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dismissed the case
against Amante. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26
who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Held:
Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the
offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December
19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction
of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution
of the [15] action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The
exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides
that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the
offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Esquivel v. Ombudsman G.R. No. 137237
September 17, 2002 Quisumbing, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Certiorari--Mandamus Digest By: Bries
SUMMARY: Several police officers filed complaint-affidavits against Antonio
Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva Ecija and his brother, Mark Anthony,
brgy. captain of Brgy. Apo, Jaen. They were charged with illegal arrest, arbitrary
detention, maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats. After preliminary
investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a resolution
recommending that petitioners be indicted for less serious physical injuries and
Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The Ombudsman approved the resolution.
Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners pleaded not guilty and
filed an SCA for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or TRO to annul and set aside the Ombudsman resolution. SC: NO
GAD BY OMBUDSMAN, CAN’T AVAIL OF MANDAMUS.
DOCTRINE: Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of
a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment. When a decision has been reached in a matter
involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct
it, however erroneous it may be. Where another remedy is available in the ordinary
course of law, mandamus will not lie
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: SCA for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
prayer for preliminary injunction and/or TRO to annul and set aside the Ombudsman
resolution, and the order denying petitioners’ MR .
FACTS: PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan are residents of Brgy. Dampulan, Jaen,
Nueva Ecija, but assigned with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division,
Police Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their respective
complaint-affidavits, filed before the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,
Third Regional Office, Eduardo and Catacutan charged Antonio Esquivel, municipal
mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony, brgy captain of Apo, Jaen, with alleged
illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats.
Also included in the charges were SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, and LTO Officer Diaz.
Eduardo and Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp. Padua and SPO3 Bautista of the Jaen
Municipal Police Force of dereliction of duty.
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30 p.m. of
March 14, 1998, Eduardo was about to eat lunch at his parents house at Sta. Monica
Village, Jaen, when petitioners arrived. Espiritu, Almayda, Diaz, and several unidentified
persons accompanied them. Petitioners disarmed Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service pistol,
which was covered by a Memorandum Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption.
They forced him to board petitioners’ vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall.
Eduardo stated that while they were on their way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel
mauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed
a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said “You son of a bitch! I will kill you, I will create an
accident for you. Why are you against me?” Upon reaching the municipal hall, Mark
Anthony shoved Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered Espiritu to
kill him, then create a scenario and make a report
Catacutan arrived to verify what happened to his teammate, Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel
threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp. Padua to file charges against
Eduardo. The mayor once again struck Eduardo in the nape with a handgun, while Mark
Anthony was holding the latter. Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness. When he
regained his consciousness, he was told he would be released. Prior to his release,
however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good
physical condition.
Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and
threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the
law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the
mayor disliked the fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to
the mayor. In support of his sworn statement, he presented a medical certificate showing
the injuries he suffered and other documentary evidence.
After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the
records to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary investigation
and required petitioners and their companions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In
their joint counter-affidavit, petitioners denied the charges against them. Instead, they
alleged that Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for
malversation. They alleged that the gun confiscated from Eduardo was the subject of an
illegal possession of firearm complaint.
The Deputy Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending that Mayor Esquivel and
Mark Anthony be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor
Esquivel alone for grave threats. The charges against the others were dismissed, either
provisionally or with finality. Ombudsman Desierto approved the resolution. Separate
informations for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony,
and for grave threats against Mayor Esquivel, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman. As
directed by the Sandiganbayan, they filed an MR/reinvestigation with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor. That was denied by the OSP, which the Ombudsman approved.
Petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and they pleaded not guilty to the charges. With
their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings previously granted by the
Sandiganbayan by virtue of their MR, petitioners elevated the matter to the SC alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in rendering the resolution
and the order. SC denied their petition for the issuance of a TRO directing public
respondents to refrain from prosecuting criminal cases.
ISSUES: WON Ombudsman commit GAD in directing the filing of the informations
against petitioners?
WON Sandiganbayan commit GAD in assuming jurisdiction?
HELD: NO to both. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the SC will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his
constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. Otherwise,
innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the
same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on
the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.
There was no abuse of discretion in disregarding Eduardo’s admission that he was in
good physical condition when he was released from the police headquarters. Such
admission was never brought up during the preliminary investigation. The records show
that no such averment was made in petitioners counter-affidavit nor was there any
document purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as an annex or
exhibit. Petitioners only raised in their MR. In his opposition, Eduardo did admit signing
a document to the effect that he was in good physical condition when. However, the
admission applied to the execution of the document—not the truthfulness of its contents.
Here, certiorari is not the proper remedy. The SC is not a trier of facts and it is not its
function to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the
concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.
Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their persons as they
hold positions excluded in R.A. No. 7975, as the positions of municipal mayors and
barangay captains are not mentioned. Municipal mayors fall under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Mark Anthony claim that since he is
not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides that it is only in cases where none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher that exclusive original
jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC, and municipal circuit court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in BP 129, as
amended. Under the 1991 LGC, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27. Since Brgy.
Captain Esquivel is the co-accused of Mayor Esquivel in a criminal case, whose position
falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over both criminal cases involving them. Hence, the writ of
certiorari cannot issue in petitioners favor.
Petitioners’ prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be denied. A writ of prohibition is
directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to
which it has no legal claim. The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over criminal cases is clearly
founded on law.
Being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and
usual remedies provided by law are adequate and available. Prohibition is granted only
where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners
have another and complete remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally
held sufficient reason for denying the issuance of the writ. In this case, petitioners could
have filed a motion to quash the informations at the first instance but they did not. They
have only themselves to blame for this as they have not shown any adequate excuse for
failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for time to file a motion to
quash the informations, during their arraignment, but its denial is not a proper subject for
certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an interlocutory order.
A writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of
the court whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The foundation of this rule is the respect and consideration due to
the lower court and the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation; it cannot be
presumed that the lower court would not properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it
were properly presented. Petitioners only raised the issue of the alleged lack of
jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan.
Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and
not a discretionary duty. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. Hence, the SC cannot
issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the
Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the SC. When a decision has been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of
mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it may be.
Petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Where such
remedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.
E. JURISDICTION OF OMBUDSMAN
1. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v LIWAG
FACTS:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a
complaint-affidavit on before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel
Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her
complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents
Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form
and substance and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the
charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that
the charges against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before
the NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit
before the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP
officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes: kidnapping for ransom and murder
of several individuals. On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to
Lacson, et al named in the witnesses’ sworn statements directing them to submit their counter-
affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint
filed by the NBI. However, Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001 that the
DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are
complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same
respondents, and claimed that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving
public officials, including police and military officials such as private respondent. DOJ, which
construed the letter as a motion to dismiss, denied the motion.
Lacson, et al. filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition, which the RTC granted, saying that the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case, and directing the DOJ to desist from conducting
preliminary investigation. Thus, the DOJ filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC.
ISSUE/RULING: W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the
pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and
circumstances – NO
RATIO:
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the
case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. Since
the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction over the matter, respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on
the same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the
resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no power and right
to add an input into the Ombudsman’s investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative
agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such
agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman.
The public respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the law that the Ombudsman may
take over, at any stage, from any investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials such as the petitioners. That situation
presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving
public officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the
Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take
over, at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another agency. It has
the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power and authority
would thus require the respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the
Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors by the
Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates
absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The hierarchy of powers
must be remembered.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the settled
rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between
the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to
be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a
contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case,
it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to
proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation
over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of
justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A
preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to
be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of
proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear
and defend his position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This
would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There
is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies
exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the
guilt of the respondents.
ANTONINO v DESIERTO
FACTS
Petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against the respondents for
violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of RA No. 3019 and for malversation of public funds
or property through falsification of public documents. This concerns the alleged conspiracy involving
respondents to cheat and defraud the city government of General Santos through the illegal
disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park in violation of law and its charter.
The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges against the respondents. Petitioner filed
MR which was denied by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman held that since the criminal
Informations were already filed and the cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan and
the regular courts of General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.
Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: w/n the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in the exercise of his prosecutor functions, by dismissing the charges against the
respondents.
HELD: NO
1. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
 A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of
written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects
the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall
be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Petitioner failed to establish that her MR was indeed filed on time, and thus, failed to
refute the assertion of the respondents based on the aforementioned Certification that petitioner
was personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution. There are a number of instances when rules
of procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer
any explanation at all for the late filing of the MR. We find no justification why the Ombudsman
entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.
2. (relevant topic)
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Well-
settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of
his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate
otherwise. A contrary rule would encourage innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper the
functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts would be swamped by a
deluge of cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors
each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This Court laid down the following
exceptions to the rule:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to
amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in
contemplation of law. The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found
wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule.
3.
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused under Section
3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of
his or her official duties, or in relation to his or her public functions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a
private party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable neglect.
As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no showing of evident
bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective acts of the respondents. Finally, petitioner
speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and those indicted. However, as found by the
Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not supported by ample evidence.
Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design. This, the
petitioner sadly failed to establish.
.PUNZALAN v DELA PENA(Borrowed from C)
FACTS:
Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors. On Aug. 13, 1997, Dela Peña, a house
boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan,
Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex “Toto” Ofrin, and others arrived. Eugenio
shouted at Dela Peña, “Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili ang sumbrero mo?” Dela Peña replied, “Kalbo nga
ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako.” Irked by the response, Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while
Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on him. Somebody shouted, “Yariin
na ‘yan!” Thereafter, Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed.
 While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas’ family driver, who was
carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun and pointed it to the group chasing him to scare them. Michael
Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Peña. The gun
accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. The group ran after them and when they
got to the Platas’ house, shouted, “Lumabas kayo d’yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!”
Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide
and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm.
In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña filed several counter-charges for grave oral
defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries against the
Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña against Rainier and Randall
Punzalan and fourteen others and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Peña against Ofrin.
In their counter-affidavit, the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were
fabricated in order to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal
Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara, respectively.
Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan,
mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City, Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance of other people, told him, “Hoy Robert,
magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng
trabaho.” In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the alleged defamatory statements.
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the
complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, holding that Cagara failed to show
that the alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon him. He
also found that the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a state of distress and were not
actionable. The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also
dismissed because complainant Dela Peña’s claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the
defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier against the
latter.
Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the DOJ. On March 23, 2000, then Justice
Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the
Assistant City Prosecutor.
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their co-respondents,
filed separate MR. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000
Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the movants, Punzalan et
al. (Reason: Oral Defamation case should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements
were uttered without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger. Anent the
Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Peña against Rainier, the Secretary held that the allegations
in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by
Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Peña failed to prove that Rainier, Randall and his
companions intended to kill him.)
Respondents’ MR was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which
reversed June 6, 2000 Resolution where Secretary of Justice directed the withdrawal of
informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against
the respondents.
Petitioners’ MR was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice –YES
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion to justify
interference by the Courts.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code,
the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the decisions or
resolutions of the prosecutors. “Supervision and control” includes the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the
performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or
units.
In the case of People v. Peralta, we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
In the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, we declared that: A public prosecutor, by the
nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal
justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been
presented by the petitioner.
We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the
prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is
not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting
officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are
convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the
determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested
with discretion in the discharge of this function.
 Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the
functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide
against the other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative of whether or not he
committed grave abuse of discretion.
First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory
remarks were uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The CA in its
Decision stated the settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the
trial court in view of its opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the
stand. The City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the occurrence of the incident, is the
best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine
probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within the hearing distance
of third parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence existed. The
Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.
As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners other than
Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the
nature of a countercharge. The DOJ in a Resolution had already directed that Dela Peña be likewise
investigated for the charge of attempted homicide in connection with the shooting incident that
occurred on August 13, 1997 making him a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted
in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of Dela Peña should be threshed out
in the proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of Rainier
Punzalan.
In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion
contrary to the finding of the CA. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v.
Guingona that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject
to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.
SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT or INFORMATION
1. PEOPLE v DIMAANO
FACTS:
Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano, with 2 counts of rape and 1 count of
attempted rape in the complaints which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Maricar Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his
own daughter, a minor 10 years of age, against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 96-150
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Maricar Maricar Dimaano y
Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 96-151
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the
commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform
all the acts of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause
other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant’s mother. CONTRARY TO LAW.
The trial court found Edgardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape (2 counts) and
the crime of attempted rape. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with modifications as to
the award of damages. In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern
Review of Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), the case was
CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for review.
ISSUE:
W/N the complaint for attempted rape was sufficient?
RULING: NO.
RATIO:
We affirm the trial court's conviction for the crimes of rape. However, we acquit Edgardo for the
crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of
attempted rape.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements
of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as
to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The above-cited complaint upon which Edgardo was arraigned does not allege specific acts or
omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient
allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the Edgardo 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted
the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of
conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of Edgardo to be informed of the nature of
the accusation against him.
SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
1. SALUDAGA v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses, MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares,
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares,
Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official
administrative function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of
Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate
intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage
to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, through evident bad
faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for
the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares,
Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00)
each or a total of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the
benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government and public interest.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation dated June 4, 2008 which was strongly
opposed by the prosecution in its Opposition dated June 18, 2008.
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary investigation
before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter
charged a different offense–that is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to
private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They argue that assuming
that no substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment in the new
information and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the finding of a
prima facie cause to file the case.
The graft court found that there is no substituted information or substantial amendment that would
warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. It gave the following ratiocination:
The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but merely modified the
mode by which accused committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not such as to
necessitate the conduct of another preliminary investigation.
Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the accused upgraded in
the re-filed information. Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, when the
second Information in the instant case constituted substituted Information whose submission
required the conduct of preliminary investigation. - NO
RULING:
There is no substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the offense charged.
While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the
accused before trial, the denial of petitioners’ claim for a new investigation, however, did not
deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of the case discloses that
there was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first Information, and
conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct violations of,
or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from
giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very least, a substantial
amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded on the same transaction as the first
Information, that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care
centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary
requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same.
A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are
charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a
principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence.
No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no modification in the nature of
the charged offense.1avvphi1 Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary and
cannot be demanded by the petitioners.
AMENDED INFORMATION
1. BONIFACIO v RTC
FACTS:
Planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously
purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the
benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with
prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC, formed PEPCI.
PEPCI manages and controls the following websites that served as a forum to seek redress
for their pecuniary loss under their policies; www.pepcoalition.com,
www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group[7] at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com.
These websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet and were
alleged to contain libellous statements against the Yuchengcos.
Gimenez, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), a
criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under
Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against petitioners.
The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, found probable cause and caused the issuance of the
information which was eventually reversed on appeal by the Secretary of Justice. The Justice
Secretary opined that the crime of “internet libel” was non-existent, hence, the accused could not
be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.
Hence, Petitioners, filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law
since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective
for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense of libel. Motion granted.
Motion for reconsideration granted and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to “amend the
Information to cure the defect of want of venue. The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the
Amended Information dated March 20, 2007, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees
they hold the legal title to the websitewww.pepcoalition.com which is of general
circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John
Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue,
honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc.,
Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for
further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an
article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted
and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati
City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the
private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
ISSUE: whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondent’s admission of the
Amended Information.
RULING: YES
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.[33] This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as
amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil
aspects of such cases.
Venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two
places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.1 The Amended
Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated
that the offending article “was first published and accessed by the private complainant
in Makati City.” In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation
of printing and first publication.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended
party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to
forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its
printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his firstaccess to the
defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with “printing and first publication” would
spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent.
It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending
website.
PRESCRIPTION
1. PANAGUITON v DOJ(lifted from net)
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of
money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business
associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the
said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of
funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary
investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that
he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to
Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate;
in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson
denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said
checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's
signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a
copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business
associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause
only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the
proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson
to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to
refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of
merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to
Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe
after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled
in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint
with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered
"the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In
justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special
acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a
special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No.
3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of
offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004
resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's
failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant
petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition
on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the
questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not
provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act
No. 3326.
Issue: Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art.
90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held: It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in
the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing
rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However,
from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24
August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9)
years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already
initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks
because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October
2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice
dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
1. PINOTE v AYCO
FACTS:
State Prosecutor Pinote filed an administrative case against RTC Judge Ayco for gross ignorance of
the law, grave abuse of authority, and grave misconduct. In a criminal case being handled by Pinote,
Judge Ayco allowed the testimony of 2 witnesses in court, despite the absence of Pinote. Pinote, at
that time, was undergoing medical treatment in the Philippine Heart Center.
In the following hearings, despite orders of Ayco, Pinote refused to cross examine the witnesses due
to his being absent during their direct examinations, contending that the proceedings were void.
Pinote filed a Manifestation stating such, but Judge Ayco ruled that the prosecution was waiving its
right to cross-examine the 2 witnesses instead.
The Court Administrator found in favor of Pinote, stating that Ayco violated Rule 110, Sec. 5 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE:
W/N Ayco should be held administratively liable?
HELD:
YES. Ayco should be held administratively liable.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the
public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public
prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution
Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the
court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the
termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked
or otherwise withdrawn.
Ayco’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant
public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of
the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-
examine the witnesses.
Bun Tiong vs. Balboa
A separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of violations of B.P.
No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case.
***********
Facts:
Balboa filed two (2) cases against Sps. Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok
Ching Teng:
(1) A CIVIL CASE for sum of money based on the three (3) post-dated checks
issued by Caroline in the total amount of P5,175,250.00. The Regional Trial Court
found the spouses liable and ordered them to pay the amount.
(2) A CRIMINAL CASE for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Caroline
covering the said three checks. The Municipal Trial Court acquitted Caroline but
held her civilly liable. On appeal, the RTC modified the MTC Decision by deleting
the award of civil damages.
The spouses now comes to court charging Balboa with forum-shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the Balboa's act of filing civil and criminal cases constitute forum-
shopping.
Held:
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court
would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt
to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by an
appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the
parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions;
(2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on
the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., the Court
ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of action between a civil case for
the recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of bouncing checks, and
a criminal case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the
dismissal of the civil action so as to prevent double payment of the claim.
In the said case, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 effective
September 16, 1997, which provides that "the criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding
civil action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or
recognized."
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit: (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.
The foregoing, however, is not applicable as the civil and criminal case were filed
on February 24, 1997 and on July 21, 1997, respectively, prior to the adoption of
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. At the time of filing of
the cases, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to
wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Since Balboa instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then the civil
case may proceed independently of the criminal cases and there is no forum
shopping to speak of. Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for
the recovery of civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when
the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage
the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. (Bun Tiong vs. Balboa, G.R. No.
158177, January 28, 2008)
Community Rural Bank vs Judge Talavera
Case Doctrines:
● The secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision and control over
prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority who decides which of the
conflicting theories of the complainants and the respondents should be believed.
The provincial or city prosecutor has neither the personality nor the legal
authority to review or overrule the decision of the secretary.
● A preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a
trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except to determine whether a
crime has been committed, and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty of that crime.
● In criminal proceedings, the word “party” is held to mean not only the
government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the
orders issued and/or judgment rendered therein. Elementary due process
mandates that the other party be notified of the adverse action of the opposing
party, so as to avoid a capricious change of mind and to ensure impartiality of the
trial.
● When a motion is pro forma, the court cannot act upon it.
Facts: Community Rural Bank (Bank) filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office
of Cabanatuan charging several persons (the accused) with Estafa. After
preliminary investigation, 6 informations for estafa were filed, 2 of which were
raffled to the branch where respondent, Judge Talavera, presided.
The accused appealed the finding of the Fiscal to the DOJ, which the latter denied,
so Judge Talavera issued a warrant of arrest with no bail against the accused.
Later, the accused filed with Judge Talavera a motion for reinvestigation and to
lift the warrant of arrest. Bank was not notified of this motion. Judge granted the
motion without any hearing thereon. When the reinvestigation was conducted,
the Bank was still not notified.
The assistant provincial prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation reversed
the earlier findings of the fiscal. On the same day, a motion to dismiss was filed
with Judge, which he granted, and he also ordered the release of the accused.
The Bank was never notified of any of these proceedings. Bank then filed an MR
arguing it was deprived of due process. It also asked that the criminal information
be reinstated. Judge denied this. Hence, Bank filed the present case charging
Judge Talavera with (1) serious misconduct and/or gross inefficiency and (2)
violation of Rules 1.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance and violation of
simple legal precepts.
Held:
Yes. Respondent judge's gross ignorance and violation of simple legal precepts is
clearly shown by his issuance of the Orders granting the Motion for
Reinvestigation of the accused and the prosecutor’s Motion to Dismiss.
Motion for Reinvestigation
First, judge should not have entertained the motion for reinvestigation, since DOJ
Secretary Serafin Cuevas already denied with finality the appeal of the accused,
finding that there was prima facie evidence against the accused. The secretary of
justice, who has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers, is
the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of the
complainants and the respondents should be believed. The provincial or city
prosecutor has neither the personality nor the legal authority to review or
overrule the decision of the secretary.
Section 7 of Department Order No. 223 (the rules governing appeals from
resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations) provides:
Sec. 7. Motion for Reinvestigation. – At any time after the appeal has been
perfected and before the resolution thereof, the appellant may file a motion for
reinvestigation on the ground that new and material evidence has been
discovered which appellant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered
during the preliminary investigation and which if produced and admitted would
probably change the resolution.
Here, the motion for reinvestigation was filed 3 months after the DOJ Secretary
already denied their appeal with finality. Clearly, therefore, Judge Talavera was
wrong in granting the motion. In granting the Motion for Reinvestigation,
respondent effectively demolished the DOJ’s power of control and supervision
over prosecutors.
Newly discovered evidence
Also, there was no newly discovered evidence. The one-page Affidavit executed
by Ms Gloria Sacramento, one of the co-accused in the criminal case. was clearly
not newly discovered; it was already known to the accused even during the
preliminary investigation. There was no explanation whatsoever as to why this
piece of evidence was never presented during the preliminary investigation.
Nonetheless, respondent hastily granted the Motion.
Preliminary investigation
It must be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and
inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except
to determine whether a crime has been committed, and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of that crime. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence, which needs to be presented only to engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
Motion to Dismiss
Second, it was also error for the Judge to grant the Motion to Dismiss by relying
merely on the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation. In
his Order, he merely stated that the motion to dismiss is meritorious, and nothing
more. The Order failed to demonstrate an independent evaluation or assessment
of the evidence against the accused.
The Judge acted with undue haste when he granted the Motion only a day after
the reinvestigation was concluded. This leads to the conclusion that the judge did
not personally evaluate the parties’ evidence before acting on the Motion.The
discretion to grant a Motion to Dismiss rests solely with the court. However, mere
approval of the position taken by the prosecution is not equivalent to the
discretion required. Once a complaint or an information is filed in court, the judge
-- not the prosecutor -- assumes full control of the controversy. A grant of the
motion to dismiss is equivalent to a disposition of the case itself, which is a
subject clearly within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
When Judge issued the warrants of arrest without bail against all the accused, it is
presumed that he had studied the Information and the Resolution of the
prosecutor and agreed with the latter’s findings of probable cause. Thus, the
grant of the Motion for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to Dismiss for alleged
insufficiency of evidence posed a serious contradiction of the earlier finding of
probable cause.
Pro forma motions
Finally, Judge granted both of the Motions despite the obvious lack of notice to
the Bank and lack of hearing. This lapse effectively deprived it of its day in court.
The Rules of Court require that, with the exception of motions that the court may
act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written
motion should be set for hearing by the movant. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court explicitly require that notices be sent at least three days before
the hearing and directed at the parties concerned; and that they state the time
and place of hearing of the motion, with proper proof of notice thereof. Without
such proof, the motion is considered pro forma; thus, the court cannot act upon
it.
The purpose of the notice is to enable the adverse party to appear for its own
protection and to contest the motion. Elementary due process mandates that the
other party be notified of the adverse action of the opposing party, so as to avoid
a capricious change of mind and to ensure impartiality of the trial. Here, the
Motions for Reinvestigation and to Dismiss were fatally defective, as neither
contained any proper notice of hearing. Respondent thus grossly erred in taking
cognizance of these Motions.
In criminal proceedings, the word “party” is held to mean not only the
government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the
orders issued and/or judgment rendered therein.
Due process
Undoubtedly, complainant had an interest in the maintenance of the criminal
prosecution. Its right to intervene therein was practically beyond question, as it
neither instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do so.
Thus, as the party injured by the crime, it had the right to be heard on a motion
that was derogatory to its interest in the civil aspect of the case. Due process
necessitates that it be afforded this opportunity, especially because of a conflict
between the positions of the public prosecutor and of the offended party.
All told, respondent showed his lack of understanding, not only of the basic and
established superior-subordinate relationship between the secretary of justice
and the provincial prosecutors, but also of the functions and duties of the trial
court in “the proper scheme of things” in our criminal justice system.
Judges are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. The Code of Judicial Ethics requires them to be
embodiments of, among other desirable characteristics, judicial competence.
They are not common individuals whose gross errors “men forgive and time
forgets.” Judge was FINED P20,000.00. (Community Rural Bank v. Tomas B.
Talavera, 455 SCRA 34, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909, April 6, 2005)
Serag v. Court of appeals
Facts:
In the wee hours of May 11, 2001, Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr., a mayoralty candidate in
San Joaquin, Iloilo during the 2001 elections, was shot to death in front of his
residence. His driver, Norberto Salamat III, was also wounded. The Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group in Iloilo City filed a criminal complaint for
murder and attempted murder against LinoNapao, then incumbent mayor of San
Joaquin, and Sebastian Serag.[1] In a Joint Resolution dated May 26, 2001, the
Provincial Prosecutor filed two Informations with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Guimbal, Iloilo:
(1) for Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms, and
(2) Attempted Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms against Serag and
Napao and seven unidentified persons. Accused Juan Napao and the 14 other
additional accused filed on August 16, 2002, a petition for review of the July 26,
2001 Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
The trial court found probable cause for murder and attempted murder against
the accused. Consequently, the court issued an Order[7] on September 27, 2001,
for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused who were still at large.
Pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the said petition for review,
the proceedings were suspended. The Secretary of Justice had issued Resolution
No. 258 affirming with modification, the Joint Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor, downgrading the charges from Murder to Homicide, and from
Attempted Murder to Attempted Homicide, The Provincial Prosecutor was
likewise ordered to amend the Amended Informations accordingly. Amended
Information for homicide and attempted homicide in the two cases, and for the
court to admit the said second Amended Informations. However, the RTC verbally
granted the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor, and admitted the Second
Amended Information for Homicide. Motion for reconsideration. The court
forthwith arraigned the accused for homicide, who pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. On November 22, 2002, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with Criminal Case Nos. 925 and 926 In
the meantime, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution[17] on November 18,
2002, granting the motion for reconsideration of the private complainant, setting
aside Resolution No. 258.
Issue:
Whether he RTC acted with inordinate and precipitate haste when it granted the
Provincial Prosecutors motion for the admission of the Second Amended
Information for homicide?
Held:
As the appellate court correctly pointed out in its November 10, 2003
Resolution.the pendency of an appeal before the DOJ is enough reason for the
deferment of any proceedings in the trial court and petitioner, through the
private prosecutors, correctly moved for the deferment of the admission of the
second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide. It should be
considered that the motion to defer was even with the conformity of the public
prosecutor and the appearance of the private prosecutors is pursuant to Section
16, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Intervention of the
offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
Besides the oral recitation in open court by the private prosecutors of the
grounds cited in the motion to defer the admission of the second amended
informations for homicide and attempted homicide, which the public respondent
found unprocedural, petitioner was not really given the opportunity to oppose
the motion to admit the same informations. All these facts taken together, there
appears to be an undue haste on the part of the public respondent in admitting
the second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide and
ordering the arraignment of the private respondents to the said informations.
This is considering that no word of protestation was heard from the petitioner
when she waited for nine (9) months for the DOJ to resolve the private
respondents petition for review.
Soriano vs People and BSP
G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010
Facts:
Soriano was charged for estafa through falsification of commercial documents for
allegedly securing a loan of 48 million in the name of two (2) persons when in fact
these individuals did not make any loan in the bank, nor did the bank's officers
approved or had any information about the said loan. The state prosecutor
conducted a Preliminary Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers
of Special Investigation of BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2) separate
information against Soriano for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents and violation of DORSI law.
Soriano moved for the quashal of the two (2) informations based on the ground:
that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, for the letter
transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and was defective
for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, such as statment of address of the petitioner and oath of
subscription and the signatories were not authorized persons to file the
complaint; and
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, for the commission of estafa
uner par. 1(b) of Art. 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation
of DORSI law (Sec. 83 or RA 337 as amended by PD 1795), and therefore a person
cannot be charged of both offenses.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint filed complied with the mandatory requirements of
law.
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in
an order denying a Motion to Quash.
Ruling:
Yes, the letters transmitted were not intended to be the complaint but merely
transmitted for preliminary investigation. The affidavits and not the letter
transmitting them initiated the preliminary investigation and therefore is the
complaint which substantially complied with the manadory requirements of law.
No. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to
trial without prejudice on his part to present special defenses he had invoked in
his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
Topic: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
SAMUEL LEE V. KBC BANK
Facts:
In a complaint-affidavit, Liza M. Pajarillo, manager of the corporate division of
KBC Bank, charged Lee and Lim of estafa. In his Resolution, State Prosecutor
Josefino A. Subia (State Prosecutor Subia) found the existence of probable cause
and recommended that two counts of estafa be filed against Lee and Lim.
In the Petition for Review filed by Lee and Lim, they claimed that the prosecutor’s
resolution merely relied on hearsay evidence (fax message) which cannot be the
basis for a finding of probable cause.
Issue:
If the issue of admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence assailed as hearsay
applies during preliminary investigation stage?
Held:
NO. Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the exhaustive display of
presentation of evidence.
Whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence and whether the
element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters best ventilated in a
full-blown trial, not in the preliminary investigation. In Andres v. Justice Secretary
Cuevas, the Court held that:
[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of [the prosecutions] evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon
after a full-blown trial on the merits.
Thus, the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation level.
Preliminary investigation is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Topic: Preliminary Investigation
OKABE V. GUTIERREZ
Facts:
Charged for Estafa, Petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only
documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating
prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the
complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced
by the parties were not attached thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the
documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were not enough on which
the trial court could base a finding of probable cause for estafa against her.
The court denied the petitioners motions on the following grounds:
(a) Based on its personal examination and consideration of the Information, the
affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama and the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor duly approved by the city prosecutor, the court found
probable cause for the petitioners arrest. Since the petitioners motion for a
determination of probable cause was made after the court had already found
probable cause and issued a warrant for the petitioners arrest, and after the
latter filed a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, such motion was a
mere surplusage;
In denying her motion for a determination of probable cause, she posits that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
If the RTC judge may rely on investigating prosecutor’s resolution in the
determination of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
HELD:
NO. In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the said report.[The
judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also
the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-
affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted
to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.
The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to the issuing
judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of the
investigating prosecutor that he had conducted a preliminary investigation in
accordance with law and the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable
cause for the filing of the Information.
The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first
and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included
therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The purpose of
the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the
accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged of crimes from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must make a personal determination of the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Under
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the investigating
prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation of a case cognizable by the
RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent therein is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is
for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the
Information against the respondent, he executes a certification at the bottom of
the Information that from the evidence presented, there is a reasonable ground
to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is, by
itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the
said certification as basis for a finding of the existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused.
Topic: ARREST
PEOPLE V. DE LEON
Facts:
Rodante de Leon was charged with violation of RA 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
A buy-bust team was formed to act on the illegal activities of De Leon upon the
report of a confidential informant at the Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task
Force at the Novaliches Police Station in Quezon City. De Leon was arrested upon
selling to PO2 Magcalayo, posing as buyer, shabu for P200. The seized drug was
identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence.
The RTC and CA both found De Leon guilty of the crime charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the buy-bust operation, allegedly full of irregularities was legal.
Ruling:
YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has
been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided
due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
The Court upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties and ruled that the elements of the crime were sufficiently established,
thereby affirming the decision of the CA.
PEOPLE VS LAGUIO JR.
FACTS: Respondent was acquitted on 3 different cases filed against him
(dangerous drugs act, illegal possession of firearms and comelec gun ban) after
his demurrer to evidence (inadmissibility of the evidence) was granted due to the
illegal/unlawful arrest, search and seizure that was conducted by the police
officers contending that he was arrested in flagrante delicto but the defense
further presented that respondent did not do any overt act to make him be
subject to a warrantless arrest under the exceptions in section 5 of rule 113.
ISSUE: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a WOA and/or SW.
HELD:
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless
arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search
may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires
that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process
cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search
and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a
crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for
a warrant of arrest.
Section 5, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that
said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest
of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph
(a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any
suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would
reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the
Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the
police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded
him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned
by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under
paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent
any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the
warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the
illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
Topic: Arrest
VALDEZ V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Arsenio Valdez was found guilty for violating Sec. 11 of RA 9165.
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the
crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit
for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against him by
the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that
followed was likewise contrary to law.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest was validly made?
HELD:
NO. When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit.
Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not
one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By
their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he
alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense.The
tanoddid not have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that
two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. Here, petitioners act of looking around
after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached
 him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the
tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly,
petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay
tanod when they approached him.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared
dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity
enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for
the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-
frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioners
behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing, and should
be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him.
ROLITO GO V. CA G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
FACTS:
The incident happen along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila where the car of Rolito Go
bumped the car of Eldon Maguan while the Go was traversing a one-way “wrong
direction” road.
Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then
boarded his car and left the scene.
A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number.
The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an
empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol.
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa
Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the
suspect had come from.
The police were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the
shooting.
The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the
cashier of the bake shop.
The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively
identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a
manhunt for petitioner.
7 days after the shooting incident, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him.
An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman.
That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against
petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner,
in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to a preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
2 days after and before the prosecutor filed the information in court, Eldon Maguan died of
gunshot wounds.
Accordingly, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, the prosecutor filed an
information for murder before the RTC. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the
information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release
and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the
information was filed.
Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail.
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page
of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted
provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
Petitioner was released when his cash bond was approved.
Prosecutor filed with the RTC a motion for leave to conduct a preliminary investigation and
prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended.
The prosecutor stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which
motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to
recommend cash bail of P100,000.00.
The trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and
cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have
concluded its preliminary investigation.
However, the respondent judge issued an order on July 17, 1991, recalling his bail, the leave
to conduct P.I, and his omnibus for immediate release. Likewise, the judge ordered the
petitioner to surrender within 48 hours.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme
Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order.
Petitioner contends that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process.
Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by
the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent
Judge.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without a warrant because he went to
the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus,
petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was
arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness
to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly, none had the “personal knowledge” required
for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless
arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to
the right to a preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful
WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
1. NO. The arrest was invalid.
First, the trial court’s reliance in the case of Umil v. Ramos is incorrect. Herein, appellant was
charged with murder while in Umil, the accused was charged with subversion, a
continuing offense.
The petitioner’s appearance to the police station did not mean he was arrested at all.
Petitioner neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of
any crime.
Second, the instant case did not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan.
The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at
the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of
Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating
that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan.
The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out
to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute
"personal knowledge."
2. NO. Petitioner did not waive his right to P.I.
Petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be
conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder was
filed with the RTC, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation.
Moreover, the Court does not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, we did hold that appellants there had
waived their right to a preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest,
they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have
the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for
preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to
preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by
petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of a preliminary investigation on the part of
petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
a preliminary investigation, he clearly implied to recognized that petitioner's claim to the
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
#24 MABUTAS vs JUDGE PERELLO
FACTS:
The case involves two admin complaints against Judge Perello by Supt. Mabutas and City
Prosec. Togononon regarding Judge’s gross ignorance of the law in granting bail in
dangerous drugs cases. In Admin Case 1, Mabutas complains about the granting of bail to
accused Omadan who was charged with possession of 57.78 g of shabu, with no bail
recommended. However, Judge Perello, in her order, stated that evidence of guilt was not
strong for her to deny bail. Additionally, there may have been lapses in carrying out the
arrest and preliminary investigation of Omadan (no witness during search of Omadan’s
illegal activities). Thus, Judge Perello, allowed bail in the amount of P1M.
In Admin Case 2, the Prosecutor likewise complains of Judge Perello’s granting of bail to 4
drug cases. These were done without hearing. Judge Perello reasons out that since the
shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor and that the amounts of
Shabu involved were less than 1 gram which is not punishable by capital offense and thus
bail should be a matter of right without need for hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge can be administratively liable for granting the bail in the drug cases.
HELD:
Admin Case 1. No, the Judge cannot be held liable administratively. This case has been
dismissed by SC as they found that Judge Perello has complied with her duty. The
Dangerous Drugs Act punishes possession of 50 grams or more of shabu with life
imprisonment to death. Hence, a capital offense. As such, bail is a matter of discretion
pursuant to Rule 114, Sec 7 which states that “No person charged with capital offense or
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
A hearing on application of bail is mandatory. In case one is filed, the judge is entrusted to
observe the following:
(a) In all cases, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application of bail and require him
to submit his recommendation;
(b) Where bail is matter of discretion, conduct a hearing regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence;
(c) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution; and
(d) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of bail
bond. Otherwise, bail should be denied.
In the case at bar, Judge Perello has complied with all the foregoing duties. She conducted
hearing; the prosecution has presented their evidence; she based her decision based on the
evidence presented; and since it was her conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong,
the petition for bail was granted.
Admin Case 2. Yes, Judge Perello should be held liable. Respondent Judge explains that
she did not conduct any hearings on the motions/petitions for bail filed in the criminal cases
subject of the complaint because the crimes charged are not capital offenses as the quantity
of shabu involved therein was minimal. Criminal Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 all
involve selling of less than 5 grams of shabu. Respondent Judge believes that under R.A.
No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the
selling of less than 5 grams is punishable only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years.
Such being the case, respondent Judge maintains that bail is a matter of right and a hearing
is not required. The SC ruled, for his failure to conduct any hearing on the application for
bail, we hold respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law justifying the imposition
of the severest disciplinary sanction on her.
Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010.
[CORONA, J.]
FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail
pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions as
grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court
to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the
grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court?
HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean
automatic grant of bail in case of appeal.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly,
the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial
discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by
the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards
approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the
rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise
consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent
effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long
delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the
post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more
likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too
freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a
mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.
#26 DOMINGO VS. PAGAYATAN
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint dated December 7, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator,
Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) charged Executive
Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
(Branch 46) with Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Criminal Case No. R- 5075 for
Estafa, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto M. Peaflorida. Complainant alleged:
On September 14, 2001, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of Commissioners (BOC)
issued Summary Deportation Order (SDO) against Ernesto M. Peaflorida, a U.S. citizen,
after finding that he is an overstaying and undocumented alien, in violation of Section
37(a)(7) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940. Peaflorida is also a fugitive from justice since he stands indicted in the United
States for health care fraud which resulted in more than $1,376,000.00 losses to the U.S.
Federal Government. No appeal was filed with the Office of the President. The SDO
became final and executory on October 15, 2001. On the same date, respondent issued a
Notice of Arraignment requiring the production of Peaflorida on November 19 and 20, 2001.
On the scheduled hearing of November 19, 2001, respondent denied the P40,000.00 bail
recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional release of the accused on the
ground that the crime Peaflorida was charged with involved large scale estafa, a non-
bailable offense. Respondent ordered the commitment of Peaflorida to the Provincial Jail in
Magbay, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. However, later on that same day, the BOI received
information that respondent had allowed the release from detention of Peaflorida, who is an
alien federal fugitive, without the interdepartmental courtesy of affording prior notice to the
BOI of such action.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent Judge should be administratively liable for not conducting
hearing on bail.
RULING:
The Court ruled, under the present rules, a hearing is required before granting bail whether
it is a matter of right or discretion. The prosecution must always be given an opportunity to
present within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
Court may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails
to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions. Moreover, since the accused was
accompanied by the personnel of the Bureau of Immigration when brought to the
RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, for his arraignment in Criminal Case No. R-
5075 respondent Judge could have easily verified from his escort if the former was being
detained for other crimes aside from the one where he was being arraigned in respondent’s
sala. Had he done so, respondent could have been informed outright by the B.I. personnel
escort that the accused had already been the subject of a Summary Deportation Order and,
thus, he could have deferred action on the latter’s (accused) Motion to Fix Bail and afforded
the Bureau of Immigration the chance and opportunity to interpose their objection to the
grant thereof. A hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching questions from which
it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused, in
cases where the offense is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should then formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt
of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be
invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge’s
evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the defense
Topic: Bail
LACHICA V. TORMIS
Facts:
In an affidavit dated Oct 2, 2003, Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judged Rosabella M Tormis
of the Municipal Trial court of Cebu City, Branch IV, with abuse of authority. On July 2,
2003, accused Domugho was apprehended by the police at around 8:45pm and was
brought to the police station for booking and custody at 9:30pm.
On July 3, 2003, complainant was surprised to receive a call from the accused that she was
released from confinement on July 2 at 10:00pm. Complainant inquired from the police
station if an order of release was issued by the court, but she was informed that the accused
was released because of the phone call the respondent judge made telling the desk officer
that the accused already posted a cash bail. Complainant checked the case records but the
expediente contained no copies of the order of release. She was only shown a copy of such
at 1:00pm. Also, it was only on 430pm of july 3, 2003 that the case records was found.
The police blotter showed no entry of the order of release received was by the police. Only a
notation that there was a posting of the cash bail bond was entered therein.
Complainant states that it was improper for the respondent judge to receive the cash bail
bond as the function belonged exclusively to the office of the clerk of court. Also, she
claimed that said judge committed an act of impropriety when she called the police station to
verbally order the release of the accused.
Respondent judge denied the charges. She states that she issued the order of release at
7pm after accused posted the cash bond. She claimed that such accused was released
because of the order of release and not because of the phone call. The investigating judge
submitted a report recommending that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000
or suspended for 3 months. OCA agreed with the findings and recommended the
suspension of 3 months.
Issue:
WON respondent judge can be held administratively liable for personally receiving the cash
bail bond for the accused.
Held:
Yes. Section 14, of Rule 114 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that:
“The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the
nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of
bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the
case…….”
Section 14 exclusively enumerates those officials who are tasked to receive such bail bond.
A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should
such cash be kept in the office of the judge.
Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority
when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately
misleading the court by making false representations. She is suspended from office for 6
months w/o salary and other benefits and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall
be dealt more seriously.
28. SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR Numbers 148468, 148769, and 149116
January 28, 2003
FACTS:
The case is a consolidation of 3 petitions filed by Edward Serapio which assailed resolutions
of the 3rd Division of the Sandiganbayan in denying his petition for bail, motion for
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus in relation to a plunder
case against him.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation. He received a Php200 million donation from Chavit Singson. He received
the donation and turned it over to the treasurer of the Foundation and it was deposited to
the account with the Equitable PCI Bank. In 2000, Singson publicly accused Estrada and his
cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities triggering the filing with the Ombudsman
several criminal complaints against Estrada. Petitioner was among the persons included in
the criminal charges. Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations
against Estrada and other persons and no bail was recommended for the provisional
released of the accused. Ombudsman found probable cause for plunder and petitioner filed
an MR. It was denied because the information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of
warrants of arrests for the accused, including petitioner. Petitioner was detained at Camp
Crame for the said charge. Arraignment was set and petitioner filed a petition for Bail.
Several other bail meetings did not push through. Even before the Sandiganbayan can
resolve the issues, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus and
certiorari praying that the issued Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be declared void
because he was denied due process.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner of his right to due process of the law.
HELD:
No. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but it is a right
conferred by a statute. Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to answer the charges
against him during the preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence dictates that the Court do not
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in its conduct of preliminary investigations. It
was enunciated in Raro v. Sandiganbayan that in the performance of the task to determine
probable cause, the Ombudsman’s discretion is paramount. The lack of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the information filed before the court. The denial
of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus does not deny him of his right to due process
because there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner
has voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. Habeas corpus does not lie because
there was no deprivation of liberty. Also, the delay in the hearing of the bail cannot be solely
pinned upon the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is also to be blamed. Habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail.
Salta vs. CA
Facts: On 1970, Almario T. Salta was charged by the Philippine National Bank before the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). Salta filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
against Patrocinio Dayrit, Renato Tayag and others. In support of his complaint and as part
of his defense in Salta submitted his affidavit .
On 1973, Salta filed a complaint against Patrocinio Dayrit, Renato Tayag, Adoracion Tayag
and Montano Bundad directly with Judge Ancheta for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. The
complaint, docketed, alleged the same grounds and issues raised by Salta in the earlier
complaint against
Dayrit, Tayag and the others filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The complaint had
been dismissed by both the Provincial Fiscal and District State Prosecutor Kliatchko.
On the other hand, the Philippine National Bank charged Salta before the Provincial Fiscal
in Pampanga for alleged violations of the Anti-Graft Act committed by Salta in the PNB
Guagua Branch where he was transferred after his Malolos assignment. After an
investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga found a prima facie case against Salta and
filed the corresponding information with the Circuit Criminal Court presided by Judge
Ancheta. Judge Ancheta issued an order ruling that "unless otherwise restrained by higher
courts, the requisite preliminary investigation thereon on Salta's complaint shall be
conducted. Judge Ancheta further held that "until such time when the preliminary
investigation shall have been terminated, the hearings on the merits of the criminal case is
hereby suspended." The scheduled preliminary investigation was postponed upon motions
of respondents Adoracion S. Tayag, Renato D. Tayag, Montano Bundad and Patrocinio
Dayrit. Subsequently, these respondents filed their respective motions to dismiss, premised
on the principle that under Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, the judge
may take cognizance of and conduct preliminary investigation of a complaint filed directly
with him only if there has been no "... previous preliminary examination and investigation
conducted by fiscal ... ." Judge Ancheta denied the motion to dismiss. A joint motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondents was likewise denied. The judge then reset the
preliminary investigation. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal
Court presided by Judge Ancheta to conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaint
filed by Salta against Tayag, Dayrit and others when the previous Identical complaint filed
by Salta with the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan had already been dismissed by the fiscal and,
later, by the district state prosecutor for insufficiency of evidence. Judge Ancheta acquitted
Salta in Criminal Cases. On March 22, 1974, Judge Ancheta issued a resolution in
connection with the preliminaryinvestigation he conducted. The Dayrit petition was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Tayag petition was
granted and the resolutions and orders complained of were set aside and declared as null
and void. A motion for reconsideration filed by Dayrit was denied. Likewise, a motion for
reconsideration filed by Salta was denied. Hence, both Dayrit and Salta filed the present
petitions for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Ancheta had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation over Salta's complaint against petitioner Dayrit and Renato Tayag, the
respondent
Ruling: We have in the past viewed with disfavor the unseemly interest of Judges of Circuit
Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary investigations in cases they will later try. We stated in
Collector of Customs v. Villaluz (71 SCRA 357) that the authority given to regular Courts of
First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal
Courts. However, we made it clear that even as said courts may have such authority, they
must concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before them instead of
discharging a function that could very well be handled by the provincial or city fiscal.
A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience,
expense, and burden of defending himself in a formal trial until the reasonable probability of
his guilt has first been ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. It
is also intended to protect the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials.
(Section 1, Rule 112 of the present Rules of Court states that it is conducted for the purpose
of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The preliminary investigation proper is, therefore,
not a judicial function. It is a part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive.
Wherever there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations,
courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them. The fact that a
certain power is granted does not necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately
exercised.
Cognizant of the above, Section 37 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 reiterates the removal from
Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital Region the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations. There are enough fiscals and prosecutors in the region to do the
job. Similarly, Section 2 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longer
authorizes Regional Trial Judges to conduct preliminary investigations.
The respondent Judge conducted the questioned preliminary investigation pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. Even if we assume that there had been
no prior investigations and granting that Judge Ancheta had jurisdiction to conduct another
preliminary investigation, the record shows that he behaved in such a manner that the
respondents, among them Tayag and Dayrit, were virtually deprived of due process of law.
The death of Renato D. Tayag has rendered the said petition moot and academic. This
however, does not preclude this Court from cautioning trial judges on their obligation to
observe "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" at all times to satisfy the requirements of
due process. The petition is granted. The questioned decision of CA is reversed and set
aside
Gozo vs Tac-An
In a school party in Batangas, Gilbert Dyogi was killed while he an a member
of PNP grappled for the possession of his gun. The PNP members were
charged with murder but files a motion to quash which was granted by the
judge who ruled that there is a probable cause to hold Blanco to stand in
trial for homicide only while co-accused were discharged for insufficiency of
evidence. He then directed the Provincial Prosecutor to file an Ammended
information as a matter of convenience.
Issue: W/N a judge can conduct a preliminary investigation
Held: No. Rule 112 of Rules of Court enumerated the officers authorized to
conduct PI. Judges of RTCs is not one among those mentioned. They nno
longer have authority that was once given under 1964 Rles of Court. 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure did not eestore such athority. Art. 3 sec. 1 is
dfferent from PI by Prosecutors. The purpose of PI is whether a crime has
been commited and w/ntheres a probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof PI is not a trial of a case on merits, it is only inquisitorial. It is not
an occation for the full and exhaustive display of evidence
Yapdiangco v. Buencamino
Facts: On February 1, 1965, the fiscal diled information for slight physical injuries allegedly
committed by the petitioner on December 2, 1964. Since the information was filed after the
prescribed 60‐day period petitioner moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground
of prescription. Respondent denied the motion contended that it was filed within the
prescriptive period since the last day fell on a Sunday or legal holiday, therefore should not
be counted.
Issue: Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays or Legal Holidays.
Held: No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop the running of the
prescriptive period as a matter of statutory articulation. According to Article 91, the only
exception is the offender’s physical absence and no other cause can be sufficient to
interrupt prescription. The Court ruled that where the sixtieth and last day to file information
falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty‐day period cannot be extended up to the next
working day. Prescription has automatically set in.” The fiscal cannot file the information on
the next following working day as it would tantamount to extending the prescriptive period
fixed by law. Criminal Statutes are to be strictly construed. Statutes of limitations in criminal
suits is essentially different from statute of limitations in civil suits. Therefore, the motion to
quash the criminal prosecution was granted on the valid ground on the valid ground of
prescription.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ
G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
An accused cannot be convicted of a crime which is not indicated or included in
the offense as charged in the information.
Facts:
An information was filed against Pareja, charging him of raping his stepdaughter.
During trial, the prosecution was able to prove that Pareja penetrated AAA’s anal
orifice. The trial court convicted Pareja of rape by sexual assault.
Issue:
Whether Pareja may be convicted of rape by sexual assault
Ruling:
No. The accused has the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him to avoid surprises on the accused and to
allow him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
Rape by sexual assault is not indicated in the information, which charged Pareja
with rape by carnal knowledge. Rape by sexual assault is not necessarily included
under rape by carnal knowledge and vice versa; the two offenses are
fundamentally different from each other. Rape by sexual assault is committed by
inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; while rape by carnal
knowledge is committed only through penile penetration of the vagina. Pareja
may not be convicted of rape by sexual assault even if it be duly proven by the
prosecution during trial.
Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug. 3, 2010
Crim Pro - Rule 110
Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste
charging him with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12,
2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed
an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow
the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the
Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to
conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other order that
admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate
court.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered
the plea of "not guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent
Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court
granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not
strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended
Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From
the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate
court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to
murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a
right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.
Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other
matters are merely of form. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by
the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood
would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one
form as in the other.
An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime
alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been
held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no substantial distinction
between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining
whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from
the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him
as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not, however, make much of the
opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended
charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the
proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in
the reinvestigation.
Ricarze v. CA, G.R. No. 151785, Dec. 10, 2007
Crim Pro - Rule 110
Facts:
Eduardo Ricarze was a collector-messenger of City Service Corporation. He
was assigned to collect checks payable to Caltex. He then opened a bank account
in the name of Dante Gutierrez, a regular customer of caltex. He did so by forging
the signatures of the dorsal portions of the stolen check and deposited it in that
same bank account. Upon knowledge of his crimes, he was charged by the
officers of Caltex with estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
In the original infomation filed by the prosecutor, Caltex appeared to be the
only offended party because the prosecutor was not informed that PCI Bank
credited certain amount to Caltex.
After the arraignment and enter of plea, PCIBank appeared as the
complainant. Then, Ricarze averred that the information can no longer be
amended because he had already been arraigned under the original information,
and that doing so would place him in double jeopardy.
PCIBank argued that it had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of
the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of
Caltex as private complainant.
Issue: Whether or not an information can be amended even after the accused had
been arraigned and had entered his plea.
Held: Yes, because the amendment in the name of the complainant is one of
form. Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of
the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry
of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it
does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available
after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime
alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been
held to be one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is
not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the
charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The
documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and
all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot
claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
G.R. No. 141986 July 11, 2002
NEPLUM, INC.
EVELYN Vs.. ORBESO
FACTS:
The trial court promulgated its judgment acquitting Neplum of the crime of estafa
on October 29, 1999. On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private
prosecutor, received its copy of the Judgment. On 29 November 1999, petitioner
filed a motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment, considering that
27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration
on 29 November 1999. On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy
of the 24 January 2000 Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit
petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration. On 31 January 2000, a Monday,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. On the same day,
petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.
On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner
received through the private prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying due course
to petitioner‘s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. It accepted
respondent‘s arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was being
taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice
of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period was
counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be
reviewed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation of the
decision to the accused or from the time a copy thereof is served on the offended
party.
HELD:
It is from the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the
judgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as a consequence of the
service of the notice of the decision. Section 6, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides:
“SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.
This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion
for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the
motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel.”
The italicized portion of the provision uses the conjunctive “or” in providing for
the reckoning period within which an appeal must be taken. It shall be counted
from the promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.
It is petitioner‘s assertion that “the parties would always need a written
reference or a copy of the judgment x x x to intelligently examine and
consider the judgment from which an appeal will be taken.” Thus, it
concludes that the 15-day period for filing a notice of appeal must be
counted from the time losing party actually receives a copy of the decision
or order. Petitioner ratiocinates that it “could not be expected to capture or
memorize all the material details of the judgment during the promulgation
thereof.” It likewise poses the question: “why require all proceedings in
court to be recorded in writing if the parties thereto would not be allowed
the benefit of utilizing these written [documents]?”

We clarify. Had it been the accused who appealed, we could have easily
ruled that the reckoning period for filing an appeal be counted from the
promulgation of the judgment. In People v. Tamani, the Court was
confronted with the question of when to count the period within which the
accused must appeal the criminal conviction. Answered the Court:
“The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from
February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on
appellant‘s counsel by registered mail is not well-taken. The word
‘promulgation‘ in section 6 should be construed as referring to ‘judgment‘,
while the word ‘notice‘ should be construed as referring to ‘order‘.” The
interpretation in that case was very clear. The period for appeal was to be
counted from the date of promulgation of the decision. Text writers are in
agreement with this interpretation.

In an earlier case, this Court explained the same interpretation in this

wise: “It may, therefore, be stated that one who desires to appeal in a
criminal case must file a notice to that effect within fifteen days from the
date the decision is announced or promulgated to the defendant. And this
can be done by the court either by announcing the judgment in open court
as was done in this case, or by promulgating the judgment in the manner
set forth in [S]ection 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.” Clear as those
interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to the case at bar,
because in those instances it was the accused who appealed, while here
we are confronted with the offended party‘s appeal of the civil aspect only.
Thus, the question arises whether the accused-appellant‘s period for
appeal, as construed in the cited cases, is the same as that for the private
offended party. The Court answer in the negative.