QUAMTO (1987-2016)
May LEGALCARE be legally incorporated? Discuss fully.
LEGAL ETHICS QUAMTO
LEGAL ETHICS
Q: What do you understand by Legal Ethics? Discuss its
importance and state its sources.
A: Legal ethics is that branch of moral science which treats
of the duties that an attorney owes to the court, to his client,
to his colleagues, in the profession, and to society.
The sources of legal ethics are the Constitution, the Rules of
Court, some particular provisions of statutes, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Judicial decisions.
Legal ethics is important in order to maintain a high moral
standard for the lawyer in performing his duties as an
officer of the court, his duties to his client, to the members
of the legal profession as well as to society. Lawyers wield
so much power and influence in society. Unless their acts
are regulated by high norms of ethical conduct they are
likely to abuse them.
PRACTICE OF LAW (RULE 138)
Definition of the practice of law (2005, 1995)
Q: Atty. Yabang was suspended as a member of the Bar
for period of one (1) year. During the period of
suspension, he was permitted by his law firm to
continue working in their office, drafting and preparing
pleadings and other legal documents, but was not
allowed to come into direct contact with the firms’
clients. Atty. Yabang was subsequently sued for illegal
practice of law. Would the case prosper? Explain. (2005
Bar)
A: The Supreme Court has defined the practice of law as any
activity in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal principle, practice or procedure and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (Cayetano vs. Monsod,
201 SCRA 210 [1991]). Based on this definition, the acts of
Atty. Yabang of preparing pleadings and other legal
documents would constitute practice of law. More so, if his
activities are for the benefit of his law firm, because the
employment of a law firm is the employment of all the
members thereof. The case against him will prosper.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The traditional concept of practice of law requires the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship as a requisite.
Pursuant to this concept, inasmuch as Atty. Yabang was not
allowed by his law firm to come into direct contact with the
firm’s clients during the period of his suspension, he cannot
be considered as having engaged in illegal practice of law. .
The case against him will not prosper.
Q: Evelyn, Luisa. Myra, Josefina, Pamela and Rose are
bona fide members of the Philippine bar. They agree to
form a close corporation to be named LEGALCARE the
principal purpose of which is “to provide clients legal
services, research and advice as well as trial advocacy
for a fee." The services shall be rendered not only by
these enterprising pioneers of LEGALCARE but also by
lawyers to be employed by the projected corporation
on regular monthly salary basis.
(1995 Bar)
A: A corporation cannot engage in the practice of law even
by hiring lawyers to perform legal work. It has been held
that only a natural person can engage in the practice of law.
A lawyer is burdened with peculiar duties and
responsibilities. A corporation cannot take an oath of office,
be an officer of the court or subjected to court discipline: it
cannot engage in law practice directly, it cannot evade the
requirements by employing competent lawyers to practice
for it. (Matter of Cooperative Law Co., N.Y. 579). Hence,
LEGALCARE cannot be legally incorporated because the
principal purpose involves the practice of law.
Practice of law is a privilege, not a right
Q: Is the practice of law a right or a privilege? Discuss
fully. (1995 Bar)
A: The practice of law is basically a privilege because it is
limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. (5 Am. Jur.
270) Thus, only those persons are allowed to practice law,
who by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science. Attorneys
are the court’s constituency - to aid it in the administration
of justice. (Dodge v. State, 38 NE 745)
Law as a profession, not a business or trade (2015,
2013, 2006, 1997)
Q: Why is law a profession and not a trade? (2006 Bar)
A: Law is a profession and not a trade because its basic ideal
is to render public service and secure justice for those who
seek its aid. The gaining of a livelihood is only a secondary
consideration.
Q: You are the managing partner of a law firm. A new
foreign airline company, recently granted rights by the
Civil Aeronautics Board at the NAIA, is scouting for a
law firm which could handle its cases in the Philippines
and provide legal services to the company and its
personnel. After discussing with you the extent of the
legal services your law firm is prepared to render, the
general manager gives you a letter-proposal from
another law firm in which its time-billing rates and
professional fees for various legal services are
indicated. You are asked to submit a similar letter-
proposal stating your firm's proposed fees. The airline
company's general manager also tells you that, if your
proposed fees would at least be 25 per cent lower than
those proposed by the other firm, you will get the
company's legal business. How would you react to the
suggestion? (1997 Bar)
A: I will emphasize to the General Manager that the practice
of law is a profession and not a trade. Consequently, I will
not propose a lower fee just for the sake of competing with
another firm. Because such practice smacks of
commercialism. Moreover, Rule 2. 04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed
unless the circumstances so warrant. I will charge fees that
will be reasonable under the circumstances.
Q: As a new lawyer, Attorney Novato started with a
practice limited to small claims cases, legal counseling,
and notarization of documents. He put up a solo
practice law office and was assisted by his wife who
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
served as his secretary/helper. He used a makeshift hut
in a vacant lot near the local courts and a local transport
regulatory agency. With this strategic location, he
enjoyed heavy patronage assisting walk-in clients in
the preparation and filing of pleadings and in the
preparation and notarization of contracts and
documents, and charges a reasonable fee for the
service. He draws electric power from an extension
wire connected to an adjoining small restaurant. He put
up a shingle that reads: “Atty. Novato, Specialist in Small
Claims, Fastest in Notarization; the Be stand Cheapest
in Copier Services.”
Is Atty. Novato’s manner of carrying out his
professional practice –i.e., mixing business with the
practice of law, announcing his activities via a shingle
and locating his office as above-described – in keeping
with appropriate ethical and professional practice?
(2013 Bar)
A: No. Atty. Novato’s manner of carrying out his
professional practice is not in keeping with appropriate
ethical and professional practice. He has degraded the law
profession, which may result to loss of respect to lawyers as
a whole.
The use of a makeshift hut standing alone would create the
impression that the lawyer does not have a permanent
address which is required to be stated in all pleadings he
signs as well as required to be shown in documents he
notarizes.
His shingle shows that he has considered the law profession
as a business. He should have a separate shingle for his
copier services business.
When he included in his shingle the phrases “Specialist in
Small Claims” and “Fastest in Notarization,” he has
transgressed the rule that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only dignified information or
statement of facts (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 3). So also the norm that a lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any misleading, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services (Ibid., Canon 3, Rule 3.01).
The use of the phrases “Specialist in Small Claims” and
“Fastest in Notarization” is misleading advertisement
because they are likely to create an unjustified expectation
about the results the lawyer can achieve or implies that the
lawyer can achieve results by improper means (ABA Model
Rule 7.1.b).
Q: Cite some of the characteristics of the legal
profession which distinguish it from business. (2015
Bar)
A: The primary characteristics which distinguish the legal
profession from a business are:
1. a duty of public service of which emolument is a by-
product and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
2. a relation as officer of the court to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability;
3. a relation to client in the highest degree fiduciary;
4. a relation to colleagues characterized by candor,
fairness and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on
2
UST BAR OPERATIONS
their, or dealing directly with their clients (In Re Sycip,
92 SCRA 1).
Qualifications for admission to the Bar (2004, 2013,
1997, 2005)
Q: Upon learning from newspaper reports that bar
candidate Vic Pugote passed the bar examinations. Miss
Adorable immediately lodged a complaint with the
Supreme Court, praying that Vic Pugote be disallowed
from taking the oath as a member of the Philippine Bar
because he was maintaining illicit sexual relations with
several women other than his lawfully wedded spouse.
However, from unexplained reasons, he succeeded to
take his oath as a lawyer. Later, when confronted with
Miss Adorable’s complaint formally, Pugote moved for
its dismissal on the ground that it is already moot and
academic.
Should Miss Adorable’s complaint be dismissed or not?
Explain briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: It should not be dismissed. Her charge involves a matter
of good moral character which is not only a requisite for
admission to the Bar, but also a continuing condition for
remaining a member of the Bar. As such, the admission of
Vic Pugote to the Bar does not render the question moot and
academic.
Q: Miguel Jactar, a fourth year law student, drove his
vehicle recklessly and hit the rear bumper of Simplicio
Medroso’s vehicle. Instead of stopping, Jactar
accelerated and sped away. Medroso pursued Jactar
and caught up with him at an intersection.
In their confrontation, Jactar dared Medroso to sue,
bragged about his connections with the courts, and
even uttered veiled threats against Medroso. During
the police investigation that followed, Medroso learned
that Jactar was reviewing for the Bar examinations.
Under these facts, list and justify the potential
objections that can be made against Jactar’s admission
to the practice of law. (2013 Bar)
A: The potential objection that can be made against Jactar’s
admission to the practice of law is the absence of good
moral character (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 2).
Jactar’s bragging about his connection with the courts and
uttering veiled threats against Medroso are indications of
his lack of good moral character. His acts are contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals (In re Basa, 41 Phil.
276). He has acted in a manner that has violated the private
and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man (Tak Ng v.
Republic, G.R. No. L-13017, 106 Phil. 730, December 23,
1959).
NOTE: Any answer which explains the nature of absence of
good moral character should be given full credit.
The following additional objection should not result to a
deduction nor should an absence of the additional objection
also result to a deduction.
a. If light threats would be filed against him, then another
potential objection would be the pendency of charges
against him, involving moral turpitude (Rules of Court,
Rule 138, Sec. 2).
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
b. The question states, “Under these facts, list and justify
the potential objections that can be made against
Jactar’s admission to the practice of law.”
c. The question requires that an assumption be made that
Jactar has passed the Bar Examination and is about to
take his oath as an attorney. It is suggested that the
better question should have been: “Under these facts,
list and justify the potential objections that can be made
against Jactar’s being admitted to take the Bar
Examination.”
Q: Prior to his admission to the freshman year in a
reputable law school, bar examinee A was charged
before the Municipal Trial Court with damage to
property through reckless imprudence for accidentally
sideswiping a parked jeepney. The case was amicably
settled with A agreeing to pay the claim of the jeepney
owner for P1,000.00. In his application to take the 1997
Bar Examinations, A did not disclose the above incident.
Is he qualified to take the Bar Examinations? (1997,
2005 Bar)
A: Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar”. In
the case of In re: Ramon Galang, 66 SCRA 245, the
respondent repeatedly omitted to make mention of the fact
that there was a pending criminal case for slight physical
injuries against him in all four (4) applications for
admission to take the bar examinations. He was found to
have fraudulently concealed and withheld such fact from
the Supreme Court and committed perjury. The Supreme
Court cited the rule that “the concealment of an attorney in
his application to take the bar examinations of the fact that
he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime,
is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law.”
A’s failure to disclose that he had been charged with damage
to property through reckless imprudence in his application
for admission to the bar examinations disqualifies him. It
does not matter that the offense charged does not involve
moral turpitude or has been amicably settled. When the
applicant concealed a charge of a crime against him but
which crime does not involve moral turpitude, this
concealment nevertheless will be taken against him. It is the
fact of concealment and not the commission of the crime
itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer (In
re: Ramon Galang, A.C. No. 1163, August 29, 1975).
Q: Does the legislature have the power to regulate
admission to the bar and the practice of law? Discuss
fully. (1995 Bar)
A: Congress under the 1987 Constitution has no power to
regulate admission to the Bar and the practice of law. Unlike
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution no
longer provides for the power of the legislature to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
legislature had the power to repeal, alter the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court although the power and
the responsibility to admit members of the bar resides in
the Supreme Court. (See In Re: Cunanan, 50 OG 1602) Under
the 1987 Constitution however, the Supreme Court has the
exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning the
enforcement of rights, pleadings and practice and
procedures of all courts and the admission to the practice of
law. (See Art. 8. Section 5, subpar. 3-5).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Agpalo has pointed out that the legislature, in the exercise
of police power, may enact laws regulating the practice of
law to protect the public and promote public welfare, but it
may not pass a law that will control the Supreme Court in
the performance of its function to decide who may be
admitted into the practice of law (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 5th
Edition, p. 5). Constitutional Commissioner Joaquin C.
Bemas also submits that the matter stays as if the 1935 and
1973 provisions had been re-enacted (Bernas, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 1992 ed., Vol.
II. p. 293).
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
Law student practice rule (Rule 18-A) (2009, 2006)
Q1: Enumerate the instances when a law student may
appear in court as counsel for a litigant. (2006 Bar)
A:
a. Under the Student Practice Rule, a law student who has
successfully completed his third year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in
a recognized law school’s clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted
by the legal clinic of the law school, under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines if he appears in a Regional Trial
Court, and without such supervision if he appears in an
inferior court (Bar Matter 730, June 10, 1997);
b. When he appears as an agent or friend of a litigant in an
inferior court (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court);
c. When he is authorized by law to appear for the
Government of the Philippines (Sec. 33, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court);
d. In remote municipalities where members of the bar are
not available, the judge of an inferior court may appoint
a non-lawyer who is a resident the province and of good
repute for probity and ability, to aid the defendant in
his defense (Sec. 4, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Court);
e. A law student may appear before the National Labor
Relations Commission or any Labor Arbiter if (a) he
represents himself, as a party to the case, (b) he
represents an organization or its members with written
authorization from them, or (c) he is a duly-accredited
member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines in cases referred to by the latter (Art. 222,
Labor Code; Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. v.
NLRC, 279 SCRA 337 [1997]);
f. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer may represent a
claimant before the Cadastral Court (Sec. 8, Act No.
2250).
Q: What is the student practice rule? (2009 Bar)
A: The Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) is the Rule
authorizing a law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school’s
clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court, to appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal or board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school, under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the IBP
accredited by the law school.
Non-lawyers in courts (1996, 1999)
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
Q: Generally, only those who are members of the bar
can appear in court. Are there exceptions to this rule?
Explain (1996 Bar)
Answer:
The exceptions to the rule that only those who are members
of the bar can appear in court are the following:
a. In the municipal trial court, a party may conduct his
litigation in person or with the aid of an agent or friend
(Sec. 34. Rule 138).
b. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally (id.)
c. In criminal proceedings before a municipal trial court
in a locality where a duly licensed member of the bar is
not available, the court may in its discretion admit or
assign a person, resident of the province and of good
repute for probity and ability, to aid the defendant in
his defense, although the person so assigned is not a
duly authorized member of the bar (Sec. 4. Rule 116).
d. Any official or other person appointed or designated in
accordance with law to appear for the Government of
the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly
authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in
which said government has an interest direct or
indirect (Sec. 33. Rule 138).
e. A senior law student who is enrolled in a recognized
law school’s clinical education program approved by
the Supreme Court may appear before any court
without compensation to represent indigent clients
accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law school (Rule 138-
A).
f. Non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor
Arbiter if they represent themselves or their labor
organization or members thereof (Art. 222, Labor
Code).
g. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can rep-resent a
claimant before the Cadastral Court (Sec. 9. Act. 2259).
Q: A, a mere high school graduate, with the aid of a
friend who is a college undergraduate, filed a complaint
for recovery of a sum of money in the amount of Four
Thousand (P4, 000.00) Pesos in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of his town. The Clerk of Court told A that his
complaint might be dismissed for insufficiency as to
form because neither he nor his friend who is assisting
him is a lawyer. Is the Clerk of Court correct? (1999 Bar)
A: The Clerk of Court is not correct. In the Justice of the
Peace courts (now known as Municipal Trial Court or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Court),
a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
Q: A, a law graduate but has not passed the bar
examination, filed a Complaint in the Regional Trial
Court for recovery of Fifty Thousand (P50, 000.00)
Pesos owed him by B. At the hearing of the case after
Answer was filed, A appeared by himself alone and
without counsel to prosecute his case. The defendant
pointed out to the Court that A was not a member of the
bar and suggested that for his own protection, A should
engage the services of a counsel duly accredited as a
member of the Bar. The Judge intimated his willingness
to reset the hearing of the case to another day to enable
plaintiff to engage the services of counsel. Plaintiff
replied he could manage to prosecute his own case, it
being but a simple case for collection of sum of money.
4
UST BAR OPERATIONS
If you were the Judge, will you allow A to continue
prosecuting his case by himself alone? (1999 Bar)
A: Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that
in a Regional Trial Court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar. Hence, if I were the Judge, I will allow A to continue
prosecuting his case alone, but I will warn him about the
risks involved in his doing so because of his lack of
knowledge of law and legal procedure.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
a. If I were the Judge, I will not allow A to prosecute his
case. Although he is a law graduate, it does not appear
that he is familiar with procedural law, having filed the
case with the RTC which has no jurisdiction over the
case in view of the amount involved. The judge is duty
bound to see to it that there is no miscarriage of justice.
b. No. I shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction
because the amount of P50.000.00 is within the
jurisdictional ambit of the Municipal Trial Court.
Consequently, A could not continue prosecuting the
case.
Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals
Q: Raul Catapang, a law graduate and vice-president for
labor relations of XYZ Labor Union, entered his
appearance as representative of a member of the union
before the Labor Arbiter in a case for illegal dismissal,
unpaid wages and overtime pay. Counsel for the
Company objected to Raul’s appearance and moved for
his disqualification on the ground that he is not a
lawyer. If you were the Labor Arbiter, how would you
resolve the motion? Why? (2002 Bar)
A: I will deny the motion to disqualify Raul. Article 222 of
the Labor Code authorizes non-lawyers to appear before
the National Labor Relations Commission or any Labor
Arbiter in representation of their organization or members
thereof.
SANCTIONS FOR PRACTICE OR APPEARANCE
WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Lawyers without authority (2006, 2000)
Q: (1) The Supreme Court suspended indefinitely Atty.
Fernandez from the practice of law for gross
immorality. He asked the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge of his town if he can be appointed counsel de
officio for Tony, a childhood friend who is accused of
theft. The judge refused because Atty. Fernandez’s
name appears in the Supreme Court’s List of Suspended
Lawyers. Atty. Fernandez then inquired if he can appear
as a friend for Tony to defend him. If you were the judge,
will you authorize him to appear in your court as a
friend for Tony?
A: I will not authorize him to appear as a friend of Tony. The
accused in a criminal case is entitled to be represented by
legal counsel, and only a lawyer can be appointed as counsel
de officio. Although a municipal trial court may appoint a
person of good refute to aid the accused as counsel de officio
in his defense, this is applicable only where members of the
bar are not present (Sec. 4, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Court).
Necessarily, the friend referred to one who is not a lawyer.
Atty. Fernandez is a lawyer but under indefinite suspension.
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
He should not be allowed to practice law even as a counsel
de officio.
(2) Supposing Tony is a defendant in a civil case for
collection of sum of money before the same court, can
Atty. Fernandez appear for him to conduct his
litigation? (2006 Bar)
A: Even if Tony is a defendant in a civil case, Atty. Fernandez
cannot be allowed to appear for him to conduct his
litigation; otherwise, the judge will be violating Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that
"a lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO 1 AND 2:
Yes, if Atty. Fernandez was appointed by Tony. Even if Atty.
Fernandez was suspended indefinitely, he may appear as
an. agent or friend of Tony, the party litigant in the
Municipal Trial Court, if Tony appoints him to conduct his
case (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, Cantimbuhan
v. Cruz, Jr., 126 SCRA 190 [1983])
Q: Atty. E entered his appearance as counsel for
defendant F in a case pending before the Regional Trial
Court. F later complained that he did not authorize Atty.
E to appear for him. F moved that the court suspend
Atty. E from the practice of law. May the judge grant the
motion? Explain. (2000 Bar)
A: The judge may grant the motion. Unauthorized
appearance is a ground for suspension or disbarment (Sec.
27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. A lawyer’s appearance for a party without the
authority of the latter must be willful, corrupt or
contumacious in order that he may be held administratively
liable therefor. But if he has acted in good faith, the
complaint for suspension will fail (Garrido v. Qutsumbing, 28
SCRA 614 [1969]).
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Prohibition or disqualification of former government
attorneys
Q: Atty. Herminio de Pano is a former Prosecutor of the
City of Manila who established his own law office after
taking advantage of the Early Retirement Law. He was
approached by Estrella Cabigao to act as private
prosecutor in an estafa case in which she is the
complainant. It appears that said estafa case was
investigated by Atty. de Pano when he was still a
Prosecutor. Should Atty. de Pano accept employment as
private prosecutor in said estafa case? Explain. (1992
Bar)
A: Atty. de Pano should not accept the employment as
private prosecutor as he will be violating Canon 6, Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service.
Q: Lawyer U, a retired Tanodbayan prosecutor, now in
the private practice of law entered his appearance for
and in behalf of an accused in a case before the
Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved for his
disqualification on the ground that he had earlier
appeared for the prosecution in the case and is
knowledgeable about the prosecution's evidence, both
documentary and testimonial. U contended that he
merely appeared at the arraignment on behalf of the
prosecutor assigned to the case who was absent at the
time. Decide. (Bar)
A: Lawyer U should be disqualified from entering his
appearance in this case even only for arraignment of the
accused. His appearance is deemed to be appearing for
conflicting interest.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Canon 36 provides that a lawyer, having once held public
office or having been in public employ, should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ. The contention of U that he merely
appeared at the arraignment on behalf of the absent
prosecutor, is not enough. As a former Tanodbayan
prosecutor, he certainly had occasion to obtain knowledge
about the prosecution’s evidence.
Public officials who cannot practice law or can practice
law with restrictions (1990, 2000)
Q: A town mayor was indicted for homicide through
reckless imprudence arising from a vehicular accident.
May his father-in-law who is a lawyer and a
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member represent him in
court? Reason. (2000 Bar)
A: Yes, his father-in-law may represent him in court. Under
the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), members of the
Sanggunian may engage in the practice of law, except in the
following: (1) they shall not appear as counsel before any
court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or
any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is
the adverse party; (2) they shall not appear as counsel in
any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office; (3) they shall not collect
any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
including the local government unit of which he is an
official; and (4) they shall not use property and personnel
of the Government except when the Sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interests of the government. In
this case, the town mayor was indicted for homicide
through reckless imprudence, an offense that is not related
to his office.
Q: In a civil case before the Regional Trial Court
between Mercy Sanchez and Cora Delano, Sanchez
engaged the services of the Reyes Cruz & Santos Law
Offices. Delano moved for the disqualification of the
Reyes Cruz & Santos Law Offices on the ground that
Atty. Cruz is an incumbent senator. Rule on the motion
with reasons. (1990 Bar)
A: As a judge, I will require that the name of Atty. Cruz, an
incumbent Senator, be dropped from any pleading filed in
court or from any oral appearance for the law firm by any
other member of the law firm, and should the law firm
refuse, I will disqualify the law firm. My reasons are as
follows:
Article VI, Sec. 14ofthe 1987 Constitution provides that “no
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of Justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies." What is prohibited is personal
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
appearance of the Senator Atty. Cruz, and for as long as the
Senator does not personally appear in court for Mercy
Sanchez, the prohibition does not apply. Personal
appearance includes not only arguing or attending a
hearing of a case in court but also the signing of a pleading
and filing it in court. Hence, the Senator should not allow his
name to appear in pleadings filed in court by itself or as part
of a law firm name, such as Reyes Cruz and Santos Law
Offices, under the signature of another lawyer in the law
firm, nor should he allow the firm name with his name
therein to appear as counsel through another lawyer,
without indirectly violating the constitutional restriction,
because the signature of an agent amounts to a signing by
the Senator through another lawyer is in effect his
appearance, the office of attorney being originally one of
agency, and because the Senator cannot do indirectly what
the Constitution prohibits directly. The lawyer actually
appearing for Mercy Sanchez should drop the name of Atty.
Cruz from any pleading or from any oral appearance in
court, otherwise the law firm could be disqualified.
Moreover, Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a lawyer in government from using
his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, and the Senator’s name appearing in pleadings or
in appearances by other lawyers in the law firm may be
misconstrued as indirectly influencing the judge to decide
the case in favor of the law firm’s client, which can only be
avoided by dropping the name of the Senator from the firm
name whenever it appears in court.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
a. The motion to disqualify the Reyes Cruz and Santos Law
Offices may not prosper as Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution prohibits a Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives to personally appear as
counsel in any court of justice. If Attorney Cruz who is a
Senator personally appears, he may be disqualified.
b. I will deny the motion. The Constitution prohibits
personal appearance by a member of Congress before
the Courts but does not totally prohibit law practice. As
long as the Senator does not personally or physically
appear in court, there is no disqualification.
Lawyers who are authorized to represent government
(2001, 2006)
Q: From the viewpoint of legal ethics, why should it be
mandatory that the public prosecutor be present at the
trial of a criminal case despite the presence of a private
prosecutor? (2001 Bar)
A: The public prosecutor must be present at the trial of the
criminal case despite the presence of a private prosecutor
in order to see to it that the interest of the State is well-
guarded and protected, should the private prosecutor be
found lacking in competence in prosecuting the case.
Moreover, the primary duty of a public prosecutor is not to
convict but to see to it that justice is done (Rule 6.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility). A private prosecutor would be
naturally interested only in the conviction of the accused.
Q: Prosecutor Coronel entered his appearance on
behalf of the State before a Family Court in a case for
declaration of nullity of marriage, but he failed to
appear in all the subsequent proceedings. When
required by the Department of Justice to explain, he
argued that the parties in the case were ably
represented by their respective counsels and that his
time would be better employed in more substantial
prosecutorial functions, such as investigations,
6
UST BAR OPERATIONS
inquests and appearances in court hearings. Is Atty.
Coronel’s explanation tenable? (2006 Bar)
A: Atty. Coronel’s explanation is not tenable the role of the
State’s lawyer in nullification of marriage cases is that of
protector of the institution of marriage (Art 48, Family
Code). “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable
social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation
and not mere pro forma compliance" (Malcampo-Sin v. Sin,
355 SCRA 285 [2001]). This role could not be left to the-
private counsels who have been engaged to protect the
private interests of the parties.
LAWYER’S OATH
Q: The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligation and its
violation is a ground for suspension, disbarment, or
other disciplinary action. State in substance the
Lawyer’s Oath. (2015, 2009 Bar)
Answer:
“I, ____________________________________________, having been
permitted to continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the law as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same;
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.”
Q: What is the significance of lawyer's oath? (1996,
2003 Bar)
A: “The significance of the oath is that it not only impresses
upon the attorney his responsibilities but it also stamps him
as an officer of the court with rights, powers and duties as
important as those of the judge themselves. The oath of a
lawyer is a condensed code of legal ethics. It is a source of
his obligation and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action".
(Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 5th ed., p.59)
Q: Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates
nine (9) duties of attorneys. Give at least three (3) of
them. (2000, 2007 Bar)
A: Under Section 20, Rule 138, it is the duty of an attorney:
1. To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines;
2. To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers;
3. To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings
only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only
as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
4. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or
any Judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law;
5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril
to himself, to preserve the secret of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his client’s
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
business except from him with his knowledge and
approval;
6. To abstain from all offensive personality, and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged;
7. Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
8. Never to reject, for any consideration personal to
himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
9. In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair
and honorable means, regardless of his personal
opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every
defense that the law permits, to the end that no person
may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
law.
Q: State the duties of a lawyer imposed by the Lawyer’s
oath (2016 Bar)
A: The following are the duties of a lawyer imposed by the
lawyer’s oath:
1. To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines;
2. To support its Constitution;
3. To obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities;
4. To do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same
in any court;
5. Not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor to give nor to
consent to the doing of the same;
6. To delay no man for money or malice;
7. To conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to
the courts as to his clients;
8. To impose upon himself that voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
TO SOCIETY (CANONS 1-6)
Respect for law and legal processes (2013, 1998, 2010)
Q: Atty. Doblar represents Eva in a contract suit against
Olga. He is also defending Marla in a substantially
identical contract suit filed by Emma. In behalf of Eva,
Atty. Doblar claims that the statute of limitations runs
from the time of the breach of the contract. In the action
against Marla, Atty. Doblar now argues the reverse
position – i.e. that the statute of limitation does not run
until one year after discovery of the breach.
Both cases are assigned to Judge Elrey. Although not the
sole issue in the two cases, the statute of limitations
issue is critical in both.
Is there an ethical/professional responsibility problem
in this situation? If a problem exists, what are its
implications or potential consequences? (2013 Bar)
A: Yes. There is an ethical/professional responsibility
problem that results from the actuation of Atty. Doblar in
arguing the reverse positions.
The signatures of Atty. Doblar on the pleadings for Eva and
for Marla, constitute a certificate by him that he has read the
pleadings; that to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief there is good ground to support them; and that
the pleadings were not interposed for delay (Rules of Court,
Rule 7, Sec. 3, 2nd par.). Atty. Doblar could not claim he has
complied with the foregoing requirement because he could
not take a stand for Eva that is contrary to that taken for
Marla. His theory for Eva clearly contradicts his theory for
Marla. He has violated his professional responsibility
mandated under the Rules of Court.
He has likewise violated the ethical responsibility that his
appearance in court should be deemed equivalent to an
assertion on his honor that in his opinion his client’s case is
one proper for judicial determination (Canons of
Professional Ethics, Canon 30, 2nd par., last sentence).
In counseling on the contradictory positions, Atty. Doblar
has likewise counseled or abetted activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule
1.02) because conflicting opinions may result arising from
an interpretation of the same law.
Atty. Doblar could not seek refuge under the umbrella that
what he has done was in protection of his clients. This is so
because a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is
wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always
be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics (Ernesto
Pineda, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 211 [1999], citing
Maglasang v. People, G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990).
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest, which is
resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion
to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical (Ibid.).
Q: Atty. Asilo, a lawyer and a notary public, notarized a
document already prepared by spouses Roger and
Luisa when they approached him. It is stated in the
document to Roger and Luisa formally agreed to live
separately from each other and either one can have a
live-in partner with full consent of the other. What is
the liability of Atty. Asilo, if any? (1998 Bar)
A: Atty. Asilo may be held administratively liable for
violating Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility - a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
leg system. An agreement between two spouses to live
separately from each other and either one could have a live-
in partner with full consent of the other, is contrary to law
and morals. The ratification by a notary public who is a
lawyer of in illegal or immoral contract or document
constitutes malpractice or gross misconduct in office. He
should at least refrain from its consummation. (In re
Santiago, 70 Phil. 661 Panganiban v. Borromeo; 58 Phil. 367,
In re Bucana, 72 SCRA 14).
Q: Atty. XX rented a house of his cousin JJ on a month-
to-months basis. He left for a 6-month study in Japan
without paying his rentals and electric bills while he
was away despite JJ’s repeated demands.
Upon his return to the Philippines, Atty. XX still failed
to settle his rental arrearages and electric bills,
drawing JJ to file an administrative complaint against
Atty. XX.
Atty. XX contended that his non-payment rentals and
bills to his cousin is a personal matter which has no
bearing on his profession as a lawyer and, therefore, he
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
did not violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Is Atty. XX’s contention in order? Explain. (2010 Bar)
A: No. In a case involving the same facts, the Supreme Court
held that having incurred just debts, a lawyer has a moral
duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they
become due. “Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the court and
to their clients. As part of their duties, they must promptly
pay their financial obligations.” (Wilson Cham v. Atty. Eva
Pata-Moya, 556 SCRA 1 [2008])
True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
on legal services (2016, 2001, 2003, 1998, 1996, 1994)
Q: A lone law practitioner Bartolome D. Carton, who
inherited the law office from his deceased father
Antonio C. Carton, carries these names:“Carton &
Carton Law Office.” Is that permissible or
objectionable? Explain. (2001, 1996, 1994 Bar)
A: Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides as follows: “In the choice of a firm name, no false,
misleading or assumed name shall be used; the continued
use of the name of deceased partner is permissible provided
that the firm indicates in all its communications that the
partner is deceased.” Since Atty. Antonio C. Carton is a solo
practitioner, it is improper for him to use the firm name
“Carton & Carton Law Office”, which indicates that he is
and/or was in partnership with his father. Even if he
indicates in all his communication that his father is already
dead, the use of the firm name is still misleading because his
father was never his partner before. A lawyer is not
authorized to use in his practice of profession a name other
than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys.
Q: Facing disciplinary charges for advertising as a
lawyer, Atty. A argues that although the calling card of
his businessman friend indicates his law office and his
legal specialty, the law office is located in his friend’s
store. Decide. (2001 Bar)
A: This appears to be a circumvention of the prohibition on
improper advertising. There is no valid reason why the
lawyer’s businessman friend should be handling out calling
cards which contains the lawyer’s law office and legal
specialty, even if his office is located in his friend’s store.
What makes it more objectionable is the statement of his
supposed legal specialty. It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant.
Q: A Justice of the Supreme Court, while reading a
newspaper one weekend, saw the following
advertisement:
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Competent Lawyer
Reasonable Fee
Call 221-2221
The following session day, the Justice called the
attention of his colleagues and the Bar Confidant was
directed to verify the advertisement. It turned out that
the number belongs to Attorney X, who was then
directed to explain to the court why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for the improper
8
UST BAR OPERATIONS
advertisement. Attorney X, in his answer, averred that
(1) the advertisement was not improper because his
name was not mentioned in the ad; and (2) he could not
be subjected to disciplinary action because there was
no complaint against him. Rule on Attorney X’s
contention. (2003, 1998 Bar)
A: The advertisement is improper because it is a solicitation
of legal business and is tantamount to self-praise by
claiming to be a “competent lawyer”. The fact that his name
is not mentioned does not make the advertisement proper.
His identity can be easily determined by calling the
telephone number stated. In the case of Ulep v. Legal Clinic,
Inc., 223 SCRA 378, the Supreme Court found a similar
advertisement to be improper is spite of the fact that the
name of a lawyer was also not mentioned.
A complaint is not necessary to initiate disciplinary action
against a lawyer. In Sec. 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
disciplinary action against a lawyer may be initiated by the
Supreme Court motu proprio.
Q: Determine whether the following advertisements by
an attorney are ethical or unethical. Write “Ethical” or
“Unethical”, as the case may be, opposite each letter and
explain.
1. A calling card, 2x2 in size, bearing his name in bold
print, office, residence and e-mail address,
telephone and facsimile numbers. 

2. A business card, 3’’x4’’ in size, indicating the
aforementioned data with his photo, 1’’x1’’ in size.
(2002 Bar) 

A:
1. Ethical – A lawyer, in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 3). For solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If made in a modest and decorous manner,
it would bring no injury to the lawyer or to the bar
(Warvelle, Legal Ethics, p.55). 

2. Unethical – The size of the card and the inclusion of the
lawyer’s photo in it smacks of commercialism. It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents
or skill as a merchant. 

Q: A sign was posted at the building where the law office
of Atty. Redentor Walang-Talo is located. The sign
reads:
Atty. Redentor A. Walang-Talo
Chairman, IBP Legal Aid Committee
Makati City IBP Chapter
Free conciliation, mediation and court representation
Suite 210, Galaxy Building, J.P. Rizal Street, Makati City
a. Does the posting constitute solicitation?
A: There is nothing wrong with the advertisement. The
statement that he is the chairman of the IBP Legal Aid
Committee is factual and true. Canon 27 of the Code of
Professional Ethics states that “memberships and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof” may be included
in a lawyer’s advertisement. The statement that he gives
free consultation, mediation and court representation
services is for the purpose of promoting the IBP Legal Aid
Committee.
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
b. Suppose the sign reads:
Atty. Redentor A. Walang-Talo
Attorney and Counsel-at-Law
General Practitioner
(Accepts pro bono cases pursuant to the IBP Legal Aid
Program)
Does the posting constitute solicitation? (2016 Bar)
A: On the other hand, this advertisement is for the benefit
of the lawyer alone and constitutes solicitation.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: This does not constitute
solicitation. The lawyer does not claim to be a specialist, but
only a “general practitioner.” The statement that he accepts
pro bono cases is not for the purpose of promoting his
“business’’, as ”pro bono” means “for free.”
TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (RULE 139-A)
Membership and dues
Q: Not paying the annual IBP dues. (2008 Bar)
A: It is the duty of every lawyer to support the activities of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Canon 7, CPR). Default
in payment of IBP dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership to the Integrated Bar, and
default to make such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys (In Re Atty. Marcial Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 [1978]).
Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession
Q: Atty. Kuripot was one of Town Bank's valued clients.
In recognition of his loyalty to the bank, he was issued
a gold credit card with a credit limit of P250, 000.00.
After two months, Atty. Kuripot exceeded his credit
limit, and refused to pay the monthly charges as they
fell due. Aside from a collection suit, Town Bank also
filed a disbarment case against Atty. Kuripot.
In his comment on the disbarment case, Atty. Kuripot
insisted that he did not violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, since his obligation to the bank was
personal in nature and had no relation to his being a
lawyer. Is Atty. Kuripot correct? Explain your answer.
(2005 Bar)
A: Atty. Kuripot is not correct. Section 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that adversely affects his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession."
Q: Sonia, who is engaged in the lending business,
extended to Atty. Roberto a loan of P50, 000.00 with
interest of P25, 000.00 to be paid not later than May 20,
2016. To secure the loan, Atty. Roberto signed a
promissory note and issued a postdated check. Before
the due date, Atty. Roberto requested Sonia to defer the
deposit of the check. When Atty. Roberto still failed to
pay, Sonia deposited the check which was dishonored.
Atty. Roberto ignored the notice of dishonor and
refused to pay.
a. Did Roberto commit any violation of the CPR?
Explain.
b. Can he be held civilly liable to Sonia in an
administrative case for suspension or disbarment?
(2016 Bar)
A:
a. Atty. Roberto committed a violation of Canon 1 Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 in issuing a bouncing check.
He should very well know that the issuance of a
bouncing check is an unlawful act, a crime involving
moral turpitude. (Co v. Bernardino, A.C. No. 3919,
January 28, 1998)
b. No. The sole issue in an administrative case is the
determination of whether or not a lawyers is still fit to
continue being a lawyer. The Supreme Court will not
order the return of money which is not intimately
related to a lawyer-client relationship. (Wong v. Moya,
A.C. 6972, October 17, 2008; Sps. Concepcion v. Atty. De
La Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, Feb. 3, 2015)
Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional
colleagues (1997, 1995, 1989)
Q: You are the counsel of K in his action for specific
performance against DEV. Inc., a subdivision developer
which is represented by Atty. L. Your client believes
that the president of DEV, Inc., would be willing to
consider an amicable settlement and your client urges
you to discuss the matter with DEV. Inc., without the
presence of Atty. L whom he considered to be an
impediment to an early compromise. Would it be all
right for you to negotiate the terms of the compromise
as so suggested above by your client? (1997 Bar)
A: No. Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not directly or
indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer." Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics
is more particular, "a lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of the controversy with a
party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him
but should deal only with his counsel." In the case of Likong
vs. Liin, 235 SCRA 414, a lawyer was suspended for
negotiating a compromise agreement directly with the
adverse party without the presence and participation of her
counsels.
Q: After the pre-trial Atty. Hans Hilado, counsel for
plaintiff Jennifer Ng, persuaded defendant Doris Dy to
enter into a compromise agreement with the plaintiff
without the knowledge and participation of defendant’s
counsel, Atty. Jess de Jose. Doris acceded and executed
the agreement. Therein Doris admitted her obligation
in full and bound herself to pay her obligation to
Jennifer at 40% interest per annum in ten (10) equal
monthly installments. The compromise agreement was
approved by the court.
Realizing that she was prejudiced, Doris Dy filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Hilado alleging
that the latter prevented her from consulting her
lawyer Atty. de Jose when she entered into the
compromise agreement, thereby violating the rules of
professional conduct. Atty. Hilado countered that Doris
Dy freely and voluntarily entered into the compromise
agreement which in fact was approved by the court.
Was it proper for the judge to approve the compromise
agreement since the terms thereof were just and fair
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
even if counsel for one of the parties was not consulted
or did not participate therein? Explain. (1995 Bar)
A: It was not proper for the Judge to approve the
compromise agreement without the participation of the
lawyer of one of the parties, even if the agreement was Just
and fair. Even if a client has exclusive control of the cause of
action and may compromise the same, such right is not
absolute. He may not, for example, enter into a compromise
to defeat the lawyer’s right to a just compensation. Such
right is entitled to protection from the court.
Q: Gretel’s residence in Makati village was foreclosed
by Joli Bank. Armed with a writ of possession issued by
the lower court, the sheriff and Joli Bank’s lawyers
evicted Gretel and padlocked the house. A restraining
order issued by the Court of Appeals which Gretel
showed the sheriff was disregarded. Gretel requested
Hansel, an attorney who lives in the same village, to
assist her in explaining the restraining order, since
Gretel’s counsel of record was out of town. The
discussion on the restraining order was conducted on
the sidewalk along Gretel’s house. The village security
guards were attracted by the commotion brought about
by the discussion, so they called the Makati Police and
the CAPCOM who responded immediately. The CAPCOM
colonel, who arrived at the scene with his troop took it
upon himself to open the house and declare Gretel as
the rightful possessor. The colonel invited Gretel and
Hansel to enter the house. Five days later, Hansel was
made a co-respondent (together with Gretel) in a
complaint for trespass to dwelling filed by Joli Bank’s
lawyers before the Makati Fiscal’s office.
Discuss the propriety of the act of Joli Bank’s lawyers,
considering that all lawyers are mandated to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
their professional colleagues and to avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel. (1989 Bar)
A: Considering that there was a restraining order issued by
the Court of Appeals, it was proper for Gretel to take steps
to maintain possession of his residence with the assistance
of Hansel as lawyer.
It was not proper for the Joli Bank’s lawyers to file an action
of trespass to dwelling against Gretel and lawyer Hansel.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer shall conduct himself with fairness and candor
towards his professional colleagues and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
No assistance in unauthorized practice of law (2005,
2010)
Q: You had just taken your oath as a lawyer. The
secretary to the president of a big university offered to
get you as the official notary public of the school. She
explained that a lot of students lose their Identification
Cards and are required to secure an affidavit of loss
before they can be issued a new one. She claimed that
this would be very lucrative for you, as more than 30
students lose their Identification Cards every month.
However, the secretary wants you to give her one-half
of your earnings therefrom. Will you agree to the
arrangement? Explain. (2005 Bar)
A: No, I will not agree. Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not divide or
stipulate to divide a fee for legal service with persons not
licensed to practice law". The secretary is not licensed to
10
UST BAR OPERATIONS
practice law and is not entitled to a share of the fees for
notarizing affidavits, which is a legal service.
Q: Atty. Monica Santos-Cruz registered the firm name
“Santos-Cruz Law Office” with the Department of Trade
and Industry as a single proprietorship. In her
stationery, she printed the names of her husband and a
friend who are both non-lawyers as her senior partners
in light of their investments in the firm. She allowed her
husband to give out calling cards bearing his name as
senior partner of the firm and to appear in courts to
move for postponements. Did Atty. Santos-Cruz
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility? Why?
(2010 Bar)
A: Yes, she did. In the case of Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio
(434 SCRA 288 [2004]), which involves the same facts, the
Supreme Court held that a lawyer who allows a non-
member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and
to practice law, is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provide as
follows:
“Canon 9. A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.”
“Rule 9.01. A lawyer shall not delegate to any unauthorized
person the performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the bar in good standing.”
TO THE COURTS
Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
(2000, 1994, 1996, 2015)
Q: In a pending labor case, Atty. A filed a Position Paper
on behalf of his client, citing a Supreme Court case and
quoting a portion of the decision therein which he
stated reflected the ratio decidendi. However, what he
quoted was not actually the Supreme Court ruling but
the argument of one of the parties to the case. May Atty.
A be faulted administratively? Explain. (2000 Bar)
A: Yes, he may be faulted administratively. A lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.02 of
the Code of Professional Conduct expressly provides that a
lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not has been proved. To cite an argument of one
of the parties as a ratio decidendi of a Supreme Court
decision shows, at least, lack of diligence on the part of Atty.
A (Commission on Election v. Noynay, 292 SCRA 254).
Q: Atty. Billy, a young associate in a medium-sized law
firm, was in a rush to meet the deadline for filing his
appellant’s brief. He used the internet for legal research
by typing keywords on his favorite search engine,
which led him to many websites containing text of
Philippine jurisprudence. None of these sites was
owned or maintained by the Supreme Court. He found a
case believed to be directly applicable to his client’s
cause, so he copied the text of the decision from the blog
of another law firm, and pasted the text to the
document he was working on. The formatting of the text
he had copied was lost when he pasted it to the
document, and he could not distinguish anymore,
which portions were the actual findings or rulings of
the Supreme Court, and which were quoted portions
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
from the other sources that were used in the body of the
decision. Since his deadline was fast approaching, he
decided to just make it appear as if every word he
quoted was part of the ruling of the Court, thinking that
it would not be discovered.
Atty. Billy’s opponent, Atty. Ally, a very conscientious
former editor of her school’s law journal, noticed many
discrepancies in Atty. Billy’s supposed quotations from
the Supreme Court decision when she read the text of
the case from her copy of the Philippine Reports. Atty.
Billy failed to reproduce the punctuation marks and
font sizes used by the Court. Worse, he quoted the
arguments of one party as presented in the case, which
arguments happened to be favorable to his position,
and not the ruling or reasoning of the Court, but this
distinction was not apparent in his brief. Appalled, she
filed a complaint against him.
a. Did Atty. Billy fail in his duty as a lawyer? What
rules did he violate, if any?
b. How should lawyer quote a Supreme Court
decision? (2015, 1994 Bar)
A:
A. Atty. Billy has violated Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which
provide as follows:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of the opposing counsel, or the text of a decision
or authority, or knowingly cite a law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as
a fact that which has not been proved.
B. They should be verbatim reproductions of the Supreme
Court’s decisions, down to the last word and punctuation
mark (Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association
v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., G.R. No. L-25291, January
30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244).
Q: Atty. X was retained by E in a case for violation of BP
22 filed by B before the scheduled hearing, Atty. X
assured B that E would pay the value of the dishonored
check. Elated at the prospect of being paid, B wined and
dined Atty. X several times. Atty. X convinced B not to
appear at the scheduled hearings. Due to non-
appearance of B, the estafa case was dismissed for
failure to prosecute. B, however, was never paid. Thus,
she filed a case for disbarment against Atty. X. Does the
conduct of Atty. X constitute malpractice? Explain.
(1996 Bar)
A: Yes, the conduct of Atty. S constitutes malpractice. A
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. He
shall not do any falsehood or shall be mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice. He owes loyalty to his
client. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court
found that the lawyer concerned obstructed the
administration of justice and suspended him for two years
(Cantome v. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 20)
Respect for the courts and judicial officers (2016, 2015,
2010, 1993, 1996)
Q: Atty. Luna Tek maintains an account in the social
media network called Twitter and has 1,000 followers
there, including fellow lawyers and some clients. Her
Twitter account is public so even her non-followers
could see and read her posts, which are called tweets.
She oftentimes takes to Twitter to vent about her daily
sources of stress like traffic or to comment about
current events. She also tweets her disagreement and
disgust with the decisions of the Supreme Court by
insulting and blatantly cursing the individual Justices
and the Court as an institution.
a. Does Atty. Luna Tek act in a manner consistent with
the Code of Professional Responsibility? Explain
the reasons for your answer.
b. Describe the relationship between a lawyer and the
courts. (2015 Bar)
A:
a. Atty. Luna did not act in a manner consistent with the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Canon 11 of
the Code provides that “a lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct with
others.” As an officer of the court, a lawyer should set
the example in maintaining a respectful attitude
towards the court. Moreover, he should abstain from
offensive language in criticizing the courts. Atty. Luna
Tek violated this rule in insulting and blatantly cursing
the individual Justices and the Supreme Court in her
tweets. Lawyers are expected to carry their ethical
responsibilities with them in cyberspace (Lorenzana v.
Judge Ma. Cecilia L. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April
2, 2014).
b. A lawyer is an officer of the court. As such, he is much a
part of the machinery of justice as a judge is. The judge
depends on the lawyer for the proper performance of
his judicial duties. Thus, Canon 10 enjoins a lawyer to
be candid with the courts; Canon 11 requires him to
show respect to judicial officers; and Canon 12 urges
him to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
Q: Atty. Y, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision rendered by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), alleged that there was connivance
of the NLRC Commissioners with Atty. X for monetary
considerations in arriving at the questioned Decision.
He insulted the Commissioners for their ineptness in
appreciating the facts as borne by the evidence
presented.
Atty. X files an administrative complaint against Atty. Y
for using abusive language.
Atty. Y posits that as lawyer for the down-trodden
laborers, he is entitled to express his righteous anger
against the Commissioners for having cheated them;
that his allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration
are absolutely privileged; and that proscription against
the use of abusive language does not cover pleadings
filed with the NLRC, as it is not a court, nor are any of its
Commissioners Justice or Judges.
Is Atty. Y administratively liable under the Code of
Professional Responsibility? Explain. (2010 Bar)
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
A: Atty. Y “has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is administratively liable.
A lawyer shall not in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offense or otherwise improper” (Rule 8.01,
CPR). A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the courts (Rule
11.03, CPR).
In the case of Johnny Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (507 SCRA
465 [2006]), which involves the same facts, the Supreme
Court held that the argument that the NLRC is not a court, is
unavailing. The lawyers remains a member of the Bar, an
“oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice and whose
conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of
the law and ethics.”
The Supreme Court also held that the argument that labor
practitioners are entitled to some latitude of righteous
anger is unavailing. It does not deter the Court from
exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who
misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of
them as members of the bar.
Q: Having lost in the Regional Trial Court and then in
the Court of Appeals, Atty. Mercado appealed to the
Supreme Court. In a minute resolution, the Supreme
Court denied his petition for review for lack of merit. He
filed a motion for reconsideration which was also
denied. After the judgment had become final and
executory, Atty. Mercado publicly criticized the
Supreme Court for having rendered what he called an
unjust judgment, even as he ridiculed the members of
the Court by direct insults and vituperative
innuendoes. Asked to explain why he should not be
punished for his clearly contemptuous statements,
Atty. Mercado sets up the defense that his statements
were uttered after the litigation had been finally
terminated and that he is entitled to criticize Judicial
actuations. Is Atty. Mercado's contention tenable?
Explain. (1993 Bar)
A: Atty. Mercado’s contention is not tenable. While he is free
to criticize the decision itself, he is not at liberty to call said
judgment an unjust judgment and to ridicule the members
of the court. It is one thing to analyze and criticize the
decision itself, which is proper, and it is another thing to
ridicule the members of the court, which is wrong. The right
of a lawyer to comment on or criticize the decision of a judge
or his actuations is not unlimited. It is the cardinal condition
of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and judges on the other. A publication
in or outside the court tending to impede, obstruct,
embarrass or influence the courts in administering Justice
in a pending suit, or to degrade the courts, destroy public
confidence in them or bring them in any way into disrepute,
whether or not there is a pending litigation, transcends the
limits of fair comment. Such publication or intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the lawyer’s duty to
respect the courts. It is a misconduct that subjects him to
disciplinary action.
Q: Atty. Harold wrote in the Philippine Star his view that
the decision of the Supreme Court in a big land case is
incorrect and should be re-examined. The decision is
not yet final. Atty. Alfonso, the counsel for the winning
party in that case, filed a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Harold for violation of sub judice rule and
Canon 11 of the CPR that a lawyer shall observe and
12
UST BAR OPERATIONS
maintain respect due to the courts. Explain the sub
judice rule and rule on the disbarment case. (2016 Bar)
A: The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to pending judicial proceedings, not only by
participants in the pending case, members of the bar and
bench, litigants and witnesses, but also to the public in
general, which necessarily includes the media, in order to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this
rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec.
3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The specific rationale for
the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of
fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
(Marantan v. Diokno, 716 SCRA 164, Feb. 12, 2014) After a
case is decided, however, the decision is open to criticism,
subject only to the condition that all such criticism shall be
bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety.
A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (In
re Almace, G.R. L-27654, February 18, 1970)
In this case, the published comment of Atty. Harold was
made after the decision of the Supreme Court was rendered,
but the same was not yet final. The case was still pending.
Hence, the publication of such comment was inappropriate,
and Atty. Harold may be penalized for indirect contempt of
court.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Although the comment of Atty.
Harold was made while the case was technically pending, it
was made after a decision was rendered, and the comment
made is within the grounds of decency and propriety.
Hence, the lawyer does not deserve punishment for the
same.
Q: The Code of Professional Responsibility is to lawyers,
as the Code of Judicial Conduct is to members of the
bench. How would you characterize the relationship
between the Judge and a lawyer? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers
to observe and maintain respect for judicial officers (Canon
11). On the other hand, the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires judge to be patient, attentive and courteous to
lawyers (Rule 3) In a word, lawyers and judges owe each
other mutual respect and courtesy.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
a. The relationship between a judge and a lawyer must be
based on independence and self-respect. He must
neither be a mindless fawning slave of the judge, nor
must he take an attitude of hostility towards the Judge.
The lawyer must maintain toward the court a respectful
attitude and to uphold and protect the dignity of the
court.
b. Being an officer of the court, the first and foremost duty
of the lawyer is to the court. He is bound to obey lawful
orders and decisions of the court. Like the court itself,
the lawyer is an instrument to advance the ends of
justice. Should there be a conflict between the duty to
his client and that of the court, he should resolve the
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
conflict against his client and obey the lawful orders of
the court. On the other hand, judges should be
courteous and impartial to counsel. To maintain
impartiality, the judge should not associate too much
with lawyers.
Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice (2003, 1993)
Q: The Supreme Court issued a resolution in a case
pending before it, requiring the petitioner to file, within
ten (10) days from notice, a reply to the respondent's
comment. Attorney A, representing the petitioner,
failed to file the reply despite the lapse of thirty (30)
days from receipt of the Court’s resolution. The
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for non-
compliance with its resolution. Attorney A timely
moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the
petition, claiming that his secretary, who was quite new
in the office, failed to remind him of the deadline within
which to file a reply. Resolve Attorney A's motion.
(2003 Bar)
A: Attorney A’s motion is not meritorious. He has violated
Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that “a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions
of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period
lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so”. His claim that it was the
fault of his secretary is not sufficient. He cannot take refuge
behind the inefficiency of his secretary because the latter is
not a guardian of the lawyer’s responsibilities (Nidua v.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581 [1989]).
Q: Atty. Cua wins a case involving a donation mortis
causa. Afterwards, she discovers, and is convinced, that
the Deed of Donation was falsified, and that it was her
client who did the falsification. If you were Atty. Cua
what would you do? Explain. (1993 Bar)
A: If I were Atty. Cua., I would resign as his lawyer. The
question as to whether the attorney should disclose the
falsification to the court or to the prosecuting attorney
involves a balancing of loyalties. One ethical rule states that
“counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been
committed owes it to the profession and the public to bring
the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities".
Another ethical rule provides that when “a lawyer discovers
that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which is
unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he should
endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his
client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained,
he should promptly inform the injured person or his
counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps". A literal
application of these ethical injunctions requires the
disclosure of the falsification. On the other hand, the
attorney’s duty to keep inviolate the client's confidence
demands that he refrain from revealing the client’s wrong-
doing, the same being a past offense. Resigning as a lawyer
will enable the lawyer to observe such loyalties. If the
decision is already final, as a lawyer, I would advise my
client to withdraw any claim on the donation mortis causa
and have the property be given to the rightful owner of the
property the subject matter of the donation.
This action is in compliance with my duty as a lawyer to
assist in the administration of justice and in compliance of
my oath: “I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; that I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false and or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same”.
Q: Atty. Vidal, a semi-retired Metro Manila law
practitioner, has a cattle ranch in the remote
municipality of Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. He attends to
his law office in Manila on Mondays, Tuesdays and
Wednesdays, and spends the rest of the week in his
cattle ranch riding horses and castrating bulls.
In a criminal case pending before the Municipal Trial
Court of Carranglan, the only other licensed member of
the Bar is representing the private complainant. The
accused is a detention prisoner. The judge wants to
expedite proceedings.
1. What must the judge do to expedite proceedings?
2. If Atty. Vidal is appointed to act as counsel de oficio
for the accused, could he refuse by saying that in the
province, he does not want to do anything except
ride horses and castrate bulls? Explain. (1993 Bar)
A:
1. The judge may appoint Atty. Vidal as counsel de officio
in order to expedite the proceedings. This is especially
because the accused is a detention prisoner who is
presumed to be indigent and cannot retain a paid
counsel.
2. Atty. Vidal cannot validly refuse the appointment as
counsel de officio. While it is true that he stays in the
province to rest during the latter part of the week as
lawyer he must comply with his oath to assist in the
administration of justice. This is precisely one of the
objectives of the Integrated Bar which is to compel all
lawyers whether in the active practice or not to comply
with their obligation to assist in the administration of
justice.
Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any
impropriety which tends to influence or gives the
appearance of influence upon the courts (2013, 2000,
1994, 2001)
Q: Atty. Hermano requested his fraternity brother,
Judge Patron, to introduce him to Judge Apestado,
before whom he has a case that had been pending for
sometime.
Judge Patron, a close friend of Judge Apestado, acceded
to the request, telling the latter that Atty. Hermano is
his fraternity “brod” and that Atty. Hermano simply
wanted to ask for advice on how to expedite the
resolution of his case. They met, as arranged, in the fine
dining restaurant of a five-star hotel. Atty. Hermano
hosted the dinner.
Did Atty. Hermano, Judge Patron and Judge Apestado
commit any ethical/administrative violation for which
they can be held liable? (2013 Bar)
A: Yes, the three (3) of them committed
ethical/administrative violations for which they can be held
liable.
For hosting the dinner, Atty. Hermano acted in
contravention of ethical standards. A lawyer should refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence or give the
appearance of influencing the court (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 13, Rule 13.01). A lawyer shall not
extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with judges (Ibid.,
Canon 13, Rule 13.01). Marked attention and unusual
hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by
the personal relations on the parties, subject both the judge
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
and the lawyer to misconstruction of motive and should be
avoided (Canons of Professional Ethics, canon 3, 2nd par., 1st
sentence). Even if the purpose of the meeting was merely to
“ask advice on how to expedite the resolution of his case,”
Atty. Hermano still acted outside of the bounds of ethical
conduct. This is so because a lawyer deserves rebuke and
denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge
a special personal consideration or favor (Ibid., Canon 3, 2nd
par., 2nd sentence).
Both judge patron and Judge Apestado may be held liable
for having the dinner meeting with Atty. Hermano. Judges
shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer (New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
Canon 2, Sec.1). Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities (Ibid.,
Canon 4, Sec. 1). Their having dinner with Atty. Hermano, a
practicing lawyer, could be construed as appearance of
impropriety.
Judge Patron for having allowed himself to be used as a
“bridge” by Atty. Hermano, his fraternity “brod”, to meet
with Judge Apestado exhibited judicial misconduct in the
following manner: Judges shall refrain from influencing in
any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court (Ibid., Canon 1, Sec. 3). Furthermore, in
allowing Atty. Hermano to take advantage of his fraternity
bond, Judge Patron allowed the prestige of judicial office to
advance the private interests of others, conveyed or
permitted hos fraternity “brod” to convey the impression
that he is in a special position to influence the judge (Ibid.,
Canon 1, Sec 4, 2nd sentence).
The specific violations of Judge Apestado were committed
when he allowed himself to be convinced by Judge Patron
to have the dinner meeting with Atty. Hermano to discuss
how the case may be expedited. In performing judicial
duties, judges shall be independent form judicial colleagues
in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make
independently (Ibid., Canon 1, Sec. 2). Finally, in having
dinner meeting with Atty. Hermano who has a pending case
with his sala, Judge Apestado has exhibited an appearance
of impropriety in his activities (Ibid., Canon 4, Sec 1).
Q: Atty. J requested Judge K to be a principal sponsor at
the wedding of his son. Atty. J met Judge K a month
before during the IBP-sponsored reception to welcome
Judge K into the community, and having learned that
Judge K takes his breakfast at a coffee shop near his
(Judge K's) boarding house, Atty. J made it a point to be
at the coffee shop at about the time that Judge K takes
his breakfast. Comment on Atty. J's acts. Do they violate
the Code of Professional Responsibility? (2000 Bar)
A: Yes, his actions violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 13 of the said Code provides that a
lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 of the same
Code provides that a lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for,
cultivating familiarity with Judges. Atty. J obviously sought
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judge K by being
at the coffee shop where the latter takes his breakfast, and
is extending extraordinary attention to the judge by inviting
him to be a principal sponsor at the wedding of his son.
Q: After a study of the records and deciding that
plaintiff was entitled to a favorable Judgment, Judge
Reyes requested Atty. Sta. Ana, counsel for the plaintiff,
14
UST BAR OPERATIONS
to prepare the draft of the decision. Judge Reyes then
reviewed the draft prepared by Atty. Sta. Ana and
adopted it as his decision for plaintiff. Judge Reyes saw
nothing unethical in this procedure as he would ask the
other party to do the same if it were the prevailing
party.
Please comment on whether Judge Reyes' approach to
decision-writing is ethical and proper. (1994 Bar)
A: This procedure of Judge Reyes is unethical because the
judge is duty bound to study the case himself; he must
personally and directly prepare his decisions and not
delegate it to another person especially a lawyer in the case
(See Section 1. Rule 36, Rules of Court).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In the case of Lantoria vs. Bunyi, 209 SCRA 528, a lawyer was
suspended for preparing drafts of decisions for a judge. The
Supreme Court held that this violated Canon No. 13 and
Rule 13.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provide that:
“CANON 13. – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his case
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence,
or gives the appearance of influencing the court."
“Rule 13.01 – A lawyer should not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with the judge."
Conversely, therefore, a judge should not ask lawyers of
parties to a case before him to draft his decisions. “A judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
(Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct)
Q: Atty. A is offered professional engagement to appear
before Judge B who is A’s relative, compadre and former
office colleague. Is A ethically compelled to refuse the
engagement? Why? (2001 Bar)
A: There is no ethical constraint against a lawyer appearing
before a judge who is a relative, compadre or former office
colleague as long as the lawyer avoids giving the impression
that he can influence the judge. On the other hand, the judge
is required by the Code of Judicial Conduct not to take part
in any proceeding where his impartiality may be reasonably
questioned (Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.12). Among the
grounds for mandatory disqualification of the judge is if any
of the lawyers is a relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth degree.
Q: Rico, an amiable, sociable lawyer, owns a share in
Marina Golf Club, easily one of the more posh golf
courses. He relishes hosting parties for government
officials and members of the bench.
One day, he had a chance meeting with a judge in the
Intramuros golf course. The two readily got along well
and had since been regularly playing golf together at
the Marina Golf Club.
a. If Atty. Rico does not discuss cases with members of
the bench during parties and golf games, is he
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Explain.
b. How about the members of the bench who grace the
parties of Rico, are they violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct? Explain. (2010 Bar)
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
A:
a. Yes. A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention
or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating
familiarity with judges (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 13.01). Moreover, he should refrain
from any impropriety which gives the appearance of
influencing the court (CPR, Canon 13). In regularly
playing golf with judges, Atty. Rico will certainly raise
the suspicion that they discuss cases during the game,
although they actually do not. However, if Rico is
known to be a non-practicing lawyer, there is not much
of an ethical problem.
b. Members of the bench who grace the parties of Atty.
Rico would be guilty of violating Sec. 3, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
which provides that “judges shall, in their personal
relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid
situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality”. It
has been held that “if a judge is seen eating and drinking
in public places with a lawyer who has cases pending in
his or her sala, public suspicion may be aroused, thus
tending to erode the trust of litigants in the impartiality
of the judge” (Padilla v. Zantua, 237 SCRA 670). But if
Atty. Rico is not a practicing lawyer, such suspicion may
not be aroused.
TO THE CLIENTS
AVAILABILITY OF SERVICE WITHOUT
DISCRIMINATION
Services regardless of a person’s status (2004, 2000,
1996, 1990)
Q: M was criminally charged with violation of a special
law. He tried to engage the service of Atty. N. Atty. N
believed, however, that M is guilty on account of which
he declined. Would it be ethical for Atty. N to decline?
Explain. (2000, 1996 Bar)
A: It would not be ethical for Atty. N to decline. Rule 14.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that’ a
lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on
account of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status of life, or
because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said
person. It is for the judge, not the lawyer, to decide the guilt
of the accused, who is presumed to be innocent until his
guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt by procedure
recognized by law.
Q: Atty. DD’s services were engaged by Mr. BB as
defense counsel in a lawsuit. In the course of the
proceedings, Atty. DD discovered that Mr. BB was an
agnostic and a homosexual. By reason thereof, Atty. DD
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel without Mr. BB’s
express consent. Is Atty. DD’s motion legally tenable?
Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: No. Atty. DD’s motion is not legally tenable. He has no
valid cause to terminate his services. His client, Mr. BB,
being an agnostic and homosexual, should not be deprived
of his counsel’s representation solely for that reason. A
lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on
account of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status of life or
because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said
person (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 14, Rule
14.01).
Q: Your services as a lawyer are engaged by John Dizon
to defend him from the charge of malversation of public
funds before the Sandiganbayan. John confessed to you
that he actually misappropriated the amount charged
but he said it was out of extreme necessity to pay for the
emergency operation of his wife.
Will you agree to defend him? State your reason. (1990
Bar)
A: I will agree to defend him, notwithstanding his
confession to me that he actually misappropriated the
amount. Rule 14.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not decline to
represent a person because of his own opinion regarding
the guilt of the person. One of the duties of an attorney is
that he should, in the defense of a person accused of a crime,
by all fair and honorable means regardless of his personal
opinion as to guilt of the accused, present every defense that
the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived
of life liberty but by due process of law. The burden of proof
lies with the prosecution and if the prosecution fails to
discharge such burden, the lawyer can always invoke the
presumption of innocence for the acquittal of his client. If
the prosecution proves the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the lawyer can strive to lower the penalty
by presenting mitigating circumstances, for he is not
necessarily expected to sustain the client’s innocence. A
lawyer is an advocate, not a judge, and if he has rendered
effective legal assistance to his client as allowed by law, he
can rightfully say that he has faithfully discharged his duties
as a lawyer, even if the accused is found guilty by the court.
Services as counsel de officio (1991, 1996, 1994, 1993)
Q: May a lawyer decline an appointment by the court as
counsel de oficio for an accused because he believes,
and is fully convinced that the accused is guilty of the
crime charged? (1991 Bar)
A: A lawyer may not decline an appointment as counsel de
oficio even if he is convinced that the accused is guilty. It is
his obligation to at least protect his rights. He might even
have him acquitted or at least reduce his penalty depending
on the evidence presented during the trial.
Q: In a homicide case, Atty. M was appointed by the
Court as counsel de oficio for F, the accused. After trial,
F was acquitted. Atty. M sent F a bill for attorney’s fees.
a. Can F be compelled to pay? Explain.
b. Can F employ a counsel de parte to collaborate with
Atty. M, his counsel de oficio? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A:
a. No, F may not be compelled to pay attorney’s fees. A
counsel de officio is a lawyer appointed to render
professional services in favor of an indigent client. In
the absence of a law allowing compensation, he cannot
charge the indigent litigant for his professional
services. One of the obligations which the lawyer
assumed when he took his oath as a lawyer is to render
free legal services when required by the law to do so.
The Rules of Court provides a token compensation for
an attorney de officio to be paid by the state.
b. He may do so, but if he can afford to employ a counsel
de parte, then he is no longer indigent and will not need
a counsel de officio. The latter can withdraw as his
counsel if he chooses to.
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
Q: Atty. Aguirre, as counsel de oficio for Boy
Batongbakal, was able to win an acquittal for Boy who
was charged with robbery in band. A year later, Atty.
Aguirre discovered that Boy in fact had a lot of money
which he had been bragging was part of the loot in the
crime for which he was acquitted. Knowing that Boy
could no longer be prosecuted on the ground of double
jeopardy, Atty. Aguirre sent him a bill for his services as
his counsel de oficio.
Please give your reasoned comments on the ethical
considerations involved, if any, in the above case. (1994
Bar)
A: A counsel de oficio is a lawyer appointed by the court to
defend an indigent defendant in a criminal case. The lawyer
designated as counsel de officio cannot charge the indigent
litigant for his professional services. In a sense, there is no
contract for legal services between him and the defendant.
In the absence of an express or implied contract, there is no
obligation to compensate. Suing his client for attorney’s fees
might also involve a violation of the confidential nature of a
lawyer-client relationship.
Q: Atty. Vidal, a semi-retired Metro Manila law
practitioner, has a cattle ranch in the remote
municipality of Caranglan, Neuva Ecija. He attends to
his law office in Manila on Mondays, Tuesdays and
Wednesdays, and spends the rest of the week in his
cattle ranch riding horses and castrating bulls. In a
criminal case pending before the Municipal Trial Court
of Caranglan, the only other licensed member of the Bar
is representing the private complainant. The accused is
a detention prisoner. The judge wants to expedite
proceedings.
a. What must the judge do to expedite proceedings?
b. If Attorney Vidal is appointed to act as counsel de
oficio for the accused, could he refuse by saying that
in the province, he does not want to do anything
except ride horses and castrate bulls? Explain.
(1993 Bar)
A:
a. The judge may appoint Atty. Vidal as counsel de oficio in
order to expedite the proceedings. This is especially
because the accused is a detention prisoner who is
presumed to be indigent and cannot retain a paid
counsel.
b. Atty. Vidal cannot validly refuse the appointment as
counsel de oficio. While it is true that he stays in the
province to rest during the latter part of the week as
lawyer he must comply with his oath to assist in the
administration of justice. Precisely one of the objectives
of the Integrated Bar is to compel all lawyers in the
active practice of law to comply with their obligation to
assist the courts in the administration of justice.
Valid grounds for refusal to serve (2015, 2001, 2014)
Q: Give three instances when a lawyer is allowed to
withdraw his/her services. (2015 Bar)
A:
1. When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of
conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;
2. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules; 

3. When his inability to work with co-counsel will not
16
UST BAR OPERATIONS
promote the best interest of the client;
4. When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
5. When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the
services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
6. When the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public
office; and
7. Other similar cases. 

Q: When may refusal of a counsel to act as counsel de
oficio be justified on grounds aside from reasons of
health, extensive travel abroad, or similar reasons of
urgency? Support your answer. (2001 Bar)
A: Other justified grounds for refusal to act as counsel de
oficio are:
a. Too many de oficio cases assigned to the lawyer (People
v. Daeng, 49 SCRA 222);
b. Conflict of interest (Rule 14.03, CPR);
c. Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work
effectively or competently (supra);
d. Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason of
his public office which prohibits appearances in court;
and
e. Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases which will
spell prejudice to the new clients.
Q: A is accused of robbery in a complaint filed by B. A
sought free legal assistance from the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) and Atty. C was assigned to handle his case.
After reviewing the facts as stated in the complaint and
as narrated by A, Atty. C is convinced that A is guilty.
a. May Atty. C refuse to handle the defense of A and ask
to be relieved? Explain fully.
b. In problem (a), if the lawyer is counsel de parte for
the accused and he learns later after accepting the
case and while trial is ongoing that his client was
indeed the perpetrator of the crime, may the lawyer
withdraw his appearance from the case? Why or
why not? (2014 Bar) 

A:
a. Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not decline to represent a
person solely on account of his own opinion regarding
the guilt of the said person. It is not the duty of a lawyer
to determine whether the accused is guilty or not, but
the judge’s. Besides, in a criminal case, the accused is
presumed innocent, and he is entitled to an acquittal
unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
role of the lawyer is to see to it that his constitutional
right to due process is observed. 

b. He may withdraw his appearance but in accordance
with procedure in Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, Rule 19.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer who has received
information that his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetuated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify
the same, and failing which, he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with the
Rules of Court.”
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY TO CLIENTS
Privileged communications (1999, 2006, 2015)
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
Q: A, who is charged in Court with estafa for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by B,
consulted Atty. C about the case with the intention of
engaging his services as defense counsel. Because A
could not afford to pay the fee that Atty. C was charging
him, A engaged the services of another counsel, Atty. D.
At the trial of the case for the estafa against A, the
prosecutor announced in open court that his next
witness was Atty. C, whom he was calling to the witness
stand. Counsel for A, Atty. D, vigorously opposed the
prosecutor’s move on the ground Atty. C may not be
called as witness for the prosecution as he might
disclose a would-be client’s confidence and secret.
Asked by the presiding Judge what would be the nature
of Atty. C’s testimony, the prosecutor said it has
something to do with how A obtained from B the funds
that the latter received from the former but failed to
account for. Thereupon, Atty. A vigorously opposed the
prosecutor’s motion. If you were the Judge, how would
you rule on the matter? (1999 Bar)
A: If I were the judge, I will not allow Atty. C to take the
witness stand. When A consulted Atty. C about his case, a
lawyer-client relationship was established between them. It
does not matter that A did not eventually engage his
services because of his fees; such relationship has already
been created (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil 569). A lawyer shall be
bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect
to matters disclosed to him by a prospective client (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Rule 15.02). The rule on
privileged communication provides that an attorney
cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him (Rules of
Court, Rule 130, Sec. 21 [b]). The prosecutor has announced
that Atty. C will be asked about how A obtained from B the
funds that he failed to account for. Atty. C’s knowledge of
such matter could have come only from A.
Q: In the course of a drinking spree with Atty. Holgado
who has always been his counsel in business deals,
Simon bragged about his recent sexual adventures with
socialites known for their expensive tastes. When Atty.
Holgado asked Simon how he manages to finance his
escapades, the latter answered that he has been using
the bank deposits of rich clients of Banco Filipino where
he works as manager. Is Simon’s revelation to Atty.
Holgado covered by the Attorney-client privilege?
(2006 Bar)
A: Simon’s revelation to Atty. Holgado is not covered by the
lawyer-client privilege. In the first place, it was not made on
account of a lawyer-client relationship, that is, it was not
made for the purpose of seeking legal advice. In the second
place, it was not made in confidence (Mercado v. Vitriolo,
459 SCRA 1). In the third place, the attorney-client privilege
does not cover information concerning a crime or a fraud
being committed or proposed to be committed.
Q: Maria and Atty. Evangeline met each other and
became good friends at zumba class. One day, Maria
approached Atty. Evangeline for legal advice. It turned
out that Maria, a nurse, previously worked in the
Middle East. So she could more easily leave for work
abroad, she declared in all her documents that she was
still single. However, Maria was already married with
two children. Maria again had plans to apply for work
abroad but this time, wished to have all her papers in
order. Atty. Evangeline, claiming that she was already
overloaded with other cases, referred Maria’s case to
another lawyer. Maria found it appalling that after Atty.
Evangeline had learned of her secrets, the latter
refused to handle her case.
Maria’s friendship with Atty. Evangeline permanently
turned sour after Maria filed an administrative case
against the latter for failing to return borrowed
jewelry. Atty. Evangeline, on the other hand, threatened
to charge Maria with a criminal case for falsification of
public documents, based on the disclosures Maria had
earlier made to Atty. Evangeline.
Was the consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline
considered privilege? (2015 Bar)
A: The consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline is
considered privileged. The moment the complainant
approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal
advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved
between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the
lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of
the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is
that which enjoins the lawyer to keep inviolate confidential
information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day not
inclined to handle the client’s case is hardly of consequence.
Of little moment too, is the fact that no formal professional
engagement follows consultation. Nor will it make any
difference, that no contract whatsoever was executed by the
parties to memorialize the relationship (Hadjula v.
Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007).
Conflict of Interest (2016, 1997, 1993, 2009, 1992,
2014, 2003, 1991, 1994, 2006, 1999, 1993, 2005)
Q: St. Ivan’s Hospital, Inc. (St. Ivan’s) and allied
Construction Co. (Allied) separately retained the legal
services of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices. St. Ivan’s
engaged the service of Allied for the construction of a
new building but failed to pay the contract price after
the completion of the works. A complaint for sum of
money was filed by Atty. Budoy, a former associate of
Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, on behalf of Allied
against St. Ivan’s. St. Ivans, lost the case and was held
liable to Allied.
Thereafter, St. Ivan’s filed a disbarment complaint
against Atty. Budoy. It claimed that while Atty. Budo has
established his own law office, an arrangement was
made whereby Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices assign
cases for him to handle, and that it can be assumed that
Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices collaborate with Atty.
Budo in the cases referred to him, creating a conflict of
interest. Rule on the complaint with reasons. (2016
Bar)
A: I will rule in favor of St. Ivan’s and against Atty. Budoy. St.
Ivan’s was a client of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, of
which Atty. Budoy was an associate attorney. As such, St.
Ivan’s was also his client, because of the principle that when
a party hires a law firm, he hires all the lawyers therein.
Moreover, Atty. Budoy was in a position to know the
information transmitted by St. Ivan’s to the firm. “There is
conflict of interest if the acceptance of a new retainer will
require the lawyer to perform a act which will injuriously
affect his new client in any matter in which he represents
him, and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired during their relation.” (Hornilla v. Salunat, 453
Phil. 108, July 01, 2003)
“As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in
any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.”
(Anglo v. Atty. Valencia, A.C. No. 10567, Feb. 25, 2015)
Q: Mrs. F, a young matron, was referred to you for legal
advice by your good friend in connection with the
matron’s jewelry business. She related to you the facts
regarding a sale on consignment of pieces of jewelry to
someone she did not name or identify. Since she was
referred to you by a close friend, you did not bill her for
the consultation. Neither did she offer to compensate
you. Six months later, Mrs. G, the wife of the general
manager of a client company of your law firm, asked
you to defend her in a criminal case for estafa filed by
Mrs. F. Would you agree to handle her case? (1997 Bar)
A: First, I will inquire if the case for estafa filed by Mrs. F
against the wife of the general manager is the same matter
concerning which Mrs. F consulted me six months before. If
it is a same matter, I will not be able to handle the case for
the general manager’s wife, because of a conflict of
interests. When Mrs. F consulted me and I give her
professional advice, a lawyer-client relationship was
created between us, regardless of the fact that I was not
compensated for it. It would involve a conflict of interests if
I will handle the case for the opposite party on the same
matter (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 571).
Q: Explain your understanding of “Conflict of Interests”
under the Code of professional Responsibility. (2009,
1997, 1993 Bar)
A: A lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting
interests. There is conflict of interests within the context of
the rule when, on behalf of client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
contend for that which his duty to another client requires
him to oppose. Another test is whether the acceptance of a
new lawyer-client relation will prevent a lawyer from
discharging fully his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to another client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance thereof.
It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one
party against his present client even in a totally unrelated
case. With regard to former client, the traditional rule is to
distinguish between related and unrelated cases. A lawyer
may not represent a subsequent client against former client
in a controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the
subject matter of the previous litigation in which he
appeared for the former client, otherwise, he may. However,
in the case of Rosacia vs. Atty.B. Bulalacao, 248 SCRA 665, the
Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer may not accept a case
against a former client, even on an unrelated matter.
The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his
client not in the case in which he has represented him but
also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated
as it is not good practice to permit afterwards to defend in
another case other person against his former client under
the pretext that the other case. It behooves respondent not
only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.
Q: Atty. Belle Montes is a former partner in the Rosales
Law Office which is representing Corporation X before
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Atty. Montes
18
UST BAR OPERATIONS
who is now practicing on his own, entered her
appearance as counsel for Corporation Y in a suit
between said corporation and Corporation X. Atty.
Montes claims that since she did not personally handle
the case of Corporation X when she was still with the
Rosales Law Office she will not be representing
conflicting interests. Is such argument valid? Explain.
(1992 Bar)
A: Atty. Belle Montes will be deemed to be appearing for
conflicting interests if she appears for Corporation Y against
Corporation X.
This question is similar to the case of Philippine Blooming
Mills vs. Court of Appeals. In said case, the Philippine
Blooming Mills was the retainer of the ACCRA Law Office.
Three lawyers of the ACCRA Law Office separated from said
law firm and established their own law office. The three
lawyers were disqualified from appearing for a corporation
against the Philippine Blooming Mills.
The rule which prohibits appearing for conflicting interests
applies to law firms. The employment of one member of a
law firm is considered as an employment of the law firm and
that the employment of a law firm is equivalent to a retainer
of the members thereof.
Q: R is a retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita Branch.
One day, his balikbayan compadre, B, consulted him
about his unclaimed deposits with the said branch of
ABC Bank, which the bank had refused to give to him
claiming that the account had become dormant. R
agreed to file a case against the bank with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. B lost the case, but upon the
advice of R, he no longer appealed the decision. B later
discovered that R was the retained counsel of ABC
Bank-Ermita Branch.
Does B have any remedy? Discuss the legal and ethical
implications of the problem. (2014 Bar)
A: Atty. R clearly violated the rule against representing
conflicting interests (Rule 15.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility). B may file an action to set aside the
judgment on the theory that if a lawyer is disqualified from
appearing as counsel for a party on account of conflict of
interests, he is presumed to have impropriety and
prejudicially advised and represented the party in the
conduct of the litigation from beginning to end. He may also
file an action for damages against Atty. R, aside from an
administrative complaint due to his misconduct. He was
prejudiced by the adverse decision against him, which he no
longer appealed upon the advice of Atty. R.
Q: You are the counsel for the estate of a deceased
person. Your wife is a practicing Certified Public
Accountant. She was asked by her client to prepare and
submit an itemized claim against the estate you are
representing. She asks for your advice on the legal
propriety of her client’s claim. What advice would you
give her? Explain. (2003 Bar)
A: I would advise her that it will be improper for her to
handle her client’s claim against the estate. As a counsel for
the estate, it is my duty to preserve the estate. Her client’s
claim seeks to reduce the said estate. If she will handle such
claim, I can be suspected of representing conflicting
interests. The interests of the estate and of its creditors are
adverse to each other (Nakpil v. Valdez, 288 SCRA 75). Even
if she is a different person, the fact that she is my wife will
still give rise to the impression that we are acting as one.
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
Q: You are the lawyer of Mr.”H”, the plaintiff, in a civil
case for rescission of contract. The prospects for an
amicable settlement look bright. Impressed by your
ability, Mr. “I”, the defendant, would like very much to
retain you as his defense counsel in a criminal case for
homicide through reckless imprudence. Mr. “I” wants
you to forthwith enter your appearance, the
arraignment already having been scheduled. Would
you accept the offer? (1997 Bar)
A: It depends. If the criminal case for homicide through
reckless imprudence is against Mr. “H”, I cannot accept the
same for that will involve a conflict of interest, although it is
an unrelated case.
But if it will not involve Mr. “H”, I can accept the same.
However, to avoid suspicion and misunderstanding, it
would be better if I inform Mr. “H” about the offer and
secure his conformity to my handling the same.
Q: Atty. B acted as counsel for C in a civil case. He also
acted as counsel for D against C in another civil case.
When D lost his case against C, he filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. B for conflict of
interests. Decide. (1991 Bar)
A: If the case of C in the first case is entirely different and
not related with the case of D against C, there is no conflict
of interests. If the two cases however are related wherein
the attorney has knowledge of the evidence of C then there
is conflict of interests. Rule 15.01 provides that: A lawyer in
conferring with a prospective client shall ascertain as soon
as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict
with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall
forthwith inform the prospective client. Rule 15.03 further
provides that: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
Q: The law firm of Sale, Santiago and Aldeguer has an
existing and current retainership agreement with XYZ
Corporation and ABC Company, both of which were
pharmaceutical firms. XYZ Corporation discovered that
a number of its patented drugs had been duplicated and
sold in the market under ABC Company’s brand names.
XYZ Corporation turned to the law firm and asked it to
bring suit against ABC Company for patent
infringement on several counts. What are the ethical
considerations involved in this case and how are you
going to resolve them? (1994 Bar)
A: A lawyer may refuse to accept the representation of a
client if he labors under conflict of interests between him
and the prospective client or between a present client and
the prospective client (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 14, Rule 14.03). It is unprofessional for a lawyer to
represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of
all concerned given after full disclosure of the fact (Canons
of Professional Ethics, Canon 6). A lawyer cannot accept a
case against a present client either in the same case or in a
totally unrelated case.
Q: Atty. Juan Cruz, a practicing lawyer, was employed by
Pilipinas Bank as its bank attorney and notary public in
three of its branches in Manila. While thus employed,
Maria del Rio, who was unaware of Atty. Cruz’s
employment in the bank, engaged Atty. Cruz’s services
as a lawyer in a case that was filed by Pilipinas Bank for
collection of sum of money involving one of its branches
in Quezon City which Atty. Cruz accepted. The Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, after due proceeding and
hearing, rendered judgment in favor of Pilipinas Bank
and against Maria del Rio who wanted to appeal the
adverse judgment. But upon advice of Atty. Cruz, the
adverse judgment was not appealed. Thereafter, Maria
del Rio learned Atty. Cruz was employed by Pilipinas
Bank as one of its attorneys. She now consults with you
and asks you to take legal steps against Atty. Cruz for
his apparent misconduct. What do you think of what
Atty. Cruz did? Is there a valid and legal basis to
discipline him? (2006, 1999 Bar)
A: In agreeing to represent Maria del Rio in a case which
Pilipinas Bank filed against her, Atty. Cruz violated the rule
against representing conflicting interests. Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. It
is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client, even in an unrelated case (Philippine National Bank
v. Cedo, 243 SCRA 1). It does not matter that the Pilipinas
Bank branch in Quezon City is not one of the branches he
services in Manila. The bank itself is his client. This
constitutes malpractice for which Atty. Cruz can be
disciplined.
Q: Huey Company and Dewey Corporation are both
retainer clients of Atty. Anama. He is the Corporate
Secretary of Huey Company. He represents Dewey
Corporation in three pending litigation cases. Dewey
Corporation wants to file a civil case against Huey
Company and has requested Atty. Anama to handle the
case. What are the options available to Atty. Anama?
Explain your answer. (1993 Bar)
A: The options available to Atty. Anama are:
1. To decline to accept the case because to do so will
constitute representing conflicting interests. It is
unethical for a lawyer to represent a client in a case 

against another client in the said case. 

2. To accept to file the case against Huey Company, after
full disclosure to both retained clients and upon their
express and written consent. The written consent may
free him from the charge of representing conflicting
interests, because written consent amounts to a release
by the clients of the lawyer’s obligation not to represent
conflicting interests.
Q: Atty. Japzon, a former partner of XXX law firm, is
representing Kapuso Corporation in a civil case against
Kapamilya Corporation whose legal counsel is XXX law
firm. Atty. Japzon claims that she never handled the
case of Kapamilya Corporation when she was still with
XXX law firm. Is there a conflict of interests? Explain.
(2005 Bar)
A: There is a conflict of interests when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests. This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided,
but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or
will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon
in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection (Santos vs.
Beltran, 418 SCRA 17). Since Atty. Japzon was a partner of
the XXX law firm which has Kapamilya Corporation as its
client, she cannot handle a case against it as such will
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
involve conflict of interests. The employment of a law firm
is equivalent to the retainer of the members therof. It does
not matter if Atty. Japzon never handled a case of the
Kapamilya Corporation when she was still with the XXX law
firm.
Representation with zeal within legal bounds (1995,
2009)
Q: Winnie retained the services of Atty. Derecho to file
a collection case against Carmen. Winnie paid Atty.
Derecho a sizeable retainer’s fee which the latter
accepted. Later, in the process of determining the
amount of debt to be collected from Carmen, Atty.
Derecho noticed that of the total claim of 8.5 Million,
certain invoices covering 3.5 Million appeared to be
irregular. Winnie while admitting the irregularity
assures her lawyer that there would be no problem as
Carmen was by nature negligent in keeping her records
and would not notice the mistakes anyway. Atty.
Derecho tried to convince Winnie to exclude the
amount of 3.5 Million but Winnie refused. As a
consequence Atty. Derecho terminated their
relationship and withdrew from the case. Was Atty.
Derecho right in terminating their relationship and
withdrawing from the case? How about the fact that he
had already accepted a sizeable retainer’s fee from his
client? Discuss fully. (1995 Bar)
A: Atty. Derecho was right in terminating the lawyer-client
relationship and withdrawing from the case. Rule 22.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer may withdraw his services when the client pursues
an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with
the matter he is handling, or when the client insists that the
lawyer pursue conduct violative of the canons and rules.
Rule 15.07 provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his
client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness. While he owes his client warm zeal, it should
always be within the bounds of the law (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 19). The fact that Atty. Derecho had
already accepted a sizeable retainer’s fee should make no
difference on his decision to withdraw. Moreover, he may
retain the fees he has already received, his withdrawal
being justified (Pineda, Legal & Judicial Ethics, 1994 edition,
p. 223), unless the same is unconscionable.
Q: What are the three (3) tests to determine conflict of
interest for practicing lawyers? Explain each briefly.
(2009 Bar)
A:
1. When in representation of one client, a lawyer is
required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty
bound to oppose it for another client;
2. When the acceptance of the new retainer will require
an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously
affect the first client or when called upon in a new
relation to use against the first client any knowledge
acquired through their professional connection;
When the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty (Northwestern University v. Arquillo, 415 SCRA 513
[2005]).
CLIENT’S MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
20
UST BAR OPERATIONS
Fiduciary relationship
Q: A lawyer charged his client P10, 000.00 for filing fees
pertaining to the complaint he filed in court. He actually
spent only P1, 000.00. He did not account the balance.
May his client charge him for misconduct as a member
of the Philippine bar? Explain your answer. (1990 Bar)
A: The client may charge his lawyer with misconduct for not
accounting for the balance on P9, 000.00. It is well-settled
that where the client gives his lawyer money for a specific
purpose, such as to pay the docket fees for the filing of an
action in court, so much of the money not used for the
purpose belongs to the client and the lawyer holds in it trust
for him. And it is the lawyer’s duty to promptly account for
all money received from his client. For this reason, the
lawyer’s failure to account for the balance of the money not
spent for filing fees will render him liable for
misappropriation, which is a ground for disbarment.
Client’s moneys and properties; Fidelity to client’s
cause
Q: C engaged the services of attorney D concerning
various mortgage contracts entered into by her
husband from whom she is separated fearful that her
real estate properties will be foreclosed and of
impending suits for sums of money against her.
Attorney D advised C to give him her land titles covering
her lots so he could sell them to enable her to pay her
creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of
sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable
consideration, to which C agreed on condition that he
would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her
creditors. Later on, C came to know that attorney D did
not sell her lots but instead paid her creditors with his
own funds and had her land titles registered in his
name. Did attorney D violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Explain. (2009, 2007 Bar)
A: The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Hernandez v. Go (450 SCRA 1) is squarely applicable to this
problem. Under the same set of facts, the Supreme Court
held the lawyer to have violated Canons 16 and 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide as
follows:
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client hat may come into his possession.
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
The Supreme Court further held that the lawyer concerned
has engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly
immoral acts, which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the legal profession, consequently, the Court disbarred
him.
Delivery of Funds (2000, 2009)
Q: D was charged with estafa by C before the barangay
for misappropriating the proceeds of sale of jewelry on
commission. In settlement of the case, D turned over to
the barangay captain, a lawyer, the amount of P2,
000.00 with the request that the barangay captain turn
over the money to C. Several months passed without C
being advised of the status of her complaint. C
contacted D who informed her that she (D) had long
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
before turned over the amount of P2, 000.00 to the
barangay captain who undertook to give the money to
her (C). C thus filed a case against the barangay captain
who at once remitted the amount of P2, 000.00 to C. May
the barangay captain be faulted administratively?
Explain. (2000 Bar)
A: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
lawyers who are in the government service. As a general
rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his office as a government official. However, if
that misconduct as a government official is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member
of the bar on such ground (Dinsay v. Ctoco, 264 SCRA 703
[1996]). In the case of Penticostes v. Ibanez, 304 SCRA 281
[1999], a barangay captain who failed to remit for several
months the amount given to him for payment of an
obligation, was found to have violated the Code of
Professional Conduct.
Q: Marlyn, a widow engaged the services of Atty.
Romanito in order to avert the foreclosure of several
parcels of land mortgaged by her late husband to
several creditors. Atty. Romanito advised the widow to
execute in his favor deeds of sale over the properties, so
that he could sell them and generate funds to pay her
creditors. The widow agreed. Atty. Romanito did not
sell the properties, but paid the mortgage creditors
with his own funds, and had the land titles registered in
his name. Atty. Romanito succeeds in averting the
foreclosure. Is he administratively liable? Reasons.
(2009 Bar)
A: Yes, Atty. Romanito is administratively liable. The basic
facts in this case are the same as the facts in Hernandez v. Go
(450 SCRA 1 [2005]), where the Supreme Court found the
lawyer to have violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and disbarred him. The
Supreme Court held that a lawyer’s acts of acquiring for
himself the lots entrusted to him by his client are, by any
standard, acts constituting gross misconduct. The lawyer in
that case was disbarred.
FIDELITY TO CLIENT’S CAUSE
Competence and diligence (2000, 1993, 1998, 2014,
2002, 1989, 2001)
a. Adequate protection
Q: X was indicted for murder. As he had no counsel on
arraignment, the trial court appointed Atty. A as his
counsel de oficio. When Atty. A asked X what was his
stand, X said he was guilty. X thereupon pleaded guilty.
Trial was thereafter conducted. When the turn of the
defense to present evidence came, Atty. A manifested
that he was not presenting any and that he was
submitting the case for decision, praying that X’s plea
be considered mitigating. Did Atty. A’s assistance or
conduct approximate the competence and diligence
which the Code of Professional Responsibility expected
of him? Explain. (2000 Bar)
A: No. It is the duty of defense counsel when his client
desires to enter a plea of guilty to fully acquaint himself with
the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case, advise
his client of his constitutional rights and the full import of a
plea of guilty, see to it that the prescribed procedure is
observed, present evidence, including possible mitigating
circumstances, so that the precise degree of his client's
culpability is established and the appropriate penalty is
imposed, and thus leave no room for doubt that there was a
mistake or misunderstanding as to the nature of the charges
to which his client has pleaded guilty. Atty. A has fallen short
of this required conduct.
Q: Your services as a lawyer were engaged by Manuel
Jalandoni to defend him from the charge of
malversation of public funds before the
Sandiganbayan. Manuel confessed to you that he
actually misappropriated the amount out of extreme
necessity to pay for the emergency operation of his
wife. Will you agree to defend him? State your reasons.
(1993 Bar)
A: Yes, I will agree to defend Manuel Jalandoni even if he
admitted to me that he malversed public funds. A lawyer
has the duty to defend an accused even if he knows that he
is guilty - at least to defend his rights. He might be able to
find some mitigating or extenuating circumstances.
Moreover, it is not the lawyer who shall decide whether the
accused is guilty. It is the task of the Judge.
b. Negligence
Q: Nene approached Atty. Nilo and asked him if it was
alright to buy a piece of land which Maneng was selling.
What was shown by Maneng to Nene was an Original
Certificate of Title with many annotations and old
patches, to which Nene expressed suspicion. However,
Atty. Nilo, desirous of pushing through with the
transaction because of the high notarial fee promised to
him, told Nene that the title was alright and that she
should not worry since he is an attorney and that he
knew Maneng well. He notarized the Deed of Sale and
Nene paid Maneng P 108, 000.00. It turned out that
Maneng had previously sold the same property to
another person. For the injustice done to Nene, may
Atty. Nilo be disciplined? (1998 Bar)
A: Yes. Atty. Nilo is guilty of gross negligence in protecting
the interests of his client. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable (Rule 18.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility). Worse, he was negligent
because he placed his own interest in receiving a high
notarial fee over and above the Interest of his client. In the
case of Nadayag v. Grageda, 237 SCRA 202, which involves
similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the lawyer
"should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice
permeated every aspect of a transaction for which his
services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed
duties of a worthy member of the Bar."
Q: May a lawyer be held liable for damages by his client
for the lawyer’s failure to file the necessary pleadings
to prosecute the client’s case and as a result of which
the client suffered damages? (2014 Bar)
A: Yes, he may be held liable. Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”
But attorney-client relationship, want of reasonable care
and diligence, and injury sustained by the client as the
proximate result thereof, are the prerequisites to the
maintenance of an action for damages against a lawyer.
Q:
a. State the rule on whether a client is bound by the
mistake of his counsel.
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
b. On account of his mistake, is counsel liable to his
client for damages? Explain. (2002 Bar)
A:
a. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer [Cabales
v. fiery, 94 SCRA 374 (1979); Valerio v. Secretary of
Agriculture, 7 SCRA 719(1963)]. However, when the
lawyer has practically sold his client down the river or
when the negligence is so gross that the client was
deprived of due process, the client is not bound by the
negligence of the lawyer [PHHC v. Tiongco, 12 SCRA
471(1964); San Miguel Corp. v. Laguesma, 236 SCRA
595(1994)].
b. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
make him liable (Rule 18.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility). A client who suffers prejudice by reason
of his counsel’s inexcusable negligence in the discharge
of his duty may file an action for damages against him.
However, there must be a showing that had the lawyer
exercised due diligence, the client under the facts and
the law would have succeeded in recovering from the
adverse party or in resisting the claim of the latter.
c. Collaborating counsel
Q: May a client hire additional counsel as collaborating
counsel over and above the objection of the original
counsel? (2014, 1989 Bar)
A: Yes, the client is entitled to have as many lawyers as he
can afford. Professional courtesy, however, demands that a
lawyer retained as a collaborating counsel should at least
communicate with the original counsel and should at least
communicate with the original counsel before entering his
appearance. On the part of the original counsel, he should
not look at the employment of a collaborating counsel as a
loss of confidence in him.
Q: Atty. A objects to the collaboration of Atty. B as
proposed by Client C in a pending case. How would A, B
and C handle the situation? (2001 Bar)
A: A, B, and C may handle the situation in the following
manner:
a. "A" can offer to withdraw his services. Rule 22.01(c) of
the Code of Professional Responsibility allows a lawyer
to withdraw his services if his inability to work with co-
counsel will not promote the best interest of his client.
Here, by objecting to the collaboration of Atty. B, Atty. A
foresees his inability to work with the former. “A” may
with withdraw to give his client a free hand in
protecting his interest.
b. "B" should refuse to accept the case, otherwise, he may
be encroaching on the professional employment of
another lawyer. A lawyer should decline association as
colleague if it is objectionable to the original counsel,
but if the lawyer first retained is relieved, another may
come into the case. (Canon 7, Canons of Professional
Ethics).
c. "C" the client must choose only one of the lawyers. If he
wants Atty. B as his lawyer, he should formally
terminate the services of "A" so "B" can formally enter
his appearance in the case.
REPRESENTATION WITH ZEAL WITHIN LEGAL
BOUNDS
22
UST BAR OPERATIONS
Use of fair and honest means
Q: Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, "a lawyer shall represent his client with
zeal within the bounds of the law." How far, in general
terms, may a lawyer go in advocating, supporting and
defending the cause of his client in a criminal case filed
against the latter? (2003, 1997 Bar)
A: The right to counsel must be more than just the presence
of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is simply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause of
the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an
active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings,
particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in
mind the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed
on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedure,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an
accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by
the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely
put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance
and not a simple prefunctory representation. (People v.
Bemas, 306 SCRA 293 [1999], cited in People v. Sta. Teresa,
354 SCRA 697 [2001]). However, a lawyer shall employ only
honorable and honest means in the maintenance of his
client’s cause. (Section 20, Rule 128).
Client’s fraud (2001, 2014)
Q: Atty. A discovered his client's fraud against the
adverse party. What steps should he take so that his
client will secure only that which is legally and justly
due him? (2001 Bar)
A: A lawyer who has received information that his client
has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in accordance
with the Rules of Court. (Rule 19.02, Code of Professional
Conduct)
Q: A is accused of robbery in a complaint filed by B. A
sought free legal assistance from the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) and Atty. C was assigned to handle his case.
After reviewing the facts as stated in the complaint and
as narrated by A, Atty. C is convinced that A is guilty.
If the lawyer is counsel de parte for the accused and he
learns later after accepting the case and while trial is
ongoing that his client was indeed the perpetrator of
the crime, may the lawyer withdraw his appearance
from the case? Why or why not? (2014 Bar)
A: He may withdraw his appearance but in accordance with
procedure in Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, Rule 19.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer who has received
information that his client has, in the course of
representation, perpetuated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the
same, and failing which, he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.”
Attorney’s Fees (2016, 2015, 2002, 1999, 2008, 2014,
2000, 1998, 1995, 2007, 2010, 1988, 1997, 1994, 1991)
a. Contingency fee arrangements
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
Q: The spouses Manuel were the registered owners of a
parcel of land measuring about 200,000 square meters.
On May 4, 2008, the spouses Manuel sold the land for
P3, 500, 000.00 to the spouses Rivera who were issued
a certificate of title for said land in their names. Because
the spouses Rivera failed to pay the balance of the
purchase price for the land, the spouses Manuel,
through Atty. Enriquez, instituted an action on March
18, 2010 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for sum
of money and/or annulment of sale, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1111. The complaint in Civil Case No. 1111
specifically alleged that Atty. Enriquez would be paid
P200, 000.00 as attorney’s fees on contingent basis. The
RTC subsequently promulgated its decision upholding
the sale of the land to the spouses Rivera. Atty. Enriquez
timely filed an appeal on behalf of the spouses Manuel
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found
for the spouses Manuel, declared the sale of the land to
the spouses Rivera null and void, and ordered the
cancellation of the spouses Rivera’s certificate of title
for the land. The Supreme Court dismissed the spouses
Rivera’s appeal for lack of merit. With the finality of
judgment in Civil Case No. 1111 on October 20, 2014,
Atty. Enriquez filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution.
Meanwhile, the spouses Rivera filed on November 10,
2014 before the RTC a case for quieting of title against
the spouses Manuel, docketed as Civil Case No. 2222.
The spouses Manuel, again through Atty. Enriquez, filed
a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2222 on the ground of
res judicata given the final judgment in Civil Case No.
1111.
Pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss in Civil
Case No. 2222, the RTC granted on February 9, 2015 the
motion for issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case
No. 1111 and placed the spouses Manuel in possession
of the land. Atty. Enriquez, based on a purported oral
agreement with the spouses Manuel, laid claim to ½ of
the land, measuring 100,000.00 square meters with
market value of P1, 750, 000.00, as his attorney’s fees.
Atty. Enriquez caused the subdivision of the land in two
equal portions and entered into the half he
appropriated for himself. Based on the professional
and ethical standards for lawyers, may Atty. Enriquez
claim ½ of the land as his contingency fee? Why? (2015
Bar)
A: Atty. Enriquez may not claim ½ of the land as his
contingency fee. In the first place, a lawyer cannot charge
his client a contingent fee or a percentage of the amount
recovered as his fees in the absence of an express contract
to that effect. (Corpus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40424,
June 30, 1980, 98 SCRA 424). There is no such contract in this
case. As a matter of fact, the claim of a purported oral
agreement for a contingency fee of ½ of the land is
contradicted by the allegation in the Complaint in Civil Case
No. 1111 for a contingency fee of P200, 000.00 only.
Moreover, the amount claimed as contingent fee appears to
be excessive and unreasonable. The issue involved in the
case was simple and did not require extensive skill, effort
and research on the part of Atty. Enriquez.
Furthermore, Atty. Enriquez caused the division of the land
and appropriate one half thereof, pending resolution of the
motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 2222. This constitutes a
violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code, because the
case in which the property is involved has not yet been
terminated (The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouse
Cadavedo v. Victorino T. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, January 15,
2014).
Q: Atty. CJ handled the case for plaintiff GE against
defendant XY in an action for damages. Judgment was
rendered for plaintiff GE. When a writ of execution was
issued, the sheriff levied on a 400 square meter lot of
defendant XY. Pursuant to their contingent fee contract,
plaintiff GE executed a deed of assignment in favor of
Atty. CJ of one-half of the lot. Atty. CJ accepted the
assignment.
Is the contract for contingent fee valid? Explain. (2002
Bar)
A: Contract for contingent fee is a contract wherein the
attorney’s fee, usually a percentage of what may be
recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success
of the lawyer in enforcing or defending his client’s right. It
is a valid contract, unlike a champertous contract which is
invalid because the lawyer undertakes to shoulder the
expenses of the litigation. However, the amount of the fee
agreed upon may be reduced by the courts if it should be
unconscionable. Fifty percent (50%) of what the client
might recover may or may not be unconscionable
depending on the factors to be considered in determining
the reasonableness of an attorney's fee.
Q: Atty. A’s services as a lawyer were engaged by B to
recover from C certain construction materials and
equipment. Because B did not have the means of defray
the expenses of litigation, he proposed to Atty. A that he
(A) shoulders all expenses of the litigation and he (B)
would pay him (A) a portion of the construction
materials and equipment to be recovered as
compensation for his professional services.
May Atty. A correctly agree to such arrangement? (1999
Bar)
A: No, Atty. A may not correctly agree to such an agreement.
Such an arrangement would constitute a champertous
contract which is considered void due to public policy,
because it would make him acquire a stake in the outcome
of the litigation which might lead him to place his own
interest above that of the client. (Bautista v. Gonzales, 182
SCRA 151) A champertous contract is one in which a lawyer
undertakes to prosecute a case, and bear all the expenses in
connection therewith without right of reimbursement, and
will be paid his fees by way of a portion of the property or
amount that may be recovered, contingent on the success of
his efforts. It is different from a contingent fee contract,
which is valid, in which the lawyer will also be paid
depending on the success of his efforts, but he does not
undertake to shoulder all the expenses in the case. He may
advance such expenses but always subject to
reimbursement by his client.
Q: Chester asked Laarni to handle his claim to a sizeable
parcel of land in Quezon City against a well-known
property developer on a contingent fee basis. Laarni
asked for 15% of the land that may be recovered or
15% of whatever monetary settlement that may be
received from the property developer as her only fee
contingent upon securing a favorable final judgment or
compromise settlement. Chester signed the contingent
fee agreement.
Assume the property developer settled the case after
the case was decided by the Regional Trial Court in
favor of Chester for P1 Billion. Chester refused to pay
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
Laarni PI50 Million on the ground that it is excessive.
Is the refusal justified? Explain. (2008 Bar)
A: The refusal of Chester to pay is unjustified. A contingent
fee is impliedly sanctioned by Rule 20.01 (f) of the CPR. A
much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer will get nothing if
the suit fails. In several cases, the Supreme Court has
indicated that a contingent fee of 30% of the money or
property that may be recovered is reasonable. Moreover,
although the developer settled the case, it was after the case
was decided by the Regional Trial Court in favor of Chester,
which shows that Atty. Laarni has already rendered service
to the client.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Chester’s refusal to pay Atty. Laarni P150 million as
attorney’s fees on the ground that it is excessive, is justified.
In the case of Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals (245 SCRA 30
[1995]), the Supreme Court held that “contingent fee
contracts are under the supervision and close scrutiny of
the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust
charges” and that “its validity depends on a large measure
on the reasonableness of the stipulated fees under the
circumstances of each case.” Also, “stipulated attorney’s
fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so
disproportionate compared to the value of the services
rendered as to amount to fraud perpetuated against the
client.” Considering the circumstances that the case was
decided by settlement of the property developer, the
attorney’s fee of P150 Million would be unconscionable.
b. Attorney’s Liens
Q: M engaged the services of Atty. D to prosecute his
annulment of marriage case in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). After a long-drawn trial, Atty. D was able to
secure a favourable judgment from the court.
Unfortunately, M failed to pay in full the stipulated
attorney’s fees of Atty. D. How can Atty. D collect his fees
from M? Discuss fully. (2014 Bar)
A: He can allot his fees either by filing a motion in the
annulment of marriage case that he handled, and to order M
to pay the same, or he can file a separate action for the
recovery of his attorney’s fees. Of the two, the first is
preferable because the judge in the annulment case will be
in a better position to evaluate the amount and value of his
services. In the meantime, he may avail of the retaining lien,
which is to retain the moneys and properties of M in his
possession until he is paid for his services, or a charging
lien, which is to charge the money judgment in the case for
the payment of his fees.
Q: Define an attorney's retaining lien. (2000, 1998 Bar)
A: A retaining lien is the right of an attorney to retain the
funds, documents, and papers of his client which have
lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and to apply such funds to
the satisfaction thereof (Sec. 37, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Q: Upon being replaced by Justice C, Atty. B, the former
counsel of the parents of the victims of the OZONE Disco
tragedy, was directed to forward all the documents in
his possession to Justice C. Atty. B refused, demanding
full compensation pursuant to their written contract.
Sensing that a favorable Judgment was forthcoming,
Atty. B filed a motion in court relative to his attorney’s
fees, furnishing his former clients with copies thereof.
24
UST BAR OPERATIONS
Is Atty. B legally and ethically correct in refusing to turn
over the documents and in filing the motion? Explain.
(1998 Bar)
A: Atty. B is legally and ethically correct in refusing to turn
over the documents. He is entitled to a retaining lien which
gives him the right to retain the funds, documents and
papers of his client which have lawfully come to his
possession until his lawful fees and disbursement have
been paid (Sec. 37, Rule 138. Rules of Court. Rule 16.03, Code
of Professional Responsibility). Likewise, he is legally and
ethically correct in filing a motion in court relative to his
fees. He is entitled to a charging lien upon all judgments for
the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when the records of the court
rendering such judgment or issuing such execution (ibid.)
Q: Harold secured the services of Atty. Jarencio to
collect from various debtors. Accordingly. Atty.
Jarencio filed collection cases against the debtors of
Harold and in fact obtained favorable Judgments in
some. Atty. Jarencio demanded from Harold his
attorney’s fees pursuant to their agreement but Harold
refused. When one of the defendants paid his
indebtedness of 20, 000.00 through Atty. Jarencio, the
latter refused to turn over the money to Harold;
instead, Atty. Jarencio applied the amount to his
attorney’s fees having in mind the provisions of the
Civil Code on legal compensation or set-off to justify his
act.
Was Atty. Jarencio correct in refusing to turn over to his
client the amount he collected? Discuss fully. (1995
Bar)
A: A lawyer has a retaining lien which entitled him to retain
possession of a client’s document, money or other property
which come into the hands of the attorney professionally,
until the general balance due him for professional services
is paid. Under Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the
attorney cannot be compelled to surrender the documents
in his possession without prior proof that his fees have been
duly satisfied.
However, Atty. Jarencio here cannot appropriate the sum of
20 ,000.00. If there is a dispute between him and Harold as
to the amount of the fees that he can collect, what he should
do if Harold disputes the amount of the fees he is entitled,
he must file an action for the recovery of his fee or record a
charging lien so that the court can fix the amount to which
he is entitled.
Q: The vendor filed a case against the vendee for the
annulment of the sale of a piece of land.
Assume the vendee obtained a summary judgment
against the vendor. Would the counsel for the
defendant vendee be entitled to enforce a charging
lien? Explain. (2008 Bar)
A: A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for payment
of attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a
judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in
favor of his client (Metropolitan Bank v. Court of Appeals,
181 SCRA 367 [1990]). A summary judgment against the
vendor in this case only means that his complaint was
dismissed. This is not a judgment for payment of money,
hence, a charging lien cannot attach. However, if the
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
judgment should include a money judgment in favor of the
vendee on his counterclaim, a charging lien can properly be
enforced.
Q: Differentiate “retaining lien” from “charging lien”
(2016 Bar)
A: A retaining lien gives the lawyer the right to retain the
funds, documents and papers of the client which have
lawfully come into his possession, until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid. A charging lien is a lien upon
all judgments for payment of sum of money and executions
thereof, to ensure payment of his fees and disbursements in
the said case.
A retaining lien is a passive lien; the lawyer is not required
to perform any act except to hold on to the client’s funds,
documents and papers, until his fees and disbursements are
paid. A charging lien is an active lien; the lawyer is required
to file a motion in court, with copy served on the adverse
party, to have a statement of his claim to such fees and
disbursements charged or attached to the decision in such
case and executions thereof.
A retaining lien is general lien; it may be resorted to in order
to secure payment of the lawyer’s fees in all the cases he has
handled and services he has rendered to the client. A
charging lien is a special lien; it can be utilized for the
purpose of collecting only the unpaid fees and
disbursements of the lawyer in the case where the
judgment for a sum of money may be secured.
c. Fees and controversies with clients (Quantum
Meruit)
Q:
a. Explain the doctrine of quantum meruit in
determining the amount of attorney’s fees.
b. Identify the factors to be considered in determining
attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. (2015,
2014, 2007, 1998 Bar)
A:
a. Quantum meruit means as much as the services of a
lawyer are worth. Recovery of attorney’s fees on the
basis of quantum meruit is authorized when (1) there
is no express contract for the payment of attorney’s
fees; (2) although there is a contract for attorney’s fees,
the fees stipulated are found unconscionable by the
court; (3) the contract for attorney’s fees is void due to
formal defects of execution; (4) the lawyer was not able
to finish the case for justifiable cause; (5) the lawyer
and the client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees;
and (6) the client dismissed his counsel or the latter
withdrew therefrom, for valid reasons.
b. The factors are those set in Rule 20.01 of the Coe of
Professional Reponsibility (CPR), as follows:
i. the time spent and the extent of the services
rendered or required;
ii. the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
iii. the importance of the subject matter;
iv. the skill demanded;
v. the probability of losing other employment as a
result of acceptance of the proffered case;
vi. the customary charges for similar services and
the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which
he belongs;
vii. the amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the service;
viii. the contingency or certainty of compensation;
ix. the character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
x. the professional standing of the lawyer.
Q: A inherited a parcel of land situated in Batasan Hills
which is occupied by informal settlers. He wants to eject
the occupants, but he has no financial means to pursue
the ejectment case. He contracted the services of Atty.
B, who agreed to defray all the expenses of the suit on
the condition that he will be paid one-half (1/2) of the
property to be recovered as his compensation.
What is the kind of attorney’s fees? Can Atty. B enforce
this contract against A? What are the respective
remedies relative to the collection of attorney’s fees, if
any, of A and Atty. B against each other? (2014, 2010,
1988 Bar)
A: This is a champertous fee agreement because Atty. B
agreed to defray all the expenses of the action and will be
paid only if he is successful in recovering A’s property. Atty.
B cannot enforce it because it is contrary to public policy
and the ethics of the legal profession. The remedy of A is to
file an action to have the agreement declared null and void,
or simply to refuse to pay attorney’s fees to Atty. B on the
basis of the said agreement. On the other hand, Atty. B will
still be entitled to collect attorney’s fees on a quantum
meruit basis. He may bring an action to collect such fees.
Q: Discuss the propriety of a lawyer filing a suit against
his client concerning his fees. (1998 Bar)
A: Rule 20.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer shall avoid controversies with his
clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or
fraud.” The legal profession is not a money-making trade
but a form of public service. Lawyers should avoid giving
the impression that they are mercenary (Perez v. Scottish
Union and National Insurance Co., 76 Phil. 325). It might even
turn out to be unproductive for him for potential clients are
likely to avoid a lawyer with a reputation of suing his clients.
d. Concepts of Attorney’s fees
Extraordinary concept
Q: A real estate company, elated over the decision in a
case regarding a dispute over a personal matter
between its top sales representative and his neighbor,
gifted Atty. O, who represented its sales representative
in the litigation, with a 240-square-meter lot in its
newly developed subdivision. The case handled by Atty.
O had nothing to do with the sales representative in the
litigation, with a 240 square-meter lot in its newly
developed subdivision. The case handled by Atty. O had
nothing to do with the sales representative's work for
the real estate company. The latter's offer of the lot,
which Atty. O accepted, was in consideration of its sales
representative’s being the firm's Number One
salesman. Was there a breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by Atty. O when he accepts
the 240 square-meter lot? (1997 Bar)
A: Rule 20.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge
and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs,
commission, interests, rebate of forwarding allowance or
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
other compensation whatsoever related to his professional
employment from anyone other than the client.
There should be no room for suspicion on the part of the
client that his lawyer is receiving compensation in
connection with the case from third persons with hostile
interests (Report of IBP Committee, p. 112). Even if the secret
compensation comes from a friendly person, if the act is
discovered, it is bound to create dissension in the client-
lawyer relationship. Worse, the lawyer will be able to enrich
himself by receiving more than what is due him as
attorney’s fees. (Pineda. Legal & Judicial Ethics, 1995 ed. p.
243)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The gift of the real estate company does not come from the
adverse party, hence, there is no violation of the lawyer is
duty of loyalty to his clients. The property given was not his
client's property involved in the litigation. Hence, it does
not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code. The lawyer's
acceptance of the gift is proper. However, it would be better
if he informs his client.
Q: Deciding a case for malicious prosecution, Judge
Sales awarded attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, in addition to exemplary damages, to the
plaintiff.
a. Did the judge act within his discretion in awarding
attorney's fees?
b. As counsel for the plaintiff, are you entitled to
receive the attorney's fees thus awarded in
addition to your stipulated legal fees? (1994 Bar)
A:
a. A party may recover attorney's fees in cases of
malicious prosecution against him in an action for
damages against the party responsible therefore (Art.
2208 (3), Civil Code). But he must prove not only that he
was acquitted in the criminal action, but that the person
who charged him knowingly made a false statement of
facts to induce the prosecutor to prosecute or that the
institution of the criminal action was prompted by a
sinister design to vex or humiliate him and to cast upon
him dishonor and disgrace.
b. No. Attorney’s fees in the concept or as an item of
damages is an indemnity for damages sustained by the
client, and belongs to him.
Q: A, after taking his oath as a lawyer in 1985, was
maliciously charged with the crime of seduction by
Amor, his former girlfriend. Her parents instigated the
filing of the case. A appeared for and defended himself.
In the decision acquitting him, the court explicitly
stated that he was a victim of malicious prosecution. A
then filed a complaint for damages and attorney’s
against Amor and her parents. A likewise appeared for
himself in the case. Can her recover attorney’s fees?
(1991 Bar)
A: No. Attorney A is not entitled to attorney's fees. He may,
however, be entitled to attorney’s fees in the form of
damages upon proof of bad faith of the defendant and a
definite ruling be made by the court on the claim.
PRESERVATION OF CLIENT’S CONFIDENCES
Prohibited disclosures and use (1999, 2008, 2009)
26
UST BAR OPERATIONS
Q: A, who is charged in Court with estafa for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by B,
consulted Atty. C about the case with the intention of
engaging his services as defense counsel. Because A
could not afford to pay the fee that Atty. C was charging
him, A engaged the services of another counsel, Atty. D.
At the trial of the case for estafa against A the
prosecutor announced in open court that his next
witness was Atty. C. whom he was calling to the witness
stand. Counsel for A. Atty. D, vigorously opposed the
prosecutor's move on the ground that Atty. C may not
be called as a witness for the prosecution as he might
disclose a would be client's confidence and secret.
Asked by the presiding Judge what would be the nature
of Atty. C's testimony, the prosecutor answered it has
something to do with how A obtained from B the funds
that the latter received from the former but failed to
account for. Thereupon, Atty. A vigorously opposed the
prosecutor's motion.
If you were the Judge, how would you rule on the
matter? (1999 Bar)
A: If I were the judge, I will not allow Atty. C to take the
witness stand. When A consulted Atty. C about his case, a
lawyer-client relationship was established between them. It
does not matter that A did not eventually engage his
services because of his fees; such relationship has already
been created (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil 569). A lawyer shall be
bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect
to matters disclosed to him by a prospective client (Rule
15.02 Code of Professional Responsibility). The rule on
privileged communication provides that an attorney
cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him (Sec. 21 [b],
Rule 130, Rules of Court). The prosecutor has announced
that Atty. C will be asked about how A obtained from B the
funds that he failed to account for. Atty. C's knowledge of
such matter could have come only from A.
COMMENT: There seems to be a typographical error in the
last sentence which refers to Atty. A. Perhaps, the examiner
intended to refer to simply A or to his counsel Atty. D. It is
recommended that the use by the candidate of Atty. A
should not detract from the appreciation of his answer.
Q: Christine was appointed counsel de oficio for Zuma,
who was accused of raping his own daughter. Zuma
pleaded not guilty but thereafter privately admitted to
Christine that he did commit the crime charged.
Can Christine disclose the admission of Zuma to the
court? Why or why not? (2008 Bar)
A: Christine cannot disclose the admission of Zuma to the
Court. If she does so, she will violate her obligation to
preserve confidences or secrets of her client (Canon 21, Rule
21.02, CPR). The privileged communication between lawyer
and client may be used as a shield to defend crimes already
committed.
Q: When Atty. Romualdo interviewed his client,
Vicente, who is accused of murder, the latter confessed
that he killed the victim in cold blood. Vicente also said
that when he takes the witness stand, he will deny
having done so. Is Atty. Romualdo obliged, under his
oath as lawyer, to inform the judge (a) that his client is
guilty? (2009 Bar)
A: Atty. Romualdo cannot reveal to the judge that Vicente is
guilty. He is bound to keep what Vicente told him in
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
confidence, because that is an admission of a crime already
committed.
Disclosure, when allowed (2009, 2013, 1998, 1988,
1987)
Q: When Atty. Romualdo interviewed his client, Vicente,
who is accused of murder, the latter confessed that he
killed the victim in cold blood. Vicente also said that
when he takes the witness stand, he will deny having
done so. Is Atty. Romualdo obliged, under his oath as
lawyer, to inform the judge that (b) his client will
commit perjury on the witness stand? Explain. (2009
Bar)
A: Atty. Romualdo can reveal to the judge that Vicente will
commit perjury on the witness stand. This is already a
revelation of a crime still to be committed, and that lies
outside the mantle of privileged communication.
Q: Atty. Serafin Roto is the Corporate Secretary of a
construction corporation that has secured a multi-
million infrastructure project from the government. In
the course of his duties as corporate secretary, he
learned from the company president that the
corporation had resorted to bribery to secure the
project and had falsified records to cut implementing
costs after the award of the project.
The government filed a civil action to annul the
infrastructure contract and has subpoenaed Atty. Roto
to testify against the company president and the
corporation regarding the bribery. Atty. Roto moved to
quash the subpoena, asserting that lawyer-client
privilege prevents him from testifying against the
president and the corporation.
Resolve the motion to quash. (2013 Bar)
A: Motion denied. The motion should be denied because
Atty. Roto did not learn of the bribery and falsification in
connection with a lawyer-client relation. Being a corporate
secretary does not create a lawyer-client relation because
membership to the Bar is not a requirement to perform the
functions of a corporate secretary. Consequently, Atty. Roto
does not owe any obligation of confidentiality to the
corporation.
Atty. Roto may be compelled to testify. As an officer of the
court, a “lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice” (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 12).
Furthermore, “a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court” (Ibid., Canon 10).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Motion Granted. It is true that being a corporate secretary
does not necessarily constitute a lawyer-client relationship.
However, Atty. Roto may be considered in the practice of
law if part of his duties as a corporate secretary is to give
legal advice to or prepares legal documents for the
corporation. Thus a lawyer-client relationship may have
been constituted between Atty. Roto and the corporation.
Consequently, it is his duty as an attorney “to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client” (Rules of Court, Rule 138,
Sec. 20, par. E, paraphrasing and arrangement supplied).
Atty. Roto learned from the company president of the
bribery and falsification, while Atty. Roto was in the course
of his performance of his duties as corporate secretary.
Thus, he could not be examined on that matter without the
consent of his client. [Ibid., Rule 130, Sec. 24(b)].
Q: A mayor charged with Homicide engaged your
services as his lawyer. Since there is only one witness to
the incident, the mayor disclosed to you his plan to kill
the lone witness through a contrived vehicular
accident.
a. What are the moral and legal obligations of an
attorney to the mayor and to the authorities?
b. Should the killing push through and are you certain
that the mayor is the one responsible, are you
under obligation to disclose to the authorities what
was confided to you? Is this not a privileged
communication between client and attorney?
(1998 Bar)
A:
a. It is the duty of an attorney to divulge the
communication of his client as to his announced
intention to commit a crime to the proper authorities to
prevent the act or to protect the person against whom
it is threatened.
b. Public policy and the lawyer's duty to counsel
obedience to the law forbid that an attorney should
assist in the commission of a crime or permit the
relation of attorney and client to conceal a wrongdoing.
He owes it to himself and to the public to use his best
efforts to restrain his client from doing any unlawful act
and if, notwithstanding his advise, his client proceeds
to execute the illegal deed, he may disclose it or be
examined as to any communication relating thereto.
There is privileged communication only as to crimes
already committed before its communication to the
lawyer.
Q: In a prosecution for murder against a ranking army
officer, the latter engaged the services of Atty. Carlos
Malilin, a well-known trial lawyer, to whom the officer
in one of their conferences disclosed a plan to
“eliminate” or “salvage”— i.e., kill or otherwise cause to
disappear— the only witness, a fellow military officer,
through a contrived traffic or highway accident.
a. What are the legal and moral obligations of Atty.
Carlos Malillin to his client and to the authorities,
under the given circumstances?
b. Should the planned “accident” take place and the
only witness for the prosecution be killed as a
result, is Atty. Carlos Malillin under any obligation
to disclose to the authorities the plan that his client
had mentioned to him as above mentioned?
Reasons. (1988, 1987 Bar)
A:
a. Attorney Malillin has the moral and legal obligation to
advise the army officer not to execute his plan. If the
accused army officer does not abide by his advise, Atty.
Malillin should withdraw from the case.
b. Atty. Malillin has the obligation to testify in said case if
he is called upon by the Court to do so. The obligation
of the lawyer to keep the secrets of his client obtained
in the course of his employment covers only lawful
purposes.
Withdrawal of services (2015, 1997, 1988, 2014, 2013,
1998, 1994, 1989)
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
Q: Give three instances when a lawyer is allowed to
withdraw his/her services. (2015, 1997, 1988 Bar)
A: (Any three of the following:)
1. When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of
conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;
2. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules;
3. When his inability to work with co-counsel will not
promote the best interest of the client;
4. When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
5. When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the
services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
6. When the lawyer is elected or appointed to apublic
office.
7. Other similar cases.
Q: B hired Atty. Z to file a replevin case against C for an
agreed acceptance fee of P30, 000.00 which was
evidenced by a written contract. After the complaint
was filed by Atty. Z, B terminated his services and hired
a new lawyer for the same amount of attorney’s fees.
How much attorney’s fees is Atty. Z entitled? (2014 Bar)
A: Atty. Z is entitled to the entire amount of the attorney’s
fees agreed upon because his services were terminated by
the client without just cause (Sec. 26, Rule 138, Rules of
Court).
Q: Atty. Bravo represents Carlos Negar (an insurance
agent for Dormir Insurance Co.) in a suit filed by
insurance claimant Andy Limot who also sued Dormir
Insurance. The insurance policy requires the
insured/claimant to give a written notice to the
insurance company or its agent within 60 days from the
occurrence of the loss.
Limot testified during the trial that he had mailed the
notice of the loss to the insurance agent, but admitted
that he lost the registry receipt so that he did not have
any documentary evidence of the fact of mailing and of
the timeliness of the mailed notice. Dormir Insurance
denied liability, contending that the timely notice had
not been given either to the company or its agent. Atty.
Bravo’s client, agent Negar, testified and confirmed that
he never received any notice.
A few days after Negar testified, he admitted to Atty,
Bravo that he had lied when he denied receipt of
Limot’s notice, he did receive the notice by mail but
immediately shredded it to defeat Limot’s claim.
If you were Atty. Bravo, what would you do in light of
your client’s disclosure that he perjured himself when
he testified? (2013 Bar)
A: If I were Atty. Bravo I shall promptly call upon Carlo
Negar, my client, to rectify his perjured testimony by
recanting the same before the court.
Should he refuse or fail to do so I shall then terminate my
relationship with him (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 19, Rule 19.02) stating that with his having
committed perjury he pursued an illegal conduct in
connection with the case (Ibid., Canon 22, Rule 22.01).
Since my client Limot refuses to forego the advantage thus
unjustly gained as a result of his perjury, I should promptly
inform the injured person or his counsel, so that they may
28
UST BAR OPERATIONS
take the appropriate steps (Canons of Professional Ethics,
Canon 41).
Finally, as part of my duty to do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and the Attorney’s
oath). I shall file a manifestation with the court attaching
thereto the notice of termination as Limot’s counsel.
Q: On the eve of the initial hearing for the reception of
evidence for the defense, the defendant and his counsel
had a conference where the client directed the lawyer
to present as principal defense witnesses two (2)
persons whose testimonies were personally known to
the lawyer to have been perjured. The lawyer informed
his client that he refused to go along with the
unwarranted course of action proposed by the
defendant. But the client insisted on his directive, or
else he would not pay the agreed attorney’s fees.
When the case was called for hearing the next morning,
the lawyer forthwith moved in open court that he be
relieved as counsel for the defendant. Both the
defendant and the plaintiffs counsel objected to the
motion.
Under the given facts, is the defense lawyer legally
justified in seeking withdrawal from the case? Why or
why not? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: Yes, he is justified. Under Rule 22.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may withdraw his
services "if the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules". The insistence of the
client that the lawyer present witnesses whom he
personally knows to have been perjured, will expose him to
criminal and civil liability and violate his duty of candor,
fairness and good faith to the court.
Q: Atty. X filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance as
counsel for the accused Y after the prosecution rested
its case. The reason for the withdrawal of Atty. X was
the failure of accused Y to affix his conformity to the
demand of Atty. X for increase in attorney’s fees. Is the
ground for withdrawal justified? Explain. (Bar)
A: The ground for the withdrawal is not justified. Rule 22.01
(e) of the Code of Professional responsibility provides that
a lawyer may withdraw his services when the client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for his services or fails to
comply with the retainer agreement. In this case, the client
has not failed to pay the lawyer’s fees or to comply with the
retainer agreement. He has only refused to agree with the
lawyer’s demand for an increase in his fees. It is his right to
refuse; that is part of his freedom of contract.
Q: State the rule on (a) the right of the client to dismiss
his lawyer and (b) the prerogative of a lawyer to
withdraw as counsel. (1998, 1994, 1989 Bar)
A:
a. A client has the right to dismiss his lawyer at any time,
with or without just cause. The existence or non-
existence of just cause is material only for determining
the right of the lawyer to compensation for services
rendered. The client's right to terminate the lawyer's
services springs from the strictly personal and highly
confidential nature of the relationship between the
lawyer and the client. Once the client loses confidence
in his lawyer, he has the right to dismiss him.
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
b. On the other hand, the lawyer does not have an
unqualified right to withdraw as counsel. As an officer
of the court, he may not withdraw or be permitted to
withdraw as counsel if such withdrawal will work
injustice to a client or frustrate the ends of justice. A
lawyer may withdraw at any time with his client's
written consent. Without such consent, he may
withdraw his services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in the circumstances (Canon 22,
Code of Professional Responsibility).
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF
LAWYERS (RULE 139-B, RULES OF COURT)
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS
Sui generis (2010, 2002, 2004, 2000)
Q: Is the defense of Atty. R in a disbarment complaint
for immorality filed by his paramour P that P is in pari
delicto material or a ground for exoneration? Explain.
(2010 Bar)
A: The defense of in pari delicto is immaterial in an
administrative case which is sui generis. The administrative
case is about the lawyer’s conduct, not the woman’s (Mortel
v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586 [1956]; Po Cham v. Pizarro, 467 SCRA
1 [2005]; Marjorie F. Samaniego v. Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer,
555 SCRA 1 [2008]).
Q: Arabella filed a complaint for disbarment against her
estranged husband Atty. P on the ground of immorality
and use of illegal drugs.
After Arabella presented evidence and rested her case
before the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline, she filed an Affidavit of
Desistance and motion to dismiss the complaint, she
and her husband having reconciled for the sake of
their children.
You are the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP.
Bearing in mind that the family is a social institution
which the State is duty-bound to preserve, what will
be your action on Arabella’s motion to dismiss the
complaint? (2010 Bar)
A: I would still deny the motion to dismiss. The general rule
is that “no investigation shall be interrupted or terminated
by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same unless the Supreme
Court motu proprio or upon recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors determines that there is no compelling
reason to continue with the proceedings. An administrative
investigation of a lawyer is sui generis, neither a civil nor
criminal proceeding. An affidavit of desistance has no place
in it.
Q: A proceeding for disbarment is considered sui
generis, explain briefly, giving at least five (5) reasons
in support of your answer. (2002 Bar)
A: A disbarment proceeding is sui generis or a class by itself,
because of the following reasons:
a. It Is neither a civil nor a criminal proceeding;
b. Double jeopardy cannot be availed of as a defense;
c. It can be initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court
or by the IBP;
d. It can proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant;
e. It is imprescriptible;
f. It is confidential;
g. It is in itself due process.
Q: Alleging that Atty. Malibu seduced her when she was
only sixteen (16) years old, which resulted in her
pregnancy and the birth of a baby girl, Miss Magayon
filed a complaint for his disbarment seven years after
the alleged seduction was committed.
Atty. Malibu contended that, considering the period of
delay, the complaint filed against him can no longer be
entertained much less prosecuted because the alleged
offense has already prescribed.
Is Atty. Malibu’s contention tenable or not? Reason
briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: Atty. Malibu’s contention is not tenable. Disciplinary
proceedings are sui generis. They are neither civil nor
criminal proceedings. Its purpose is not to punish the
individual lawyer but to safeguard the administration of
justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers and to remove from the profession
of law persons whose disregard of their oath of office
proves them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed
in them as members of the bar. Disbarment is
imprescriptible. Unlike ordinary proceedings, it is not
subject to the defense of prescription. The ordinary statute
of limitations has no application to disbarment proceedings
(Cazo v. Degamo, 20 SCRA 1162 [1967]).
Q: C filed a verified administrative complaint against
Atty. D. In the course of the investigation, C presented
an affidavit of desistance which she identified on the
witness stand. What course of action should the
investigator take? Explain. (2000 Bar)
A: The investigator should continue with the investigation.
A disbarment proceeding is sui generis, neither a civil nor
criminal action. As such, a desistance by the complainant is
unimportant. The case may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainant (Rayos-Ombac v.
Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 [1998]). If the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
regardless of the desistance of the complainant. Of course,
if the complainant refuses to testify and the charges cannot
then be substantiated, the court will have no alternative but
to dismiss the case.
Grounds (2015, 2014, 2006, 2002, 2009, 2004, 1992,
1989)
Q: What are the grounds for disbarment or suspension
from office of an attorney? (2015 Bar)
A: Under Sec. 27, Rule 138, the grounds for suspension or
disbarment of a lawyer are “any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party or to a
cause without authority to do so.” The practice of soliciting
cases for the purposes of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers constitutes malpractice.
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
Q: Atty. Forma is a member of the Philippine Bar. He
went to New York City, took the New York State Bar, and
passed the same. He then practiced in New York City.
One of his American clients filed a case for disbarment
against him for pocketing the money which was
entrusted to him as payment for the filing fee and other
incidental expenses of his damage suit. Atty. Forma was
later disbarred for dishonesty. Disheartened, Atty.
Forma came back to the Philippines and practiced as a
lawyer.
Will his disbarment in New York be used against him
for purposes of disbarment proceedings here in the
Philippines? (2014, 2006, 2002 Bar)
A: Atty. Forma may be disbarred in the Philippines if the
ground for his disbarment in New York is also a ground for
disbarment in this country. But he is still entitled to due
process of law, and the foreign court’s judgment against him
only constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical conduct
as a lawyer. He is entitled to be given an opportunity to
defend himself in an investigation to be conducted in
accordance with Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court (In
Re: Suspension from the Practice of Law in the Territory of
Guam of Atty. Leon Maquera, B.M. 793, July 30, 2004; Velez v.
De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006).
Q: Cliff and Greta were law school sweethearts. Cliff
became a lawyer, but Greta dropped out. One day, Cliff
asked Greta to sign a marriage contract. The following
day, Cliff showed Greta the document already signed by
an alleged solemnizing officer and two witnesses. Cliff
then told Greta that they were already married and
Greta consented to go on a honeymoon. Thereafter, the
couple cohabited and begot a child. Two years later,
Cliff left Greta and married a Venezuelan beauty.
Incensed, Greta filed a disbarment complaint against
Cliff. Will the case prosper? Explain. (2009 Bar)
A: The disbarment case will prosper. In the case of Cabrera
v. Agustin (106 Phil. 256 [1959]), a lawyer who deceived a
woman to believe that they were already married after they
had signed an application for a marriage license, and
afterwards took advantage of her belief to satisfy his lust,
until she bore him a child, was considered by the Supreme
Court to be lacking in integrity and good moral character to
remain a member of the bar.
Q: Atty. Walasunto has been a member of the Philippine
Bar for twenty (20) years but has never plied his
profession as a lawyer. His sole means of livelihood is
selling and buying real estate. In one of his transactions
as a real estate broker, he issued a bouncing check. He
was criminally prosecuted and subsequently convicted
for violating B.P. Big. 22. In the disbarment proceedings
filed against him, Atty. Walasunto contended that his
conviction for violation of B.P. Big. 22 was not a valid
ground for disciplinary action against a member of the
bar. He further argued that his act in issuing the check
was done in relation to his calling as a real estate
broker and not in relation to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer.
Are the contentions of Atty. Walasunto meritorious or
not? Reason. (2004, 1992 Bar)
A: No. His contentions are not meritorious. In the first place,
a ground for disbarment is conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court), and the
violation of B.P. 22 is considered to be a crime involving
moral turpitude (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]). In
30
UST BAR OPERATIONS
the second place, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
Additionally, Rule 1.01 of the same Code provides that “a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
Q: The agreement between the estranged husband and
wife provided for, among others, the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children,
and support for the children. In the same agreement,
the couple waived the right to prosecute each other for
bigamy, adultery, concubinage and whatever acts of
infidelity. There was also a condonation provision. The
agreement was prepared and notarized by a lawyer
who was the best man at the wedding. What are the
liabilities, if any, of this lawyer? Explain your answer.
(1989 Bar)
A: The document executed by the spouses is immoral and
contrary to law. The lawyer who drafted and notarized all
said documents committed malpractice and can be
disbarred or suspended. Although the principal duty of the
notary public is to ascertain the identity of the parties and
the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless
incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or immoral
agreement.
Proceedings (2004, 2014, 2009, 2003, 1999, 1998,
1994, 1990, 1989)
Q: A disbarment complaint against a lawyer was
referred by the Supreme Court to a Judge of the
Regional Trial Court for investigation, report and
recommendation. On the date set for the hearing of the
complaint, the Judge had the case called for trial in open
court and proceeded to receive evidence for the
complainant. What would you have done if you were the
counsel for the respondent-lawyer? Why? Reason
briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: I would object to the holding of a trial in public.
Disciplinary proceedings against an attorney are
confidential in nature until its termination. The professional
success of a lawyer depends almost entirely on his good
reputation. If that is tarnished, it is difficult to restore the
same (Ibanez v. Vina, 107 SCRA 607 [1981]). To avoid the
unnecessary ruin of a lawyer’s name, disbarment
proceedings are directed to be confidential until their final
determination (Sec. 18, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court).
Q: Atty. D was required by Judge H of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt of court for shouting
invectives at the opposing counsel and harassing his
witness.
Assuming that there was sufficient cause or ground,
may Judge H suspend Atty. D from the practice of law?
If Judge H finds that the actuations of Atty. D are grossly
unethical and unbecoming of a member of the bar, may
Judge H disbar Atty. D instead?
Explain your answer. (2014 Bar)
A: Under Section 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a Regional
Trial Court may suspend a lawyer from the practice of law
for any of the causes provided in Section 27, until further
action of the Supreme Court. But it may not disbar him, for
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
only the Supreme Court can disbar a lawyer pursuant to its
constitutional power to admit persons to the practice of
law.
Q: Atty. Hyde, a bachelor, practices law in the
Philippines. On long weekend, he dates beautiful
actresses in Hong Kong. Kristine, a neighbor in the
Philippines, filed with the Supreme Court an
administrative complaint against the lawyer because of
sex videos uploaded through the internet showing Atty.
Hyde’s sordid dalliance with the actresses in Hong
Kong.
In his answer, Atty. Hyde (1) questions the legal
personality and interest of Kristine to institute the
complaint and (2) insists that he is a bachelor and the
sex videos relate to his private life which is outside
public scrutiny and have nothing to do with his law
practice.
Rule on the validity of Atty. Hyde’s defenses. (2009 Bar)
A:
a. The legal personality and interest of Kristine to initiate
the complaint for disbarment is immaterial. A
disbarment proceedings is sue generis, neither a civil
nor a criminal proceeding. Its sole purpose is to
determine whether or not a lawyer is still deserving to
be a member of the bar. In a real sense, Kristine is not a
plaintiff; hence, interest on her part is not required.
b. Atty. Hyde’s second defense is untenable. His duty not
to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct under Rule 1.01 of the CPR, as well as his duty
not to engage in scandalous conduct to the discredit of
the legal profession under Rule 7.03, is applicable to his
private as well as to his professional life.
Q: Y hired Attorney X to represent him in a collection
case he filed against Z. The parties later on agreed to
settle the case and Z turned over to Attorney X the
amount of P25, 000.00 as partial settlement of his
obligation. Attorney X kept the money. Y, upon learning
of Attorney X’s action, filed a disbarment case against
the latter before the Supreme Court, which in turn,
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP Commissioner tasked to investigate the case
reviewed all the pleadings submitted by Y and Attorney
X and their respective witnesses, and promptly made a
report recommending that Attorney X be suspended for
six months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Attorney X assailed his suspension on the ground of an
impingement on his right to due process. Is Attorney X's
contention sustainable? Explain. (2003 Bar)
A: There is no impingement on Attorney X’s right to due
process. The IBP Commissioner tasked to investigate the
case reviewed all the pleadings of the parties and their
respective witnesses. This implies that Atty. A was given an
opportunity to present his side. Due process has been
satisfied. This is especially true if the principle of res ipsa
loquitur is applicable. (However, it may be noted that the
IBP Board of Governors is not authorized to impose the
penalty of suspension).
Q: A engaged the services of Atty. B to defend him in a
case for collection of sum of money that was brought
against him in the Municipal Trial Court by D. Despite
notice of the scheduled dates of hearing, Atty. B failed
to appear much less to inform A about it. The case was
decided against A. It was only when the adverse
judgment was being executed against him that A
learned he had lost the case. When he went to see
counsel, Atty. B put up the excuse that he was busy
attending to his cases which were more important than
A's.
Before whom can A seek redress against Atty. B who
apparently was negligent in attending his case? (1999
Bar)
A: He may file a verified complaint against Atty. B, asking
that he be administratively disciplined, with either the
Supreme Court, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), or the EBP Chapter to which
Atty. B belongs. (Sec. 1, Rule 139-B).
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
He may also file a complaint against Atty. B before a
Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, depending on
the amount involved, for damages he may have sustained
due to the latter's negligence.
Q: When Atty. Aldrin received copy of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, he filed a motion for reconsideration
using intemperate and disrespectful language with a
subtle threat that “knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment is punishable under the Revised Penal Code."
The Court of Appeals ordered him to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt of court. Instead of
complying, he submitted to the Court of Appeals his
Petition to Retire from the practice of law which he
immediately filed with the Supreme Court after
receiving the citation for contempt. May he be allowed
to retire from the practice of law? (1998 Bar)
A: No. A practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing
contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily
retire from the practice of law which would negate the
inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt.
(Montecillo v. Gica, 60 SCRA 234)
Q: Ben filed proceedings for disbarment against his
lawyer, Atty. Co, following the latter’s conviction for
estafa for misappropriating funds belonging to his
client (Ben). While the proceedings for disbarment was
pending, the President granted absolute pardon in
favor of Atty. Co. Atty. Co. then, moved for the dismissal
of the disbarment case.
Should the motion be granted? (1998 Bar)
A: An absolute pardon by the President is one that operates
to wipe out the conviction as well as the offense itself. The
grant thereof to a lawyer is a bar to a proceeding for
disbarment against him, if such proceeding is based solely
on the fact of such conviction (In re Parcasion, 69 SCRA 336).
But where the proceeding to disbar is founded on the
professional misconduct involved in the transaction which
culminated in his conviction, the effect of the pardon is only
to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act and does
not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding,
inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute
proof that the attorney does not possess good moral
character (In re Lontoc, 43 Phil. 293).
Q: A verified complaint for disbarment was filed against
Atty. Cruz who was accused of misappropriating funds
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
belonging to the complainant. The matter was referred
to the IBP which forthwith conducted an investigation
through its local chapter. During the pendency of the
investigation, the complainant filed an Affidavit of
Desistance claiming that Atty. Cruz had already
reimbursed him for the funds which he had accused
him of unlawfully spending for his own use. Atty. Cruz
moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
As the hearing officer, how will you act on the motion of
Atty. Cruz? (1994 Bar)
A: The desistance of a complaint in a disbarment
proceedings or his withdrawal of the charges against a
lawyer does not deprive the court of the authority to
proceed to determine the matter. Nor does it necessary
result in the dismissal of the complaint, except when, as a
consequence of withdrawal or desistance, no evidence is
adduced to prove the charges. Since a disbarment
proceeding is neither a civil nor a criminal action but one
presented solely for public interest, the fact that the
complainant and the respondent have considered the case
closed, is unimportant.
As hearing officer, I will deny the motion of Atty. Cruz and
continue the hearings.
Q: A lawyer charged his client P 10,000.00 for filing fees
pertaining to the complaint he filed in court. He actually
spent only P1, 000,00. He did not account for the
balance.
Suppose that the lawyer should be charged, how and
where should the complaint be filed? Explain your
answer. (1990 Bar)
A: The client may file a verified complaint for disbarment
against his lawyer. His verified complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of person or persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by
such documents as may substantiate said facts. The client
may file the complaint directly with the Supreme Court, in
which case at least 18 copies thereof shall be filed, and the
Supreme Court may refer the complaint to the IBP Board of
Governors for appropriate action, such as assigning the
complaint to an investigator, or to the Solicitor General or
court officer or judge for investigation when the interest of
justice requires. The client may, however, file his complaint,
in six copies, with the IBP Board of Governors, which will
then assign the case to an investigator for investigation, or
with the Secretary of a local chapter of the IBP, which will
in turn transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for
assignment to an investigator. (Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court).
Q: How may a proceeding for disbarment, suspension
or discipline of attorneys be instituted? (1989 Bar)
A: A proceeding for disbarment, or suspension or discipline
of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, on its own motion, or
upon complaint under oath of another in writing. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines may investigate the matter
and recommend to the Supreme Court the disbarment and
suspension from the practice of law of the erring lawyer.
DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS PRACTICING
ABROAD (2006, 2002)
32
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Q: Atty. Perez was admitted as a member of the New
York Bar. While in Manhattan, he was convicted of
estafa and was disbarred.
Does his disbarment in New York a ground for his
automatic disbarment in the Philippines? (2006 Bar)
A: The disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension (pars. 2 & 3, Section
27, Rule 138, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution, dated
February 13, 1992).
Thus, the disbarment of Atty. Perez in New York for estafa
is a ground for his disbarment in the Philippines. However,
such disbarment in the Philippines is not automatic. Atty.
Perez is still entitled to due notice and hearing. (In Re
Suspension from the Practice of Law in the Territory of Guam
of Atty. Leon G. Maquera, 435 SCRA 417 (2004]).
Q: Atty. LA is a member of the Philippine Bar and the
California Bar in the United States. For willful
disobedience of a lawful order of a Superior Court in
Los Angeles, Atty. LA was suspended from the practice
of law in California for one (1) year.
May his suspension abroad be considered a ground for
disciplinary action against Atty. LA in the Philippines?
Why? (2002 Bar)
A: The suspension of Atty. LA from the practice of law
abroad may be considered as a ground for disciplinary
action here if such suspension was based on one of the
grounds for disbarment in the Philippines or shows a loss
of his good moral character, a qualification he has to
maintain in order to remain a member of the Philippine
Bar.
READMISSION TO THE BAR
LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN DISBARRED (1994, 1993)
Q: Atty. Queliza was convicted of qualified seduction. He
was subsequently disbarred at the initiative of the IBP.
Before he could complete the service of his sentence, he
was given an absolute pardon by the President. He
thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court for
reinstatement to the practice of law as a legal and
logical consequence of the absolute pardon.
Is he entitled to reinstatement? (1994 Bar)
A: An absolute pardon granted to a lawyer who has been
previously disbarred for conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude does not automatically entitle him to
reinstatement. The matter of his reinstatement is still
subject to the discretion of the Supreme Court. He should
still show by evidence aside from the absolute pardon that
he is now a person of good moral character, a fit and proper
person to practice law (In Re Rovero, 101 SCRA 797).
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
Q: The Faculty of the College of Law of the University of
the Philippines pleaded for compassion on behalf of
Atty. Juan Santos. The Supreme Court had earlier found
Atty. Santos guilty of grave professional misconduct
and imposed upon him “an indefinite suspension,
leaving it to him to prove at some future and opportune
time that he shall have once again regained the fitness
to be allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer
of the court."
Is the plea of the Faculty for Atty. Juan Santos well
taken? Explain. (1993 Bar)
A: The plea of the Faculty of Law of the University of the
Philippines asking compassion on behalf of Atty. Juan
Santos is not well taken.
In order that a lawyer who was disbarred can be reinstated,
he must show with convincing proof that he has good moral
character acquired through positive efforts, honorable
dealings and moral reformation as to be fit to practice law
again. Mere allegation of compassion for a lawyer is not
sufficient. In one decision of the Supreme Court, in order
that a disbarred lawyer can be reinstated, he must prove his
good moral character as if he is applying for admission to
the bar.
LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED (2013,
2010)
Q: Atty. Repatriar, a law school classmate, approached
you on your 25th Class Reunion, with questions on how
he can resume the practice of law in the Philippines. He
left the country in 1977 after two (2) years of initial law
practice, and migrated to the United States where he
was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New
York. He asks that you give him a formal legal opinion
on his query.
Outline briefly the steps and the supporting legal
reasons you would state in your legal opinion on what
Atty. Repatriar should do to resume his Philippine
practice. (2013 Bar)
A: Atty. Repatriar must prepare a sworn petition to
reacquire the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. He
should manifest in his petition his desire to resume his law
practice in the Philippines, and he is not disqualified to
practice law. The “right to resume the practice of law” is not
automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who
intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice. It cannot be overstressed that the
practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the
power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice of law. Any breach by a lawyer of
any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust
and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him
for the continued exercise of his professional privilege” (In
re: Petition to re-acquire the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses, B.M. No. 2112, July 24,
2012).
He should file the petition with the Supreme Court, through
the Bar Confidant accompanied by the original or certified
copies of the following documents:
1. Showing that he is still a Filipino citizen. ”The Court
reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing
requirement for the practice of law” (In re: Petition to
re-acquire the privilege to practice law in the Philippines,
B.M. No. 2112, supra). Having retained Philippine
citizenship could be evidenced by the Philippine
passport, the U.S. Green card showing Philippine
citizenship and U.S. residency or other authentic
documents which the Supreme Court may require.
On the other hand, if Atty. Repatriar has lost his Philippine
citizenship, he must submit the following:
a. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
b. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
c. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
d. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of
Immigration.
The loss of Filipino citizenship means termination of Atty.
Repatriar’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of
the Philippine Bar (B.M. No. 2112, In re: Petition to re-
acquire the privilege to practice law in the Philippines,
supra).
2. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments
of annual membership dues;
3. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
4. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
(Ibid.)
5. A certificate of good moral character attested to by at
least three (3) members of the bar; and
6. A certification from the State Bar of New York that Atty.
Repatriar does not have any previous or pending
disciplinary action filed against him before that body.
Q: After passing the Philippine Bar in 1986, Richards
practiced law until 1996 when he migrated to Australia
where he subsequently became an Australian citizen in
2000. As he kept abreast of legal developments,
petitioner learned about the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225),
pursuant to which he reacquired his Philippine
citizenship in 2006. He took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen at the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia. Jaded by the laid back life in the outback, he
returned to the Philippines in December 2008. After
the holidays, he established his own law office and
resumed his practice of law.
Months later, a concerned woman who had secured
copies of Atty. Richards’ naturalization papers with
consular authentication, filed with the Supreme Court
an anonymous complaint against him for illegal
practice of law.
Is respondent entitled to resume the practice of Law?
Explain. (2010 Bar)
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
A: Yes, as long as he observes the procedure laid down in
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin M.
Dacanay (B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 424),
to wit:
a. Updating and payment in full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
b. Payment of the professional tax;
c. Completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; and,
d. Pretaking of the lawyer’s oath.
NOTARIAL PRACTICE (A.M. NO. 02-8-13-SC, AS
AMENDED)
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS (2010, 1995)
Q: Enumerate the instances when a Notary Public may
authenticate documents without requiring the physical
presence of the signatories. (2010 Bar)
A:
1. If the signatory is old or sick or otherwise unable to
appear, his presence may be dispensed with if one
credible witness not privy to the instrument and who is
known to the notary public, certifies under oath or
affirmation the identity of the signatory.
2. If two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to
the instrument, not known to the notary public but can
present their own competent evidence of identity,
certify under oath or affirmation to the identity of the
signatory.
3. In case of copy certification and issuance of certified
true copies.
Q: What are the powers and duties of a notary public?
(1995 Bar)
A: Every notary public shall have power to administer all
oaths and affirmations provided for by law, in all matters
incidents to his notarial office, and in the execution of
affidavits, depositions, and other documents requiring an
oath; to receive the proof or acknowledgment of all writings
relating to commerce or navigation, such as bills of
exchange, bottomries, mortgages, and hypothecations of
ships, vessels, or boats, charter parties or affreightments,
letters of attorney, deeds, mortgages, transfers and
assignments of land or buildings, or an interest therein, and
such other writings as are commonly proved or
acknowledged before notaries; to act as a magistrate in the
writing of affidavits or depositions, and to make
declarations and certify the truth thereof under his seal of
office, concerning all matters done by him by virtue of his
office. (Sec. 241, Notarial Law)
The duties of a notary public are the following:
1. To keep a notarial register;
2. To make the proper entry or entries in the notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by the law;
3. To send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of
court within the first 10 days of the month next
following;
4. To affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of
his commission, as required by law;
34
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5. To forward his notarial register, when filled, to the
proper clerk of court;
6. To make report, within a reasonable time, to the proper
judge concerning the performance of his duties, as may
be required by such judge;
7. To make the proper notation regarding residence
certificates. (Sec. 247, Rev. Adm. Code)
Q: Comment on the propriety of the acts of the
municipal judge who prepared and notarized the
following documents:
a. a deed of absolute sale executed by two of his
friends;
b. an extrajudicial settlement of estate of his cousins;
c. a memorandum of agreement between a building
contractor and a neighboring municipality;
d. a memorandum of agreement between another
private contractor and the municipality where he
sits as judge. (1995 Bar)
A: Municipal Judges may not engage in notarial work except
as notaries public ex-officio. As notaries public ex-officio,
they may engage only in notarization of documents
connected with the exercise of their judicial functions. They
may not as such notaries public ex-officio, undertake the
preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,
contracts and other acts of conveyance, which bear no
relation to the performance of their functions as judges.
However, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still
municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries
public, the Supreme Court ruled that MTC and MCTC Judges
assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or
notaries public may, in their capacity as notaries public ex-
officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular
notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be
for the account of the Government and turned to the
municipal treasurer and (2) certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or
notary public of such municipality or circuit. (Balayon, Jr. vs.
Ocampo, 218 SCRA 13)
On the basis of the foregoing, I would say that the propriety
of the actuations of the municipal judge in this problem
depends on whether or not there are notaries public
available in his community. If there are notaries available,
his acts are improper. Otherwise they are proper, provided
that the two conditions mentioned above are complied
with.
JURISDICTION OF NOTARY PUBLIC AND PLACE OF
NOTARIZATION (2016, 2009, 1995, 1996)
Q: Atty. Sabungero obtained a notarial commission.
One Sunday, while he was at the cockpit, a person
approached him with an affidavit that needed to be
notarized. Atty. Sabungero immediately pulled out
from his pocket his small notarial seal, and notarized
the document. Was the affidavit validly notarized?
Explain. (2009 Bar)
A: Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
provides that a Notary Public shall not perform a notarial
act outside his regular place of work, except in few
exceptional occasions or situations, at the request of the
parties. Notarizing in a cockpit is not one of such
exceptions. The prohibition is aimed to eliminate the
practice of ambulatory notarization. However, assuming
that the cockpit is within his notarial jurisdiction, the
notarization may be valid but the notary public should be
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
disciplined.
Q: What is the extent of the jurisdiction of a notary
public? (1995 Bar)
A: The Jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be
co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary
public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said
city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act
beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Sec. 240, Rev. Adm.
Code)
Q: Atty. Z, a notary public commissioned in Quezon City,
attended a wedding at Makati. B requested Z to notarize
a deed of sale executed between X and Y who were both
in Baguio City. Atty. Z who has a portable notarial seal,
notarized the document. Subsequently, X assailed the
document alleging that his signature thereon was
falsified. X filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Z.
Will the complaint prosper? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: Atty. Z may be held criminally liable for violating Article
171 (Falsification by Public Officer) of the Revised Penal
Code, by making it appear that X and Y appeared and
acknowledged having executed the deed of sale before him,
when in fact they did not so appear or acknowledged. He
may also be administratively liable for not obeying the laws
of the land (Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility).
Moreover, his jurisdiction as notary is only in Quezon City.
Q: Jojo, a resident of Cavite, agreed to purchase the lot
owned by Tristan, a resident of Bulacan. Atty. Agaton,
Jojo’s lawyer who is also a notary public, prepared the
Deed of Sale and Jojo signed the document in Cavite.
Atty. Agaton then went to Bulacan to get the signature
of Tristan. Thereafter, Atty. Agaton went back to his
office in Cavite where he notarized the Deed of Sale. Is
the notarization legal and valid? Explain. (2016 Bar)
A: The Notarization is not legal and valid. Rule IV, Section
2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a
person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document is not
personally in the notary’s presence at the time of
notarization.Tristan was not in Atty. Agaton’s presence
when the latter notarized the deed of sale in his office in
Cavite; moreover, Tristan signed in Bulacan which is
outside the Atty. Agaton’s territorial jurisdiction.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, what
is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards:
a. The legal professional and the Integrated Bar?
b. His professional colleagues?
c. The development of the legal system?
d. The administration of justice?
e. His client? (2004 Bar)
A:
a. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the integrated bar. (Canon 7, Code of
Professional Responsibility)
b. A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor towards his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
(Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility)
c. A lawyer shall participate in the improvement of the
legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the administration of justice. (Canon 4,
Code of Professional Responsibility)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a. A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,
participate in continuing legal education programs,
support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools
as well as in the practical training of law students and
assist in disseminating information regarding the law
and jurisprudence. (Canon 5, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
b. A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. (Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a. A lawyer shall participate in the improvement of the
legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the administration of justice. (Canon 4,
Code of Professional Responsibility)
b. A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with his client. (Canon
15, Code of Professional Responsibility)
JUDICIAL ETHICS
Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)
(2015, 2010, 1997, 1991, 1989, 1988, 2010, 1998)
Q: In a land registration case before Judge Lucio, the
petitioner is represented by the second cousin of Judge
Lucio’s wife.
a. Differentiate between compulsory and voluntary
disqualification and determine if Judge Lucio
should disqualify himself under either
circumstances.
b. If none of the parties move for his disqualification,
may Judge Lucio proceed with the case? (2015 Bar)
A:
a. In compulsory disqualification, the judge is compelled
to inhibit himself from presiding over a case when any
of the ground provided by the law or the rules exist.
Under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court,
no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case (1) in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested
as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or (2) in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity or to counsel within the fourth
degree computed according to the rules of the civil law,
or (3) in which he has been executor, administrator,
trustee or counsel, or (4) in which he has presided in
any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without consent of all parties in
interest and entered upon the record.
Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary adds the following grounds:
a. the judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a
party or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
b. the judge has previously served as a lawyer or was
a material witness in the matter under controversy.
In voluntary disqualification, a judge may inhibit
himself in the exercise of his discretion. Paragraph 2,
Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that “a
judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and
valid reasons other than those mentioned above”. The
New Code of Professional Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary adds that “judges shall disqualify themselves
from participating in any proceedings in which they are
unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it
may appear to a reasonable observer that they are
unable to decide the matter impartially.”
There is no mandatory ground for Judge Lucio to
disqualify himself. The second cousin of his wife, a sixth
degree relative, is appearing not as a party but as
counsel.
b. If none of the parties moves for his disqualification,
Judge Lucio may proceed with the case. All the more so
if, without the participation of the Judge, the parties and
their lawyers execute a written agreement that Judge
Lucio may proceed with the same, and such agreement
Is signed by them and made a part of the records of the
case.
Q: Rebecca’s complaint was raffled to the sala of Judge
A. Rebecca is a daughter of Judge A’s wife by a previous
marriage. This is known to the defendant who does not,
however, file a motion to inhibit the Judge.
Is the Judge justified in not inhibiting himself from the
case? (2010 Bar)
A: The judge is not justified in not inhibiting himself. It is
mandatory for him to inhibit if he is related to any of the
parties by consanguinity or affiant within the sixth civil
degree (Sec. 3 [f] Canon 3, New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary). Judge A, being the stepfather of
Rebecca, is related to her by affinity by just one degree.
“Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in
any proceeding in which they are unable to decide the
matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable
observer that they are unable to decide the matter
impartially” (Id., Sec. 5, Canon 3). The fact that Rebecca is a
daughter of Judge A’s wife is liable to make a reasonable
observer doubt his impartially.
Q: RTC Judge Q is a deacon in the Iglesia ni Kristo church
in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. R, a member of
the same religious sect belonging to the same INK
community in San Francisco del Monte, filed a case
against S who belongs to the El Shaddai charismatic
group. The case was raffled to Judge Q's sala. The lawyer
of S filed a motion to disqualify Judge Q on the ground
that since he and the plaintiff belonged to the same
religious sect and community in San Francisco del
Monte, Judge Q would not possess the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge. Judge Q denied the motion on the
ground that the, reason invoked for his disqualification
was not among the grounds for disqualification under
the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Was
Judge Q’s denial of the motion for inhibition well
founded? (1997 Bar)
A: The fact that Judge Q and Litigant R both belong to the
Iglesia Ni Kristo while Litigant S belongs to the El Shaddai
group, is not a mandatory ground for disqualifying Judge Q
from presiding over the case. The motion for his inhibition
36
UST BAR OPERATIONS
is addressed to his sound discretion and he should exercise
the same in a way the people's faith in the courts of justice
is not impaired. He should reflect on the probability that a
losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the
thought that the Judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales
of Justice against him (Dimacuha vs. Concepcion. 117 SCRA
630). Under the circumstances of this case, where the only
ground given for his disqualification is that he and one of
the litigants are members of the same religious community,
I believe that his denial of the motion for his disqualification
is proper. In Vda. de Ignacio v. BLT Bus Co., 34 SCRA 618, the
Supreme Court held that the fact that one of the counsels in
a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground
for the disqualification of the judge.
Q: Lawyer W lost his ejectment case in the Municipal
Trial Court. He appealed the decision to the RTC which
V, the judge thereof, affirmed through a memorandum
decision. He filed a motion for reconsideration praying
that the RTC should state the facts and the law on which
its decision is based. Judge V denied his motion. Instead
of filing a Petition for Review, lawyer W filed an
administrative complaint against Judge V for breach of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. What is the liability of
Judge V, if any? (1991 Bar)
A: There is no breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct
committed by the RTC Judge. The memorandum decision
rendered in an appeal from the Municipal Court in its
original jurisdiction carries with it the statement of facts
found by the Municipal Court which are deemed affirmed by
the RTC judge. Memorandum decisions are allowed on
appeal.
Q:
1. Discuss briefly the grounds for disqualification or
inhibition of judges to try a case.
2. A judge rendered a decision in a criminal case
finding the accused guilty of estafa. Counsel for the
accused filed a motion for reconsideration which
was submitted without arguments. Later, another
lawyer entered his appearance for the accused. The
judge issued an order inhibiting himself from
further sitting in the case because the latter lawyer
had been among those who recommended him to
the Bench. Can the judge's voluntary inhibition be
sustained? (1989, 1988 Bar)
A:
1. Under Rule 137 Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a judge
is disqualified to sit in every case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heirs; legatee,
creditor, or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree
computed according to the rules of civil law or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
This rule enumerates the grounds under which a judge
is legally disqualified from sitting in a case, and
excludes all other grounds not specified therein. The
judge may, however, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
Under said rule, the judge may voluntarily inhibit
himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons
other than those mentioned in the rule.
2. The judge may not voluntarily inhibit himself by the
mere fact that a lawyer recommended him to the Bench.
In fact, the appearance of said lawyer is attest as to
whether the judge can act independently and
courageously in deciding the case according to his
conscience. Inhibition is not allowed at every instance
that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a
presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one
of the parties to a case. “Utang na loob”, per se, should
not be a hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor
should recognition of such value in Philippine society
prevent the performance of one’s duties as judge, x x x.
(Masadao and Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954-M;
155 SCRA 78-79). However, in order to avoid any
suspicion of partiality, it is better to the judge to
voluntarily inhibit himself.
Q: Judge L is assigned in Turtle Province. His brother
ran for Governor in Rabbit Province. During the
election period this year, judge L took a leave of
absence to help his brother conceptualize the campaign
strategy. He even contributed a modest amount to the
campaign kitty and hosted lunches and dinners.
Did Judge L incur administrative and/or criminal
liability? Explain. (2010 Bar)
A: Judge L incurred administrative liability. Rule 5.18 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct (which is applicable in a suppletory
character to the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary) provides that “[A] Judge is entitled to entertain
personal views on political questions, but to avoid suspicion
of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political
speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse
candidates for political office or participate in other
partisan political activities.”
He may also be held criminally liable for violation of Section
26 (I) of the Omnibus Election Code, which penalizes any
officer or employee in the civil service who, directly or
indirectly, intervenes, in any election campaign or engages
in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to
preserve public order.
Q: Judge C was appointed MTC Judge in 1993.
Subsequently, the Judicial and Bar Council received
information that previously he had been dismissed as
Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila. It appeared that
when he applied for appointment to the Judiciary, his
answer to the question in the personal Data Sheet -
“Have you ever been retired, dismissed or forced to
resign from any employment?" was - “Optional under
Republic Act No. 1145.” The truth is, he was dismissed
for gross misconduct as Assistant City prosecutor.
May he be dismissed as Judge? [1998 Bar]
A: Yes. By his concealment of his previous dismissal from
the public service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would
have taken into consideration in acting on his application
for appointment as a judge, he (the judge) committed an act
of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed, and
to remain, in the Judiciary he has tarnished with his
falsehood. (Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique
A. Cube, 227 SCRA 193; Jose Estacion, 181 SCRA 33, Estanislao
Belan, August 6, 1998).
Compulsory (2016, 2004, 1999)
Q: State at least five (5) instances where judges should
disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceedings where their impartiality might reasonably
be questioned (2016 Bar)
A: Any five (5) of the following instances provided in Sec. 5,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary:
a. The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a
party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceedings;
b. The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a
material witness in the matter in controversy;
c. The judge or a member of his or her family has an
economic interest in the outcome of the matter in
controversy;
d. The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy,
or a former associate of the judge served as counsel
during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a
material witness therein;
e. The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of
review;
f. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a
party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel
within the fourth civil degree; or
g. The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a
financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or
otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceedings.
Section 1, Rue 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides
for similar grounds.
Q: In a case for homicide filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Presiding Judge Quintero issued an order
for the arrest of the accused, granted a motion for the
reduction of bail, and set the date for the arraignment
of the accused. Subsequently, Judge Quintero inhibited
himself from the case, alleging that even before the case
was raffled to his court, he already had personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the case.
Is Judge Quintero’s inhibition justified? Explain. (2009,
2004 Bar)
A: Judge Quintero’s inhibition is justified. One of the
grounds for inhibition under Section 5, Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary is
“where the judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a
party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceedings.”
Q: In a case before him, it was the son of Municipal Trial
Court Judge X who appeared as counsel for the plaintiff.
After the proceeding, judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, B. the
defendant in the case, complained against Judge X for
not disqualifying himself in hearing and deciding the
case. In his defense, Judge X alleged that he did not
disqualify himself in the case because the defendant
never sought his disqualification.
Is Judge X liable for misconduct in office? (1999 Bar)
A: Judge X is liable for misconduct in office. Rule 3.12 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should take
no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. In fact, it is mandatory for him to
inhibit or disqualify himself if he is related by consanguinity
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to
counsel within the fourth degree (Hurtado v. Jurdalena, 84
SCRA 41). He need not wait for a motion of the parties in
order to disqualify himself.
Voluntary (2014, 2013, 2004, 1988)
Q: Judge Clint Braso is hearing a case between Mr.
Timothy and Khristopher Company, a company where
his wife used to work as one of its Junior Executives for
several years. Doubting the impartiality of the Judge,
Mr. Timothy filed a motion to inhibit Judge Clint Braso
refused on the ground that his wife has long resigned
from the company. Decide. (2014 Bar)
A: The fact that Judge Braso’s wife used to work for
Khristopher Company is not a mandatory ground for his
inhibition. However, Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that
judges should disqualify themselves from participating in
any proceeding in which “it may appear to a reasonable
observer that they are unable to decide the matter in
partially.” The Supreme Court has advised that a judge
“should exercise his decision in a way that the people’s faith
in the courts of justice is not impaired” (Pimentel v. Salanga,
G.R. No. L-27934, September 18, 1967). While it may not be
reasonable to believe that Judge Braso cannot be impartial
because his wife used to work as a Junior Executive for
Khristopher Company, the better part of prudence would
dictate that he inhibit himself from the case involving the
said company.
Q: Justice B of the Court of Appeals (CA) was a former
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge. A case which he heard
as a trial judge was raffled off to him. The appellant
sought his disqualification from the case but he refused
on the ground that he was not the judge who decided
the case as he was already promoted to the appellate
court before he could decide the case.
Was the refusal of Justice B to recuse from the case
proper? Explain your answer. (2014 Bar)
A: The refusal of Justice B to recuse from the case is
improper. In the case of Sandoval v. CA (G.R. No. 106657,
August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283), involving the same facts, the
Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals Justice
concerned was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the
case. However, he “should have been more prudent and
circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his
earlier involvement in the case,” because “a judge should
not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or
wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality.” This axiom
is “intended to preserve and promote public confidence in
the integrity and respect for the judiciary.”
Q: The criminal case arising from the P10 Billion Peso
pork barrel scandal was raffled to Sandiganbayan
Justice Marciano Cobarde. Afraid that he would
antagonize the parties, his political patrons and
ultimately, his judicial career, he decided to inhibit
from participating in the case, giving “personal
reasons” as his justification.
If you were to question the inhibition of SB Justice
Cobarde, on what legal basis, and where and how will
you do this? (2013 Bar)
A: The grounds relied upon by Justice Cobarde for his
inhibition conveys the impression that “the parties” and
“his political patrons” are in a special position improperly
38
UST BAR OPERATIONS
to influence him in the performance of judicial duties (New
Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Canon 4, Sec. 8).
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan sits in Divisions, so the
fears of Justice Cobarde are unfounded. Justice Cobarde
should not shirk from the performance of his judicial duties.
I would file a motion with the Division of the Sandiganbayan
in which Justice Cobarde is sitting for the remittal of his
voluntary inhibition. I would advance in motion the reasons
why the “personal reasons” set forth by the Justice are
insubstantial and does not merit his inhibition. I would
likewise set the motion for hearing as appropriate.
Q4: Assume that your friend and colleague, Judge Peter
X. Mahinay, a Regional Trial Court judge stationed at KL
City, would seek your advice regarding his intention to
ask the permission of the Supreme Court to act as
counsel for and thus represent his wife in the trial of a
civil case for damages pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.
What would be your advice to him? Discuss briefly.
(2004 Bar)
A: I would advise him against it. Rule 5.07 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct expressly and absolutely prohibits judges
from engaging in the private practice of law, because of the
incompatible nature between the duties of a judge and a
lawyer. Moreover, as a Judge he can influence to a certain
extent the outcome of the case even if it is with another
court. A Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner
the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
court or administrative agency (Rule 2.04, Code of Judicial
Conduct).
Q: On what grounds may a judge be disqualified, or
asked to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing a
case? Briefly explain each ground. (1988 Bar)
A: Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that a
judge is disqualified from sitting on any case in which he or
his wife or child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise or in which he is related to either
party within sixth degree of consanguinity of affinity or to
counsel within the fourth civil degree.
Under the last sentence of Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, a judge may voluntarily inhibit himself from
participating in a case for just and valid reasons.
The rule on voluntarily inhibition of judges was set by the
Supreme Court in Pimentel v. Salonga, 21 SCRA 160 as
follows:
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this
should be a good occasion as any to draw
the attention of all judges to appropriate
guidelines in a situation where their
capacity to try and decide fairly and
judiciously comes to the fore by way of
challenge from any one of the parties. A
judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation. But when the
suggestion is made of record that he might
be induced to act in favor 'of one party or
with bias or prejudice ‘against a litigant
arising out of circumstances reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination.
He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
INITIATION OF COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGES AND
JUSTICES (2015, 2014)
Q: An anonymous letter addressed to the Supreme
Court was sent by one Malcolm X, a concerned citizen,
complaining against Judge Hambog, Presiding Judge of
the RTC of Mahangin City, Branch 7. Malcolm X reported
that Judge Hambog is acting arrogantly in court; using
abusive and inappropriate language; and embarrassing
and insulting parties, witnesses, and even lawyers
appearing before him. Attached to the letter were pages
from transcripts of records in several cases heard
before Judge Hambog, with Judge Hambog’s arrogant,
abusive, inappropriate, embarrassing and/or insulting
remarks or comments highlighted.
Describe briefly the procedure followed when giving
due course to a complaint against an RTC judge. (2015
Bar)
A: If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a
copy thereof shall be sent to the respondent, and he shall be
required to comment within 10 days from date of service.
Upon the filing of the respondent’s comment, the Supreme
Court shall refer the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation,
or assign the case to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, for
investigation, report and recommendation. The
investigating Justice shall set a date for the hearing and
notify the parties thereof, and they may present evidence,
oral or documentary, at such hearing. The investigating
Justice shall terminate the investigation within 90 days
from its commencement, and submit his report and
recommendation to the Supreme Court within 30 days from
the termination of the investigation. The Supreme Court
shall take action on the report as the facts and the law may
warrant (Rule 140).
Q: Judge A has an illicit relationship with B, his Branch
Clerk of Court. C, the wife of Judge A, discovered the
illicit affair and consulted a lawyer to vindicate her
violated marital rights. If you were that lawyer, what
would you advice C, and if she agrees and asks you to
proceed to take action, what is the legal procedure that
you should follow? Discuss fully. (2014 Bar)
A: I will advice her to file an administrative case against
Judge A with the Supreme Court. I can tell her that she can
also file civil or criminal actions against him. But an
administrative case is confidential in nature and will not
unnecessarily drag the name and reputation of the court
into the picture.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
Lower court judges and justices of the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals (Rule 140)
(1991, 1989, 1988)
Q: A complaint for rape against ZZ was filed by the
father of Dulce, an 11-year old girl, with the Municipal
Trial Court of Bantayan, Cebu. After preliminary
examination of the offended party and the witnesses,
Judge YY of said court issued an order finding probable
cause and ordering the arrest of ZZ without bail. ZZ was
arrested and detained. He file: (1) a Waiver of
Preliminary Investigation, and (2) an Ex- Parte Motion
to Fix Bail Bond. Judge YY granted the waiver and
forthwith elevated the records of the case to the RTC,
which forwarded the same to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
Ten (10) days after the elevation of the records. YY,
acting on the Motion To Fix Bail, issued an order fixing
the bail bond at P20, 000.00. The father of Dulce filed
against YY an administrative complaint for ignorance of
law, oppression, grave abuse of discretion and
partiality. If you were the executive judge of the RTC
designated to investigate the case and to make a report
and recommendation thereon, what would be your
recommendation? (1991 Bar)
A: The facts narrated in this case is similar to the decision of
the Supreme Court in 1989. The judge was found guilty of
ignorance of the law for granting bail despite the fact that
he had already lost jurisdiction after elevating the records
of the case to the Regional Trial Court.
If I am the RTC Judge assigned to investigate the case I
would recommend the dismissal of the Judge for gross
ignorance of the law.
Q: Under the grievance procedures in Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, may judges be investigated by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines? Explain. (1989 Bar)
A: Judges may not be investigated under the grievance
procedure in Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Complaints
against judges are filed with the Supreme Court which has
administrative supervision over all courts. This was the
ruling of the Supreme Court in a minute resolution in reply
to the letter of acting Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals Rodolfo Nocon 03 January 1989.
Q: In Administrative Circular No. 1 addressed to all
lower courts dated January 28, 1988, the Supreme
Court stressed:
All judges are reminded that the
Supreme Court has applied the “Res
Ipsa Loquitur” rule in the removal of
judges even without any formal
investigation whenever a decision, on
its face, indicates gross incompetence
or gross ignorance of the law or gross
misconduct (See: People vs. Valenzuela,
135 SCRA 712; Cathay Pacific Airways vs.
Romillo, Jr., 142 SCRA 262).
The application of the “res ipsa loquitur” rule in the
removal of judges is assailed in various quarters as
inconsistent with due process and fair play.
Is there basis for such a reaction? Explain. (1988 Bar)
A: In one view, there is a basis for the reaction against the
res ipsa loquitur rule on removing judges. According to the
position taken by the Philippine Bar Association. The res
ipsa loquitur rule might violate the principle of due process,
that is the right to be heard before one is condemned
Moreover, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the
procedure for the removal of judges. Upon service of the
complaint against him, he is entitled to file his answer. If the
answer merits a hearing, it is referred to a justice of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, the report of the
investigation is submitted to the Supreme Court for proper
disposition.
The danger in applying the res ipsa loquitur rule is that the
judge may have committed only an error of judgment. His
outright dismissal does violence to the jurisprudence set In
Re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212.
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
The other view taken by the Supreme Court is that the
lawyer or a judge can be suspended or dismissed based in
his activities or decision, as long as he has been given an
opportunity to explain his side. No investigation is
necessary.
Grounds (2013, 2005, 1998, 1996)
Q: An Audit team from the Office of the Court
Administrator found that Judge Contaminada
committed serious infractions through the
indiscriminate grant of petitions for annulment of
marriage and legal separation. In one year, the judge
granted 300 of such petitions when the average number
of petitions of similar nature granted by an individual
judge in his region was only 24 petitions per annum.
The audit revealed many different defects in the
granted petitions; many petitions had not been
verified; the required copies of some petitions were not
furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor; docket fees had not
been fully paid; the parties were not actual residents
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court; and, in
some cases, there was no record of the cross-
examinations conducted by the pubic prosecutor or any
documentary evidence marked and formally offered.
All these, viewed in their totality, supported the
improvident and indiscriminate grant that the OCA
found.
If you were the counsel for Andy Malasuerte and other
litigants whose marriages had been improperly and
finally annulled, discuss your options in
administratively proceeding against Judge
Contaminada, and state where and how you would
exercise these options. (2013 Bar)
A: As a counsel for Andy Malasuerte, I have the option of
participating in the administrative proceedings by filing a
verified complaint in writing against Judge Contaminado,
with the Office of the Court Administrator, supported by
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the
facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations. The complaint shall state
clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting
violations of standards of conduct prescribed for judges by
law, the Rules of Court, the Code of Judicial Conduct (Rules
of Court, Rule 140, Sec. 1) and the new Code of Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary.
Q: Judge Horacio would usually go to the cockpits on
Saturdays for relaxation, as the owner of the cockpit is
a friend of his. He also goes to the casino once a week to
accompany his wife who loves to play the slot machines.
Because of this, Judge Horacio was administratively
charged. When asked to explain, he said that although
he goes to these places, he only watches and does not
place any bets.
Is his explanation tenable? Explain. (2005 Bar)
A: The explanation of Judge Horacio is not tenable. In the
case of City of Tagbilaran vs. Hontanosas, Jr., 375 SCRA 1
[2002], the Supreme Court penalized a city court judge for
going to gambling casinos and cockpits on weekends.
According to the Court, going to a casino violates Circular
No. 4, dated August 27, 1980, which enjoins judges of
inferior courts from playing or being present in gambling
casinos.
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The prohibition refers to both actual gambling and mere
presence in gambling casinos. A judge’s personal behavior,
not only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
With regard to going to cockpits, the Supreme Court held
that “verily, it is plainly despicable to see a judge inside a
cockpit and more so, to see him bet therein. Mixing with the
crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors is
unbecoming a judge and undoubtedly impairs the respect
due him. Ultimately, the Judiciary suffers therefrom because
a judge is a visible representation of the Judiciary" (City of
Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas, Jr., ibid at p. 8).
Q: Before he joined the bench, Judge J was a vice-mayor.
Judge J resumed writing a weekly column in a local
newspaper. In his column, Judge J wrote:
“It was wondering if the present vice-mayor can shed
off his crocodile hide so that he can feel the clamor of
the public for the resignation of hoodlum public officers
of which he is one".
When charged administratively, Judge J invoked
freedom of expression. Is his defense tenable? Explain.
(Bar)
A: The Judge’s reliance on freedom of expression is
untenable. The judge's vicious writings compromise his
duties as judge in the impartial administration of justice. His
writings lack judicial decorum which requires the use of
temperate language at all times. The judge should not
instigate litigation (Galang v. Santos, 307 SCRA 583 [1999],
Royeca v. Animas. 71 SCRA 1 [1976]).
Q: A judge, in order to ease his clogged docket, would
exert efforts to compel the accused in criminal cases to
plead guilty to a lesser offense and advise party
litigants in civil cases, whose positions appear weak, to
accept the compromise offered by the opposing party.
Is the practice legally acceptable? (1998 Bar)
A: The practice is legally acceptable as long as the judge
does not exert pressure on the parties and takes care that
he does not appear to have prejudged the case. Where a
judge has told a party that his case is weak before the latter
was fully heard, such was considered as a ground for his
disqualification (Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124).
Q: A Judge of the Regional Trial Court, notwithstanding
the fact that he was facing criminal charges at the time
he obtained his appointment, did not disclose the
pendency of the cases either to the President or to the
Supreme Court. He claims that: (a) he enjoys
presumption of innocence in the pending criminal
cases; (b) that the said cases even if sustained after trial
do not involve moral turpitude; and (3) before an
administrative complaint based on a criminal
prosecution can be given due course there must be a
conviction by final Judgment.
May the Judge be considered as an undeserving
appointee and therefore be removed from his office?
(1996 Bar)
A: He may be considered as undeserving and removed from
office. This problem falls squarely under the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Court Administrator v.
Estacion, 181 SCRA 33, wherein a complaint was filed
 QUAMTO (1987-2016)
concerning the appointment of a Regional Trial Court judge
notwithstanding the fact that he was then facing criminal
charges for homicide and attempted homicide. The Judge
also claimed that (a) he enjoys the presumption of
innocence, (b) the said cases, even if sustained, do not
involved moral turpitude, and (c) before an administrative
complaint based on a criminal prosecution is given due
course, there must be a conviction by final judgment. The
Supreme Court held:
“The argument that he had not yet been convicted and
should be presumed innocent is beside the point, and so is
the contention that the crimes of homicide and attempted
homicide do not involve moral turpitude. The important
consideration is that he had a duty to inform appointing
authority and this Court of the pending criminal charges
against him to enable them to determine on the basis of his
record, eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did not
discharge that duty. His record did not contain the
important information in question because he deliberately
withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as
obvious as his reason for suppression of such vital fact,
which he knew would have been taken into account against
him if it had been disclosed.
As stressed in the report, it behooves every prospective
appointee to the judiciary to apprise the appointing
authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial
office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his
integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically
required of appointees to the judiciary under Article VIII,
Sec. 7 (3) of the Constitution. The fact alone of his
concealment of the two criminal cases against him is clear
proof of his lack of the said qualifications and renders him
unworthy to sit as a Judge."
The respondent Judge was accordingly removed from
office.
PRACTICAL EXERCISES
SIMPLE CONTRACTS – LEASE, SALE OF REALTY
Q: Prepare a Contract of Lease of an apartment unit,
(1998, 1996, 1988, 1987)
A:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This contract of lease, entered into by and between:
A.B., Filipino, of legal age, single, with residence at
_______________ and hereafter called the LESSOR
- and-
B.D., Filipino, of legal age, single, with residence at
_________________and hereafter called the LESSEE.
WITNESSETH:
THAT, for and in consideration of the rentals to be
paid, the LESSOR has hereby leased to the LESSEE and the
LESSEE hereby accepts the same In lease, the * following
described property:
(description of apartment)
subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. Period of the Lease-
2. Rentals to be Paid –
3. (Other terms and conditions)
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed
these presents, at __________________, this
_________________day of _____________, 1998.
A.B.
C.D.
Lessor
Lessee
WITNESSES
(acknowledgment)
Q: Gerry Cruz is the owner of a 1,000-square meter lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12345
located in Sampaloc. Metro Manila. Gerry decided to
sell the property but did not have the time to look for a
buyer. He then designated his brother, Jon, to look for a
buyer and negotiate the sale. Jon met Angelo Santos
who expressed his interest to buy the lot. Angelo agreed
to pay PI Million for the property on September 26.
2005.
Draft the Deed of Sale of Real Property. (2005, 1991,
1989)
A:
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This instrument, executed by and between:
GERRY CRUZ, of legal age, single, and a resident of
_______________, herein represented by his Attorney-in- Fact,
JON CRUZ, of legal age and a resident of _____________ and
_____________ hereafter referred to as the VENDOR,
- and -
ANGELO SANTOS, Filipino, of legal age, single, a resident of
_____________ and hereafter referred to as the VENDEE,
WITNESSETH:
THAT, for and in consideration of the sum of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), in hand paid by the VENDEE
to the VENDOR and receipt of which is herein
acknowledged by the latter, the VENDOR has sold,
transferred and conveyed, and by these presents does
hereby sell, transfer and convey, unto the VENDEE, that
certain parcel of land with an area of 1,000 square meters,
more or less, located in Sampaloc, Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12345 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila, and which is more particularly described
as follows:
(technical description)
 Legal and Judicial Ethics
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM
signed these presents at Manila, this 26th day of September, SHOPPING
2005.
Q: Prepare a Verification and Certification against
GERRY CRUZ ANGELO SANTOS Forum Shopping. (2010, 2003)
Vendor Vendee
T.I.N. _________ T.I.N. _________ A:

By: VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST

JON CRUZ
Attorney-in-Fact
WITNESSES:
___________________ _________________
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
IN THE CITY OF MANILA, Philippines, personally
appeared before me, Mr. JON CRUZ, with Community Tax
Certificate No. ____________ issued at ____________ on
______________, 2005, in his capacity as Attorney-in-Fact of Mr.
GERRY CRUZ, with Community Tax Certificate No.
____________ issued at ____________ on ______________, 2005, both
of whom are personally known to me to be the same
persons who executed the foregoing instrument, and they
acknowledged to me that the same is their free and
voluntary act and deed, and the free and voluntary act and
deed of the principal whom Mr. JON CRUZ represents.
FORUM SHOPPING
X, after being duly sworn, hereby deposes
and states:
That he is the plaintiff in the above-
entitled case; that he has caused the foregoing
Complaint to be prepared; that he has read the
same and that the allegations of fact therein
contained are true of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic documents;
That (a) he has not heretofore commenced
any action of filed an claim involving the same
issued in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency, and to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; and (b) if
he should thereafter learn that the same of similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
this Honorable Court.

I further certify that the foregoing instrument is a

deed of sale of a parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila,
and consists of ____ pages, including this page, and is signed
on each and every page by the said parties and their
instrumental witnesses.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission expires on December 31, 2005
(Address)
Commission No._______, Manila
Attorney’s Roll No.
IBP Membership No.
PTR O.R. No. ________, Manila, 2005

Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2005.

PROMISSORY NOTE

Q: Prepare a negotiable promissory note. (1994, 1991 Bar)

A:

City of Manila, September 28, 1994

6,000.00

Thirty (30) days after date, I, Arturo M. Padilla, hereby

promise to pay to the order of Milagros Concepcion, the sum
of six thousand (6,000.00) Pesos (Philippine Currency).

(Sgd.) Arturo M. Padilla

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