YUJUICO VS. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MGT. CORPORATION Respondents Lilian S.
Respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the estate of Leandro A Soriano jr. filed for their answer, stating that
Facts:
This case involves the Stockholders of STRADEC, a domestic corp which executed
pledge agreements where they pledge certain amount of stocks in favor of URAMI (R).
These pledges served as securities to the loan obtained by STRADEC and one of the
stockholders who so pledged his shares was Yujuico.
Later, STRADEC failed to comply with its obligations and so it received a notice
informing them the auction sale of the stocks pledged and the notice was sent by a certain
Atty. Nethercott.
Petitioner filed before the RTC Pasig an injunction complaint to enjoin the sale and
one of the issues raised is Atty. Nethercott’s lack of authority to represent URAMI.
RTC: did not act on the complaint and the public auction pushed through.
It issued a writ of Prelim. Injunction preventing URAMI from selling the stocks.
URAMI, in its answer admitted that the auction was void and that it never authorised Atty.
Nethercott to cause the sale thereof.
Petitioner then filed a motion for summary judgment since there’s no longer any
genuine issue left by reason of URAMI’s admission.
URAMI, changed counsel and subsequently filed an amended answer and claimed
that the auction sale was valid and that it duly authorised Atty Nethercott to initiate such sale
on its behalf.
Issue:
Whether or not the amended answer may be allowed even if it was filed more than
a year after the original answer has been submitted
HELD:
Yes. as long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or with
intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended
pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will not
be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.
The mere fact that URAMI filed its motion for leave years after the original answer is also not reason
enough in itself to discredit the amended answer as a sheer dilatory measure.
even if it wanted to, URAMI really could not have filed a motion for leave to file amended answer sooner
than it already had because of the issuance of a temporary restraining order that effectively suspended
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027 for more than a year.
we note that it only took URAMI a little over three months after the lifting of the temporary restraining
order to replace its previous counsel of record in Civil Case No. 70027 and to file its amended answer.
LISAM ENTERPRISES VS. BANCO DE ORO
Lisam Enterprises filed an action before the RTC against respondents for annulment of mortgage with
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with damages.
they were duly authorized by Lisam to mortgage the subject property and that the proceeds of the loan
were all for the benefit of Lisam and that the documents presented were signed by Lolita Soriano.
Respondent PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss on 3 grounds; lack of legal capacity to sue , failure to state
cause of action , and litis pendencia . Respondent PCIB’s co-defendants filed a Motion to suspend action.
The RTC then issued a resolution dismissing the complaint. Petitioners filed for a MR. During the pendency
of the resolution on said MR , petitioners filed a Motion to Admit amended Complaint , amending
paragraph 13of the original complaint.
RTC denied BOTH MR and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint .The trial court held that no new
argument had been raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration to address the fact of
plaintiffs' failure to allege in the complaint that petitioner Lolita A. Soriano made demands upon the Board
of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc. to take steps to protect the interest of the corporation against the
fraudulent acts of the Spouses Soriano and PCIB. The trial court further ruled that the Amended Complaint
can no longer be admitted, because the same absolutely changed petitioners' cause of action.
. Whether RTC should have granted the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. 

amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such
liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order
dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper
had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused anydelay. Moreover, doing so
would have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues
among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the
Court overrules the trial court's denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders the
admission of the same.
TIU VS. PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS 596 SCRA 432
PBCOM filed a complaint for collection against herein petitioners-representatives of Asian Water
Resources, Inc. (AWRI) due to the latter’s failure to pay loans after several demands made by PBCOM.
Pursuant to said loans, a duly notarized Surety Agreement was executed by AWRI’s Directors, before the
controversy arose. 

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. VS. CA
Petitioner (Remington Industrial Sales Corp) filed complaint for sum of money and damages arising from
breach of contract against Industrial Steels with Ferro Trading GMBH as principal defendant, and
respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL and BS separately moved for dismissal for failure to
state a cause of action. RTC denied the motions and the MR. ISL filed answer.
British Steel separately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CA claiming that complainant
failed to show that it had commited any act or ommission violating Remington’s rights. Complaint only
stated that BS and Ferro were just mere suppliers of goods for ISL.
Remington then sought to amend the complaint by incorporating additional FACTS to have a cause of
action against BS by using Sec 2, Rule 10, stating that it can amend its complaint as a matter of right
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because respondent (BS) has not yet filed a responsive pleading.
RTC RULING: Amended Complaint is noted and other proceedings were held in abeyance until CA decides
on the petition for certiorari and prohibition of BS.
CA RULING: Granted BS writ of certiorari, ordered judge to dismiss without prejudice the Complaint
against BS. MR was also dienied.
1. WON CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint agasint BS for lack of cause of action
under the original complaint even if it was already amended as a matter of right, and sufficient
causes of action are averred in the amended complaint. 
 APPCDCs subsequent compliance.
2. WON CA erred in holding if Remington wants to pursue its case against BS, it has to refile
complaint, pre-empting the right of the lower court to rule on amended complaint. 
 Capalad and Urdaneta City to switch from being defendants to becoming complainants.
HELD:
YES. CA erred in dismissing the complaint because it the amendment made by Remington was done in a
timely manner and as a matter of right, which was before BS gave its answer in accordance to Sec 2, Rule
10 of the ROC. The decision of the CA will result into multiple suits. THE AMENDMENT SHOULD BE
ALLOWED INSTEAD OF IT BEING DISMISSED. 
Sec 2, rule 10 - Before the answer, a complaint may be
amended as a matter of right. It can amend to introduce a new cause of action or change in theory. During
this time, rights of defendant have not yet been violated because he hasn’t filed an answer yet.
Considerable leeway is given the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, PRIOR
the filing of answer. 
Sec 3, rule 10 - After the answer, subtantial amendment of complaint is not allowed
without leave of court. RATIONALE: any material change in the allegations already contained in the
complaint could prejudice the rights of defendant who has alerady set up his defense in the answer. 
 (2) No, the court may allow amendment of pleadings. Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently
ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS VS. CITY OF URDANETA
This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary
prohibitory injunction and TRO filed by respondent Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against
respondents City of Urdaneta and Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and
petitioners APP and APP Construction and Dev’t. Corp
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor entered into 5 contracts for the preliminary design,
construction and management of a 4-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel amounting to
P250M, funded by a loan from the PNB. For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95M. Del
Castillo claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men, which
is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a
public elementary school. He also claimed that the contracts are void because they were all awarded
solely to the Goco family.
In their Answer, APP and APPCDC, and Urdaneta City asserted that the contracts were valid. Respondent
Capalad, through counsel, likewise filed an Answer with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss
on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
After pre-trial, Urdaneta City filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta City’s
Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta City’s
complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-trial, which the RTC granted.
The RTC also granted Capalad’s motion to expunge all pleadings filed by his counsel. Capalad was dropped
as defendant, and his complaint was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and
Urdaneta City.
Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was dismissed. APP and
APPCDC’s subsequent MR was likewise denied.
Issues:
. WON the CA erred in denying reconsideration of its April 15, 2003 Resolution despite APP and


. (2) WON the RTC erred and commited grave abuse of discretion in allowing respondents


. HELD: 

(1)Yes, it was thus error for the CA to deny reinstatement of the petition. Indeed, proof of authority to
sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corp. must be attached; otherwise, the petition is
subject to dismissal. However, it must be pointed out that the SC had considered as substantial
compliance with the procedural requirements the submission in the MR of the authority to sign the
verification and certification, as in this case. Similarly, the SC considered as substantial compliance
petitioners’ submission in the MR of the certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders. Petitioners also
included in the MR their explanation that copies of the petition were personally served on the Lazaro Law
Firm, and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance, as supported by the affidavit of service.
provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by
the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.
Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre- trial Order already defined as an issue whether
the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties’ evidence on the issue. Any
evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also
that under Sec. 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform
to the evidence. In addition, despite Urdaneta City’s judicial admissions, the RTC is still given leeway to
consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over
documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A party’s testimony in open court may also override
admissions in the Answer.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. SISON
This case involves The iso Han Samar Movt, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog,
Samar. He filed a letter-complaint accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials of
the Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Sison, before the Office of the Ombudsman
relative to the alleged highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions
of pesos. The alleged calamity funds were expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by
the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially
overpriced.
Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.
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The Office of the Ombudsman found basis to proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded
provincial officials of Samar. In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations and
asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the
requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds are available.
He averred that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance
sheet of the bidding and that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached in the letter-
complaint bore his signature.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials of the
Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and dismissing him from service. Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review
under Rule 43.
CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman against
Sison.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion
for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed resolution. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of
the adverse decision rendered by the CA?
HELD: No. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the
court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention
Intervention:
Facts: Complainants Ethelwoldo Fernandez, and Antonio Henson were elected to the board of directors
of NADECOR.
In a regular stockholder’s meeting where two groups were vying for control over the company, Calalang,
De Jesus, Romulo, Ayala, Lazatin, Fernandez, Nitorreda, Engle were Elected. Gatmaitan was also elected as
Corporate Secretary.
Ricafort/s, claiming to be stockholders of record, sought to annul the said meeting held.
They alleged that they were not given due notice of the said meeting thus they were not present
and were not able to exercise their right. RTC agreed with the Ricaforts.
Four separate Petition for Certiorari were filed by the members of the board with the CA, all with
application for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
The CA denied such applications, but on the same day nevertheless, the 11th division issued a TRO.
During the effectivity of the TRO, the old Board of Directors assumed the functions of the new one in
order to prevent any hiatus and not to prejudice the corporation.
The petitioners therein thereafter filed three (3) urgent motions to resolve their application for writ of
preliminary injunction, on March 8, on May 22, and again on June 6, 2012. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was granted by the CA 14th Division, which not for long was questioned.
Issue: Whether the Ricaforts have a legal personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the CA 14th Division.
Held: NO. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action.
Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a
preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.
Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for
certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed. Stated differently, if a petition for
certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to
question the assailed order.
We pointed out that they should first have intervened below, and then filed a motion for reconsideration
from the questioned CA order.
For even granting that the issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate
cannot be held administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled
rule is that “a Judge cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous
decision render
RODRIGUEZ VS. CA
Purita Landicho filed before the RTC an Application for Registration of a piece of land.
It has been established that the parcel of land under consideration was formerly several smaller parcels
owned and possessed by the several people, all of whom executed instruments of conditional sale of their
respective parcels of land in favor of [Landicho], all of them executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x
x x which superseded the conditional sale.
all of them executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x x x which superseded the conditional sale.
Upon finality, a TCT was issued instead of an OCT
Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI), which was still pending before the RTC of Pasig City as of 2008.
ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject property. While still pending in court, ADRDI subsequently
transferred the subject property to Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was issued
Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of herein petitioner
Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.
Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion alleging therein that the Order of of the RTC which confirmed
Landicho’s title over the subject property has not been executed alleging that no OCT had been ever
issued by the ROD in Landicho’s name.
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As Landicho’s successor-in-interest to the subject property, Rodriguez prayed that the Register of Deeds
for Marikina City issue OCT in his name.
Rodriguez himself submitted TCT of PCCAI but alleged that said certificate of title was fictitious. Thus, the
RTC issued a subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing of Land Reg. Case and to bring its TCT
with its tax dec.
PCCAI filed before the RTC a Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene justified its intervention by arguing
that it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal interest therein as the registered
owner of the subject property under TCT PCCAI
It also likewise pointed out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT No. 482970, only alleging that
said certificate was fictitious. PCCAI averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in his Omnibus
Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and subsisting, there being no direct action or final court
decree for its cancellation
The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in an Order
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to intervene filed by PCCAI is proper even though it was filed after
rendition of judgment by the trial court.
HELD:
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading- nintervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties.
Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the Court allowed
exceptions in several cases
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed
in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to
afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision
has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been
submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become
final and executory.
It is permitted to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive
issues raised by the parties.
the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of procedure on
intervention. First, the interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject property arose only after the
CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and executory. Second,
as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the
intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho who
prayed for the execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the
case only to oppose Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion on the ground that the subject property is already
registered in its name under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landicho’s TCT No. 167681. And
fourth, after learning of Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the November 3,
2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action was
the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguez’s name.
For this reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
ANONUEVO VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF JALANDONI
This case involves Jalandoni who died intestate.
His brother Bernardino filed petition for issuance of letters of administration with Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental to commence the judicial settlement of the estate. May Anonuevo and their siblings
introduced themselves as children of Sylvia Desantis, who is the daughter of Isabel Blee, who at the time
of Rodolfo’s death is the legal spouse of the letter. Thus, isable is entitled to a share in estate of Rodolfo.
Petitioners pray that they be allowed to intervene on behalf in the intestate proceedings because Sylvia
and Isabel have already passed away. Respondents opposed because the evidences showed by the
Petitioners revealed that Isabel has a subsisting marriage with John Desantis at time she was purportedly
married to Rodolfo. Thus, marriage with Rodolfo was void ab initio.
The intestate court issued an order allowing petitioners to take part in settlement proceedings. CA sided
with the respondents with regard to the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred when it nullified the orders of intestate court allowing Petitioners to intervene in
settlement proceedings
RULING: NO
A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic
demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be
allowed to intervene. Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in
an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.
Petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse
of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has
interest in Rodolfo’s estate. The birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage
was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an
intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified.
YAO VS. PERELLO

ALBERTO G. PINLAC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their dependents and successors-in-interest.
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Together, they filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the RTC. In particular, petitioners invoked by the Republic to protect its properties.
claimed that the real property, which has an aggregate area of 502 hectares, were part of forest lands
belonging to the government; that they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied said property
continuously, adversely, and exclusively for more than thirty (30) years; and that they have accordingly
filed applications for land titling in their respective names with the appropriate government agency.
CHIPONGIAN vs BENITEZ-LIRIO

One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-
The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian, the petitioner’s sister. Isabel had predeceased
Ma). The individual lot owners of the said subdivision, however, were not specifically named. Since
Vicente. The couple had no offspring. After the death of Isabel, Vicente and petitioner executed an
personal service of summons could not be effected on Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents,
extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of Isabel, whereby the latte waived all his rights to the
petitioners moved for leave of court to serve summons by publication which was granted. Accordingly,
estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente. According to petitioner, however, Vicente executed an affidavit on the
the summons was published in the "Metropolitan Newsweek", a periodical edited and published in the
same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the paraphernal properties of Isabel.
City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.

Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings, while the others, including
Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus declared in default.
Exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days after the above-quoted judgement by default was rendered
Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria Benitez (Victoria), a sister of Vicente, and Feodor Benitez Aguilar
(Feodor), a nephew of Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente in the
RTC. In its order dated May 13, 1994, the RTC appointed Feodor the administrator of Vicente’s estate.
The petitioner intervened in the Special Proceedings. He sought the partial revocation of the May 13,
1994 order in order to exclude the parapherna properties of Isabel from inclusion in the estate of Vicente.
He cited the affidavit of Vicente in support of the partial revocation.

They assailed the default judgement which nullified all their titles, arguing that the court a quo had no The RTC granted the Motion, and admitted the complaint-in-intervention of the petitioner.
jurisdiction over them and their respective titled properties. They also alleged that they only came to
know of the adverse judgement when petitioners sought the execution of the judgement by attempting to
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint-in-intervention, holding that petitioner was
dispossess some of the titled owners of the lots and making formal demands for them to vacate their
negligent in asserting his right within a reasonable time which warrants the presumption that he had
respective properties.
either abandoned it or declined to assert it but also cast doubt on the validity of his claim.

the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru the Office of
RULING: Yes. Intervention is “a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest
judgment be rendered declaring:
which may be affected by such proceedings. If an intervention makes a third party litigant in the main
proceedings, his pleading-in- intervention should form part of the main case.
“1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line with the decisions this Honorable Court had already
rendered;
Accordingly, when petitioner intervened in the Special Proceeding, his complaint-in-intervention, once
admitted by the RTC, became part of the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof subject to the
That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land rules specifically applicable to special proceedings, including Rule 109 of the Rules, which deals with
appeals in special proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the intervention of the Republic of the Philippines is proper in this case.
VALMONTE VS. CA
Held:
Lourdes Valmonte is a foreign resident. Lourdes Valmonte is married to Alfredo Valmonte who is
Yes. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court a member of the Philippine Bar and practices his profession in the Philippines.
fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival
claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Lourdes’ sister, Rosita Dimankanta, filed an action for the partition of real property and accounting of
Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial court. In one case, rentals against Lourdes and Alfredo.
intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment was already
submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
She alleged that while Lourdes and Alfredo are spouses, of legal age and at present, residents of 90222
Carkeek Drive, South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A., but, for purposes of the complaint, may be served with
the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as government properties summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D.
located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can be found.
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law can certainly be invoked by the Republic
which is an indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, while
Lourdes Valmonte through a letter, referred Rosita’s counsel to her husband as the party to whom all
the provision is intended as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the State, it may also be
communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner

5
Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes,
on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Then, the summons of
Lourdes were not served upon her.
On one hand, Alfredo Valmonte file his answer with counterclaim, and on the other hand, Lourdes
Valmonte did not file her answer. This prompted Rosita to file a motion to declare Lourdes in default.
Thereafter, Alfredo made a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the motion filed by
Rosita.
The RTC denied Rosita’s Motion to Declare Lourdes in default, then the latter moved for a
reconsideration, which was again denied by the RTC. Rosita then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition. Accordingly, the CA declared Lourdes in Default.
ISSUE: Whether Lourdes Valmonte was validly served with summons.
HELD: No.
To provide perspective, it will be helpful to determine first the nature of the action filed
against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte by private respondent, whether it is an
action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. This is because the rules on service of summons embodied in
Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or the other of these actions.
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be
personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad,
but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by
publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally
served with summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance with Rule
14, 8 or by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same Rule.
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an
action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding
decision.
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an
action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding
decision.
On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the
defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially
in accordance with Rule 14, 17, which provides:
Extraterritorial service. – When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within
the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which
the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or
the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under Section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer.
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction
over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property
litigated or attached. Service of summons in the manner provided in 17 is not for the purpose of vesting it
with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that he will be
informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines
belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of
summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside the
Philippines, must be made either
(1) by personal service;
(2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant; or
(3) in any other manner which the court may deem
sufficient.
MANOTOC VS. CA 499 SCRA 21
TOPIC: Substituted service of summon.
FACTS: Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the US District Court
of Hawaii against Ma. Imelda Manotoc (Imee Marcos) for the wrongful death of Archimedes Trajano
committed by military intelligence in the Philippines allegedly working for Manotoc. RTC issued summons
for Manotoc addressed at Alexandra Homes, Pasig. It was served on a Macky dela Cruz described as a
caretaker of her unit. Manotoc failed to file her answer and was declared in default.
Manotoc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person, stating that she is
not a resident of the said condo and that she does not hold office there, and dela Cruz is not her
representative or employee. Thus no valid service was made. Further, she states that she is a resident of
Singapore.
RTC denied the motion and the subsequent MR. Manotoc filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the CA, that was denied. MR was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether there was valid substituted service.
RULING: No. In actions strictly ‘in perosnam’ jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory
and can be complied with valid service of summons. If defendant cannot be served, for excusable reason,
within a reasonable time, substituted service can be resorted to. It is extraordinary in character and a
derogation of the usual method of service thus rules for such must be faithfully complied with.
The requirements of valid substituted service if there is impossibility of prompt personal service which is
15-30 days for the sheriff are:
1) By leaving copies of summons at defendant’s residence with a person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein or by leaving copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
6
competent person in charge.
2) The sheriff must narrate in specific details how service in person became impossible.
3) The attempt must be extraordinary and at least 3 times. The person of suitable age and discretion must
be at least 18 years old, able to read the summons written in English, and must be with confidential
relation to defendant. A competent person in charge can be the president or manager.
The substituted service was invalid because the sheriff did not comply with the requirements. Dela Cruz
was not a representative of Manotoc. Therefore, since there was no valid service of summons, there was
no jurisdiction acquired.
DOLE PHIL. VS. QUILALA 557 SCRA 433
TOPIC: Service of Summons on Corporations Sec. 11, Rule 14; Voluntary Appearance Sec. 20, Rule 14
FACTS: Private respondent All Season Farm Corporation (ASFC) filed a complaint with the Makati City RTC
presided by Hon. Judge Quilala which sought the recovery of a sum of money, accounting and damages
from petitioner Dole Philippines Inc. (Dole) and several of its officers.
Dole stated that an alias summons was served upon it through Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant
employed by Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd., separate from Dole. Subsequently, Dole filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint based on the following grounds: (a) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over Dole due to
improper service of summons; (b) the complaint filed failed to state a cause of action; (c ) ASFC was not
the real party in interest and (d) the officers of Dole cannot be sued in their personal capacities for alleged
acts performed in their official capacities as Dole corporate officers.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by Dole. Thereafter, Dole filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA contending that the alias summons was not properly served. The CA ruled that Dole’s president had
known of the service of the alias and summons although he did not personally receive and sign it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dole was validly served with summons.
RULING: The Court held that summons was validly served. Well-settled is the rule that service of summons
on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Service must therefore be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant, received the alias
summons. There was no evidence that she was authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the
president. Considering that the service of summons was made on a legal assistant, not employed by
herein petitioner and who is not one of the designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court
did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is
equivalent to service of summons. As held previously by this Court, the filing of motions seeking
affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time. It was not a
conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons and praying
for additional time to file responsive pleading.
Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also having invoked the
jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time, petitioner effectively
submitted
voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this
Court. The RTC therefore properly took cognizance of the case against Dole Philippines, Inc., and we agree
that the trial and the appellate courts committed no error of law when Dole’s contentions were overruled.
GUY VS. GACOTT
FACTS:
Sometime on March 3, 1997, Atty. Gacott (Gacott) from Palawan purchased two (2) brand new
transreceivers from Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC) in Manila through its employee Rey
Medestomas (Medestomas), amounting to a total of PI 8,000.00. On May 10, 1997, due to major defects,
Gacott personally returned the transreceivers to QSC and requested that they be replaced. Medestomas
received the returned transreceivers and promised to send him the replacement units within two (2)
weeks from May 10, 1997.
Time passed and Gacott did not receive the replacement units as promised. QSC informed him that there
were no available units and that it could not refund the purchased price. Despite several demands, both
oral and written, Gacott was never given a replacement or a refund. The demands caused Gacott to incur
expenses in the total amount of P40,936.44. Thus, Gacott filed a complaint for damages. Summons was
served upon QSC and Medestomas, afterwhich they filed their Answer, verified by Medestomas himself
and a certain Elton Ong (Ong). QSC and Medestomas did not present any evidence during the trial.
RTC ruled in favor of Atty. Gacott and issued a Writ of Execution. Gacott learned that QSC is a partnership
and not a corporation. He is also discovered that petitioner was appointed as General Manager of QSC. To
execute the judgment, Gacott instructed the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one of the motor
vehicles of Guy.
Sheriff attached Guy’s vehicle by virtue of the Notice of Attachment upon Personalty. Thereafter, Guy
filed his Motion to Lift Attachment Upon Personalty, arguing that he was not a judgment debtor and,
therefore, his vehicle could not be attached. RTC denied his motion. Not satisfied, Guy moved for
reconsideration and argued that he was neither impleaded as a defendant nor validly served with
summons and, thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Guy
RULING: NO. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam - the power of the court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action - is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal,
23
except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the
mere filing of the complaint in court. As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over
7
 24
his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the action.
Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, the service of summons may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that
such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for
25
juridical entities. cralawred
The records of this case reveal that QSC was never shown to have been served with the summons through
any of the enumerated authorized persons to receive such, namely: president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Service of summons upon persons other
than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient
service of summons. The CA was obviously mistaken when it opined that it was immaterial whether the
27
summons to QSC was served on the theory that it was a corporation.
Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court jurisdiction over the
defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the service of summons
may be cured by the defendant's subsequent voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction through his
filing a responsive pleading such as an answer. In this case, it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer
despite the defective summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its person was acquired through voluntary
appearance.
SUNRICE GARDEN CORP. VS. CA 771 SCRA 616
FACTS: In 1998, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City passed City Ordinance No. 08-98 entitled
"An Ordinance Creating a Technical Committee to Conduct a Feasibility Study, Preliminary and Parcellary
Survey for the Proposed Construction of a City Road Connecting Four (4) Barangays in Antipolo City.
Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. Its property was located in Barangay Cupang,
which Sunrise Garden Corporation planned to develop into a memorial park.
Sunrise Garden Corporation, through Cesar T. Guy, Chair of the Board of Directors, executed an
Undertaking where Sunrise Garden Corporation would construct the city road at its own expense, subject
to reimbursement through tax credits.
The city road project, thus, became a joint project of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay
Cupang, Barangay Mayamot, and Sunrise Garden Corporation.
15 16
Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor began to position its construction equipment. However,
17
armed guards, allegedly hired by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden Corporation's
18
contractor from using an access road to move the construction equipment.
On January 24, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.
On March 19, 2002, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, subject to the
posting of a bond by Sunrise Garden Corporation. On March 22, 2002, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
.
was issued
While the Complaint was pending, informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the proposed city
road.
27
Sunrise Garden Corporation, thus, filed a Motion and Manifestation on May 16, 2002, praying for the
amendment of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction "to include any and all persons or group of persons from
interfering, preventing or obstructing all of petitioner's contractors, equipment personnel and
representatives in proceeding with the construction of the city road as authorized by Ordinance No. 08-98
of Antipolo City
Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly hired by First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc.,blocked Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor's employees and prevented them
from proceeding with the construction. On November 15, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed an Ex-
parte Motion to require K-9 Security Agency and First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. to comply
with the May 22, 2002 Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The trial court granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion and issued an Order dated November 22,
2002
requiring K-9 Security Agency to comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Despite the issuance of the Order to comply, security guards dressed in civilian clothes still allegedly
50
prevented the workers from proceeding to the construction site on November 28, 2002.
On November 29, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Motion to cite Forefront Security Agency and
58
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. in contempt. Sunrise Garden Corporation alleged that First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was notified and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. Sunrise Garden Corporation also alleged that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. adopted
K-9 Security Agency's Opposition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over First Alliance Real Estate Development by
virtue of its voluntary appearance to the effect that it may be a subject of the ancillary writ of preliminary
injunction RULING: NO. While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
213
not be deemed a voluntary appearance."
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, et al., this court discussed that
voluntary appearance in court may not always result in submission to the jurisdiction of a court.
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of
legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by
reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however,
is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance
to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
8
submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
. (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
. (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and 

. (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially
in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the
court for resolution. 

The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency should
not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction
of the trial court. The records of this case show that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised at the
first instance and repeatedly argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. in their pleadings.
E.B. Villarosa
FACTS: E.B. Benito is a limited partnership with principal office at Davao City and with branch offices at
Parañaque City and Cagayan De Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent, Imperial Development
Corporation, executed a Deed of Sale with development agreement wherein the former agreed to
develop certain parcels of land belonging to Imperial. On April 3, 1998, Imperial filed a complaint for
breach of contract against E.B. Benito before the RTC Makati. Summons, together with the complaint,
were served upon the defendant, through its BRANCH MANAGER Engy. Sabulbero at Cagayan De Oro City
Branch. E.B. Benito moved to dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons thus, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner. On the other hand, Imperial contended
that the service is valid alleging that there was a substantial compliance with the rule as it was served
through its branch manager.
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss and held that there was a valid service of summons. Hence, this
petition was filed by EB Villarosa contending that the trial court committed GAD amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of
summons on its Branch Manager.
RULING: No. Sec 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
This provision revised the former Sec 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that:
If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its
directors.
The rule now states “general manager” instead of only “manager”. As held by Justice Regalado, the
aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical
interpretations, especially the word “agent”. Service of summons upon persons other than those
mentioned in Sec 13 of Rule (old rule) has been held improper. The purpose of which is to render it
reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such
person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. Accordingly, the service of summons
upon the branch manager at its branch in CDO, instead to the general manager at its principal office in
Davao City is improper.
MASON VS. CA 413 SCRA
TOPIC: Summons, Default
FACTS: Spouses Mason owned two parcels along EDSA in Pasay City. Petitioners and private respondent
Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus undertook to
construct a building worth ten million pesos (P10,000,000) at the end of the third year of the lease.
Private respondent failed to comply with this stipulation, petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of
contract with damages against private respondent before the RTC of Pasay City. Summons was served
upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons
described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriff’s return described Rejalde as a secretary to the
corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.
Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading. The private respondent was
declared in default and the petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte.The trial court
rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs. That decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following
day, private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default. The trial court ordered the parties to submit
their respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26, 1999,
denied the motion to lift order of default since according to the court, the incidents can be resolved based
on the records.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Undaunted, private respondent
filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution which was also denied for being dilatory.
Private respondent appealed to the CA, which ruled in its favor.
The CA held that private respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it
failed to file an Answer. Consequently, the subsequent proceedings, including the order of default,
judgment by default and its execution, were also invalid because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over private respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition
for review.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether there was valid service of summons on private respondent for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, and 2. Whether private respondent’s motion to lift order of default was in order.
RULING:
1. None. Petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
specifies the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical entity, said provision
did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial compliance rule. Petitioners stress that even
9
though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk in private respondent’s corporation, there was
substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 because the summons actually reached private
respondent.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation
or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary"
instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize
the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a
manifest intent to liberalize the rule, there should be strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Since service of summons upon private respondent through its filing clerk
cannot be considered valid, it necessarily follows therefore that the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City did
not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Consequently, all the subsequent proceedings held
before it, including the order of default, are null and void.
JOSE VS. BOYON
FACTS: Petitioners lodged a complaint before the RTC for specific performance against respondents to
compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale.
Respondent judge, through the acting Branch Clerk of Court issued summons to the [respondents]. As per
return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because
efforts to serve the summons personally to the [respondents] failed. Petitioners filed before the trial court
an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication, which was granted. The
respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring herein [respondents] in default for
failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were
allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA
held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders. According to the
appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of
summons upon them.
ISSUE: WON there was valid service of summons? HELD: NO. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the
defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the
procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. As can be gleaned from
the rules, personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be
made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons
must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts
exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent FACTS proving these circumstances be
stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully
with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. In
the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service
of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents. Summons by publication
in this case was also improper. It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.
GREEN STAR EXPRESS VS. NISSIN
FACTS: On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation ( URC) owned
figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.' s (Green Star) passenger bus,
resulting in the death of the van's driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged
with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent NissinUniversal Robina Corporation (NURC) for
the repair of its passenger bus amounting to ₱567, 070.68. NURC denied any liability therefore and argued
that the criminal case shall determine the ultimate liabilities of the parties. Thereafter, the criminal case
was dismissed without prejudice, due to insufficiency of evidence.
Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the R TC of San Pedro,
Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the summons. On February 6,
2004, NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service.
On May 5, 2004, the RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was
substantial compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC. The dispositive
portion of said Resolution thus reads:
3
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, defendant's "Motion to Dismiss" is hereby DENIED.
Since its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, NURC elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari. On September 17, 2007, the CA reversed the RTC ruling
ISSUE: Whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC, vesting the trial court with jurisdiction
RULING: It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical
entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was received by its cost
accountant, Francis Tinio.1âwphi1 It argues that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
which provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a
domestic corporation like NURC, summons may be served only through its officers.Thus:
Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service
may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.
Here, Tinio, a, member of NURC’s accounting staff, received the summons on January 22, 2004. Green star
claims that it was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo. The general manager of the
corporation. Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriff’s Return.13 The Return did not even state
whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant
manager. Green Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Avedillo simply refused to
sign and receive the same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf. However,
Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURC’s motion to dismiss to
attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which appears to support such allegation,
the same was likewise not presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA
that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is
not one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not vadily acquire
jurisdiction over NURC,14 although the corporation may have actually received the summons.15 To rule
otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the
10
administration of justice.

11