Professional Documents
Culture Documents
New Ventures
Expanding Beyond a Single Industry
Hotel Corporation of India Limited (HCI):
India Hotel Group Ltd. (HCI) is a public limited company wholly owned by Air India Limited. It
was established in 1956 under the Companies Act in 1971, when Indian Airlines decided to enter
the hospitality industry to maintain the prevailing trend. Between world airlines. The goal is to
provide passengers with better products, including international airports and other tourist
attractions, which has also increased tourism to India. However, in 2002-03, three properties of
HCL, namely Indo-Hokke Hotel Co., Ltd. (Centaur Hotel, Rajgir), Centaur Hotel, Juhu Beach and
Centaur Hotel, Mumbai Airport were sold. The remaining HCI units are Centaur Hotel, Delhi
Airport, Centaur Hotel Lakeview, Srinagar and Delhi Kitchens at Delhi and Mumbai.
Air India Express: Air India Express is the airline's low-cost subsidiary which was established in
2005 during the aviation boom in India. It operates scheduled passenger services primarily to the
Persian Gulf and South East Asia. Air India Express is currently the only airline in Air India
Limited which posts profits. It operates a fleet of Next Generation Boeing 737-800 aircraft.
Air India Regional: Air India Regional (formerly known as Alliance Air) serves mainly on
regional routes. Its main hub is Delhi's Indira Gandhi International Airport.
These are actually helpful in maximizing the learning effects, increasing brand loyalty and also
increasing the share or revenue of the airline on a whole.
Alliance Air operates air services to 53 destinations with a fleet of 16 ATR 72-600 (70-Seater) and
2 ATR 42-320 (48-Seater) aircraft.
Air India Charters Limited: Air India Charters Limited operates a low-cost airline under the
brand name Air India Express. It offers scheduled flight services mainly between Tier-2 and Tier-
3 cities in India and destinations in Gulf and South East Asia. The company was incorporated in
1971 and is headquartered in Kochi, India. Air India Charters Limited operates as a subsidiary of
Air India Limited.
Air India Air Transport Services Limited: Air India Air Transport Services Limited provides
ground handling services. The company was incorporated in 2003 and is based in Mumbai, India.
Air India Air Transport Services Limited operates as a subsidiary of Air India Limited.
Air India Engineering Services Limited: Air India, the Country's proud flag carrier, also has the
`biggest' MRO set up in India that can serve as a One-Stop-Shop for all Engineering requirements.
Air India Engineering Services Limited (AIESL), a wholly owned subsidiary company of Air
India Limited was formed on 11th March 2004. Presently, AIESL is approved by the DGCA
under the purview of CAR-145 which carries with it nomination and acceptance by the DGCA of
additional Managers (Base Maintenance, Line Maintenance and Workshops) who are competent
and experienced in the area of their work.
AIESL policy is to be self-reliant in areas of Aircraft Maintenance (Line and Base Maintenance),
Preventive Maintenance, Alterations or required Inspections, overhaul of aero engines and
components and accessories and specialized services NDT etc.
AIESL comprises of huge infrastructure to cater to Line Maintenance, Base Maintenance, Engine
Overhaul, Accessories Overhaul and Component Overhaul activities as per capability at main
bases and line stations.
AIESL provides Base Maintenance facilities at Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Hyderabad,
Thiruvananthapuram and Nagpur Airports. These locations also have specialized overhaul shops
and are equipped with the necessary hangars, workshops, storage rooms and office buildings, in
accordance with national and international regulations and requirements.
AIESL also provides Line Maintenance Facilities at various Indian as well as International
Stations. It offers exclusive maintenance services to Third Party Customers.
Entry Strategy
Acquisitions
As part of the merger process, a new company called National Airline of India (NACIL) was
formed, in which Indian Airlines (along with Air India Express) and Indian Airlines (and Alliance
Airlines) merged. On February 27, 2011, Indian Airlines and Indian Airlines merged with their
subsidiaries to form Air India Limited.
It turns out that although the combined entity is still touted, there are still losses, which makes
people wonder whether it is feasible to maintain a national airline under taxpayer spending. In the
case of economic fluctuations and high oil prices, the debate continues.
Restructuring
In order to attract passengers, the airline launched the latest printing event called “Jaldi Jaldi”,
which offers discounted fares for domestic travel. It also launched an extension of the short-term
promotional plan Silver and Platinum pass in September this year. Air China spokesperson G. P.
Rao said that in addition, the airline also launched an advertising campaign and the Delhi Metro,
and increased the frequency of its film brand promotion.
In addition, according to the company's statement, airline passenger traffic increased by 23% in
August and passenger revenue increased by 11% in 2017-18. This is the outlook after management
restructuring and improvement.
Chapter 11: Corporate Performance, Governance, and Business Ethics
Agency Theory
The airline sacked 58 union members of the ACEU and All India Aircraft Engineers
Association.
They have held signature campaigns, seeking employees‟ support. The management has
been encouraging this exercise to split the ACEU which had opposed several of its policies.
Governance Mechanisms
Board of directors
Shri Pradeep Singh Kharola
Board Chairman and Managing Director,
Air India Ltd.
of Ms Gargi Kaul
Addl. Secretary and Financial Advisor
The current financial state of Air India has led to widespread speculation about the airlines ability
to survive. While diehard loyalists are hopeful that the government, in its capacity as 100% owner,
will never allow it to go bust, independent industry analysts are not as optimistic and are in fact
willing to set a timeframe up to which the national carrier can possibly survive, or be allowed to
survive.
The government’s response to the crisis in Air India has been ill thought-out and grossly
inadequate. The action initiated does not reflect the sense of urgency that is warranted.
The new board consists of Men of equal integrity, competence and proven track record have in the
past been appointed on the boards of Air India and Indian Airlines. Since the airlines have
witnessed a gradual and sustained decline in service standards, market share, etc, over the years
without showing signs of recovery, one should not expect too much from this exercise of
appointing new directors.
How much difference did their presence make to the fortunes of the airlines?
A review of the recent past shows that eminent personalities from the private sector have been
directors of one of the two airlines before their merger. Ajit Kerkar, the then head of the Taj Group
of Hotels, industrialist Suresh Keswani, Inder Sharma of Sita Travels and actor Jaya Bachchan, to
name a few, have been on the board of Air India at one time or the other. The national carriers
have also had stalwarts like Ratan Tata, Rahul Bajaj and Russi Modi as chairmen.
In all fairness to them, one can state with a certain degree of authority that most of the time the
civil aviation ministry has been engaged in backseat driving. Internal resistance to much needed
changes has also compounded the problem. What is needed is not new members (with no offence
intended to the new appointees) but good corporate governance. The board cannot have members
with little or no understanding of the airline industry’s functioning and the ground realities that
exist in Air India. It is one thing to take decisions that are deemed critical and imperative and
another thing to ensure the implementation of such decisions.
How much independence will the newly-appointed members exercise for approving and rejecting
proposals for the sake of the company’s well-being? One is tempted to raise this question because
notwithstanding the pitiable financial state that the airline has been in for the past few years,
decisions with enormous financial ramifications have been taken by the board, either voluntarily
or under some compulsions thrust on them.
Good corporate governance at the board level should also ensure that calls from ministry officials
or the minister himself are not entertained during board meetings for diktats on what decisions the
board must take on key agenda matters. This disdainful practice of tendering last minute advice
(read: order) has been on for almost two decades. Needless to say, intervention comes in most
cases where someone else’s interests supersede that of the airline.
What will be of significance, therefore, will be to see how the new board members approach the
present crisis. In the past, most members of the board have played roles which can be broadly
classified into three categories.
Needless to say, most private members, based on their performance, would see themselves
classified in the last two categories as they have generally failed to make an impact that is expected
of them. As the new members have been appointed at a time when Air India‟s ability to survive is
being questioned, it is only to be hoped that they will play a role, notwithstanding the infirmities
in the system, which can help save the national carrier.
With time being the greatest factor, the four new members should play their parts fearlessly with
the airline’s interest being the sole guiding force. Indians, particularly Air Indians, serving or
retired, will watch their performance with keen interest because Air India is not just any company
but has been an institution which in the yester years had evoked a lot of national pride.
Here’s wishing the new members from the private sector all the best and hoping that they will
reverse the historical trend which is heavily loaded against them and help steer the airline out of
turbulence.
Financial statement and Auditor:
CAG blasts ministry for Air India mess:
The national auditor said Accenture, the consultant asked to prepare the merger plan, did
not do enough work on the move's financial implications.
CAG did not agree with the theory that the merger was initiated by AI or IA in April 2006.
'Top down'; the ministry directed the erstwhile AI to appoint a consultant for the process.
The ministry failed to do a good monitoring job.