Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito,
Javier, Magculang
E. Tort distinguished from breach of contract
Jose Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co., (1918)
Facts:
Jose Cangco, herein plaintiff, was a clerk in the Manila
Railroad Company. By virtue of a pass issued to him, he would come
to work daily through the company’s trains free of charge. On January
20, 1915, while he was returning home by rail, an accident occurred.
When the plaintiff alighted when the train was barely moving, one or
both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons. As a
result, he fell violently on the platform and was drawn under the
moving car. As the train moved possibly six meters before it came to a
full stop, his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. Considering
that the accident occurred between 7-8pm and as the railroad station
was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away,
objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. His arm
had to be amputated in two operations. Thus, he eventually filed a
complaint in the CFI of the City of Manila to recover damages. The
lower court ruled that although negligence was attributable to the
defendant by reason of the fact that the sack of melons were so placed
as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless,
the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the
coach and was therefore precluded from recovering.
Issue: WON defendant railroad company is liable
Decision:
The decision of the lower court is reversed and judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
There are two kinds of culpa: 1) extra-contractual culpa,
substantive and independent, w/c of itself constitutes the source of an
obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie
(Art.1903) and 2) contractual culpa considered as “an accident in the
performance of an obligation already existing. On the first, the
obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the
unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his employment,
causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct.
There is a juris tantum presumption which may be rebutted by proof
that the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the
selection and supervision of the servant. The proof of diligence and
care in the selection and control of the servant does not relieve the
master from liability, in fact, it prevents the birth of the said liability.
This kind of culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission
which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention,
has caused damage to another. This Court has ruled that in cases of
extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that
there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant
personally. The liability in this case is imposed by reason of the breach
of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority
existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the
one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it. On the other
hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or
omissions of their servants or agents in cases of contractual culpa is
not based upon a mere presumption of the master’s negligence in their
selection or control, and proof of exercise of utmost diligence and care
in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach
of his contract. Proof of the contract and of its non-performance is
sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
The fundamental distinction between these two kinds of culpa,
rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum
juris, whereas in contractual relations, the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the
parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, the liability is limited to
persons who are morally culpable and for reasons of public policy, to
extend the said liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over persons whose acts or omissions are imputable.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it,
by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe
means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, Art.1258). That
duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-
performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally
imputable to defendant’s servants. As to the defendant’s defense of the
plaintiff’s contributory negligence, it has been settled that the test to
determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or
reasonable care. Thus, taking into consideration, the age, sex and
physical condition of Cangco, this Court held that he has not been
negligent for the following reasons: first, the circumstances of the
location of accident barred him from clearly noticing the sacks of
watermelon; second, he was possessed of the vigor and agility of
young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off
while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an
aged or feeble person; third, the place was perfectly familiar to the
plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this
station and last, there are other passengers who were able to alight
safely from the train while it is slowly moving.
Japan Airlines vs Jesus Simangan (2008)
Facts:
In 1991, Jesus Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his
cousin, Loreto Simangan, after tests proved that their blood and tissue
types matched. Simangan needed to go to the United States to
complete his preliminary work-up and donation surgery. Having
obtained an emergency U.S. visa, Simangan purchased a round trip
plane ticket from JAL bound to Los Angeles via Narita, Japan.
Simangan was allowed to board the plane on July 29, 1992, but
while inside, the crew suspected that he was carrying falsified visa and
travel documents to work illegally in Japan. The stewardess asked him
to show his travel documents. Shortly after, the stewardess ordered
him out of the plane and it was only when the plane left that he was
informed that his papers were in order. JAL refunded his ticket, but it
was deducted $500, and his emergency US visa was subsequently
cancelled.
Displeased by the turn of events, Simangan filed an action for
damages against JAL with RTC in Valenzuela. He claimed he was not
able to donate his kidney to Loreto; and that he suffered terrible
embarrassment and mental anguish. The RTC rendered a decision in
favor of respondent Simangan. JAL appealed to the CA contending
that it is not guilty of breach of contract of carriage, hence, not liable
for damages. CA affirmed the decision of RTC with modification as to
the amount of damages. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1) WON JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage?
2) WON respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages?
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang

Decision: example or correction for the public good, may be recovered in

contractual obligations, as in this case, if defendant acted in wanton,
JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is Radio Communications of the Philippines Inc. vs Court of Appeals
required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of such contract and its
(1986)
non-performance by the carrier through the latter's failure to carry the
passenger safely to his destination. Respondent has complied with Facts:
these requisites. Damage was made by JAL when respondent was
bumped off despite his protestations and valid travel documents and A telegram was sent through the Manila office of Radio
notwithstanding his contract of carriage with JAL. Communications of the Philippines (RCPI) to the offended party.
Loreto Dionela, reading as follows:
Respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
LORETO DIOMELA-CABANGAN-WIRE
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the
items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. As an 115 PM
exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING
mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764, KA DIYAN—WALA
in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in
which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article KANG PADALA DITO—KAHIT
2220. BULBUL MO”

The acts committed by JAL against respondent amounts to bad
faith. As found by the RTC, JAL breached its contract of carriage with
respondent in bad faith. JAL personnel summarily and insolently
ordered respondent to disembark while the latter was already settled in
his assigned seat. He was ordered out of the plane under the alleged
reason that the genuineness of his travel documents should be verified.
Dionela alleges that the defamatory words sent to him not only
wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and
affected his business. A carbon copy of the telegram is readily
available to the public as part of RCPI’s files, making it possible for
third persons to read the message. Both the lower courts and the Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of Dionela.

JAL is also liable for exemplary damages as its above- RCPI as a defense, alleges the following; (1) the additional
mentioned acts constitute wanton, oppressive and malevolent acts words were a private joke between the sending and receiving
against respondent. Exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of operators. It was never intended for Dionela; (2) RCPI as a petitioner-
employer should not be directly and primarily liable for the civil
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
liability arising from the criminal act of its employee; (3) there was no
sufficient publication of the telegram as to constitute libel and (4)
RCPI is not liable under art 19 and 20 of the NCC.
Issue: WON the petitioner is liable for breach of contract
Decision:
Petition DENIED. Decision of Court of Appeals affirmed.
Petitioner’s contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for
damages was filed in the lower court directly against respondent
corporation not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions
of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code. The cause of action of the
private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code
(supra). As well as on respondent’s breach of contract thru the
negligence of its own employees.
There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in
adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the
private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only
through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving
and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. In most cases,
negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover,
However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases,
we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing
speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or
circumstances surrounding the injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the
appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Juan J. Syquia, Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia and
Anthony C. Syquia vs The Honorable Court of Appeals, and the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (1993)
Facts:
Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, entered in
a contract of Deed of Sale and Interment Order with Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery Inc (MMPCI) . In the contract, there contained a
provision which stated that the coffin would be placed in a sealed
concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased from the
elements.
During the preparation for the transfer of Vicente’s remains in
the newly bought lot in Manila Memorial, it was discovered that there
was a hole in the concrete vault which caused total flooding inside,
damaged the coffin as well as the body of the deceased and covered
the same with filth.
Syquia filed a complaint for recovery of damages arising from
breach of contract and/or quasi- delict against the MMPCI for failure
to deliver a defect-free concrete vault to protect the remains of the
deceased. In its defense, MMPCI claimed that the boring of the hole
was necessary in order to prevent the vault from floating when water
fills the grave. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that
there was no quasi-delict because the defendant is not guilty of any
fault or negligence and because there was a pre-existing contract
between the parties. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: WON the private respondent is guilty of tort
Decision:
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
Denied. Decision of the CA affirmed.
We are more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the
negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify
a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the
pleas of the petitioners. Although a pre -existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent’s Court
finding that there was no negligence.
“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x
x.”
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled
“Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care” on August 27, 1969.
That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their
respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual
negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it
would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for
culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to
wit: “Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs The Honorable Court of
Appeals, Luis A. Luna and Clarita S. Luna (1995)
Facts:
Some time in October 1986, private respondent Luis A. Luna
applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner
Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. The
bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita S.
Luna.In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was
forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted
an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security
procedures and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so record the
lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled
Card" in its master file. Luis tendered lunch for a close friend, at Hotel
Intercontinental Manila, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD. Since
the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill
amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this
incident. In a letter, Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from
FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president
of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis. On 05 December
1988, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
Trial Court’s Ruling: On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given
the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to
pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b)
P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
CA: The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
M.R.: Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for
review.
Issue: WON FEBTC can be held liable for moral damages?
Decision:
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
There is merit in this appeal. The appealed decision is
MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to
private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal
damages.
RATIO:
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where
the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the
breach of the contract. 2 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple,
negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages
are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault
(which is presumed) of the common carrier.
Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to
personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can
sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to
cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence
in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to
amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is
different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad
faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill will. 6
“Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.” Article 21 of the Code, it should be
observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm.
Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could
properly relate to a breach of contract, its application
can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard
of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to
approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less
worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article
21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human
relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the
specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code
authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa
contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or
bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it
immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or
deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral
damages; and
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in
the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only
because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are
caused contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in
Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a
"preexisitng contractual relations between the parties."
The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made
by the court a quo, affirmed by the appellate court, to be inordinate
and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve
as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory. In criminal offenses,
exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with
one or more aggravating circumstance. In quasi-delicts, such damages
are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross
negligence as to approximate malice. In contracts and quasi-contracts,
the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to
have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to
honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle
him to recover a measure of nominal damages.
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court
deems such recovery to be just and equitable. We see no issue of
sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the
award thereof by the trial court.
Kristine Rea M. Regino vs Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology, Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elisa Baladad (2004)
Facts:
Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science
student at Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST).
Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the
financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of
school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics under
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
Sometime in February, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the
“Rave Part and Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go
to the construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts. Each
student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100.00
each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing
students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test
scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take
the final examinations. Financially strapped and prohibited by her
religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused
to pay for the tickets. On the scheduled dates of the final examinations
in logic and statistics, her teachers disallowed her from taking the
tests. Regino’s pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and
Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance
with PCST’s policy.
As a result, Regino filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for
damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad (PCST et al.). In her
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
complaint, she prayed from P500,000 as nominal damages, P500,000
as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages;
P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney’s
fees. PCST et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, contending that the complaint should
have been lodged with the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Aggrieved, Regino filed the present Petition on pure questions of law.
Issue: Whether PCST et al. can be made liable for damages
Decision:
Court ruled in favor of Regino. PCST et al. can be made liable
for damages.
In her Complaint, Regino also charged that PCST et al.
“inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty,
religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon
[petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness”; as a
result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of
her subjects for the second semester of that school year and had to lag
behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents
supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and
“demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in violation of Articles
19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the law state thus:
“Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.”
“Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
“Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly
station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.”
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not
otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may
be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its
students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. We
ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, from which we quote:
“x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that
obligations arising from quasidelicts or tort, also known as extracontractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this
Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722; 18 SCRA 155), the
private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from
a firstclass seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the
Court referred to the petitionerairline’s liability as one arising from tort, not
one arising form a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for
the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was not all
that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a
similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice
Fisher elucidated thus: ‘x x x. When such a contractual relation exists the
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an
extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.’
“Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code
on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x x x.”
F. Tort distinguished from civil liability arising from crime
The People of the Philippines vs Rogelio Ligon y Trias and
Fernando Gabat y Almera and Fernando Gabat y Almera (1987)
Facts:
On October 23, 1983, the accused, Fernando Gabat (Gabat),
was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio
Gabat, and driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon (Ligon). The
Kombi was coming from Espana Street going towards the direction of
Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat
by the window on the right side of the Kombi. At the intersection of
Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the
underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic
light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando
Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales), the
victim, to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the
Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this
transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the
Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. Rosales
clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell
down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the
Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October
30, 1983. In an autopsy, it was stated that the cause of death of Rosales
was "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries
of the head."
The prosecution claimed that Gabat grabbed the box of
cigarettes from Rosales and moved loose the latter's hand from the
window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting
the pavement. The defense, however, claims that as the vehicle sped
onward, the cigarette box which was squeezed between the right arm
of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi. Rosales then
ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving
vehicle. Gabat testified that when he saw the cigarette vendor clinging
on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to veer to the right in order
that Rosales could get off at the sidewalk. However, Gabat declared,
that Ligon said that it could not be done because of the moving
vehicular traffic. Then, while the vehicle slowed down and Ligon was
maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward the sidewalk,
Rosales lost his grip on the window frame and fell to the pavement of
Quezon Boulevard. Gabat allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon
replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to
the parents of Gabat, and later they would come back to the scene of
the incident. However, while the Kombi was speeding along Dewey
Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of Prudencio Castillo and a jeep
driven by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought to police
headquarters, but neither of them executed any written statement.
Issue: WON the accused who was acquitted from any criminal
liability is free from any civil liability.
Decision:
It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is
also free from civil liability.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must
be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or
omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in
the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw
a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is
just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine
upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any
less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption
of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged.
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence
exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of
Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses at the trial and
applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a
preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and
omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and
should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of
calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to
buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the
death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to
prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase was
completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to
the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act of
speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim.
These proven facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat
civilly liable under the Civil Code for the damage done to Rosales.
Rufo Mauricio Construction and/or Rufo Mauricio vs Hon.
Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines (1987)
Facts:
On September 20, 1979, Illustre Cabiliza, driver of Izusu dump
truck owned by RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTIONS, was charged
before the RTC of Legazpi City with homicide and damage to
property through reckless imprudence. The dump truck that he was
driving sideswipe and hit a Colt Gallant driven and owned by the late
Judge Arsenio Solidum, thereby inflicting injuries upon him which
directly caused his untimely death and further causing damage to the
said vehicle and likewise causing damage to the house owned by Pablo
Navarro.
Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal but he died and did not live to
pursue his appeal. Hence, the lower court issued an Order requiring the
heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to substitute him with respect to the
civil aspect of the case. However, Cabiliza was found insolvent
evidenced by a certificate of insolvency. The victim’s widow Mrs.
Aurora Solidum filed a motion for issuance of a subsidiary writ of
execution to be enforced against the employer, Rufo Mauricio, which
was granted.
Petitioner filed MR but it was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner contends that ---
1. The dismissal of the criminal case against the accused-
employee wipes out not only the employee’s primary civil
liability, bu also the employer’s subsidiary liability because:
a. The criminal case is based on Article 100 of RPC wherein
criminal liability and exemption of criminal liability
implies exemption from civil liability arising from crime.
b. The civil liability of the employer is based, if any, on quasi-
delict, since the accused was exempted from criminal
liability.
2. Exemplary damages cannot be imposed upon employer who at
the time of the alleged incident was not present nor inside the
vehicle.
3. The petitioner-employer cannot be condemned to pay an
exorbitant amount of damages without giving him opportunity
to cross examine the witness and opportunity to adduce
evidence to resist the claim.
4. The IAC misapplied the facts contrary to the physical evidence
relied on conjectures that depicted a different picture of the
accident when the evidence shows that it was the victim who
was negligent at the time of the accident. (by invading the
proper lane of the dump truck)
Issue: WON Rufo Mauricio Construction is subsidiarily liable
Decision:
The first contention of petitioner that the death of the accused-
employee wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but
also his employer's subsidiary liability is without merit. The death of
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment
of conviction (rendered against him by the lower court) became final
and executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his
obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary
liability for fines, but not his civil liability should the liability or
obligation arise (not from a crime, for here, no crime was
committed, the accused not having been convicted by final
judgment, and therefore still regarded as innocent) but from
a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil Code), as in this case.
The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary
but solidary with his driver (unless said employer can prove there was
no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in
the selection and supervision of his driver).
Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in
the criminal case, and to grant him his day in court for the purpose of
cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on the
driver's alleged negligence and the amount of damages to which the
heirs of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any evidence or
witnesses he may care to present in his defense, the hearing on the
motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must be reopened
precisely for the purpose adverted to hereinabove.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the
appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE, and this case is REMANDED to
the trial court for the hearing adverted to in the next preceding
paragraph.
Maria Benita A. Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of the
minor children Krizteen Elizabeth, Beverly Marie and Napoleon
II, all surnamed Dulay vs The Court of Appeals, Former 8 th
Division, Hon. Teodoro P. Regino, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the RTC, NCR, QC, Br. 84, Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., and Safeguard Security Corporation (1995)
Facts:
An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard
on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased filed an action
for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents
Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD")
and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela. An information was also filed by the
petitioners charging Torzuela with homicide.
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Private respondent
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action, alleging that
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties,
and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint
for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies
only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
While respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be
excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not
one of its employees.
RTC- Respondent Judge Regino ruled in favour of
SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for
exclusion as defendant.
CA- Affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
Issue: WON quasi-delicts cover acts that are intentional and voluntary
not just acts of negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Decision:
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for
homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action
before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even
far better than a compliance with the requirement of express
reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357
[1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case.
However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the
ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as
the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute
therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic
v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit
and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the
party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v.
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An
examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the
plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover
damages against the private respondents for their vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of
shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2
of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to
acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far
back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this
Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. ...Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent
acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the
Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not
only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also
charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New
Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to
the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the
term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to
include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago,
97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro,
126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was
held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33
where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in
Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case,
a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is
subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable
for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security
guard. It having been established that the instant action is not ex-
delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the
private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection
of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection
or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363
[1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]).
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also
acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on
the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply
because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence
attributable to private respondents.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
Francis Chua vs Hon. Court of Appeals and Lydia C. Hao (2004)
Facts:
Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a
complaint charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four
counts of falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that
Chua falsified the Minutes of the Annual Stockholders meeting of the
Board of Directors of the Siena Realty Corporation by making or
causing it to appear in said Minutes of the Annual Stockholders
Meeting that one LYDIA HAO CHUA was present in said
proceedings, when in truth and in fact, said person was never present
during the Annual Stockholders Meeting. During the trial, Atty.
Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as private
prosecutors. Chua moved to exclude complainant’s counsels as private
prosecutors in the case on the ground that Hao failed to allege and
prove any civil liability in the case. The court granted Chua’s motion.
Hao moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, Hao filed a
petition for certiorari. The RTC gave due course to the petition.
Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari but was denied. He filed a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the decision of the CA.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals and the lower court err in allowing
private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of Criminal Case?
Decision:
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly
liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely
(1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the
State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or
omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by
law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to
the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by
reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms
an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of
the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the
offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage
caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that,
“[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.”
a. Independent Civil Action, Rationale
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation
not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without
due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private
property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication
correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in
any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness
in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt,
or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and
unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not
been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or
not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
and
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable
from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police
force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace
officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the
city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a
preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action. (NCC)
QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) (NCC)
RULE 111
Prosecution of Civil Action
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the
civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying
the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is
specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing
fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint
may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil
actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which
shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and
trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-
97)
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. —
After the criminal action has been commenced, the
separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action
has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended
in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on
the merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered
in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action
in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented
by the offended party in the criminal case and of the
parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated
criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided
jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running
of the period of prescription of the civil action which
cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has
been suspended shall be tolled. (n)
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action
based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is
a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. (2a)
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded
independently. — In the cases provided for in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
(3a)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death
of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the
civil liability arising from the delict. However, the
independent civil action instituted under section 3 of
this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be
continued against the estate or legal representative of
the accused after proper substitution or against said
estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may
be substituted for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative
or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in
these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of
the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the
offended party may file against the estate of the
deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final
judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the
defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal
action against the defendant for the same act or
omission subject of the civil action. (4a)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed
in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in
the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. (5a) (Rules of Court)
Sps. Antonio C. Santos and Esperanza C. Santos, Nora Barnalo,
Belinda Lumactad, Marienela Dy, Nikka Santos and Leonardo
Ferrer vs Hon. Normandie B. Pizarro, as Presiding Judge, RTC of
QC, Branch 101, Dionision M. Sibayan and Viron Transportation
Company, Inc., represented by Virgilio Q. Rondaris (2005)
Facts:
In April 1994, Viron Transit driver Dionisio Sibayan was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and
multiple physical injuries in connection with a collision between a bus
driven by Sibayan and a lite ace van, for which Sibayan was convicted
on December 1998.
As there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no
pronouncement of civil liability was made by the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC).
In October 20, 2000, Santos filed a complaint for damages
against Sibayan, Viron Transit and Rondaris, president and chairman
of Viron Transit with the RTC of Quezon City, pursuant to their
reservation to file a separate civil action. They cited the judgment
convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint citing
prescription alleging that actions based on quasi delict prescribe in
4years from the accrual of the cause of action.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint on the ground that the cause of action
had already prescribed.
CA: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari which was dismissed for
error in the choice or mode of appeal.
Issue: WON the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
when it insisted that the cause of action is based on quasi delict and
concluded that the action had prescribed
Decision:
Our RPC provides that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of
restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of
consequential damages.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a
separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan.
The reason why MCTC did not make any pronouncement as to the
latter's civil liability.
The complaint reveals that the allegations are consistent with
petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability
arising from a crime. Even if there were allegations of negligence on
the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, it does not mean that petitioners
were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that
at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed.
In cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice
between an action to enforce liability arising from crime under the
Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil
Code.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2
separate civili liabilities on the part of the offender :
1. Civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC
2. Independent civil liabilities
a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, ( culpa contractual or obligations arising from
law under Art. 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Art. 32 and
34, and culpa aquiliana under Art. 2176
b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal proceedings.
While the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed, petitioners can still pursue the remaining avenue opened
for them by their reservation. The surviving cause of action ex delicto.
This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been
expressly reserved.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa
aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of
the employer.
Once there is a conviction for felony, final in character, the
employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime
was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
Article 103 of the RPC is the controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even
after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
L.G. Foods Corporation and Victorino Gabor, Vice
President and General Manager vs Hon. Philadelfa B. Pagapong-
Agraviador, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Br43,
Bacolod City and Sps Florentino and Theresa Vallejera (2006)
Facts:
On Feb. 26, 1996, Charles Vallejera, a 7-yr old son of the
spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, died as he was hit
by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by
their employee, Vincent Norman Ferrer. Eventually, an information
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the
driver before the MTCC Bacolod City. However, as the accused driver
committed suicide, the case was dismissed. Claiming that the
petitioners should be held civilly liable as they failed to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee, the spouses Vallejera later
on filed a complaint for damages against them. For their part, the
petitioners prayed, by way of an Answer w/ Compulsory
Counterclaim, for the dismissal of the complaint. They argued that
they had exercised the required due diligence and maintained that for
their liability to attach their driver must first be convicted. Thus, since
the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua
non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled. Hence,
they argued that there is lack of cause of action on the part of the
Spouses. They also argued that since the Spouses Vallejera did not
make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the
criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed
instituted with the criminal action w/c was already dismissed. The
RTC and the CA both denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
Issue: Whether the spouses Vallejeras’ cause of action in the
Civil Case for Damages is founded on Art. 103 of the RPC, as
maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code, as decided by the lower courts.
Decision:
PETITION Denied.
From the allegations of their complaint, it is clear that quasi-
delict was the spouses’ choice of remedy against the petitioners. An
act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2 separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender: 1) civil liability ex delicto
and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those a) not arising from an
act or omission complained of as felony (culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law, intentional torts and culpa aquiliana) or
b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of these two
possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. The victims
of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Art. 100 of the
RPC, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Arts 2176-
2194 of the Civil Code. If, as in this case, the action chosen is for
quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the
negligent act of its employee, subject to the employer’s defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other
hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold
the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of
its employee. According to Art. 2177, these are alternative remedies
the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility
of arising indirectly from the crime or directly from tort. The choice is
with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory
pleading or complaint and not with the defendant who can not ask for
the dismissal of the plaintiff’s case of action or lack of it based on the
defendant’s perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a
claim under Art. 103, RPC. Under Art. 2180 of the CC, the liability of
the employer is direct/immediate. It is not considered upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee. Furthermore, the circumstance that no
reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made
when the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple
reason that the criminal case was dismissed w/o any pronouncement
having been made therein. In reality, it is as if there was no criminal
case to speak of in the first place.
b. Prejudicial Question Doctrine Not Applicable
Consing, Jr. vs People of the Philippines (2013)
Facts:
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz various loans from Unicapital Inc. The
loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of
land in Cavite. In accordance with its option to purchase the
mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the
property. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus
Builders, Inc. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the
property, they learned that the title to the property was really in the
names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng. And the title held by De
la Cruz appeared to be spurious. Unicapital demanded the return of the
total amount that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and
Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed a Civil Case in the Pasig City
RTC (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin
Unicapital from proceeding against him for collection on the ground
that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother. On August 6, 1999,
Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City for the recovery of
a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for
estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati
City (Makati criminal case). Consing moved to defer his arraignment
in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial
question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. The
RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
The CA uphold the order of the RTC.
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders
commenced its own suit for damages against Consing in the RTC in
Manila (Manila civil case). On January 21, 2000, an information for
estafa through falsification of public document was filed against
Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite (Cavite Criminal
Case). Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground
of the existence of a prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the
Pasig and Manila civil cases. RTC denied Consing’s motion. However,
CA enjoined the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial
until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
The State assailed the decision of the CA in SC (G.R. No.
148193), praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA. SC granted
the petition, and reversed and set aside the decision of the CA. SC held
that there is no prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of
the criminal case at bar.
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for
the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA, citing the ruling
in G.R. No. 148193. On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its
decision, reversing itself. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue: WON the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence
of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the
proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Decision:
Petition DENIED.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud
and physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This was
precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: Moreover,
neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action. In the instant case
(Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of
the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question
that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
G. Principles
1. Abuse of Rights
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. (NCC)
1.1 Elements
Sea Commercial Company, Inc. vs The Honorable Court of
Appeals, Jamandre Industries, Inc. and Tirso Jamandre (1999)
Facts:
SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling
and distributing agricultural machinery, products and equipment.
SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement whereby
SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City and
Province of Iloilo. The agreement was subsequently amended to
include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the dealership
agreement on a non-exclusive basis.
JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid
deliveries. SEACOM brought action to recover the amount. JII filed an
Answer denying the obligation and interposed a counterclaim for
damages representing unrealized profits. In the counterclaim, JII
alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in 1977 twenty-
four (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a group of farmers, which
fact JII allegedly made known to petitioner, but the latter taking
advantage of said information and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC
and dealt with it and sold twenty one (21) units of said tractors,
thereby depriving JII of unrealized profits. SEACOM alleges that the
transaction with FSDC was the result of a public bidding. It alleges
that it did not know FSDC’s intent to buy machineries from JII.
Moreover, the dealership agreement is a non-exclusive, therefore, it
can still compete in the market against JII.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering JII to pay
SEACOM P18,843.85 representing its outstanding obligation. It also
granted the JII’s counterclaim for unrealized profits and for moral and
exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court stating that while there exists no agency relationship
between SEACOM and JII, SEACOM is liable for damages and
unrealized profits to JII.
Issue: WON there was an abuse of right by SEACOM resulting to bad
faith when it competed with its own dealer, JII, as regards the sale of
farm machineries to FSDC
Decision:
Petition DENIED. Decision of Court of Appeals affirmed.
The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article (Art.
19 of NCC), departs from the classical theory that “he who uses a right
injures no one.” The modern tendency is to depart from the classical
and traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases
where there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit.
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for
damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or
bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to
abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or
technicalities of the law, together with an absence of all information or
belief of fact which would render the transaction unconscientious. In
business relations, it means good faith as understood by men of affairs.
While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration
of principle,8 the “cardinal law on human conduct” expressed in said
article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises
his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a
manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens
himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19
are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was established. By
appointing JII as a dealer of its agricultural equipment, SEACOM
recognized the role and undertaking of JII to promote and sell said
equipment. Under the dealership agreement, JII was to act as a
middleman to sell SEACOM’s products, in its area of operations, i.e.
Iloilo and Capiz provinces.
Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a
nonexclusive basis,19 SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or
in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith;
otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule
embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code above-quoted.
1.2. Test when principle may be invoked
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp., and Herbert C. Hendry vs
The Honorable Court of Appeals and Restituto M. Tobias (1989)
Facts:
Restituto Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay as
purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering
operations manager. In 1972, Globe Mackay discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions which caused significant
loss to the company. Tobias claimed that he was the one who
discovered the same which prompted him to report the incident to his
immediate superiors including the petitioner Herbert Hendry, the
general manager of Globe Mackay. Soon after making the report,
Tobias was considered as the primary suspect by Hendry and he was
instructed to take a forced leave, leave his office drawers open and
leave his office keys. Upon his return, he was called a crook and a
swindler by Hendry.
Two separate investigations by the police were conducted
which confirmed Tobias’ non-participation in the incident. Despite the
said conclusions made by the police, the petitioners filed six (6)
complaints against Tobias for estafa which were subsequently
dismissed by the fiscal and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice. Tobias
tried to protest the said filing but Hendry ordered him to confess or
else the company would file cases against him until he landed in jail
and that Filipinos are not trustworthy. During the course of the filing
of criminal charges, Tobias’ employment was terminated which
prompted him to file a case for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter.
The labor arbiter upheld the validity of the dismissal but upon appeal
to the NLRC, it was reversed. The petitioners appealed to the
Secretary of Labor which upheld the decision of the labor arbiter. The
respondent then raised the matter to the Office of the President but
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
during the pendency of the proceedings, the parties entered into a
compromise agreement.
Tobias then applied for other employment but Hendry wrote a
letter to the prospective employer, without the latter’s request, that
Tobias’ employment was terminated due to dishonesty. As a result,
Tobias was never hired by the said employer which caused him to file
an action for damages for malicious prosecution and abusive acts of
the petitioners. The trial court ruled in favor of Tobias which was
affirmed by the CA. Hence, the present appeal.
Issue: WON the petitioners are liable for damages
Decision:
Denied. Decision of the CA affirmed.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is
the codification of “some basic principles that are to be observed for
the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of
the social order.” Foremost among these principles is that pronounced
in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law,
provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not
violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their
legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave
private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code
provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights
may be invoked, there is NO RIGID TEST which can be applied. The
question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each
case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and
considering certain significant circumstances, finds that petitioners
have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to
private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has
committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate
action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to
go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also
be expected from such employer. But the high -handed treatment
accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this
reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work. The imputation of guilt without basis and
the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the
Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer
to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in
which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to
the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right
to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
1.3 Requisites to be liable for Damages under the
Principle
Heirs of Purisima Nala vs. Artemio
Cabansa (2008)
Facts:
Artemio Cabansag filed Civil Case for damages in October
1991. According to respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property
from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July
23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in
the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a
demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado in behalf
of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987
to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned
by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will be filed against
him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of
such demands, respondent suffered damages and was constrained to
file the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.[3]
Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good
faith and that he was merely acting in behalf of his
client, Nala. Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square
meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was
subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square meter property
was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the
agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's
children. Said property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
281115 in the name of spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that
respondent is only renting the property which he
occupies.
RTC RULING: In favor of respondent. P150,000.00 by way of moral
damages; P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages; P20,000.00 as
and for reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses; and to
pay the costs.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
CA RULING: Decision dated December 19, 2002 affirmed the RTC
Decision with modification. P30,000.00 by way of moral damages;
exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and P10,000.00,
attorney's fees.
Issue: WON respondent Cabansag is entitled to damages?
Decision:
“Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.” The foregoing provision sets the
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and
in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is
an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure
another.
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights
principle, the following requisites must concur:
(a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and
(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of
Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and he who
alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other
hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence,
dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a
wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or
ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove
that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice
in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there
was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was
owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was
illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses
Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and
surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was
only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that
she learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims
ownership over the property does not give rise to the conclusion that
the sending of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad
faith. Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or
malice could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying
to protect their interests over the property.
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty.
Del Prado's acts were done with the sole intention of prejudicing and
injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental anguish,
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand
letters; however, there is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the
hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. Thus, there can
be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
1.4 Illustrative Cases:
Miguel Perez Rubio vs Court of Appeals, Roberto O. Philipps &
Sons, Inc., Magdalena Ysmael Philipps, Manufacturers Bank and
Trust Co., Inc., Hacienda Benito, Inc., et al (1987)
Facts:
Miguel Perez Rubio alleges that Robert O. Phillips & Sons,
Inc. (ROPSI), Magdalena Ysmael Phillips, Manufacturers Bank &
Trust Co., Inc. (MBTC), Hacienda Benito, Inc. (collectively, ROPSI et
al.) conspired among themselves to put the properties of
Hacienda Benito, Inc. (HBI) represented by Robert O. Phillips,
president, and Victoria Valley Development Corporation (VVDC)
executed a Memorandum Agreement the thrust of which is that VVDC
will acquire 134.1668 hectares of land including account receivables
belonging to HBI and the 78 hectares mortgaged to Manufacturers
Bank & Trust Co., Inc. (MBTC). It was further provided that HBI will
convey all the 78 hectares in favor of MBTC after which VVDC will
purchase from MBTC the same parcels of land together with the
receivables. This agreement, however, was executed when Robert O.
Phillips & Sons, Inc. (ROPSI) had still to pay its outstanding
P4,250,000.00 debt to Miguel Perez Rubio as the result of Rubio’s sale
of his shares of stock of HBI. Thus, Rubio restates his position that the
ROPSI, including HBI, VVDC and MBTC, had conspired amongst
themselves to put the properties of HBI beyond his reach and thus
make it impossible for him to collect the sum of P4,250,000.00 still
unpaid on the purchase price of his shares of stock in HBI. Rubio asks
for a reconsideration of the decision of the court insofar as it makes no
finding against Phillips for moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees (Note: Because it appears from the beginning of the
case that the court had already adjudged Phillips to pay the amount of
P4,250,000.00, only that there was no pronouncement with regard to
damages).
Issue: Whether Rubio is entitled to an award for damages
Decision:
The court ruled in favor of Rubio.
The scheme provided for in the Memorandum Agreement
wherein all the properties of Hacienda Benito will be ultimately
transferred to VVDC without any mention at all and completely
ignoring the petitioner's interest in said Hacienda placed the
petitioner's rightful claim to the payment of his shares of stock in clear
jeopardy.
The fact that the Memorandum Agreement was not fully
implemented is immaterial. The intent to defraud the petitioner and the
damage which led to the filing of this case was present in the
execution of the Memorandum Agreement. Therefore, an award for
damages in favor of the petitioner is in order against respondents
Hacienda Benito, VVDC and MBTC.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. "
while Article 20 thereof provides that:
"Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same."
Parenthetically, these respondents did not observe honesty and
good faith in dealing with the rightful claim of the petitioner to the still
unpaid P4,250,000.00 collectibles from ROPSI. The respondents' acts
are tortious pursuant to Articles 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code.
Hence, these respondents are obliged to pay for the damage done to
the petitioner.
(See Article 2176, New Civil Code).
In the case at bar, the tortious and fraudulent scheme of the
private respondents made it impossible for the petitioner to collect the
P4,250,000.00 still unpaid purchase price of his shares of stock in
Hacienda Benito. All the respondents are, therefore, solidarily liable
for these actual damages suffered by the petitioner. (See Article 2194
of the New Civil Code).
Consequently, we rule that Hacienda Benito, VVDC and
MBTC together with ROPSI and the Phillips spouses are solidarily
liable to the petitioner for the outstanding debt of ROPSI in the amount
of P4,250,000.00 with interest at the rate of eight (8%) per cent per
annum from April 30, 1964 until fully paid as provided for in the
parties' agreement dated August 13,1963.
Also, an award for moral damages in favor of the petitioner is
in order against respondents Hacienda Benito, VVDC and MBTC. The
planned transfer of all the assets of Hacienda Benito to VVDC which
the respondents sought to accomplish through the Memorandum
Agreement created further aguish and anxiety on the part of the
petitioner who at that time was still trying to collect the P4,250,000.00
full payment of his shares of stock in Hacienda Benito. Considering
the circumstances under which the respondents executed the
Memorandum Agreement and the social status of the parties herein,
the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the petitioner
is awarded.
Jose Roque, Jr., substituted by his wife Norma Roque, petitioner
vs Jaime T. Torres, substituted by his son James Kenley M. Torres
and the Honorable Court of Appeals
Facts:
Jose Roque, Jr. (Roque) was the administrator of certain
parcels of land in Antipolo, Rizal, registered in the name of his son
Rafael Roque. Sometime before the incident, Jaime T. Torres
(Torres), claiming to be the owner of said property, hired security
guards from Anchor Security and Detective Agency, who allegedly
barred Roque from entering the property and threatened him with
physical harm should he attempt to tend the said land. Roque, then,
filed a case for grave threats against said security guards before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Rizal. Prior to the incident, Torres
instituted an Action for cancellation of Certificate of Titles in the name
of Roque’s son Rafael Roque before the RTC of Antipolo which was
dismissed by the trial court. According to the court a quo, Torres’
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
action was premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in
the Bureau of Lands. Respondent appealed the dismissal before the
Court of Appeals, which later affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Respondent’s appeal to this Court was also dismissed.
Roque visited the said property and was surprised to see seven
security guards guarding the property upon orders of
respondent. Three security guards approached Roque and exchange of
words happened. When Roque refused to leave the premises, Cabos,
one of the guards threatened Roque that should he stay
inside, Cabos would shoot him, so Roque immediately left the
place. However, Cabos still fired at him but missed. Roque ran fast to
his makeshift hut where Cabos followed him and shot again hitting
petitioner on the back. After a while, the other security guards,
namely Sulla, Betasulo, and Romy Mendoza, came, and together
with Cabos mauled and kicked petitioner all over his body until he lost
consciousness. As a result of the incident, petitioner was hospitalized
and placed under continuous treatment and medication. Due to the
multiple gunshot wounds, hematoma, and contusions sustained by
petitioner, his left eye became 90 to 95% blind and his body was
paralyzed from the bustline down. Consequently, petitioner filed a
criminal case for frustrated murder before the RTC of Antipolo against
the security guards. Eventually, after suffering for more than nine
years, petitioner died.
Torres admits the existence of the titles in the name of Rafael
Roque but denies the latter’s ownership over the property. He further
admits the dismissal of his case for cancellation of Roque’s titles based
on a technical ground. Torres likewise admits to the posting of the
security guards on the property to guard the same from any intruder
but denies that they were his personal security guards, and moreover
claimed that they were security guards of the Antipolo Landowners
and Farmers Association, Inc. (ALFAI), of which he was
president. Respondent further asserts that being the President of
ALFAI, his instruction to the security guards was to prevent squatters
or intruders from entering the property and to make use of reasonable
force to repel aggression in the event of any untoward incident.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of
Roque. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC judgment and rendered a
Decision, stating that Art. 2180 does not apply as there is no question
that the security guards involved in the shooting incident were
employed of Anchor Security Detective Agency and not by Torres.
Issue: WON Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code
is applicable to the case at bar
Decision:
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ finding that respondent
cannot be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the
damages suffered by petitioner because respondent is not the employer
of the security guards who inflicted the injuries upon the person of the
petitioner. As reiterated in the recent case of Mercury Drug
Corporation v. Libunao:
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, we held that where the
security agency recruits, hires and assigns the works of
its watchmen or security guards to a client, the
employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency,
and not the client, since the latter has no hand in
selecting the security guards. Thus, the duty to observe
the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be
demanded from the said client:
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
x x x [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the
security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is
the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for
illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients
or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a client
or customer of a security agency has no hand in
selecting who among the pool of security guards or
watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to
it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the
ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client
whose premises or property are protected by the
security guards.
x x x [T]he fact that a client company may give
instructions or directions to the security guards assigned
to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as
an employer of the security guards concerned and liable
for their wrongful acts or omissions.
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily preclude this
Court from holding respondent liable under the law for damages
resulting from the injuries inflicted on petitioner by the unlawful acts
of the security guards.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code states that “whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done.” In the case at bar, Torres cannot
feign ignorance of the fact that at the time of the shooting incident, the
titles to the disputed property were already registered in the name of
Roque’s son, the cancellation for title case filed by Torres having been
dismissed. In fact, during trial, the offer for stipulation of Roque’s
counsel that at the time of the shooting incident, there is a valid and
existing title in the name of Roque’s son which was never cancelled by
the court, was accepted by Torres. Therefore, by hiring the security
guards to prevent entry, possibly even by the registered owner, to the
subject property, titles to which he fully knew he did not possess,
Torres blatantly acted in bad faith. Torres’ unwarranted act of posting
security guards within the property, which he clearly knew is
registered in the name of another, unduly placed petitioner at harm and
deprived him of his right to fully exercise his privileges and duties as
administrator of said property. Respondent, by his grossly faulty acts,
paved the way to the infliction of injuries by the security guards on
petitioner.
Furthermore, respondent’s palpable display of bad faith in
claiming a superior right to the property over petitioner’s son entitles
petitioner to damages resulting therefrom. In order that a plaintiff may
maintain an action for the injuries which he sustained, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. In other
words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing
damage, the act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.
In the case at bar, it is clear that respondent violated the
principle embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code which mandates
that “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.” When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
accountable. As we have stated in a previous case, if mere fault or
negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury
caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him
liable.[
University of the East vs Jader (2000)
Facts:
Romeo Jader was a law student enrolled at UE from 1984-
1988. During the first semester as fourth year law student, he failed to
take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was
given an incomplete grade. As he enrolled for the second semester he
filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given by
Prof. Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson
after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 8
and on March 30 Prof Ortega gave him grade of 5.
The Dean and Faculty Members met to deliberate on whom
among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate and the
plaintiff’s name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for
graduation. Likewise his name appeared in the invitation for
Investiture & Commencement Ceremonies. Having learned of the
deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar
examination. Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages
alleging that he suffered shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation etc. arising from the latter’s negligence.
Petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent
to believe that he completed the requirements when his name was
included in the tentative list of graduating student. Furthermore, it
argued that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages
arose out of respondent’s own negligence in not verifying from the
professor concerned the result of his removal exam.
Lower Court ruled in favor of respondent. CA affirmed with
modification. Hence, this petition.
Issue: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case?
Decision:
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning
institution, a contract of education is entered into between said
institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired
by the school are considered merely as agents and administrators
tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since
the contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not
duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors
with respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing
prevents either professors or students from sharing with each other
such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional
practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly
furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation
of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or she had
already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a
degree or whether they would be included among those who will
graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal
ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such
ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the
whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be
conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied
all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student
of any problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also
most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of
the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted
in good faith.
It is the school that has access to those information and it is
only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with
its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and
the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control,
much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run
its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and
ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders. The
negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the
school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is
not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being
his employer.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus
liable to respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that
respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. As a senior
law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to
ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic
achievement, are in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Titus B. Villanueva vs Emma M. Rosqueta (2010)
Facts:
This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged
abuse of right committed by a superior public officer in preventing a
subordinate from doing her assigned task and being officially
recognized for it.
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy
Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the
Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation but
later on withdrew withdrew the same. Meanwhile Gil Valera was
appointed by President Arroyo. Rosqueta challenged the same by
filing a petition for prohibition, quo warranto and injunction against
Villanueva, then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance
and Valera with the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance
Secretary3 from implementing Valera’s appointment which later on
was superseded by a writ of preliminary injunction.4
Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance
challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own
TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But
the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the
petition before it.
During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary
its special Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy
commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The commemorative
billboard also displayed at the Bureau’s main gate included Valera’s
picture but not Rosqueta’s. Rosqueta filed a complaint for damages
before the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva alleging
that the latter maliciously excluded her from the centennial
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented her
from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her
salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked
the RTC to award her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, P500,000.00
in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and costs of
suit.
RTC- Dismissed6 respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating
that petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no
omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva
had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven
months before the Bureau’s centennial anniversary.
CA- Reversed the RTC’s decision, holding instead that
petitioner Villanueva’s refusal to comply with the preliminary
injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta
the right to recover moral damages from him. Citing the abuse of right
principle, the RTC said that Villanueva acted maliciously when he
prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of
salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy
Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia.
Issue: WON Villanueva is liable for damages to respondent Rosqueta
for ignoring the preliminary injunction order.
Decision:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the
Civil Code a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act
in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with
intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles
20 and 21of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the
injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.
Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when he allowed Valera to
assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta
held the position merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked
the Career Executive Service eligibility required for the job.
But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged
advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his
rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court
of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right
to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.
That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad
faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law
the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial
anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning.
Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the
duties of the position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses
Gutierrez, a party’s refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him
from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse and an
unlawful exercise of right.1avvphi1
That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy
Commissioner for another division of the Bureau is immaterial. While
such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo warranto case
moot and academic, it did not have the effect of wiping out the injuries
she suffered on account of petitioner Villanueva’s treatment of her.
The damage suit is an independent action.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent
Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded when the defendant’s
transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiff’s anguish in the
cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Here, respondent Rosqueta’s colleagues and friends testified
that she suffered severe anxiety on account of the speculation over her
employment status.17 She had to endure being referred to as a
"squatter" in her workplace. She had to face inquiries from family and
friends about her exclusion from the Bureau’s centennial anniversary
memorabilia. She did not have to endure all these affronts and the
angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good
faith by the court’s order in her favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral
damages.
The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive.
As it held in Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Alejandro,18 moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease
the defendant’s grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably
approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong
done. Here, that would be P200,000.00.
The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of
example or correction for the public good but, in line with the same
reasoning, reduces it to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the
award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses but reduces it
to P50,000.00.
MWSS vs Act Theatre Inc.
Facts:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act
Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel
Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of the
Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in
violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876. The
respondent’s employees were subsequently criminally charged. On
account of the incident, the respondent’s water service connection was
cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for injunction
with damages against the petitioner MWSS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in that the petitioner
acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the
respondent’s water service connection without prior notice. Due to
lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the respondent’s
patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were adversely
affected.
After due trial, the court acquitted the four employees of Act
Theater, Inc. in the criminal case. In the civil case, the court ordered
MWSS to pay Act Theater, Inc. actual damage in the amount of
P25,000 and to return the sum of P200,000.00 deposited by the
plaintiff for the restoration of its water services after its disconnection
on September 23, 1988.
The petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the decision to the
CA. The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. According to
the CA, the petitioner’s act of cutting off the respondent’s water
service connection without prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and
prejudicial to the latter justifying the award of damages under Article
19 of the Civil Code.
Issue: WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S]
CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 19 OF
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
THE NEW CIVIL CODE WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
APPLICABLE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 429 OF THE SAME
CODE
Decision:
The petition is devoid of merit. Article 429 of the Civil Code,
relied upon by the petitioner in justifying its act of disconnecting the
water supply of the respondent without prior notice, reads:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has
the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonable to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a
constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long
usage, 6 constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person
against the other.
Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing
water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the
right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to
be exercised. Article 19 of the Civil Code sets the norms for the
exercise of one’s rights:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these
norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which actor can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed
to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the
petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent’s water service
connection.
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to
plaintiff-appellee prior to the disconnection of the latter’s water
services, this was done only a few hours before the actual
disconnection. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was denied due process
when it was deprived of the water services. As a consequence thereof,
Act had to contract another source to provide water for a number of
days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the
sum of P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water services.
2. Unjust Enrichment (Solutio Indebiti)
2.1 Requisites
H . L Carlos ConstructionV. Marina Properties Corp.
Facts:
Marina Properties Corporation (MPC) is engaged in the
business of real estate development.
It entered into a contract with H.L Carlos Construction, inc
(HLC) to construct Phase III of a condominium complex ( Marina
Bayhomes Condominium Project) consisting of townhouses and villas
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
for a total consideration of P38, 580, 609 within a period of 365days
from receipt of " notice to proceed ".
The original completion date of the project was May 16, 1989,
but it was extended to October 31, 1989 with a grace period until
November 30, 1989.
The contract was signed by Jovencio F. Cinco, president of
MPC, and Honorio L. Carlos, president of HLC.
" On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted this case for sum of
money against not only MPC but also against the latter's alleged
president, (Respondent) Jesus K. Typoco, Sr. (Typoco) and
(Respondent) Tan Yu (Tan), seeking the payment of various sums with
an aggregate amount of P14 million pesos
RTC: Judgment in favor of (Petitioner) H.L Carlos
Construction inc. and as against Respondent Marina Properties
Corporation, Tan Yu and Typoco
CA: Respondents were not liable for escalations in the cost of
labor and construction materials since petitioner failed to show any
basis for the award sought. They were also absolved from paying for
change orders and extra work since there was no supplemental
agreement covering them as required in the main construction contract.
Issues:
1) WON petitioner is entitled to price escalation for labor, cost of
change order and extra work
2) Whether Typoco and Tan are solidarily liable with MPC
3) WON H.L Construction is liable for actual and liquidated
damages
Decision:
1) MPC argues that to allow the claim for labor cost
escalation would be to reward petitioner for incurring delay,
thereby breaching a contractual obligation. This contention is
untenable. To allow MPC to acquire the partially accomplished
project without paying for labor cost escalation validly incurred
would constitute UNJUST ENRICHMENT at the expense of the
petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code
when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived
at the expense of or with damages to another.
Since petitioner had rendered services that were accepted by
MPC, then the former should be compensated for them. Labor cost
escalation, has already been earned by petitioner.
Evidence on record reveals that MPC approved some change
order jobs despite the absence of any supplementary agreement.
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed
to recover the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered
despite the lack of written contract, in order to avoid unjust
enrichment.
2 ) Typoco and Tan are not liable. The records are bereft of
any evidence that they acted in bad faith with gross or inexcusable
negligence, or that they acted outside the scope of his authority.
3) Yes, petitioner did not fulfill its contractual obligations.
It could not totally pass the blame to MPC for hiring a second
contractor, because the latter was allowed to terminate the services of
the contractor.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
Either party shall have the right to terminate this contract for
reason of violation or non-compliance by the other party of the terms
and condition herein agreed upon.
As of November 1989, petitioner accomplished only
approximately 80 percent of the project. In other words, it was already
in delay at the time.
Engr. Miranda testified that it would lose money even if it
finished the project; respondents already suspected that it had no
intention of finishing the project at all.
Petitioner was in delay and in breach of contract. Clearly, the
obligor is liable for damages that are the natural and probable
consequences of its breach of obligation.
In order to finish the project, the latter had to contract the
services of a second construction firm for P11, 750,000. Hence, MPC
suffered actual damages in the amount of P4,604,579 for the complaint
of the project.
Petitioner is also liable for liquidated damages as provided in
the Contract.
Liquidated damages are those that the parties agree to be paid
in case of a breach. As worded, the amount agreed upon answers for
damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the completion of the
project. Under Philippine laws, these damages take the nature of
penalties.
A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume greater
liability in case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to
ensure performance.
2.2 Manifestation of Unjust Enrichment
Vicente S. Almario vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (2007)
Facts:
Almario, then about 39 years of age and a Boeing 737 (B-737)
First Officer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus
300 (A-300) First Officer. Since said higher position required
additional training, he underwent, at PAL’s expense, more than five
months of training consisting of ground schooling in Manila and flight
simulation in Melbourne, Australia. After completing the training
course, Almario served as A300 First Officer of PAL, but after eight
months of service as such, he tendered his resignation, for “personal
reasons”. Almario pushed through with his resignation.
PAL filed a Complaint against Almario for reimbursement of
training costs. PAL invoked the existence of an innominate contract of
do ut facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in that by spending
for his training, he would render service to it until the costs of training
were recovered in at least three (3) years.
Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that
he would have to render service to it for three years after his training
failing which he would reimburse the training costs.
Issue: WON Article 22 of the Civil Code can be applied to recover
training costs.
Decision:
Article 22 of the Civil Code applies. This provision on unjust
enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself at
the expense of another. The enrichment of the defendant must have a
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang

correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or injury to the plaintiff. This CHAPTER 1

prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the
deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of non-payment of compensation
for a prestation or rendered to the defendant without intent to donate
on the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something which
the latter would have obtained.
It bears noting that when Almario took the training course, he
was about 39 years old, 21 years away from the retirement age of 60.
Hence, with the maturity, expertise, and experience he gained from the
training course, he was expected to serve PAL for at least three years
to offset “the prohibitive costs” thereof.
PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to
acquire a higher level of skill, proficiency, or technical competence so
that he could efficiently discharge the position of A-300 First Officer.
Given that, PAL expected to recover the training costs by availing of
Almario’s services for at least three years. The expectation of PAL
was not fully realized, however, due to Almario’s resignation after
only eight months of service following the completion of his training
course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training
without violating the principle of unjust enrichment.
2.3 Laws and Cases
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him. (NCC)
Title XVII. - EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS
QUASI-CONTRACTS
Art. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts
give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the
end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited
at the expense of another. (n)
Art. 2143. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this
Chapter do not exclude other quasi-contracts which
may come within the purview of the preceding article.
(n)
SECTION 1. - Negotiorum Gestio
Art. 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the
agency or management of the business or property of
another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to
continue the same until the termination of the affair and
its incidents, or to require the person concerned to
substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so.
This juridical relation does not arise in either of these
instances:
(1) When the property or business is not neglected or
abandoned;
(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by
the owner.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
In the first case, the provisions of Articles 1317, 1403,
No. 1, and 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts shall
govern.
In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this
Book shall be applicable. (1888a)
Art. 2145. The officious manager shall perform his
duties with all the diligence of a good father of a
family, and pay the damages which through his fault or
negligence may be suffered by the owner of the
property or business under management.
The courts may, however, increase or moderate the
indemnity according to the circumstances of each case.
(1889a)
Art. 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another
person all or some of his duties, he shall be liable for
the acts of the delegate, without prejudice to the direct
obligation of the latter toward the owner of the
business.
The responsibility of two or more officious managers
shall be solidary, unless the management was assumed
to save the thing or business from imminent danger.
(1890a)
Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any
fortuitous event:
(1) If he undertakes risky operations which the owner
was not accustomed to embark upon;
(2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the
owner;
(3) If he fails to return the property or business after
demand by the owner;
(4) If he assumed the management in bad faith. (1891a)
Art. 2148. Except when the management was assumed
to save property or business from imminent danger, the
officious manager shall be liable for fortuitous events:
(1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management;
(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more
competent person from taking up the management. (n)
Art. 2149. The ratification of the management by the
owner of the business produces the effects of an express
agency, even if the business may not have been
successful. (1892a)
Art. 2150. Although the officious management may not
have been expressly ratified, the owner of the property
or business who enjoys the advantages of the same shall
be liable for obligations incurred in his interest, and
shall reimburse the officious manager for the necessary
and useful expenses and for the damages which the
latter may have suffered in the performance of his
duties.
The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when
the management had for its purpose the prevention of
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
an imminent and manifest loss, although no benefit may
have been derived. (1893)
Art. 2151. Even though the owner did not derive any
benefit and there has been no imminent and manifest
danger to the property or business, the owner is liable
as under the first paragraph of the preceding article,
provided:
(1) The officious manager has acted in good faith, and
(2) The property or business is intact, ready to be
returned to the owner. (n)
Art. 2152. The officious manager is personally liable
for contracts which he has entered into with third
persons, even though he acted in the name of the owner,
and there shall be no right of action between the owner
and third persons. These provisions shall not apply:
(1) If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratified the
management, or
(2) When the contract refers to things pertaining to the
owner of the business. (n)
Art. 2153. The management is extinguished:
(1) When the owner repudiates it or puts an end thereto;
(2) When the officious manager withdraws from the
management, subject to the provisions of Article 2144;
(3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or
insolvency of the owner or the officious manager. (n)
SECTION 2. - Solutio Indebiti
Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no
right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligation to return it arises. (1895)
Art. 2155. Payment by reason of a mistake in the
construction or application of a doubtful or difficult
question of law may come within the scope of the
preceding article. (n)
Art. 2156. If the payer was in doubt whether the debt
was due, he may recover if he proves that it was not
due. (n)
Art. 2157. The responsibility of two or more payees,
when there has been payment of what is not due, is
solidary. (n)
Art. 2158. When the property delivered or money paid
belongs to a third person, the payee shall comply with
the provisions of article 1984. (n)
Art. 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue
payment, shall pay legal interest if a sum of money is
involved, or shall be liable for fruits received or which
should have been received if the thing produces fruits.
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or
impairment of the thing from any cause, and for
damages to the person who delivered the thing, until it
is recovered. (1896a)
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
Art. 2160. He who in good faith accepts an undue
payment of a thing certain and determinate shall only
be responsible for the impairment or loss of the same or
its accessories and accessions insofar as he has thereby
been benefited. If he has alienated it, he shall return the
price or assign the action to collect the sum. (1897)
Art. 2161. As regards the reimbursement for
improvements and expenses incurred by him who
unduly received the thing, the provisions of Title V of
Book II shall govern. (1898)
Art. 2162. He shall be exempt from the obligation to
restore who, believing in good faith that the payment
was being made of a legitimate and subsisting claim,
destroyed the document, or allowed the action to
prescribe, or gave up the pledges, or cancelled the
guaranties for his right. He who paid unduly may
proceed only against the true debtor or the guarantors
with regard to whom the action is still effective. (1899)
Art. 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake in
the payment if something which had never been due or
had already been paid was delivered; but he from whom
the return is claimed may prove that the delivery was
made out of liberality or for any other just cause. (1901)
SECTION 3. - Other Quasi-Contracts
Art. 2164. When, without the knowledge of the person
obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the
latter shall have a right to claim the same from the
former, unless it appears that he gave it out of piety and
without intention of being repaid. (1894a)
Art. 2165. When funeral expenses are borne by a third
person, without the knowledge of those relatives who
were obliged to give support to the deceased, said
relatives shall reimburse the third person, should the
latter claim reimbursement. (1894a)
Art. 2166. When the person obliged to support an
orphan, or an insane or other indigent person unjustly
refuses to give support to the latter, any third person
may furnish support to the needy individual, with right
of reimbursement from the person obliged to give
support. The provisions of this article apply when the
father or mother of a child under eighteen years of age
unjustly refuses to support him.
Art. 2167. When through an accident or other cause a
person is injured or becomes seriously ill, and he is
treated or helped while he is not in a condition to give
consent to a contract, he shall be liable to pay for the
services of the physician or other person aiding him,
unless the service has been rendered out of pure
generosity.
Art. 2168. When during a fire, flood, storm, or other
calamity, property is saved from destruction by another
person without the knowledge of the owner, the latter is
bound to pay the former just compensation.
Art. 2169. When the government, upon the failure of
any person to comply with health or safety regulations
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
concerning property, undertakes to do the necessary
work, even over his objection, he shall be liable to pay
the expenses.
Art. 2170. When by accident or other fortuitous event,
movables separately pertaining to two or more persons
are commingled or confused, the rules on co-ownership
shall be applicable.
Art. 2171. The rights and obligations of the finder of
lost personal property shall be governed by Articles 719
and 720.
Art. 2172. The right of every possessor in good faith to
reimbursement for necessary and useful expenses is
governed by Article 546.
Art. 2173. When a third person, without the knowledge
of the debtor, pays the debt, the rights of the former are
governed by Articles 1236 and 1237.
Art. 2174. When in a small community a nationality of
the inhabitants of age decide upon a measure for
protection against lawlessness, fire, flood, storm or
other calamity, any one who objects to the plan and
refuses to contribute to the expenses but is benefited by
the project as executed shall be liable to pay his share
of said expenses.
Art. 2175. Any person who is constrained to pay the
taxes of another shall be entitled to reimbursement from
the latter.
Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation vs. New
World Properties and Ventures, Inc. (2006)
Facts:
New World conducted a bidding for the construction of 69
bored piles which would form the foundation of the 36-storey World
Trade Exchange Building it planned to erect. New World notified
AFCSC of the acceptance of its bid to construct the 69 bored piles.
After the issuance of the Notice to Proceed, but before the
signing of the contract, AFCSC, proposed an amendment to the
contract conditions, to wit:
1.6 Excluded in the contractor scope of work shall be as follows:
1.6.2. Removal of Underground Obstruction
xxx
New World did not respond to said proposal but instead
directed AFCSC to proceed with the construction. Both parties signed
the contract for the construction of the 69 bored piles. AFCSC’s
proposal, however, was not incorporated in said contract.
Included in the billing is the cost of the removal of
underground obstructions in the project site as well as the installation
of sonic pipes to be used to conduct load tests on the bored piling
works. AFCSC claimed that these works were not part of the original
contract and should be treated as extra work. New World refused to
pay its outstanding obligations to AFCSC.
Issue: WON the removal of underground obstructions, installation of
sonic pipes, build up of pile test cap, soil investigation, and crane
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
rental constitute additional works which will entitle AFCSC to its
claim of additional pay.
Decision:
The removal of the underground obstructions was not covered
by the scope of work in the contract. It is not disputed though that the
same was a major work entailing additional expenses and extra
working time. Neither was it denied that such major work was indeed
necessary for the successful completion of the project. Indeed, to deny
AFCSC relief for the expenses it incurred in removing said
obstructions would result in allowing New World to unjustly enrich
itself at the expense of AFCSC. Equity necessarily dictates that New
World be held liable for the expenses incurred for the extra work
conducted for its sole benefit.
Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim, Nemo
ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made
rich out of another’s injury) states: Art. 22. Every person who through
an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The above-quoted
article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the
provisions of which were formulated as “basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for
the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society to
the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and
dominance of justice.
Hence, to allow New World to acquire the finished project at a
price far below its actual construction cost would undoubtedly
constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of AFCSC.
Such unjust enrichment, as previously discussed, is not allowed by
law.
Avon Cosmetics, Incorporated and Jose Marie Franco vs Leticia
H. Luna (2006)
Facts:
Luna initially worked for Beautifont as franchise dealer then
Supervisor. Later, Beautifont was acquired by Avon Cosmetics, in
which Luna continued working.
Avon and Luna entered into a Supervisor’s Agreement which
contained that Luna is an independent retailer of the company and is
not an employee or an agent and that she shall sell, display or promote
only the products of Avon.
Sometime in 1988, Luna became a Group Franchise Director of
Sandre Philippines, a company which sells vitamins and supplements,
while concurrently being a Group Supervisor of Avon. She consulted a
law firm as to the legality of her agreement with Avon and she was
advised that the same was contrary to public policy and
unconstitutional as it restraints the trade and livelihood of the party.
Upon learning the connection of Luna to Sandre Phils., Avon
terminated the exclusive dealership of the former. Hence, Luna filed
complaint for damages against Avon.
RTC ruled in favour of Luna and ordered Avon to pay
damages. The clause was held to be contrary to public policy as it
limits the trade and livelihood of the party involved. It should be
construed only as to not get involved in companies that are direct
competitors of Avon.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
CA affirmed.
Issue: WON the exclusivity clause was void for being contrary to
public policy.
Decision:
NO.
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that the clause
was made to protect Avon from other companies, whether competitors
or not, who would exploit the sales and promotions network
established by Avon.
Apparently, Sandre Phils. made Luna one of its Franchise
Directors to utilize her skills learned from Avon in the sale and
distribution of its products. Hence, this is tantamount to unjust
enrichment. Also, the goodwill established by Avon will be taken
advantage by Sandre since the dealers may be the same, this will
create beliefs in the minds of customers that both products are
manufactured by the same company.
Agapito Bonzon vs Standard Oil Company of New York and
Leonardo Osorio (1914)
Facts:
Bonzon purchased a real estate at an execution sale and paid
the sum of P2, 170 to the Sheriff; in return, the sheriff turned over the
proceeds of the sale to Standard Oil, judgment creditor.
Bonzon initially possessed the property but was later evicted
after having been discovered that the aforesaid property belonged to
third parties. Neither the judgment debtor nor Bonzon obtained title to
such property.
Bonzon later filed a complaint against Standard Oil and the
defendant Sheriff for the amount of purchase price paid at the
execution sale.
Issue: WON Bonzon may still recover the purchase price from the
judgment creditor.
Decision:
YES.
Under the general principle that one person may not enrich
himself at the expense of another, a judgment creditor would not be
permitted to retain the purchase price of land sold as the property of
the judgment debtor after it has been made to appear that the judgment
debtor had no title to the land and that the purchaser had failed to
secure title thereto.
The judgment in favour of Standard Oil gave it the right to
have the property of the judgment debtor to be sold to satisfy the
judgment; but it could not be given any right over the property of
another person.
In this case, the property was never owned by the judgment
debtor. By the tortious act of the sheriff, such property was sold to
Bonzon of which no title was transferred. The proceeding concerning
the sale have been found to be void hence the eviction of Bonzon from
the property, it is clear that the company have no right to the proceeds
of the sale. The purchaser is equitably entitled to the return of the
purchase price.
CHAPTER II
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
THE TORTFEASOR
A. The Tortfeasor
1. Natural Persons
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural
person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost. (n)
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are
mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt
the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as
when the latter arise from his acts or from property
relations, such as easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others,
modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes,
the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act
is not limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is
qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases
specified by law. (n)
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
(NCC)
2. Juridical Persons
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for
public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for
private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of
each shareholder, partner or member. (35a)
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of
the preceding article are governed by the laws creating
or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general
application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code
concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a)
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess
property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the
laws and regulations of their organization. (38a)
Philippine National Bank vs CA (1978)
Facts:
The basic action is the complaint filed by Philamgen
(Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc.) as surety against
Rita Gueco Tapnio and Cecilio Gueco, for the recovery of the sum of
P2,379.71 paid by Philamgen to the Philippine National Bank on
behalf of respondents Tapnio and Gueco, pursuant to an indemnity
agreement. Petitioner Bank was made third-party defendant by Tapnio
and Gueco on the theory that their failure to pay the debt was due to
the fault or negligence of petitioner.
Philamgen executed its Bond, with defendant Rita Gueco
Tapnio in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch at San
Fernando, Pampanga, to guarantee the payment of defendant Rita
Gueco Tapnio's account. In turn, to guarantee the payment of whatever
amount the bonding company would pay to the Philippine National
Bank, both defendants executed the indemnity agreement.
Defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio was indebted to the bank which
she failed to pay despite demands. The Bank wrote a letter of demand
to plaintiff. Plaintiff paid the bank for the defendant Rita Gueco's
obligation. Plaintiff made several demands upon defendant Rita Gueco
Tapnio. Tapnio told the Plaintiff that she did not consider herself to be
indebted to the Bank at all because she had an agreement with one
Jacobo-Nazon whereby she had leased to the latter her unused export
sugar quota. Tapnio filed her third-party complaint against the Bank.
She agreed to allow Mr. Jacobo C. Tuazon to use said quota for the
consideration of P2,500.00. This agreement was called a contract of
lease of sugar allotment. Her indebtedness was known as a crop loan
and was secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her
sugar quota allocation. Her sugar cannot be exported without sugar
quota allotment. A planter harvest less sugar than her quota, so her
excess quota is utilized by another who pays her for its use. This is the
arrangement entered into between Mrs. Tapnio and Mr. Tuazon . Since
the quota was mortgaged to the P.N.B., the contract of lease had to be
approved by said Bank.
The bank required the parties to raise the consideration of
P2.80 per picul or a total of P2,800.00. When the branch manager of
the Philippine National Bank at San Fernando recommended the
approval of the contract of lease at the price of P2.80 per picul, the
board of directors required that the amount be raised to 3.00 per picul.
The parties were notified of the refusal on the part of the board of
directors.
The refusal on the part of the bank to approve the lease at the
rate of P2.80 per picul would have enabled Rita Gueco Tapnio to
realize the amount of P2,800.00 which was more than sufficient to pay
off her indebtedness to the Bank
Petitioner argued that as an assignee of the sugar quota of
Tapnio, it has the right to fix the rental price per picul of the sugar
quota subject of the lease between private respondents and Jacobo C.
Tuazon.
Tuazon informed the Branch Manager of the Bank that the
minimum lease rental of P2.80 per picul was acceptable to him and
that he even offered to use the loan secured by him from petitioner to
pay in full the sum of P2,800.00 which was the total consideration of
the lease. This arrangement was not only satisfactory to the Branch
Manager but it was also approves by Vice-President J. V.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
Buenaventura of the PNB. Under that arrangement, Rita Gueco Tapnio
could have realized the amount of P2,800.00, which was more than
enough to pay the balance of her indebtedness to the Bank which was
secured by the bond of Philamgen.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable for the damage caused. Yes
Decision:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
ordering petitioner, as third-party defendant, to pay respondent Rita
Gueco Tapnio.
The difference between the amount of P2.80 per picul offered
by Tuazon and the P3.00 per picul demanded by the Board amounted
only to a total sum of P200.00. Considering that all the accounts of
Rita Gueco Tapnio with the Bank were secured by chattel mortgage
and surety, there was no reasonable basis for the Board of Directors of
petitioner to have rejected the lease agreement because of a measly
sum of P200.00.
The law makes it imperative that every person "must in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This petitioner failed to do.
The bank knew that the agricultural year was about to expire,
that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be
unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe the
reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the surrounding
circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner bank is consequently
liable for the damages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21
of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
B. Persons Made Responsible For Others
1. In General
a. Quasi-delicts under Art. 2180, how interpreted
Felina Rodriguez-Luna vs The Honorable Intermediate Appellate
Court (1985)
Facts:
The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed
in a vehicular collision.Those involved were the go-kart driven by the
deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela
Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.
Trial court ruled On the amount of the award of P1,650,000.00.
It was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R.
Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net
income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income
less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at
age 33 the life expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years. Dr.
Vicente Campa testified that based on Roberto Luna’s condition, he
could reasonably expect to have a life expectancy of 30 years.
Court of First Instance of Manila rendered sentencing the
defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly and
severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net
earnings of Roberto Luna, compensatory damages plus attorney's fees
in the sum of P50,000.00.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals. The
court affirmed in toto that of the trial court. However, upon a motion
for reconsideration filed by the defendants-appellants, the Court of
Appeals ordered the defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally,
the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) as
unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna.
The Court of appeal takes notice that the wrongful death
occurred as early as January 18, 1970 and that until now the process of
litigation is not yet over. In the interest of justice, the private
respondents are hereby ordered to pay to the petitioners within thirty
(30) days from notice the following amounts adjudged against them:
P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the deceased.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas,
the Court of Appeals took into account the fact that the deceased
Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car racing and manner of life
should be one of the factors affecting the value of mortality table in
actions for damages. The court concluded that Luna could not have
lived beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year life expectancy
of Luna was reduced to 10 years only.
Court of Appeals ruled in respect of Luna's annual personal
expenses, the escalating price of automobile gas which is a key
expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing, it should increase
that amount to P30,000.00.The Court of Appeals then determined the
amount of the award thus: P75,000.00 annual gross income less
P30,000.00 annual personal expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by
10 years of life expectancy and the product is P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when
by its resolution of June 19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy
from 30 to 10 Years and increased his annual personal expenses from
P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Their petition contains the following prayer: That after notice
and hearing, judgment be rendered, setting aside or modifying the
RESOLUTION of respondent Court of Appeal only insofar as it
reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00, so as to affirm the
trial court's finding as to the unearned net earnings of the deceased in
the amount of P1,650,000.00
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when
required to explain they said that they had no cash money.
Matters still to be resolved shall be the following; whether the
award for unearned net earnings shall be increased to P1,650,000.00;
and whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at
the legal rate.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original
decision. YES
Decision:
Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.
Supreme Court sustain the petitioners. Luna was engaged in
go-kart racing which cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for
go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly
larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances. It was error for
the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the deceased
by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the same
time increasing his annual gross income.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be
with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the
complaint. There is merit in this prayer. The attorney's fees were
awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the
circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the
discretion of the court.
The courts are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in
this case because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela
Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover,
he does not have any property either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In
fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.
b. Indirect liability for intentional acts
Linday Paleyan, for her own and behalf of her Minor children vs
Carlos Bangkili and Victoria Bangkili (1971)
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the widow and children of Balos Paleyan, who
was killed by defendant Carlos Bangkili. He was then accused of the
crime of Homicide with less serious physical injuries. At the time of
the commission of the offense Carlos Bangkili was a minor. Upon his
plea of guilty, he was sentenced accordingly, but the decision made no
pronouncement as to the civil indemnity. The plaintiffs filed the an
action for damages against Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria
Bangkili.
The Court orders the dismissal of the complaint against the
defendant Victoria Bangkili and renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant Carlos Bangkili. In dismissing the
complaint against Victoria Bangkili the court held that under Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code Victoria Bangkili could not be held
civilly liable for the criminal act of her minor son, who was already 19
years of age at the time he committed the offense; and that Article
2180 of the New Civil Code was not applicable for it covers only
obligations arising from quasi-delicts and not to those arising from
crimes.
Issue: WON the latter, as the mother of Carlos who had him in her
custody at the time he committed the offense, should be adjudged
liable with him for the amount which he was sentenced to pay,
considering that he was then a minor of 19 years.
Decision:
VICTORIA BANGKILI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH HER CO-
DEFENDANT.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180: "The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the
instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-
delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent.
Where the allegations in the complaint show that herein
appellee was sued directly under the said provision, in that she "failed
and neglected to exercise the proper care and vigilance over her ward
and minor child and as a consequence of such failure and neglect, the
said Carlos Bangkili committed the wrongful act herein complained of.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in this case,
but submits that its application should be relaxed, considering that her
son, although living with her, was already 19 years of age and hence
mature enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal
defense, however, and does not exempt the appellant from her
responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Article 2180 does
not provide for any exemption except proof that the defendant
parent "observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage." There is no such proof in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed with
respect to defendant-appellee Victoria Bangkili, and she is hereby
adjudged liable solidarily with her co-defendant for the amounts
awarded in said judgment, with costs.
c. Nature of Solidarity
Feliz Lanuzo vs Sy Bon Ping and Salvador Mendoza (1980)
Facts:
A Complaint for damages was instituted by Felix Lanuzo
against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a truck and his driver,
Salvador Mendoza. It was alleged that while Mendoza was driving the
truck and because of his reckless negligence, he rammed into the
residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store
were completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the
total amount of P13,000.00. The defendants moved to dismiss on the
ground that a criminal case for Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court of Nabua, Camarines
Sur, between the same parties for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the
dismissal stressing that he had made an express reservation in the
criminal case to institute a civil action for damages separate and
distinct from the criminal suit.
The Court rendered a judgment in plaintiff's favor ordering the
defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P13,000.00 as
damages.
They urged that the civil action was prematurely instituted in
view of Rule 111, section 3, providing in part that "after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Additionally,
they contended that even assuming their liability, the lower Court
nevertheless committed an error in holding them jointly and severally
liable.
Issues:
1) WON THE CIVIL ACTION WAS PREMATURELY
INSTITUTED IN VIEW OF RULE 111, SEC.3.
2) WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING SY BONG
PING JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR THE
DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT ACT OF HIS
EMPLOYEE
Decision:
1.) The terms of plaintiff's reservation of his right to institute a
separate civil action clearly and unmistakably make out a case for
quasi-delict. This is also evident from the recitals in plaintiff's
Complaint averring the employer-employee relationship between the
appellants, alleging that damages to the house and store were caused
by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly,
with gross negligence and imprudence, without observance of traffic
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
rules and regulations and without regard to the safety of persons and
property".
As it is apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim
for damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from proceeding with this
independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot have
the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict. And the
separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and
regardless of the result of the criminal case, except that a plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or commission of the
defendant.
2.) As to the subject of liability of the appellants herein, For his
own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by
his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his
employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180
of the same Code, which explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
For failure of the Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of
his negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, he is
likewise responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his
employee (driver), and his liability is primary and solidary. But
although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for
damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his
employee for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the
offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.
Prima Malipol, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of her
minor children, Lydia Malijan, Josefina Malijan, Teodoro Malijan
and Sebastian Malijan vs Lily Lim Tan and Ernesto Labsan
(1974)
Facts:
In the evening of February 6, 1965, Pantaleon Malijan, who
was walking on a road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was
hit by a gasoline tanker and was thrown to the ground. While he was
sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's right
wheel that got detached from its axle. He died due to the accident. The
cause of death is "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to
vehicular accident."
The gasoline tanker was driven at the time of the accident by
herein appellant Ernesto Labsan which was being used in connection
with the gasoline business of the owner, the herein appellant Lily Lim
Tan.
Representations and demands for payment of damage having
been ignored by appellants, appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that
appellants be condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the damages as
specified in said complaint. The appellees are the mother and the
minor brothers and sisters of the deceased Pantaleon Malijan.
Appellants were duly served but they failed to file their answer
within the reglementary period. Upon appellees' motion, the trial court
declared the appellants in default and appellees were permitted to
present their evidence in the absence of the appellants.
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
CFI- Ernesto Labsan is liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs
and should Ernesto Labsan not be able to pay the damages, they shall
be paid for by defendant Lily Lim Tan, who by law, being the owner
and operator of the gasoline tanker that featured in the accident, is
subsidiarily liable.
Appellants subsequently filed a verified motion to lift the order
of default and for a new trial which was denied by the trial court.
Issue: WON the liability of Lily Lim Tan in the case, who by law,
being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker is subsidiary.
Decision:
No. Lily Lim Tan’s liability is direct and primary.
We must point out a flaw in the decision of the lower court. It
is stated in the decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto Labsan,
was primarily liable for the payment of damages adjudged therein, and
the appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the owner and operator of the
gasoline tanker that figured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable, that
is, liable only in case Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay. This is not
correct. The action in the instant case was brought not to demand civil
liability arising from a crime. The complaint makes no mention of a
crime having been committed, much less of the driver Ernesto Labsan
having been convicted of a crime. But there is an allegation in the
complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized driver of the truck
that figured in the accident, which truck was operated by appellant
Lily Lim Tan in connection with her gasoline business. The prayer in
the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold appellants jointly and
solidarily liable for damages. The instant action, therefore, was based,
as the complaint shows, on quasi delict. Under Article 218 of the Civil
Code, which treats of quasi delicts, the liability of the owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by
their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. 9 The employer,
however, can demand from his employee reimbursement of the
amount which he paid under his liability. The employer, appellant Lily
Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable
for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court. This is, of
course, without prejudice to the right of appellant Lily Lim Tan to
demand from her co-appellant Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the
damages that she would have to pay to appellees.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, dated July 1, 1966, as modified in accordance with the
observations we made in the preceding paragraph, and the order, dated
October 10, 1966, denying appellants' motion for the lifting of the
order of default and for new trial, in Civil Case No. 1732, are affirmed.
Costs against defendants-appellees.
Gregorio Anuran, Maria Maligaya, Lapaz Laro, et al vs
Pepito Buno, Pedro Gahol, Luisa Alcantara, Guillermo Razon,
Anselmo Maligaya and Cerefina Aro (1966)
Facts:
Petitioners- Representatives of the dead and the injured
Respondents- Driver and owners of motor truck and
driver and owners of jeepney
At noon of January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked
on the road to Taal, Batangas. A motor truck speeding along,
negligently bumped it from behind, with such violence that three of its
passengers died, even as two others (passengers too) suffered injuries
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many
days.
So, in February 1958 these suits were instituted by the
representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover consequently
damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and also against
the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
Court of First Instance- rendered judgment absolving the
driver of the jeepney and its owners but it required the truck driver and
the owners thereof to make compensation.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that
the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for
damages.
Court of Appeals- it affirmed the exoneration of the jeepney
driver and of its owners. It explained that although the driver of the ill-
starred jeepney was not free from fault, for he was guilty of an
antecedent negligence in parking his vehicle improperly with a portion
thereof occupying the asphalted road and because it was overloaded, it
considered the truck driver guilty of greater negligence which was the
efficient cause of the collision; and applying the doctrine of the "last
clear chance", the said Court ordered the owners of the truck to pay,
solidarily with its driver, damages.
The plaintiffs brought the matter to this Supreme Court
insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be
made liable.
Issue: WON the driver and the owners of the jeepney should
also be made liable.
Decision: Yes.
Upon further and more extended consideration of the matter,
we have become convinced that error of law was committed in
releasing the jeepney from liability. It must be remembered that the
obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that
the New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art.
1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary
diligence" (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal presumption of
negligence is confirmed by the Court of Appeals' finding that the
driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking the vehicle
improperly. It must follow that the driver — and the owners — of the
jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.
The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence.
WHEREFORE, affirming the decision under review, we
hereby modify it in the sense prayed for by plaintiffs-petitioners. The
three defendants ( Driver and owners of the jeepney) are required to
pay solidarily with the other defendants-respondents the amounts fixed
by the appealed decision. Costs of both appeals against said three
defendants. So ordered.
* The last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts that is
employed in contributory negligence jurisdictions. Under this doctrine, a
negligent plaintiff can nonetheless recover if he is able to show that the
defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the accident. Where the plaintiff's
previous negligence has placed him or her in a position from which the
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
person is powerless to extricate himself or herselfby the exercise of any
ordinary care, and the defendant detects the danger while time remains to
avoid it but fails to act, the courts have held that the plaintiff can
recover.There must be proof that the defendant discovered the situation, had
the time to take action that would have saved the plaintiff, but failed to do
what a reasonable person would have done. In the absence of any one of
these elements, the courts deny recovery on the part of the plaintiff.
John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. vs Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc. (2005)
Facts:
Petitioner John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. (Chan), owner of a
gasoline station bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent
Iglesia ni Kristo, Inc. (INC), supposedly needed additional sewage and
septic tanks for his gasoline station. To this end Chan contracted the
services of Dioscoro Yoro (Yoro) in which the latter was to dig the
parcel of land. Their Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) provided
among others, that any damage within or outside Chan’s property
incurred during the digging shall be borne by Yoro. Digging
commenced, and after some time Chan was informed that the digging
traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to INC. The
foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly
under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent.
A complaint was filed by INC with the RTC against Chan and
his engineer Oller, who filed an answer and third-party complaint
against Yoro. The RTC ruled that the diggings were not intended for
the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to
construct tunnels to find hidden treasure, and that Chan and Yoro are
solidarily liable to INC and absolving Oller from any liability.
Chan and Yoro separately appealed to the CA, which
disallowed the latter’s appeal for failure to pay the docket and other
fees. The CA denied Chan’s appeal.
Issue: Whether Aruego is the real party in interest and may be sued as
defendant
Decision:
Petition DENIED.
The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb this particular
conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. The issue, therefore,
must be ruled in the negative.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the
following:
a) there must be an act or omission;
b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act
was the excavation which caused damage to INC because it was done
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang

surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY
foundation of the chapel. The excavation INC’s premises was caused FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS,
by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE
between Chanand Yoro on the one hand, and INC on the other. ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
For the damage caused to INC, Chan and Yoro are jointly liable as
they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
The heavy reliance of Chan in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited
earlier cannot steer him clear of any liability. Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209,
the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who to read as follows:
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it "Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment
after it is done, if done for their benefit. of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of eighteen years."
Indubitably, Chan and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort.
They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code
the treasure if any is found within or outside Chan’s property line. are hereby repealed.
Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the
very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable. Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also
hereby amended to read as follows:
Besides, Chan cannot claim that he did not know that the
excavation traversed INC’s property. In fact, he had two (2) of his "Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental
employees actually observe the diggings, his security guard and his authority over the person and property of the child who
engineer Teofilo Oller. shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of
civil life, save the exceptions established by existing
2. In Particular laws in special cases.

a. Parents "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent

until the age of twenty-one.
Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate
from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians
for children and wards below twenty-one years of age
mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article
2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing
wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies
and similar instruments containing references and
provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their
prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon
completion of its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are
shall have special parental authority and responsibility
over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility
under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that
they exercised the proper diligence required under the
particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding
articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the
Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental
authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children on wards the following rights
and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support,
educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping
with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate
their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them
from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring
habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their
interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required
under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by
law upon parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a ) (NCC)
Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano, in their capacity as Ascendants
of Agapito Elcano, deceased vs Reginald Hill, minor, and Marvin
Hill, as father and natural guardian of said minor (1977)
Facts:
Appellee Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he
was living and getting subsistence, was charged by appellants Pedro
and Patricia Elcano for the killing by Reginald of their son named
Agapito Elcano. The CFI acquitted the Hills on the ground that
Marvin’s act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." The CFI also dismissed the Elcano’s complaint
for recovery of damages against the Hills for the same charge. Hence
the appeal.
Issue: Whether Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil
Code may be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of,
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his
father, was already legally married
Decision:
Petition DENIED.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
his father, it is also the Court’s considered opinion that the conclusion
of the Hills that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be
upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)",
it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall
terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without
the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leungson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang

sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or Accordingly, in the Court’s considered view, Article 2180
guardian." applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at
the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which
is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason

behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by
marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance
of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom
to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely,
killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to
see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for
the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
property which cannot be done by their minor married child without
their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)