[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.

MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

 Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Tra􏰀c Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of
Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of
Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
 It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from
1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m.
to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to tra􏰀c; that the Chairman of the National
Tra􏰀c Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and tra􏰀c on national roads;
 that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Tra􏰀c Commission as
aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to tra􏰀c to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that
Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to tra􏰀c of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to tra􏰀c;
 that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations
thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the places above- mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of
the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control
the use of and tra􏰀c on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain
provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the
national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of tra􏰀c by the Director of Public Works and his duly
authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the tra􏰀c thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest, or for a speci􏰀ed period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."

ISSUE/S:

1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and tra􏰀c on national
roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
2. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

HELD:

1. NO. The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules
and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down
by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to
any or all classes of tra􏰀c "whenever the condition of the road or the tra􏰀c thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and
regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to tra􏰀c, in view of the
condition of the road or the tra􏰀c thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government o􏰀cial to whom is
con􏰀ded the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law.

Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by
virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of tra􏰀c, which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S.vs. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil.,
218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made
to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn
from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the
very means of insuring its preservation.

2. NO. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justi􏰀able, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi
est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

POLICE POWER; NATURE AND SCOPE. — Police power is far-reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to limit its sweep. It derives
its existence from the very existence of the State itself, and does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. It is said to be co-
extensive with self - protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of
public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.

The conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly
related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence, or the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty
or property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the
equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction or classification has been made,
there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]

LAWFUL MEANS AS A TEST OF VALIDITY OF EXERCISE. A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, where a law
regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the
Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number
had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of
the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the
registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and
declared in part as follows:

"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .

"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by `the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class' and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for
human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a `reasonably necessary' limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted
either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the
community may be measurably and dangerously affected."

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a
direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is
also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-
cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and
eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or
breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The
object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing.

We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef,
the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow
that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the
measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon [G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988]

CONCEPT OF POLICE POWER. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary
power of the State "to govern its citizens."

"The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming
necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society."

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or
a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even
liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding
demands and requirements of the greater number.

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the
public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]

CONCEPT OF POLICE POWER. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt
ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently
wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as
malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in
the state, plenary, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing
upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check
is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end.
Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which
prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and
thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 million to 80 million pesos a day.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego[G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989]

TESTS OF VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat
that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-
flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling
in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to
harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be
applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a
plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force
his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course
in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the
right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may
still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been
tested and found wanting.
[G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005.]

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.

FACTS

At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), which authorizes it to con􏰀scate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.

The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a tra􏰀c violation receipt (TVR) and
his driver's license con􏰀scated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements
were printed on the TVR:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CENTER PORT AREA MANILA AFTER
48 HOURS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION FOR DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION THEREON. CRIMINAL CASE
SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE AFTER 30 DAYS.

VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVER'S LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION. 1

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter 2 to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting
the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint 3 with application for preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, on 12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec.
5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further
contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to 􏰀x and impose unspeci􏰀ed — and therefore unlimited — 􏰀nes and other penalties on erring motorists. SaHTCE

In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable
damage because of the deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the
confiscation of his license have no legal basis.

For its part, the MMDA, represented by the O􏰀ce of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act
No. 7924 are limited to the 􏰀xing, collection and imposition of 􏰀nes and penalties for tra􏰀c violations, which powers are legislative and
executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not preclude "admixture" of the three powers of government in administrative agencies.

The MMDA also refuted Garin's allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has
as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the court's attention to MMDA Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-
95-001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.

Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26 September 1995, extending the validity of the TVR as a
temporary driver's license for twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted on 23 October 1995, and the MMDA was
directed to return the respondent's driver's license.

ISSUE/S

1. WON a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.
2. WON MMDA is vested with police power.

RULING

1. YES. The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the
state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare,
subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal 8 on the license
to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry 9 and Oposa v. Factoran 10 on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc.
v. Municipality of Surigao 11 on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant.

2. NO. We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local government is a "political subdivision
of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government units are the provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:

. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the e􏰀􏰀cient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All
its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . .

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government
units concerning purely local matters." IcHSCT

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions.There is no grant of authority to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. 17 (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to
con􏰀scate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of
police power.

A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would
entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and tra􏰀c management, 23 and we are
aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions
are limited by the MMDA's enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be
authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source. A
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983]

We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the
lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:

"The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

"An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 5371), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in
question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax,
fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City.' (Sub- sections
'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).

"The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765,
May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance,
'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and
maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from
operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in question be justified under sub-section 't', Section 12 of Republic Act 537
which authorizes the City Council to —

"'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for their burial in such proper place and in such
manner as the council may determine, subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing
funerals and disposal of the dead.'(Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).

There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically termed by the respondents, 'donation.'

We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. The police power of
Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:

"(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote, the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions
of subsection (jj) of this section.'

"We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which
states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. III, Section 1 subparagraph 1,
Constitution).

"On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely (1) police
power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

"Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tañada and Carreon, V-II, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to
promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.
(12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of
the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 Phil. 104). The Supreme Court has said that police
power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence
of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is
the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially it is so under the modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope
of police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all embracing
and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public
interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).

"The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest limitation on
governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.

"It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of
liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a
few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order
and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

"It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation."
Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989]

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN MAY BE USED AS AN IMPLEMENT OF POLICE POWER. There are traditional distinctions between the
police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject.
In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the
NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the
property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials,
which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general
rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The
regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed
on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining
rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained
without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police
power. He said:

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction
imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is
merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not
appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social
conditions — the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.

Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the
latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose
has long been accepted. As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the
earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following
significant remarks:

Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the police and eminent domain powers on different planets.
Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that
would be available for "public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive
task of preventing harmful externalities, a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster
its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public
purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's
involvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs
eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power — a trend expressly approved in the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match
that of the police power's standard of "public purpose."

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners
of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.