CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 1
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, Second
Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA,
respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the
People of the Philippines seek to set aside the
orders of the respondent Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No.
266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8 November
1976, respectively, quashing an information for
theft filed against private respondent Manuel
Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and
denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas
City Police together with personnel of the
Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a
search warrant issued by a city judge of
Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant
and Cold Storage owned and operated by the
private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The
police discovered that electric wiring, devices
and contraptions had been installed, without the
necessary authority from the city government,
and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of
the building" 1 owned by the private respondent.
These electric devices and contraptions were, in
the allegation of the petitioner "designed
purposely to lower or decrease the readings of
electric current consumption in the electric meter
of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant."
2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel
Opulencia admitted in a written statement that
he had caused the installation of the electrical
devices "in order to lower or decrease the
readings of his electric meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal
of Batangas City filed before the City Court of
Batangas City an information against Manuel
Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1,
Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this
ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a
fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty
Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not
exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion
of the court." 4 This information reads as follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses
Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b)
in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II,
Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage
to the City Government of Batangas, and
penalized by the said ordinance, committed as
follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at
Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to defraud the City
Government of Batangas, without proper
authorization from any lawful and/or permit from
the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized
installations of electric wirings and devices to
lower or decrease the consumption of electric
fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at
Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of
such unathorized installations of electric wirings
and devices made by the accused, the City
Government of Batangas was damaged and
prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND
SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine
currency, covering the period from November
1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and
prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in
the aforestated amount of P41,062.16,
Philippine currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not
guilty to the above information. On 2 February
1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information
upon the grounds that the crime there charged
had already prescribed and that the civil
indemnity there sought to be recovered was
beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City
Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976,
the Batangas City Court granted the motion to
dismiss on the ground of prescription, it
appearing that the offense charged was a light
felony which prescribes two months from the
time of discovery thereof, and it appearing
further that the information was filed by the fiscal
more than nine months after discovery of the
offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the
Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch
11, another information against Manuel
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 2
Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power
under Article 308 in relation to Article 309,
paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This
information read as follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses
Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft,
defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation
to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the month of
November, 1974, and the 21st day of February,
1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent of gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the Batangas Electric Light
System, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and appropriate
electric current valued in the total amount of
FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS
AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16)
Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light
System, owned and operated by the City
Government of Batangas, in the aforementioned
sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could
be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a
Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging
that he had been previously acquitted of the
offense charged in the second information and
that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. By
Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent
Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash
and ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this
Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal
of the first case can be properly pleaded by the
accused in the motion to quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it
alleges that the prosecution "accuses Manuel
Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in
relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title
IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to
the City Government of Batangas, etc. "
(Emphasis supplied). The first case, as it
appears, was not simply one of illegal electrical
connections. It also covered an amount of
P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect,
allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived the city
government of Batangas. If the charge had
meant illegal electric installations only, it could
have alleged illegal connections which were
done at one instance on a particular date
between November, 1974, to February 21, 1975.
But as the information states "that from
November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to defraud the City Government of
Batangas, without proper authorization from any
lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make unauthorized installations of
electric wirings and devices, etc." (Emphasis
supplied), it was meant to include the P
41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect,
defrauded the city government. The information
could not have meant that from November 1974
to 21 February 1975, he had daily committed
unlawful installations.
When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced
the indictment before the City Court, he had
already been exposed, or he felt he was
exposed to consequences of what allegedly
happened between November 1974 to February
21, 1975 which had allegedly resulted in
defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of
P 41,062.16. (Emphases and parentheses in the
original)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-
quoted Order filed by the petitioner was denied
by the respondent Judge in an Order dated 18
November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for
certiorari and mandamus was filed in this Court
by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on
behalf of the People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is
that the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is protection against a second or later
jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The
petitioner stresses that the first information filed
before the City Court of Batangas City was one
for unlawful or unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in
violation of an ordinance of the City Government
of Batangas. Only two elements are needed to
constitute an offense under this City Ordinance:
(1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no
authority therefor had been obtained from the
Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 3
System or the District Engineer. The petitioner
urges that the relevant terms of the City
Ordinance — which read as follows:
Section 3.-Connection and Installation
(a) xxx
(b) The work and installation in the houses
and building and their connection with the
Electrical System shall be done either by the
employee of the system duly authorized by its
Superintendent or by persons adept in the
matter duly authorized by the District Engineer.
Applicants for electrical service permitting the
works of installation or connection with the
system to be undertaken by the persons not duly
authorized therefor shall be considered guilty of
violation of the ordinance.
would show that:
The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision
is to ensure that electrical installations on
residences or buildings be done by persons duly
authorized or adept in the matter, to avoid fires
and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It
is primarily a regulatory measure and not
intended to punish or curb theft of electric fluid
which is already covered by the Revised Penal
Code. 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance,
the petitioner's argument continues, is the
installing of electric wiring and devices without
authority from the proper officials of the city
government. To constitute an offense under the
city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any
mens rea on the part of the offender generally
speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to
appropriate and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of
theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite
different essential elements. These elements
are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken)
belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of
gain;
4. That the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without
violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. 6
The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view,
that theft of electricity can be effected even
without illegal or unauthorized installations of
any kind by, for instance, any of the following
means:
1. Turning back the dials of the electric
meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a
manner that it will not register the actual
electrical consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption;
and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary
blade to slow down the rotation of the same. 7
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the
ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as
theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal
Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt
to commit the first or a frustration thereof and
that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first
inforrnation 8
The above arguments made by the petitioner are
of course correct. This is clear both from the
express terms of the constitutional provision
involved — which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis
supplied; Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) 9
and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic
difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it
must be examined, not under the terms of the
first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The first sentence
of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 4
is not available where the second prosecution is
for an offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although
both the first and second offenses may be based
upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the
constitutional protection, against double
jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from
the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the Revised Penal
Code, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts. This was made clear
sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in
Criminal Case No. 16054 of the Municipal Court
of Iloilo City, with violation of Article 14 of
Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to
Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1954, of the City of
Iloilo. The information charged him with having
"wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive[n] and
operate[d]" an automobile — "recklessly and
without reasonable caution thereby endangering
other vehicles and pedestrians passing in said
street." Three months later, Yap was again
charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same
Municipal Court, this time with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. The
information charged him with violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as
amended by Republic Act No. 587) committed
by driving and operating an automobile in a
reckless and negligent manner and as a result
thereof inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate
pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the second
information upon the ground that it placed him
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
This motion was denied by the respondent
municipal judge. Meantime, another municipal
judge had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No.
16054. Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside
the order of the respondent municipal judge. The
Court of First Instance of Iloilo having reversed
the respondent municipal judge and having
directed him to desist from continuing with
Criminal Case No. 16443, the respondent Judge
brought the case to the Supreme Court for
review on appeal. In affirming the decision
appealed from and holding that the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy was
available to petitioner Yap, then Associate
Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion wrote:
To begin with, the crime of damage to property
through reckless driving — with which Diaz
stood charged in the court of first instance — is
a violation of the Revised Penal Code (third
paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile
Law (Act No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act
No. 587). Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of
a violation of the same law. Secondly, reckless
driving and certain crimes committed through
reckless driving are punishable under different
provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence —
from the view point of Criminal Law, as
distinguished from political or Constitutional Law
— they constitute, strictly, different offenses,
although under certain conditions, one offense
may include the other, and, accordingly, once
placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double
jeopardy may be in order as regards the other,
as in the Diaz case. (Emphases in the original)
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds
of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause
20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
ordains that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
(Emphasis in the original) The second sentence
of said clause provides that "if an act is
punishable by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits
double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, whereas the second contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
Under the first sentence, one may be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment of the same act
provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or the offense charged in one case is
not included in or does not include, the crime
charged in the other case. The second sentence
applies, even if the offenses charged are not the
same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of a statute. If the two charges are
based on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance
shall bar a prosecution under the other. 12
Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
indispensable to sustain the plea of double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So
long as jeopardy has attached under one of the
informations charging said offense, the defense
may be availed of in the other case involving the
same offense, even if there has been neither
conviction nor acquittal in either case.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 5
The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore,
on whether or not, under the information in case
No. 16443, petitioner could — if he failed to
plead double jeopardy — be convicted of the
same act charged in case No. 16054, in which
he has already been acquitted. The information
in case No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on
the date and in the place therein stated,
petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously driven and operated "recklessly and
without reasonable caution" an automobile
described in said information. Upon the other
hand, the information in case No. 16443,
similarly states that, on the same date and in the
same place, petitioner drove and operated the
aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and
negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed
and in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law (Act No. 3992), as amended by Republic
Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances." Thus,
if the theories mentioned in the second
information were not established by the
evidence, petitioner could be convicted in case
No. 16443 of the very same violation of
municipal ordinance charged in case No. 16054,
unless he pleaded double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not
erred eventually sustaining the theory of
petitioner herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses
charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the
identity of offenses charge: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available
only where an Identity is shown to exist between
the earlier and the subsequent offenses
charged. In contrast, where one offense is
charged under a municipal ordinance while the
other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry
is to the identity of the acts which the accused is
said to have committed and which are alleged to
have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is available so long as the acts which constitute
or have given rise to the first offense under a
municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense
charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should
exist where two offenses under two different
sections of the same statute or under different
statutes are charged, and another rule for the
situation where one offense is charged under a
municipal ordinance and another offense under
a national statute. If the second sentence of the
double jeopardy provision had not been written
into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal
under a municipal ordinance would never
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act under a national statute. An offense
penalized by municipal ordinance is, by
definition, different from an offense under a
statute. The two offenses would never constitute
the same offense having been promulgated by
different rule-making authorities — though one
be subordinate to the other — and the plea of
double jeopardy would never lie. The
discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional
Convention show that the second sentence was
inserted precisely for the purpose of extending
the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy to a situation which would not
otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of
offenses is addressed by examining the
essential elements of each of the two offenses
charged, as such elements are set out in the
respective legislative definitions of the offenses
involved. The question of Identity of the acts
which are claimed to have generated liability
both under a municipal ordinance and a national
statute must be addressed, in the first instance,
by examining the location of such acts in time
and space. When the acts of the accused as set
out in the two informations are so related to each
other in time and space as to be reasonably
regarded as having taken place on the same
occasion and where those acts have been
moved by one and the same, or a continuing,
intent or voluntary design or negligence, such
acts may be appropriately characterized as an
integral whole capable of giving rise to penal
liability simultaneously under different legal
enactments (a municipal ordinance and a
national statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of
reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance
and serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law as derived from the same act or sets of acts
— that is, the operation of an automobile in a
reckless manner. The additional technical
element of serious physical injuries related to the
physical consequences of the operation of the
automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the
automobile upon the body of the offended party.
Clearly, such consequence occurred in the
same occasion that the accused operated the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 6
automobile (recklessly). The moral element of
negligence permeated the acts of the accused
throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place
within the same time frame: from November
1974 to February 1975. During this period, the
accused Manuel Opulencia installed or
permitted the installation of electrical wiring and
devices in his ice plant without obtaining the
necessary permit or authorization from the
municipal authorities. The accused conceded
that he effected or permitted such unauthorized
installation for the very purpose of reducing
electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus
present from the very moment that such
unauthorized installation began. The immediate
physical effect of the unauthorized installation
was the inward flow of electric current into
Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding
recording thereof in his electric meter. In other
words, the "taking" of electric current was
integral with the unauthorized installation of
electric wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule
limiting the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense is not to be understood with
absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that
must be shown need not be absolute Identity:
the first and second offenses may be regarded
as the "same offense" where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or
where the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus,
for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to
be available, not all the technical elements
constituting the first offense need be present in
the technical definition of the second offense.
The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of
an accused person by multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one
another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief
Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in People vs.
del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits
prosecution for the same offense, it seems
elementary that an accused should be shielded
against being prosecuted for several offenses
made out from a single act. Otherwise, an
unlawful act or omission may give use to several
prosecutions depending upon the ability of the
prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as
many offenses as can be justified by said act or
omission, by simply adding or subtracting
essential elements. Under the theory of
appellant, the crime of rape may be converted
into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that
by force and intimidation the accused prevented
the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88
Phil. at 53; emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which
physically occur on the same occasion and are
infused by a common intent or design or
negligence and therefore form a moral unity,
should not be segmented and sliced, as it were,
to produce as many different acts as there are
offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes
that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the
Batangas City Court of the information for
violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon
the ground that such offense had already
prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the
accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime"
is one of the grounds for "total extinction of
criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an
order sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense. 15
It is not without reluctance that we deny the
people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in
this case. It is difficult to summon any empathy
for a businessman who would make or enlarge
his profit by stealing from the community.
Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal
punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by
inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an
information for an offense which he should have
known had already prescribed. We are,
however, compelled by the fundamental law to
hold the protection of the right against double
jeopardy available even to the private
respondent in this case.
The civil liability aspects of this case are another
matter. Because no reservation of the right to file
a separate civil action was made by the
Batangas City electric light system, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action both before the City Court of
Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability
whether by prescription or by the bar of double
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 7

jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of

civil liability arising from the offense charged. In
the present case, as we noted earlier, 16
accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted
during the police investigation having stolen
electric current through the installation and use
of unauthorized elibctrical connections or
devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty
before the City Court of Batangas City, he did
not deny having appropriated electric power.
However, there is no evidence in the record as
to the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal
informations having been dismissed both by the
City Court and by the Court of First Instance
(from which dismissals the Batangas City
electric light system could not have appealed 17)
before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related
civil action which has not been waived expressly
or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of
First Instance of Batangas City for reception of
evidence on the amount or value of the electric
power appropriated and converted by Manuel
Opulencia and rendition of judgment
conformably with such evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and

mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for
related civil liability be remanded to the Court of
First Instance of Batangas City for further
proceedings as indicated above. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 8
[G.R. Nos. 137953-58. April 11, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant, vs.
WILFREDO DELA TORRE, appellee.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a
criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or
to increase the penalty imposed in a conviction.
The Case
The prosecution appeals the March 31, 1998
Decision[1] and June 3, 1998 Order[2] issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales
(Branch 69)[3] in Criminal Cases Nos. 2179-I,
2180-I, 2181-I, 2182-I, 2183-I and 2184-I. The
assailed Decision convicted Wilfredo Dela Torre
of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four
counts of rape, while the challenged Order
denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
plaintiff (now appellant).
The dispositive portion of the Decision is
reproduced hereunder:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused
Wilfredo dela Torre is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2179-I of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years of
prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary
Rose dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as
and by way of civil damages.
2) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2180-I of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years of
prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary
Rose dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as
and by way of civil damages.
3) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2181-I of the crime of
Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount
of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
4) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2182-I of the crime of
Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount
of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
5) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2183-I of the crime of
Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount
of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
6) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2184-I of the crime of
Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount
of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.[4]
The two Amended Informations for acts of
lasciviousness, dated July 1, 1997, were
similarly worded as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of September,
1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being the father of one Mary
Rose de la Torre, actuated by lust and by means
of coercion, threats, intimidation and other
consideration, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness on the person of Mary Rose de la
Torre, a minor of 11 years old, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Mary Rose de la
Torre.[5]
The other Information[6] charged appellee with
the same crime against the same victim on a
different date, October 10, 1996.
On the other hand, the four Informations
charging him with rape, dated July 1, 1997,
similarly read as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of October, 1996
at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Province of Zambales, Philippine[s], and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de
la Torre, with lewd design by means of coercion,
threats, intimidation and other consideration, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge with one
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 9
Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old,
without her consent and against her will, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.[7]
The three other Amended Informations recited
the same allegations on different dates:
November 1,[8] November 12[9] and December
23,[10] 1996. When arraigned on August 13,
1997, appellee pleaded[11] not guilty[12] to all
six (6) Informations. After trial in due course, the
RTC rendered the challenged Decision.
Appellee did not appeal, but the prosecution filed
a Notice of Appeal[13] dated June 9, 1998.
The Facts
Appellants Version
In its Brief,[14] the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the
facts as follows:
Appellee Wilfredo dela Torre had a common-law
relationship with Melinda dela Torre. The latter
gave birth to three children, Mary Rose, Mark
Anthony, and Mark Domil. When Mary Rose was
about seven (7) years old, her mother left the
conjugal abode with Mark Domil, leaving her and
sibling Mark Anthony in the care of appellee,
who resided with his progeny in a one-room hut
in Sitio Pao, Guis-guis, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
Mary Rose and her brother Mark Anthony
studied at the Guinabon Elementary School.
She was the brightest in her class, even though
because of their poverty, she had to walk from
their hut to the school everyday.
In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, noticed a
sudden change in the behavior and performance
of Mary Rose, who was twelve-year[s] old at
th[at] time. The latter appeared sleepy, hungry
and snobbish. She also urinated on her panty.
When confronted by Generosa Mayo, the head
teacher, Mary Rose admitted to her that she was
abused repeatedly by appellee. Mayo informed
Elpidia Balindo, the aunt of Mary Rose, about the
abuses. They then decided to refer the matter to
the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), who took Mary Rose
under its custody.
It turned out that on September 30, 1996, Mary
Rose was about to sleep when appellee told her,
anak puwede ba nating subukan? She did not
understand what that meant and continued to
sleep. Appellee then placed himself on top of
Mary Rose. After removing her shorts as well as
his shorts, he poked his penis into her organ. He
also kissed and embraced Mary Rose, who just
wept. The same incident was repeated in the
evening of October 10, 1996.
In the evening of October 18, 1996, appellee
was able to insert his penis into the vagina of
Mary Rose. After the act, her whole body ached.
She started to fear appellee. He also had sexual
intercourse with his minor daughter on three
more occasions, that is, on November 1 and 12
and December 23, 1996.
A medical examination conducted by Dr.
Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her
vagina admitted one finger with ease. She was
no longer a virgin. Her hymen was broken with
healed lacerations at the 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00
nine oclock positions. The girl also suffered from
urinary tract infection.[15] (Citations omitted)
Appellees Version
On the other hand, appellees statement of
facts,[16] as contained in his Brief,[17] is
reproduced as follows:
Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three
(3) children with Melinda Torre, namely: Mary
Rose, Mark Anthony and Mark Ronnil. Melinda
left her family when Mary Rose was about seven
(7) years old bringing with her Mark Ronnil. The
victim lived with her father and brother Mark
Anthony in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
Felina Sobrevilla, teacher of Mary Rose, noticed
sudden changes in her behavior and when
confronted, the latter admitted that she was
sexually abused by her father. Her head teacher
informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the
sexual abuses. They referred the case to the
DSWD who took her under its custody.
Mary Rose testified that her father committed
sexual abuses on her on the following dates:
September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October
18, 1996, November 01, 1996, November 12,
1996 and December 23, 1996.
Appellee, on the other hand denies vehemently
the charges being imputed on him by her
daughter and said that the only reason he can
think of why the daughter filed the charges is
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 10
because he did not allow her to stay with her
teacher, Mrs. Sobrevilla.[18] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC ruled that it was duly established that
accused Wilfredo committed acts of
lasciviousness against Mary Rose on 30
September 1996 and 10 October 1996, and had
carnal knowledge [of] Mary Rose on 18 October
1996, 01 November 1996, 12 November 1996
and 23 December 1996.[19] Further, the trial
court added that the moral ascendancy of
appellee over the victim was equivalent to
intimidation. It did not give any probative value
to his uncorroborated and unsubstantiated
defenses of denial and alibi.
However, the court a quo refused to impose the
supreme penalty of death on appellee. It
maintained that there were circumstances that
mitigated the gravity of the offenses, as follows:
1. As testified to (supra) there was absence of
any actual, physical violence or intimidation in
the commission of the acts complained of.
xxxxxxxxx
2. The abandonement by Melinda (common-law
wife of accused Wilfredo and mother of Mary
Rose) when Mary Rose was seven (7) years old
leaving behind Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her
brother, Mark Anthony.
3. The extreme poverty on the life of Wilfredo,
Mary Rose and Mark Anthony.
4. After the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal
home, for more than five (5) years, Wilfredo,
Mary Rose and Mark Anthony were living
together as a family and Mary Rose was never
molested by her father.
5. There is reason to deprive Wilfredo of the love
of her daughter Mary Rose but there is no
reason to deprive Mark Anthony of the love of his
father considering that both Mary Rose and
Mark Anthony have no one to call as a
mother.[20]
Hence, this appeal.[21]
The Issue
In this appeal, the solicitor general assigns this
single error for our consideration:
The Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee
with reclusion perpetua in each of the four
indictments for rape, instead of imposing the
supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A.
No. 7659.[22]
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Lone Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Prosecution
The prosecution asks this Court to modify the
RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty
of death on the accused. It argues that it has
proven that the victim is the daughter of the
accused, and that she was below eighteen (18)
years old when the rapes took place. As a
consequence, the trial court should have
imposed the penalty of death pursuant to
Section 11 of RA 7659.[23]
Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from
a judgment or final order, unless the accused will
be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is
substantially the same as that provided by the
1985 Rules.
The question now is whether an increase in the
penalty imposed by the lower court will violate
the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
In several cases, this Court has already
definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in
People v. Leones,[24] it unmistakably declared
that [w]hile it is true that this Court is the Court of
last resort, there are allegations of error
committed by a lower court which we ought not
to look into to uphold the right of the accused.
Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution
seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon
the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the
accused against double jeopardy.[25] It added:
This Court has not just once ruled that where the
accused after conviction by the trial court did not
appeal his conviction, an appeal by the
government seeking to increase the penalty
imposed by the trial court places the accused in
double jeopardy and should therefore be
dismissed.[26]
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 11

This doctrine was applied as early as 1904 in

Kepner v. United States[27] (hereinafter
Kepner), as follows:
The Court of First Instance, having jurisdiction to
try the question of the guilt or innocence of the
accused, found Kepner not guilty; to try him
again upon the merits, even in an appellate
court, is to put him a second time in jeopardy for
the same offense.[28]
The Kepner doctrine was clarified in a 1987
case.[29] Speaking through Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, the Court explained that an appeal of the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for
the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed
upon the convict) would place him in double
jeopardy.[30]
Double jeopardy provides three related
protections: (1) against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal, (2) against a
second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction, and (3) against multiple punishments
for the same offense.[31]
Although Kepner technically involved only a
single proceeding, the Court regarded the
practice as equivalent to two separate trials, and
the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was
plainly that of multiple prosecution.[32]
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in
jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from
using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials.[33] It
also serves the additional purpose of precluding
the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope
of securing a conviction.[34] And finally, it
prevents the State, following conviction, from
retrying the defendant again in the hope of
securing a greater penalty.[35]
Whatever error may have been committed by
the lower court was merely an error of judgment
and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the
intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind
of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal
by the prosecution no matter how obvious the
error may be.[37]
The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase
the penalty is through a proper petition for
certiorari to show grave abuse of discretion. This
was explained in People v. CA and
Maquiling[38] as follows:
While certiorari may be used to correct an
abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
On the other hand, if the petition, regardless of
its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary
review of the findings of the court a quo, the
constitutional right against double jeopardy
would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount
to converting the petition for certiorari into an
appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence on double jeopardy.[39]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Being violative of the right against double

jeopardy, the instant appeal filed by the
prosecution cannot prosper. The rule is clear --
the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground
that the accused should have been given a more
severe penalty.[36]

Besides, even assuming that the penalties

imposed by the RTC were erroneous, these
cannot be corrected by this Court on an appeal
by the prosecution. Said the Court:
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 12
EX POST FACTO LAW BILL OF
ATTAINDER
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S
RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A.
No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.
MAKASIAR, J.:.
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by
Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly
recognized and existing non-stock and non-
profit corporation created under the laws of the
land, and praying for a determination of the
validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a
declaration of petitioner's rights and duties
thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition,
petitioner avers that it has printed materials
designed to propagate its ideology and program
of government, which materials include Annex
B; and that in paragraph 11 of said petition,
petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by
supporting delegates to the Constitutional
Convention who will propagate its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually
impugns because it quoted, only the first
paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it
violates the due process clause, right of
association, and freedom of expression and that
it is an ex post facto law.
The first three grounds were overruled by this
Court when it held that the questioned provision
is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom
of expression, freedom of association, freedom
of assembly and equal protection clauses; for
the same is designed to prevent the clear and
present danger of the twin substantive evils,
namely, the prostitution of electoral process and
denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test,
the cleansing of the electoral process, the
guarantee of equal change for all candidates,
and the independence of the delegates who
must be "beholden to no one but to God, country
and conscience," are interests that should be
accorded primacy.1
The petitioner should therefore be accordingly
guided by the pronouncements in the cases of
Imbong and Gonzales. 2
The claim of petitioner that the challenged
provision constitutes an ex post facto law is
likewise untenable.
An ex post facto law is one which:.
(1) makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.3
From the aforesaid definition as well as
classification of ex post facto laws, the
constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal
laws which are given retroactive effect.4
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation
of any provision of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec.
8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts
committed after the approval of the law and not
those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing
in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs.
8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall
apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On
the contrary, See. 23 directs that the entire law
shall be effective upon its approval. It was
approved on August 24, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is
hereby denied and paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 13
R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without
costs.
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27,
1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO
alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy
Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano
Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the
constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion
Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines and other "subversive associations,"
and punishes any person who "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member" of the Party or
of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for
violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act
was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March
10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a
preliminary investigation and, finding a prima
facie case against Co, directed the Government
prosecutors to file the corresponding
information. The twice-amended information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5,
1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
feloniously became an officer and/or ranking
leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization
aimed to overthrow the Government of the
Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion, or any other illegal means for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and placing the government
under the control and domination of an alien
power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse
Tung University, the training school of recruits of
the New People's Army, the military arm of the
said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the
following aggravating circumstances are
present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in
contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band;
and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-
Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal
complaint was filed with the same court, sharing
the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion. After preliminary investigation was
had, an information was filed, which, as
amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and
State Prosecutors duly designated by the
Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the
Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order
dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby
accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias
TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY)
CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL
ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias
COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN
DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for
violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise
known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed
as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime
prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of
Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the
above-named accused knowingly, willfully and
by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained
as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive
organization as defined in Republic Act No.
1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER
MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully
and by over acts joined and/or remained as a
member and became an officer and/or ranking
leader not only of the Communist Party of the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 14
Philippines but also of the New People's Army,
the military arm of the Communist Party of the
Philippines; and that all the above-named
accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders
of the aforestated subversive organizations,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there knowingly,
willfully and feloniously commit subversive
and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and
stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and
tumultuously and take up arms against the
government, and/or engage in rebellious
conspiracies and riots to overthrow the
government of the Republic of the Philippines by
force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province
of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings
and/or seminars wherein the said accused
delivered speeches instigating and inciting the
people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or
other illegal means; and toward this end, the said
accused organized, among others a chapter of
the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio
Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose
of undertaking or promoting an armed
revolution, subversive and/or seditious
propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or
other illegal means to discredit and overthrow
the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and to established in the Philippines
a Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY
REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO
PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others,
pursued the above subversive and/or seditious
activities in San Pablo City by recruiting
members for the New People's Army, and/or by
instigating and inciting the people to organize
and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
through armed revolution, deceit, subversion
and/or other illegal means, and establishing in
the Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid
of armed men or persons to insure or afford
impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was
employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash,
impugning the validity of the statute on the
grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is
vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject
not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it
denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the
trial court, in its resolution of September 15,
1970, declared the statute void on the grounds
that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overboard, and dismissed the informations
against the two accused. The Government
appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a
special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution
states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto
law shall be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without
trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.4
The constitutional ban against bills of attainder
serves to implement the principle of separation
of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative
usurpation of the judicial function.7 History in
perspective, bills of attainder were employed to
suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling
out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden
on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to
stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was
condemned by the court a quo as a bill of
attainder because it "tars and feathers" the
Communist Party of the Philippines as a
"continuing menace to the freedom and security
of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and
grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'"
By means of the Act, the trial court said,
Congress usurped "the powers of the judge,"
and assumed "judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of
the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally,
according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to
be determined] is whether or not the accused is
a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still
a bill of attainder because it has expressly
created a presumption of organizational guilt
which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual
operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 15
the Communist Party of the Philippines or the
members thereof for the purpose of punishment.
What it does is simply to declare the Party to be
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition,
stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term "Communist
Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not
only to the Communist Party of the Philippines
but also to "any other organization having the
same purpose and their successors." Its focus is
not on individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from
section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held
to be a bill of attainder and therefore
unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its
pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member
of the Communist
Party ... shall serve —
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of
any executive board or similar governing body,
business agent, manager, organizer, or other
employee (other than as an employee
performing exclusively clerical or custodial
duties) of any labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of
his membership in the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this
section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and
imposes disability and penalties on its members.
Membership in the Party, without more, ipso
facto disqualifies a person from becoming an
officer or a member of the governing body of any
labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the
United States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of
the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of
attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses
power under the Commerce Clause to enact
legislation designed to keep from positions
affecting interstate commerce persons who may
use of such positions to bring about political
strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has
exceeded the authority granted it by the
Constitution. The statute does not set forth a
generally applicable rule decreeing that any
person who commits certain acts or possesses
certain characteristics (acts and characteristics
which, in Congress' view, make them likely to
initiate political strikes) shall not hold union
office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of
deciding what persons have committed the
specified acts or possessed the specified
characteristics. Instead, it designates in no
uncertain terms the persons who possess the
feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold
union office without incurring criminal liability —
members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S
CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That
case involved an appeal from an order by the
Control Board ordering the Communist Party to
register as a "Communist-action organization,"
under the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq.
(1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action
organization" which the Board is to apply is set
forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which
(i)is substantially directed, dominated, or
controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist
movement referred to in section 2 of this title,
and(ii) operates primarily to advance the
objectives of such world Communist
movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782
(1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument
that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that
sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups
upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act
are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a
general definition. Although the Board has
determined in 1953 that the Communist Party
was a "Communist-action organization," the
Court found the statutory definition not to be so
narrow as to insure that the Party would always
come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the
Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion,
that the Communist Party, by virtud of the
activities in which it now engages, comes within
the terms of the Act. If the Party should at
anytime choose to abandon these activities,
after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 16
Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US,
at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of
attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to
charge Communists in court, as the law alone,
without more, would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their
guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the
accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and
by overt acts, and that they joined the Party,
knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e.,
to overthrow the existing Government by force
deceit, and other illegal means and place the
country under the control and domination of a
foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute
organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed
despite the requirement of proof of knowing
membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is
precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has
been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby
all who participate in the criminal covenant are
liable. The contention would be correct if the
statute were construed as punishing mere
membership devoid of any specific intent to
further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the
statute specifically required that membership
must be knowing or active, with specific intent to
further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is
what section 4 means when it requires that
membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to
have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to
pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be
shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an
element of "membership" distinct from the
ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former
requires proof of direct participation in the
organization's unlawful activities, while the latter
requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act
specifies individuals and not activities, this
feature is not enough to render it a bill of
attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or
employees of securities underwriting firms from
serving as officers or employees of national
banks on the basis of a legislative finding that
the persons mentioned would be subject to the
temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to
the national economy, has been declared not to
be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute
requiring every secret, oath-bound society
having a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who
becomes a member of such society which fails
to register or remains a member thereof, was
declared valid even if in its operation it was
shown to apply only to the members of the Ku
Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of
the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor
unions to file with the Department of Labor
affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they
are not members of the Communist Party and
that they are not members of any organization
which teaches the overthrow of the Government
by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
method," was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial does
it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this
ground that statutes which disqualified those
who had taken part in the rebellion against the
Government of the United States during the Civil
War from holding office, 21 or from exercising
their profession, 22 or which prohibited the
payment of further compensation to individuals
named in the Act on the basis of a finding that
they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or
which made it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer or
employee of a labor union, 24 have been
invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation
is so universally acknowledged to be certain as
to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may
apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not
needed fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26
the New York legislature passed a law requiring
every secret, oath-bound society with a
membership of at least twenty to register, and
punishing any person who joined or remained a
member of such a society failing to register.
While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux
Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK
exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the
claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux
Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound
organizations like masonic societies and the
Knights of Columbus, the United States
Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 17
the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The
Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle
shown in the cases just cited and reached the
conclusion that the classification was justified by
a difference between the two classes of
associations shown by experience, and that the
difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency
on the part of one class to make the secrecy
surrounding its purpose and membership a
cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal
rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence
of such a tendency on the part of the other class.
In pointing out this difference one of the courts
said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal
association in the included class: "It is a matter
of common knowledge that this organization
functions largely at night, its members disguised
by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated
to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and
later said of the other class: "These
organizations and their purposes are well
known, many of them having been in existence
for many years. Many of them are oath-bound
and secret. But we hear no complaint against
them regarding violation of the peace or
interfering with the rights of others." Another of
the courts said: "It is a matter of common
knowledge that the association or organization
of which the relator is concededly a member
exercises activities tending to the prejudice and
intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But
the legislation is not confined to this society;"
and later said of the other class: "Labor unions
have a recognized lawful purpose. The
benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent
Orders Law have already received legislative
scrutiny and have been granted special
privileges so that the legislature may well
consider them beneficial rather than harmful
agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the
potentialities of evil in secret societies," and
observing that "the danger of certain
organizations has been judicially demonstrated,"
— meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent
orders, labor unions and college fraternities
have existed for many years, and, while not
immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole
justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it
such information as was readily available
including the published report of a hearing,
before a committee of the House of
Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to
the formation, purposes and activities of the Klu
Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting aside
controverted evidence — that the order was a
revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with
additional features borrowed from the Know
Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods;
that its memberships was limited to native-born,
gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its
constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the
widest freedom for all and full adherence to the
Constitution of the United States; in another
exacted of its member an oath to shield and
preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another
declared any person actively opposing its
principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the
body politic of our country and an enemy to the
weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was
conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews,
and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious
and race prejudices; that it was striving for
political power and assuming a sort of
guardianship over the administration of local,
state and national affairs; and that at times it was
taking into its own hands the punishment of what
some of its members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the
Communist Party has been the object of
continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we
found the Communist Party of the Philippines to
be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again
found that the objective of the Party was the
"overthrow of the Philippine Government by
armed struggle and to establish in the
Philippines a communist form of government
similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China."
29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we
noted the growth of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the organization of Communist
fronts among youth organizations such as the
Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
emergence of the New People's Army. After
meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said:
"We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the
existence of a sizeable group of men who have
publicly risen in arms to overthrow the
government and have thus been and still are
engaged in rebellion against the Government of
the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify
persons or groups in order that it may fall within
the ambit of the prohibition against bills of
attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply
retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of
attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As
Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 18
attainder was ... doubly objectionable because
of its ex post facto features. This is the historic
explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a
bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But
if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that
establish that it is not are persuasive that it
cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Charter of the City of Los Angeles which
provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible
for any public office or employment in the service
of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or
department thereof, either elective or appointive,
who has within five (5) years prior to the effective
date of this section advised, advocated, or
taught, or who may, after this section becomes
effective, become a member of or affiliated with
any group, society, association, organization or
party which advises, advocates or teaches or
has within said period of five (5) years advised,
advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or
violence of the Government of the United States
of America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the
prospective application of the Act to the
petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have
as to the charter provision insofar as it purported
to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to
its effective date. We assume that under the
Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is
valid to the extent that it bars from the city's
public service persons who, subsequently to its
adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the
violent overthrow of the Government or who are
or become affiliated with any group doing so.
The provisions operating thus prospectively
were a reasonable regulation to protect the
municipal service by establishing an
employment qualification of loyalty to the State
and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and
ordinance under which petitioners were
removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not
declare general and prospectively operative
standards of qualification and eligibility for public
employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited
any further payment of compensationto named
individuals or employees. Under these
circumstances, viewed against the legislative
background, the statutewas held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is
thatCongress thereby assumed judicial
magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that
the statute claimed to be a bill of
attainderreaches past conduct and that the
penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S.
Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S.
Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of
1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of
attainderby the fact that the conduct which it
regulates is describedwith such particularity that,
in probability, few organizationswill come within
the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb
behaviour which they regard as harmful to the
public welfare,whether that conduct is found to
be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So
long as the incidence of legislation issuch that
the persons who engage in the regulated
conduct, bethey many or few, can escape
regulation merely by altering thecourse of their
own present activities, there can be no
complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said
of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof
expressly statesthat the prohibition therein
applies only to acts committed"After the
approval of this Act." Only those who
"knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate
themselves with,become or remain members of
the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its
successors or of any subversive
association"after June 20, 1957, are punished.
Those whowere members of the Party or of any
other subversive associationat the time of the
enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity
of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in
writing and under oath their membershipin the
Party. The law expressly provides that such
renunciationshall operate to exempt such
persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties
prescribed by the Act are thereforenot
inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due
Process
1. As already stated, the legislative
declaration in section 2 of the Act that the
Communist Party of the Philippinesis an
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 19
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
theGovernment is inteded not to provide the
basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the
members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of
expression and freedom of association are
sofundamental that they are thought by some to
occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any
limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by
the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe
reason why before enacting the statute in
question Congressconducted careful
investigations and then stated itsfindings in the
preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines
althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracyto overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippinesnot only by force and violence but
also by deceit, subversionand other illegal
means, for the purpose of establishing in
thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to
alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the
CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a
clear, present andgrave danger to the security of
the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and
persistentsubversion, national in scope but
international in direction,posed by the
Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities,there is urgent need for special
legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to
the freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be
opento question if, instead of making these
findings in enactingthe statute, Congress
omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has
assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd
failed to takeproper account of the distinction
between legislative fact and adjudicative fact.
Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial
distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages
containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol
would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e.,
whether this standard has a reasonable
relationto public health, morals, and the
enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale
of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so
vague as to require supplementation by rule-
making)would raise a question of adjudicative
fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is
intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand
the limits on governmental action imposed by
the Constitution. Of course what we mean by
fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion
founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of
judgment for weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative
facts — those facts which are relevant to the
legislative judgment — will not be canvassed
save to determine whether there is a
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while
adjudicativefacts — those which tie the
legislative enactment to the litigant — are to be
demonstrated and found according to the
ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37
andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia,
38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and
judicial determination to that effect renders a
court functus officio." The recital of legislative
findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative
findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action
organizations" are controlledby the foreign
government controlling the worldCommunist
movement and that they operate primarily
to"advance the objectives of such world
Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme
Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of
theselegislative findings and reject them....They
are the productof extensive investigation by
Committes of Congress over morethan a decade
and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502,
516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as
unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we
accept them, as we mustas a not
unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the
threatwhich Communist organizations pose not
only to existing governmentin the United States,
but to the United States as asovereign,
independent Nation. ...we must recognize that
thepower of Congress to regulate Communist
organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 20
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said
of thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-
Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself
againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to
require elaboration.Self-preservation is the
"ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and
transcendes every other value, "forif a society
cannot protect its very structure from
armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value
can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so
aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the
argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against
dictatorial governmentsis without force where
the existing structure of government provides for
peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany
principle of governmental helplessness in the
face of preparationfor revolution, which principle,
carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to
anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot
within the power of Congress to prohibit acts
intended tooverthrow the government by force
and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the
Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4
thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the
rule that "even throughthe governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial,that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved."
42 The requirement of knowing membership,as
distinguished from nominal membership,
hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing
membershipin a subversive organization. 43
For, as has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and
encouragement to the organization; and when
membership is acceptedor retained with
knowledge that the organization is engaged inan
unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining
membershipwith such knowledge makes himself
a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is
engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is
unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2
merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government
and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful
means, misconceives the function of the
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in
section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative
declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties
prescribed for the different acts prescribedare
stated in section 4 which requires that
membershipin the Communist Party of the
Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed,
the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe
overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only
by forceand violence but also be deceit,
subversion and other illegalmeans." The
absence of this qualificatio in section 2
appearsto be due more to an oversight rather
than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently
connotesthe use of violent and other illegal
means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one
speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments,
and certainly the law does not speak in
metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion
Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a
metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the
clearly delineated objective of the
"overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic]
the Government under thecontrol and
domination of an alien power." What thisCourt
once said in a prosecution for sedition is
appropos: "The language used by the appellant
clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government
by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the
plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently
intended to be understood. The word
'overthrow'could not have been intended as
referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of
the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which
the accused exhorted his audience to
useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument
designed toleave marks on the sides of
adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild
interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us
impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free
Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against
conspiracies to overthrow the Government by
force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever
interest in freedom of speechand freedom of
association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst
knowing membership in the Communist Party
ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so
insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily
outweighed by the overriding considerationsof
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 21
national security and the preservartion of
democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal
Smith Actis similar in many respects to the
membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion
Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to
organize anysociety, group, or assembly of
persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the
overthrow or destruction of any such
governmentby force or violence; or becomes or
is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such
society, group or assembly of persons,
knowingthe purpose thereof —
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or
imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both,
and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the
United States or any department or
agencythereof, for the five years next following
his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the
"Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which
we arehere concerned is not constitutionally
protected speech, and itwas further established
that a combination to promote suchadvocacy,
albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a
politicalparty, is not such association as is
protected by the firstAmendment. We can
discern no reason why membership, whenit
constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a
group engagingin this same forbidden advocacy,
should receive anygreater degree of protection
from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where
the problemsof accommodating the exigencies
of self-preservationand the values of liberty are
as complex and intricate as inthe situation
described in the legislative findings stated inthe
U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950,the legislative judgment as to how that
threat may best bemet consistently with the
safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set
aside merely because the judgment of
judgeswould, in the first instance, have chosen
other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation,
"whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom
to speak, is itself an effort at
compromisebetween the claims of the social
order and individual freedom,and when the
legislative compromise in either case isbrought
to the judicial test the court stands one step
removedfrom the conflict and its resolution
through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional
commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced
in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section
4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires
with anyother person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or
the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit,
subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of
placing such Government or political
subdivisionunder the control and domination of
any lien power, shallbe punished by prision
correccional to prision mayor with allthe
accessory penalties provided therefor in the
same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality,
punishes notonly membership in the Communist
Party of the Philippinesor similar associations,
but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to
overthrow the national or any local
governmentby illegal means, even if their intent
is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a
democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to
place the nation under an aliencommunist
power, but under an alien democratic power
likethe United States or England or Malaysia or
even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan,
Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to
Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines
and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing
Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"),
has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act
shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main
title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally
indicates that the subject matter is subversionin
general which has for its fundamental purpose
the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in
place of theexisting Government and not merely
subversion by Communistconspiracies..
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 22

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for
indexof its contents, and need not recite the trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates
in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and
consequences of the proposed lawand its Esguerra, JJ., concur.
operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction
isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly
and reasonablyin order not to thwart the
legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-
Subversion Act fully satisfies these
requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of

theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot
overemphasize the needfor prudence and
circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it
does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the
following basic guidelines to be observed in any
prosecution under the Act.The Government, in
addition to proving such circumstancesas may
affect liability, must establish the following
elementsof the crime of joining the Communist
Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive
association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations

other thanthe Communist Party of the
Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the
organization is to overthrow the
presentGovernment of the Philippines and to
establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime
under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that
the accused joined such organization;and (c)
that he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert
acts; and

(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the

Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue
the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to
declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for
the purpose of placing the country under
thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the
accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so
willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.

We refrain from making any pronouncement as

to thecrime or remaining a member of the
Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any
other subversive association: weleave this
matter to future determination.

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of

September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 23
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
[G.R. No. 127930. December 15, 2000]
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC.,
petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ, RELLY
CARPIO, ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE
MARI RAMOS, CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL
TAN and GERALD GARY RENACIDO,
respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Obscene, vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually
explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid
of all moral values.[1] This was how some
members of the Miriam College community
allegedly described the contents of the
September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14)
of Miriam Colleges school paper (Chi-Rho), and
magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-
Rho). The articles in the Chi-Rho included:
xxx a story, clearly fiction, entitled Kaskas
written by one Gerald Garry Renacido xxx.
Kaskas, written in Tagalog, treats of the
experience of a group of young, male, combo
players who, one evening, after their
performance went to see a bold show in a place
called Flirtation. This was the way the author
described the groups exposure during that stage
show:
Sige, sa Flirtation tayo. Happy hour na halos. he!
he! he! sambit ng kanilang bokalistang kanina pa
di maitago ang pagkahayok sa karneng babae
na kanyang pinananabikan nuong makalawa pa,
susog naman ang tropa.
"x x x Pumasok ang unang mananayaw. Si Red
Raven ayon sa emcee. Nakasuot lamang ng
bikining pula na may palamuting dilaw sa gilid-
gilid at sa bandang utong. Nagsimula siya sa
kanyang pag-giling nang tumugtog na ang
unang tono ng Goodbye ng Air Supply. Dahan-
dahan ang kanyang mga malalantik at mapang-
akit na galaw sa una. Mistulang sawa na
nililingkis ang hangin, paru-parong padapo-dapo
sa mga bulaklak na lamesa, di-upang umamoy
o kumuha ng nektar, ngunit para ipaglantaran
ang sariling bulaklak at ang angkin nitong
malansang nektar.
Kaskas mo babe, sige kaskas.
Napahaling ang tingin ng balerinang huwad kay
Mike. Mistulang natipuhan, dahil sa harap niyay
nagtagal. Nag-akmang mag-aalis ng pangitaas
na kapirasong tela. Hindi nakahinga si Mike,
nanigas sa kanyang kinauupuan, nanigas pati
ang nasa gitna ng kanyang hita. Ang mga mata
niyay namagnet sa kayamanang ngayoy halos
isang pulgada lamang mula sa kanyang
naglalaway na bunganga. Naputol-putol ang
kanyang hininga nang kandungan ni Red Raven
ang kanyang kanang hita. Lalo naghingalo siya
nang kabayuhin ito ng dahan-dahan Pabilis ng
pabilis.
The author further described Mikes responses to
the dancer as follows (quoted in part):
x x x Nagsimulang lumaban na ng sabayan si
Mike sa dancer. Hindi nagpatalo ang ibong
walang pakpak, inipit ng husto ang hita ni Mike
at pinag-udyukan ang kanyang dibdib sa mukha
nito.
Kaskas mo pa, kaskas mo pa!
Palpakan at halagpakan na tawanan ang
tumambad sa kanya ng biglang halikan siya nito
sa labi at iniwang bigla, upang kanyang muniin
ang naudlot niyang pagtikim ng karnal na nektar.
Hindi niya maanto kung siya ay nanalo o natalo
sa nangyaring sagupaan ng libog. Ang alam
lang niya ay nanlata na siya.
After the show the group went home in a car with
the bokalista driving. A pedestrian happened to
cross the street and the driver deliberately hit
him with these words:
Pare tingnan natin kung immortal itong baboy na
ito. He! He! He! He! Sabad ng sabog nilang
drayber/bokalista.
The story ends (with their car about to hit a truck)
in these words: Pare trak!!! Put.!!!!
Ang Magasing Pampanitikan, October, 1994
issue, was in turn, given the cover title of Libog
at iba pang tula.
In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled
Foreplay, Jerome wrote: Alam ko, nakakagulat
ang aming pamagat. Jerome then proceeded to
write about previous reactions of readers to
women-writers writing about matters erotic and
to gay literature. He justified the Magazines
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 24
erotic theme on the ground that many of the
poems passed on to the editors were about
sekswalidad at ibat ibang karanasan nito.
Nakakagulat ang tapang ng mga manunulat
tungkol sa maselang usaping ito xxx at sa isang
institusyon pang katulad ng Miriam!
Mr. Gomez quoted from a poem entitled Linggo
written by himself:
may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang
mga putang biyak na sa gitna,
di na puwedeng paglabhan,
di na maaaring pagbabaran
Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine
are not garapal and sa mga tulang ito namin
maipagtatanggol ang katapangan (o pagka-
sensasyonal) ng pamagat na Libog at iba pang
Tula. He finished Foreplay with these words:
Dahil para saan pa ang libog kung hindi
ilalabas?
The cover title in question appears to have been
taken from a poem written by Relly Carpio of the
same title. The poem dealt on a woman and a
man who met each other, gazed at each other,
went up close and Naghalikan, Shockproof. The
poem contained a background drawing of a
woman with her two mamaries and nipples
exposed and with a man behind embracing her
with the woman in a pose of passion-filled mien.
Another poem entitled Virgin Writes Erotic was
about a man having fantasies in his sleep. The
last verse said: At zenith I pull it out and find
myself alone in this fantasy. Opposite the page
where this poem appeared was a drawing of a
man asleep and dreaming of a naked woman
(apparently of his dreams) lying in bed on her
buttocks with her head up (as in a hospital bed
with one end rolled up). The womans right nipple
can be seen clearly. Her thighs were stretched
up with her knees akimbo on the bed.
In the next page (page 29) one finds a poem
entitled Naisip ko Lang by Belle Campanario. It
was about a young student who has a love-
selection problem: Kung sinong pipiliin: ang
teacher kong praning, o ang boyfriend kong
bading. The word praning as the court
understands it, refers to a paranoid person;
while the word bading refers to a sward or bakla
or badidang. This poem also had an illustration
behind it: of a young girl with large eyes and
sloping hair cascading down her curves and
holding a peeled banana whose top the
illustrator shaded up with downward-slanting
strokes. In the poem, the girl wanted to eat
banana topped by peanut butter. In line with
Jeromes Foreplay and by the way it was drawn
that banana with peanut butter top was meant
more likely than not, to evoke a spiritedly
mundane, mental reaction from a young
audience.
Another poem entitled Malas ang Tatlo by an
unknown author went like this:
Na picture mo na ba
nong magkatabi tayong dalawa
sa pantatluhang sofa
ikaw, the legitimate asawa
at ako, biro mo, ang kerida?
tapos, tumabi siya, shit!
kumpleto na:
ikaw, ako at siya
kulang na lang, kamera.
A poem Sa Gilid ng Itim by Gerald Renacido in
the Chi-Rho broadsheet spoke of a fox (lobo)
yearning for karneng sariwa, karneng bata,
karneng may kalambutan. isang bahid ng
dugong dalaga, maamot malasa, ipahid sa mga
labing sakim sa romansa and ended with hinog
na para himukin bungang bibiyakin.[2]
Following the publication of the paper and the
magazine, the members of the editorial board,[3]
and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of
Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr.
Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College
Discipline Committee. The Letter dated 4
November 1994 stated:
This is to inform you that the letters of complain
filed against you by members of the Miriam
Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five
student have been forwarded to the Discipline
Committee for inquiry and investigation. Please
find enclosed complaints.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 25
As expressed in their complaints you have
violated regulations in the student handbook
specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30
and 32, Section 4 (Major offenses) letter j, page
36 letters m, n, and p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor
offenses) letter a, page 37.
You are required to submit a written statement in
answer to the charge/s on or before the initial
date of hearing to be held on November 15,
1994, Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at the DSA
Conference Room.[4]
None of the students submitted their respective
answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to
transfer the case to the Regional Office of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order
No. 94, Series of 1992, supposedly had
jurisdiction over the case.[5]
In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla
again required the students to file their written
answers.
In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for
the students, submitted a letter[6] to the
Discipline Committee reiterating his clients
position that said Committee had no jurisdiction
over them. According to Atty. Valmonte, the
Committee was trying to impose discipline on
[his clients] on account of their having written
articles and poems in their capacity as campus
journalists. Hence, he argued that what applies
is Republic Act No. 7079 [The Campus
Journalism Act] and its implementing rules and
regulations. He also questioned the partiality of
the members of said Committee who allegedly
had already articulated their position against his
clients.
The Discipline Committee proceeded with its
investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline
Board, after a review of the Discipline
Committees report, imposed disciplinary
sanctions upon the students, thus:
1. Jasper Briones Expulsion. Briones is the
Editor-in-Chief of Chi-Rho and a 4th year
student;
2. Daphne Cowper suspension up to (summer)
March, 1995;
3. Imelda Hilario suspension for two (2) weeks to
expire on February 2, 1995;
4. Deborah Ligon suspension up to May, 1995.
Miss Ligon is a 4th year student and could
graduate as summa cum laude;
5. Elizabeth Valdezco suspension up to
(summer) March, 1995;
6. Camille Portugal graduation privileges
withheld, including diploma. She is an
Octoberian;
7. Joel Tan suspension for two (2) weeks to
expire on February 2, 1995;
8. Gerald Gary Renacido Expelled and given
transfer credentials. He is a 2nd year student. He
wrote the fiction story Kaskas;
9. Relly Carpio Dismissed and given transfer
credentials. He is in 3rd year and wrote the poem
Libog;
10. Jerome Gomez Dismissed and given
transfer credentials. He is in 3rd year. He wrote
the foreword Foreplay to the questioned
Anthology of Poems; and
11. Jose Mari Ramos Expelled and given
transfer papers. He is a 2nd year student and art
editor of Chi-Rho.[7]
The above students thus filed a petition for
prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction/restraining order before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the
jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam
College over them.
On 17 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CIII, presided by Judge Jaime N.
Salazar, Jr., issued an order denying the
plaintiffs prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order. It held:
There is nothing in the DECS Order No. 94, S.
1992 dated August 19, 1992 that excludes
school Administrators from exercising
jurisdiction over cases of the nature involved in
the instant petition. R.A. 7079 also does not
state anything on the matter of jurisdiction. The
DECS undoubtedly cannot determine the extent
of the nature of jurisdiction of schools over
disciplinary cases. Moreover, as this Court reads
that DECS Order No. 94, S. of 1992, it merely
prescribes for purposes of internal
administration which DECS officer or body shall
hear cases arising from R.A. 7079 if and when
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 26
brought to it for resolution. The said order never
mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases falling under R.A. 707.[8]
The students thereafter filed a Supplemental
Petition and Motion for Reconsideration. The
College followed with its Answer.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated
10 February 1995 granting the writ of preliminary
injunction.
ACCORDINGLY, so as not to render the issues
raised moot and academic, let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue enjoining the
defendants, including the officers and members
of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary
Board, or any similar body and their agents, and
the officers and members of the Security
Department, Division, or Security Agency
securing the premises and campus of Miriam
College Foundation, Inc. from:
1. Enforcing and/or implementing the expulsion
or dismissal resolutions or orders complained of
against herein plaintiffs (a) Jasper Briones; (b)
Gerald Gary Renacido; (c) Relly Carpio; (d)
Jerome Gomez; and (e) Jose Mari Ramos, but
otherwise allowing the defendants to impose
lesser sanctions on aforementioned plaintiffs;
and
2. Disallowing, refusing, barring or in any way
preventing the herein plaintiffs (all eleven of
them) from taking tests or exams and entering
the Miriam campus for such purpose as
extended to all students of Miriam College
Foundation, Inc.; neither should their respective
course or subject teachers or professors
withhold their grades, including final grades, if
and when they meet the requirements similarly
prescribed for all other students, this current 2nd
Semester of 1994-95.
The sanctions imposed on the other plaintiffs,
namely, Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario,
Elizabeth Valdezco, Camille Portugal and
Daphne Cowper, shall remain in force and shall
not be covered by this Injunction: Provided, that
Camille Portugal now a graduate, shall have the
right to receive her diploma, but defendants are
not hereby prevented from refusing her the
privilege of walking on the graduation stage so
as to prevent any likely public tumults.
The plaintiffs are required to post an injunction
bond in the sum of Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000.00) each.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the
above order. In an Order dated 22 February
1995, the RTC dismissed the petition, thus:
4. On the matter raised by both parties that it is
the DECS which has jurisdiction, inasmuch as
both parties do not want this court to assume
jurisdiction here then this court will not be more
popish than the Pope and in fact is glad that it
will have one more case out of its docket.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant case is hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice to the parties
going to another forum.
All orders heretofore issued here are hereby
recalled and set aside.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda
Hilario and Daphne Cowper, sought relief in this
Court through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining
order[11] questioning the Orders of the RTC
dated 10 and 24 February 1995.
On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer
the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
disposition.[12] On 19 May 1995, the CA issued
a resolution stating:
The respondents are hereby required to file
comment on the instant petition and to show
cause why no writ of preliminary injunction
should be issued, within ten (10) days from
notice hereof, and the petitioners may file reply
thereto within five (5) days from receipt of
formers comment.
In order not to render ineffectual the instant
petition, let a Temporary Restraining Order be
issued enjoining the public respondents from
enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated
January 19, 1995.
SO ORDERED.[13]
In its Decision dated 26 September 1996,
respondent court granted the students petition.
The CA declared the RTC Order dated 22
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 27
February 1995, as well as the students
suspension and dismissal, void.
Hence, this petition by Miriam College.
We limit our decision to the resolution of the
following issues:
(1) The alleged moot character of the case.
(2) The jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain
the petition for certiorari filed by the students.
(3) The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss
respondent students.
(4) The jurisdiction of petitioner over the
complaints against the students.
We do not tackle the alleged obscenity of the
publication, the propriety of the penalty imposed
or the manner of the imposition thereof. These
issues, though touched upon by the parties in
the proceedings below, were not fully ventilated
therein.
I automatically expired under the aforesaid
Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals found the
case moot thus:
While this petition may be considered moot and
academic since more than one year have
passed since May 19, 1995 when this court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the dismissal and
suspension on petitioners.[14]
Since courts do not adjudicate moot cases,
petitioner argues that the CA should not have
proceeded with the adjudication of the merits of
the case.
We find that the case is not moot.
It may be noted that what the court issued in 19
May 1995 was a temporary restraining order, not
a preliminary injunction. The records do not
show that the CA ever issued a preliminary
injunction.
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to perform to refrain
from performing a particular act or acts.[15] As
an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated
to preserve or maintain the status quo of things
and is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can
be heard.[16] A preliminary injunction persists
until it is dissolved or until the termination of the
action without the court issuing a final injunction.
The basic purpose of restraining order, on the
other hand, is to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction.[17] Under the former 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by 5, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may
issue a temporary restraining order with a limited
life of twenty days from date of issue.[18] If
before the expiration of the 20-day period the
application for preliminary injunction is denied,
the temporary order would thereby be deemed
automatically vacated. If no action is taken by
the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary
restraining order would automatically expire on
the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
declaration to that effect being necessary.[19] In
the instant case, no such preliminary injunction
was issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued
provision of the Rules of Court.[20]
This limitation as to the duration of the temporary
restraining order was the rule prevailing when
the CA issued its TRO dated 19 May 1995.[21]
By that time respondents Elizabeth Valdezco
and Joel Tan had already served their respective
suspensions. The TRO was applicable only to
respondents Jasper Briones, Jerome Gomez,
Relly Carpio, Jose Mari Ramos and Gerald Gary
Renacido all of whom were dismissed, and
respondent Camille Portugal whose graduation
privileges were withheld. The TRO, however,
lost its effectivity upon the lapse of the twenty
days. It can hardly be said that in that short span
of time, these students had already graduated
as to render the case moot.
Either the CA was of the notion that its TRO was
effective throughout the pendency of the case or
that what is issued was a preliminary injunction.
In either case, it was error on the part of the CA
to assume that its order supposedly enjoining
Miriam from enforcing the dismissal and
suspension was complied with. A case becomes
moot and academic when there is no more
actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon
the merits.[22] To determine the moot character
of a question before it, the appellate court may
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 28
receive proof or take notice of facts appearing
outside the record.[23] In the absence of such
proof or notice of facts, the Court of Appeals
should not have assumed that its TRO was
enforced, and that the case was rendered moot
by the mere lapse of time.
Indeed, private respondents in their Comment
herein[24] deny that the case has become moot
since Miriam refused them readmission in
violation of the TRO. This fact is unwittingly
conceded by Miriam itself when, to counter this
allegation by the students, it says that private
respondents never sought readmission after the
restraining order was issued.[25] In truth, Miriam
relied on legal technicalities to subvert the clear
intent of said order, which states:
In order not to render ineffectual the instant
petition, let a Temporary Restraining Order be
issued enjoining the public respondents from
enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated
January 19, 1995.
Petitioner says that the above order is absurd
since the order incorrectly directs public
respondent, the Hon. Jaime Salazar, presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
not to dismiss or suspend the students.[26]
We do not agree. Padua vs. Robles[27]lays
down the rules in construing judgments. We find
these rules to be applicable to court orders as
well:
[T]he sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must
be tested by its substance rather than its form.
In construing a judgment, its legal effects
including such effects that necessarily follow
because of legal implications, rather than the
language used, govern. Also, its meaning,
operation, and consequences must be
ascertained like any other written instrument.
Thus, a judgment rests on the intent of the Court
as gathered from every part thereof, including
the situation to which it applies and attendant
circumstances. (Underscoring supplied.)
Tested by such standards, we find that the order
was indeed intended for private respondents (in
the appellate court) Miriam College, et al., and
not public respondent Judge. In dismissing the
case, the trial judge recalled and set aside all
orders it had previously issued, including the writ
of preliminary injunction. In doing so, the trial
court allowed the dismissal and suspension of
the students to remain in force. Thus, it would
indeed be absurd to construe the order as being
directed to the RTC. Obviously, the TRO was
intended for Miriam College.
True, respondent-students should have asked
for a clarification of the above order. They did
not. Nevertheless, if Miriam College found the
order absurd, then it should have sought a
clarification itself so the Court of Appeals could
have cleared up any confusion. It chose not to.
Instead, it took advantage of the supposed
vagueness of the order and used the same to
justify its refusal to readmit the students.
As Miriam never readmitted the students, the
CAs ruling that the case is moot has no basis.
How then can Miriam argue in good faith that the
case had become moot when it knew all along
that the facts on which the purported moot
character of the case were based did not exist?
Obviously, Miriam is clutching to the CAs
wrongful assumption that the TRO it issued was
enforced to justify the reversal of the CAs
decision.
Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot,
Miriams pretensions to the contrary
notwithstanding.
II
To uphold and protect the freedom of the press
even at the campus level and to promote the
development and growth of campus journalism
as a means of strengthening ethical values,
encouraging critical and creative thinking, and
developing moral character and personal
discipline of the Filipino youth,[28] Congress
enacted in 1991 Republic Act No. 7079.
Entitled AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF
CAMPUS JOURNALISM AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES,[29] the law contains provisions for
the selection of the editorial board[30] and
publication adviser,[31] the funding of the school
publication,[32] and the grant of exemption to
donations used actually, directly and exclusively
for the promotion of campus journalism from
donors or gift tax.[33]
Noteworthy are provisions clearly intended to
provide autonomy to the editorial board and its
members. Thus, the second paragraph of
Section 4 states that (o)nce the publication is
established, its editorial board shall freely
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 29
determine its editorial policies and manage the
publications funds.
Section 7, in particular, provides:
A member of the publication staff must maintain
his or her status as student in order to retain
membership in the publication staff. A student
shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the
basis of articles he or she has written, or on the
basis of the performance of his or her duties in
the student publication.
Section 9 of the law mandates the DECS to
promulgate the rules and regulations necessary
for the effective implementation of this Act.[34]
Pursuant to said authority, then DECS Secretary
Armand Fabella, issued DECS Order No. 94,
Series of 1992, providing under Rule XII that:
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. The Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) shall help ensure
and facilitate the proper carrying out of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 7079. It shall also act on cases
on appeal brought before it.
The DECS regional office shall have the original
jurisdiction over cases as a result of the
decisions, actions and policies of the editorial
board of a school within its area of administrative
responsibility. It shall conduct investigations and
hearings on the these cases within fifteen (15)
days after the completion of the resolution of
each case. (Underscoring supplied.)
The latter two provisions of law appear to be
decisive of the present case.
It may be recalled that after the Miriam
Disciplinary Board imposed disciplinary
sanctions upon the students, the latter filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the
Regional Trial Court raising, as grounds
therefor, that:
I Regional Office, not the RTC, had jurisdiction,
DEFENDANTS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
AND DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF DEFENDANT
SCHOOL HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE.[35]
II
DEFENDANT SCHOOLS DISCIPLINARY
COMMITTEE AND THE DISCIPLINARY
BOARD DO NOT HAVE THE QUALIFICATION
OF AN IMPARTIAL AND NEUTRAL ARBITER
AND, THEREFORE THEIR TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS WILL DENY THE LATTER OF
THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.[36]
Anent the first ground, the students theorized
that under Rule XII of the Rules and Regulations
for the Implementation of R.A. No. 7079, the
DECS Regional Office, and not the school, had
jurisdiction over them. The second ground, on
the other hand, alleged lack of impartiality of the
Miriam Disciplinary Board, which would thereby
deprive them of due process. This contention, if
true, would constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court. These were the same
grounds invoked by the students in their refusal
to answer the charges against them. The issues
were thus limited to the question of jurisdiction a
question purely legal in nature and well within
the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial
court, not the DECS Regional Office. This is an
exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
As the Court held in Phil. Global
Communications, Inc. vs. Relova.[37]
Absent such clarity as to the scope and
coverage of its franchise, a legal question arises
which is more appropriate for the judiciary than
for an administrative agency to resolve. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for
application when there is such competence to
act on the part of an administrative body.
Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That is
to beg the question. There is merit, therefore, to
the approach taken by private respondents to
seek judicial remedy as to whether or not the
legislative franchise could be so interpreted as
to enable the National Telecommunications
Commission to act on the matter. A jurisdictional
question thus arises and calls for an answer.
However, when Miriam College in its motion for
reconsideration contended that the DECS
the trial court, refusing to "be more popish than
the Pope," dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial
court could hardly contain its glee over the fact
that "it will have one more case out of its docket."
We remind the trial court that a court having
jurisdiction of a case has not only the right and
the power or authority, but also the duty, to
exercise that jurisdiction and to render a
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 30
decision in a case properly submitted to it.[38]
Accordingly, the trial court should not have
dismissed the petition without settling the issues
presented before it.
III
Before we address the question of which
between the DECS Regional Office and Miriam
College has jurisdiction over the complaints
against the students, we first delve into the
power of either to impose disciplinary sanctions
upon the students. Indeed, the resolution of the
issue of jurisdiction would be reduced to an
academic exercise if neither the DECS Regional
Office nor Miriam College had the power to
impose sanctions upon the students.
Recall, for purposes of this discussion, that
Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act
prohibits the expulsion or suspension of a
student solely on the basis of articles he or she
has written.
A.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint.[39] The essential freedoms subsumed
in the term "academic freedom" encompasses
the freedom to determine for itself on academic
grounds:
(1) Who may teach,
(2) What may be taught,
(3) How it shall be taught, and
(4) Who may be admitted to study.[40]
The right of the school to discipline its students
is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e.,
"how it shall be taught." A school certainly
cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the
establishment of an educational institution
requires rules and regulations necessary for the
maintenance of an orderly educational program
and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Such rules and
regulations are equally necessary for the
protection of the students, faculty, and
property.[41]
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching
the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By
instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to
teach."
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but
the duty to develop discipline in its students. The
Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate
patriotism and nationalism, foster love of
humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation
of the role of national heroes in the historical
development of the country, teach the rights and
duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and
spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and
technological knowledge, and promote
vocational efficiency.[42]
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline
was a means for the school to carry out its
responsibility to help its students "grow and
develop into mature, responsible, effective and
worthy citizens of the community."[43]
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the
right to discipline more evident than in "who may
be admitted to study." If a school has the
freedom to determine whom to admit, logic
dictates that it also has the right to determine
whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom
to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension
and the withholding of graduation privileges.
Thus, in Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong,[44] the
Court upheld the expulsion of students found
guilty of hazing by petitioner therein, holding
that:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the
immediate reinstatement of respondent students
who have been investigated and found guilty by
the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner
university's disciplinary rules and standards will
certainly undermine the authority of the
administration of the school. This we would be
most loathe to do.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 31
More importantly, it will seriously impair
petitioner university's academic freedom which
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the
present 1987 Constitution.[45]
Tracing the development of academic freedom,
the Court continued:
Since Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology, we
have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of
higher learning is discretionary upon a school,
the same being a privilege on the part of the
student rather than a right. While under the
Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to
freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation," such right is subject,
as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.
"For private schools have the right to establish
reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students.
This right extends as well to parents as parents
under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and
cooperate with the schools."
Such rules are "incident to the very object of
incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The
rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the
establishment of the rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to
student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of
the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the
eruption of militancy in the academic groves as
collectively, the students demanded and plucked
for themselves from the panoply of academic
freedom their own rights encapsulized under the
rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, In
Hohfeldian terms, they have the concomitant
duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the
rules laid down by the school.
xxx. It must be borne in mind that universities are
established, not merely to develop the intellect
and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty
values, ideals and attitudes; may, the
development, or flowering if you will, of the total
man.
In essence, education must ultimately be
religious -- not in the sense that the founders or
charter members of the institution are sectarian
or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a
religious education, as the renowned
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is 'an
education which inculcates duty and reverence.'
It appears that the particular brand of religious
education offered by the Ateneo de Manila
University has been lost on the respondent
students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a
venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila
University as their own a minute longer, for they
may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on
the students currently enrolled, as well as those
who come after them.
Quite applicable to this case is our
pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of
Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally
conducive and orderly educational environment
will be seriously imperilled, if, under the
circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is
forced to admit petitioner's children and to
reintegrate them to the student body." Thus, the
decision of petitioner university to expel them is
but congruent with the gravity of their
misdeeds.[46]
B.
Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution
recognizes the State's power to regulate
educational institution:
The State recognizes the complementary roles
of public and private institutions in the
educational system and shall exercise
reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institutions.
As may be gleaned from the above provision,
such power to regulate is subject to the
requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the
Constitution allows merely the regulation and
supervision of educational institutions, not the
deprivation of their rights.
C.
In several cases, this Court has upheld the right
of the students to free speech in school
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 32
premises. In the landmark case of Malabanan
vs. Ramento,[47] students of the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation, believing that
the merger of the Institute of Animal Science with
the Institute of Agriculture would result in the
increase in their tuition, held a demonstration to
protest the proposed merger. The rally however
was held at a place other than that specified in
the school permit and continued longer than the
time allowed. The protest, moreover, disturbed
the classes and caused the stoppage of the work
of non-academic personnel. For the illegal
assembly, the university suspended the
students for one year. In affirming the students'
rights to peaceable assembly and free speech,
the Court through Mr. Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, echoed the ruling of the US Supreme
Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School
District.[48]
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech. They are entitled to
do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the
freedom to express their views and
communicate their thoughts to those disposed to
listen in gatherings such as was held in this
case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of
Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District, 'shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.' While,
therefore, the authority of educational
institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative
of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific
level there is persuasive force to this Fortas
opinion. "The principal use to which the schools
are dedicated is to accommodate students
during prescribed hours for the purpose of
certain types of activities. Among those activities
is personal intercommunication among the
students. This is not only inevitable part of the
educational process. A student's rights,
therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours, he may express his opinions,
even on controversial subjects like the conflict in
Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and
substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school' and without colliding with the rights of
others. * * * But conduct by the student, in class
or out of it, which for any reason - whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior --
materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.[49]
The Malabanan ruling was followed in Villar vs.
Technological Institute of the Philippines,[50]
Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation,[51] and Non vs. Dames II.[52]
The right of the students to free speech in school
premises, however, is not absolute. The right to
free speech must always be applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school
environment.[53] Thus, while we upheld the right
of the students to free expression in these cases,
we did not rule out disciplinary action by the
school for "conduct by the student, in class or out
of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior - which materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others."[54]
Thus, in Malabanan, we held:
6. Objection is made by private respondents to
the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders.
That there would be a vigorous presentation of
view opposed to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture was to be expected. There was no
concealment of the fact that they were against
such a move as it confronted them with a serious
problem ('isang malaking suliranin.") They
believed that such a merger would result in the
increase in tuition fees, an additional headache
for their parents ('isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng
ating mga magulang.") If in the course of such
demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience
goading them on, utterances extremely critical at
times, even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
understandable. Student leaders are hardly the
timid, diffident types. They are likely to be
assertive and dogmatic. They would be
ineffective if during a rally they speak in the
guarded and judicious language of the
academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic
audience is not disposed to accord full credence
to their fiery exhortations. They take into account
the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of
speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of
youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of
their applause, but with the activity taking place
in the school premises and during the daytime,
no clear and present danger of public disorder is
discernible. This is without prejudice to the
taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which,
to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 33

classwork or involves substantial disorder or

invasion of the rights of others."[55]

It is in the light of this standard that we read

Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act.
Provisions of law should be construed in
harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of
the legislature should be construed, wherever
possible, in a manner that would avoid their
conflicting with the fundamental law.[56] A
statute should not be given a broad construction
if its validity can be saved by a narrower one.[57]
Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as
not to infringe upon the school's right to
discipline its students. At the same time,
however, we should not construe said provision
as to unduly restrict the right of the students to
free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we
read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to
mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a
student solely on the basis of the articles he or
she has written, except when such articles
materially disrupt class work or involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others.

IV.

From the foregoing, the answer to the question

of who has jurisdiction over the cases filed
against respondent students becomes self-
evident. The power of the school to investigate
is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It
is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of
rules and regulations and the maintenance of a
safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning.[58] That power, like the
power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of
the academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning guaranteed by the Constitution. We
therefore rule that Miriam College has the
authority to hear and decide the cases filed
against respondent students.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of

Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Miriam College is ordered to
READMIT private respondent Joel Tan whose
suspension has long lapsed.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 34
[G.R. No. 161172. December 13, 2004]
NADINE ROSARIO M. MORALES, petitioner,
vs. THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
It is an accepted principle that schools of
learning are given ample discretion to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for
purposes of graduation. This is part of academic
freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it
is within the competence of universities and
colleges to determine who are entitled to the
grant of honors among the graduating students.
Its discretion on this academic matter may not
be disturbed much less controlled by the courts
unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its
exercise.[1]
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals[3]
dated 28 November 2003, reversing the 05
September 2002 Order[4] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87.
The pivotal issue from which this case arose is
the interpretation and application of Article 410
of the University of the Philippines (UP) Code
which provides:
ART. 410. Students who complete their courses
with the following absolute minimum weighted
average grade shall be graduated with honors:
Summa Cum Laude .. 1.20
Magna Cum Laude .1.45
Cum Laude ..1.75
Provided, that all the grades in all subjects
prescribed in the curriculum, as well as subjects
that qualify as electives, shall be included in the
computation of the weighted average grade;
provided further that in cases where the
electives taken are more than those required in
the program, the following procedure will be
used in selecting the electives to be included in
the computation of the weighted average grade:
(I) For students who did not shift programs,
consider the required number of electives in
chronological order.
(II) For students who shifted from one program
to another, the electives to be considered shall
be selected according to the following order of
priority:
(1) Electives taken in the program where the
student is graduating will be selected in
chronological order.
(2) Electives taken in the previous program and
acceptable as electives in the second program
will be selected in chronological order.
(3) Prescribed courses taken in the previous
program, but qualify as electives in the second
program will be selected in chronological
order.[5]
The Facts
In the school year 1997-1998, petitioner Nadine
Rosario M. Morales transferred from the UP
Manila campus, where she was taking up
Speech Pathology, to UP Diliman and enrolled
in the European Languages undergraduate
program under the College of Arts and Letters.
Said program has three curricula, namely, Plan
A, Plan B, and Plan C. Upon the petitioners
transfer, she chose the Plan A curriculum and
elected French as her major and German as her
minor. Under the Plan A curriculum, the student
is required to complete 141 units worth of
subjects in the University, 27 of which should be
electives in his or her minor field of study.
During the first semester of school year 1997-
1998, the petitioner enrolled in the subjects
German 10 and German 11 where she obtained
the grades of 1.0 in both subjects. At the start of
the second semester, however, the petitioner
changed her language minor from German to
Spanish, while maintaining French as her major.
By the end of the first semester of school year
1999-2000, the petitioner was included in the list
of candidates for graduation with probable
honors issued by the College of Arts and Letters
of UP Diliman. The inclusion of the petitioner in
the said list was based on the computation made
by the College of Arts and Letters of the
petitioners General Weighted Average (GWA)
inclusive of her grades of 1.0 in German 10 and
11. According to the colleges computation, the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 35
petitioner had a GWA of 1.725, clearly above the
minimum weighted average grade[6] for
conferment of cum laude honors.[7] Petitioner
obtained an average of 1.708 for her remaining
subjects in her final semester in the University,
bringing her GWA to 1.729, which is definitely
higher than the 1.75 average grade required for
cum laude honors.
During the assessment for graduation though,
the petitioner was not granted cum laude honors
because her grades of 1.0 in the subjects
German 10 and 11, which she took when her
minor was still German, were excluded in the
computation of her GWA, thus bringing her GWA
to 1.760, which is lower than the minimum
weighted average grade required for the
conferment of cum laude honors.
Prof. Edwin Thaddeus L. Bautista, Chair of the
Department of European Languages, explained
that a student following the Plan A curriculum is
required to major in one European language
other than Spanish, and minor in another or any
of the disciplines allowed under the curriculum.
In petitioners case, her major is French and her
minor is Spanish, thus, German does not fit into
her curriculum. Furthermore, the Plan A
curriculum does not allow for free electives.
Electives under said curriculum must be major
language electives, which, in the case of
petitioner, must have been taken from French
courses in either literature or translation.
German 10 and 11, being basic language
courses, do not fall under electives as
contemplated in the Plan A curriculum.
Maintaining that the colleges manner of
computing her grades was erroneous, the
petitioner wrote Dr. Ofelia Silapan, College
Secretary of the College of Arts and Letters, on
06 April 2000, requesting that her German
language subjects (i.e., German 10 and 11) be
included in the computation of her GWA, it
appearing that such had been done in
connection with the inclusion of her name in the
list of those graduating with probable honors.
Said letter was followed-up by another letter
signed by petitioners father, and addressed to
Dr. Elena L. Samonte, University Registrar, on
08 April 2000, explaining why petitioners
German 10 and 11 grades should be included in
the computation of her GWA.
These letters were taken up on a no-name basis
during the 68th meeting of the University Council
on 10 April 2000 upon the University Registrars
endorsement. After deliberating on the matter,
the University Council, by a vote of 207 in favor
and 4 against, affirmed the recommendation of
the European Languages Department and the
College of Arts and Letters of not awarding the
cum laude honors to the petitioner.
In view of the adverse decision of the University
Council, the petitioner, together with her parents,
wrote UP President Francisco A. Nemenzo, on
18 April 2000, asking that the merits of
petitioners case be reviewed and, if deemed
appropriate, the same be elevated to the UP
Board of Regents in order to correct the error in
the computation of the petitioners GWA.
At the 1142nd meeting of the Board of Regents
held on 26 May 2000, petitioners appeal was
thus discussed, and it was resolved that said
appeal be returned to the University Council for
further consideration, with full disclosure of who
is involved in the matter.
Petitioners case was then again considered by
the University Council during its 69th meeting
held on 21 June 2000. After much deliberation,
the University Council, by a vote of 99 for, 12
against, and 6 abstentions, resolved to reaffirm
its earlier decision of 10 April 2000 denying the
award of cum laude honors to petitioner.
Upon the denial of the appeal, petitioners
parents, on petitioners behalf and for
themselves, submitted a Notice of Appeal dated
27 June 2000 to the Board of Regents through
President Nemenzo and, subsequently, an
Appeal Memorandum and Supplemental
Memorandum dated 24 and 30 August 2000,
respectively. The appeal was taken up during
the 1144th meeting of the Board of Regents held
on 31 August 2000. After a thorough discussion
on the proper interpretation and application of
Article 410 of the UP Code, the Board of
Regents, by a vote of 9 against 2, elected to
deny the appeal. Petitioners parents thereafter
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same
was also denied.
Assailing the decision of the UP Board of
Regents as erroneous, petitioner, on 21 March
2001, brought a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the RTC, which resolved the
case in her favor under Order of 05 September
2002. According to the said Order, the UP Board
of Regents gravely abused its discretion in the
improper application of its academic discretion in
interpreting Article 410 of the UP Code. The
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 36
lower court, hence, required the respondent UP
Board of Regents to re-compute petitioners
grades by including her grades in German 10
and 11 and to confer upon petitioner cum laude
honors. The respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on 07 October 2002, which was
subsequently denied by the lower court. Upon
said denial, the respondent appealed the RTCs
Order to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice
of Appeal dated 14 February 2003.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
appeal on 24 April 2003, advancing that the
Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the appeal, inasmuch as it raised
only questions of law. Said argument was
reiterated in petitioners Memorandum, together
with the position that the lower court was correct
to find that respondent had gravely abused its
discretion in arbitrarily excluding petitioners
grades in German 10 and 11 from the
computation of her GWA.
The respondent, for its part, contended that the
lower court failed to take into consideration the
interpretation of the pertinent provision of the UP
Code arrived at by the University Council during
its deliberations. It instead, substituted its own
interpretation in violation of the academic
freedom of UP as an institution of higher
learning.
Noting the identity of the arguments raised by
petitioner in both her Motion to Dismiss and
Memorandum, the Court of Appeals, in a
resolution, deemed the case submitted for
decision. In deciding the appeal, the appellate
court initially determined whether only questions
of law are involved in the case. Eventually, the
appellate court declared that an analysis of the
facts of the case is indispensable. According to
the Court of Appeals:
To resolve these issues, an incursion or
investigation of the facts attending the case of
the petitioner-appellee is indispensable. The
Court must sift through the contrasting evidence
submitted to determine the specific situation of
appellees academic standing, and the
chronology of appellees scholastic progress, her
grades and scholastic average, as well as what
particular rules were used or misused by the
Respondent Board, and by the lower court, in
coming up with its respective decisions. The
Court is called upon to make a calibration and
resolution of all these elements, and to
determine the existence and relevancy [sic] of
specific surrounding circumstances, its relation
to each other and to the whole and the
probabilities of the situation.
This is not a simple matter of determining what
the [sic] law is applicable on a given or specific
set of facts. Indeed, the facts itself [sic] must be
determined and reviewed, before a legal
adjudication could be made.
To be sure, questions of law are attendant in the
instant appeal, but to resolve the same, a review
and determination of [the] facts, based on
evidence and matters on record, is necessary
before such issues could be resolved. The
Court, therefore, as a legal reviewer of issues of
fact and law, is competent, and legally
empowered, to take cognizance of and resolve
the instant appeal.[8]
Having resolved the issue of jurisdiction, the
Court of Appeals went on to determine whether
the lower court erred in not finding that academic
freedom should apply in the instant case.
According to the appellate court, the RTCs
Order involved an intrusion on the discretion and
authority of the UP Board of Regents in the
matter of whether or not to confer academic
honors upon the petitioner. The Court of Appeals
stated that the lower court violated UPs
constitutionally protected right to academic
freedom when it substituted its own
interpretation of the internal rules and
regulations of the University for that of the UP
Board of Regents, and applied the same to the
petitioners case. The appellate court further
made a determination that respondent is not
guilty of grave abuse of discretion in deciding not
to confer academic honors upon the petitioner,
inasmuch as respondent proceeded fairly in
reaching its decision, giving the petitioner and
her parents ample opportunity to present their
case. Accordingly, on 28 November 2003, the
Court of Appeals issued a decision granting the
UP Board of Regents appeal:
The Order, dated September 5, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87
is hereby SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment
is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition for
certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioner-
appellee Nadine Rosario M. Morales.[9]
Claiming that the Court of Appeals committed
grave and reversible errors in issuing its 28
November 2003 decision, petitioner filed before
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 37
this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
raising the following assignment of errors:[10]
I precisely the reason why the RTC did not
The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over
respondents appeal of the RTCs Order (the CA
Appeal) because the essential facts here were
never in dispute, this case involves purely
questions of law.
II
The RTC correctly required respondent to confer
cum laude honors on petitioner because
respondent gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to comply with Article 410 of the UP
Code (which respondent itself issued) and in
arbitrarily excluding petitioners grades in
German 10 and 11 from the computation of her
GWA. The Court of Appeals therefore gravely
erred in reversing the RTCs Order.
According to the petitioner, it was erroneous for
the appellate court to assume jurisdiction over
respondents appeal of the RTC Order as said
appeal involved purely questions of law, and that
respondents should have challenged said Order
directly with the Supreme Court through a
Petition for Review on Certiorari and not before
the Court of Appeals through a Notice of Appeal.
The petitioner further argues that it was error for
the Court of Appeals to rule that respondents
refusal to interpret and apply Article 410 of the
UP Code in order to confer cum laude honors to
petitioner did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Lastly, petitioner advances that the
appellate court mischaracterized this case as
one involving academic freedom, thus
condoning respondents alleged injustice to
petitioner.
Ruling of the Court
First, we shall endeavor to dispose of the issue
of jurisdiction.
Petitioner submits that this case involves only
the interpretation of a rule (i.e., Article 410 of the
UP Code) and the determination of whether the
subjects German 10 and 11 can be considered
as qualified electives under the assailed rule in
relation to petitioners situation. According to
petitioner, the facts of the case have never been
in dispute. Both petitioner and respondent have
presented the same pieces of evidence, albeit of
course, their respective interpretations and
positions on the legal effects of their common
evidence are different. Petitioner also points out
that the total absence of questions of fact is
require, and the parties themselves did not
demand, an evidentiary hearing for the case
before the lower court.
We agree with petitioner that respondents
appeal to the appellate court raises only
questions of law. There is a question of law when
the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of evidence presented, the truth
or falsehood of facts being admitted and the
doubt concerns the correct application of law
and jurisprudence on the matter.[11] On the
other hand, there is a question of fact when the
doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no
dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not
the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a
question of law.[12]
Contrary to what the Court of Appeals
postulates, the resolution of the issues
presented by respondent UP Board of Regents
does not necessitate an incursion of the facts
attending the case. Whether the lower court
erred in finding that respondent gravely abused
its discretion in interpreting and applying the
provisions of the UP Code on the case of
petitioner is a question of law, the determination
of which calls for the analysis of the proper
application of law and jurisprudence. While the
Court of Appeals is correct in saying that in order
to resolve the issues raised by the parties, the
court must consider all the facts and evidence
presented in the case, it does not, however, rule
on the truth or falsity of such facts, based on the
evidence and matters on record. It must be
stressed that the facts were admitted by both
parties. Therefore, any conclusion based on
these facts would not involve a calibration of the
probative value of such pieces of evidence, but
would be limited to an inquiry of whether the law
was properly applied given the state of facts of
the case.
It is thus evident that the controversy centered
on, and the doubt arose with respect to, the
correct interpretation and application of Rule 410
of the UP Code in relation to petitioners situation
and not as to any fact or evidence advanced by
the parties. And since the appeal brought by
respondent UP Board of Regents before the
Court of Appeals raises only questions of law,
the proper mode of appeal is by way of a petition
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 38
for certiorari under Rule 45.[13] Therefore, the
appellate court did not have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and to resolve respondents
appeal.
The above conclusion, however, will not deter
this Court from proceeding with the judicial
determination of the basic legal issues herein.
We must bear in mind that procedural rules are
intended to ensure the proper administration of
law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for
they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice.[14] A deviation from its rigid
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its
prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of
justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts.[15] Noting that this case involves the
exercise of a fundamental right - academic
freedom no less - of the State University, and
that the petitioner has, in any event, raised
before us the legal question of whether the RTC
correctly required respondent to confer cum
laude honors on the petitioner because of
respondents alleged grave abuse of discretion,
for pragmatic reasons and consideration of
justice and equity, the Court must go on to
resolve the second assignment of error.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of
University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals,[16]
the discretion of schools of learning to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for
purposes of graduation forms part of academic
freedom. And such discretion may not be
disturbed much less controlled by the courts,
unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its
exercise. Therefore, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not
disturb the Universitys decision not to confer
honors to petitioner.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other
words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[17]
A judicious review of the records will show that
the respondent proceeded fairly in evaluating
petitioners situation, giving her and her parents
ample opportunity to present their side on
different occasions and before different fora, i.e.,
the Department of European Languages, the
College of Arts and Letters, the University
Council and finally, the Board of Regents.
Contrary to the trial courts findings, there is no
showing that respondent acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in interpreting Article 410 of the UP
Code and consequently not conferring academic
honors on petitioner.
For clarity, Article 410 of the UP Code is again
quoted hereunder:
ART. 410. Students who complete their courses
with the following absolute minimum weighted
average grade shall be graduated with honors:
Summa Cum Laude .. 1.20
Magna Cum Laude 1.45
Cum Laude .... 1.75
Provided, that all the grades in all subjects
prescribed in the curriculum, as well as subjects
that qualify as electives, shall be included in the
computation of the weighted average grade;
provided further that in cases where the
electives taken are more than those required in
the program, the following procedure will be
used in selecting the electives to be included in
the computation of the weighted average grade:
(I) For students who did not shift programs,
consider the required number of electives in
chronological order.
(II) For students who shifted from one program
to another, the electives to be considered shall
be selected according to the following order of
priority:
(1) Electives taken in the program where the
student is graduating will be selected in
chronological order.
(2) Electives taken in the previous program and
acceptable as electives in the second program
will be selected in chronological order.
(3) Prescribed courses taken in the previous
program, but qualify as electives in the second
program will be selected in chronological
order.[18]
As can be seen from the minutes of the meetings
of the University Council and the Board of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 39
Regents, petitioners case was subjected to an
exhaustive and judicious deliberation. During the
68th Meeting of the University Council, where
petitioners case was first submitted to the body
for discussion on a no-name basis, a member
raised the issue of whether German 10 and 11
could be counted as electives in the program of
petitioner, to which the University Registrar
replied that the students program is European
Languages, major in French, minor in Spanish
under which German 10 and 11 are not required
in the checklist; neither can these subjects be
considered electives as said electives should be
non-language electives. Since the student chose
Spanish as her minor language, German 10 and
11 are excess subjects.[19] Another member
argued that if the student had satisfied all the
requirements in the curriculum, then German 10
and 11 should be included in the computation of
the GWA since the student had good grades.[20]
To this, Dean Josefina Agravante of the College
of Arts and Letters replied that while they
empathize with the student and her parents, this
same rule had been applied in the past, and if
the student would be allowed to graduate with
honors, she (Dean Agravante) will be forced to
recommend the same for the other students who
were denied the same request in the past.[21] At
the 1142nd Meeting of the Board of Regents,
both positions of the petitioner and the University
Council on the proper interpretation of Article
410 of the UP Code were presented before the
Board and an agreement was reached among
the members to return petitioners appeal to the
University Council for further consideration, with
full disclosure of who is involved in the matter.
Upon the appeals return to the University
Council, the issue of whether the University rule
allows for excess electives more than those
required by the program was raised. Prof.
Cao[22] answered this query by pointing to
Section 2 of Article 410[23] which provides for
the manner of selecting which electives shall be
considered. Since the rule provides for an order
of priority, it is clear that not all electives taken
by a student may be included in the computation
of the GWA. Dean Yu,[24] on the other hand,
pointed out that the more basic issue is whether
German 10 and 11 can be considered as
electives under petitioners curriculum within the
contemplation of the assailed rule. Dean Yu
further stated that the determination of which
subjects will qualify as electives is best left to the
Department of European Languages and the
students curriculum. To this issue, Prof.
Bautista, Chair of the Department of European
Languages, replied that this matter had been
taken up again at the Department level and they
stood by their decision that in the Plan A of the
BA European Languages program, there is a
major and a minor language. There are no free
electives and for the minor language, subjects
that fall under the same language were the ones
counted. In the case of Ms. Morales, she initially
thought that she would minor in German so she
took German 10 and 11 during her first semester
in UP Diliman, but eventually, she changed her
minor to Spanish. He said that the Advising
Committee of the Department allows a student
to change his major or minor, but courses which
had been previously taken before the shifting of
major or minor are not counted as part of the
courses with credit in the curriculum. As to the
interpretation of the rules, Dean Tabunda[25]
said that it is a matter of course that the
traditional interpretation of the Department be
taken. And the Department made it clear that a
free elective is different from a course taken as
a minor. With respect to the question of what
interpretation should prevail, she (Dean
Tabunda) believed that the traditional
interpretation must be taken into account.[26]
In trying to get into the heart of the issue, the
Board of Regents, at its 1144th Meeting, went
into an examination of Rule 410.[27] Regent
Hernandez[28] considers the rule as referring to
the computation of the GWA, not only with
respect to the subjects prescribed in the
curriculum, but also takes into account all
subjects that qualify as electives. Thus, those
electives may not only be part of the Plan A
curriculum but are part of the program. On the
contrary, Vice President Diokno[29] said that the
understanding of the Department and the
University Council is that subjects that qualify as
electives must be in the curriculum. Otherwise,
the student can take anything they want. Vice
President Diokno stated further that in cases
where there are free electives, the electives are
applied chronologically. Moreover, the Plan A
curriculum, incidentally, does not allow free
electives, therefore, there was nothing to put in
chronologically. This has always been the
practice of the Department which is being
supported by the College Assembly and the
University Council.[30]
Further discussing the matter, Regent
Hernandez requested for an interpretation of
Article 410[31] on the issue of whether or not the
German subjects which are supposedly
electives should be included in the computation
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 40
of the petitioners GWA. Atty. Azura,[32]
University General Counsel, explained that the
words subjects that qualify as electives must be
read in conjunction with the immediately
preceding qualifying phrase in the curriculum.
Where the first conjunctive part contains the
descriptive phrase/modifier in the curriculum, so
too must the second conjunctive part be subject
to the same modifier. Thus, subjects that qualify
as electives is modified by the words in the
curriculum. In other words, in the computation of
the GWA, the grades of subjects prescribed in
the curriculum and the grades of subjects that
qualify as electives in the curriculum are
included. Seen in this light, the view that German
10 and 11 must be considered in the
computation of petitioners GWA, being electives
in the European Languages undergraduate
program, is incorrect. The word program in
Article 410[33] must be interpreted in the context
of a particular curriculum. A student fulfills the
requirements of a program by following a certain
curriculum. Atty. Azura said that the University
Council, in excluding German 10 and 11 from the
computation of petitioners GWA, effectively
ruled that these subjects do not qualify as
electives in the course curriculum for a degree in
BA European Languages, major in French,
minor in Spanish.[34]
In deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration
submitted by petitioner, the Board of Regents,
during its 1147th Meeting, reviewed the
interpretation of petitioners curriculum.
University General Counsel, Prof. Marvic
Leonen, explained that the interpretation of the
required subjects or allowable electives in the
curriculum must be taken in the context of the
entire courses. A student in Plan A is required to
take:
Minor Language 12/Elective.b
Minor Language 13/Elective.b
Minor Language 20/Elective.b
Minor Language 21/Elective.b
Minor Language 30/Elective.b
Minor Language 40/Elective.b
Minor Language 31/Elective.b
The numbered sequencing of the courses
therefore clearly implies that if German 10 and
11 would be equivalent to Minor Language 10
and 11, then German 12, 13, 20, 21, 30, 40, 31
should have been taken by the student. The
pattern would be different if the student took up
Spanish. This is so because there are no
Spanish 12, 13, and 21 offered. This also
explains why footnote b that uniformly qualifies
the quoted entries states:
(b) Courses in English, Comparative Literature,
Creative Writing, Filipino, Panitikan ng Pilipinas,
Speech, Theater Arts, Art Studies, Social
Science, Philosophy, Music, Fine Arts,
Education, Mass Communication or Tourism. As
minor discipline, these non-language electives
must be taken only in one department provided
that the prerequisites has/have been satisfied.
For those taking Spanish as minor, the following
are recommended: Spanish 3, 20, 30, 31, 40, 60,
80, 100 and 105.[35]
The first two sentences in the footnote could not
refer to minor language. The last sentence, on
the other hand, could not refer to the entry
elective. There is nothing in the footnote that
could be read to imply that the electives could be
language courses other than those enumerated
in the footnotes first sentence. Petitioner argues
that German 10 and 11 should be appreciated
as the minor languages 10 and 11 required. And
that the Spanish subjects should be taken as the
elective subjects in the curriculum. The difficulty
with this position is that the description of
elective is very clear and leaves no further room
for interpretation. For purposes of graduation
and for honors, petitioner has to abide by the
requirements of the curriculum. Petitioners
decision to shift her minor language caused the
exclusion of her grades in German 10 and 11 in
the computation of her GWA.
It must be stressed that it is the policy of the
University to thoroughly evaluate all candidates
for graduation with honors to ensure that
students do not earn extra credits in order to
increase their GWA. A perusal of petitioners
official transcript of records[36] will show that the
subjects German 10 and 11 are in excess of the
requirements of the program (i.e., 141 units, 27
of which are electives in the minor field of study),
to illustrate:
Subjects
Number of Units Earned
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 41
General Education Subjects (i.e. common
subjects for BA programs and required subjects
under the BA European Languages program)
69 French (major)
45 Spanish (minor)
27 German
6 Total Units 147
The fact that the UP Board of Regents chose to
accept the interpretation of Article 410 of the UP
Code as construed by the University Council
based on its time-honored interpretation and
application of said rule, after the latter has
deliberated on the matter twice, vis--vis
petitioners interpretation, is not tantamount to a
whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the
respondent. It is not grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the UP Board of Regents to uphold
the decisions of the Department of European
Languages, the College of Arts and Letters and
the University Council, when said decisions
were reached after a thorough discussion of the
merits of petitioners case in relation to the
established interpretation and analysis of its very
own internal rules.
In the case of University of the Philippines v.
Ayson,[37] UP has been likened to an
administrative agency whose findings must be
accorded respect within its areas of
competence. Well-settled is the principle that by
reason of the special knowledge and expertise
of administrative agencies over matters falling
under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their
findings of fact in that regard are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts.[38] Accordingly, the conclusion arrived at
by the UP Board of Regents that petitioners
grades in German 10 and 11 should not be
included in computing her GWA must be
respected and given finality, the interpretation
and application of Article 410 of the UP Code
being within the competence and expertise of
the Department of European Languages, the
College of Arts and Letters and the University
Council to make.
Therefore, it was error on the part of the lower
court to rule that respondents discretion has
been gravely abused, thus justifying the
substitution of judicial discretion in the
interpretation of Article 410 of the UP Code. The
decision of the lower court in substituting its own
interpretation of the Universitys internal rules for
that of the respondent UP Board of Regents, is
an intrusion into the constitutionally protected
right of the University to academic freedom.
Sec. 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
provides that [a]cademic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
Academic freedom accords an institution of
higher learning the right to decide for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them.
This constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion.[39] Certainly, the wide sphere of
autonomy given to universities in the exercise of
academic freedom extends to the right to confer
academic honors. Thus, exercise of academic
freedom grants the University the exclusive
discretion to determine to whom among its
graduates it shall confer academic recognition,
based on its established standards. And the
courts may not interfere with such exercise of
discretion unless there is a clear showing that
the University has arbitrarily and capriciously
exercised its judgment. Unlike the UP Board of
Regents that has the competence and expertise
in granting honors to graduating students of the
University, courts do not have the competence
to constitute themselves as an Honors
Committee and substitute their judgment for that
of the University officials.
Therefore, for failure to establish that the
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
in not conferring cum laude honors to petitioner,
the lower court erred in mandating that
petitioners grades be re-computed including her
marks in German 10 and 11 and to confer upon
petitioner academic honors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the UP Board of Regents on 31
August 2000 denying the appeal of the petitioner
is AFFIRMED. The Order of the Regional Trial
Court dated 05 September 2002 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 42
G.R. No. L-40779 November 28, 1975
EPICHARIS T. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE,
LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, herein
represented by FR. ANTONIO B. LAMBINO,
respondent.
Epicharis T Garcia in her own behalf.
Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso and Cudala
for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific issue posed by this mandamus
proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology,
represented by Father Antonio B. Lambino, to
allow petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue
studying therein is whether she is deemed
possessed of such a right that has to be
respected. That is denied not only on general
principle, but also in view of the character of the
particular educational institution involved. It is a
seminary. It would appear therefore that at most
she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being
cast on respondent school. Moreover, as a
reinforcement to such an obvious conclusion,
there is the autonomy recognized by the
Constitution in this explicit language: "All
institutions of higher learning shall enjoy
academic freedom."1 The petition must
therefore fail.
Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975,
Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies
leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May
30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for
the same course for the first semester, 1975-76,
Respondent told her about the letter he had
written her, informing her of the faculty's decision
to bar her from re-admission in their school; 5.
That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May
19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground
for expulsion, for they neither present any
violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are
they indicative of gross misconduct; 6. That from
June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and
effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at
a compromise that would not duly inconvenience
the professors and still allow her to enjoy the
benefits of the kind of instruction that the school
has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told
by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that
the compromises she was offering were
unacceptable, their decision was final, and that
it were better for her to seek for admission at the
UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner then
subsequently made inquiries in said school, as
to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate
studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was
informed that she could enroll at the UST
Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have
to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in
Philosophy in order to have her degree later in
Theology — which would entail about four to five
years more of studies — whereas in the Loyola
School of Studies to which she is being
unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail
only about two years more; 8. That Petitioner,
considering that time was of the essence in her
case, and not wanting to be deprived of an
opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for
her life's work, enrolled as a special student at
said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she
would not thereby be credited with any academic
units for the subject she would take; 9. That
Petitioner could have recourse neither to the
President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being
with the First Couple's entourage now in Red
China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since
this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11,
1975 is the last day for registration; ... "2 She
prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose
of allowing her to enroll in the current semester.
She made it more specific in a pleading she
called Amended Petition so that she would be
allowed cross-enrollment even beyond the June
11, 1975 deadline for registration and that
whatever units may be accredited to her in the
UST Ecclesiastical Faculties be likewise
recognized by respondent. Her petition included
the letter of respondent Father Lambino which
started on a happy note that she was given the
grade of B+ and B in two theology subjects, but
ended in a manner far from satisfactory for her,
as shown by this portion thereof: "Now, you will
have to forgive me for going into a matter which
is not too pleasant. The faculty had a meeting
after the summer session and several members
are strongly opposed to having you back with us
at Loyola School of Theology. In the spirit of
honesty may I report this to you as their reason:
They felt that your frequent questions and
difficulties were not always pertinent and had the
effect of slowing down the progress of the class;
they felt you could have tried to give the
presentation a chance and exerted more effort
to understand the point made before
immediately thinking of difficulties and problems.
The way things are, I would say that the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 43
advisability of your completing a program (with
all the course work and thesis writing) with us is
very questionable. That you have the requisite
intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it
would seem to be in your best interests to work
with a faculty that is more compatible with your
orientation. I regret to have to make this report,
but I am only thinking of your welfare."3
This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 1975,
required comment on the part of respondent
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology.4 As submitted on behalf of Father
Lambino, it set forth the following: "Respondent
is the Chairman of the Faculty Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology,
which is a religious seminary situated in Loyola
Heights, Quezon City; In collaboration with the
Ateneo de Manila University, the Loyola School
of Theology allows some lay students to attend
its classes and/or take courses in said Loyola
School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be
obtained from such courses is granted by the
Ateneo de Manila University and not by the
Loyola School of Theology; For the reason
above given, lay students admitted to the Loyola
School of Theology to take up courses for credit
therein have to be officially admitted by the
Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the
Ateneo de Manila University in order for them to
be considered as admitted to a degree program;
Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted
by respondent to take some courses for credit
but said admission was not an admission to a
degree program because only the Assistant
Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School
can make such admission; That in the case of
petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean
of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was
given, so that she was not accepted to a degree
program but was merely allowed to take some
courses for credit during the summer of 1975;
Furthermore, petitioner was not charged a single
centavo by the Loyola School of Theology
and/or the Ateneo de Manila University in
connection with the courses she took in the
summer of 1975, as she was allowed to take it
free of charge; That respondent Fr. Antonio B.
Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola School of
Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee,
necessarily has discretion as to whether to admit
and/or to continue admitting in the said school
any particular student, considering not only
academic or intellectual standards but also other
considerations such as personality traits and
character orientation in relation with other
students as well as considering the nature of
Loyola School of Theology as a seminary. The
Petition for Mandamus therefore does not lie, as
there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the
part of respondent to admit the petitioner therein
in the current year to take up further courses in
the Loyola School of Theology."5 It was likewise
alleged in the aforesaid comment that as set
forth in the letter of May 19, 1975, the decision
not to allow petitioner to take up further courses
in said seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based
on reasonable grounds, ... ."6 Then reference
was made to the availability of non-judicial
remedies which petitioner could have pursued.7
The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition
for lack of merit. Petitioner sought permission to
reply and it was granted. Thereafter, she had a
detailed recital of why under the circumstances
she is entitled to relief from the courts. In a
resolution of August 8, 1975, this Court
considered the comment of respondent as
answer and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda. That they did, and the
petition was deemed submitted for decision. As
was made clear at the outset, we do not see
merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.
1. In respondent's memorandum, it was
made clear why a petition for mandamus is not
the proper remedy. Thus: "Petitioner cannot
compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit
her into further studies in the Loyola School of
Theology. For respondent has no clear duty to
so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of
Theology is a seminary for the priesthood.
Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not
studying for the priesthood, she being a lay
person and a woman. And even assuming ex
gratia argumenti that she is qualified to study for
the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part
of respondent to admit her to said studies, since
the school has clearly the discretion to turn down
even qualified applicants due to limitations of
space, facilities, professors and optimum
classroom size and component
considerations."8 No authorities were cited,
respondent apparently being of the view that the
law has not reached the stage where the matter
of admission to an institution of higher learning
rests on the sole and uncontrolled discretion of
the applicant. There are standards that must be
met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion
appears to be of the essence. In terms of
Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the
position of petitioner possesses is a privilege
rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy
the prime and indispensable requisite of a
mandamus proceeding. Such being the case,
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 44
there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School
of Theology. In a rather comprehensive
memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately
did not have counsel, an attempt was made to
dispute the contention of respondent. There was
a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was
not sufficiently persuasive. It is understandable
why. It was the skill of a lay person rather than a
practitioner that was evident. While she pressed
her points with vigor, she was unable to
demonstrate the existence of the clear legal right
that must exist to justify the grant of this writ.
2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously
noted, the recognition in the Constitution of
institutions of higher learning enjoying academic
freedom. It is more often identified with the right
of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty and thereafter to make
known or publish the result of his endeavors
without fear that retribution would be visited on
him in the event that his conclusions are found
distasteful or objectionable to the powers that
be, whether in the political, economic, or
academic establishments. For the sociologist,
Robert McIver it is "a right claimed by the
accredited educator, as teacher and as
investigator, to interpret his findings and to
communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or
penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority
within or beyond the institution." 9 As for the
educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is
his version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly
put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified
persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach
the truth as they see it in the field of their
competence. It is subject to no control or
authority except the control or authority of the
rational methods by which truths or conclusions
are sought and established in these disciplines."
10
3. That is only one aspect though. Such a
view does not comprehend fully the scope of
academic freedom recognized by the
Constitution. For it is to be noted that the
reference is to the "institutions of higher
learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would
follow then that the school or college itself is
possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them.
It is free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of
students. This constitutional provision is not to
be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
gradging fashion. That would be to frustrate its
purpose, nullify its intent. Former President
Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the
Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is
similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the
right of academic freedom to the university as an
institution as distinguished from the academic
freedom of a university professor." 11 He cited
the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector
of the University of Dijon, France, President of
the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of
European universities: " "It is a well-established
fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be
obscured in discussions of the problems of
freedom, that the collective liberty of an
organization is by no means the same thing as
the freedom of the individual members within it;
in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even
necessarily connected. In considering the
problems of academic freedom one must
distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of
the university, as a corporate body, and the
freedom of the individual university teacher." " 12
Also: "To clarify further the distinction between
the freedom of the university and that of the
individual scholar, he says: "The personal
aspect of freedom consists in the right of each
university teacher — recognized and effectively
guaranteed by society — to seek and express
the truth as he personally sees it, both in his
academic work and in his capacity as a private
citizen. Thus the status of the individual
university teacher is at least as important, in
considering academic freedom, as the status of
the institutions to which they belong and through
which they disseminate their learning."' 13 He
likewise quoted from the President of the
Queen's University in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby:
"'The internal conditions for academic freedom
in a university are that the academic staff should
have de facto control of the following functions:
(i) the admission and examination of students;
(ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii) the
appointment and tenure of office of academic
staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the
different categories of expenditure. It would be a
poor prospect for academic freedom if
universities had to rely on the literal
interpretation of their constitutions in order to
acquire for their academic members control of
these four functions, for in one constitution or
another most of these functions are laid on the
shoulders of the law governing body .'" 14
Justice Frankfurter, with his extensive
background in legal education as a former
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 45

Professor of the Harvard Law School, referred to

what he called the business of a university and
the four essential freedoms in the following
language: "It is the business of a university to
provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a
university — to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted
to study." 15 Thus is reinforced the conclusion
reached by us that mandamus does not lie in this
case.

4. It is not an easy matter then to disregard

the views of persons knowledgeable in the field,
to whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness
of the need to respect freedom of thought on the
part of students and scholars. Moreover, it could
amount to minimizing the full respect that must
be accorded the academic freedom expressly
granted by the Constitution "to institutions of
higher learning." It is equally difficult to yield
conformity to the approach taken that colleges
and universities should be looked upon as public
utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to
admit or reject. Education, especially higher
education, belongs to a different, and certainly
higher, category.

5. It only remains to be added that the futility

that marked the persistence of petitioner to
continue her studies in the Loyola School of
Theology is the result solely of a legal appraisal
of the situation before us. The decision is not to
be construed as in any way reflecting on the
scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on
the part of respondent due acknowledgment of
her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons
explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was
deemed best, considering the interest of the
school as well as of the other students and her
own welfare, that she continue her graduate
work elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in
such appraisal of the circumstances deemed
relevant. It could be that on more mature
reflection, even petitioner would realize that her
transfer to some other institution would redound
to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as
indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the
controversy was touched upon in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack

of merit.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 46
G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC.,
EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES,
JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO,
CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO
and JAMES YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO
D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION,
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR,
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD
REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES, JR.,
respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang
mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot
sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang
karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James
Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the
De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of
Saint Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board
because of their involvement in an offensive
action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap
and three other student members of Domino Lux
Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the
controversy before Us pitting private
respondents' right to education vis-a-vis the
University's right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996
dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorari against
respondent Judge and private respondents
Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes,
Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15,
1996 denying the motion for reconsideration;3
(3) Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting
private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate
writ of preliminary injunction;4 and (4)
Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
exonerating private respondent Aguilar and
lowering the penalties for the other private
respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent
incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private
respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining
witnesses, it appears that one week prior to
March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his
dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant near La
Salle, when he overheard two men bad-
mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux.
He ignored the comments of the two. When he
arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the
remarks to his two other brods while watching
television. These two brods had earlier finished
eating their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three,
together with four other persons went back to
Manang's and confronted the two who were still
in the restaurant. By admission of respondent
Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was
a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity.
There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted
between the two heads of the fraternity through
the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an
apology. "Kailangan ng apology" in the words of
respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino
Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were
respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Papio.
They were looking for a person whose
description matched James Yap. According to
them, this person supposedly "nambastos ng
brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of
them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na
lang."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m.,
Mr. James Yap went out of the campus using the
Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft
Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft
Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back.
Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He
panicked. He did not know what to do. Then,
respondent Bungubung punched him in the
head with something heavy in his hands –
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 47
"parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and
Lee were behind Yap, punching him.
Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were
in front of him, were also punching him. As he
was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar
kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and
the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members
of the group who attacked him. With respect to
respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita
ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya."
What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also
running with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the
campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was
at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual
accompanied Yap to the university clinic;
reported the incident to the Discipline Office; and
informed his fraternity brods at their tambayan.
According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the
Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang gagalaw.
Uwian na lang."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a
ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under the
clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not
proceed directly for home. With a certain
Michael Perez, they went towards the direction
of Dagonoy Street because Mr. Pascual was
supposed to pick up a book for his friend from
another friend who lives somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before
they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate
Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys
inside the restaurant. He said not to mind them
and just keep on walking. However, the group
got out of the restaurant, among them
respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr.
Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo." But,
respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without
provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr.
Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr.
Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to
run from the mauling and they were chased by
respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent
Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was
ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but
the group was able to catch up with him. His shirt
was torn and he was hit at the back of his head
with a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was
chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr.
Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente
and Lee, as among those who hit him. Although
Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit
him, he identified respondent Valdez (sic) as
also one of the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near
Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the corner of
Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent
Pascual who managed to run was stopped at the
end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent
Valdes shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo."
Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the
last time. Apparently being satisfied with their
handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano,
Perez and Pascual proceeded to a friend's
house and waited for almost two hours, or at
around 8:00 in the evening before they returned
to the campus to have their wounds treated.
Apparently, there were three cars roaming the
vicinity.6
The mauling incidents were a result of a
fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner
James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano,
and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino
Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants,
private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto
Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap
lodged a complaint7 with the Discipline Board of
DLSU charging private respondents with "direct
assault." Similar complaints8 were also filed by
Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin
Lee and private respondents Valdes and
Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle
University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin
Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul
Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R.
Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee
(EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-
MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-
MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline
Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent
separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente
informing them of the complaints and requiring
them to answer. Private respondents filed their
respective answers.9
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 48
As it appeared that students from DLSU and
CSB10 were involved in the mauling incidents, a
joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was formed
to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner
Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices
of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12,
1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded
Discipline Board had been constituted to hear
and deliberate the charge against you for
violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the
written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C.
Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the
Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m.
at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your
witnesses to give testimony and present
evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by
a lawyer when you give your testimony or those
of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further
directed to provide the Board, through the
Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as
well as the sworn statement of their proposed
testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing
or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and
the sworn statement of their proposed testimony
will be considered a waiver on your part to
present evidence and as an admission of the
principal act complained of.
For your strict compliance.13
During the proceedings before the Board on
April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents
interposed the common defense of alibi,
summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board as follows:
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung,
March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances
when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain
Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent
Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But
on this particular date, respondent Bungubung
said that his dad asked his permission to use the
car and thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo
to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family
driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for
the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder
Bungubung is also employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of
respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he
arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up
respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd.
route towards respondent's house in BF
Parañaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and
arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent
Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and
taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at
the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine
Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor.14
xxxx
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was
with his friends at McDonald's Taft just before
6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left
McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to get some
medicine at the university clinic for his throat
irritation. He said that he was at the clinic at 5:52
p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a
span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the
girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain
Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate
Valdez' alibi.15
xxxx
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the
Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of
March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the
responsibility to be the paymaster of the
construction workers who were doing some
works in the apartment of his parents. Although
he had classes in the evening, the workers
according to him would wait for him sometimes
up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes.
The workers get paid everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit,
unsigned by the workers listed there,
supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the
workers at the date and time in question.16
xxxx
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore]
that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame
for a meeting with some of the officers that we
were preparing."17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board issued a Resolution18 finding private
respondents guilty. They were meted the
supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 49
pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The
dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the
Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-
BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG
(AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE
(EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V.
REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of
having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby
orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO
(AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of
the charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for
reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior
Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU.
The motions were all denied in a Letter-
Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar
filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a
petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent
Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially
sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of
the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the
June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of
the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent
Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its
subordinates, agents, representatives and/or
other persons acting for and in its behalf to
refrain and desist from implementing Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated
June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from
barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second
term of school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed
an ex parte motion to amend his petition to
correct an allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of his
original petition. Respondent Judge amended
the TRO26 to conform to the correction made in
the amended petition.27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to
furnish it with copies of the case records of
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,28 in view of
the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
(MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents
Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes,
filed petitions-in-intervention29 in Civil Case No.
95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued
corresponding temporary restraining orders to
compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private
respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion
to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except
James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed
a supplemental motion to dismiss31 the
petitions-in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge
issued an Order32 denying petitioners'
(respondents there) motion to dismiss and its
supplement, and granted private respondents'
(petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents,
representatives or any and all other persons
acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and
enjoined from –
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-
intervention from the De La Salle University and
the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995,
affirming the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered
at respondent De La Salle University and to
immediately allow them to enroll and complete
their respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat in accordance with the
standards set by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for
is granted. Respondent, its agents,
representatives, or any and all persons acting for
and its behalf are hereby restrained and enjoyed
from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated
June 1, 1995; and
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 50
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered
at respondent (De La Salle University) and to
forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitioners-
in-intervention to enroll and complete their
respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take
effect upon petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention posting an injunctive bond in the
amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of
respondent to the effect that petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention will pay to respondent
all damages that the latter may suffer by reason
of the injunction if the Court will finally decide
that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are
not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement
thereto is denied for lack of merit. Respondents
are directed to file their Answer to the Petition
not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent
Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner
DLSU when he attempted to enroll on
September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY
1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995,
Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent
motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in
contempt of court.34 Aguilar also prayed that
petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU
in accordance with respondent Judge's Order
dated September 20, 1995. On September 25,
1995, respondent Judge issued35 a writ of
preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of
which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned
of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
that until further orders, you the said DE LA
SALLE University as well as your subordinates,
agents, representatives, employees and any
other person assisting or acting for or on your
behalf, to immediately desist from implementing
the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and the
intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution
dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution
of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from
barring the enrolment of petitioner and
intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU and
to allow them to enroll and complete their degree
courses until their graduation from said
school.36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP
No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement
of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995
Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners'
prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its
questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all
private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be
reinstated, while other private respondents were
to be excluded.38 The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE
LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT
AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF
THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON
MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR.,
ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE
BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE
COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO
IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE
REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND
THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR.
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R.
VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR.
RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION
TO EXCLUSION.39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU
again prevented private respondent Aguilar from
enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting
his lawyer to write several demand letters40 to
petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of
petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent
Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26,
1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco
requesting that private respondent Aguilar be
allowed to continue attending his classes
pending the resolution of its motion for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96.
However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do
so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order
dated September 23, 1996 which states:
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 51
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr.
Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle
University (DLSU) to comply with CHED
Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin
Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to
reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent
request as meritorious, there being no other
plain and speedy remedy available, considering
the set deadline for enrollment this current
TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further
prejudice to his rights as a student of the
institution, DLSU, through the proper school
authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin
Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the
Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion
for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
SO ORDERED.41
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner
DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still
refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to
enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's
counsel wrote another demand letter to
petitioner DLSU.42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent
Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96,
filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing
that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the
CA case moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned
resolution granting the motion to dismiss of
private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of
herein petition is hereby directed.
SO ORDERED.44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its
resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No.
181-96 is immediately executory in character,
the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration
notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of
merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested
transfer of case records to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the
CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the
DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over
expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer
of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-
3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction, private respondent
Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995
before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued
its questioned order granting private respondent
Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate preliminary
injunction. The pertinent portion of the order
reads:
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's
urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby granted, and respondents'
motion to dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force
and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served
personally by the Court's sheriff upon the
respondents at petitioners' expense.
SO ORDERED.48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was
allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner
DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the
writ of preliminary injunction dated September
25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No.
95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the
instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as
prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance
of a TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners,
and enjoined respondent Judge from
implementing the writ of preliminary injunction
dated September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case
No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until
further orders from this Court.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 52
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar
filed his manifestation51 stating that he has long
completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He
finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for
the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated
in his transcript of records52 issued by DLSU.
However, despite having completed all the
academic requirements for his course, DLSU
has not issued a certificate of
completion/graduation in his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which
has legal authority to review decisions of
institutions of higher learning that impose
disciplinary action on their students found
violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its
rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due
process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to
academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven
by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU
on private respondents is proportionate to their
misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of
petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No.
181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other
private respondents, it nonetheless authorized
their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However,
because of the dismissal of the CA case,
petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle
of having two different directives from the CHED
and the respondent Judge – CHED ordering the
exclusion of private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge
ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll
and complete their degree courses until their
graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole
case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities,
in order to settle the substantial issues involved.
This Court has the power to take cognizance of
the petition at bar due to compelling reasons,
and the nature and importance of the issues
raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our
jurisdiction.54 This is in consonance with our
case law now accorded near-religious reverence
that rules of procedure are but tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, this Court has
the duty to suspend their operation.55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may
kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso
sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga
institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to
review student expulsion cases, even those
involving students in secondary and tertiary
levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED.
In support of their stance, petitioners cite
Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and
7060 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232,
otherwise known as the "Education Act of 1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722
did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power
of supervision/review over expulsion cases
involving institutions of higher learning. They say
that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes
no reference to the right and duty of learning
institutions to develop moral character and instill
discipline among its students. The clear concern
of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED
was academic, i.e., the formulation,
recommendation, setting, and development of
academic plans, programs and standards for
institutions of higher learning. The enumeration
of CHED's powers and functions under Section
8 does not include supervisory/review powers in
student disciplinary cases. The reference in
Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of institutions of
higher education is limited to the powers and
functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of
Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced
and whose functions and responsibilities it has
taken over, never had any authority over student
disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 53
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No.
7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the
Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating
Funds Thereof and for other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way
for the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on
Higher Education. – In pursuance of the
abovementioned policies, the Commission on
Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter
referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and
separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the
office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public
and private institutions of higher education as
well as degree-granting programs in all post
secondary educational institutions, public and
private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are
enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They
include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the
Commission. – The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and
exercise such other powers and functions as
may be necessary to carry out effectively the
purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be
necessary for its effective operations and for the
continued enhancement of growth or
development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of
petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to
the CHED the DECS' power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases
involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing.
They make no reservations of powers to the
DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning
are concerned. They show that the authority and
supervision over all public and private
institutions of higher education, as well as
degree-granting programs in all post-secondary
educational institutions, public and private,
belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has
authority to decide disciplinary cases involving
students on the tertiary level would render
nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is
"both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree granting programs
in all post secondary educational institutions,
public and private." That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is
a private educational institution which offers
tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the
CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only
the protection, fostering and promotion of the
right of all citizens to affordable quality education
at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps
to ensure that education shall be accessible to
all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring
and protecting academic freedom and with
promoting its exercise and observance for the
continued intellectual growth of students, the
advancement of learning and research, the
development of responsible and effective
leadership, the education of high-level and
middle-level professionals, and the enrichment
of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress
passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware
that disciplinary cases involving students on the
tertiary level would continue to arise in the future,
which would call for the invocation and exercise
of institutions of higher learning of their right to
academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its
bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education,
which CHED replaced, never had authority over
student disciplinary cases. In fact, the
responsibilities of other government entities
having functions similar to those of the CHED
were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of
review in student discipline cases should
therefore be read in conjunction with the
provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear
in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-
supervised or chartered state-supported post-
secondary degree-granting vocational and
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 54
tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the
Commission [On Higher Education]." This
provision does not limit or distinguish that what
is being transferred to the CHED is merely the
formulation, recommendation, setting and
development of academic plans, programs and
standards for institutions of higher learning, as
what petitioners would have us believe as the
only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where
the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit
grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily
includes the transfer to the CHED of any
jurisdiction which the DECS might have
possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other
law or rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due
process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng
tamang proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1
of the Constitution embodies a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply imbedded
in the traditions and feelings of our people as to
be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as
conceived by our entire history.64 The
constitutional behest that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law is solemn and inflexible.65
In administrative cases, such as investigations
of students found violating school discipline,
"[t]here are withal minimum standards which
must be met before to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process and these are: that (1)
the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them and with the assistance if
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but failed to do so,
he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is
among the primary rights that must be respected
even in administrative proceedings.68 The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.69 So long as
the party is given the opportunity to advocate her
cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and
in all instances, essential to due process – it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does
not only mean presentation of testimonial
evidence in court – one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to
be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is
no denial of due process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in
writing of the charges against them by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through
petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them
as they, in fact, submitted their respective
answers. They were also informed of the
evidence presented against them as they
attended all the hearings before the Board.
Moreover, private respondents were given the
right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they
did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all
the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the
parties before rendering its resolution in
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were
denied due process when they were not allowed
to cross-examine the witnesses against them.
This argument was already rejected in Guzman
v. National University73 where this Court held
that "x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process.
And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts
of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination
is not, x x x an essential part thereof."
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 55
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher
learning, possesses academic freedom which
includes determination of who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas
mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng
kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang
pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guaranties all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public interest calls for some
restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence,
academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what
may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4)
who may be admitted to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an
interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any
field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right
to discipline the student likewise finds basis in
the freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it
is categorically stated under the Education Act
of 1982 that students have a right "to freely
choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up
to graduation,"77 such right is subject to the
established academic and disciplinary standards
laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner
DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its
academic freedom, which includes its free
choice of students for admission to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by
substantial evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na
sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay
napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents
interposed the common defense of alibi.
However, in order that alibi may succeed as a
defense, "the accused must establish by clear
and convincing evidence (a) his presence at
another place at the time of the perpetration of
the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of
his presence at the scene of the crime."78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not
be successfully invoked where the identity of the
assailant has been established by witnesses.79
Positive identification of accused where
categorical and consistent, without any showing
of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial
of appellants whose testimonies are not
substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial
and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot
overcome the positive testimonies of the
offended parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible
eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively
identify the accused.82 Alibi is an inherently
weak defense and courts must receive it with
caution because one can easily fabricate an
alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, like
alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of
positive declarations of truthful witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters that accused
were at the scene of the crime and were the
victim's assailants. As between categorical
testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a
bare denial on the other, the former must
prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for
it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove,
and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over
the positive identification of accused by the
witnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such
as in student discipline cases, is neither proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of
evidence but only substantial evidence.
According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,86 it means "such reasonable
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of
private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and
Reverente.1awphi1 They were unable to show
convincingly that they were not at the scene of
the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was
impossible for them to have been there.
Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their
positive identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement
affirming the expulsion of several students found
guilty of hazing:
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 56
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the
immediate reinstatement of respondent students
who have been investigated and found guilty by
the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner
university's disciplinary rules and standards will
certainly undermine the authority of the
administration of the school. This we would be
most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair
petitioner university's academic freedom which
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the
present 1987 Constitution.87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to
claim a venerable institution as their own, for
they may foreseeably cast a malevolent
influence on the students currently enrolled, as
well as those who come after them.88 It must be
borne in mind that universities are established,
not merely to develop the intellect and skills of
the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals
and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering
if you will, of the total man.89
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We
are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he
was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time
of the incident in question on March 29, 1995.
This claim was amply corroborated by the
certification that he submitted before the DLSU-
CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm
by way of this Certification that sometime on
March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M.
and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A.
Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame,
Quezon City, meeting in connection with an
affair of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of
the Philippine Constabulary discussing on the
proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI from
said Batch '89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30
P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked
our permission to leave and we saw him leave
Camp Crame, in his car with the driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90
The said certification was duly signed by PO3
Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC,
NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM,
Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C.
Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and
PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center,
PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes
significance or strength when it is amply
corroborated by credible and disinterested
witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak
defense which an accused can easily fabricate
to escape criminal liability. But where the
prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack
of credibility as to the identification of defendant,
alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is
but consistent with the presumption of
innocence in favor of accused.92
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there
are times when accused has no other possible
defense for what could really be the truth as to
his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such
defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in
his favor.93
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU
on private respondents is disproportionate to
their misdeed.
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU
sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa
kanilang pagkakasala.
It is true that schools have the power to instill
discipline in their students as subsumed in their
academic freedom and that "the establishment
of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely
to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival."94 This power,
however, does not give them the untrammeled
discretion to impose a penalty which is not
commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed.
If the concept of proportionality between the
offense committed and the sanction imposed is
not followed, an element of arbitrariness
intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
question.95
We agree with respondent CHED that under the
circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts
committed by private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two
mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds
and the victims did not suffer any serious injury.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 57

Disciplinary measures especially where they

involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut
significantly into the future of a student. They
attach to him for life and become a mortgage of
his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases.
Officials of colleges and universities must be
anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that,
appropriately construed, a disciplinary action
should be treated as an educational tool rather
than a punitive measure.96

Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of

exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on
them by the CHED. As such, pursuant to Section
77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may
exclude or drop the names of the said private
respondents from its rolls for being undesirable,
and transfer credentials immediately issued.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions
dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996,
and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36,
Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-
96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate

of completion/graduation in favor of private
respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may
exclude or drop the names of private
respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer
credentials immediately issued.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 58
HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA,
in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN,
ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO
GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER,
respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the
Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows:
where the relief sought from the Commission on
Human Rights by a party in a case consists of
the review and reversal or modification of a
decision or order issued by a court of justice or
government agency or official exercising quasi-
judicial functions, may the Commission take
cognizance of the case and grant that relief?
Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-
matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of
a court or other government agency or official for
purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the
Commission on Human Rights take cognizance
of the same subject-matter for the same
purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied
by the respondents and are hence taken as
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the
legal questions posed in the present action.
These facts, 1 together with others involved in
related cases recently resolved by this Court 2
or otherwise undisputed on the record, are
hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and
a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT)
undertook what they described as "mass
concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances that
had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention. According to them they had decided to
undertake said "mass concerted actions" after
the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes
as a last call for the government to negotiate the
granting of demands had elicited no response
from the Secretary of Education. The "mass
actions" consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc.
Through their representatives, the teachers
participating in the mass actions were served
with an order of the Secretary of Education to
return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and
a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire
their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into
the week, with more teachers joining in the days
that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted
mass actions" were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had
agreed to support the non-political demands of
the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work
order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on
the basis of the principal's report and given five
(5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
"pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and
temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits,
Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee
was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as
Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta
Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber
were, among others, named respondents, 6 the
latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal
investigation, and also moved "for suspension of
the administrative proceedings pending
resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order." But when their
motion for suspension was denied by Order
dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating
Committee, which later also denied their motion
for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 59
November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by
their counsel staged a walkout signifying their
intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The
case eventually resulted in a Decision of
Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well
as the answers, affidavits and documents
submitted by the respondents, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber
and the suspension for nine (9) months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a
petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño),
which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit,
Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme
Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said
dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of
the striking teachers" right to due process and
peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No.
95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar
petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed
as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court
were filed in behalf of the teacher associations,
a few named individuals, and "other teacher-
members so numerous similarly situated" or
"other similarly situated public school teachers
too numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent
teachers submitted sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as
teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown
to them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other
teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . .
(DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were
docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No.
90775." In connection therewith the Commission
scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990,
and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño
requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that
it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño)
received the subpoena which was served at his
office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman
presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R.
Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to
hear the case;" it heard the complainants'
counsel (a) explain that his clients had been
"denied due process and suspended without
formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not
join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the
grievances which were "the cause of the mass
leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which
causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize."
12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order
13 reciting these facts and making the following
disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the
case and be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter,
considering that these forty two teachers are
now suspended and deprived of their wages,
which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro
Cariño, of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school
superintendent of Manila and the Principal of
Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are
hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at
11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all
documents relevant to the allegations
aforestated herein to assist the Commission in
this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of
complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor
General, Secretary Cariño sought and was
granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the
case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on
November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds
therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of
action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over
the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the
Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments
affecting the "striking teachers" were
promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated,
viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of
Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS
90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9)
months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15
and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated
August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590
dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any
appeals, if still timely, that the individual
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 60
petitioners may take to the Civil Service
Commission on the matters complained of," 16
and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful
for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work
orders, file administrative charges against
recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and
issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990,
respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's
motion to dismiss and required him and
Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-
affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which)
the Commission shall proceed to hear and
resolve the case on the merits with or without
respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the
"striking teachers" "were denied due process of
law; . . . they should not have been replaced
without a chance to reply to the administrative
charges;" there had been a violation of their civil
and political rights which the Commission was
empowered to investigate; and while expressing
its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the
facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the
case decided by the Supreme Court" (the
reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint
Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445
and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of
December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in
behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the
present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made
clear its position that it does not feel bound by
this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445
and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its
intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e.,
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the
merits." It intends, in other words, to try and
decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were
denied due process, and just cause exists for the
imposition of administrative disciplinary
sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were
"the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR
complainants) sympathize," justify their mass
action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself
adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
character of finality and definiteness, the same
issues which have been passed upon and
decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture
& Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers
affected may take appeals to the Civil Service
Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the
Commission on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so; whether or not,
like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial
agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try and decide, or
hear and determine, certain specific type of
cases, like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human
Rights to have no such power; and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another
court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. 21
This function, to repeat, the Commission does
not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the
constitutional provisions specifying the powers
of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987
Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon
its constitution, it succeeded and superseded
the Presidential Committee on Human Rights
existing at the time of the effectivity of the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 61
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the
following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules
of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for
the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails,
prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of
research, education, and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations
of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's
compliance with international treaty obligations
on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in
accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions
as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of
the enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to
the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. It can exercise that power on
its own initiative or on complaint of any person.
It may exercise that power pursuant to such
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases
of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or
the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to
examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire
into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to
conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere
included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in
the facts inquired into by application of the law to
the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially
the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to
search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn
describe as "(a)n administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery
and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly
understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 62
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally
(the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge."
30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon
as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case
of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To
settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in
its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or
to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human
Rights, having merely the power "to investigate,"
cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it
has announced it means to do; and it cannot do
so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against
the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More
particularly, the Commission has no power to
"resolve on the merits" the question of (a)
whether or not the mass concerted actions
engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b)
whether or not the act of carrying on and taking
part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return
to their classes despite the order to this effect by
the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions
of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are
justified by the grievances complained of by
them; and (c) what where the particular acts
done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for
said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly
within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the
Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as
above narrated, already taken cognizance of the
issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that
appeals have been seasonably taken by the
aggrieved parties to the Civil Service
Commission; and even this Court itself has had
occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the
conclusions reached by the Secretary of
Education in disciplinary cases are correct and
are adequately based on substantial evidence;
whether or not the proceedings themselves are
void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not
the Secretary of Education had in truth
committed "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights," are matters which may
be passed upon and determined through a
motion for reconsideration addressed to the
Secretary Education himself, and in the event of
an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil
Service Commission and eventually the
Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has
no place in this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the jurisdiction and
functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil
Service Commission. It has no business going
over the same ground traversed by the latter and
making its own judgment on the questions
involved. This would accord success to what
may well have been the complaining teachers'
strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the
judgment of the Education Secretary in the
administrative cases against them which they
anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to
be done.
In any event, the investigation by the
Commission on Human Rights would serve no
useful purpose. If its investigation should result
in conclusions contrary to those reached by
Secretary Cariño, it would have no power
anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions.
Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil
Service Commission and lastly by this Court.
The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is
to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance;
that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35
It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order
of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 63

ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on

Human Rights and the Chairman and Members
thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the
case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775) on the merits." SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 64
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO,
CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE
FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES,
respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the
Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again
placed into focus in this petition for prohibition,
with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to
prohibit public respondent CHR from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-
1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice,"
dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo
(one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office
of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by,
the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three
(3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to
vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition
notice, the private respondents were informed
by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be
removed to give way to the "People's Park".2 On
12 July 1990, the group, led by their President
Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-
samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter
to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon,
Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the
private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and
carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint
was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On
23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted
by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as
well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and
convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners
carried out the demolition of private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR,
in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more
than P200,000.00 in favor of the private
respondents to purchase light housing materials
and food under the Commission's supervision
and again directed the petitioners to "desist from
further demolition, with the warning that violation
of said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest."6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990,
questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also
averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged
violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency
Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-
Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the
demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in
Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement
(revealed) that the moratorium referred to
therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of
the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were)
not poor dwellers but independent business
entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that
the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying
government land, particularly the sidewalk of
EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . .
and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had)
the sole and exclusive discretion and authority
whether or not a certain business establishment
(should) be allowed to operate within the
jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a
permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly
specified by law and ordinance.8
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 65
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the
petitioners moved for postponement, arguing
that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September
1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners
likewise manifested that they would bring the
case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion
to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating
that the Commission's authority should be
understood as being confined only to the
investigation of violations of civil and political
rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in
this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but)
their privilege to engage in business."9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss
was heard and submitted for resolution, along
with the contempt charge that had meantime
been filed by the private respondents, albeit
vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the
ground that the motion to dismiss was still then
unresolved).10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the
CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for
carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia despite the "order to
desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each
of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order,
denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights
under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction
over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors
who complained of the gross violations of their
human and constitutional rights. The motion to
dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of
the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a
paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and
political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a
quasi-judicial body with the power to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines
. . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to
one's right to development, to life and to dignity.
All these brazenly and violently ignored and
trampled upon by respondents with little regard
at the same time for the basic rights of women
and children, and their health, safety and
welfare. Their actions have psychologically
scarred and traumatized the children, who were
witness and exposed to such a violent
demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our
resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was
subsequently reinstated, however, in our
resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also
issued a temporary restraining order, directing
the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further
hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has
jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the
"business rights" of the private respondents
whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners
at the instance and authority given by the Mayor
of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the
petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00
as financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the
Solicitor-General was excused from filing his
comment for public respondent CHR. The latter
thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon.
Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The
Court also resolved to dispense with the
comment of private respondent Roque Fermo,
who had since failed to comply with the
resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such
comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created
by the 1987
Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by
then President Corazon Aquino via Executive
Order No. 163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the
exercise of her legislative power at the time. It
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 66
succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission
are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules
of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for
the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails,
prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of
research, education, and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations
of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's
compliance with international treaty obligations
on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in
accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions
as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional
Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body.23 This view, however, has not heretofore
been shared by this Court. In Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is
"only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions that bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment," but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to
the adjudicatory power itself. The Court
explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another
court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does
not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above
rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of
CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human
rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to
define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best
be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In
a symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in
1977, one of the questions that has been
propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by
"human rights?" The participants, representing
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 67
different sectors of the society, have given the
following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere
in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the
same in all parts of the world, whether the
Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet
Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the
right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of
speech, of the press, of religion, academic
freedom, and the rights of the accused to due
process of law; political rights, such as the right
to elect public officials, to be elected to public
office, and to form political associations and
engage in politics; and social rights, such as the
right to an education, employment, and social
services.25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in
the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human
rights are not granted by the State but can only
be recognized and protected by it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political,
economic, social, and cultural rights defined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man
simply because he is human. They are part of
his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as
well as, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, suggests that the scope of
human rights can be understood to include those
that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems
to closely identify the term to the universally
accepted traits and attributes of an individual,
along with what is generally considered to be his
inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing
almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally
contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the
specific provisions on human rights and in
creating an independent commission to
safeguard these rights? It may of value to look
back at the country's experience under the
martial law regime which may have, in fact,
impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard.
Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps
of the sentiments expressed by others, comes
from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist
and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his
paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights
in the Philippines,"29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of
1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the
human rights expressed in the International
Covenant, these rights became unavailable
upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21
September 1972. Arbitrary action then became
the rule. Individuals by the thousands became
subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were
detained and held for indefinite periods,
sometimes for years, without charges, until
ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or
this representative. The right to petition for the
redress of grievances became useless, since
group actions were forbidden. So were strikes.
Press and other mass media were subjected to
censorship and short term licensing. Martial law
brought with it the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and judges lost independence
and security of tenure, except members of the
Supreme Court. They were required to submit
letters of resignation and were dismissed upon
the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by
international bodies like Amnesty International
and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the
Constitutional Commission, we can see the
following discussions during its 26 August 1986
deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task
must be made clear in view of the importance of
human rights and also because civil and political
rights have been determined by many
international covenants and human rights
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and
subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover
such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence,
its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of
its tasks so that the commission can be most
effective.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 68
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my
difficulty because civil and political rights are
very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights
covers civil and political rights. Every single right
of an individual involves his civil right or his
political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political
rights have been made clear in the language of
human rights advocates, as well as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
addresses a number of articles on the right to
life, the right against torture, the right to fair and
public hearing, and so on. These are very
specific rights that are considered enshrined in
many international documents and legal
instruments as constituting civil and political
rights, and these are precisely what we want to
defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner
say civil and political rights as defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from
the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will
encompass social and economic rights, and
there are other violations of rights of citizens
which can be addressed to the proper courts and
authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the
commission to define its functions, and,
therefore, in doing that the commission will be
authorized to take under its wings cases which
perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under
the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and
prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I
correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned
earlier that we would like to define the specific
parameters which cover civil and political rights
as covered by the international standards
governing the behavior of governments
regarding the particular political and civil rights
of citizens, especially of political detainees or
prisoners. This particular aspect we have
experienced during martial law which we would
now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question
that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to
say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could
specify all those rights stated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and defined as
human rights. Those are the rights that we
envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also
enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution.
They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman
saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights
covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil
and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on
the scope of human rights, I would like to state
that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the
violation of human rights, the Marcos regime
came out with the defense that, as a matter of
fact, they had defended the rights of people to
decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of
human rights to political rights. Is that the sense
of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and
respond also to repeated points raised by the
previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this
Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political
detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4)
cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and
hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 69
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with
Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to
make the proposed Commission more effective,
delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to
future expansion. The coverage of the concept
and jurisdictional area of the term "human
rights". I was actually disturbed this morning
when the reference was made without
qualification to the rights embodied in the
universal Declaration of Human Rights, although
later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and
political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President,
Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
mentioned or linked the concept of human right
with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I
correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona
referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the
commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one
is the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is
that, although I have a copy of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have
a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is
quite possible that there are rights specified in
that other convention which may not be specified
here. I was wondering whether it would be wise
to link our concept of human rights to general
terms like "convention," rather than specify the
rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the
period of amendments, could specify to us which
of these articles in the Declaration will fall within
the concept of civil and political rights, not for the
purpose of including these in the proposed
constitutional article, but to give the sense of the
Commission as to what human rights would be
included, without prejudice to expansion later
on, if the need arises. For example, there was no
definite reply to the question of Commissioner
Regalado as to whether the right to marry would
be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a
civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to
repeat the various specific civil and political
rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by
this provision — freedom from political detention
and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and
public trials, as well as crimes involving
disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and
collective violations. So, it is limited to politically
related crimes precisely to protect the civil and
political rights of a specific group of individuals,
and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of
the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the
record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his
concept or the concept of the Committee on
Human Rights with the so-called civil or political
rights as contained in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was
referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will
refer to each and every specific article therein,
but only to those that pertain to the civil and
politically related, as we understand it in this
Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not
even clear as to the distinction between civil and
social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international
covenants: the International Covenant and Civil
and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. The second covenant contains all the
different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the
right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the
moment the sense of the committee to those that
the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 70
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint
of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress
more on how much we need a Commission on
Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless.
They cannot pay and very few lawyers will
accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are
the ones more abused and oppressed. Another
reason is, the cases involved are very delicate
— torture, salvaging, picking up without any
warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons
who are allegedly guilty are people in power like
politicians, men in the military and big shots.
Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must
be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much
we need this commission, especially for the little
Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind
of help and cannot get it. And I think we should
concentrate only on civil and political violations
because if we open this to land, housing and
health, we will have no place to go again and we
will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis
supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18,
Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a
provision empowering the Commission on
Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec.
1).
The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as
referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of
the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the
government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom
of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by
virtue of his citizenship in a state or community.
Such term may also refer, in its general sense,
to rights capable of being enforced or redressed
in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees
against involuntary servitude, religious
persecution, unreasonable searches and
seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to
refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration
of government, the right of suffrage, the right to
hold public office, the right of petition and, in
general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-
a-vis the management of government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent
that the delegates envisioned a Commission on
Human Rights that would focus its attention to
the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of
rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair
and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances,
(5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other
crimes committed against the religious." While
the enumeration has not likely been meant to
have any preclusive effect, more than just
expressing a statement of priority, it is,
nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In
any event, the delegates did not apparently take
comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive
delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial
jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve,
instead, that "Congress may provide for other
cases of violations of human rights that should
fall within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil
that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private
respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than
that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon
City which, this Court can take judicial notice of,
is a busy national highway. The consequent
danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise
simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a
right which is claimed to have been violated is
one that cannot, in the first place, even be
invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may,
looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed
vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this
instance, we are not prepared to conclude that
the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia of the private respondents
can fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 71
On its contempt powers, the CHR is
constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure,
and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in
providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or
hold any person in direct or indirect contempt,
and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court." That power
to cite for contempt, however, should be
understood to apply only to violations of its
adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power
to cite for contempt could be exercised against
persons who refuse to cooperate with the said
body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons,
and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us,
however, is not investigatorial in character but
prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess. In Export Processing Zone
Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36
the Court, speaking through Madame Justice
Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to
"provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection"
may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or
writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution
or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal
aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer
to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a
writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR
may seek from proper courts on behalf of the
victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction
to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of
any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for
the preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to
indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of
government.37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the
amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to
the vendors affected by the demolition is not an
appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only
is there lack of locus standi on the part of the
petitioners to question the disbursement but,
more importantly, the matter lies with the
appropriate administrative agencies concerned
to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition
for prohibition filed by the petitioners has
become moot and academic since the case
before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already
been fully heard, and that the matter is merely
awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition
is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an
act about to be done, and not intended to provide
a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38
Here, however, said Commission admittedly has
yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No.
90-1580. The instant petition has been intended,
among other things, to also prevent CHR from
precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition
is GRANTED. The Commission on Human
Rights is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and
from implementing the P500.00 fine for
contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 72
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF
RIGHTS
G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975
DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND
ORLANDO MADDELA, defendants-
appellees.
Ricardo L. Manalilig for plaintiffs-appellants.
Iñigo R. Peña for defendants-appellees.
MARTIN, J.:
Appeal on a question of law from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Palawan in Civil
Case No. 416, entitled "Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha
vs. Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando
Maddela", dismissing the complaint of the
plaintiffs and ordering them to pay each of the
defendants jointly and severally the sum of
P500.00 by way of actual damages; P500.00 by
way of attorney's fees; and P1,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages.
On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha
sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of
Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launch named
M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9,
1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took
away the motor launch from him.
On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary
investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in
his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Palawan the corresponding information for
Robbery the Force and Intimidation upon
Persons against Jikil Taha. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2719.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de
Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch
was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial
Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct
the detachment commander-in Balabac to
impound and take custody of the motor launch.1
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon
reiterated his request to the Provincial
Commander to impound the motor launch,
explaining that its subsequent sale to a third
party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot
prevent the court from taking custody of the
same.2 So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the
Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee
Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of
Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch
"SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim and impounded it.
On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim
pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the
motor launch but the latter refused. Likewise, on
September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his
counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce
de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon
refused, on the ground that the same was the
subject of a criminal offense.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to
naught, plaintiffs-appellants Delfin Lim and Jikil
Taha, on November 19, 1962, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Palawan a complaint
for damages against defendants-appellees
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando
Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando
Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim
without a search warrant and then and there took
away the hull of the motor launch without his
consent; that he effected the seizure upon order
of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that
his office was not vested with authority to order
the seizure of a private property; that said motor
launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil
Taha in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)
of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance
payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful
seizure of the motor launch, its sale did not
materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said
motor launch had been moored at the Balabac
Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the
elements it had become worthless and beyond
repair. For the alleged violation of their
constitutional rights, plaintiffs-appellants prayed
that defendants-appellees be ordered to pay
jointly and severally each of them the sum of
P5,750.00 representing actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied
the material allegations of the complaint and as
affirmative defenses alleged that the motor
launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha
to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 73
sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with
violence upon persons and with intent to gain by
Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the
latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise
to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery
against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in
his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and
impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for
being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that
Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of
his superior officer to impound said launch. By
way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees
alleged that because of the malicious and
groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-
appellants, they were constrained to engage the
services of lawyers, each of them paying
P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they
suffered moral damages in the amount of
P5,000.00 each and actual damages in the
amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that
each of them awarded exemplary damages in
the amount of P1,000.00.
On September 13, 1965, the trial court rendered
its decision, upholding the validity of the seizure
of the motor launch on the ground that "the
authority to impound evidences or exhibits or
corpus delicti in a case pending investigation is
inherent in the Provincial Fiscal who controls the
prosecution and who introduces those exhibits in
the court." Accordingly, the trial court dismissed
the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants and
ordered them to pay jointly and severally each of
the defendants-appellees the amount of
P500.00 by way of actual damages another
amount of P500.00 for attorney's fees and
P1,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Hence, this appeal.
Two vital issues call for resolution by this Court.
First, whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal
Ponce de Leon had the power to order the
seizure of the motor launch in question without a
warrant of search and seizure even if the same
was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.
Second, whether or not defendants-appellees
are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for
damages allegedly suffered by them granting
that the seizure of the motor launch was
unlawful.
The gravamen of plaintiffs-appellants' argument
is that the taking of the motor launch on July 6,
1962 by Orlando Maddela upon the order of
Fiscal Ponce de Loon was in violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures since it was done without
a warrant.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution then
in force reads:
3) The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.3
A cursory reading of the above provision easily
brings into focus the unreasonableness of the
seizure of the aforementioned motor launch. A
search and seizure to be reasonable, must be
effected by means of a valid search warrant. And
for a search warrant to be valid: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable
cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3)
in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized.4 Thus in a
long line of decisions, this Court has declared
invalid search warrants which were issued in
utter disregard of the constitutional injunction.5
Defendants-appellees admitted that when
Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin
Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not
armed with a search warrant; that he effected the
seizure of the motor launch in the absence of
and without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can
be no question that without the proper search
warrant, no public official has the right to enter
the premises of another without his consent for
the purpose of search and seizure.6 And since
in the present case defendants-appellees seized
the motor launch without a warrant, they have
violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-
appellants against unreasonable search and
seizure.
Defendants-appellees however would want to
justify the seizure of the motor launch even
without a warrant because of Fiscal Ponce de
Leon's alleged inherent power to order the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 74
seizure of a personal property which is the
corpus delicti of a crime, he being a quasi judicial
officer who has the control of the prosecution
and the presentation of the evidence in the
criminal case. They argue that inasmuch as the
motor launch in question was allegedly stolen by
Jikil Taha from Timbangcaya, Fiscal Ponce de
Leon could order its seizure even without a
search warrant. We cannot agree. Under the old
Constitution7 the power to issue a search
warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in
no other officer and no search and seizure can
be made without a proper warrant. At the time
the act complained of was committed, there was
no law or rule that recognized the authority of
Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In
his vain attempt to justify the seizure of the motor
launch in question without a warrant Fiscal
Ponce de Leon invoked the provisions of
Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections
1674 and 1687 of the Revised Administrative
Code. But there is nothing in said law which
confers upon the provincial fiscal; the authority
to issue warrants, much less to order without
warrant the seizure of a personal property even
if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic
Act No. 732 has broadened the power of
provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary
investigations, but said law did not divest the
judge or magistrate of its power to determine,
before issuing the corresponding warrant,
whether or not probable cause exists therefor.8
Moreover, under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court 9 which complement the
constitutional provision earlier cited, two
principles are made clear, namely: (1) that in the
seizure of a stolen property search warrant is still
necessary; and (2) that in issuing a search
warrant the judge alone determines whether or
not there is a probable cause. The fact that a
thing is a corpus delicti of a crime does not justify
its seizure without a warrant. As held in U.S. v.
de los Reyes and Esguerra, 10 citing McClurg v.
Brenton: 11
The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether
of high or low degree, gives him no more right
than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen
to break in upon the privacy of a home and
subject its occupant to the indignity of a search
for the evidence of crime, without a legal warrant
procured for that purpose. No amount of
incriminating evidence whatever its source, will
supply the place of such warrant. At the closed
door of the home be it palace or hovel even
bloodhounds must wait till the law, by
authoritative process, bids it open. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon would
also invoke lack of time to procure a search
warrant as an excuse for the seizure of the motor
launch without one. He claimed that the motor
launch had to be seized immediately in order to
preserve it and to prevent its removal out of the
locality, since Balabac, Palawan, where the
motor launch was at the time, could only be
reached after three to four days' travel by boat.
12 The claim cannot be sustained. The records
show that on June 15, 1962 13 Fiscal Ponce de
Leon made the first request to the Provincial
Commander for the impounding of the motor
launch; and on June 26, 1962 14 another
request was made. The seizure was not effected
until July 6, 1962. In short, Fiscal Ponce de Leon
had all the time to procure a search warrant had
he wanted to and which he could have taken in
less than a day, but he did not. Besides, there is
no basis for the apprehension that the motor
launch might be moved out of Balabac because
even prior to its seizure the motor launch was
already without its engine. 15 In sum, the fact
that there was no time to secure a search
warrant would not legally justify a search without
one. 16
As to whether or not they are entitled to
damages, plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim
for damages on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New
Civil Code which provide in part as follows:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 75
(6) Illegal search;
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person
whose constitutional rights have been violated or
impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages
from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may
also be awarded. In the instant case, plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim claimed that he purchased
the motor launch from Jikil Taha in consideration
of P3,000.00, having given P2,000.00 as
advanced payment; that since or seizure on July
6, 1962 the motor launch had been moored at
Balabac Bay and because of exposure to the
elements it has become worthless at the time of
the filing of the present action; that because of
the illegality of the seizure of the motor launch,
he suffered moral damages in the sum of
P1,000.00; and that because of the violation of
their constitutional rights they were constrained
to engage the services of a lawyer whom they
have paid P1,500.00 for attorney's fees. We find
these claims of Delfin Lim amply supported by
the evidence and therefore should be awarded
the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages;
P1,000.00 as moral damages and P750.00 for
attorney's fees. However, with respect co
plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not entitled to recover
any damage which he alleged he had suffered
from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch
inasmuch as he had already transferred the
ownership and possession of the motor launch
to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and
therefore, he has no legal standing to question
the validity of the seizure. Well settled is the rule
that the legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties. 17
Consequently, one who is not the owner, lessee,
or lawful occupant of the premise searched
cannot raise the question of validity of the search
and seizure. 18 Jikil Taha is not without recourse
though. He can still collect from his co-plaintiff,
Delfin Lim the unpaid balance of P1,000.00.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon
wanted to wash his hands of the incident by
claiming that "he was in good faith, without
malice and without the slightest intention of
inflicting injury to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha"
19 when he ordered the seizure of the motor
launch. We are not prepared to sustain his
defense of good faith. To be liable under Article
32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there
was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants
should have acted with malice or bad faith. Dr.
Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code
Commission, gave the following reasons during
the public hearings of the Joint Senate and
House Committees, why good faith on the part
of the public officer or employee is immaterial.
Thus:
DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual
rights; Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that
Article 32 be so amended as to make a public
official liable for violation of another person's
constitutional rights only if the public official
acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code
Commission opposes this suggestion for these
reasons:
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong
may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad
faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public officials in
the past have abused their powers on the pretext
of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object
of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by
the plea of good faith. In the United States this
remedy is in he nature of a tort.
Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the
fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil
Code to implement democracy. There is no real
democracy if a public official is abusing, and we
made the article so strong and so
comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of
individual rights even if done in good faith, that
official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that
there are very few public officials who openly
and definitely abuse the individual rights of the
citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on
a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with
one's duty. And so, if we should limit the scope
of this article, that would practically nullify the
object of the article. Precisely, the opening
object of the article is to put an end to abuses
which are justified by a plea of good faith, which
is in most cases the plea of officials abusing
individual rights. 20
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 76

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela

cannot be held accountable because he
impounded the motor launch upon the order of
his superior officer. While a subordinate officer
may be held liable for executing unlawful orders
of his superior officer, there are certain
circumstances which would warrant Maddela's
exculpation from liability. The records show that
after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request
to the Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962
Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor
launch despite repeated orders from his superior
officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a
copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated
June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial
Commander, justifying the necessity of the
seizure of the motor launch on the ground that
the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim
could not prevent the court from taking custody
of the same, 22 that he impounded the motor
launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming
from the legal officer of the province, Maddela
was led to believe that there was a legal basis
and authority to impound the launch. Then came
the order of his superior officer to explain for the
delay in the seizure of the motor launch. 23
Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his
Commander, Maddela was left with no
alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of
the above circumstances. We are not disposed
to hold Maddela answerable for damages.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision

appealed from is hereby reversed and another
one entered declaring the seizure illegal and
ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco
Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages,
plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition,
P750.00 for attorney's fees. With costs against
defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 77
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA,
NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO
DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES,
MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ,
EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX
MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-
MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS
PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN,
BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA,
EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN
petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL
SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL.
GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO
KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M.
LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO,
CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO
TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT.
RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO
BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues
not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It
poses the question whether the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution. If such action for
damages may be maintained, who can be held
liable for such violations: only the military
personnel directly involved and/or their superiors
as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches
and seizures and other violations of the rights
and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence
units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM)
ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-
emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of
increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege,
among others, that complying with said order,
elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued
judicial search warrants; that during these raids,
certain members of the raiding party confiscated
a number of purely personal items belonging to
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without
proper warrants issued by the courts; that for
some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence
and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms
of violence on them in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in
order to punish them; that all violations of
plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a
concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from
plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish
them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages
amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the
amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total
of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the
amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total
of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees
amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants,
through their counsel, then Solicitor-General
Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may
not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2)
assuming that the courts can entertain the
present action, defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in the performance of their
official duties; and (3) the complaint states no
cause of action against the defendants.
Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by
plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente,
Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo
Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983,
and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario
Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos
Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo
Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca,
Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July
21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated
Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95,
Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a
resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I
sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the
defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not
cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 78
their detention in the guise of a damage suit
because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming
that the court can entertain the present action,
defendants are immune from liability for acts
done in the performance of their official duties;
and (3) that the complaint states no cause of
action against defendants, since there is no
allegation that the defendants named in the
complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal
properties in violation of their constitutional
rights, and with the possible exception of Major
Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido
Balabo committed acts of torture and
maltreatment, or that the defendants had the
duty to exercise direct supervision and control of
their subordinates or that they had vicarious
liability as employers under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a
careful study of defendants' arguments, the
court finds the same to be meritorious and must,
therefore, be granted. On the other hand,
plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are
lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the
complaint and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on
November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983,
respectively. On December 9, 1983, the
defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid
motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to
the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys.
Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene
Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso Sanchez,
Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V.
Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene
Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas
Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an
order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further
proceeding in the case and leaving the
resolution of the motion to set aside the order of
dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any
suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve
[the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end
to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has
no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said
pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs
to reesolve an amplificatory motion for
reconsideration signed in the name of the Free
Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal
Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo,
Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12,
1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a
comment on said amplificatory motion for
reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court,
Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting
on the motion to set aside order of November 8,
1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the
following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by
counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez
represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez,
Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-
Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty.
Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos represented
by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando
Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren
Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the
Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the
complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom
within the reglementary period, as prayed for by
the defendants, said Order is now final against
said plaintiffs.
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on
May 28,1984, alleging that it was not true that
plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente,
Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino,
Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos
and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to
reconsider the order of November 8, 1983
dismissing the complaint, within the
reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the
motion to set aside the order of November 8,
1983 and the amplificatory motion for
reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs,
although signed by only some of the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the
respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to
reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring
that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the
resolution of November 8, 1983 had already
become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution
of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants'
motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of
the order of September 21, 1984, the
respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of
finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the Resolution of
dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio
Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan
Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 79

Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
is deed for lack of merit; private individual who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the impedes or impairs any of the following rights
following defendants, to wit: and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
(1) Freedom of religion;
2. Col. Fidel Singson
(2) Freedom of speech;
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr. maintain a periodical publication;

5. Col. Galileo Montanar (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal

detention;
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
(6) The right against deprivation of property
8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango without due process

9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo (7) of law;

10. Lt. Raul Bacalso (8) The right to a just compensation when
private property is taken for public use;
the motion to set aside and reconsider the
Resolution of dismissal of the present action or (9) The right to the equal protection of the
complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also laws;
denied but in so far as it affects and refers to
defendants, to wit: (10) The right to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects against
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and unreasonable searches and seizures;

2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba (11) The liberty of abode and of changing the
same;
the motion to reconsider and set aside the
Resolution of dismissal dated November 3, 1983 (12) The privacy of cmmunication and
is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in correspondence;
this respect, reconsidered and modified.
(13) The right to become a member of
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for associations or societies for purposes not
certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul contrary to law;
and set aside the respondent court's resolution
of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, (14) The right to take part in a peaceable
and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. assembly to petition the Government for redress
Respondents were required to comment on the of grievances;
petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A
reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, (15) The right to be free from involuntary
1986. servitude in any form;

We find the petition meritorious and decide to (16) The rigth of the accused against
give it due course. excessive bail;

At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 (17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by
of the Civil Code which provides: himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 80
a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a
witness against ones self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel
and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute
which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article,
whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the against
grieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for
damages, and for other relief. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may
be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal
provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply
cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may
seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity.
In times of great upheaval or of social and
political stress, when the temptation is strongest
to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather
than the force of law, it is necessary to remind
ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties
are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the
transient needs or imperious demands of the
ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else
liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic
principles and to the rule of law compels us to
reject the view which reduces law to nothing but
the expression of the will of the predominant
power in the community. "Democracy cannot be
a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless
the law is respected by him who makes it and by
him for whom it is made. Now this respect
implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of
Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter,
we discover that life demands of us a certain
residuum of sentiment which is not derived from
reason, but which reason nevertheless controls.
2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs'
complaint, the respondents postulate the view
that as public officers they are covered by the
mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done
in the performance of official duties or function In
support of said contention, respondents
maintain that —
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to
safeguard public safety and order. The
Constitution no less provides that the President
may call them "to prevent or supress lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article
VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued
Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but
providing for the continued suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of
the remaining dangers to the security of the
nation. The proclamation also provided "that the
call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insuitection rebellion and subversion shall
continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their
causes of action proceed from respondent
General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa
to launch pre-emptive strikes against communist
terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that this order and its
subsequent implementation by elements of the
task force resulted in the violation of their
constitutional rights against unlawful searches,
seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to
silence, and the right to property and that,
therefore, respondents Ver and the named
members of the task force should be held liable
for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against
communist terrorists, respondent members of
the armed forces merely performed their official
and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to
recover from respondents by way of damages
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 81
for acts performed in the exercise of such duties
run contrary to the policy considerations to
shield respondents as public officers from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially
disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald
102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16
Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of protecting
the performance of governmental and public
functions from being harassed unduly or
constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan
v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes,
79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability
arising from the performance of their duties is
now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson,
21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944;
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16
S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v.
Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S.
Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232;
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de
Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d
755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed
the lawful orders of the President and his call for
the suppression of the rebellion involving
petitioners enjoy such immunity from Suit.3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine
of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The
cases invoked by respondents actually involved
acts done by officers in the performance of
official duties written the ambit of their powers.
As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in
damages or otherwise for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority, under the law, to
do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had
authority, under the law to deport or expel the
defendants, and circumstances justifying the
deportation and the method of carrying it out are
left to him, then he cannot be held liable in
damages for the exercise of this power.
Moreover, if the courts are without authority to
interfere in any manner, for the purpose of
controlling or interferring with the exercise of the
political powers vested in the chief executive
authority of the Government, then it must follow
that the courts cannot intervene for the purpose
of declaring that he is liable in damages for the
exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were
merely responding to their duty, as they claim,
"to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of
President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial
law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of
such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes
against alleged communist terrorist underground
houses. But this cannot be construed as a
blanket license or a roving commission
untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution. The Constitution
remains the supreme law of the land to which all
officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe
obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any
public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are
excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other
penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are
restrained from pursuing their assigned task or
carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no
quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic
from its enemies, whether of the left or of the
right, or from within or without, seeking to
destroy or subvert our democratic institutions
and imperil their very existence. What we are
merely trying to say is that in carrying out this
task and mission, constitutional and legal
safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the
very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the
battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for
the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms.
The linchpin in that psychological struggle is
faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or
compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion
that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners
cannot circumvent the suspension of the
privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 82
aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into
the alleged illegality of their detention. While the
main relief they ask by the present action is
indemnification for alleged damages they
suffered, their causes of action are inextricably
based on the same claim of violations of their
constitutional rights that they invoked in the
habeas corpus case as grounds for release from
detention. Were the petitioners allowed the
present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ will take
place. The net result is that what the courts
cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered
by the President, petitioners will be able to do by
the mere expedient of altering the title of their
action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners'
contention that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners' right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and
other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is
merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their
right and cause of action for damages are
explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which
amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by
adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights
of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or
out of any act, activity or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law including the
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the
same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even
assuming that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners'
right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their
rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of respondents' confiscation of their
private belongings, the violation of their right to
remain silent and to counsel and their right to
protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the
constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March
25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos.
2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The
question therefore has become moot and
academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this
petition. May a superior officer under the notion
of respondent superior be answerable for
damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional
rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of
respondent superior is applicable to the case.
We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior
has been generally limited in its application to
principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e.
employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of
the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in
this case, in our view, is the language of Article
32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or
person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties
of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the
one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages
or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability
of public officials under the Constitution 5
acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger
dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the
thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against
the constitutionally protected rights and liberties
of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled
people power in February 1986 was the widely
held perception that the government was callous
or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for,
the rampant violations of human rights. While it
would certainly be go naive to expect that
violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits,
it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones
terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the
persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 83
responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped
defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel
Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo
Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo
Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro
Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo
Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only
Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt.
Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on
the ground that they alone 'have been
specifically mentioned and Identified to have
allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some
of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical
violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave
rise to a cause of action. But such finding is not
supported by the record, nor is it in accord with
law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for
damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of
alleged physical violence" which constituted
delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as
actionable the act of violating or in any manner
impeding or impairing any of the constitutional
rights and liberties enumerated therein, among
others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal
detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property
without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person,
house, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and
correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a
witness against one's self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make a
confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts
showing with abundant clarity and details, how
plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties
mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were
violated and impaired by defendants. The
complaint speaks of, among others, searches
made without search warrants or based on
irregularly issued or substantially defective
warrants; seizures and confiscation, without
proper receipts, of cash and personal effects
belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property
which were not subversive and illegal nor
covered by the search warrants; arrest and
detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
irregular, improper and illegal circumstances;
detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed
places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and
psychological torture and other inhuman,
degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose
of extracting incriminatory statements. The
complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses
perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their
constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those
shown to have participated "directly" should be
held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code
encompasses within the ambit of its provisions
those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether
direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the
complaint. It is well established in our law and
jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of
action must be based on what appears on the
face of the complaint. 6 To determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint, and no others, should
be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to
dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial
court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of
action the complaint against all the defendants,
except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt.
Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained
allegations against all the defendants which, if
admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to
establish a cause or causes of action against all
of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial
court correct in dismissing the complaint with
respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex
Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo
Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the
alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for
reconsideration of the court's resolution of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 84

November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's 1984. Let the case be remanded to the
motion to dismiss? respondent court for further proceedings. With
costs against private respondents.
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside
said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by SO ORDERED.
'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was
signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for
Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales,
counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin
Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for
Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V.
Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty.
Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer;
and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo
Benosa.

But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated

that the motion was filed on behalf of all the
plaintiffs. And this must have been also the
understanding of defendants' counsel himself for
when he filed his comment on the motion, he
furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers
who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of
plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio
Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado,
Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla
Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker
Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and
Felicitas S. Aquino.

In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of

November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so
on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no
specific authority to do that. The authority of an
attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party
can be assumed, unless questioned or
challenged by the adverse party or the party
concerned, which was never done in this case.
Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of
respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule
that the motion to set aside the order of
November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was
filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its
very language it was clearly intended to be filed
by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious
that the respondent judge took umbrage under a
contrived technicality to declare that the
dismissal of the complaint had already become
final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose
lawyers did not sign the motion for
reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal
infirmity cannot be sanctioned.

Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and

set aside the resolution of the respondent court,
dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May
11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21,
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 85
G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE
GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL
LUGATIMAN, and GERTRUDES GONZALES,
respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioners.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco for private
respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The constitutional protection of our people
against unreasonable search and seizure is not
merely a pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our
right to privacy and dignity against undesirable
intrusions committed by any public officer or
private individual. An infringement of this right
justifies an award for damages.
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP
Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts
of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell
and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms,
supplies, badges, and insignias. In their
Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation
was given the authority to "undertake or cause
to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all
illegal sources of scout uniforms and other
scouting supplies." 1
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner
corporation received information that private
respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol
Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were
selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia
without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an
employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked
to undertake the necessary surveillance and to
make a report to the Philippine Constabulary
(PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M.,
petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M.
Peñafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of
the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village,
Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of
respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl
scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a
commotion and embarrassed private
respondents. Receipts were issued for the
seized items. The items were then turned over
by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for
safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was
then filed against private respondents. 2 During
its pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted
from private respondent Lugatiman the sum of
THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the
complaint. On December 6, 1983, after a
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the
private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he
also ordered the return of the seized items. The
seized items were not immediately returned
despite demands. 3 Private respondents had to
go personally to petitioners' place of business to
recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized
items were returned. The other items returned
were of inferior quality.
Private respondents then filed Civil Case No.
51144 against the petitioners for sums of money
and damages. 4 In its Decision dated January 9,
1987, the trial court ruled for the private
respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants,
ordering the latter jointly and severally:
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to
plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at 12%
per annum from January 12, 1984, the date of
the last receipt issued, until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum
of P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of girl scout items
not returned;
3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of
P50,000.00 for and as moral damages and
P15,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and
4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
The decision was appealed to the respondent
court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth Division, 5
affirmed the Decision with modification, thus:
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 86
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION; and, as
modified, the dispositive portion thereof now
reads as follows:
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs
(private respondents) and against defendants
(petitioners), ordering the latter jointly and
severally;
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to
plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman and
cancel her application for distributor's license;
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa
Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the unreturned 26
pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12%
per annum from June 4, 1984 (date the
complaint was filed) until it is fully paid;
3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the
amount of P10,000.00 each, or a total of
P30,000.00, for and as moral damages; and
P5,000.00 each, or a total of P15,000.00, for and
as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00
for and as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal
are assessed jointly and severally against
defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP
Garments, Inc. and Larry de Guzman.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO THE
PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE
SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
MADE A FINDING THAT THE MANNER WITH
WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT
PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS
WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF
CONFISCATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects
our people from unreasonable search and
seizure. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision protects not only those who
appear to be innocent but also those who appear
to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the
case at bench, the seizure was made without
any warrant. Under the Rules of Court, 7 a
warrantless search can only be undertaken
under the following circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest.
- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the
warrantless search and seizure of private
respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation
received information that private respondents
were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific
date and time are not established in the
evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de
Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores
of private respondents. They reported to the
Philippine Constabulary and on October 25,
1983, the raid was made on the stores of private
respondents and the supposed illicit goods were
seized. The progression of time between the
receipt of the information and the raid of the
stores of private respondents shows there was
sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding
party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 87
sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a
warrant and seized the goods of private
respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a
suit for damages in case the seizure would be
proved to violate the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. In the
case at bench, the search and seizure were
clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for
the seizure. Probable cause for a search has
been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched." 8 These facts and
circumstances were not in any way shown by the
petitioners to justify their warrantless search and
seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation,
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their
complaint for unfair competition and later
ordered the return of the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the
argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary
that conducted the raid and their participation
was only to report the alleged illegal activity of
private respondents.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC
raiding team should have been included in the
complaint for violation of the private
respondents' constitutional rights, still, the
omission will not exculpate petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled
for the recovery of damages for violation of
constitutional rights and liberties from public
officer or private individual, thus:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered
in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person
whose constitutional rights have been violated or
impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages
from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may
also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong
may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad
faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public officials in
the past have abused their powers on the pretext
of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object
of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by
plea of the good faith. In the United States this
remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis
supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the
Court En Banc explained the liability of persons
indirectly responsible, viz:
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is
the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one
directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages
or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
xxx xxx xxx
While it would certainly be too naive to expect
that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damages
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code
makes the persons who are directly, as well as
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 88
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to
have participated "directly" should be held liable.
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within
the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well
as indirectly, responsible for its violations.
(emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading
cases, the respondent court correctly granted
damages to private respondents. Petitioners
were indirectly involved in transgressing the right
of private respondents against unreasonable
search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the
raid pursuant to their covenant in the
Memorandum Agreement to undertake the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of
scouting supplies. 11 As correctly observed by
respondent court:
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of
unlawfully seizing appellees' (respondents')
merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint
for unfair competition against appellees
(respondents) were for the protection and
benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation.
Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair
to infer from those acts that it was upon appellant
(petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC
soldiers conducted the raid and effected the
illegal seizure. These circumstances should
answer the trial court's query — posed in its
decision now under consideration — as to why
the PC soldiers immediately turned over the
seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner)
corporation. 12
The raid was conducted with the active
participation of their employee. Larry de
Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of
the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and
apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to
the same extent as the officers themselves. 13
So with the petitioner corporation which even
received for safekeeping the goods
unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and
de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for
quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint
for unfair competition.
Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was
precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard
not only the privilege of franchise holder of
scouting items but also the citizen's
constitutional rights, to wit:
TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED
MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF
SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING
OF SAID PARAPHERNALIA.
ABSTRACT:
Directs all law enforcement agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend
immediately unauthorized manufacturers and
distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper
application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines
and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant
of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law; and to impound the said
paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or
other appropriate administrative body. Orders
the immediate and strict compliance with the
Instructions. 14
Under the above provision and as
aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to
report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper
application of a warrant. Private respondents'
rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to
transient needs. 15 Petitioners did not have the
unbridled license to cause the seizure of
respondents' goods without any warrant.
And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in
the raid, they should have filed a third-party
complaint against the raiding team for
contribution or any other relief, 16 in respect of
respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of
Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
We have consistently ruled that moral damages
are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to
compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may
have suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in
Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages
can be awarded in the case at bench. There can
be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered
sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded
feelings due the tortious raid caused by
petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of
embarrassment and humiliation during the
seizure of their merchandise were supported by
their testimonies. Respondent Cruz declared:
I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my
goods and capital because I am doing business
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 89

with borrowed money only, there was

commotion created by the raiding team and they
even stepped on some of the pants and dresses
on display for sale. All passersby stopped to
watch and stared at me with accusing
expressions. I was trembling and terribly
ashamed, sir. 18

Respondent Lugatiman testified:

I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very

much ashamed because many people have
been watching the PC soldiers hauling my items,
and many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw pala ang mga
iyan" for which I am claiming P25,000.00 for
damages.19

While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:

I do not like the way the raid was conducted by

the team sir because it looked like that what I
have been selling were stolen items that they
should be confiscated by uniformed soldiers.
Many people were around and the more the
confiscation was made in a scandalous manner;
every clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses even
those not wrapped dropped to the ground. I was
terribly shamed in the presence of market goers
that morning.20

Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful

seizure justifies the award of exemplary
damages. 21 It will also serve as a stern
reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and
seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of
rhetoric. The all encompassing protection
extends against intrusions directly done both by
government and indirectly by private entities.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is

AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose
a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9,
1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26)
pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE
PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX
PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon
finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.
22 Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 90
UN TREATY BODIES
G.R. No. 189220, December 07, 2016
ALBERT WILSON, Petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALBERTO ROMULO,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL
GONZALES, BUREAU OF JAIL
MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, BOARD
OF CLAIMS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SOLICITOR GENERAL AGNES
DEVANADERA, AND BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Mandamus1
filed by Albert Wilson (Wilson) to enforce the
United Nations Human Rights Committee (the
Committee) Communication No. 868/19992
(View) against the Republic of the Philippines
(RP).
Antecedent Facts
The present case has its roots in the
incarceration and subsequent acquittal of Wilson
for the crime of rape which was the subject of the
Court's ruling in GR. No. 135915 entitled People
of the Philippines v. Wilson.3
Proceedings in G.R. No. 135915
On September 16, 1996, Wilson, a British
national, was accused and charged with the
crime of consummated rape4 by a 12-year-old
girl, the daughter of his Filipina live-in partner.
The girl was assisted by her biological father in
filing the criminal complaint. Immediately
thereafter, Wilson was taken into custody.
After trial, Wilson was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 171, in its Decision dated
September 30, 1998 and was imposed the death
penalty pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 76595 and ordered to indemnify the
victim the amount of P50,000.00.6 The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic
review.
Pending appeal, or on June 15, 1999, Wilson
filed with the Committee, pursuant to Article 5,
paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol, a
case7against the RP for violations of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) specifically: Article 2,
paragraphs 2 and 3;8 Articles 6;9 7;10 9;11 10,
paragraphs 1 and 2;12 and Article 14,
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 and 6.13
In the Decision14 dated December 21, 1999, the
Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. It found
that there were serious discrepancies and
inconsistent statements particularly in the
testimony given by the victim. It concluded that
there was not enough evidence to support the
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of rape by Wilson. The Court, thus,
acquitted Wilson stating:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is
reversed and set aside. The accused is hereby
acquitted of the charge of consummated rape.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to effect his immediate release from
custody unless he is being held in custody for
some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.15
The Present Case
Wilson was released from detention the day
after the acquittal. He immediately left the
Philippines for the United Kingdom (UK). Upon
his return in the UK, Wilson sought
compensation from the Board of Claims (BOC)
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to
R.A. No. 730916 through counsel as one who
was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned
but released by virtue of an acquittal.
On January 1, 2001, the BoC-DOJ awarded to
Wilson P14,000.00 as compensation. On
February 21, 2001, Wilson was informed of the
BoC-DOJ award and that he had to claim the
compensation in person in the Philippines.
Wilson moved for reconsideration arguing that
under R.A. No. 7309, he was entitled to
P40,000.00.17
On April 23, 2001, the BoC-DOJ informed
Wilson that a memorandum was issued directing
the BOC to raise the award to the maximum
amount that may be paid to those unjustly
imprisoned or detained subject to the availability
of funds.18
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 91
Wilson applied for and was denied a tourist visa
to travel to the Philippines due to his presence in
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) watch list.19
According to the BI, Wilson's presence in the
watch list could be attributed to his overstaying
and his previous conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude.20
The BoC-DOJ, thereafter, issued Resolution No.
2001-25 dated August 24, 2001 granting Wilson
an additional award of P26,000.00 in addition to
the initial amount of P14,000.00 bringing the
total award to P40,000.00.21
In September 2001, the DOJ issued a check
amounting to P26,000.00 representing the
additional award. The check was made out to
Wilson, care of the Ambassador of UK at the
request of the former.22
On November 11, 2003, the Committee issued
the View. It found that the allegations falling
under Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the
ICCPR were inadmissible.23 The Committee
stated:
9. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a),
of the [ICCPR], the State party is under an
obligation to provide the author with an effective
remedy. In respect of the violations of article 9
the State party should compensate the author.
As to the violations of articles 7 and 10 suffered
while in detention, including subsequent to
sentence of death, the Committee observes that
the compensation provided by the State party
under its domestic law was not directed at these
violations, and that compensation due to the
author should take due account both of the
seriousness of the violations and the damage to
the author caused. In this context, the
Committee recalls the duty upon the State party
to undertake a comprehensive and impartial
investigation of the issues raised in the course of
the author's detention, and to draw the
appropriate penal and disciplinary
consequences for the individuals found
responsible. As to the imposition of immigration
fees and visa exclusion, the Committee takes
the view that in order to remedy the violations of
the Covenant the State party should refund to
the author the moneys claimed from him. All
monetary compensation thus due to the author
by the State party should be made available for
payment to the author at the venue of his choice,
be it within the State party's territory or abroad.
The State party is also under an obligation to
avoid similar violations in the future.24
In a letter25cralawred dated June 19, 2008,
Wilson, through his counsel, asked the
Executive Secretary [ES]:
As with internationally wrongful acts, a breach of
a State obligation gives rise first to a duty of
reparation. The Committee found that the
breach of Covenant obligations required that the
Philippines provide compensation or redress. In
accordance with the decision of the Committee,
we thus pray that this Honorable Office:
take steps to effect payment of compensation to
Mr. Wilson, taking into consideration the
seriousness of the breach of his human rights;
direct the [BOC] to release the sums awarded to
Mr. Wilson to his authorized representatives, the
undersigned counsel Roque and Butuyan Law
Office.
direct the [BI] to refund the amount unjustly
imposed upon Mr. Wilson for overstaying his
tourist visa, such be indirectly attributable to the
wrongful decision of the trial court.26
In his letter27 dated October 20, 2008, Wilson
reiterated his June 19, 2008 letter and asked that
the payment of compensation be effected, a
comprehensive and impartial investigation be
conducted, and the monies paid by Wilson with
respect to immigration fees and visa exclusion
be refunded.28
On October 29, 2008, the letter was referred by
the ES to the DOJ Secretary for appropriate
action.29
On September 9, 2009, Wilson filed the present
petition for mandamus.30 He insists his
entitlement to the writ of mandamus owing to the
ICCPR and the Optional Protocol. He argues
that by virtue of the doctrine of transformation,
the RP is in breach of an international obligation
since any View issued by the Committee
constitutes part of international law and that the
RP is obligated to enforce the same. He prays
that:
Respondents take steps to ensure that Albert
Wilson is paid and given reparation in the
amount sufficient to compensate him for the
torture and abuse he suffered under the penal
system of the Philippines, in compliance with
Philippine treaty obligations in the ICCPR as
embodied in the Communication of the Human
Rights Committee in Case no. 868/1999 in
keeping with international law on reparations.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 92
Respondents undertake continual efforts and
steps to ensure that no torture and inhuman and
degrading treatment are suffered by prisoners in
the National Penitentiary and other places of
detention and imprisonment in the Philippines, in
the manner laid down in the Manila Bay case.31
The RP, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opines that the petition is
without merit. It argues that Wilson was not able
to prove that there is any national law giving life
to the ICCPR and Optional Protocol in order for
it to have force and effect in our jurisdiction as
required under Article 2(2) of the ICCPR.32 It
further avers that the findings of the Committee
are merely recommendatory and does not give
rise to an obligation to enforce and implement
the View. Thus, being recommendatory, the
View cannot be used to compel the Philippine
Government to compensate Wilson.33 In any
event, Wilson's documents show that BoC-DOJ
had already awarded in his favor P40,000.00
pursuant to R.A. No. 7309 and it was of Wilson's
own volition that the amount remains
unclaimed.34 It disagrees that the case of
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et
al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et
al.35 is applicable because unlike the Manila
Bay case, the petitioner, in this case, seeks to
enforce international law and not domestic
law.36
Issue
Simply, the issue before this Court ts whether
mandamus lies to compel the enforcement of the
View.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
mandamus is a writ issued to compel a tribunal
to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station, to wit:
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
(Emphasis ours)
In Yuvienco v. Hon. Canonoy, etc., et al.,37 and
several times reiterated thereafter, the Court
held that a purely ministerial duty must exist and
a clear legal right must be established by the
petitioner for mandamus to lie, to wit:
Two pertinent principles arc well settled in this
jurisdiction: (a) one is that mandamus would lie
only to compel a tribunal, board or officer to
comply with a purely ministerial duty, or to allow
a party to exercise a right or to occupy and enjoy
the privileges of an office to which he is lawfully
entitled; (b) the others is that for the writ of
mandamus to issue, petitioner must establish a
clear legal right to the relief sought, and a
mandatory duty on the part of the respondent in
relation thereto.38
It behooves the Court to examine whether the
View dated November 11, 2003 relied upon by
Wilson confers upon him any legal right which
the respondents are ministerially required to
perform but have unlawfully neglected.
No Ministerial Duty
It is well-settled that a ministerial duty must be
clear and specific as to leave no room for the
exercise of discretion in its performance.39 As
stated in Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Hon.
Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Secretary
General Marilyn B. Barua-Yap and Regina
Ongsiako Reyes:40
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives
him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary
and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 93
when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion or judgment.41
R.A. No. 7309 was passed on March 30, 1992
creating a BoC-DOJ to evaluate and investigate
claims for compensation for persons who were:
(1) unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned
but released by virtue of an acquittal; (2) unjustly
detained and released without being charged;
(3) a victim of arbitrary or illegal detention and
released without being charged; and (4) victim of
a violent crime.42 Under R.A. No. 7309,
compensation for victims of unjust imprisonment
or detention will be based on the number of
months of imprisonment. Compensation for
each month of imprisonment shall not exceed
P1,000.00.43
It is clear, however, that Wilson has been
granted compensation under R.A. No. 7309. In
fact, the BoC-DOJ granted to Wilson the
maximum allowed compensation under that law.
It was Wilson's decision not to collect the money
granted to him.
Other than the R.A. No. 7309, under which
Wilson had already been granted compensation,
there is no other law or regulation that forms the
basis of such ministerial right that the
government is impelled to grant. Wilson does not
present any law by which his ministerial right
arises from with respect to additional
compensation. It is not within this Court's
discretion to adjust any monetary grant
arbitrarily.
There is No Clear and Complete Legal Right
On December 19, 1966, the RP became party to
the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol.44 The
ICCPR recognized the "inherent dignity of the
human person" and its concomitant rights. At the
same time, the Philippines made a declaration
that:
The Philippine Government, in accordance with
article 41 of the said Covenant, recognizes the
competence of the Human Rights Committee set
up in the aforesaid Covenant, to receive and
consider communications to the effect that a
State Party claims that another State Party is not
fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant.45
Pursuant to Article 41 of the ICCPR, the
Committee was organized. Signatories
recognized the competence of the Committee to
receive and consider communications to the
effect that a State Party claims that another
State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under
the ICCPR.46 In addition, under Article 1 of the
Optional Protocol, the State parties agreed to
recognize the competence of the Committee to
receive and consider communications from
individuals who claim to be victims of a violation
by that State Party of any rights set forth in the
ICCPR. The Philippine Congress ratified the
ICCPR on October 23, 1986 and the Optional
Protocol on August 22, 1989.
As the OSG points out, the Court in the case of
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of
the Philippines v. Health Sec. Duque III47 stated
that a treaty is transformed into domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism. The Court
explained:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land
through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides
that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of. all the members of the
Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be
applied to domestic conflicts.48 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
In sum, there must be an act more than
ratification to make a treaty applicable in our
jurisdiction. To be sure, what was ratified were
the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, nowhere
in the instrument does it say that the View of the
Committee forms part of the treaty. Even the
Committee in its General Comment No. 33
stated that:
11. While the function of the Human Rights
Committee in considering individual
communications is not, as such, that of a judicial
body, the views issued by the Committee under
the Optional Protocol exhibit some important
characteristics of a judicial decision. xxx.49
Any View issued by the Committee only displays
"important characteristics of a judicial decision"
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 94

and are not per se decisions which may be

enforced outright. These Views, therefore, are
mere recommendations to guide the State it is
issued against.

Once again, the Court would like to stress that it

is beyond its purview to act on such
recommendations as these are matters which
are best taken up by the Legislative and the
Executive branches of government as can be
seen by the formation of the Presidential Human
Rights Committee.50 To recall, the Court
derives its powers under its basic mandate
under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in

one Supreme Court and in such l9wer courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The Court finds that there is no ministerial duty
and clear legal right which would justify the
issuance of a writ of mandamus.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 95
CITIZENSHIP
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.
DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD
ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on
those whom the state believes are deserving of
the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as
an inestimable acquisition,[1] that cannot be
taken lightly by anyone - either by those who
enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases,
all of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of
citizenship is brought up to challenge the
qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold
the highest office of the land. Our people are
waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated
breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver
screen, and now one of the main contenders for
the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he
not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to
face with Spanish and American colonial roots
and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law
and common law traditions, the fusion resulting
in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could
be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald
Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate
of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and
his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No.
161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on
09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No.
04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent
on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted
a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only
a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the
COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in
support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the
certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy
of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita
Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case
for bigamy and concubinage against the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a
certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of
Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the
Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 96
was no record in the National Archives that a
Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered
the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives to the
effect that no available information could be
found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two
documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being - a) a certification issued
by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to
be no available information regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San
Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by
the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives that no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e)
copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643,
No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death
of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the
City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in
the said office during the period of from 1900
until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed
SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days
later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC
en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before
this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No.
161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction
or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R.
No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434,
entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections,
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other,
docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy
of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due
course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy
for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact
(i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before
the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of
COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the
Commission on Elections. In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly and honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny
or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any
nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification
cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under
Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987
Constitution also reads
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 97
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority
vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date
of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of
the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same
Constitution provides that judicial power is
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law which
power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up
in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and
could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court.
A contrary view could be a gross denial to our
people of their fundamental right to be fully
informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
could or should be elected to occupy the highest
government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434,
and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions
they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987
Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be
the sole judge of presidential and vice-
presidential contests, has constrained this Court
to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being)
justiciable controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on
21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793,
"An Act Constituting an Independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and
Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of
the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court to be the
members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form
of government under the 1973 Constitution
might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.
1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would
now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in
reference to a post-election scenario. Election
contests consist of either an election protest or a
quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,
to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would
support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is
initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President
or Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for
quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered
candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 98
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction
of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office.[5] In such context, the election contest
can only contemplate a post-election scenario.
In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third
highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include
cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency
or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on
Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled
"Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to
first give a brief historical background on the
concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of
citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the
"citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to
determine the constituency of the "State," which
he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to
achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The
concept grew to include one who would both
govern and be governed, for which qualifications
like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with
rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and
with concomitant obligations, on the other.[8] In
its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life
and fundamentally willing to submit his private
interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone
changes over the centuries. In the 18th century,
the concept was limited, by and large, to civil
citizenship, which established the rights
necessary for individual freedom, such as rights
to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its
meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed
the right to participate in the exercise of political
power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage
of the development of social citizenship, which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security.[11] The
idea of citizenship has gained expression in the
modern welfare state as it so developed in
Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of
development, in keeping with the rapidly
shrinking global village, might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens"
during the Spanish regime but "subjects of
Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church
records, the natives were called 'indios',
denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship
became highly codified during the 19th century
but their sheer number made it difficult to point
to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to
apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to
the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in
Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law
was extended to the Philippines remained to be
the subject of differing views among experts;[15]
however, three royal decrees were undisputably
made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines
- the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
specifically defining the political status of
children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July
1870, which was expressly made applicable to
the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never
extended to the Philippine Islands because of
the express mandate of its Article 89, according
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 99
to which the provisions of the Ultramar among
which this country was included, would be
governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made
effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical
enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even
if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have
become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in
Philippine history. Already in the state of decline
as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede
her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world
power, the United States. An accepted principle
of international law dictated that a change in
sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of
all political laws then in force, would have no
effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10
December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil
rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United
States would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula,
residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all
their rights of property, including the right to sell
or dispose of such property or of its proceeds;
and they shall also have the right to carry on their
industry, commerce, and professions, being
subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in
the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court
of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they
shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which
they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the
Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending
legislation by the United States Congress on the
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they
did not become American citizens, they,
however, also ceased to be "aliens" under
American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands"
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of
1902, also commonly referred to as the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of
the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United
States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen
hundred and ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines
was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th
day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken
to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children
born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01
July 1902, during which period no citizenship law
was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given
to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing
at the time, that the common law principle of jus
soli, otherwise also known as the principle of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 100
territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.[25] More about
this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United
States made the following amendment to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is
hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives
of other insular possession of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United
States, under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the
first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was
used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor
General in the Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for
the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy
Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in
1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some
other country; Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States
under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of
the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in
the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that
date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent
views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution
brought to an end to any such link with common
law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis
or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The
following are citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935
Constitution, taken together with existing civil
law provisions at the time, which provided that
women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the
new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns -
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 101
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The
following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article
also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries
an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless
by her act or omission she is deemed, under the
law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable
proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now
provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to
include "those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ
appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its
history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e.,
jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person
to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29]
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner
would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While
the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate,
however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84
years old at the time of his death on 11
September 1954. The certificate of birth of the
father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was
born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father,
Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother,
Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the
date of their marriage to be on 16 September
1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried,
and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be
twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ,
would disclose that he was born on 20 August
1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four
years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American
citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the
parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of respondent and the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 102
marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some
degree of certainty from the documents would
be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married
to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe;
and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September
1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or
insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the
birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate
of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record
in the custody of a public officer. The documents
have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings
before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit
"A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for
respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit
"5." While the last two documents were
submitted in evidence for respondent, the
admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to
the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the
marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and
the death certificate relative to the death of
Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San
Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by
petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents
were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced;
exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public office or is recorded in a
public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of
Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the
value given to the entries made therein could be
grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of
that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin
of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would
indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at
the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was
born sometime in the year 1870 when the
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner
would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of from
1898 to 1902 considering that there was no
existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo
Pou was at any other place during the same
period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or
at least to presume, that the place of residence
of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and
Archives Office would have had complete
records of all residents of the Philippines from
1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 103
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in
establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity
(relationship or civil status of the father to the
child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being
an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in
force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889
up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when
the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish
filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only
if done during the lifetime of the putative parent;
voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in
a record of birth, a will, or a public document.[32]
Complementary to the new code was Act No.
3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in
Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth
certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by
the parents of the infant or only by the mother if
the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not
be permissible to state or reveal in the document
the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be
identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be
utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of
filiation or paternity, the certificate was required
to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure
of such requirement rendered the same useless
as being an authoritative document of
recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the
Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the
registry law was enacted, the question here
really is whether or not his birth certificate
(Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the
registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient
proof of his having been voluntarily recognized.
No such reliance, in our judgment, may be
placed upon it. While it contains the names of
both parents, there is no showing that they
signed the original, let alone swore to its
contents as required in Section 5 of Act No.
3753. For all that might have happened, it was
not even they or either of them who furnished the
data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners
say that in any event the birth certificate is in the
nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough,
but in such a case, there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ,
presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe
found. There being no will apparently executed,
or at least shown to have been executed, by
decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of
voluntary recognition remained to be "some
other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35]
this Court defined what could constitute such a
document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two
classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated
by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The
public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be
made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory.
Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took
place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of
an illegitimate child who was recognized or
judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally
in cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to
claim legitimacy which would last during the
lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action
to claim acknowledgment, however, could only
be brought during the lifetime of the presumed
parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during
the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to
be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary
recognition, simply as being a genuine or
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 104
indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted
by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the
rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175
provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child
die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall
survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same
period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are
retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of
Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily
recognized natural child should be decided
under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides
that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if
the child was born before the effectivity of this
body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence,
Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away
from the traditional idea of keeping well apart
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships
within the family in favor of the greater interest
and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and
personal affairs of the family. There is little, if
any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate
civil status of the individual would also affect his
political rights or, in general, his relationship to
the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code,
such provisions must be taken in the context of
private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its
double purpose the organization of the family
and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which
determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist
among members of a society for the protection
of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court
has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of
Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although
they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature,
such as those dealing with the validity or nullity
of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 105
husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their
property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of
the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce
upon the persons and properties of the spouses,
are questions that are governed exclusively by
the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to
Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code
a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the
Civil Code,[39] such as on successional rights
and family relations.[40] In adoption, for
instance, an adopted child would be considered
the child of his adoptive parents and accorded
the same rights as their legitimate child but such
legal fiction extended only to define his rights
under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias
against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude
may be traced to the Spanish family and
property laws, which, while defining proprietary
and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of
legitimate and illegitimate children. In the
monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly
according to bloodlines and the concern to keep
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign
blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and
illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived
when the Spanish Civil Code became the
primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain
only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly
impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably
tied up with that prescribed for civil law
purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code
provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive
effects on matters alien to personal and family
relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
well and should govern. For instance, the matter
about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from
being applicable by the Civil Code or Family
Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may
be received in evidence where it occurred before
the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word `pedigree
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be
necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead
or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person
must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a
relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before
the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by
Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley
Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the
COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts
of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with
Bessie Kelley and his children (including
respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one
family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and
sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in
accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 106
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the
name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,
or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August
20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena
Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met
and became engaged while they were students
at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was
also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my
sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had
their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their
first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our
mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now
Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of
Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie,
were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to
the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a
natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate
child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this
12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In
Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
-
"Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now
the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother
and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and the child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe
were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley,
Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making
his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate
child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less
than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage
certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was
born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and
an American mother who were married to each
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940.
Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an
illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an
illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship
of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 107
citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian
vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by
amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the
lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis
was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would
be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule
of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was
irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement
would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum
which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite
the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about
an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was
about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was
the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese
father. The issue was whether the stepson
followed the naturalization of the stepfather.
Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson
did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was
not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father.
It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office
before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article
IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one
was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not
about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father.
Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother. The issue was
whether one who was already a Filipino because
of his mother who still needed to be naturalized.
There is nothing there about invidious jus
sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more
complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of
Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his
father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin
therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said
that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in
fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court
therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was
his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only
not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a
Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But
instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The
Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's
father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be
Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to
fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for
the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in
Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement
would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution not once
but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate
child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child
of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable
distinctions was established long ago by People
vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction
between legitimate children and illegitimate
children rests on real differences. x x x But real
differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify
distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or
illegitimacy to elective public service? What
possible state interest can there be for
disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming
a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive
the child of the fullness of political rights for no
fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate
child from holding an important public office is to
punish him for the indiscretion of his parents.
There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And
if there is neither justice nor rationality in the
distinction, then the distinction transgresses the
equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente
Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 108
Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately
hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate
child as taking after the citizenship of its mother,
it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure
a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of
an alien father in line with the assumption that
the mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most
significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on
the day, month and year of birth of respondent
FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is.
Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none
provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the
petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the
resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of
merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ
from running for the position of President in the
10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of
jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R.
No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been
directly elevated to this Court in the latters
capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election
contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the
primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are
held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether
grave abuse of discretion has been committed
by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in
the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity
given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has
been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48]
must not only be material, but also deliberate
and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to
DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners,
versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and
Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 109

No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,

Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want
of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X.

Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in
dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 110
[G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition
for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim
with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte,
Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.
In her petition, respondent claimed that she was
born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City.
Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to
Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan
and Iligan City records of birth have four
erroneous entries, and prays that they be
corrected.
The trial court then issued an Order,[1] which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, let the hearing
of this case be set on December 27, 1999 before
this Court, Hall of Justice, Rosario Heights,
Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 oclock in the afternoon
at which date, place and time any interested
person may appear and show cause why the
petition should not be granted.
Let this order be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Iligan and the
Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of
the petitioner.
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the
Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi
Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o,
Iligan City.
SO ORDERED.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname Yu was
misspelled as Yo. She has been using Yu in all
her school records and in her marriage
certificate.[2] She presented a clearance from
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)[3] to
further show the consistency in her use of the
surname Yu.
Second, she claims that her fathers name in her
birth record was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian)
when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese
when it should have been Filipino considering
that her father and mother never got married.
Only her deceased father was Chinese, while
her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being
a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a
Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth
certificate that she was a legitimate child when
she should have been described as illegitimate
considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that
she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both
Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and
her daughters father were never married
because the latter had a prior subsisting
marriage contracted in China.
In this connection, respondent presented a
certification attested by officials of the local civil
registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte that there is no record of marriage
between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948
to the present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City, did not present any evidence
although it actively participated in the
proceedings by attending hearings and cross-
examining respondent and her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted
respondents petition and rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises
considered, to set the records of the petitioner
straight and in their proper perspective, the
petition is granted and the Civil Registrar of
Iligan City is directed to make the following
corrections in the birth records of the petitioner,
to wit:
1. Her family name from YO to YU;
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 111
2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)
to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);
3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by
changing YES to NO in answer to the question
LEGITIMATE?; and,
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial courts decision.[5]
Hence, this petition on the following assigned
errors:
I Republic avers that respondent did not comply
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE
CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y.
LIM FROM CHINESE TO FILIPINO DESPITE
THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER
DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH
THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE
USING HER FATHERS SURNAME DESPITE
ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.[6]
To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did
not cite as error respondents recourse to Rule
108 of the Rules of Court to effect what
indisputably are substantial corrections and
changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify,
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
under said rule may either be summary or
adversary in nature. If the correction sought to
be made in the civil register is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial,
and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia[7]
where we held that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite partys case, and where the evidence
has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.[8]
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals,
we take it that the Republics failure to cite this
error amounts to a recognition that this case
properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court considering that the proceeding
can be appropriately classified as adversarial.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the
with the constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the
1935 Constitution, which provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship.[9] Likewise, the Republic invokes
the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.[10]
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory
requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not
apply in the case of respondent who was
concededly an illegitimate child, considering that
her Chinese father and Filipino mother were
never married. As such, she was not required to
comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino
upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino
since birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of
majority.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 112
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the
Bar,[11] citing In re Florencio Mallare,[12] we
held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him
all the rights and privileges attached to
Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan
vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano
vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither
could any act be taken on the erroneous belief
that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled.[13]
This notwithstanding, the records show that
respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a
voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old.[14] The exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute
a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.[15]
In its second assignment of error, the Republic
assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing
respondent to use her fathers surname despite
its finding that she is illegitimate.
The Republics submission is misleading. The
Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use
her fathers surname. What it did allow was the
correction of her fathers misspelled surname
which she has been using ever since she can
remember. In this regard, respondent does not
need a court pronouncement for her to use her
fathers surname.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old.
To bar her at this time from using her fathers
surname which she has used for four decades
without any known objection from anybody,
would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of
the reasons allowed for changing ones name or
surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a
person is allowed to use a name by which he has
been known since childhood.
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already
addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of
the Phils.,[16] we held:
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which
regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to
use a name by which he has been known since
childhood (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil.
795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679;
Republic v. Taada, infra). Even legitimate
children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of
their father from using his surname (De Valencia
v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).[17]
While judicial authority is required for a change
of name or surname,[18] there is no such
requirement for the continued use of a surname
which a person has already been using since
childhood.[19]
The doctrine that disallows such change of
name as would give the false impression of
family relationship remains valid but only to the
extent that the proposed change of name would
in great probability cause prejudice or future
mischief to the family whose surname it is that is
involved or to the community in general.[20] In
this case, the Republic has not shown that the
Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced
or be the object of future mischief. In
respondents case, the change in the surname
that she has been using for 40 years would even
avoid confusion to her community in general.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is
DIRECTED to make the following corrections in
the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to
wit:
1. Her family name from YO to YU;
2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)
to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);
3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by
changing YES to NO in answer to the question
LEGITIMATE?; and,
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 113
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.
LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in
these twin cases is: Who should be declared the
rightful governor of Sorsogon
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably
obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice
declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold
such office due to his alien citizenship, and who
now claims to have re-assumed his lost
Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in
the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast
in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void;
that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that
legally, he secured the most number of valid
votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G.
Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to
prevailing jurisprudence should take over the
said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of
Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested
office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new
doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and
upholds the superiority of substantial justice over
pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and
58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a
Resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec), First Division,1
promulgated on December 19,19952 and
another Resolution of the Comelec en bane
promulgated February 23, 19963 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G.
Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8,
1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4
with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position
by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines," and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution5 granting the petition with the
following disposition:6
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to
GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground
that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines.
Accordingly, respondent's certificate of
candidacy is cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo
remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and
he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution
of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed
the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was
issued showing the following votes obtained by
the candidates for the position of Governor of
Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-
028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 114
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of
Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but
promulgated according to the petition "only on
June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed
"the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of
proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of
Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly,
at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec
a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317,
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995
proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995,
at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after
"his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted." As such, when "the said order (dated
June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no
more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative,
he averred that pursuant to the two cases of
Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor not Lee
should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First
Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having
garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
the highest number of votes, and xxx having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to
hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission
(First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT
the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme
Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered
annulled, being contrary to law, he not having
garnered the highest number of votes to warrant
his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed
canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as
the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having
garnered the highest number of votes, and he
having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30,1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and,
thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of
Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
Commission is directed to notify His Excellency
the President of the Philippines, and the
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation
thereof."
On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution14
promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February
26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting
on the prayer for a temporary restraining order,
this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a
Resolution which inter alia directed the parties
"to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the
filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand
briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions":15
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far
insufficient in form and substance to warrant the
exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with
the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
deciding said petition;
Second- The judicially declared disqualification
of respondent was a continuing condition and
rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected
to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent
was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify
him to hold the Office of Governor; and
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 115
Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo
Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's
proclamation as duly elected Governor of
Sorsogon."
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of
the respondent Comelec, the first two of which
are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division,
promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying
Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon
in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that
he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane,
promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane,
promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending
the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same
as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo
assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a
different ground: that under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced
hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election." (Italics supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said
Resolutions because they were not rendered
"within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later
than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the
failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days
prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said
Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court
consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755
since they are intimately related in their factual
environment and are identical in the ultimate
question raised, viz., who should occupy the
position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral
argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective
memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the
consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and
legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed
and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared"
disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be
elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction
over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that : said petition is not "a pre-
proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in
the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections
exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented
Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not
rendered within ( the period referred to in Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later
than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's
repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal
issue in this case. All the other matters raised
are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119
expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 116
qualification for elective local officials, including
that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice
governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member
of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this
Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has
reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses
the qualifications prescribed under the said
statute (R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this
Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral
argument in this case that he tried to resume his
citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the
bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several
members of the House of Representatives" due,
according to him, to the "maneuvers of his
political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at
naturalization was rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship,
Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor
by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of
27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in
1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same
opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially
declared a non-Filipino and thus twice
disqualified from holding and discharging his
popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third
time, with a fresh vote from the people of
Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the
Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he
now boasts of having successfully passed
through the third and last mode of reacquiring
citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725,
with no less than the Solicitor General himself,
who was the prime opposing counsel in the
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for
co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of
his cause (in addition to his able private counsel
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of
allegiance under the provisions of said Decree
at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
Hence, he insists that henot Leeshould have
been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of
Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date
since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered
the highest number of votes in the elections and
since at that time, he already reacquired his
citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's
repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects,
which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been
effectively repealed," asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative
powers under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of
citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and
contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution," adding that in her memorandum
dated March 27,1987 to the members of the
Special Committee on Naturalization constituted
for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725,
President Aquino directed them "to cease and
desist from undertaking any and all proceedings
within your functional area of responsibility as
defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No.
270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724
cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a
repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be
express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President
Aquino in her memorandum based on the copy
furnished us by Lee did not categorically and/or
impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed
or was being rendered without any legal effect.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 117
In fact, she did not even mention it specifically
by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a
basic rule of statutory construction that repeals
by implication are not favored. An implied repeal
will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws
are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent
that they cannot co-exist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino
cannot even be regarded as a legislative
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the
Chief Executive even under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor
should be regarded as an exercise of her law-
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an
executive policy addressed to the Special
Committee to halt the acceptance and
processing of applications for repatriation
pending whatever "judgment the first Congress
under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In
other words, the former President did not repeal
P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once
createdto deal with the matter. If she had
intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the
matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully
couched her presidential issuance in terms that
clearly indicated the intention of "the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to
the new Congress. Any other interpretation of
the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is
now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would
visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory
construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious
congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's
application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995
x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on
June 30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a
judicious review and evaluation of the merits
thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his
application for repatriation with the Office of the
President in Malacanang Palace on August 17,
1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General.
However, the Special Committee was
reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when
presumably the said Committee started
processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he
filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the
Committee required. Under these
circumstances, it could not be said that there
was "indecent haste" in the processing of his
application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden
reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the
personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor
General explained during the oral argument on
March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply
baseless as there were many others who
applied and were considered for repatriation, a
list of whom was submitted by him to this Court,
through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are
convinced that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the
presumption of legality in the repatriation of
Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by
Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were
speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude
that such proceedings were necessarily tainted.
After all, the requirements of repatriation under
P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor
are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant,
and even the rules and regulations to implement
the said decree were left to the Special
Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual
since, unlike in naturalization where an alien
covets a first-time entry into Philippine political
life, in repatriation the applicant is a former
natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to
reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of
Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born
citizen who openly and faithfully served his
country and his province prior to his
naturalization in the United States a
naturalization he insists was made necessary
only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship
he abhorred and could not in conscience
embrace and who, after the fall of the dictator
and the re-establishment of democratic space,
wasted no time in returning to his country of birth
to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as
certified to by the Solicitor General, were
granted repatriation argues convincingly and
conclusively against the existence of favoritism
vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate,
any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
repatriation should have been pursued before
the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 118
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the
assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June
30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
prescribed by the Local Government Code "must
exist on the date of his election, if not when the
certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our
decision in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both
the Local Government Code and the
Constitution require that only Philippine citizens
can run and be elected to Public office"
Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as
the only issue in said case was whether
Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not and
NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court
held his naturalization to be invalid, then the
issue of when an aspirant for public office should
be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the
Court. Which question we shall now directly rule
on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code,
"(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x x x where he
intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of
governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does
not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that
for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day
of election) and age (at least twenty three years
of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public
office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country
or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official
begins to govern or to discharge his functions
only upon his proclamation and on the day the
law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30,
1995the very day32 the term of office of
governor (and other elective officials) beganhe
was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed,
to hold such office and to discharge the functions
and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In
short, at that time, he was already qualified to
govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent
with the purpose for which such law was
enacted. So too, even from a literal (as
distinguished from liberal) construction, it should
be noted that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of
"ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates.
Why then should such qualification be required
at the time of election or at the time of the filing
of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists?
Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise
expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and
residence should thus be possessed when the
"elective [or elected] official" begins to govern,
i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995.
Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs.
Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose
of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that
our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as
applying to the time of proclamation of the
elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the
one raised during the oral argument34 to the
effect that the citizenship qualification should be
possessed at the time the candidate (or for that
matter the elected official) registered as a voter.
After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the
official to be a citizen, also specifies as another
item of qualification, that he be a "registered
voter." And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a
citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo
could not have been a voter-much less a validly
registered one if he was not a citizen at the time
of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in
discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the
law intended the citizenship qualification to be
possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it
would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 119
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It
therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from
being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that
the voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to
reiterate the need for nationality but to require
that the official be registered as a voter IN THE
AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e.,
the law states: "a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x
where he intends to be elected." It should be
emphasized that the Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered
voter. It does not require him to vote actually.
Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the
core of this "qualification." In other words, the
law's purpose in this second requirement is to
ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern and
not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly
emphasizedand Lee has not disputed that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and
his registration as a voter has been sustained as
valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast
his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel
stead-fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He
has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted
again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter
was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his
eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote
as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections
including on May 8,1995.37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter
in the province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue
of citizenship should be reckoned from the date
of proclamation, not necessarily the date of
election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code38 gives any voter, presumably including
the defeated candidate, the opportunity to
question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a
candidate. This is the only provision of the Code
that authorizes a remedy on how to contest
before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility
arising from failure to meet the qualifications
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo
Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after
proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence,
it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility
may be taken cognizance of by the Commission.
And since, at the very moment of Lee's
proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan
G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a
citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance
earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he
should have been the candidate proclaimed as
he unquestionably garnered the highest number
of votes in the immediately preceding elections
and such oath had already cured his previous
"judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such
time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue,
we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the
Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there
are settled exceptions40 to this general rule,
such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW
RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are
those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or
administrative proceedings, acts of public
officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory
disability or failure to comply with some technical
requirement. They operate on conditions already
existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says
that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x
curing defects and adding to the means of
enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are
intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities
in existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By
their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events
to correct errors or irregularities and to render
valid and effective attempted acts which would
be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the
parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws,
i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes
of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 120
such rights, ordinarily do not come within the
legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within
the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it
creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women
(who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the
existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their
husbands or the termination of their marital
status" and who could neither be benefitted by
the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing
"a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain
her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such
provision of the new Constitution does not apply
to Filipino women who had married aliens before
said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725
granted a new right to these womenthe right to
re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their
marital coverture, which right did not exist prior
to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also
provided a new remedy and a new right in favor
of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost
their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to
the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former
Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious
and cumbersome process of naturalization, but
with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since
they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil.
119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14
SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure
the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino
women are allowed to repatriate only upon the
death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the
difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of
C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by
naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy
for the aforementioned legal aberrations and
thus its provisions are considered essentially
remedial and curative."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the
wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the
legislative intent was precisely to give the statute
retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective
operation is given to a statute or amendment
where the intent that it should so operate clearly
appears from a consideration of the act as a
whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious
to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach
back" to those persons, events and transactions
not otherwise covered by prevailing law and
jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held
that citizenship is a political and civil right equally
as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of
abode, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in
the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent
to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must
be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been
said that a remedial statute must be so
construed as to make it effect the evident
purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the
reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future,
then it will be so applied although the statute
does not in terms so direct, unless to do so
would impair some vested right or violate some
constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more
true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of
repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised:
How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted
on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and
applied for repatriation even later, on August 17,
1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect
at the time that Frivaldo became an American
citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself
(P.D. 725) which is tobe given retroactive effect,
but even the repatriation granted under said law
to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to
have retroacted to the date of his application
therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of
the legislative authority that the law should apply
to past events i.e., situations and transactions
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 121
existing even before the law came into being in
order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy
and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention
is to be given the fullest effect and expression,
then there is all the more reason to have the law
apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to
situations, events and transactions subsequent
to the passage of such law. That is, the
repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995
can and should be made to take effect as of date
of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is
nothing in the law that would bar this or would
show a contrary intention on the part of the
legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything
unjust or injurious would result from giving
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee
shown that there will result the impairment of any
contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested
right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the
people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever
defects there were in his nationality should now
be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of
filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given
retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing
of applications for any substantial length of time,
then the former Filipinos who may be stateless,
as Frivaldohaving already renounced his
American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for
causes outside their control. This should not be.
In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is to be presumed that the
law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special
Committee was able to process, act upon and
grant applications for repatriation within
relatively short spans of time after the same
were filed.48 The fact that such interregna were
relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of
prejudice to the government as a result of giving
retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind
of the Court, direct prejudice to the government
is possible only where a person's repatriation
has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the
government arising in connection with or as a
result of his being an alien, and accruing only
during the interregnum between application and
approval, a situation that is not present in the
instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of
the people, already twice frustrated, should now
prevail. Under the circumstances, there is
nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
repatriation as having become effective as of the
date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994.
This being so, all questions about his
possession of the nationality qualification
whether at the date of proclamation (June 30,
1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or
date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March
20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding
Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also
be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is
considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his
Filipino citizenship restored as of August 17,
1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983
Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give
him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the
Local Government Code would disqualify him
"from running for any elective local position?"49
We answer this question in the negative, as
there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was
really STATELESS at the time he took said oath
of allegiance and even before that, when he ran
for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenshiplong before
May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in
the interim when he abandoned and renounced
his US citizenship but before he was repatriated
to his Filipino citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed
Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner
Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988,
in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his
foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 122
Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a
Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53
of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-
028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in
its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and
executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995,
no restraining order having been issued by this
Honorable Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was
proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30,
1995, there was already a final and executory
judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that
this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now
concedes were legally "correct") declaring
Frivaldo an alien have also become final and
executory way before the 1995 elections, and
these "judicial pronouncements of his political
status as an American citizen absolutely and for
all time disqualified (him) from running for, and
holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No.
87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in
G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such
elections is final and can no longer be changed.
In the words of the respondent Commission
(Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme
Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the
purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections.
However, there is no record of any 'final
judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What
the Commission said in its Order of June 21,
1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing
the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that
Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen 'having been
declared by the Supreme Court in its Order
dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the
Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme
Court, however, was in connection with the 1992
elections."
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or
denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a
person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the
modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again, as the occasion demands."
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No.
95-317 because the only "possible types of
proceedings that may be entertained by the
Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an
election protest or a quo warranto case." Again,
Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June
30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317
questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July
6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day reglementary period."
Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse
was to file either an election protest or a quo
warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The
Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample
power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x
x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the
various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of
its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain,
suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized
the Commission's authority to hear and decide
petitions for annulment of proclamations of
which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58
Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation
and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are
aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by
the COMELEC after the winning candidate has
been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando,
187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 123
SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA
468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no
proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive
the COMELEC of the power to make such
declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs.
COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs.
COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"
The Court however cautioned that such power to
annul a proclamation must "be done within ten
(10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch
as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days
after Lee's proclamation, there is no question
that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction
over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee
proclamation. We uphold him for the following
reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs.
COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee)
was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in
Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second
placer, xxx just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the
governorship on the pronouncement of this
Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the
electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and
efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next
paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the
instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none
was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously
known as an ineligible candidate, much less the
electorate as having known of such fact. On the
contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by
no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution
dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of
the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992
denying due course to petitioner Labo's
certificate of candidacy had not yet become final
and subject to the final outcome of this case."
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo,
unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in
this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an
identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the
Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy was not yet final on election day as
there was in both cases a pending motion for
reconsideration, for which reason Comelec
issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that
Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others
can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election,
as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient
evidence presented to show that the electorate
of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law"
of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in
other words, that the voters intentionally wasted
their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting
for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any
relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and
not Leeshould be proclaimed, since in losing the
election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again,
"obviously not the choice of the people" of
Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of
Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected.
A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to
have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of
votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be
proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was
patently erroneous and should now be
corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election
Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the
assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the
confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11,
1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 124
should be annulled because they were rendered
beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which
reads as follows:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided
after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election" (italics supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch
as these resolutions are deemed superseded by
the subsequent ones issued by the Commission
(First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed
en banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both
upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that
Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try
and decide petitions for disqualifications even
after the elections, thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any
candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
-winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong." (Italics supplied)
Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr.
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March
27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not
a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But
whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a
purely academic distinction because the said
issuance is not a statute that can amend or
abrogate an existing law. The existence and
subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the
first Frivaldo case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725,
Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx
repatriation" He also contends that by allowing
Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered
voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court
abetted a "mockery" of our two previous
judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do
not see such abetting or mockery. The
retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed
earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may
have been in his registration as a voter for the
purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity
did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and
1992, which were the subjects of such previous
rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo
Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's
authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate
of candidacy on the ground of a false material
representation therein as required by Section
74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is
merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our
point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in
G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions
promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995
were invalid because they were issued "not later
than fifteen days before the election" as
prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the
petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of
discretion because "Section 6 of R. A. 6646
authorizes the Comelec to try and decide
disqualifications even after the elections." In
spite of his disagreement with us on this point,
i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note
that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless
votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other
point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches
that a petition to deny due course under Section
78 must be filed within the 25-day period
prescribed therein. The present case however
deals with the period during which the Comelec
may decide such petition. And we hold that it
may be decided even after the fifteen day period
mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a
decision promulgated by the Comelec even after
the elections is valid but Loong held that a
petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of
time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the
Court's holding that, given the unique factual
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 125
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be
given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first
Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve
repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If
we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo
was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections.
That is settled. But his supervening repatriation
has changed his political status not in 1988 or
1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding
that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or
abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship." Since our courts are charged only
with the duty of the determining who are
Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal
question of who are or who are not Americans.
It is basic in international law that a State
determines ONLY those who are its own citizens
not who are the citizens of other countries.65
The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding
of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such
finding has not been shown by Lee to be
arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled
case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee
who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all
three previous elections, should be declared
winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being
an American was publicly known." First, there is
absolutely no empirical evidence for such
"public" knowledge. Second, even if there is,
such knowledge can be true post facto only of
the last two previous elections. Third, even the
Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and
after the 1995 elections. How then can there be
such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the
Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e.,
candidates, and not elected officials, and that
the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that
section] must be possessed by candidates, not
merely at the commencement of the term, but by
election day at the latest. We see it differently.
Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective
local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a)
were intended to apply to "candidates" and not
elected officials, the legislature would have said
so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest
of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had
meant that the citizenship qualification should be
possessed at election day or prior thereto, it
would have specifically stated such detail, the
same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other
qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor,
etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of
retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the
ground, among others, that the law specifically
provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do
not question what the provision states. We hold
however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the
applicant is deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or
repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and
intents to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding
the literal meaning of the word "elective" in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Government
Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest
non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather
extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion
call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the
Rule of Law." We agree we must all follow the
rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The
issue is how should the law be interpreted and
applied in this case so it can be followed, so it
can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a
choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply laws relating to elections:
literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism
or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context
of social conditions; harshly against or gently in
favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying
election laws, it would be far better to err in favor
of popular sovereignty than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed,
to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the
electorate of Sorsogon would constitute
unmitigated judicial tyranny and an
unacceptable assault upon this Court's
conscience.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 126
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement
in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as
of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
the term of office to which he has been elected.
We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force
and effect up to the present, not having been
suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly
at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue
thereof to have been properly granted and thus
valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the
remedial or curative nature of the law granting
him a new right to resume his political status and
the legislative intent behind it, as well as his
unique situation of having been forced to give up
his citizenship and political aspiration as his
means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his
repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of
the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having
given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in
contemplation of law, he possessed the vital
requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start
of the term of office of governor, and should have
been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore,
since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted
to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as
of said date as well. The foregoing, of course,
are precisely consistent with our holding that
lack of the citizenship requirement is not a
continuing disability or disqualification to run for
and hold public office. And once again, we
emphasize herein our previous rulings
recognizing the Comelec's authority and
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and
equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will
of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political
laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may
not be defeated by mere technical objections
(citations omitted)."67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo
every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court
has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving
effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the
popular electoral choice, this Court must exert
utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner
that would give effect to the will of the majority,
for it is merely sound public policy to cause
elective offices to be filled by those who are the
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge
a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding
such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people, would ultimately
create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably
failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically
easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could
have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects
of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due
to his failure to show his citizenship at the time
he registered as a voter before the 1995
elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual
findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at
the time of repatriation and thus hold his
consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification
"from running for any elective local position." But
the real essence of justice does not emanate
from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a
brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in
order to evoke substantial justice in the larger
social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique
situation approximating venerability in Philippine
political life. Concededly, he sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously
entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity,
he returned to this land, and sought to serve his
people once more. The people of Sorsogon
overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He
took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 127

time he filed his certificate of candidacy and

during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not
be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality
of birth despite several legal set-backs speak
more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any
legal technicality, of his consuming intention and
burning desire to re-embrace his native
Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81
years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well
as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this
Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser
mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo
was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a
citizen of the most powerful country in the world.
But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on
returning to and serving once more his
struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore
deserves every liberal interpretation of the law
which can be applied in his favor. And in the final
analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the
indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly
deserve to be governed by a leader of their
overwhelming choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the

foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby

DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also

DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In
any event, it has no merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 128
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz
is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent
Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and, without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship by, among others, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law
reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of
the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service
to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the
armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking
of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall
not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship
if either of the following circumstances is
present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a
defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with
said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed
forces on Philippine territory with the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That
the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said foreign
country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino
citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
permitted to participate nor vote in any election
of the Republic of the Philippines during the
period of his service to, or commission in, the
armed forces of said country. Upon his
discharge from the service of the said foreign
country, he shall be automatically entitled to the
full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss
of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990,
in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired
his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and
was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin
of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson
III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo
Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of
the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its
decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the
duly elected Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections.
The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution
dated April 27, 2000.[6]
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 129
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for
certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased
being such in view of the loss and renunciation
of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, when it considered private
respondent as a citizen of the Philippines
despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's
acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid,
the HRET committed serious errors and grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition
despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-
born status.[7]
The issue now before us is whether respondent
Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no
longer be considered a natural-born Filipino
since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he
swore allegiance to the United States in 1995,
and had to reacquire the same by repatriation.
He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he
reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen
when he was repatriated since the phrase "from
birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a
natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are
Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1)
by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds
of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of
his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-
born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those
who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth
Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications[12] and none of the
disqualifications[13] provided by law to become
a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only
after two (2) years from its promulgation when
the court is satisfied that during the intervening
period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted
of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary
to any Government announced policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship
may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63
(C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress.[15]
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 130
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a
mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this law,
a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications[17] and none of the
disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A.
473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had
under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II;[20] (3) service in
the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman
to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic
necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes
[referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person
desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would
not even be required to file a petition in court,
and all that he had to do was to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to register that fact with the civil registry in the
place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the
original.][25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of
the original nationality.[26] This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino
citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of
the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in
the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of
allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is
no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET
in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen"
was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the
1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a
citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be
considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not
have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there
were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those who
were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who,
upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born
obviously because they were not Filipinos at
birth and had to perform an act to acquire
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 131

Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino

mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
Constitution were likewise not considered DISMISSED.
natural-born because they also had to perform
an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now

considers those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who
are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV
adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." Consequently, only naturalized
Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of
who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1)
those who are natural-born and (2) those who
are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen
who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not
have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence
in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was
not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship,
he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such,
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to
be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered

by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House.[29]
The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely
to check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power and annul
the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court's judgment for that of the latter for the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the
assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing
of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 132
G.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora
(Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting
(Tambunting) of an election offense for violating
Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on
Elections’ (COMELEC) En Banc dismissed
Cordora’s complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18
August 2006. The present petition seeks to
reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution as well
as the Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of
the COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordora’s
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the
COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted
that Tambunting made false assertions in the
following items:
That Annex A [Tambunting’s Certificate of
Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and Annex B
[Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the
2004 elections] state, among others, as follows,
particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 – I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 – No. of years of Residence before May
14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency
where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 – I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek
to be elected.3 (Boldface and capitalization in
the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible
to run for local public office because Tambunting
lacked the required citizenship and residency
requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a
natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented
a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in
the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon
departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001.
According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American
citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu,
Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora
concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary
to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re:
CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY: which requires the
declarant/affiant to state, among others, under
oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No. 9-
residence requirement which he lost when [he
was] naturalized as an American Citizen on
December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii,
knowingly and willfully affirmed and reiterated
that he possesses the above basic requirements
under No. 12 – that he is indeed eligible for the
office to which he seeks to be elected, when in
truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably
established by his own statements before the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x x.4
(Emphases in the original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that
he did not make any misrepresentation in his
certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s
claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born
Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his
birth certificate which showed that he was born
of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Tambunting further denied that he was
naturalized as an American citizen. The
certificate of citizenship conferred by the US
government after Tambunting’s father petitioned
him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s
citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Tambunting’s possession of an American
passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a
Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of
allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 133
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in
the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has
imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the
Filipino language, and has been educated in
Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that
proof of his loyalty and devotion to the
Philippines was shown by his service as
councilor of Parañaque.
To refute Cordora’s claim that the number of
years of residency stated in Tambunting’s
certificates of candidacy is false because
Tambunting lost his residency because of his
naturalization as an American citizen,
Tambunting contended that the residency
requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended
the dismissal of Cordora’s complaint against
Tambunting because Cordora failed to
substantiate his charges against Tambunting.
Cordora’s reliance on the certification of the
Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled
on an American passport is not sufficient to
prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings
and the resolution of the COMELEC Law
Department. The COMELEC En Banc was
convinced that Cordora failed to support his
accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and
convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En
Banc’s Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
complaint is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable
cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento
(Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate
opinion which concurred with the findings of the
En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento
pointed out that Tambunting could be
considered a dual citizen. Moreover,
Tambunting effectively renounced his American
citizenship when he filed his certificates of
candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public
office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which
raised the same grounds and the same
arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution
promulgated on 20 February 2007, the
COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordora’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that there
is no sufficient evidence to support probable
cause that may warrant the prosecution of
Tambunting for an election offense.
Cordora’s petition is not an action to disqualify
Tambunting because of Tambunting’s failure to
meet citizenship and residency requirements.
Neither is the present petition an action to
declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-
resident. The present petition seeks to
prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making
untruthful statements in his certificates of
candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of
the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold
Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an
Election Offense
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the
COMELEC En Banc’s ruling that there is no
sufficient and convincing evidence to support a
finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for
trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed. Determining
probable cause is an intellectual activity
premised on the prior physical presentation or
submission of documentary or testimonial proofs
either confirming, negating or qualifying the
allegations in the complaint.6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads
as follows:
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 134
Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for
the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; x x x the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes;
his profession or occupation; that he will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders
and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in
the certificate of candidacy are true to the best
of his knowledge.
xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall
also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio-data
and program of government not exceeding one
hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on
the other hand, provides that violation of Section
74, among other sections in the Code, shall
constitute an election offense.
Tambunting’s Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a
Filipino mother and an American father. Neither
does he deny that he underwent the process
involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting
claims that because of his parents’ differing
citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by
birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s
observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his
birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting
to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in
INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the
American citizenship which Tambunting
acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented
contained two trips where Tambunting claimed
that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly,
Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to
the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the
2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had
dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who
desire to run for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous
ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we ruled
that dual citizenship is not a ground for
disqualification from running for any elective
local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess
dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers
in foreign countries which follow the principle of
jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that
country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen
of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the
above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 135
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
xxx
[I]n including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the
concern of the Constitutional Commission was
not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No.
7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be
understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of
the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual
citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a
child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on §40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like
to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any
person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to
run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but
his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen
of the Republic. There is no requirement that
such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching the
age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry
two passports, one belonging to the country of
his or her father and one belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation
disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr.
President, it only means that at the moment
when he would want to run for public office, he
has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a
Philippine passport but the country of origin or
the country of the father claims that person,
nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the
world.1avvphi1
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that
he is running for public office would, in effect, be
an election for him of his desire to be considered
a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr.
President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth,
a citizen without any overt act to claim the
citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are
saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman’s
example, if he does not renounce his other
citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the
first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate
of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I
have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the
viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the
citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr.
President. But if he exercises acts that will prove
that he also acknowledges other citizenships,
then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in
consonance with our rulings in Mercado v.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 136
Manzano,9 Valles v. COMELEC,10 and AASJS
v. Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles involve
similar operative facts as the present case.
Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting,
possessed dual citizenship by the
circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born
to Filipino parents in the United States which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born
to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in
Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles
stated that dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring
to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship
is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus,
like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough
for a person with dual citizenship who seeks
public office to file his certificate of candidacy
and swear to the oath of allegiance contained
therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is
brought about by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization process.
AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a
Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of
another country is allowed to retain his Filipino
citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority
of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of
taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit
renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign
citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years
after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles.
The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers
were not concerned with dual citizenship per se,
but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization.12 Section
5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized
citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and
desire to run for elective public office in the
Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
filing the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the
oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to
an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as
the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal
and COMELEC,13 Velasco v. COMELEC,14
and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve
natural-born Filipinos who later became
naturalized citizens of another country and
thereafter ran for elective office in the
Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a
natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently
become a naturalized citizen of another country.
Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225
do not apply to him.
Tambunting’s residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to
meet the residency requirement because of
Tambunting’s naturalization as an American.
Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting
is not a naturalized American. Moreover,
residency, for the purpose of election laws,
includes the twin elements of the fact of residing
in a fixed place and the intention to return there
permanently,16 and is not dependent upon
citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed
to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully
made false entries in his certificates of
candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting
sufficiently proved his innocence of the charge
filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the
office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled
the citizenship and residency requirements
prescribed by law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We
AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections En Banc dated 18 August 2006 and 20
February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 137
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A.
AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45
seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied
the petition for certiorari filed by Renato M. David
(petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated
March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his
motion for redetermination of probable cause.
The factual antecedents:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he
became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.
Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife
returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000,
they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house.
However, in the year 2004, they came to know
that the portion where they built their house is
public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over
the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at
the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the
said application, petitioner indicated that he is a
Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed
the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No.
08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued
by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time
he filed his application, he had intended to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had
been assured by a CENRO officer that he could
declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged
that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property
was titled land and they have the right and
authority to convey the same. The dispute had in
fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits
between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding
probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of
Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the
filing of the corresponding information in court.
Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a
petition for review he filed before the Department
of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order
rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that
petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in
his MLA which was void ab initio.8
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition
for review filed by petitioner was denied by the
DOJ which held that the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public
document suffices to warrant indictment of the
petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any
proof that he gained or intended to injure a third
person in committing the act of falsification.9
Consequently, an information for Falsification of
Public Document was filed before the MTC
(Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest
was issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the
Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed
an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of
Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the
provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner,
the said court denied the motion, holding that
R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those
who became foreign citizens during its
effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine
citizenship before its enactment when the
governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311
(CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was
charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC
concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 138
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the
motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner
questioned the foregoing order denying him
relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He
argued that since his application had yet to
receive final evaluation and action by the DENR
Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to
ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner)
who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six
months after he applied for lease of public land.
The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the
RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over
the person of an accused cannot be a pre-
condition for the re-determination of probable
cause by the court that issues a warrant of
arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order
disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-
born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in
another country re-acquires his citizenship
under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said
naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the
prosecutor emphasized that the act of
falsification was already consummated as
petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his
citizenship status and not his criminal act which
was long consummated prior to said oath of
allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the
assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari
after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED.
At any rate petitioner is not left without any
remedy or recourse because he can proceed to
trial where he can make use of his claim to be a
Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated
in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to
appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner
for falsification, the lower court has disregarded
the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-
born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the
same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by
legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it at the
time of his naturalization in Canada and through
the time when he was said to have falsely
claimed Philippine citizenship.
By compelling petitioner to first return from his
legal residence in Canada and to surrender or
allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for
his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship,
the lower court has pre-empted the right of
petitioner through his wife and counsel to
question the validity of the said warrant of arrest
against him before the same is implemented,
which is tantamount to a denial of due
process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends
that petitioner’s argument regarding the
retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit. It is
contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v.
Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity
of one’s re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship to
the date of filing his application therefor cannot
be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that such
doctrine applies in the present situation, it will
still not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple
reason that he had not alleged, much less
proved, that he had already applied for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he
made the declaration in the Public Land
Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is
stressed that in falsification of public document,
it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent
to injure a third person be present. As to
petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains
to be a defense which may be properly raised
and proved in a full-blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of
accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General
opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from
the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-
determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is
deemed to have submitted his person to the said
court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance.
Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the
lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after
a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of
the parties’ arguments contained in their
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 139
respective pleadings, and the evidence
submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1)
petitioner may be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public
Land Application despite his subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC
properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-
determination of probable cause on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of
said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
“I ______________________, solemnly swear
(or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize
and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who,
after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
(Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that
Filipinos who have become citizens of another
country shall be deemed “not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the
phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section
3 lays down such conditions for two categories
of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first
and second paragraphs. Under the first
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country who shall re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The
second paragraph covers those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A.
9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the same oath. The
taking of oath of allegiance is required for both
categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who
became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for
the first group, and “retain” for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
“Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors
of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-
acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect
of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. This is also evident from the
title of the law using both re-acquisition and
retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a
foreign country, they shall be deemed to have
re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which
was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the
ways by which Philippine citizenship may be
lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA
63 by doing away with the provision in the old
law which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries and allowing dual
citizenship,21 and also provides for the
procedure for re-acquiring and retaining
Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took
effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship
despite having acquired foreign citizenship
provided they took the oath of allegiance under
the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish
between re-acquisition and retention in R.A.
9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that
interpretation of the law which favors the
accused is preferred because it is consistent
with the constitutional presumption of
innocence, and in this case it becomes more
relevant when a seemingly difficult question of
law is expected to have been understood by the
accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 140
commission of the alleged offense. He further
cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122
of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query,
stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino
will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-
acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
was made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720
and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18,
2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was
responding to the query of Representative
Exequiel Javier:
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section
3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate version,
“Any provision of law on the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their
Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born
citizens who have lost their citizenship by reason
of their naturalization after the effectivity of this
Act are deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the
effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of
natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens
who acquired foreign citizenship after the
effectivity of this act are considered to have
retained their citizenship. But natural-born
citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before
the effectivity of this act are considered to have
reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you
mean to say that natural-born citizens who
became, let’s say, American citizens after the
effectivity of this act are considered natural-
born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-
born citizens who lost their citizenship before the
effectivity of this act are no longer natural born
citizens because they have just reacquired their
citizenship. I just want to know this distinction,
Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of
the Senate version is precisely retention and
reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to
those who lost their Philippine citizenship by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the
effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this,
upon the effectivity of this new measure
amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos
who lost their citizenship is deemed to have
reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the
effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine
citizenship applying to future instances. So that’s
the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question
because we are here making distinctions
between natural-born citizens. Because this is
very important for certain government positions,
‘no, because natural-born citizens are only
qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is
correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution
and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can
get to that later on. It’s one of the provisions, yes.
But just for purposes of the explanation,
Congressman Javier, that is our
conceptualization. Reacquired for those who
previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those
in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a
Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-
born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-
acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of
petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and
Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats
those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to
those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other
words, Section 2 declaring the policy that
considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens
as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,
should be read together with Section 3, the
second paragraph of which clarifies that such
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 141
policy governs all cases after the new law’s
effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted
Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to
Section 3 on the particular application of
reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most
favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced.
Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to
the accused following the time-honored principle
that penal statutes are construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused.23
R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1,
Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the
RPC refers to falsification by a private individual,
or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public,
private, or commercial documents. The
elements of falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
(1)
that the offender is a private individual or a public
officer or employee who did not take advantage
of his official position;
(2)
that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3)
that the falsification was committed in a public,
official or commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the
MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application,
when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he
was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among
those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses
his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship
status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not
err in finding probable cause for falsification of
public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner accused as ground for
denying petitioner’s motion for re-determination
of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior
to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not
required for the adjudication of reliefs other than
an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28
which involved a motion to quash warrant of
arrest, this Court discussed the distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over
the person, and held that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived when
he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction
over their person was already acquired by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused,
whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On
the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as
a rule the same cannot be posted before custody
of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.cralawred
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a
distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law
is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is acquired upon
his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be
under the custody of the law but not yet subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
such as when a person arrested by virtue of a
warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law,
such as when an accused escapes custody after
his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of
the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law. Custody of the law is literally custody over
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 142

the body of the accused. It includes, but is not

limited to, detention.

xxxx

While we stand by our above pronouncement in

Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that,
as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative
relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the
aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.

xxxx

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far,

in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is deemed waived by the accused
when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the
processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody
of the law. However, if a person invoking the
special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail,
he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative
relief in filing his motion for re-determination of
probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating
that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated
in the MTC’s order, the RTC correctly ruled that
no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of
merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in
Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No.
2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 143
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with extremely urgent application for an
ex parte issuance of temporary restraining
order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1)
1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2)
23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC
En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA
No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA
No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
(petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3
September 1968. Parental care and custody
over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his
wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968,
Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a
foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling
Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the
petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe
(a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court
granted their petition and ordered that
petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary
notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on
petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the
court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's
adoptive mother discovered only sometime in
the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who
handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure
from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live
Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the
name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay,
petitioner's mother executed an affidavit
attesting to the lawyer's omission which she
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006,
OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth
in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years
in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the
local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13
December 1986, she received her COMELEC
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196
in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was
issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998,
she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos.
L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a
degree in Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the United States of
America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in
1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor
of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro
Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a
citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.
10 Desirous of being with her husband who was
then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 144
the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony
or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her
eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April
1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie
(Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both
born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5
June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a
naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained
U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December
2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the
Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she gave
birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She
returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8
July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December
2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines
upon learning of her father's deteriorating
medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a
coma and eventually expired. The petitioner
stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to
take care of her father's funeral arrangements as
well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise
of her father was a severe blow to her entire
family. In her earnest desire to be with her
grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.19 The couple began preparing for their
resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester;20
coordination with property movers for the
relocation of their household goods, furniture
and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and
inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the
proper procedure to be followed in bringing their
pet dog into the country.22 As early as 2004, the
petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines
on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a
Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed25 while her husband was
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their
family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at
her mother's place until she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit with a parking
slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San
Juan City in the second half of 2005.27 The
corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
covering the unit and parking slot were issued by
the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age
began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a
quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of
some of the family's remaining household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially
informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's
change and abandonment of their address in the
U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on
27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned
from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in
the country on 4 May 2006 and started working
for a major Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband
acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family
home34 and to this day, is where the couple and
their children have been residing.35 A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was
issued in the couple's name by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As
can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the
BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and
declared that she is deemed to have reacquired
her Philippine citizenship while her children are
considered as citizens of the Philippines.38
Consequently, the BI issued Identification
Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the
names of her three (3) children. 39
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 145
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA
a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on
18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine
Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S.
Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of
the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before
assuming her post, petitioner executed an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship" before a notary public in
Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction
of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010
petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI46
and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped
using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before
the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila
an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States."49 On that day,
she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before
the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she
had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on
21 October 2010 with the intent, among others,
of relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In
the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated
that she had resided outside of the U.S.,
specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September
1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul
issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21
October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the
COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to the
question "Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed
Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained
Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530.
55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for
the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner
attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon
City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the
upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the
subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No.
221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for
President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a
petition to deny due course or cancel said COC
which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC)
and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59
She is convinced that the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially,
Elamparo's contention is that petitioner
committed material misrepresentation when she
stated in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued
that petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that
she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that
international law does not confer natural-born
status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63
Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not
qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.64
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a
natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost
that status when she became a naturalized
American citizen.65 According to Elamparo,
natural-born citizenship must be continuous
from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency,
Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound
by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012
COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she
had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 146
and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming
arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her
natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still
fell short of the ten-year residency requirement
of the Constitution as her residence could only
be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when
she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the
said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner
is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine
Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she
failed to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein
she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over
Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition
for quo warranto which could only be filed if
Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections,
and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18,
2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action
because it did not contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would make false the
statement in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that
there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material
misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention
deliberations show that foundlings were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international
law to have been born of citizens of the place
where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship prior to the filing of her
COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections
and that the same is in full force and effect and
has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that
she did not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before
she reacquired natural-born citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in
her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest
mistake, not binding and should give way to
evidence on her true date of reacquisition of
domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to
usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people
to decide a purely political question, that is,
should she serve as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective
Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted
for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second
Division promulgated a Resolution finding that
petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running
for the President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local
Elections, contained material representations
which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate
of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and
Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby
CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December
2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23
December 2015 Resolution by denying the
same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos.
221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate
petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D.
Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 147
COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled
to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule
25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71
docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad
alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite
residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,
persons of unknown parentage, particularly
foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born
Filipino citizens since blood relationship is
determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad
invoked the rule of statutory construction that
what is not included is excluded. He averred that
the fact that foundlings were not expressly
included in the categories of citizens in the 193
5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent
to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on
petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born
citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under
international conventions or treaties to support
her claim that foundlings have a nationality.76
According to Tatad, international conventions
and treaties are not self-executory and that local
legislations are necessary in order to give effect
to treaty obligations assumed by the
Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no
standard state practice that automatically
confers natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed
that petitioner cannot avail of the option to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 because it only applies to former natural-
born citizens and petitioner was not as she was
a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad
concluded that she did not comply with the ten
(10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad
opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in
Quezon City only from the time she renounced
her American citizenship which was sometime in
2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned
petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S.
domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband
stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the
U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or
cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA
No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow
upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83
He advanced the view that former natural-born
citizens who are repatriated under the said Act
reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and
will not revert to their original status as natural-
born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own
admission in her COC for Senator that she had
only been a resident of the Philippines for at
least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the
13 May 2013 Elections operates against her.
Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could
have validly reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In effect, his position was that
petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year
residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed
against petitioner, Contreras' petition,85
docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the
attack to the residency issue. He claimed that
petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be
cancelled on the ground that she did not possess
the ten-year period of residency required for said
candidacy and that she made false entry in her
COC when she stated that she is a legal resident
of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for
computing petitioner's residency in the
Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the
date when her petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He
asserted that petitioner's physical presence in
the country before 18 July 2006 could not be
valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine
domicile since she was then living here as an
American citizen and as such, she was
governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following
arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed
outright for failure to state a cause of action. His
petition did not invoke grounds proper for a
disqualification case as enumerated under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the
alleged lack of residency and natural-born status
of petitioner which are not among the recognized
grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to
an elective office.90
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 148
Second, the petitions filed against her are
basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus
on establishing her ineligibility for the
Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a
presumption in her favor that she is a natural-
born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that
foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where
they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen,
she has every right to be repatriated under R.A.
No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-
born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the
Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of
regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July
2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-
born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair
and the issuance of the decree of adoption of
San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all these
acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first
quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her
domicile of choice in the Philippines as
demonstrated by her children's resettlement and
schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the
construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally
reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her
American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are
complied with.100 She reasoned out that there
was no requirement that renunciation of foreign
citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of
a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing
in the residency portion of her COC for Senator
was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11
December 2015, the COMELEC First Division
ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen,
that she failed to complete the ten (10) year
residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when
she declared therein that she has been a
resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months as of the day of
the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC
First Division concluded that she is not qualified
for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive
portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with
the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015,
the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the
COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present
petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the
issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining
order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015,
temporary restraining orders were issued by the
Court enjoining the COMELEC and its
representatives from implementing the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from
the Court. The Court also ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions filed by
petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016.
Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these
cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL
and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered
through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 149
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015,
rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled
Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled
Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission En Banc, upholding the 11
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which
the questioned Resolutions emanated are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a
QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9
May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or
not the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground"
that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground
should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC
and restrain it from going into the issue of the
qualifications of the candidate for the position, if,
as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or
lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our
Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX,
C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of
polling places, appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the
President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present
their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered. Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any
foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign
governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an
additional ground for the cancellation of their
registration with the Commission, in addition to
other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending,
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 150
including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of
any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or
recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers
approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law
stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4
which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of the President,
the Vice-President, Senators and the Members
of the House of Representatives was made clear
by the Constitution. There is no such provision
for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in
the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in
Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized
proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on
February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 §
1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate
who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility
of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the
creation of a cause of action which is a
substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX,
A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from
the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially
involves an inquiry into qualifications based on
age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX,
C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC
rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds
but also in their consequences are proceedings
for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of
barring an individual from becoming a candidate
or from continuing as a candidate for public
office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or
during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to
remove the incumbent from office.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 151
Consequently, that an individual possesses the
qualifications for a public office does not imply
that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a
public office and vice versa. We have this sort of
dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No.
473) That an alien has the qualifications
prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that
he does not suffer from any of [the]
disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to
grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in
its statement that "the lack of provision for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the
absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of
a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and
is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In
contrast, whether an individual should be
disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined
lest he wins because of the very acts for which
his disqualification is being sought. That is why
it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will
not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for
some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a
candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as
in this case, his domicile, may take a long time
to make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in
the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito
A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still
pending in the COMELEC even after the
elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the
summary character proceedings relating to
certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state
in their certificates of candidacy that they are
eligible for the position which they seek to fill,
leaving the determination of their qualifications
to be made after the election and only in the
event they are elected. Only in cases involving
charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition
against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and
members of the House of Representatives. (R.A.
No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the
prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as
"sole judges" under the Constitution of the
election, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress of the President and Vice President,
as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the
Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in
Fermin, led to the amendment through
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25
September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15
February1993 version of Rule 25, which states
that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who
does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or
protest in which he is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found
by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking
grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a
Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily
dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an
acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of candidate. Such
that, as presently required, to disqualify a
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 152
candidate there must be a declaration by a final
judgment of a competent court that the
candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of
or found by the Commission to be suffering from
any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is
concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of
one to the other. Both do not allow, are not
authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction,
for the COMELEC to determine the qualification
of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding
before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive
order or by a judgment of a competent court or
tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a
prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the
Constitution," neither can the certificate of
candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on
grounds of false representations regarding his or
her qualifications, without a prior authoritative
finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which
the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are
self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial
confessions. Such are, anyway, bases
equivalent to prior decisions against which the
falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final
pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23
that deals with, as in this case, alleged false
representations regarding the candidate's
citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC
to rule essentially that since foundlings108 are
not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens
under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then
cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in
oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that
she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on
bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the
COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that
herein petitioner possesses blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such
relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to
say that "she now has the burden to present
evidence to prove her natural filiation with a
Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code
of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is
more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born
Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was
on private respondents to show that petitioner is
not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents
should have shown that both of petitioner's
parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because
such status did not exclude the possibility that
her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this
case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of
petitioner are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under
Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence
must have such a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or no-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics
from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111
that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986
while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278. The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines
in that decade is natural-born Filipino was
99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented
census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and
1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were
962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of the population were
Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669
Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also
presented were figures for the child producing
ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528
female Filipinos as against 730 female
foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there
were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male
aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299
Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or
99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 153
Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim
admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the
time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of
the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality
of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has
typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge,
straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an
oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things
have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of
the foregoing evidence, that a person with
typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of
the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such
that there would be more than a 99% chance
that a child born in the province would be a
Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that
petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if
not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the
words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because
foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they
can get pregnant and leave their newborn
babies behind. We do not face a situation where
the probability is such that every foundling would
have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a
50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to
frame our questions properly. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero.
What are the chances that the parents of anyone
born in the Philippines would be Filipinos?
99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority,
from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there
were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines
to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children
in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for
that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino
children to natural born Filipino children is
1:1357. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while
the total number of Filipinos born in the
Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the
ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This
means that the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines on that decade
would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social
anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us,
but I am confident that the statistical probability
that a child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born Filipino will not be affected by
whether or not the parents are known. If at all,
the likelihood that a foundling would have a
Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%.
Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or
perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners
abandoning their children here in the Philippines
thinking those infants would have better
economic opportunities or believing that this
country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising
abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a
foreign couple has ever considered their child
excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings
and render them stateless just because there
may be a theoretical chance that one among the
thousands of these foundlings might be the child
of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical
certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a
decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an
improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of
human beings. Your Honor, constitutional
interpretation and the use of common sense are
not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is
a need to examine the intent of the framers. In
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 154
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping
with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose
of the framers and of the people in the adoption
of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. The following exchange is
recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that
after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The
natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino
mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the
proponent of the amendment. The gentleman
refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also
includes natural children of unknown parentage,
natural or illegitimate children of unknown
parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of
unknown parents." Current codes consider them
Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code
wherein all children of unknown parentage born
in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards,
because the presumption is that a child of
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard.
This may be applied in the Philippines in that a
child of unknown parentage born in the
Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is
no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the
conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore,
there is no [more] need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother recognized by one, or the
children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in
the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this
[person] does not recognize the child, is not
unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or
not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the
amendment would exclude the children of a
Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize
the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I
think those of overseas Filipino mother and
father [whom the latter] does not recognize,
should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the
amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better
to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these
cases are few and far in between, that the
constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not
necessary to include a provision on the subject
exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried
out, it was not because there was any objection
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 155
to the notion that persons of "unknown
parentage" are not citizens but only because
their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by
petitioner, of delegate and constitution law
author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate
Rafols presented an amendment to include as
Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of
the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too
few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it
was believed that the rules of international law
were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother,
and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of
the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the
Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016
Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was
rejected. But note that what was declined was
the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition
of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to
explain the constitutional silence is by saying
that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas
which prevailed that there is no more need to
expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's
or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of
a constitution can constitutionalize rules based
on assumptions that are imperfect or even
wrong. They can even overturn existing rules.
This is basic. What matters here is that
Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their
colleagues in the convention that there is no
more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos because they are already impliedly so
recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully
explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it
is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as
Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935
Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over
into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is
appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he
was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the
constitution is not silently silent, it is silently
vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point
that the framers "worked to create a just and
humane society," that "they were reasonable
patriots and that it would be unfair to impute
upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave
implications of the argument that foundlings are
not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search
the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions "for an express intention to deny
foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is
on those who wish to use the constitution to
discriminate against foundlings to show that the
constitution really intended to take this path to
the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the
basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of
special consideration are several provisions in
the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which
provides that the "State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which
mandates Congress to "give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right of
children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development."
Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to
discriminate against foundlings on account of
their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article
15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights, duties, status,
conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding
on citizens of the Philippines even though living
abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 156
Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction
only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis
v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified
mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This
Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is
a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over
the subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but also over the res, which is the
personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15)
adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the
status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose,
she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not
over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043
entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern
the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children
and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as
the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A.
No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules
and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children
and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on
Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among
Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine
that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these
laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts
to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which
make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best.
This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having
to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance,
the determination of foundling status is done not
by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly,
the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the
citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or
the election of such citizenship by one born of an
alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because
there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling,
as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued
in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued
on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's
adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano
and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling
parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's
status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under
international law. Under the 1987 Constitution,
an international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation
or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the
other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws
of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law,
and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.125 International customary
rules are accepted as binding as a result from
the combination of two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinionjuris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.126 "General principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or
judicial logic, based on principles which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as
"general principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice," and the
"general principle against discrimination" which
is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation."128
These are the same core principles which
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 157
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as
embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as
part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.130
Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following
obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after
birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far
as possible, the right to know and be cared for
by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the
implementation of these rights in accordance
with their national law and their obligations under
the relevant international instruments in this
field, in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for
the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any
discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right, to such measures of protection
as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately
after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a
nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and
ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the
time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by
the application of our present naturalization
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended,
and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the
applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while
yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first
is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country
of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall
have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
child's parentage is established, its nationality
shall be determined by the rules applicable in
cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved,
presumed to have been born on the territory of
the State in which it was found. (Underlining
supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where
he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting
State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be considered to have been born within
the territory of parents possessing the nationality
of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness does not
mean that their principles are not binding. While
the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1)
ofwhich131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the
1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961
"United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 158
15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133
this Court noted that the Philippines had not
signed or ratified the "International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearances in
the said convention was nonetheless binding as
a "generally accepted principle of international
law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for
declaring the ban as a generally accepted
principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen
states and had not even come into force and
which needed the ratification of a minimum of
twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points
out, the Court was content with the practice of
international and regional state organs, regional
state practice in Latin America, and State
Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying
countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada, 134 where only four countries had
"either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966
"Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was
decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that
that nine member countries of the European
Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and
jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen
countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign
judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively
takes into account the fact that "generally
accepted principles of international law" are
based not only on international custom, but also
on "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in
Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute.
Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic
to legal systems generally,"136 support the
notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign
judgments, were correctly considered as
"generally accepted principles of international
law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least
sixty countries in Asia, North and South
America, and Europe have passed legislation
recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two
(42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis
regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are
parties to the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not
signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief
Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments
pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries
surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are
recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
including the practice of jus sanguinis countries,
show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as
having been born of nationals of the country in
which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the
Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552,
R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on
Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In
all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino
children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has
been pointed that the DFA issues passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to
citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930
Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of
the Philippines. As the empirical data provided
by the PSA show, that presumption is at more
than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions
and instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight
of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot
be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member
of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to
signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties
and conventions were drafted because the world
community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It
would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 159
ended up using the international instruments
which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool
to deny them political status or to accord them
second-class citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition
of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC
reasoned that since the applicant must perform
an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards
consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No.
9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140
repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of
the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has
been described as such in several cases. They
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141
where we described it as an "abbreviated
repatriation process that restores one's Filipino
citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v.
Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v.
Court of Appeals,143 where we said that "[t]he
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him
to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno
v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if
petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship
(under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his
natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from
birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
implying "that natural-born citizenship must
begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was
obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be
lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree
that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired
even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that
natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145
where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to
mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the
time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."
Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or
perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v.
HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only
two types of citizens under the 1987
Constitution: natural-born citizen and
naturalized, and that there is no third category
for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who
are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen
who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence
in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was
not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship,
he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such,
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to
be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial
precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And
while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new
rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147
where we decreed reversed the condonation
doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be
prospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines."
This Court also said that "while the future may
ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should
be, as a general rule, recognized as good law
prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 160
people's reliance thereupon should be
respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the
oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born
to" in her application for repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and
this misled the BI to presume that she was a
natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that
the data required were the names of her
biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact -
petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects
of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the
biological parents and the adoptee, except when
the biological parent is the spouse of the
adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner
was also entitled to an amended birth certificate
"attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child
of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not
bear any notation that it is an amended
issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll
records, books, and papers relating to the
adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department [of Social Welfare and
Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall
be kept strictly confidential."151 The law
therefore allows petitioner to state that her
adoptive parents were her birth parents as that
was what would be stated in her birth certificate
anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner
was not obligated to disclose that she was an
adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the
qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make
in the same case for cancellation of COC, it
resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover,
erroneous. The whole process undertaken by
COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of
discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing
of the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed false material representation when
she stated in her COC that she has before and
until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a
resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections, is
true.
The Constitution requires presidential
candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in
the Philippines before the day of the elections.
Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9
May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident
of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10)
years. In answer to the requested information of
"Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the
day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years
11 months" which according to her pleadings in
these cases corresponds to a beginning date of
25 May 2005 when she returned for good from
the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991,
she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire
a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence
in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there;
and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence
showing that she and her family abandoned their
U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for
good. These evidence include petitioner's
former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24
May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every
time she travelled abroad; e-mail
correspondences starting in March 2005 to
September 2006 with a freight company to
arrange for the shipment of their household
items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the
Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of
Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to
the Philippines; school records of her children
showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting
June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July
2005; titles for condominium and parking slot
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 161
issued in February 2006 and their corresponding
tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts
dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army
in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items
from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the
U.S. Postal Service confirming request for
change of address; final statement from the First
American Title Insurance Company showing
sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July
2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the
U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that
she had been a Philippine resident since May
2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe
(attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May
2005 and that she and her family stayed with
affiant until the condominium was purchased);
and Affidavit from petitioner's husband
(confirming that the spouses jointly decided to
relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he
stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some
work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and
the facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad,
Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider
that petitioner's domicile had been timely
changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral
arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur
Lim conceded the presence of the first two
requisites, namely, physical presence and
animus manendi, but maintained there was no
animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC
disregarded the import of all the evidence
presented by petitioner on the basis of the
position that the earliest date that petitioner
could have started residence in the Philippines
was in July 2006 when her application under
R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this
regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v.
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and
Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral
arguments, the private respondents also added
Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend
that these cases decree that the stay of an alien
former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she
obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires
Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a
balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since
petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from
24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in
these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only
evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his
declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not
involve a candidate who wanted to count
residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. With the Court decreeing that
residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue
there was whether the candidate's acts after
reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In
Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate
admitted that his place of work was abroad and
that he only visited during his frequent vacations.
In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was
found to be an American citizen who had not
even reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S.
citizenship. She was disqualified on the
citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof
she offered was a seven-month stint as
provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with
approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone
is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence
on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold
that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
contrast, the evidence of petitioner is
overwhelming and taken together leads to no
other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence
(selling the house, taking the children from U.S.
schools, getting quotes from the freight
company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S.,
donating excess items to the Salvation Army,
her husband resigning from U.S. employment
right after selling the U.S. house) and
permanently relocate to the Philippines and
actually re-established her residence here on 24
May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children
in Philippine schools, buying property here,
constructing a residence here, returning to the
Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband
getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with
her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous
stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it
was for good.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 162
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it
against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer
look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise
known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program," shows that there is no overriding
intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors
who must leave after one year. Included in the
law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized
abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan
program "providing the opportunity to avail of the
necessary training to enable the balikbayan to
become economically self-reliant members of
society upon their return to the country"164 in
line with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not
ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the
return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate
into society, it would be an unduly harsh
conclusion to say in absolute terms that the
balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-
free period is obviously granted him to allow him
to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself
into the community before he attends to the
necessary formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner
did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her
children and buying property while awaiting the
return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former
Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is
extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been
decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial
precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication in
Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases
cited by the respondents that the Court intended
to have its rulings there apply to a situation
where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of
residence has been decided particularly on the
facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by
the evidence of residence of petitioner, the
COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of
residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was
false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6)
months as "period of residence before May 13,
2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus,
according to the COMELEC, she started being a
Philippine resident only in November 2006. In
doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed
as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the
2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified
pleadings, she misunderstood the date required
in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as
of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She
said that she reckoned residency from April-May
2006 which was the period when the U.S. house
was sold and her husband returned to the
Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by
her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be
counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood
the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13
May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the
time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the
change which the COMELEC itself introduced in
the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence
in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised
the query if it did not acknowledge that the first
version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence
from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S.
house and the return of her husband is plausible
given the evidence that she had returned a year
before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include
her passport and the school records of her
children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the
COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding
and conclusive admission against petitioner. It
could be given in evidence against her, yes, but
it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake
as to period of residence made in a COC was
overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put
seven (7) months as her period of residence
where the required period was a minimum of one
year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence,
not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have
looked at the evidence presented and see if
petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the
Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the
COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 163
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly
stated the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission,
disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually
and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not
because it was false, but only because
COMELEC took the position that domicile could
be established only from petitioner's repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it
does not take away the fact that in reality,
petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was
here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005.
When she claimed to have been a resident for
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she
could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner
was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed
against her with the SET as early as August
2015. The event from which the COMELEC
pegged the commencement of residence,
petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A.
No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for
purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6)
years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up
in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents
have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this
point. From that time therefore when Rep.
Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated
period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement
were already matters of public record and were
not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC
was also brought up in the SET petition for quo
warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed
on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six (
6) years and six ( 6) months as she
misunderstood the question and could have
truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer
in the SET case was a matter of public record.
Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her
COC for President on 15 October 2015, she
could not be said to have been attempting to
hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC
for Senator which was expressly mentioned in
her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do
not show or even hint at an intention to hide the
2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her
side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run
for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole
ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in
his COC must not only refer to a material fact
(eligibility and qualifications for elective office),
but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture
of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number
of evidenced dates all of which can evince
animus manendi to the Philippines and animus
non revertedi to the United States of America.
The veracity of the events of coming and staying
home was as much as dismissed as
inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at
the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for
Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to
a declaration and therefore an admission that
her residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based
on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the
residency requirement for President." This
conclusion, as already shown, ignores the
standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of
residence, not the statement of the person that
determines residence for purposes of
compliance with the constitutional requirement
of residency for election as President. It ignores
the easily researched matter that cases on
questions of residency have been decided
favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts
of residence far less in number, weight and
substance than that presented by petitioner.169
It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a
primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound
by her declaration in her COC for Senator which
declaration was not even considered by the SET
as an issue against her eligibility for Senator.
When petitioner made the declaration in her
COC for Senator that she has been a resident
for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months
counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she
naturally had as reference the residency
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 164
requirements for election as Senator which was
satisfied by her declared years of residence. It
was uncontested during the oral arguments
before us that at the time the declaration for
Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet
any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016
and that the general public was never made
aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she
would run for President in 2016. Presidential
candidacy has a length-of-residence different
from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are
facts of residence other than that which was
mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other
facts of residence have never been proven to be
false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May
2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in
the USA to finish pending projects and arrange
the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with
her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled
Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005
and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City
in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning
Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was
already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her
husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her
family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills was
completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005,
[petitioner's] mother discovered that her former
lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in
1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and
"Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to
the US in order to supervise the disposal of
some of the family's remaining household
belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband
informed the United States Postal Service of the
family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April
2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned
from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working
for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband
acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where
they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the
COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case
fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation, to consider no other date than
that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for
Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship
and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned
Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with
grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the
COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of
the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through
the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated
cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco
S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No.
15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-
139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner,
v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
for the elective position of President of the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 165

Republic of the Philippines in connection with

the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC

En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES.
The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the
Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC

En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED
QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in
the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 166
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE
POE-LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The words of our most fundamental law cannot
be read so as to callously exclude all foundlings
from public service.
When the names of the parents of a foundling
cannot be discovered despite a diligent search,
but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a
reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum
of proof required to conclude that at least one or
both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this
should be sufficient to establish that he or she is
a natural-born citizen. When these inferences
are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the
exercise of its sole and exclusive prerogative to
decide the qualifications of the members of the
Senate, then there is no grave abuse of
discretion remediable by either Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the
Constitution.
This case certainly does not decide with finality
the citizenship of every single foundling as
natural-born. The circumstances of each case
are unique, and substantial proof may exist to
show that a foundling is not natural-born. The
nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its
place in the scheme of political powers, as
devised by the Constitution, are likewise
different from the other ways to raise questions
of citizenship.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed
by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays
for the nullification of the assailed November 17,
2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
Resolution of public respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.2
The assailed November 17, 2015 Decision3
dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by
David, which sought to unseat private
respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a
Senator for allegedly not being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not
being qualified to hold such office under Article
VI, Section 34 of the 1987 Constitution. The
assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution5 denied
David's Motion for Reconsideration.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator
Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are
unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.6 Edgardo
Militar found her outside the church on
September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He later
turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.8
Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on
September 6, 1968.9 She was given the name
Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.10 Local
Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live
Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS
FOUND IN THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF
JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT
9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE
SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE
CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO
MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET, JARO . .
.11
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San
Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting
the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by
Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly
known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa
Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan
Roces).12 The Decision also ordered the
change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe.13 October 27, 2005,
Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that
the Decision had become final in a Certificate of
Finality.14
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-
Iloilo received the Decision of the San Juan
Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator
Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted
by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.15
This hand-written notation appears on Senator
Poe's foundling certificate:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald
Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court
Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon.
Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974,
under Sp. Proc. No. 138.16
Senator Poe became a registered voter in
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she
turned 18 years old.17 The Commission on
Elections issued her a Voter's Identification Card
for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila on December 13, 1986.18
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 167
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign
Affairs issued her a Philippine passport.19 Her
passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19,
1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013,
and March 18, 2014.20 Having become Senator,
she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic
passport on December 19, 2013.21
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the
University of the Philippines, Manila, but
eventually went to the United States in 1988 to
obtain her college degree.22 In 1991, she
earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science
from Boston College, Chestnut Hill,
Massachusetts.23
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro
Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an
American and Filipino national since birth.24
The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San
Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila.25cralawred On
July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the
United States with her husband.26 For some
time, she lived with her husband and children in
the United States.27
Senator Poe and her husband had three (3)
children: Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie
(Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika).28 Brian was
born in the United States on April 16, 1992.
Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika on
June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born
in the Philippines.29
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted
American citizenship on October 18, 2001.30
She was subsequently given a United States
passport.31
Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe,
Jr., ran for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the 2004 National Elections.32 To
support her father's candidacy, Senator Poe and
her daughter Hanna returned to the Philippines
on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she
returned to the United States on July 8, 2004.34
It was during her stay in the Philippines that she
gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.35
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on
December 11, 2004 and eventually "slipped into
a coma."36 Senator Poe returned to the
Philippines on December 13, 2004.37 On
December 14, 2004, her father died.38 She
stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to
attend her father's funeral and to attend to the
settling of his estate.39
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the
United States. She never looked for work again
in the United States.40
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.41
After consulting her children, they all agreed to
return to the Philippines to support the grieving
Susan Roces.42 In early 2005, they notified
Brian and Hanna's schools Virginia, United
States that they would be transferring to the
Philippines the following semester.43 She came
back on May 24, 2005.44 Her children also
arrived in the first half of 2005.45 However, her
husband stayed in the United States to "finish
pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of
the family home there."46
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax
Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.47
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of
Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines:48
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear
that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.49
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for
Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225.50
She also "filed applications for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three children who
were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that
time."51
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation on July 18, 2006
through an Order signed by Associate
Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner
Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:52
A careful review of the documents submitted in
support of the instant petition indicate that David
was a former citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines being born to Filipino parents and is
presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen;
thereafter, became an American citizen and is
now a holder of an American passport; was
issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 168

on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to PR102

have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.53
(Emphasis in the original) November 15, 2009
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were PR103
"deemed Citizens of the Philippines in
accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. December 27, 2009
9225."54 Until now, the Order "has not been set PR112
aside by the Department of Justice or any other
agency of Government."55 March 27, 2010
PR102
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration
issued Identification Certificates in the name of
Senator Poe and her children.56 It stated that
Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines Arrivals
pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re- Flight No.
acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and November 4, 2006
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office SQ076
Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate
Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, July 23, 2007
2006."57 PR731

Senator Poe became a registered voter of November 5, 2007

Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August PR337
31, 2006.58
May 8, 2008
Senator Poe made several trips to the United PR103
States of America between 2006 and 2009 using
her United States Passport No. 170377935.59 October 5, 2008
She used her passport "after having taken her PR359
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July
2006, but not after she has formally renounced May 21, 2009
her American citizenship on 20 October PR105
2010."60 The following are the flight records
given by the Bureau of Immigration: August 3, 2009
Departures PR733
Flight No.
November 15, 2009
November 1, 2006 PR10361
SQ071
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon
July 20, 2007 Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as
PR730 Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB).62 On
October 31, 2007 October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an
PR300 Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of
October 2, 2008 American Citizenship,63 stating:
PR358
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES,
April 20, 2009 Filipino, of legal age, and presently residing at
PR104 No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon
City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to
July 31, 2009 in accordance with the law, do hereby depose
PR730 and state that with this affidavit, I hereby
expressly and voluntarily renounce my United
October 19, 2009 States nationality/American citizenship, together
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 169
with all rights and privileges and all duties and
allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I
make this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily,
and of my own free will, free of any duress or
undue influence.64 (Emphasis in the original)
The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of
Immigration on October 21, 2010.65 On October
21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB
Chairperson and assumed office on October 26,
2010.66 Her oath of office stated:
PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES,
na itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang Chairperson,
Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko
nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng
aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking
kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang
pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng
Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at
ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas; na
tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na
susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang
lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang
itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng
Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang
pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang
pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko
ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng
Maynila, Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis in the original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States68 in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer
E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011.69 On this
occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire
Information for Determining Possible Loss of
U.S. Citizenship.70 On December 9, 2011, Vice
Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of
Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe.71 The
certificate was approved by the Overseas
Citizen Service, Department of State, on
February 3, 2012.72
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the
2013 Elections.73 On September 27, 2012, she
executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was
submitted to the Commission on Elections on
October 2, 2012.74 She won and was declared
as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.75
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial
Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August
6, 2015.76 He contested the election of Senator
Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and
residency requirements mandated by the 1987
Constitution."77
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 15-01 requiring David "to correct
the formal defects of his petition."78 David filed
his amended Petition on August 17, 2015.79
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was
issued by the Senate Electoral Tribunal, through
its Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon
Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended
Petition.80
Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer,
David filed a Motion Subpoena the Record of
Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and
related documents from the Bureau of
Immigration on August 25, 2015.81 The
documents requested included Senator Poe's
record of travels and NSO kept Birth
Certificate.82 On August 26, 2015, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04
granting the Motion.83 The same Resolution
directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a
subpoena to the concerned officials of the
Bureau of Immigration and the National
Statistics Office.84 The subpoenas ordered the
officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at
10:00 a.m. before the Office of the Secretary of
the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the
requested documents.85 The subpoenas were
complied with by both the Bureau of Immigration
and the National Statistics Office on September
1, 2015.86
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted
her Verified Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary
Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on
Grounds for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative
Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct
Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for
Indirect Contempt of Court.87
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-05 requiring
the parties to file a preliminary conference brief
on or before September 9, 2015.88 The
Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference
on September 11, 2015.89 During the
Preliminary Conference, the parties "agreed to
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 170
drop the issue of residency on the ground of
prescription."90
Oral arguments were held by the Senate
Electoral Tribunal on September 21, 2015.91
The parties were then "required to submit their
respective [memoranda], without prejudice to
the submission of DNA evidence by [Senator
Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said
date."92
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to
extend for 15 days the submission of DNA test
results.93 The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted
the Motion on October 27, 2015 through
Resolution No. 15-08.94 On November 5, 2015,
Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the
results of DNA Testing,95 which stated that
"none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took
provided results that would shed light to the real
identity of her biological parents."96 The
Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was
to continue to find closure regarding the issue
and submit any development to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe submitted
"the issue of her natural-born Filipino citizenship
as a foundling for resolution upon the legal
arguments set forth in her submissions to the
Tribunal."97 On November 6, 2015, through
Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and
considered the case submitted for resolution."98
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision
finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen
and, therefore, qualified to hold office as
Senator.99 The Decision stated:
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born
citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continue
to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the
1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth, without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine
citizenship.
....
In light of our earlier pronouncement that
Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born
Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as
required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular
No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing
Oath of Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire
natural-born Philippine citizenship.
....
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA
passport from the moment she renounced her
American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She
remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen
from that time on until today.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted)
On November 23, 2015, David moved for
reconsideration.101 The Senate Electoral
Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on
November 24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five (5)
days to comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration.102
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to
the Motion for Reconsideration on December 1,
2015.103 David's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on
December 3, 2015:104
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY
the Verified Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of
David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November
2015.
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM
Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24 November 2015
issued by the Executive Committee of the
Tribunal; to NOTE the Comment/Opposition filed
by counsel for Respondent on 01 December
2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear
and submit memorandum as amici curiae filed
by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the
Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus Curiae)
earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139
(DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner,
versus Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."
SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)
On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal's Resolution was received by
David.106 On December 9, 2015, David filed the
pre Petition for Certiorari before this Court.107
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 171
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and Senator Poe to
comment on the Petition "within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
notice."108 The Resolution also set oral
arguments on January 19, 2016.109 The Senate
Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on
December 30, 2015.110 Senator Poe submitted
her Comment on January 4, 2016.111
This case was held in abeyance pending the
resolution of the Commission on Elections case
on the issue of private respondent's citizenship.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the
Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition
for Quo Warranto based on its finding that
private respondent is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, qualified to hold a seat as Senator under
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
I to the exclusivity of the Senate Electoral
Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our
power of judicial review through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, which state its findings and
conclusions on private respondent's citizenship.
Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment
relief calls for a consideration of two (2) factors:
first, the breadth of this Court's competence
relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal;
and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—
a petition for certiorari—through which one who
is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this
Court.
I. A
The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is
a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution:112
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
....
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
(Emphasis supplied)
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution
segregates from all other judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the
Commission on Elections113) the power to rule
on contests114 relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the Senate (as
well as of the House of Representatives). These
powers are granted to a separate and distinct
constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects
Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such
contests is exclusive to any other body. The
resolution of such contests is its only task; it
performs no other function.
The 1987 Constitution is not the first
fundamental law to introduce into our legal
system an "independent, impartial and non-
partisan body attached to the legislature and
specially created for that singular purpose."115
The 1935 Constitution similarly created an
Electoral Commission, independent from the
National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to members of the National
Assembly.116 This was a departure from the
system introduced by prior organic acts enforced
under American colonial rule—namely: the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of
1916—which vested the power to resolve such
contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935
Constitution was amended to make room for a
bicameral legislature, a corresponding
amendment was made for there to be separate
electoral tribunals for each chamber of
Congress.117 The 1973 Constitution did away
with these electoral tribunals, but they have
since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935
and 1987 Constitutions—which provide for the
creation of electoral tribunals (or their
predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 172
been unequivocal in their language. The
electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the
exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred.
. . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has
been described as "intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to
the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcohn as "full, clear and complete." . . . Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission. . . .
The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the
1987 Constitution.119
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests
relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the elective officials falling within
the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in
these electoral tribunals. It is only before them
that post-election challenges against the
election, returns, and qualifications of Senators
and Representatives (as well as of the President
and the Vice-President, in the case of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond
the scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17's
stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole"
judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII,
Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice .
. . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." Judicial
review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v.
House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal:120
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the
Constitution grants the [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members
of the House of Representatives, any final action
taken by the [House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by
this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in
any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the
same."
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of
judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles
vs. [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
interference, the Court may do so, however, but
only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of
a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that
there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs.
Bocar, the Court has ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial
interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
power as will constitute a denial of due process."
The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs.
[House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal],
venture into the perilous area of correcting
perceived errors of independent branches of the
Government; it comes in only when it has to
vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no
less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial
action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and
Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to
a determination of whether there has been an
error in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.
I. B
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or
House Electoral Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction
of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of
the proceedings in the tribunal from which the
appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed
in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and
described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
as an independent civil action.122 The viability
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 173
of such a petition is premised on an allegation of
"grave abuse of discretion."123
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been
generally held to refer to such arbitrary,
capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough: it must be grave.124
There is grave abuse of discretion when a
constitutional organ such as the Senate
Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on
Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its
factual inferences such that critical pieces of
evidence, which have been nevertheless
properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or
which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored
or not accounted for.125
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional
text or of statutory provisions, as well as a
misreading or misapplication of the current state
of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse
of discretion.126 The arbitrariness consists in
the disregard of the current state of our law.
Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and
evidence or frivolously departs from settled
principles engenders a strong suspicion of
partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent
against a party.
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued:
(a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is
premised on wrong considerations and its
conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if
not misrepresentation, of the evidence;127 (b)
where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far
from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very
personal and subjective assessment standards
when the law is replete with standards that can
be used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's action on
the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point
of being grossly unreasonable";129 and (d)
where the tribunal invokes erroneous or
irrelevant considerations in resolving an
issue.130
I. C
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate
Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are
in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading
of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an
intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its
provisions.
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated
by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
confronted with a novel legal question: the
citizenship status of children whose biological
parents are unknown, considering that the
Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly
makes reference to one's father or mother. It
was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction
in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at
that point, was without judicial precedent.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable
interpretation of the law while needfully
considering the established personal
circumstances of private respondent. It could not
have asked the impossible of private
respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's
errand to establish her parentage, when the
controversy before it arose because private
respondent's parentage was unknown and has
remained so throughout her life.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of
human capacity. It did not insist on burdening
private respondent with conclusively proving,
within the course of the few short months, the
one thing that she has never been in a position
to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it
conscientiously appreciated the implications of
all other facts known about her finding.
Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner
in keeping with the degree of proof required in
proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not
absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable
doubt or preponderance of evidence, but
"substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion."131
In the process, it avoided setting a damning
precedent for all children with the misfortune of
having been abandoned by their biological
parents. Far from reducing them to inferior,
second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 174
promoting and defending the well-being of
children, advancing human rights, and
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and
equal access to opportunities for public service.
II
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
spells out the requirement that "[n]o person shall
be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines."
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not
a natural-born citizen and, therefore, not
qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly
on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a
foundling whose parents are unknown, private
respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis
principle: that is, that she failed to establish her
Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the
essence of the Constitution's determination of
who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner
insists that as private respondent was never a
natural-born citizen, she could never leave
reverted to natural-born status despite the
performance of acts that ostensibly comply with
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.
Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he
places over Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and its enumeration of who are
Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section
1(2), which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose
fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as
private respondent's foundling status is settled,
the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon
her. With private respondent having supposedly
failed to discharge this burden, the supposed
inevitable conclusion is that she is not a natural-
born Filipino.
III
At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional
ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have biological
parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos.
Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they
may, at critical times, not know their parents.
Thus, this controversy must consider
possibilities where parentage may be Filipino
but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains
unknown.132 Resolving this controversy hinges
on constitutional interpretation.
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise
in discovering the sovereign's purpose so as to
identify which among competing interpretations
of the same text is the more contemporarily
viable construction. Primarily, the actual
words—text—and how they are situated within
the whole document—context—govern.
Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the
plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails,
contemporaneous construction may settle what
is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a
reading of the plain text is already sufficient,
contemporaneous construction may still be
resorted to as a means for verifying or validating
the clear textual or contextual meaning of the
Constitution.
III. A
The entire exercise of interpreting a
constitutional provision must necessarily begin
with the text itself. The language of the provision
being interpreted is the principal source from
which this Court determines constitutional
intent.133
To the extent possible, words must be given their
ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the
basic precept of verba legis.134 The
Constitution is truly a public document in that it
was ratified and approved by a direct act of the
People exercising their right of suffrage, they
approved of it through a plebiscite. The
preeminent consideration in reading the
Constitution, therefore, is the People's
consciousness: that is, popular, rather than
technical-legal, understanding. Thus:
We look to the language of the document itself
in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It
is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. They are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the
people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 175
what they say. Thus, these are the cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.135 (Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires
awareness of its relation with the whole of the
Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a
constituent of a greater whole. It is the
framework of the Constitution that animates
each of its components through the dynamism of
these components' interrelations. What is called
into operation is the entire document, not simply
a peripheral item. The Constitution should,
therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular,
whole unit—ut magis valeat quam pereat.136
Each provision must be understood and effected
in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution
contains, from its foundational principles to its
finest fixings.137
The words and phrases that establish its
framework and its values color each provision at
the heart of a controversy in an actual case. In
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:138
It is a well-established rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are
to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them,
if practicable, and must lean in favor of
construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.139 (Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration
of jurisprudence that has previously considered
that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is
founded on the basic principle that "judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of [our] legal
system."140 Jurisprudence is not an
independent source of law. Nevertheless,
judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written
into the text itself as of the date that it was
originally passed. This is because judicial
construction articulates the contemporaneous
intent that the text brings to effect.141
Nevertheless, one must not fall into the
temptation of considering prior interpretation as
immutable.
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy
likewise looks into how the text has evolved.
Unless completely novel, legal provisions are
the result of the re-adoption—often with
accompanying re-calibration—of previously
existing rules. Even when seemingly novel,
provisions are often introduced as a means of
addressing the inadequacies and excesses of
previously existing rules.
One may trace the historical development of text
by comparing its current iteration with prior
counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of
changes in syntax, along with accounting for
more conspicuous substantive changes such as
the addition and deletion of provisos or items in
enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of
more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and
the imposition of heavier penalties. The tension
between consistency and change galvanizes
meaning.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
which enumerates who are citizens of the
Philippines, may be compared with counterpart
provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but
even in organic laws142 and in similar
mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers
whose precepts nevertheless still resonate
today.
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a
realistic appreciation of legal interpretation must
grapple with the truth that meaning is not always
singular and uniform. In Social Weather
Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,144
this Court explained the place of a holistic
approach in legal interpretation:
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners
appeal to what they (respectively) construe to be
plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text on the
part of COMELEC, that the use of the words
"paid for" evinces no distinction between direct
purchasers and those who purchase via
subscription schemes; and, on the part of
petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from
actually using the word "subscriber" means that
subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The
variance in the parties' positions, considering
that they are both banking on what they claim to
be the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the
best evidence of an extant ambiguity.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 176
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself
to pedantic rigor that foments absurdity. The
dangers of inordinate insistence on literal
interpretation are commonsensical and need not
be belabored. These dangers are by no means
endemic to legal interpretation. Even in
everyday conversations, misplaced literal
interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation
on technical rules of grammar is no less
innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to
text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the
legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism
purports to bolster.
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases,
a universal plain language is erroneous. In
reality, universality and uniformity in meaning is
a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that
language is static.
The more appropriate and more effective
approach is, thus, holistic rather than parochial:
to consider context and the interplay of the
historical, the contemporary, and even the
envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
convergence of social realities and social ideals.
The latter are meant to be effected by the legal
apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the
prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed,
the word in the vernacular that describes the
Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this
imperative of constitutional primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair
Election Act in isolation. Here, we consider not
an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part
of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part,
that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair
elections. We consider not a cloistered provision
but a norm that should have a present
authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those
who currently read, depend on, and demand
fealty from the Constitution.145 (Emphasis
supplied)
III. B
Contemporaneous construction and aids that
are external to the text may be resorted to when
the text is capable of multiple, viable
meanings.146 It is only then that one can go
beyond the strict boundaries of the document.
Nevertheless, even when meaning has already
been ascertained from a reading of the plain text,
contemporaneous construction may serve to
verify or validate the meaning yielded by such
reading.
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction
is justified by the realization that the business of
understanding the Constitution is not exclusive
to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of
our constitutional order necessarily means that
all organs of government, and even the People,
read the fundamental law and are guided by it.
When competing viable interpretations arise, a
justiciable controversy may ensue requiring
judicial intervention in order to arrive with finality
at which interpretation shall be sustained. To
remain true to its democratic moorings,
however, judicial involvement must remain
guided by a framework or deference and
constitutional avoidance. This same principle
underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to
refrain from issuing advisory opinions.
Specifically as regards this Court, only
constitutional issues that are narrowly framed,
sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained.147
When permissible then, one may consider
analogous jurisprudence (that is, judicial
decisions on similar, but not the very same,
matters or concerns),148 as well as thematically
similar statutes and international norms that
form part of our legal system. This includes
discerning the purpose and aims of the text in
light of the specific facts under consideration. It
is also only at this juncture—when external aids
may be consulted—that the supposedly
underlying notions of the framers, as articulated
through records of deliberations and other
similar accounts, can be illuminating.
III. C
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional
interpretation, inferring meaning from the
supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the
original understanding of the individuals who
adopted the basic document is the weakest
approach.
These methods leave the greatest room for
subjective interpretation. Moreover, they allow
for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the
framers is not necessarily encompassed or
exhaustively articulated in the records of
deliberations. Those that have been otherwise
silent and have not actively engaged in
interpellation and debate may have voted for or
against a proposition for reasons entirely their
own and not necessarily in complete agreement
with those articulated by the more vocal. It is
even possible that the beliefs that motivated
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 177
them were based on entirely erroneous
premises. Fathoming original understanding can
also misrepresent history as it compels a
comprehension of actions made within specific
historical episodes through detached, and not
necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the
Constitution is not always uniform with the
original understanding of the People who ratified
it. In Civil Liberties Union:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to
consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution,
resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to
vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light
as to the views of the large majority who did not
talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave the instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the
framer's understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis
supplied)
IV
Though her parents are unknown, private
respondent is a Philippine citizen without the
need for an express statement in the
Constitution making her so. Her status as such
is but the logical consequence of a reasonable
reading of the Constitution within its plain text.
The Constitution provides its own cues; there is
not even a need to delve into the deliberations of
its framers and the implications of international
legal instruments. This reading proceeds from
several levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily
identifies the specific provision, which principally
governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in
Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-born citizens."
This definition must be harmonized with Section
1's enumeration, which includes a reference to
parentage. These provisions must then be
appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this
case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and
uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify
the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino
parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that
foundlings are natural-born unless there is
substantial evidence to the contrary. This is
necessarily engendered by a complete
consideration of the whole Constitution, not just
its provisions on citizenship. This includes its
mandate of defending the well-being of children,
guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal
access to opportunities for public service, and
respecting human rights, as well as its reasons
for requiring natural-born status for select public
offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by
contemporaneous construction that considers
related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international
instruments.
V
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth.
This status' commencement from birth means
that private respondent never had to do anything
to consummate this status. By definition, she is
natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized,
she reacquired her natural-born status upon
satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No.
9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office
as Senator of the Republic.
V. A
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2)
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines;
(3)
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4)
Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.150
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-
born citizens:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 178
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It
provides a definition of the term "natural-born
citizens." This is distinct from Section 1's
enumeration of who are citizens. As against
Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically
articulates those who may count themselves as
natural-born.
The weight and implications of this categorical
definition are better appreciated when
supplemented with an understanding of how our
concepts of citizenship and natural-born
citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the
term "natural-born citizen" was a transplanted,
but tardily defined, foreign concept.
V. B
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political
affiliation. It is the "right to have rights."151 It is
one's personal and . . . permanent membership
in a political community. . . The core of
citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political
rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote,
the right to hold public office[,] and the right to
petition the government for redress of
grievance.152
Citizenship also entails obligations to the
political community of which one is part.153
Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the
notion that loyalty is owed to the state,
considering the benefits and protection provided
by it. This is particularly so if these benefits and
protection have been enjoyed from the moment
of the citizen's birth.
Tecson v. Commission on Elections154
reckoned with the historical development of our
concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish
colonial rule.155 Under the Spanish, the native
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were
identified not as citizens but as "Spanish
subjects."156 Church records show that native
inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The
alternative identification of native inhabitants as
subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial
master's regard for native inhabitants as
inferior.157 Natives were, thus, reduced to
subservience in their own land.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons
born within Spanish territory, not just peninsular
Spain, were considered Spaniards,
classification, however, did not extend to the
Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly
mandated that the archipelago was to be
governed by special laws.158 It was only on
December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this
jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there
existed a categorical enumeration of who were
Spanish citizens,159 thus:
(a)
Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b)
Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if
they were born outside of Spain,
(c)
Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
(d)
Those who, without such papers, may have
become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.160
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule.
The Philippine Islands were ceded by Spain to
the United States of America under the Treaty of
Paris, which was entered into on December 10,
1898. The Treaty of Paris did not automatically
convert the native inhabitants to American
citizens.161 Instead, it left the determination of
the native inhabitants' status to the Congress of
the United States:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula,
residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom. . . . In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain by making . . . a declaration
of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in
default of which declaration they shall be held to
have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they may
reside.
Thus -
The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by
Congress.162
Pending legislation by the United States
Congress, the native inhabitants who had
ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States."163
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 179
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first
appeared in legislation in the Philippine Organic
Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of
1902:164
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United
States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the
status of children born in the Philippine Islands
to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as
of April 11, 1899. However, it did not account for
the status of children born in the Islands to
parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view
was expressed that the common law concept of
jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which
was operative in the United States, applied to the
Philippine Islands.165
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress
amended Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
It was made to include a proviso for the
enactment by the legislature of a law on
acquiring citizenship. This proviso read:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do
not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United
States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United
States if residing therein.166
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise
known as the Jones Law of 1916, replaced the
Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship
provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
amended:167
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such
others as have since become citizens of some
other country: Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States
under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-
born inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of
April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of
Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the
Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date,
not a citizen of some other country."168
There was previously the view that jus soli may
apply as a mode of acquiring citizenship. It was
the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference
to parentage vis-a-vis the determination of
citizenship.169 Article III, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution provided:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2)
Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
(3)
Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(4)
Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5)
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 180
Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in
this jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's
provision stipulating the qualifications for
President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
Article VII, Section 3 read:
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the
office of President or Vice-President, unless he
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and
has been a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding the election.
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the
1935 Constitution did not define the term.
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—
read with the then civil law provisions that
stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens
lip by women who marry alien husbands—was
discriminatory towards women.170 The 1973
Constitution rectified this problematic situation:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2)
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines.
(3)
Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.
(4)
Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines
who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is
deemed, under the law, to have renounced her
citizenship.171
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to
actually define the term "natural-born citizen."
Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
provided:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is
a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship.172
The present Constitution adopted most of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution on
citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof
that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the
1935 Constitution."173
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now
reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2)
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines;
(3)
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4)
Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.174
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973
Constitution's previous definition of natural-born
citizens, as follows:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born"
citizenship is a "foreign" concept that was
transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the
1935 Constitution's eligibility requirements for
President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
In the United States Constitution, from which this
concept originated, the term "natural-born
citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an
eligibility requirement for the presidency.175 It is
not defined in that Constitution or in American
laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a
requirement for the presidency are not even
found in the records of constitutional
deliberations.176 However, it has been
suggested that, as the United States was under
British colonial rule before its independence, the
requirement of being natural-born was
introduced as a safeguard against foreign
infiltration in the administration of national
government:
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this
language was inserted in response to a letter
sent by John Jay to George Washington, and
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 181
probably to other delegates, on July 25, 1787,
which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and
seasonable to provide a strong check to the
admission of Foreigners into the administration
of our national Government; and to declare
expressly that the Command in Chief of the
American army shall not be given to nor devolve
on, any but a natural born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of
Baron Von Steuben, who had served valiantly in
the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent
loyalty was suspected by Jay. Another theory is
that the Jay letter, and the resulting
constitutional provision, responded to rumors
that the Convention was concocting a monarchy
to be ruled by a foreign monarch.177
In the United States, however, citizenship is
based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis.
V. C
Today, there are only two (2) categories of
Filipino citizens: natural-born and naturalized.
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV,
Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the
Philippines "from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship." By necessary implication, a
naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-
born. Bengson v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal178 articulates this definition
by dichotomy:
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not
natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the
present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino.179
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban
further shed light on the concept of naturalized
citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson:
naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former aliens
or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
procedure, in which they had to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed
all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law in order to
become Filipino citizens."180
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship
by naturalization is generally required to file a
verified petition.181 He or she must establish.
among others, that he or she is of legal age, is
of good moral character, and has the capacity to
adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles,
or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a
significant period of time.182 Further, the
applicant must show that he or she will not be a
threat to the state, to the public, and to the
Filipinos' core beliefs.183
V. D
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
merely gives an enumeration. Section 2
categorically defines "natural-born citizens."
This constitutional definition is further clarified in
jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born
citizenship from naturalized citizenship.
Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil Code, this
jurisprudential clarification is deemed written into
the interpreted text, thus establishing its
contemporaneous intent.
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on
Section 1 and the need to establish bloodline is
misplaced. It is inordinately selective and
myopic. It divines Section 1's mere enumeration
but blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding
Section's unequivocal definition.
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which
petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is Section 2
that is on point. To determine whether private
respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must
look into whether she had to do anything to
perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this
calls for an inquiry into whether she underwent
the naturalization process to become a Filipino.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private
respondent went through the actual
naturalization process. There is no more
straightforward and more effective way to
terminate this inquiry than this realization of total
and utter lack of proof.
At most, there have been suggestions likening a
preferential approach to foundlings, as well as
compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with
naturalization. These attempts at analogies are
misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for
naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly
devised. The investiture of citizenship on
foundlings benefits children, individuals whose
capacity to act is restricted.184 It is a glaring
mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 182
relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to
become a Filipino, the grant of which is
contingent on evidence that he or she must
himself or herself adduce. As shall later be
discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised
on the immutability of natural-born status. It
privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds
from an entirely different premise from the
restrictive process of naturalization.
So too, the jurisprudential treatment of
naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born status is
clear. It should be with the actual process of
naturalization that natural-born status is to be
contrasted, not against other procedures relating
to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be
thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the
status of citizens.
V. E
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with
being a human thoroughbred.
Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens."
Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen, either
one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino
citizen.
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical
features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are
not determinative of citizenship.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be
natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not even
require them to conform to traditional
conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically
Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be
ethnically foreign.
Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one
ascendant degree: parentage. The citizenship of
everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant.
There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure
Filipino bloodline.
Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A
conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be
sustained by evidence adduced in a proper
proceeding, which substantially proves that
either or both of one's parents is a Filipino
citizen.
V. F
Private respondent has done this. The evidence
she adduced in these proceedings attests to
how at least one—if not both—of her biological
parents were Filipino citizens.
Proving private respondent's biological
parentage is now practically impossible. To
begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn
infant. She was abandoned almost half a century
ago. By now, there are only a handful of those
who, in 1968, were able-minded adults who can
still lucidly render testimonies on the
circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the
identification of individuals against whom DNA
evidence may be tested is improbable, and by
sheer economic cost, prohibitive.
However, our evidentiary rules admit of
alternative means for private respondent to
establish her parentage.
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven
through circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-
Felipe v. People:185
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption; while circumstantial evidence is
the proof of fact or facts from which, taken either
singly or collectively, the existence of a particular
fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or
probable consequence.186
People v. Raganas187 further defines
circumstantial evidence:
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to
a series of facts other than the fact in issue,
which by experience have been found so
associated with such fact that in a relation of
cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory
conclusion.188 (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, for instance, stipulates when
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a
conviction in criminal proceedings:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and cralawlawlibrary
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole
mention of circumstantial evidence is in
reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has
nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 183

evidence in other proceedings.189 There is no

rational basis for making the use of YEAR
circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN IN THE
proceedings and for not considering PHILIPPINES
circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE
civil and/or administrative proceedings. PHILIPPINES
1965
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence 1,479
suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result 795,415
in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) 1966
anchored on the highest standard or proof that 1,437
our legal system would require, i.e., proof 823,342
beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial 1967
evidence suffices for such a high standard, so 1,440
too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent 840,302
standard of proof in administrative and quasi- 1968
judicial proceedings such as those before the 1,595
Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial 898,570
evidence.190 1969
1,728
Private respondent was found as a newborn 946,753
infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on 1970
September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did 1,521
most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a 966,762
predominantly Filipino population.192 Private 1971
respondent is described as having "brown 1,401
almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, 963,749
straight black hair and an oval-shaped face."193 1972
She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.194 1,784
Further, in 1968, there was no international 968,385
airport in Jaro, Iloilo. 1973
1,212
These circumstances are substantial evidence 1,045,290
justifying an inference that her biological parents 1974
were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic 1,496
Church is more or less consistent with how a 1,081,873
Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly 1975
religious and Catholic environment, would have 1,493
behaved. The absence of an international airport 1,223,837
in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a 2010
foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, 1,244
swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of 1,782,877
Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her 2011
offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is 1,140
unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless 1,746,685
attest to it. 2012
1,454
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. 1,790,367
Commission on Elections,195 the Solicitor 2013
General underscored how it is statistically more 1,315
probable that private respondent was born a 1,751,523
Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He 2014
submitted the following table is support of his 1,351
statistical inference:196 1,748,782
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO
CHILDREN BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1965- Source: Philippine Statistics Authority
1975 and 2010-2014 [illegible]197
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 184
Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the
Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18%
newborns were foreigners. This translates to
roughly 99.8% probability that private
respondent was born a Filipino citizen.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright
impossibility, of identifying her parents after half
a century, a range of substantive proof is
available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as
to private respondent's parentage.
VI
Before a discussion on how private respondent's
natural-born status is sustained by a general
assumption on foundlings arising from a
comprehensive reading and validated by a
contemporaneous construction of the
Constitution, and considering that we have just
discussed the evidence pertaining to the
circumstances of private respondent's birth, it is
opportune to consider petitioner's allegations
that private respondent bore the burden of
proving—through proof of her bloodline—her
natural-born status.
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence
shifted to private respondent upon a mere
showing that she is a foundling is a serious error.
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a
jurisprudential presumption that all newborns
who have been abandoned in rural areas in the
Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis on
private respondent's supposed burden to prove
the circumstances of her birth places upon her
an impossible condition. To require proof from
private respondent borders on the absurd when
there is no dispute that the crux of the
controversy—the identity of her biological
parents—is simply not known.
"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law." Burden of proof lies
on the party making the allegations;198 that is,
the party who "alleges the affirmative of the
issue"199 Burden of proof never shifts from one
party to another. What shifts is the burden of
evidence. This shift happens when a party
makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.200
The other party then bears the "burden of going
forward"201 with the evidence considering that
which has ostensibly been established against
him or her.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof
necessarily falls on the party who brings the
action and who alleges that the respondent is
ineligible for the office involved in the
controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial
bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
the requisite quantum of proof is substantial
evidence.202 This burden was petitioner's to
discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima
facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the
respondent.
Private respondent's admitted status as a
foundling does not establish a prima facie case
in favor of petitioner. While it does establish that
the identities of private respondent's biological
parents are not known, it does not automatically
mean that neither her father nor her mother is a
Filipino.
The most that petitioner had in his favor was
doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means
substantial evidence establishing a prima facie
case and shifting the burden of evidence to
private respondent.
Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a
foundling, petitioner trivializes other
uncontroverted circumstances that we have
previously established as substantive evidence
of private respondent's parentage:
(1)
Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro,
Iloilo;
(2)
She was only an infant when she was found,
practically a newborn;
(3)
She was-found sometime in September 1968;
(4)
Immediately after she was found, private
respondent was registered as a foundling;
(5)
There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo;
and
(6)
Private respondent's physical features are
consistent with those of typical Filipinos.
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts
demonstrates an imperceptive bias. As against
petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more
reasonable inference from these facts is that at
least one of private respondent's parents is a
Filipino.
VII
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 185
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-
born Filipino citizen consistent with a reading
that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition
of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s
reference to parentage, the Constitution
sustains a presumption that all foundlings found
in the Philippines are born to at least either a
Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus
natural-born, unless there is substantial proof
otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section
1(2), any such countervailing proof must show
that both—not just one—of a foundling's
biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
VII. A
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro's Dissenting Opinion to the
assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner
intimates that no inference or presumption in
favor of natural-born citizenship may be indulged
in resolving this case.203 He insists that it is
private respondent's duty to present
incontrovertible proof of her Filipino parentage.
Relying on presumptions is concededly less
than ideal. Common sense dictates that actual
proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving
citizenship issues based on presumptions is
firmly established in jurisprudence.
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis
of presumptions. Ruling on the allegations that
former presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe
(more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.)
was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court
proceeded from the presumptions that: first,
Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou,
was born sometime in 1870, while the country
was still under Spanish colonial rule;204 and
second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of residence,
as indicated in his dearth certificate, must have
also been his place of residence before death,
which subjected him to the "en masse
Filipinization," or sweeping investiture of Filipino
citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of
1902.205 This Court then noted that Lorenzo
Pou's citizenship would have extended to his
son and Fernando Poe Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe.
Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then
have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born
while the 1935 Constitution, which conferred
Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino
fathers, was in effect:
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether
grave abuse of discretion has been committed
by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, when the Philippines was under Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
"en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend
to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.206
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v.
Chan207 and Go v. Ramos208 (which merely
cites Paa)—to the effect that presumptions
cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.
Paa, decided in 1967, stated:
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims
Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction
of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the
claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor
of the State.209 (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling
in light of this Court's more recent ruling in
Tecson.
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that
"no presumption can be indulged in favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship." This
reference to "the claimant" was preceded by a
sentence specifically referencing the duty of "the
respondent." The syntax of this Court's
pronouncement—using the definitive article
"the"—reveals that its conclusion was specific
only to Chan and to his circumstances.
Otherwise, this Court would have used generic
language. Instead of the definite article "the," it
could have used the indefinite article "a" in that
same sentence: "no presumption can be
indulged in favor of a claimant of Philippine
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 186
citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used
other words that would show absolute or
sweeping application, for instance: "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of
any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship;" or,
"no presumption can be indulged in favor of all
claimants of Philippine citizenship."
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly
different from those of this case. Its statements,
therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this
case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced
showing that respondent Quintin Chan was
registered as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration. His father was likewise registered
as an alien. These pieces of evidence already
indubitably establish foreign citizenship and shut
the door to any presumption. In contrast,
petitioner in this case presents no proof, direct
or circumstantial, of private respondent's or of
both of her parents' foreign citizenship.
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but
revising it to make it appear that the same
pronouncement was generally applicable:
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine
citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption
can be indulged hi favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
state.210 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was
lost in proverbial translation. In any case, Go
was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It
cannot overturn Tecson, which was decided by
this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's factual
and even procedural backdrops are different
from those of this case. Go involved the
deportation of an allegedly illegal and
undesirable alien, not an election controversy. In
Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally
showing the Chinese citizenship of Go and of his
siblings were adduced.
VII. B
The presumption that all foundlings found in the
Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-
born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise)
arises when one reads the Constitution as a
whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole
purpose."211
As much as we have previously harmonized
Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2),
constitutional provisions on citizenship must not
be taken in isolation. They must be read in light
of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-
being of children, to guarantee equal protection
of the law and equal access to opportunities for
public service, and to respect human rights.
They must also be read in conjunction with the
Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born
status for select public offices. Further, this
presumption is validated by contemporaneous
construction that considers related legislative
enactments, executive and administrative
actions, and international instruments.
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of
the 1987 Constitution require the state to
enhance children's well-being and to project
them from conditions prejudicial to or that may
undermine their development. Fulfilling this
mandate includes preventing discriminatory
conditions and, especially, dismantling
mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind
the veneer of the legal apparatus:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role
of the youth in nation-building and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs.
....
ARTICLE XV
The Family
....
SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
....
(2) The right of children to assistance, including
proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive
to natural-born citizens of the Philippines. The
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 187
1987 Constitution makes the following offices
exclusive to natural-born citizens:
(1)
President;212
(2)
Vice-President;213
(3)
Senator;214
(4)
Member of the House of Representatives;215
(5)
Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court;216
(6)
Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil
Service Commission;217
(7)
Chairperson and Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections;218
(8)
Chairperson and Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit;219
(9)
Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220
(10)
Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas;221 and
(11)
Chairperson and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights.222
Apart from these, other positions that are limited
to natural-born citizens include, among others,
city fiscals,223 assistant city fiscals,224
Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of the
Sandiganbayan, and other public offices.225
Certain professions are also limited to natural-
born citizens,226 as are other legally
established benefits and incentives.227
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens.
They can then never be of service to the country
in the highest possible capacities. It is also
tantamount to excluding them from certain
means such as professions and state
scholarships, which will enable the actualization
of their aspirations. These consequences cannot
be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all
through the present politically charged
proceedings, the direct objective of which is
merely to exclude a singular politician from
office. Concluding that foundlings are not
natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of
citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority
through no fault of their own.
If that is not discrimination, we do not know what
is.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of
the laws and equal access to opportunities for
public service:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law.
....
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
....
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good. (Emphasis
supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a
guarantee that "persons under like
circumstances and falling within the same class
are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against
'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or oppression of
inequality.'"228
Other than the anonymity of their biological
parents, no substantial distinction229
differentiates foundlings from children with
known Filipino parents. They are both entitled to
the full extent of the state's protection from the
moment of their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 188
failing to identify the parents who abandoned
them—an inability arising from no fault of their
own—cannot be the foundation of a rule that
reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as
inferior, second-class citizens who are not
entitled to as much benefits and protection from
the state as those who know their parents.
Sustaining this classification is not only
inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns
those who, from the very beginning of their lives,
were abandoned to a life of desolation and
deprivation.
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a
constitutional organ, mandated to effect the
Constitution's dictum of defending and
promoting the well-being and development of
children. It is not our business to reify
discriminatory classes based on circumstances
of birth.
Even more basic than their being citizens of the
Philippines, foundlings are human persons
whose dignity we value and rights we, as a
civilized nation, respect. Thus:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
VII. C
Though the matter is settled by interpretation
exclusively within the confines of constitutional
text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-
born citizens of the Philippines (unless
substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of
both of the foundling's parents is presented) is
validated by a parallel consideration or
contemporaneous construction of the
Constitution with acts of Congress, international
instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as
acts of executive organs such as the Bureau of
Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President
of the Philippines.
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the
premise that foundlings are Filipino citizens at
birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the
constitutional mandate to protect children.
Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put
this mandate into effect.
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
provides:
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The
following State policies shall be observed at all
times:
....
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of
the child through measures that will ensure the
observance of international standards of child
protection, especially those to which the
Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any
authority shall be conducted in the best interest
of the child and in a manner which allows the
child to participate and to express
himself/herself freely. The participation of
children in the program and policy formulation
and implementation related to juvenile justice
and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned
government agency. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344
defines the "best interest of the child" as the
"totality of the circumstances and conditions
which are most congenial to the survival,
protection and feelings of security of the child
and most encouraging to the child's physical,
psychological and emotional development."
Consistent with this statute is our ratification230
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child. This specifically requires the states-
parties' protection of: first, children's rights to
immediate registration and nationality after birth;
second, against statelessness; and third,
against discrimination on account of their birth
status.231 Pertinent portions of the Convention
read:
Preamble
The State Parties to the present Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the
principles proclaimed in the Charter of the
United Nations, recognition of the inherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world,
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United
Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their
faith in fundamental human rights and in the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 189
dignity and worth of the human person, and have
determined to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom,
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the International Covenants on Human Rights,
proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein,
without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status,
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the United Nations has
proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special
care and assistance,
....
Have agreed as follows:
....
Article 2
State parties shall respect and ensure the rights
set forth in the present Convention to each child
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of
any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property,
disability, birth or other status.
States Parties shall take appropriate measures
to ensure that the child is protected against all
forms of discrimination or punishment on the
basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal
guardians, or family members.
Article 3
In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
States Parties undertake to ensure the child
such protection and care as is necessary for his
or her well-being, taking into account the rights
and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians,
or other individuals legally responsible for him or
her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate
legislative and administrative measures.
....
Article 7
The child, shall be registered immediately after
birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far
as possible, the right to know and be cared for
by his or her parents.
States Parties shall ensure the implementation
of these rights in accordance with their national
law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, this treaty requires that children be
allowed immediate registration after birth and to
acquire a nationality. It similarly defends them
against discrimination:
Article 24. . . .
1. Every child shall have, without any
discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right to such measures of protection as
are required by his status as a minor, on the part
of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately
after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a
nationality.
....
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law
and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. (Emphasis
supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements]
concluded between state| in written form and
governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation."233 Under Article VII,
Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, treaties
require concurrence by the Senate before they
became binding:
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 190
SECTION 21. No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it
legally effective and binding by transformation. It
then has the force and effect of a statute enacted
by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health
Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
et al.:234
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land
through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides
that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be
applied to domestic conflicts.235 (Emphasis
supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further
action, legislative or otherwise, is necessary.
Thereafter, the whole of government—including
the judiciary—is duty-bound to abide by the
treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt
servanda.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute,
foundlings cannot be the object of
discrimination. They are vested with the rights to
be registered and granted nationality upon birth.
To deny them these rights, deprive them of
citizenship, and render them stateless is to
unduly burden them, discriminate them, and
undermine their development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the
constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being
of children and protecting them from
discrimination. Other legislative enactments
demonstrate the intent to treat foundlings as
Filipino citizens from birth.
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to
as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, is
formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules
and Policies on Domestic Adoption of Filipino
Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted
as a mechanism to "provide alternative
protection and assistance through foster care or
adoption of every child who is neglected,
orphaned, or abandoned."236
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino
children" covered by Republic Act No. 8552:237
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). —
It shall be the duty of the Department or the
child-placing or child-caring agency which has
custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate
his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a
foundling and subsequently be the subject of
legal proceedings where he/she shall be
declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly
referred to as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the
Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. As
with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes
foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be
adopted:
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a
legally free child may be the subject of inter-
country adoption, hi order that such child may be
considered for placement, the following
documents must be submitted: to the Board:
a) Child study;
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of
abandonment/death certificate of parents;
d) Medical evaluation/history;
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary;
and cralawlawlibrary
f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates
may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth
certificates to satisfy the requirement for the
issuance of passports, which will then facilitate
their adoption by foreigners:
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted
person, he must present a certified true copy of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 191
the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy
of his original and amended birth certificates as
issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a minor,
a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required.
In case the applicant is for adoption by foreign
parents under R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall
be required:
a)
Certified true copy of the Court Decree of
Abandonment of Child, the Death Certificate of
the child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment executed after the birth of the child.
b)
Endorsement of child to the Intercountry
Adoption Board by the DSWD.
c)
Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate.238
(Emphasis supplied)
Our statutes on adoption allow for the
recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship on
account of their birth. They benefit from this
without having to do any act to perfect their
citizenship or without having to complete the
naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they
are natural-born citizens.
Specifically regarding private respondent,
several acts of executive organs have
recognized her natural-born status. This status
was never questioned throughout her life; that is,
until circumstances made it appear that she was
a viable candidate for President of the
Philippines. Until this, as well as the proceedings
in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private
respondent's natural-born status has been
affirmed and reaffirmed through various official
public acts.
First, private respondent was issued a foundling
certificate and benefitted from the domestic
adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she
was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by
the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6,
2010, the President of the Philippines appointed
her as MTRCB Chairperson—an office that
requires natural-born citizenship.239
VIII
As it is settled that private respondent's being a
foundling is not a bar to natural-born citizenship,
petitioner's proposition as to her inability to
benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles.
Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino
citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino
citizenship when, following her naturalization as
a citizen of the United States, she complied with
the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. A
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired
in the manner provided by law."240
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect
when private respondent was naturalized an
American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided
in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign
country." Thus, private respondent lost her
Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized
an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006,
she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10,
2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of
her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this
Petition was granted.241
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded
Commonwealth Act No. 63242 and Republic Act
No. 8171243 specifically "to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens
of other countries."244
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic
Act No. 9225 is designed, in its own words, to
ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship."245 This
Court shed light on this in Calilung v.
Commission on Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep. Act
No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country."247
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born
Filipinos' status permanent and immutable
despite naturalization as citizens of other
countries. To effect this, Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225 provides:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. —
Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 192
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I _________________________, solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who,
after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born
Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225
took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries
"retain," that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship,
although the effectivity of this retention and the
ability to exercise the rights and capacities
attendant to this status are subject to certain
solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other
requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as
enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand,
those who became citizens of another country
before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225
"reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may
exercise attendant rights and capacities, also
upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read
in conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a
policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a
mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the
intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition
works to restore natural-born status as though it
was never lost at all.
VIII. B
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the
retention or reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of
civil and political rights, "subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities."248 However,
other conditions must be met for the exercise of
other faculties:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. -
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1)
Those intending to exercise their right of
suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;
(2)
Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3)
Those appointed to any public office shall
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption
of office; Provided, That they renounce their oath
of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;
(4)
Those intending to practice their profession in
the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice; and
(5)
That the right to vote or be elected or appointed
to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:
a.
are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
b.
are in active service as commissioned or
non-commissioned officers in the armed forces
of the country which they are naturalized
citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been
naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for
elective public office must comply with all of the
following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic. This effects the retention or
reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born
Filipino.249 This also enables the enjoyment of
full civil and political rights, subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are
satisfied.250
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 193
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution,251 Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing
laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right
of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in
elections.252
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath."253 This, along with satisfying the other
qualification requirements under relevant laws,
makes one eligible for elective public office.
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v.
Commission on Elections,254 this required
sworn renunciation is intended to complement
Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that
"[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State
and this Constitution allegiance at all times and
any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law."255 It is also in view
of this that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who
seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or
who are serving in the armed forces of other
countries from being appointed or elected to
public office in the Philippines.
VIII. C
Private respondent has complied with all of
these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.256 Second, on August 31, 2006,
she became a registered voter of Barangay
Santa Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her
compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution. Since she was to vote within the
country, this dispensed with the need to comply
with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship.258 This was
complemented by her execution of an
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality
of the United States259 before Vice-Consul
Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011,260
which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul
Jason Galian's issuance of a Certificate of Loss
of Nationality on December 9, 2011261 and the
approval of this certificate by the Overseas
Citizen Service, Department of State, on
February 3, 2012.262
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully
reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has also
complied with all of the other requirements for
eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in
Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. D
It is incorrect to intimate that private
respondent's having had to comply with
Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a
naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino
citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance
with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the
performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
To do so is to completely disregard the
unequivocal policy of permanence and
immutability as articulated in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in
jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a
natural-born Filipino citizen's naturalization
elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or
her natural-born status.
To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of
Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. The
prefix "re" signifies reference to the preceding
state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante that
one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a
reversion to "the way things were." Had Republic
Act No. 9225 intended to mean the investiture of
an entirely new status, it should not have used a
word such as "reacquire." Republic Act No.
9225, therefore, does not operate to make new
citizens whose citizenship commences only from
the moment of compliance with its requirements.
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of
repatriation, ruled that repatriation involves the
restoration of former status or the recovery of
one's original nationality:
recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.263 (Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while
Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its
ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225 's
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 194

policy of permanence and immutablity: "all

Philippine citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship."264 In Bengson's words, the once
naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back
to his or her natural-born status. There may have
been an interruption in the recognition of this
status, as, in the interim, he or she was
naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of
natural-born status expurgates this intervening
fact. Thus, he or she does not become a
Philippine citizen only from the point of
restoration and moving forward. He or she is
recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from
birth, although the intervening fact may have
consequences de facto.
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended
processes not limited to taking the Oath of
Allegiance and requiring compliance with
additional solemnities, but these are for
facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to
citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is
markedly different from naturalization as there is
no singular, extended process with which the
former natural-born citizen must comply.
IX
It is the empowering and ennobling
interpretation of the Constitution that we must
always sustain. Not only will this manner of
interpretation edify the less fortunate; it
establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and
civilized people.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within
the bounds of its constitutional competence
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-
born citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the
Republic. Contrary to petitioner's arguments,
there is no basis for annulling its assailed
Decision and Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess
of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November
17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-
Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen
qualified to hold office as Senator of the
Republic.

To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private SO ORDERED.

respondent is stateless265 is not only to set a
dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make
this Court an accomplice to injustice.

Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every

individual, and social justice are the bedrocks of
our constitutional order. By the unfortunate
fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility
of those gave them life, foundlings are
compelled to begin their very existence at a
disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing destitution
that can never be truly remedied by any
economic relief.

If we are to make the motives of our Constitution

true, then we an never tolerate an interpretation
that condemns foundlings to an even greater
misfortune because of their being abandoned.
The Constitution cannot be rendered inert and
meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.

Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking

maxim to be deployed against other reasonable
interpretations of our basic law. It does
command us to consider legal text, but always
with justice in mind.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 195
SUFFRAGE
[G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001]
AKBAYAN Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI,
PATRICIA O. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z.
TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO,
JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE,
RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE,
JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M.
VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 147179. March 26, 2001]
MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner, vs.
CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO,
COMMISSIONERS MEHOL SADAIN, RUFINO
JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH
LANTION, FLORENTINO TUASON and
RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the
Commission on Election (COMELEC),
respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
At the helm of controversy in the instant
consolidated petitions[1] before us is the
exercise of a right so indubitably cherished and
accorded primacy, if not utmost reverence, no
less than by the fundamental law - the right of
suffrage.
Invoking this right, herein petitioners -
representing the youth sector - seek to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
conduct a special registration before the May 14,
2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18
to 21. According to petitioners, around four
million youth failed to register on or before the
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No.
8189.[2]
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic
leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the
Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and
Peoples Participation, through a Letter dated
January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a
public hearing for the purpose of discussing the
extension of the registration of voters to
accommodate those who were not able to
register before the COMELEC deadline.[3]
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and
Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant
Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner)
attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the
Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Pasay
City.
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners
Tancangco and Lantion submitted
Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on
the Request for a Two-day Additional
Registration of New Voters Only, excerpts of
which are hereto quoted:
Please be advised that the undersigned
attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee on electoral Reforms, Suffrage and
Peoples Participation presided over by the Hon.
Sen. Raul Roco, its Committee Chairman to date
at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters
Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is
the request by youth organizations to hold
additional two days of registration. Thus,
participating students and civic leaders along
with Comelec Representatives were in
agreement that is legally feasible to have a two-
day additional registration of voters to be
conducted preferably on February 17 and 18,
2001 nationwide. The deadline for the continuing
voters registration under R.A. 8189 is December
27, 2000.
To address the concern that this may open the
flood parts for hakot system, certain restrictive
parameters were discussed. The following
guidelines to serve as safeguards against
fraudulent applicants:
1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25
years of age or less and will be registering for
the first time on May 14, 2001;
2. The applicants shall register in their places of
residences; and
3. The applicants shall present valid
identification documents, like school records.
Preparatory to the registration days, the
following activities are likewise agreed:
1. Submission of the list of students and their
addresses immediately prior to the actual
registration of the applicants;
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 196
2. The Comelec field officers will be given the
opportunity to verify the voters enumerators list
or conduct ocular inspection;
3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and
4. Meetings with student groups to ensure
orderly and honest conduct of the registration
and drum up interest to register among the new
voters.
The rationale for the additional two-day
registration is the renewed political awareness
and interest to participate in the political process
generated by the recent political events in the
country among our youth. Considering that they
failed to register on December 27, 2000
deadline, they approved for special registration
days.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission en
banc has to discuss all aspects regarding this
request with directives to the Finance Services
Department (FSD) to submit certified available
funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy
Executive Director for Operations (DEDO) for
the estimated costs of additional two days of
registration.
The presence of REDs on January 30 can be
used partly for consultation on the practical side
and logistical requirements of such additional
registration days. The meeting will be set at 1:30
p.m. at the Office of ED.[4]
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a
consultation meeting among regional heads and
representatives and a number of senior staff
headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod
Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with
the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of
the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional
registration of voters on the ground that Section
8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no
registration shall be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and that the Commission has no
more time left to accomplish all pre-election
activities.[5]
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 3584, the decretal portion of
which reads:
Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct a
two-day additional registration of new voters on
February 17 and 18, 2001.
Commissioners Rufino S. B. Javier and Mehol K.
Sadain voted to deny the request while
Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and
Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the
students request. With this impasse, the
Commission construed its Resolution as having
taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-
Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II
(YOUTH) et al. filed before this Court the instant
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed
as G.R. No. 147066, which seeks to set aside
and nullify respondent COMELECs Resolution
and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189
unconstitutional insofar as said provision
effectively causes the disenfranchisement of
petitioners and others similarly situated.
Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus directing respondent
COMELEC to conduct a special registration of
new voters and to admit for registration
petitioners and other similarly situated young
Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14,
2001 General Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle
Betito, a student of the University of the
Philippines, likewise filed a Petition for
Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147179,
praying that this Court direct the COMELEC to
provide for another special registration day
under the continuing registration provision under
the Election Code.
On March 13, 2001, this Court resolved to
consolidate the two petitions and further
required respondents to file their Comment
thereon within a non-extendible period expiring
at 10:00 A.M. of March 16, 2001. Moreover, this
Court resolved to set the consolidated cases for
oral arguments on March 16, 2001.[6]
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment,
recommended that an additional continuing
registration of voters be conducted at the
soonest possible time in order to accommodate
that disenfranchised voters for purposes of the
May 14, 2001 elections.
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of
the present petitions, is tasked to resolve a two-
pronged issue focusing on respondent
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 197
COMELECs issuance of the assailed Resolution
dated February 8, 2001, which Resolution,
petitioners, by and large, argue to have
undermined their constitutional right to vote on
the May 14, 2001 general elections and caused
the disenfranchisement of around four (4) million
Filipinos of voting age who failed to register
before the registration deadline set by the
COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a) Whether or not respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001;
b) Whether or not this Court can compel
respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a
special registration of new voters during the
period between the COMELECs imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14,
2001 general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the
right of suffrage, although accorded a prime
niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the
fundamental law, ought to be exercised within
the proper bounds and framework of the
Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent
laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which
statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted
to effectively insulate such so cherished right
from ravishment and preserve the democratic
institutions our people have, for so long, guarded
against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery
and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked
by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute.
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of
suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights,
is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law.
Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED
BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT
OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO
ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE,
AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND
IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE
TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR
OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT
SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF
SUFFRAGE.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a
citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must
undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition
to the minimum requirements set by the
fundamental charter, is obliged by law to
register, at present, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act of 1996.
Stated differently, the act of registration is an
indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the
right to vote and an indispensable element in the
election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners
argument, registration cannot and should not be
denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere
statutory requirement. Proceeding from the
significance of registration as a necessary
requisite to the right to vote, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and
regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election, to the incidental yet
generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly
manner one which is not indifferent and so far
removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and
pragmatic operational considerations bear great
weight in the adjudication of the issues raised in
the instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8, of the R.A. 8189,
which provides a system of continuing
registration, is explicit, to wit:
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of
Voters. The Personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in
the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 198
election and ninety (90) days before a special
election. (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among
others, speaks of a prohibitive period within
which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of
voters from the permanent voters list, provides:
SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from
the List Any registered voter, representative of a
political party x x x may file x x x except one
hundred (100) days prior to a regular election
xxx.
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by
respondent COMELEC in its Comment:
x x x The petition for exclusion is a necessary
component to registration since it is a safety
mechanism that gives a measure of protection
against flying voters, non-qualified registrants,
and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other
hand serves the purpose of securing the voters
substantive right to be included in the list of
voters.
In real-world terms, this means that if a special
voters registration is conducted, then the
prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion
must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If we
do not, then no one can challenge the Voters list
since we would already be well into the 100-day
prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant
breach of the principles of due process, this
would open the registration process to abuse
and seriously compromise the integrity of the
voters list, and consequently, that of the entire
election.
x x x It must be remembered that the period
serve a vital role in protecting the integrity of the
registration process. Without the prohibitive
periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of
any time to evaluate the evidence on the
application. We would be obliged to simply take
them at face value. If we compromise on these
safety nets, we may very well end up with a
voters list full of flying voters, overflowing with
unqualified registrants, populated with shadows
and ghosts x x x.
x x x The short cuts that will have to be adopted
in order to fit the entire process of registration
within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard
list of voters, some of whom might not even be
qualified to vote. x x x the very possibility that we
shall be conducting elections on the basis of an
inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt
over the results of the polls. If that happens, the
unforgiving public will disown the results of the
elections, regardless of who wins, and
regardless of how many courts validate our own
results. x x x
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario,
petitioners invoke the so called standby powers
or residual powers of the COMELEC, as
provided under the relevant provisions of
Section 29, Republic Act No. 6646[7] and
adopted verbatim in Section 28 of Republic Act
No. 8436,[8] thus:
SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain
Pre-election Acts - If it should no longer be
possible to observe the periods and dates
prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts,
the Commission shall fix other periods and dates
in order to ensure accomplishments of the
activities so voters shall not be deprived of their
right to suffrage.
On this matter, the act of registration is
concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election
act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189,
registration, as a process, has its own specific
definition, precise meaning and coverage, thus:
a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing
and filing of a sworn application for registration
by a qualified voter before the election officer of
the city or municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered
voters upon approval by the Election
Registration Board;
At this point, it bears emphasis that the
provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by
herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189
volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from
contradicting each other, actually share some
common ground. True enough, both provisions,
although at first glance may seem to be at war in
relation to the other, are in a more circumspect
perusal, necessarily capable of being
harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal
hermeneutics that changes made by the
legislature in the form of amendments to a
statute should be given effect, together with
other parts of the amended act. It is not to be
presumed that the legislature, in making such
changes, was indulging in mere semantic
exercise. There must be some purpose in
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 199
making them, which should be ascertained and
given effect.[9]
Similarly, every new statute should be construed
in connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all
should be made to harmonize and stand
together, if they can be done by any fair and
reasonable interpretation.[10] Interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi,
which means that the best method of
interpretation is that which makes laws
consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of
justice, when confronted with apparently
conflicting statutes, should endeavor to
reconcile them instead of declaring outright the
invalidity of one against the other. Courts should
harmonize them, if this is possible, because they
are equally the handiwork of the same
legislature.[11]
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present
case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed
COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law
explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to
argue that respondent COMELEC may validly
and legally conduct a two-day special
registration, through the expedient of the letter of
Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the
provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come
into play in cases where the pre-election acts are
susceptible of performance within the available
period prior to election day. In more categorical
language, Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is, to our
mind, anchored on the sound premise that these
certain pre-election acts are still capable of
being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the
remaining period before the date of election and
the conduct of other related pre-election
activities required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELECwhich is
the constitutional body tasked by no less than
the fundamental charter (Sec. 2, par. 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution) to decide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including registration of
voterspainstakingly and thoroughly emphasized
the operational impossibility[12] of conducting a
special registration, which in its on language,
can no longer be accomplished within the time
left to (us) the Commission.[13]
Hence:
xxx xxx xxx.
19) In any case, even without the legal
obstacles, the last 60 days will not be a walk in
the park for the Comelec. Allow us to outline
what the Commission has yet to do, and the time
to do it in:
20) First we have to complete the Project of
Precincts by the 19th of March. The Projects of
Precincts Indicate the total number of
established precincts and the number of
registered voters per precincts in a city or
municipality. Without the final Project of
Precincts, we cannot even determine the proper
allocation of official ballots, election returns and
other election forms and paraphernalia. More
succinctly said, without the Project of Precincts,
we wont know how many forms to print and so
were liable to come up short.
21) More Importantly, without a completed
Project of Precincts, it will be impossible to
complete the rest of the tasks that must be
accomplished prior to the elections.
22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors
must be constituted on or before the 4th of
March. In addition, the list of the members of the
BEI including the precinct where they are
assigned and the barangay where that precinct
is located - must be furnished by the Election
Officer to all the candidates and political
candidates not later than the 26th of March.
23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the
approved Voter Registration Records of
registered voters in particular precinct, must be
inspected, verified, and sealed beginning March
30, until April 15.
24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters List must
be finalized and printed out of use on election
day; and finally
25) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and
distribution of the Voters Information Sheet must
be completed on or before April 15.
26) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election
activities, the Comelec will have roughly a month
that will act as a buffer against any number of
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 200
unforeseen occurrences that might delay the
elections. This is the logic and the wisdom
behind setting the 120-day prohibitive period.
After all, preparing for an election is no easy
task.
27) To hold special registrations now would,
aside from being Illegal, whittle that
approximately 30-day margin away to nothing.
28) When we say registration of voters, we do
not - contrary to popular opinion - refer only to
the act of going to the Election Officer and writing
our names down. Registration is, In fact, a long
process that takes about three weeks to
complete not even counting how long it would
take to prepare for the registration in the first
place.
29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the
Comelec, the other Commissioners, prepared a
time-table in order to see exactly how the
superimposition of special registration would
affect the on-going preparation for the May 14
elections.
30) We assumed for the sake of argument that
we were to hold the special registration on April
16 and 17. These are not arbitrary numbers, by
the way it takes in account the fact that we only
have about 800,000 Voters Registration Forms
available, as against an estimated 4.5 million
potential registrants, and it would take about 14
days If we were to declare special registrations
today to print up the difference and to verify
these accountable forms. After printing and
verification, the forms would have to be packed
and shipped - roughly taking up a further two and
a half weeks. Only then can we get on with
registration.
31) The first step in registration is, of course,
filling the application for registration with the
Election Officer. The application, according to
Section 17 of R.A. 8189, is then set for hearing,
with notice of that hearing being posted in the
city or municipal bulletin board for at least one
week prior. Thus, if we held registrations on the
16th and the 17th the posting requirement would
be completed by the 24th. Considering that time
must be allowed for the filling of oppositions, the
earliest that the Election Registration Board can
be convened for hearing would be the May 1st
and 2nd.
32) Assuming and this is a big assumption that
there are nit challenges to the applicants right to
register, the Election registration Board can
immediately rule on the Applicants registration,
and post notices of its action by the 2nd until the
7th of May. By the 10th, copies of the notice of
the action taken by the Board will have already
been furnished to the applicants and the heads
of registered political parties.
33) Only at this point can our Election Officers
once again focus on the business of getting
ready for the elections. Once the results of the
special registration are finalized, they can be
encoded and a new Computerized Voters List
generated - at the earliest, by May 11, after
which the new CVL would be posted.
Incidentally, it we were to follow the letter of the
law strictly, a May 11 posting date for the new
CVL would be improper since the R.A. 8189
provides that the CVL be posted at least 90 days
before the election.
34) Assuming optimistically that we can then
finish the inspection, verification, and sealing of
the Book if Voters by May 15, we will already
have overshot the May 14, election date, and still
not have finished our election preparations.
35) After this point, we could have to prepare the
allocation of Official Ballots, Election Returns,
and other Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies
to be used for the new registrants. Once the
allocation is ready, the contracts would be
awarded, the various forms printed, delivered,
verified, and finally shipped out to the different
municipalities. All told, this process would take
approximately 26 days, from the 15th of May
until June 10.
36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready
to hold the elections.
xxx xxx xxx.[14]
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law
that the determination of administrative agency
as to the operation, implementation and
application of a law would be accorded great
weight considering that these specialized
government bodies are, by their nature and
functions, in the best position to know what they
can possibly do or not do, under prevailing
circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law
does not require that the impossible be
done.[15] The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 201
tenetur ad impossible.[16] In other words, there
is no obligation to do an impossible thing.
Impossibilium nulla obligato est. Hence, a
statute may not be so construed as to require
compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the
time, be legally, coincidentally[17], it must be
presumed that the legislature did not at all intend
an interpretation or application of a law which is
far removed from the realm of the possible.
Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the
interpretation to be given must be such that it is
in accordance with logic, common sense,
reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of
the considered view that the stand-by power of
the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of
R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its
being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners bare allegation that they
were disenfranchised when respondent
COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on
December 27, 2000 instead of January 13, 2001
the day before the period before the May 14,
2001 regular elections commences is, to our
mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no
allegation in the two consolidated petitions and
the records are bereft of any showing that
anyone of herein petitioners has filed an
application to be registered as a voter which was
denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint
before the respondent COMELEC alleging that
he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election
Officer to register between the period starting
from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001,
and that he or she was disallowed or barred by
respondent COMELEC from filing his application
for registration. While it may be true that
respondent COMELEC set the registration
deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of
the Firm view that petitioners were not totally
denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing
registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a
different manner, the petitioners in the instant
case are not without fault or blame. They admit
in their petition[18] that they failed to register, for
whatever reason, within the period of registration
and came to this Court and invoked its protective
mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in
their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat
curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean
hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in
our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and
not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis
sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this court is of the firm
view that respondent COMELEC did not commit
an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged
to have committed the same in some patent,
whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing
Resolution No. 3584 which, in respondents own
terms, resolved to deny the request to conduct a
two-day additional registration of new voters on
February 17 and 18, 2001.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of
discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of laws.[19]
Under these circumstances, we rule that the
COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners
to hold a special registration, acted within the
bounds and confines of the applicable law on the
matter --Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the
assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC
simply performed its constitutional task to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election,[20] inter
alia, questions relating to the registration of
voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it
and one which squarely falls within the proper
sphere of its constitutionally-mandated powers.
Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the
exercise of its wide latitude of discretion,
specifically on matters involving voters
registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than
the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the
absence of clear showing of grave abuse of
power of discretion on the part of respondent
COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct
an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively
within the province of respondent COMELEC a
body accorded by no less than the fundamental
law with independence.
As to petitioners prayer for the issuance of the
writ of mandamus, we hold that this Court
cannot, in view of the very nature of such
extraordinary writ, issue the same without
transgressing the time-honored principles in this
jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of
mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 202

one; mandamus will not issue to control the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
exercise of discretion of a public officer where petitions for certiorari and mandamus are hereby
the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise DENIED.
his judgment in reference to any manner in
which he is required to act, because it is his SO ORDERED.
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.[21]

Considering the circumstances where the writ of

mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the
present case, we are of the firm belief that
petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction
of this Court, that they are entitled to the
issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to
effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of voters. For the
determination of whether or not the conduct of a
special registration of voters is feasible, possible
or practical within the remaining period before
the actual date of election, involves the exercise
of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by
mandamus.

In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and

related cases,[22] we enunciated that the Courts
function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1,
is merely (to) check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing...(of) grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there
is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power... It has no power to look into
what it thinks is apparent error.[23]

Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of

the fact that the President has issued
Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a
Special Session on March 19, 2001, to allow the
conduct of Special Registration of new voters.
House Bill No. 12930 has been filed before the
Lower House, which bill seeks to amend R.A.
8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period
provided for under said law. Similarly, Senate
Bill No. 2276[24] was filed before the Senate,
with the same intention to amend the aforesaid
law and, in effect, allow the conduct of special
registration before the May 14, 2001 General
Elections. This Court views the foregoing factual
circumstances as a clear intimation on the part
of both the executive and legislative
departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands
in the way of the conduct by the Commission on
Elections of a special registration before the May
14, 2001 General Elections.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 203
G.R. No. 189868 December 15, 2009
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE
RAYMOND V. PALATINO, ALVIN A. PETERS,
PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP),
MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA,
CHAIRPERSON OF THE STUDENT
CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES (SCMP), VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, VIJAE O.
ALQUISOLA, PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE
EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CEGP), DIANNE KRISTEL M. ASUELO,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
KABATAANG ARTISTA PARA SA TUNAY NA
KALAYAAN (KARATULA), KENNETH
CARLISLE EARL EUGENIO, ANA KATRINA
V. TEJERO, VICTOR LOUIS E. CRISOSTOMO,
JACQUELINE ALEXIS S. MERCED, and JADE
CHARMANE ROSE J. VALENZUELA,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the threshold once again is the right of
suffrage of the sovereign Filipino people – the
foundation of Philippine democracy. As the
country prepares to elect its next set of leaders
on May 10, 2010, the Court upholds this
primordial right.
On November 12, 2008, respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 85141 which, among other
things, set December 2, 2008 to December 15,
2009 as the period of continuing voter
registration using the biometrics process in all
areas nationwide, except in the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. Subsequently, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 85852 on
February 12, 2009 adjusting the deadline of
voter registration for the May 10, 2010 national
and local elections to October 31, 2009, instead
of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by
Resolution No. 8514.
The intense public clamor for an extension of the
October 31, 2009 deadline notwithstanding, the
COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to
extend it, arguing mainly that it needs ample time
to prepare for the automated elections. Via the
present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
filed on October 30, 2009,3 petitioners challenge
the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585
and seek a declaration of its nullity.
Petitioner Raymond V. Palatino, a youth sectoral
representative under the Kabataan Party-list,
sues as a member of the House of
Representatives and a concerned citizen, while
the rest of petitioners sue as concerned citizens.
Petitioners contend that the serious questions
involved in this case and potential
disenfranchisement of millions of Filipino voters
justify resort to this Court in the first instance,
claiming that based on National Statistics Office
(NSO) data, the projected voting population for
the May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964 for the
age group 18-19 and 8,756,981 for the age
group 20-24, or a total of 12,515,945.
Petitioners further contend that COMELEC
Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional
encroachment on the legislative power of
Congress as it amends the system of continuing
voter registration under Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 8189 (RA 8189), otherwise known as
The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, reading:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of
Voters. The personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in
the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special
election.
They thus pray that COMELEC Resolution No.
8585 be declared null and void, and that the
COMELEC be accordingly required to extend
the voter registration until January 9, 2010 which
is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period
starting on January 10, 2010.
The COMELEC maintains in its Comment filed
on December 7, 2009 that, among other things,
the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code
confer upon it the power to promulgate rules and
regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and
honest elections; that Section 29 of Republic Act
No. 6646 (RA 6646)4 and Section 28 of Republic
Act No. 8436 (RA 8436)5 authorize it to fix other
dates for pre-election acts which include voter
registration; and that its schedule of pre-election
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 204
acts shows that the October 31, 2009 deadline
of voter registration was impelled by operational
and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-
Youth v. COMELEC6 wherein the Court denied
a similar prayer for an extension of the
December 27, 2000 deadline of voter
registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our
constitutional democracy. The right of every
Filipino to choose the leaders who will lead the
country and participate, to the fullest extent
possible, in every national and local election is
so zealously guarded by the fundamental law
that it devoted an entire article solely therefor:
ARTICLE V
SUFFRAGE
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a
system of securing the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting
by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for
the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the
assistance of other persons. Until then, they
shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and
such rules as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage
ensures that the State derives its power from the
consent of the governed. The paramount
importance of this right is also a function of the
State policy of people empowerment articulated
in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty
resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them,7 bolstered by the
recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and directive to the State to encourage
their involvement in public and civic affairs.8
It is against this backdrop that Congress
mandated a system of continuing voter
registration in Section 8 of RA 8189 which
provides:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of
Voters. The personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in
the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special
election. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters
be allowed to register daily during regular offices
hours, except during the period starting 120
days before a regular election and 90 days
before a special election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has
determined that the period of 120 days before a
regular election and 90 days before a special
election is enough time for the COMELEC to
make ALL the necessary preparations with
respect to the coming elections including: (1)
completion of project precincts, which is
necessary for the proper allocation of official
ballots, election returns and other election forms
and paraphernalia; (2) constitution of the Board
of Election Inspectors, including the
determination of the precincts to which they shall
be assigned; (3) finalizing the Computerized
Voters List; (4) supervision of the campaign
period; and (5) preparation, bidding, printing and
distribution of Voter’s Information Sheet. Such
determination of Congress is well within the
ambit of its legislative power, which this Court is
bound to respect. And the COMELEC’s rule-
making power should be exercised in
accordance with the prevailing law.9
Respecting the authority of the COMELEC
under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to fix other dates
for pre-election acts, the same is not in conflict
with the mandate of continuing voter registration
under RA 8189. This Court’s primary duty is to
harmonize laws rather than consider one as
repealed by the other. The presumption is
against inconsistency or repugnance and,
accordingly, against implied repeal. For
Congress is presumed to know the existing laws
on the subject and not to enact inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.10
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 205

Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No.
8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power
to fix other periods and dates for pre-election
activities only if the same cannot be reasonably
held within the period provided by law. This grant
of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling
the people to exercise the right of suffrage – the
common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646
and RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to
hold that the mandate of continuing voter
registration cannot be reasonably held within the
period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 – daily
during office hours, except during the period
starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010
regular elections. There is thus no occasion for
the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other
dates or deadlines therefor.
The present case differs significantly from
Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.11 In said case,
the Court held that the COMELEC did not
commit abuse of discretion in denying the
request of the therein petitioners for an
extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of
voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.
For the therein petitioners filed their petition with
the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period
for the conduct of voter registration under
Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of
a two-day registration on February 17 and 18,
2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive
period.
Court is of the firm view that petitioners were not
totally denied the opportunity to avail of the
continuing registration under R.A. 8189.12
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The clear import of the Court’s pronouncement
in Akbayan-Youth is that had the therein
petitioners filed their petition – and sought an
extension date that was – before the 120-day
prohibitive period, their prayer would have been
granted pursuant to the mandate of RA 8189. In
the present case, as reflected earlier, both the
dates of filing of the petition (October 30, 2009)
and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010)
are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. The
Court, therefore, finds no legal impediment to
the extension prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null
and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter
registration for the May 10, 2010 elections on
October 31, 2009. The COMELEC is directed to
proceed with dispatch in reopening the
registration of voters and holding the same until
January 9, 2010. This Decision is
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

The Court in fact suggested in Akbayan-Youth

that the therein petitioners could have, but had
not, registered during the period between the
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
COMELEC and before the start of the 120-day
prohibitive period prior to the election date or
January 13, 2001, thus:

[T]here is no allegation in the two consolidated

petitions and the records are bereft of any
showing that anyone of herein petitioners has
filed an application to be registered as a voter
which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a
complaint before the respondent COMELEC
alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office
of the Election Officer to register between the
period starting from December 28, 2000 to
January 13, 2001, and that he or she was
disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC
from filing his application for registration. While it
may be true that respondent COMELEC set the
registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 206
G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED
BY REPRESENTATIVE JAMES MARK TERRY
L. RIDON AND MARJOHARA S. TUCAY;
SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, PRESIDENT OF THE
NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES; VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON OF THE
ANAKBAYAN; MARC LINO J. ABILA,
NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE
EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES;
EINSTEIN Z. RECEDES, DEPUTY
SECRETARY- GENERAL OF ANAKBAYAN;
CHARISSE BERNADINE I. BAÑEZ,
CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS; ARLENE CLARISSE Y.
JULVE, MEMBER OF ALYANSA NG MGA
GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT
TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN
(AGHAM); AND SINING MARIA ROSA L.
MARFORI, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION
ELECTIONS, ON, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Rights beget responsibilities; progress begets
change.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition1 filed by herein petitioners Kabataan
Party-List, represented by Representative
James Mark Terry L. Ridon and National
President Marjohara S. Tucay; Sarah Jane I.
Elago, President of the National Union of
Students of the Philippines; Veneer Mari E.
Crisostomo and Einstein Z. Recedes,
Chairperson and Deputy Secretary-General of
Anakbayan, respectively; Marc Lino J. Abila,
National President of the College Editors Guild
of the Philippines; Charisse Bernadine I. Bañez,
Chairperson of the League of Filipino Students;
Arlene Clarisse Y. Julve, member of Alyansa ng
mga Grupong Haligi ngAgham at Teknolohiya
para sa Mamamayan (AGHAM); and Sining
Maria Rosa L. Marfori (petitioners) assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 10367,
entitled "An Act Providing for Mandatory
Biometrics Voter Registration,"2 as well as
respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Resolution Nos. 9721,3 9863,4
and 10013,5 all related thereto.
The Facts
On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S.
Aquino III signed into law RA 10367, which is a
consolidation of House Bill No. 3469 and Senate
Bill No. 1030, passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on December
11, 2012 and December 12, 2012,6 respectively.
Essentially, RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC
to implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voters7 in order to
establish a clean, complete, permanent, and
updated list of voters through the adoption of
biometric technology.8 RA 10367 was duly
published on February 22, 2013,9 and took
effect fifteen (15) days after.10
RA 10367 likewise directs that "[r]egistered
voters whose biometrics have not been captured
shall submit themselves for validation."11
"Voters who fail to submit for validation on or
before the last day of filing of application for
registration for purposes of the May 2016
[E]lections shall be deactivated x x x."12
Nonetheless, voters may have their records
reactivated after the May 2016 Elections,
provided that they comply with the procedure
found in Section 2813 of RA 8189,14 also known
as "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996."15
On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 972116 which serves as the
implementing rules and regulations of RA
10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for
validation,17 deactivation,18 and reactivation of
voters' registration records (VRRs).19 Among
others, the said Resolution provides that: (a)
"[t]he registration records of voters without
biometrics data who failed to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of
the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
shall be deactivated in the last [Election
Registration Board (ERB)] hearing to be
conducted prior to said elections";20 (b) "[t]he
following registered voters shall have their
biometrics data validated: [(1)] Those who do not
have BIOMETRICS data appearing in the
Voter['s] Registration System (VRS); and [(2)]
Those who have incomplete BIOMETRICS data
appearing in the VRS";21 (c) "[d]eactivated
voters shall not be allowed to vote";22 and (d)
"[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the
requirements on posting, ERB hearing and
service of individual notices to the deactivated
voters."23 Resolution No. 9721 further states
that, as of the last day of registration and
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 207
validation for the 2013 Elections on October 31,
2012, a total of 9,018,256 registered voters were
without biometrics data.24 Accordingly, all
Election Officers (EOs) were directed to
"conduct [an] information campaign on the
conduct of validation."25cralawred
On July 1, 2013, the COMELEC, pursuant to the
aforesaid Resolution, commenced the
mandatory biometric system of registration. To
make biometric registration convenient and
accessible to the voting public, aside from the
COMELEC offices in every local government
unit, it likewise established satellite registration
offices in barangays and mails.26
On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 986327 which amended certain
portions28 of Resolution No. 985329 dated
February 19, 2014, by stating that ERBs shall
deactivate the VRRs of those who "failed to
submit for validation despite notice on or before
October 31, 2015," and that the "[d]eactivation
for cases falling under this ground shall be made
during the November 16, 2015 Board
hearing."30
A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC
launched the NoBio-NoBoto public information
campaign which ran concurrently with the period
of continuing registration.31
On November 3, 2015, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 1001332 which provides for the
"procedures in the deactivation of [VRRs] who
do not have biometrics data in the [VRS] after
the October 31, 2015 deadline of registration
and validation."33 Among others, the said
Resolution directed the EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the
lists of voters without biometrics data in the
bulletin boards of the City/Municipal hall, Office
of the Election Officer and in the barangay hall
along with the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b)
"[s]end individual notices to the affected voters
included in the generated list of voters without
biometrics data."34 It also provides that "[a]ny
opposition/objection to the deactivation of
records shall be filed not later than November 9,
2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in
Section 4,35 [Chapter I,] Resolution No.
9853."36 During the ERB hearing, which
proceedings are summary in nature,37 "the
ERBs shall, based dn the list of voters without
biometrics data, order the deactivation of
registration records on the ground of 'failure to
validate.'"38 Thereafter, EOs were required to
"[s]end individual notices to the deactivated
voters within five (5) days from the last day of
ERB hearing."39 Moreover, Resolution No.
10013 clarified that the "[Registration records of
voters with incomplete biometrics data and
those corrupted data (biometrics) in the
database shall not be deactivated and be
allowed to vote in the May 9, 2016 Synchronized
National, Local and [Autonomous Region on
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)] Regional
Elections."40
On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed
the instant petition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the
constitutionality of the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well
as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013, all related thereto. They contend that: (a)
biometrics validation rises to the level of an
additional, substantial qualification where there
is penalty of deactivation;41 (b) biometrics
deactivation is not the disqualification by law
contemplated by the 1987 Constitution;42 (c)
biometrics validation gravely violates the
Constitution, considering that, applying the strict
scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling
reason for state regulation and hence, an
unreasonable deprivation of the right to
suffrage;43 (d) voters to be deactivated are not
afforded due process;44 and (e) poor
experience with biometrics should serve as
warning against exacting adherence to the
system.45 Albeit already subject of a prior
petition46 filed before this Court, petitioners also
raise herein the argument that deactivation by
November 16, 2015 would result in the
premature termination of the registration period
contrary to Section 847 of RA 8189.48
Ultimately, petitioners pray that this Court
declare RA 10367, as well as COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013,
unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be
commanded to desist from deactivating
registered voters without biometric information,
to reinstate voters who are compliant with the
requisites of RA 8189 but have already been
delisted, and to extend the system of continuing
registration and capture of biometric information
of voters until January 8, 2016.49
On December 1, 2015, the Court required the
COMELEC to file its comment to the petition.
Meanwhile, it issued a TRO requiring the
COMELEC to desist from deactivating the
registration records of voters without biometric
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 208
information, pending resolution of the case at
hand.50
On December 7, 2015, COMELEC Chairman
Juan Andres D. Bautista, through a letter51
addressed to the Court En Banc, urgently
appealed for the immediate lifting of the above-
mentioned TRO, stating that the COMELEC is
set to finalize the Project of Precincts (POP) on
December 15, 2015, and that the TRO issued in
this case has the effect of including the 2.4
Million deactivated voters in the list of voters,
which, in turn, would require revisions to the
POP and consequently, adversely affect the
timelines of all other interrelated preparatory
activities to the prejudice of the successful
implementation of the Automated Election
System (AES) for the 2016 Elections.52
On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
comment53 to the instant petition. On even date,
petitioners filed a manifestation54 asking the
Court to continue the TRO against the
deactivation of voters without biometric
information.55
With no further pleadings required of the parties,
the case was submitted for resolution.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not RA
10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto, are
unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
I.
At the outset, the Court passes upon the
procedural objections raised in this case. In
particular, the COMELEC claims that petitioners:
(a) failed to implead the Congress, the Office of
the President, and the ERB which it purports are
indispensable parties to the case;56 (b) did not
have the legal standing to institute the instant
petition;57 and (c) erroneously availed of
certiorari and prohibition as a mode of
questioning the constitutionality of RA 10367
and the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.58
The submissions do not hold.
Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an
important constitutional issue pertaining to the
right of suffrage, the Court views the matter as
one of transcendental public importance and of
compelling significance. Consequently, it deems
it proper to brush aside the foregoing procedural
barriers and instead, resolve the case on its
merits. As resonated in the case of Pabillo v.
COMELEC,59 citing Capalla v. COMELEC60
and Guingona, Jr. v. COMELEC:61
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May
2010 [in this case, the May 2016] elections is a
matter of great public concern. On election day,
the country's registered voters will come out to
exercise the sacred right of suffrage. Not only is
it an exercise that ensures the preservation of
our democracy, the coming elections also
embodies our people's last ounce of hope for a
better future. It is the final opportunity, patiently
awaited by our people, for the peaceful transition
of power to the next chosen leaders of our
country. If there is anything capable of directly
affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so as to
come within the ambit of a public concern, it is
the coming elections, [x x x.]
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and
transcending public importance of the issues
raised by petitioners, the technicalities raised by
respondents should not be allowed to stand in
the way, if the ends of justice would not be
subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of
procedure. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Furthermore, the issue on whether or not the
policy on biometrics validation, as provided
under RA 10367 and fleshed out in the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions, should be upheld is one
that demands immediate adjudication in view of
the critical preparatory activities that are
currently being undertaken by the COMELEC
with regard to the impending May 2016
Elections. Thus, it would best subserve the ends
of justice to settle this controversy not only in
order to enlighten the citizenry, but also so as
not to stymy the operations of a co-constitutional
body. As pronounced in Roque, Jr. v.
COMELEC:62
[T]he bottom line is that the Court may except a
particular case from the operations of its rules
when the demands of justice so require. Put a bit
differently, rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Accordingly, technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand in the
way, if the ends of justice would not be
subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of
procedure.63
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 209
That being said, the Court now proceeds to
resolve the substantive issues in this case.
II.
Essentially, the present petition is a
constitutional challenge against the biometrics
validation requirement imposed under RA
10367, including COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013. As non-compliance with
the same results in the penalty of deactivation,
petitioners posit that it has risen to the level of an
unconstitutional substantive requirement in the
exercise of the right of suffrage.64 They submit
that the statutory requirement of biometric
validation is no different from the
unconstitutional requirement of literacy and
property because mere non-validation already
absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of
suffrage through deactivation.65 Further, they
advance the argument that deactivation is not
the disqualification by law contemplated as a
valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage under
the 1987 Constitution.66
The contestation is untenable.
As early as the 1936 case of The People of the
Philippine Islands v. Corral,67 it has been
recognized that "[t]he right to vote is not a natural
right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
privilege granted by the State to such persons or
classes as are most likely to exercise it for the
public good. In the early stages of the evolution
of the representative system of government, the
exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a
small portion of the inhabitants. But with the
spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the
franchise in the modern states has come to
embrace the mass of the audit classes of
persons are excluded from the franchise."68
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution
delineates the current parameters for the
exercise of suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the
following qualifications in order to exercise the
right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino
citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by
law; and third, he must have resided in the
Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the
place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six
(6) months immediately preceding the election.
The second item more prominently reflects the
franchised nature of the right of suffrage. The
State may therefore regulate said right by
imposing statutory disqualifications, with the
restriction, however, that the same do not
amount to, as per the second sentence of the
provision, a "literacy, property or other
substantive requirement." Based on its genesis,
it may be gleaned that the limitation is geared
towards the elimination of irrelevant standards
that are purely based on socio-economic
considerations that have no bearing on the right
of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good.
To contextualize, the first Philippine Election
Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on January
15, 1907, mandated that only men who were at
least twenty-three (23) years old and "comprised
within one of the following three classes" were
allowed to vote: (a) those who prior to the 13th
of August, 1898, held the office of municipal
captain, governadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant,
cabeza de barangay, or member of any
ayuntamiento; (b) those who own real property
to the value of P500.00, or who annually pay
P30.00 or more of the established taxes; and (c)
those, who speak, read, and write English or
Spanish.
When the 1935 Constitution was adopted, the
minimum voting age was lowered to twenty-one
(21) and the foregoing class qualification and
property requirements were removed.69
However, the literacy requirement was retained
and only men who were able to read and write
were given the right to vote.70 It also made
women's right to vote dependent on a plebiscite
held for such purpose.71
During the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the
delegates decided to remove the literacy and
property requirements to broaden the political
base and discontinue the exclusion of millions of
citizens from the political systems:72
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Manglapus
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 210
DELEGATE MANGLAPUS: Mr. President, the
draft proposal, the subject matter of Report No.
11 contains amendments that are designed to
improve Article V on suffrage and to broaden the
electoral base of our country. The three main
points that are taken up in this draft which will be
developed in the sponsorship speeches that will
follow might need explanatory remarks, x x x.
xxxx
(2) The present requirement, reading and
writing, is eliminated and instead a provision is
introduced which says, "No literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement shall be imposed
on the exercise of suffrage;"
xxxx
The draft before us is in keeping with the trend
towards the broadening of the electoral base
already begun with the lowering of the voting age
to 18, and it is in keeping further with the
Committee's desire to discontinue the alienation
and exclusion of millions of citizens from the
political system and from participation in the
political life of the country. The requirement of
literacy for voting is eliminated for it is noted that
there are very few countries left in the world
where literacy remains a condition for voting.
There is no Southeast Asian country that
imposes this requirement. The United States
Supreme Court only a few months ago declared
unconstitutional any state law that would
continue to impose this requirement for voting.
xxxx
It is to be noted that all those who testified before
the Committee favoured the elimination of the
literacy requirement. It must be stressed that
those witnesses represented all levels of society
x x x.
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Ordoñez
x x x in the process, as we evolve, many and
more of our people were left to the sidelines
because they could no longer participate in the
process of government simply because their
ability to read and write had become inadequate.
This, however, did not mean that they were no
longer responsive to the demands of the times,
that they were unsensible to what was
happening among them. And so in the process
as years went on, conscious efforts were made
to liberate, to free these persons who were
formerly entitled in the course of election by
means of whittling away the requirements for the
exercise of the right to vote. First of all, was the
property requirement. There were times in the
English constitutional history that it was common
to say as an answer to a question, "Who are
entitled to vote?" that the following cannot vote -
- criminals, paupers, members of the House of
Lords. They were landed together at the same
figurative category.
Eventually, with the wisdom of the times,
property requirement was eliminated but the last
remaining vestige which bound the members of
the community to ignorance, which was the
persistence of this requirement of literacy
remained. And this is again preserved in our
Constitution, in our Election Code, which
provides that those who cannot prepare their
ballots themselves shall not be qualified to vote.
xxxx
Unless you remove this literacy test, the cultural
minorities, the underprivileged, the urban
guerrillas will forever be outcasts of our society,
irresponsive of what is happening. And if this
condition were to continue, my friends, we
cannot fully claim that we have representative
democracy. Let us reverse the cycle. Let us
eliminate the social imbalance by granting to
these persons who are very responsible the right
to participate in the choice of the persons who
are to make their laws for them. (Emphases
supplied)
As clarified on interpellation, the phrase "other
substantive requirement" carries the same tack
as the other standards alienating particular
classes based on socio-economic
considerations irrelevant to suffrage, such as the
payment of taxes. Moreover, as particularly
noted and as will be later elaborated on, the
phrase did not contemplate any restriction on
procedural requirements, such as that of
registration:
DELEGATE DE LOS REYES: On page 2, Line
3, the following appears:
"For other substantive requirement, no literacy[,]
property, or other substantive requirement shall
be imposed on the exercise of suffrage."
just what is contemplated in the phrase,
"substantive requirement?"
DELEGATE OCCEÑA: I can answer that, but it
belongs to the sphere of someone else in the
Committee. We use this term as distinguished
from procedural requirements. For instance, the
law cannot come in and say that those who
should be allowed to vote should have paid
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 211
certain taxes. That would be a substantial
requirement in addition to what is provided for in
the Constitution. But the law can step in as far
as certain procedural requirements are
concerned like requiring registration, and also
step in as far as these classifications are
concerned.73 (Emphases supplied)
As it finally turned out, the imposition of literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement was
proscribed and the following provision on
suffrage was adopted74 in the 1973
Constitution:
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of
age or over, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall
be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. The
Batasang Pambansa shall provide a system for
the purpose of securing the secrecy and sanctity
of the vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After deliberating on and eventually, striking
down a proposal to exclude literacy
requirements from the limitation,75 the exact
provision prohibiting the imposition of "literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement[s]" in
the 1973 Constitution was fully adopted in the
1987 Constitution.
Along the contours of this limitation then,
Congress, pursuant to Section 118 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election
Code, among others, imposed the following
legal disqualifications:
Section 118. Disqualifications. - The following
shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less
than one year, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty:
Provided, however, That any person disqualified
to vote under this paragraph shall automatically
reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence.
(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final
judgment by competent court or tribunal of
having committed any crime involving disloyalty
to the duly constituted government such as
rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-
subversion and firearms laws, or any crime
against national security, unless restored to his
full civil and political rights in accordance with
law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to
vote automatically upon expiration of five years
after service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared
by competent authority.
A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the
possession of qualities, properties (such as
fitness or capacity) inherently or legally
necessary to make one eligible for a position or
office, or to perform a public duty or function."76
Properly speaking, the concept of a
"qualification", at least insofar as the discourse
on suffrage is concerned, should be
distinguished from the concept of "registration",
which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the
means by which a person's qualifications to vote
is determined. In Yra v. Abaño,77 citing Meffert
v. Brown,78 it was stated that "[t]he act of
registering is only one step towards voting, and
it is not one of the elements that makes the
citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a
qualified voter without exercising the right to
vote."79 In said case, this Court definitively
characterized registration as a form of regulation
and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage:
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.80
(Emphasis supplied)
As a form of regulation, compliance with the
registration procedure is dutifully enjoined.
Section 115 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides:
Section 115. Necessity of Registration. - In order
that a qualified elector may vote in any election,
plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered
in the permanent list of voters for the city or
municipality in which he resides. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, although one is deemed to be a "qualified
elector," he must nonetheless still comply with
the registration procedure in order to vote.
As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution
made clear, registration is a mere procedural
requirement which does not fall under the
limitation that "[n]o literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage." This was echoed in
AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC81 (AKBAYAN-
Youth), wherein the Court pronounced that the
process of registration is a procedural limitation
on the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the right
of a citizen to vote nevertheless remains
conditioned upon it:
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of
suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights,
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 212
is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law.
Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution provides:
xxxx
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a
citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must
undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition
to the minimum requirements set by the
fundamental charter, is obliged by law to
register, at present, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act of 1996.82 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
RA 8189 primarily governs the process of
registration. It defines "registration" as "the act of
accomplishing and filing of a sworn application
for registration by a qualified voter before the
election officer of the city or municipality wherein
he resides and including the same in the book of
registered voters upon approval by the
[ERB]."83 As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA
8189 was passed in order "to systematize the
present method of registration in order to
establish a clean, complete, permanent and
updated list of voters."
To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances
in modern technology, RA 10367, or the assailed
Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February
2013. It built on the policy considerations behind
RA 8189 as it institutionalized biometrics
validation as part of the registration process:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy
of the State to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology.
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that
provides a positive identification of an individual
such as voice, photograph, fingerprint,
signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable
features."84
Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively
require registered and new voters to submit
themselves for biometrics validation:
Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation. -
Registered voters whose biometrics have not
been captured shall submit themselves for
validation.
Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration.
- The Commission shall implement a mandatory
biometrics registration system for new voters.
Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is
defined as "the process of taking the biometrics
of registered voters whose biometrics have not
yet been captured."
The consequence of non-compliance is
"deactivation" which "refers to the removal of the
registration record of the registered voter from
the corresponding precinct book of voters for
failure to comply with the validation process as
required by [RA 10367]."85 Section 7 states:
Section 7. Deactivation. - Voters who fail to
submit for validation on or before the last day of
filing of application for registration for purposes
of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated
pursuant to this Act. (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as
the requirement of validation, neutrally applies to
all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the
law creates artificial class of voters86 is more
imagined than real. There is no favor accorded
to an "obedient group." If anything, non-
compliance by the "disobedient" only rightfully
results into prescribed consequences. Surely,
this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal
protection of the laws, which only works "against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality."87
It should also be pointed out that deactivation is
not novel to RA 10367. RA 8189 already
provides for certain grounds for deactivation, of
which not only the disqualifications under the
Constitution or the Omnibus Election are listed.
Section 27. Deactivation of Registration. The
board shall deactivate the registration and
remove the registration records of the following
persons from the corresponding precinct book of
voters and place the same, properly marked and
dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after
entering the cause or causes of deactivation:
a) Any person who has been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less
than one (1) year, such disability not having
been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty:
Provided, however, That any person disqualified
to vote under this paragraph shall automatically
reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
(5) years after service of sentence as certified by
the clerks of courts of the Municipal/Municipal
Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and
the Sandiganbayan;
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 213
b) Any person who has been adjudged by final
judgment by a competent court or tribunal of
having caused/committed any crime involving
disloyalty to the duly constituted government
such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-
subversion and firearms laws, or any crime
against national security, unless restored to his
full civil and political rights in accordance with
law; Provided, That he shall regain his right to
vote automatically upon expiration of five (5)
years after service of sentence;
c) Any person declared by competent authority
to be insane or incompetent unless such
disqualification has been subsequently removed
by a declaration of a proper authority that such
person is no longer insane or incompetent;
d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2)
successive preceding regular elections as
shown by their voting records. For this purpose,
regular elections do not include the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;
e) Any person whose registration has been
ordered excluded by the Court; and
f) Any person who has lost his Filipino
citizenship.
For this purpose, the clerks of court for the
Municipal/Municipal ( requirement rises to the level of a literacy,
Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and
the Sandiganbayan shall furnish the Election
Officer of the city or municipality concerned at
the end of each month a certified list of persons
who are disqualified under paragraph (a) hereof,
with their addresses. The Commission may
request a certified list of persons who have lost
their Filipino Citizenship or declared as insane or
incompetent with their addresses from other
government agencies.
The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin
board of his office a certified list of those persons
whose registration were deactivated and the
reasons therefor, and furnish copies thereof to
the local heads of political parties, the national
central file, provincial file, and the voter
concerned.
With these considerations in mind, petitioners'
claim that biometrics validation imposed under
RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, must
perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not
a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of
suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration
procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized
conformant to the limitations of the 1987
Constitution and is a mere complement to the
existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
Petitioners would do well to be reminded of this
Court's pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth,
wherein it was held that:
[T]he act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote
and an indispensable element in the election
process. Thus, contrary to petitioners' argument,
registration cannot and should not be denigrated
to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of
registration as a necessary requisite to the right
to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of
its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter's
registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important
end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in
a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not
indifferent, and so far removed from the pressing
order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.88 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration
property or other substantive requirement as
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution
- that is, one which propagates a socio-
economic standard which is bereft of any
rational basis to a person's ability to intelligently
cast his vote and to further the public good - the
same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional,
as in this case.
III.
For another, petitioners assert that biometrics
validation gravely violates the Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test,
it is not poised with a compelling reason for state
regulation and hence, an unreasonable
deprivation of the right to suffrage.89 They cite
the case of White Light Corp. v. City of Manila90
(White Light), wherein the Court stated that the
scope of the strict scrutiny test covers the
protection of the right of suffrage.91
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation
passes the strict scrutiny test.
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 214
In terms of judicial review of statutes or
ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard
for determining the quality and the amount of
governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws
dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or
race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.92 As pointed out by petitioners, the
United States Supreme Court has expanded the
scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental
rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and
interstate travel.93
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of
less restrictive means for achieving that
interest,94 and the burden befalls upon the State
to prove the same.95
In this case, respondents have shown that the
biometrics validation requirement under RA
10367 advances a compelling state interest. It
was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct
of orderly, honest, and credible elections by
containing - if not eliminating, the perennial
problem of having flying voters, as well as dead
and multiple registrants. According to the
sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino L.
Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to
cleanse the national voter registry so as to
eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the
results of the elections were truly reflective of the
genuine will of the people.96 The foregoing
consideration is unquestionably a compelling
state interest.
Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least
restrictive means for achieving the above-said
interest. Section 697 of Resolution No. 9721
sets the procedure for biometrics validation,
whereby the registered voter is only required to:
(a) personally appear before the Office of the
Election Officer; (b) present a competent
evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo,
signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in
effect, a manner of updating one's registration
for those already registered under RA 8189, or a
first-time registration for new registrants. The re-
registration process is amply justified by the fact
that the government is adopting a novel
technology like biometrics in order to address
the bane of electoral fraud that has enduringly
plagued the electoral exercises in this country.
While registrants may be inconvenienced by
waiting in long lines or by not being
accommodated on certain days due to heavy
volume of work, these are typical burdens of
voting that are remedied by bureaucratic
improvements to be implemented by the
COMELEC as an administrative institution. By
and large, the COMELEC has not turned a blind
eye to these realities. It has tried to account for
the exigencies by holding continuous
registration as early as May 6, 2014 until
October 31, 2015, or for over a period of 18
months. To make the validation process as
convenient as possible, the COMELEC even
went to the extent of setting up off-site and
satellite biometrics registration in shopping malls
and conducted the same on Sundays.98
Moreover, it deserves mentioning that RA 10367
and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate
registered voters to submit themselves to
validation every time there is an election. In fact,
it only required the voter to undergo the
validation process one (1) time, which shall
remain effective in succeeding elections,
provided that he remains an active voter. To add,
the failure to validate did not preclude
deactivated voters from exercising their right to
vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such
status, they could still apply for reactivation99
following the procedure laid down in Section
28100 of RA 8189.
That being said, the assailed regulation on the
right to suffrage was sufficiently justified as it
was indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling state interest of establishing a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters,
and was demonstrably the least restrictive
means in promoting that interest.101
IV.
Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013 violate the tenets of procedural due
process because of the short periods of time
between hearings and notice, and the summary
nature of the deactivation proceedings.102
Petitioners are mistaken.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the
COMELEC, through Resolution No. 10013, had
directed EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the lists of voters
without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of
the City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election
Officer and in the barangay hall along with the
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 215
notice of ERB hearing;" and (b) [s]end individual
notices to the affected voters included in the
generated list of voters without biometrics
data.103 The same Resolution also accords
concerned individuals the opportunity to file their
opposition/objection to the deactivation of VRRs
not later than November 9, 2015 in accordance
with the period prescribed in Section 4,104
Chapter I, Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile,
Resolution Nos. 9721 and 9863 respectively
state that "[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with
the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and
service of individual notices to the deactivated
voters,"105 and that the "Reactivation for cases
falling under this ground shall be made during
the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."106
While the proceedings are summary in nature,
the urgency of finalizing the voters' list for the
upcoming May 2016 Elections calls for swift and
immediate action on the deactivation of VRRs of
voters who fail to comply with the mandate of RA
10367. After all, in the preparation for the May
2016 National and Local Elections, time is of the
essence. The summary nature of the
proceedings does not depart from the fact that
petitioners were given the opportunity to be
heard.
Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public
has been sufficiently informed of the
implementation of RA 10367 and its deactivation
feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early
as February 22, 2013,107 and took effect fifteen
(15) days after.108 Accordingly, dating to the
day of its publications, all are bound to know the
terms of its provisions, including the
consequences of non-compliance. As
implemented, the process of biometrics
validation commenced on July 1, 2013, or
approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years before
the October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the
COMELEC conducted a massive public
information campaign, i.e., NoBio-NoBoto, from
May 2014 until October 31, 2015, or a period of
eighteen (18) months, whereby voters were
reminded to update and validate their
registration records. On top of that, the
COMELEC exerted efforts to make the
validation process more convenient for the
public as it enlisted the assistance of malls
across Metro Manila to serve as satellite
registration centers and declared Sundays as
working days for COMELEC offices within the
National Capital Region and in highly urbanized
cities.109 Considering these steps, the Court
finds that the public has been sufficiently
apprised of the implementation of RA 10367,
and its penalty of deactivation in case of failure
to comply. Thus, there was no violation of
procedural due process.
V.
Petitioners aver that the poor experience of
other countries - i.e., Guatemala, Britain, Cote
d'lvoire, Uganda, and Kenya - in implementing
biometrics registration should serve as warning
in adhering to the system. They highlighted the
inherent difficulties in launching the same such
as environmental and geographical challenges,
lack of training and skills, mechanical
breakdown, and the need for re-registration.
They even adrnitted that while biometrics may
address electoral fraud caused by multiple
registrants, it does not, however, solve other
election-related problems such as vote-buying
and source-code manipulation.110
Aside from treading on mere speculation, the
insinuations are improper. Clearly, petitioners'
submissions principally assail the wisdom of the
legislature in adopting the biometrics registration
system in curbing electoral fraud. In this relation,
it is significant to point out that questions relating
to the wisdom, morality, or practicability of
statutes are policy matters that should not be
addressed to the judiciary. As elucidated in the
case of Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary:111
[P]olicy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive
dominion of the political branches of the
government. It is not for this Court to look into
the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is
wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to
achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed
limits should be exercised in a particular manner
are matters for the judgment of the legislature,
and the serious, conflict of opinions does not
suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.112 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress
has a wide latitude of discretion to enact laws,
such as RA 10367, to combat electoral fraud
which, in this case, was through the
establishment of an updated voter registry. In
making such choices to achieve its desired
result, Congress has necessarily sifted through
the policy's wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse.113
Whether RA 10367 was wise or unwise, or was
 CONSTI 2 DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO SUFFRAGE 216
the best means in curtailing electoral fraud is a
question that does not present a justiciable issue
cognizable by the courts. Indeed, the reason
behind the legislature's choice of adopting
biometrics registration notwithstanding the
experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in
its implementation, or its concomitant failure to
address equally pressing election problems, is
essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond
the pale of judicial scrutiny.
VI.
Finally, petitioners' proffer that Resolution No.
9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on
October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189
which states:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of
Voters. - The personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in
the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special
election. (Emphasis added.)
The position is, once more, wrong.
Aside from committing forum shopping by
raising this issue despite already being subject
of a prior petition filed before this Court, i.e., G.R.
No. 220918,114 petitioners fail to consider that
the 120- and 90-day periods stated therein refer
to the prohibitive period beyond which voter
registration may no longer be conducted. As
already resolved in this Court's Resolution dated
December 8, 2015 in G.R. No. 220918, the
subject provision does not mandate COMELEC
to conduct voter registration up to such time;
rather, it only provides a period which may not
be reduced, but may be extended depending on
the administrative necessities and other
exigencies.115 Verily, as the constitutional body
tasked to enforce and implement election laws,
the COMELEC has the power to promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to fulfil its
mandate.116 Perforce, this power includes the
determination of the periods to accomplish
certain pre-election acts,117 such as voter
registration.
At this conclusory juncture, this Court reiterates
that voter registration does not begin and end
with the filing of applications which, in reality, is
just the initial phase that must be followed by the
approval of applications by the ERB.118
Thereafter, the process of filing petitions for
inclusion and exclusion follows. These steps are
necessary for the generation of the1 final list of
voters which, in turn, is a pre-requisite for the
preparation and completion of the Project of
Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual
elections. The POP contains the number of
registered voters in each precinct and clustered
precinct, the names of the barangays,
municipalities, cities, provinces, legislative
districts, and regions included in the precincts,
and the names and locations of polling centers
where each precinct and clustered precinct are
assigned.119 The POP is necessary to
determine the total number of boards of election
inspectors to be constituted, the allocation of
forms and supplies to be procured for the
election day, the number of vote counting
machines and other paraphernalia to be
deployed, and the budget needed. More
importantly, the POP will be used as the basis
for the fmalization of the Election Management
System (EMS) which generates the templates of
the official ballots and determines the voting
jurisdiction of legislative districts, cities,
municipalities, and provinces.120 The EMS
determines the configuration of the canvassing
and consolidation system for each voting
jurisdiction. Accordingly, as the constitutional
body specifically charged with the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall,121 the
COMELEC should be given sufficient leeway in
accounting for the exigencies of the upcoming
elections. In fine, its measures therefor should
be respected, unless it is clearly shown that the
same are devoid of any reasonable justification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due
to lack of merit. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on December 1, 2015 is
consequently DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.