POLICE POWER council by law.
With this class we are not here directly
DELA CRUZ vs. PARAS
Facts:
 Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the
operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the
ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being
devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or
calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to
due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as
the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn
without judicial hearing.
 RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It
is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and
Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments,
Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement
within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of
each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by
ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of
night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars,
saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of
amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not
merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title,
however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
 As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was
considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the
operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It
was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The
power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
 Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation
of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The
lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition
for certiorari by way of appeal.
Issue: Whether ordinance is valid
Held:
NO. Reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the
enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared null
and void.
Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general
terms as follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances
and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such
ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." It
is practically a reproduction of the former Section 39 of
Municipal Code. An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof,
according to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the
leading case of United States v. Abendan "is valid, unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an
Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public
policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or
in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate
upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the
details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance
passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the
power, or it will be pronounced invalid."
In another leading case, United States v.
Salaveria, the ponente this time being Justice Malcolm, where
the present Administrative Code provision was applied, it was
stated by this Court: "The general welfare clause has two
branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal
concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more
independent of the specific functions of the council which are
enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.' It
is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the
State." If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test
of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court
had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general
powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of
fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be
heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation." It is clear that in the
guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear
invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of
those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and
property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be
earned by those therein employed.
The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as
amended. It was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is
entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS.' Its first section insofar as pertinent reads: "The
municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall
have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard
pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial
jurisdiction: ... " Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was
amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but
likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is
worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that
as thus amended, if only the above portion of the Act were
considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the
operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed
decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all, however.
The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one
whit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted
remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support
for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic
Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night
clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The
Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. " Since there
is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not
prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was
done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night
club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise
of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, in the language of
the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the
great public needs, to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any
calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that between two
possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave
1
defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would
save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly
commends itself. We have done so before We do so again.
The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as
a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining police power
legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such an
Ideal forbids such a backward step. Legislation of that character
is deserving of the fullest sympathy from the judiciary.
Accordingly, the judiciary has not been hesitant to lend the
weight of its support to measures that can be characterized as
falling within that aspect of the police power. Reference is made
by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 There is a
misapprehension as to what was decided by this Court. That was
a regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid objection
on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit
motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct
business in order precisely to put an end to practices which
could encourage vice and immorality. This is an entirely different
case. What was involved is a measure not embraced within the
regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to
prohibit. Moreover, while it was pointed out in the aforesaid
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
decision that there must be a factual foundation of invalidity, it
was likewise made clear that there is no need to satisfy such a
requirement if a statute were void on its face. That it certainly is
if the power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious and
under the present Local Government Code non-existent.
BINAY vs. DOMINGO
Doctrine: the power of municipal corporations is broad and has
been said to be commensurate with but not to exceed the duty
to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,
comfort and convenience, and consistently as may be with
private rights, x x x Ordinance is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons x x x
The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
the police power in the promotion of the common good.
Facts:
 On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its
Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which confirms the
ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the Office
of the Mayor. Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial
Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati
whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon
fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount
of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the
Municipality of Makati.
 Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60.
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial
Assistance Program.
 Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent COA for its
expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary
findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60
and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the
implementation thereof.
 Two letters for reconsideration filed by petitioners Mayor
Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent.
 Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the
Municipality of Makati, through its Council, passed
Resolution No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60 However,
the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA
Decision No. 1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was
constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari
praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and
void.
Issue: WON Resolution no. 60 is constitutional
Held:
Yes. It is a valid exercise of police power under the general
welfare clause.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general
welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority
to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate
dole-outs for maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity motives political or otherwise and
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and insure the protection of property therein.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has
been said to
be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide
for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort,
and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It
extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
includes all legislation and almost every function of the
municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and,
while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community,
it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions
which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of
the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable
to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely
indicate the limits of police power.
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose
is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office
of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare
legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate
social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of
the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10,
Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights.
(Section 11, Ibid."
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty.
The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying
paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably
classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local
councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have
been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program
of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss
of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more
painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more
in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent,
or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark
on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise.
TANO vs. SOCRATES
Facts:
 On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto
Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of
all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from
2
 January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of
Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a
several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
 Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the
ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them
from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue: Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions
baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not suffer
from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable
laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section
2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to
subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State
to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources
belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration,
development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily
includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out
such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the
principles
of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the
powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve
the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.
WHITE LIGHT CORP. vs. CITY OF MANILA
Facts:
 December 3, 1992 – Mayor Lim signed into a law the
Ordinance. The Ordinance is an ordinance prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
 December 15, 1992 - The Malate Tourist and Development
Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant,
herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor
Lim.
 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that
as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate,
Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to
charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three
hours.
 December 21, 1992 - petitioners White Light Corporation
(WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to
intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention
on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their
business interests as operators of drive-in hotels and motels
in Manila. The three companies are components of the
Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates
several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.
 December 23, 1992 - The RTC granted the motion to
intervene. The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the
proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as
plaintiff.
 December 28, 1992 - The RTC granted MTDC's motion to
withdraw.
 During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC
agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the
case involved a purely legal question.
 October 20, 1993 - The RTC rendered a decision declaring
the Ordinance null and void.
 The CA however, reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the Ordinance’s constitutionality.
 TC, WLC and STDC come to the SC via petition for review
on certiorari. In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners
in essence repeat the assertions they made before the
Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance is an invalid exercise of
police power?
Held:
YES. The Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the local government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room
more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted
in the police power as conferred on local government units by
the Local Government Code through such implements as the
general welfare clause.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions
warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of
the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous
and varied actions by the State.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative
for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject
3
to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.
However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the
vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the
presumption of validity.
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to
donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a
blunt and heavy instrument. The Ordinance makes no distinction
between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit
activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus, it
prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare
or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the
Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of
lodging thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and
subjects them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among
citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided
that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to
protect. The notion that the promotion of public morality is a
function of the State is as old as Aristotle.
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an
indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is
hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due
process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the
courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the
constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic
means to promote morality.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA
March 7, 2002
Doctrine: The Local Government Code imposes upon the City
Mayor the duly to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to
the governance of the city”. As chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to enforce an ordinance as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has
no choice; it is his ministerial duty to do so [Social Justice Society
v. Mayor Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007].
Facts:
 Nov 20, 2001: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027, which was approved by the
respondent Mayor.
 Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area
are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies
Caltex, Petron, Shell.
 June 26, 2002: City of Manila and the DOE entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies in which they agreed that the scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and
practicable option. Under the MOU, the City of Manila and
the DOE committed, among others, to enable the OIL
COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with
legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from
the joint operations and the scale down program.
 The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of
six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30,
2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13
extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003
and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business
permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also
called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
 Petitioners filed an original action for mandamus praying
that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals
of the oil companies.
Issue: (1) Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan Terminals (YES) (2) Whether the MOU and the
resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal the Ordinance (NO)
Held:
(1) Yes.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the
act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent
to do the act required to be done.
When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its
object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested
in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in
interest and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as
residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the
enforcement of the city ordinances. Respondent never
questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the
duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative
to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed
by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other
choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,
we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground
of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The
reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction
of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the
highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to
obey it.
(2) No.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the
MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions
which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect
only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that
legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines,
along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to
protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25
on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
protective measure should be delayed.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA
February 13, 2008
Facts:
 The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent
Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila,
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 that was enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in 2001.
 Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under the
4
 reclassification to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area
are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil.
 In 2002, the City of Manila and DOE entered into a MOU
with the oil companies. They agreed that scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and
practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified
the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for
a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which period
was extended up to 30 April 2003.
 This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 7 March
2007 Decision. The SC ruled that respondent had the
ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC)
to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027.
After the SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron, Petron and
Shell (herein after referred to as oil companies) and the RP,
represented by the DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a
reconsideration of the decision.
 The oil companies thereafter assailed the validity of
Ordinance No. 8027 in the RTC of Manila.
 In 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 and was approved by
respondent on June 16, 2006. The oil companies also
assailed Ordinance No. 8119’s validity.
Issue:
(1) Whether Mandamus Will Lie to Compel Respondent Mayor
to Enforce Ordinance No. 8027 (YES)
(2) Whether the City of Manila Has the Power to Enact
Ordinance No. 8027 (YES)
(3) Whether the Enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 Is A
Legitimate Exercise of Police Power (YES)
(4) Whether the DOE Cannot Exercise the Power of Control
Over LGUs (YES)
Held:
(1) YES.
Indeed, the Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings
with the legislative [or executive departments] of the
government in the legitimate exercise of its powers, except to
enforce mere ministerial acts required by law to be performed
by some officer thereof. Since this is the function of a writ of
mandamus, which is the power to compel "the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust or station." A party need not go first to the DILG in
order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance. This
suggested process would be unreasonably long, tedious and
consequently injurious to the interests of the local government
unit (LGU) and its constituents whose welfare is sought to be
protected. Besides, petitioners’ resort to an original action for
mandamus before this Court is undeniably allowed by the
Constitution.
(2) YES.
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police
power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi
est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).
While police power rests primarily with the national legislature,
such power may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as
the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police
power to local governments. LGUs like the City of Manila exercise
police power through their respective legislative bodies, in this
case, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the
Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the
city.
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has
the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city.
(3) YES
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because
there is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. It
was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of
the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take
measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the
area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of
a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot
is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is
defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future
projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued
operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present
location will no
longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police
power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the
residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on
those affected cannot be said to be unjust.
(4) YES.
Another reason that militates against the DOE’s assertions is that
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the
Presidential’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision.
Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos,
cannot exercise the power of control over them. The President
and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot
interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they
act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE
cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised
by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the
wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. LIM
November 25, 2014
Facts:
 Challenged in these consolidated petitions is the validity of
Ordinance No. 81873 entitled "AN ORDINANCE AMENDING
ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ‘THE MANILA
COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING
ORDINANCE OF 2006,’ BY CREATING A MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL
ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3) AND
PROVIDING FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT" enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on 14 May 2009.
 The ordinance created a medium industrial zone (1-2) and
heavy industrial zone (1-3) effectively lifted the prohibition
against owners and operators of businesses, including
herein intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron),
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell), and Petron
Corporation (Petron), collectively referred to as the oil
companies.
 The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or
otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027, Sec. 23 of
Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions
inconsistent therewith thereby allowing, once again the
operation of oil depots.
 Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza,
et.al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their contentions are as
follows: (a) It is an invalid exercise of police power because
5
 it does not promote the general welfare of the people; (b)
The conditions at the time the Court declared Ordinance
No. 8027 constitutional in G.R. No. 156052 exist to this date;
(c)It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution as well as health and environment related
municipal laws and international conventions and treaties,
such as: Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic and
Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code provisions on nuisance
and human relations; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child (d)
Despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and
notwithstanding that the conditions and circumstances
warranting the validity of the Ordinance remain the same,
the Manila City Council passed a contrary Ordinance,
thereby refusing to recognize that "judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of the legal system of the Philippines;
 On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and
the intervenors oil companies contend that: (a) It is the
function of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact zoning
ordinances, for which reason, it may proceed to amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8119 without prior referral to the
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA)
as prescribed under Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning)
and the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)
pursuant to Section 81 (Amendments to the Zoning
Ordinance) of Ordinance No. 8119, especially when the
action actually originated from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod itself; (b) the Sangguniang Panlungsod may, in
the later ordinance, expressly repeal all or part of the
zoning ordinance sought to be modified; (c) the provision
repealing Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119 is not violative
of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
requires that every bill must embrace only one subject and
that such shall be expressed in the title; (d) petitions are
based on unfounded fears; that the assailed ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power; that it is consistent with the
general welfare clause and public policy, and is not
unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the
Constitution, municipal laws, and international
conventions; and that the petitioners failed to overcome
the presumption of validity of the assailed ordinance
Issue: Whether the Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional
Held: YES
In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance
relative to the continued stay of the oil depots, we follow the
same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052, to wit: Ordinance
No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound
urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare" of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled
to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to
commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila
which recommended the approval of the ordinance: (1) the
depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable
and highly volatile products which include petroleum gas,
liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene
and fuel oil among others; (2) the depot is open to attack
through land, water or air; (3) it is situated in a densely populated
place and near Malacañang Palace; and (4) in case of an
explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to
the neighboring communities.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of
a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a
terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst,
the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became
necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.
According to respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident
which showed that what was perceived to be impossible to
happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is
actually possible. The destruction of property and the loss of
thousands of lives on that fateful day became the impetus for a
public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of
terrorism continued [such] that it became imperative for
governments to take measures to combat their effects.
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no
impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay
is unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders
who have categorically expressed their desire for the relocation
of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own
destiny and preserve their lives and safety should not be
curtailed by the intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios
and threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision.
The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the
contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing
reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of
the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the
presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in
relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to "reclassify
land within the jurisdiction of the city" subject to the pertinent
provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may
be modified or repealed by another ordinance. These have
been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052, where the Court
upheld the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify
the land subject of the Ordinance and declared that the mayor
has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, provided that it has
not been repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
otherwise annulled by the courts. In the same case, the Court
also used the principle that the Sanguniang Panlungsod is in the
best position to determine the needs of its Constituents – that the
removal of the oil depots from the Pandacan area is necessary
"to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation
in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals." Do all
these principles equally apply to the cases at bar involving the
same subject matter to justify the contrary provisions of the
assailed Ordinance? –– The SC held in the negative
The SC summarized the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
on the matter subject of these petitions. In 2001, the Sanggunian
found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary.
Hence, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027.
In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already
changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of the
retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of the
previous members were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-
Mayor still holding the same seat, and pending the resolution of
these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the oil
depots until the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to
another site. Former Mayor Lim stood his ground and vetoed the
last ordinance.
In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the
assailed Ordinance was enacted to alleviate the economic
condition of its constituents.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the
conditions with respect to the operations of the oil depots
existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not
substantially differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the
6
position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has
thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of
the council and/or political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows
that its determination of the "general welfare" of the city does
not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true
sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on
the personal preference of the members who sit in the council
as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to
favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city
councilors, has changed its view on the matter, favoring the
city’s economic related benefits, through the continued stay of
the oil terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety
of its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final
determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which
specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in
this present controversy, history reveals that there is truly no such
thing as "the will of Manila" insofar as the general welfare of the
people is concerned.
TAXING POWER
MIAA vs. CA
Facts:
 MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency
from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to
2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at
P624 million. The City of Parañaque, through its City
Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport
Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate
tax delinquency.
 MIAA filed a petition sought to restrain the City of
Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands
and Buildings.
 The City of Parañaque contended that Section 193 of the
Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of “government-owned and-
controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code. Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the
Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
 MIAA argued that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned
by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The
reason for tax exemption of public property is that its
taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in
such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Parañaque can impose real tax,
levy against and auction for public sale the Airport Lands and
Buildings.
Held:
MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled
Corporation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State
or the Republic of the Philippines. No one can dispute that
properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil
Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term
“ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands
and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and
Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and
Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and
other charges from the public does not remove the character of
the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The
charging of fees to the public does not determine the character
of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420
of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one
“intended for public use.”
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being
outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an
auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use,
are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through
public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being
contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if
properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances,
foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of
Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the
600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate
tax.
MCIAA vs. MARCOS
Facts:
 Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was
created by virtue of Republic Act 6958. Since the time of its
creation, MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from
payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of
its Charter. However, on 11 October 1994, the Office of the
Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment of realty
taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner.
 Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as
baseless and unjustified and asserted that it is an
instrumentality of the government performing
governmental functions, which puts limitations on the
taxing powers of local government units.
 The City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty
tax account, insisting that the MCIAA is a government-
controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has
been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), and not an instrumentality
of the government but merely a government owned
corporation performing proprietary functions. MCIAA paid
its tax account “under protest” when City is about to issue
a warrant of levy against the MCIAA’s properties.
 MCIAA filed a Petition of Declaratory Relief with the RTC
contending that the taxing power of local government
units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees on an
instrumentality of the national government. It contends that
by the nature of its powers and functions, it has the footing
of an agency or instrumentality of the national
government; which claim the City rejects. The trial court
dismissed the petition, citing that close reading of the LGC
provides the express cancellation and withdrawal of tax
exemptions of Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations.
Issue: Whether the City of Cebu has the power to impose taxes
on petitioner
Held: YES
As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty
and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no
limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency who are to pay it. Since taxes are what we pay for
civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns
against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax
exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of
exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based
on language in the law too plain to be mistaken.
There can be no question that under Section 14 RA 6958 the
petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed
by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions,
agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is
the rule and exemption is the exception, the exemption may thus
be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority.
7

The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the
constitution provides for the exercise by LGUs of their power to
tax, the scope thereof or its limitations, and the exemption from
taxation. Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common
limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs: (o) Taxes, fees or
charges of any kind on the national government, its agencies
and instrumentalities and LGUs. Among the "taxes" enumerated
in the LGC is real property tax. Section 234 of LGC provides for
the exemptions from payment of GOCCs, except as provided
therein. On the other hand, the LGC authorizes LGUs to grant tax
exemption privileges. Reading together Section 133, 232 and
234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down
in Secs 133 the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy
of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalties, and LGUs";
however, pursuant to Sec 232, provinces, cities, municipalities in
the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax
except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial used thereof has been granted to a taxable person."
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently
enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government-
owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC
prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the
effectivity of the LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC,
except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly
registered under R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit hospitals
and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in
the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234, which
enumerates the properties exempt from real property tax. But
the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention
of the exemption in so far as the real property taxes are
concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated
there-in; all others not included in the enumeration lost the
privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as the
real property is owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any
of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first
paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the
beneficial use of such property has been granted to taxable
person for consideration or otherwise.
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew,
upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from real property
taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs,
except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is,
undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily
follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14
of its charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to
the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge
under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not
under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the
said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. In short, the
petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133.
It must show that the parcels of land in question, which are real
property, are any one of those enumerated in Section 234, either
by virtue of ownership, character, or use of the property. Most
likely, it could only be the first, but not under any explicit provision
of the said section, for one exists. In light of the petitioner's theory
that it is an "instrumentality of the Government", it could only be
within be first item of the first paragraph of the section by
expanding the scope of the terms Republic of the Philippines" to
embrace "instrumentalities" and "agencies."
This view does not persuade us. In the first place, the petitioner's
claim that it is an instrumentality of the Government is based on
Section 133(o), which expressly mentions the word
"instrumentalities"; and in the second place it fails to consider the
fact that the legislature used the phrase "National Government,
its agencies and instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the
phrase "Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivision "in Section 234(a).
The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National
Government" are not interchangeable. The former is boarder
and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987 defines as
the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions
of the government are exercised through at the Philippines,
including, saves as the contrary appears from the context, the
various arms through which political authority is made effective
in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous reason,
the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivision or other
forms of local government." These autonomous regions,
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are the
political subdivision. On the other hand, "National Government"
refers "to the entire machinery of the central government, as
distinguished from the different forms of local Governments." The
National Government then is composed of the three great
departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial. An
"agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of
the Government, including a department, bureau, office
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation,
or a local government or a distinct unit therein;" while an
"instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy; usually through a charter.
This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned and controlled corporations".
If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the
withdrawal of the exemption from payment of real property
taxes under the last sentence of the said section to the agencies
and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned in
Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the
latter. Yet, it did not Moreover, that Congress did not wish to
expand the scope of the exemption in Section 234(a) to include
real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of the
government including government-owned and controlled
corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source of
this exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwise known
as the Real Property Tax Code.
Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and
any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by
its charter" was excluded. The justification for this restricted
exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax
exemption privileges, especially in light of the general provision
on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes
in the last paragraph of property taxes in the last paragraph of
Section 234. These policy considerations are consistent with the
State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments 33 and
the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. 34 The
power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed
revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local
government units for the delivery of basic services essential to
the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of
peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also be
relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of
tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned and
controlled corporations and all other units of government were
that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and
distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises,
and there was a need for this entities to share in the requirements
of the development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and
other charges due from them.
The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the
parcels of land in question belong to the Republic of the
Philippines whose beneficial use has been granted to the
petitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxable person". It
may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands" refer to
"lands" in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air Port and
8
includes the parcels of land the respondent City of Cebu seeks
to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves a "transfer"
of the "lands" among other things, to the petitioner and not just
the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the ownership
being retained by the Republic of the Philippines.
This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of the
ownership thereof because the petitioner's authorized capital
stock consists of "the value of such real estate owned and/or
administered by the airports." Hence, the petitioner is now the
owner of the land in question and the exception in Sec 234(c) of
the LGC is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never
a "taxable person" under its Charter. It was only exempted from
the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege
only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative
intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except
real property tax.
Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person
for purposes of real property tax, in light of the forgoing
disquisitions, it had already become even if it be conceded to
be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the Government, a taxable
person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last
paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of
real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to the
petitioner. Accordingly, the position taken by the petitioner is
untenable. Reliance on Basco vs. Pagcor is unavailing since it
was decided before the effectivity of the LGC. Besides, nothing
can prevent Congress from decreeing that even
instrumentalities or agencies of the government performing
governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done
precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy,
no one can doubt its wisdom.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Facts:
 Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) is
a legislative franchise holder under Republic Act (Rep. Act)
No. 3259... to establish and operate radio stations for
domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting
and... telecasting.
 Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC), took effect. Section 232
of the Code grants local government units within the Metro
Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties... the
same Code... withdrew any exemption from realty tax
heretofore granted to or enjoyed by all persons, natural or
juridical barely few months after the LGC took effect,
Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633, amending Bayantel's
original franchise contained the following tax provision:
 SEC. 11. The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable
to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and
personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other
persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be
required by law to pay.
 In addition thereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns
shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%)
of all gross receipts of the telephone or other
telecommunications businesses transacted under this
franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns and the...
said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise
or earnings thereof. Provided, That the grantee, its
successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for income
taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue
Code .... xxx. [Emphasis... supplied]
 It is undisputed that within the territorial boundary of
Quezon City, Bayantel owned several real properties on
which it maintained various telecommunications facilities.
 Government of Quezon City enacted City Ordinance
imposing a real property tax on all real properties in Quezon
City, and, reiterating in its Section 6, the withdrawal of
exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the
LGC
 Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the
exclusion of its real properties in the city from the roll of
taxable real properties. With its request having been
denied, Bayantel interposed an appeal with the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). And, evidently on its
firm belief of its exempt status, Bayantel did not pay the real
property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City
government.
 Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency
followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against
Bayantel's properties preparatory to their sale at a public
auction
 Bayantel filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for
prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO)
Issue: In declaring the real properties of respondent exempt from
real property taxes notwithstanding the fact that the tax
exemption granted to Bayantel in its original franchise had been
withdrawn by the [LGC] Whether or not Bayantel's real properties
in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes under its
legislative franchise; Bayantel's franchise being national in
character, the "exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 3259 applies to all its real or personal properties
found anywhere within the Philippine archipelago.
Held:
Real properties of Bayantel, save those exclusive of its franchise,
are subject to realty taxes. Ultimately, therefore, the inevitable
result was that all realties which are actually,... directly and
exclusively used in the operation of its franchise are "exempted"
from any property tax.
Bayantel's franchise being national in character, the "exemption"
thus granted under Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 applies to all
its real or personal properties found anywhere within the
Philippine archipelago.
However, with the LGC's taking effect, the realty tax exemption
heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise, but
subsequently withdrawn by force of Section 234 of the LGC, has
been restored by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633.
Bayantel is only "liable to pay the same taxes, as any other
persons or corporations on all its real or personal properties,
exclusive of its franchise."... there can really be no dispute that
the power of the Quezon City Government to tax is limited by
Section 232 of the LGC which expressly provides that "a province
or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may
levy an annual... ad valorem tax on real property such as land,
building, machinery, and other improvement not hereinafter
specifically exempted." Under this law, the Legislature
highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from
the taxing power of local... government units. An interpretation
denying Congress such power to exempt would reduce the
phrase "not hereinafter specifically exempted" as a pure jargon,
without meaning whatsoever. Needless to state, such absurd
situation is unacceptable.
Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the
LGC. Perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn
Bayantel's former exemption from realty taxes, Congress opted
to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using... exactly the same defining
phrase "exclusive of this franchise" which was the basis for
Bayantel's exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC.
In plain language, Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 states that
"the grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the
same taxes on their real... estate, buildings and personal
property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or
corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to
pay." The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an
express and real intention on the part of Congress to once...
again remove from the LGC's delegated taxing power, all of the
9
franchisee's (Bayantel's) properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.
DRILON vs. LIM
Facts:
 The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of
Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The Secretary
of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue
Code) null and void for non-compliance with the
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
policy.
 The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained
the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the
power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and
that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code
had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally
dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true
copy of the decision but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only
the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When
he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the
local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon
did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace
it with his own version of what the Code should be. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said
measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers to the city government under the Local Government
Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to
do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does
he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local
Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to
suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the
tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the
exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an
examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of
the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control
rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned
before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not
given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to
do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure,
without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue
Code only on two grounds, to with the inclusion therein of certain
ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality,
not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter.
(allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no publication
of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no
translation into Tagalog)
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural
requirements had been observed in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been
able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only
because he had given it only five days within which to gather
and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits)
later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court
that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed.
Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as
evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M,
M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed
ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard
on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the
Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown
by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as
approved, but this omission does not affect its validity,
considering that its publication in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has
also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been
translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the
approval of local development plans and public investment
programs of the local government unit and not to tax
ordinances.
BATANGAS CITY vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP.
Facts:
 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation operates an oil
refinery and depot in Tabagao, Batangas City, which
manufactures and produces petroleum products that are
distributed nationwide.
 In 2002, respondent was only paying the amount of
P98,964.71 for fees and other charges which include the
amount for the Mayor’s Permit.
 However, on February 20, 2001, petitioner, sent a notice of
assessment to respondent demanding the payment of
P92,373,720.50 and P312,656,253.04 as business taxes for its
manufacture and distribution of petroleum products.
 In addition, respondent was also required and assessed to
pay the amount of P4,299,851.00 as Mayor’s Permit Fee
based on the gross sales of its Tabagao Refinery.
 Respondent filed a protest contending among others that
it is not liable for the payment of the local business tax.
 Their protest was denied, and was told that under Section
14 of the Batangas City Tax Code of 2002, they are
empowered to withhold the issuance of the Mayor’s Permit
for failure of respondent to pay the business taxes
 On June 17, 2002, respondent filed a Petition for Review
pursuant to Section 195 of the LGC of 1991 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City. Trial ensued.
 In the interim, respondent paid under protest the Mayor’s
Permit Fees for When respondent applied for the issuance
of the Mayor’s Permit in 2004, it offered the amount of
P150,000.00 as compromise Mayor’s Permit Fee without
prejudice.
 RTC sustained the business taxes but withheld the
imposition of Mayor’s Permit Fee
 Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Denied, so Shell filed a
Petition for Review with TRO and WPI with CTA.
 CTA Second Division granted the said application for TRO
and WPI.
 In the CTA Decision, They granted respondent’s petition.
o It held that Shell is not subject to the business
taxes on the manufacture and distribution of
petroleum products because of the express
10
 limitation provided under Section 133(h) of the
LGC
 CTA ordered Batangas City to stop imposing business tax
on the manufacture and distribution of petroleum product,
and to refund the Mayor’s Permit fees that they found
Excessive.
 Batangas city filed an MR which was denied by the CTA En
Banc. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON an LGU is empowered under the LGC to impose
business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the business of
manufacturing and distribution of petroleum products. –– NO.
Held:
Batangas City:
Any activity that involves the production or
manufacture and the distribution or selling of any kind
or nature as a means of livelihood or with a view to
profit can be taxed by the LGUs.
They posit that the authority granted to them by
Section 143(h) of the LGC is so broad that it practically
covers any business that the sanggunian concerned
may deem proper to tax, even including businesses
which are already subject to excise, value-added or
percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC).
COURT:
 At the outset, it must be emphasized that although the
power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true
for LGUs because although the mandate to impose
taxes granted to LGUs is categorical and long
established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the same
is not all encompassing as it is subject to limitations as
explicitly stated in Section 5, Article X of the 1987
Constitution
 The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays is summarized in Icard v.
City Council of Baguio:
o It is settled that a municipal corporation
unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no
inherent power of taxation. The charter or
statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality,
cannot assume it. And the power when
granted is to be construed in strictissimi
juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of
the term used in granting that power must
be resolved against the municipality.
 Section 133 provides for the common limitations on
the taxing powers of LGUs. Among the common
limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs under Section
133 of the LGC is paragraph (h) which states:
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing
Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
not extend to the levy of the following:
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and
taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products.
 From the foregoing, Section 133(h) clearly specifies
the two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by
LGUs: (1) excise taxes on articles enumerated under
the NIRC, as amended; and (2) taxes, fees or charges
on petroleum products.
 While the power to impose business taxes is granted to
LGUs in Section 143 of the LGC, the same is subject to
the said limitation.
 Additionally, Section 133(h) of the LGC makes plain that
the prohibition with respect to petroleum products
extends not only to excise taxes thereon, but all "taxes,
fees or charges."
 The earlier reference in paragraph 143(h) to excise taxes
comprehends a wider range of subject of taxation: all
articles already covered by excise taxation under the
NIRC, such as alcohol products, tobacco products,
mineral products, automobiles, and such non-essential
goods as jewelry, goods made of precious metals,
perfumes, and yachts and other vessels intended for
pleasure or sports. In contrast, the later reference to
"taxes, fees and charges" pertains only to one class of
articles of the many subjects of excise taxes, specifically,
"petroleum products."
 While LGUs are authorized to burden all such other class
of goods with "taxes, fees and charges," excepting
excise taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed barring the
levying of any other type of taxes with respect to
petroleum products
 The specific exemption in Sec 133 prevails over sec 143.
Strictly speaking, as long as the subject matter of the
taxing powers of the LGUs is the petroleum products per
se or even the activity or privilege related to the
petroleum products, such as manufacturing and
distribution of said products, it is covered by the said
limitation and thus, no levy can be imposed
 Second, Article 232(h) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the LGC of 1991defines with more
particularity the capacity of a municipality to impose
taxes on businesses. However, it admits of certain
exceptions, specifically, that businesses engaged in the
production, manufacture, refining, distribution or sale of
oil, gasoline, and other petroleum products, shall not be
subject to any local tax imposed by Article 232
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU vs. PEZA
Facts:
 These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the
City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately
filed against the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).
 In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails
the Court of Appeals’ decision dated January 11, 2008 and
resolution dated August 6, 2008, dismissing the City’s
appeal for being the wrong mode of appeal. The City
appealed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City’s
decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real
property taxes.
 In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province)
assails the Court of Appeals’ decision dated August 27,
2008 and resolution dated April 16, 2009, granting the
PEZA’s petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City gravely
abused its discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real
property taxes to the Province of Bataan.
Issue: Whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property
taxes?
Held:
The PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes. The
PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government
An instrumentality is “any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
With the PEZA as an attached agency to the Department of
Trade and Industry, the 13-person PEZA Board is chaired by the
Department Secretary. Among the powers and functions of the
PEZA is its ability to coordinate with the Department of Trade and
Industry for policy and program formulation and
11
implementation. In strategizing and prioritizing the development
of special economic zones, the PEZA coordinates with the
Department of Trade and Industry.
The PEZA also administers its own funds and operates
autonomously, with the PEZA Board formulating and approving
the PEZA’s annual budget. Appointments and other personnel
actions in the PEZA are also free from departmental interference,
with the PEZA Board having the exclusive and final authority to
promote, transfer, assign and reassign officers of the PEZA.
As an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA is
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law. Congress
created the PEZA to operate, administer, manage and develop
special economic zones in the Philippines. Special economic
zones are areas with highly developed or which have the
potential to be developed into agro-industrial, industrial
tourist/recreational, commercial, banking, investment and
financial centers.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA
cannot be taxed by local government units.
Although a body corporate vested with some corporate powers,
the PEZA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation
taxable for real property taxes.
The law created the PEZA’s charter. Under the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to perform
the governmental function of operating, administering,
managing, and developing special economic zones to attract
investments and provide opportunities for preferential use of
Filipino labor.
Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate
endowed with some corporate powers. However, it was not
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Nothing in the
PEZA’s charter provides that the PEZA’s capital is divided into
shares. The PEZA also has no members who shall share in the
PEZA’s profits.
The PEZA does not compete with other economic zone
authorities in the country. The government may even subsidize
the PEZA’s operations. Under Section 47 of the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, “any sum necessary to augment [the PEZA’s]
capital outlay shall be included in the General Appropriations
Act to be treated as an equity of the national government.”
The PEZA, therefore, need not be economically viable. It is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation liable for real
property taxes.
The PEZA’s predecessor, the EPZA, was declared non-profit in
character with all its revenues devoted for its development,
improvement, and maintenance. Consistent with this non-profit
character, the EPZA was explicitly declared exempt from real
property taxes under its charter. Section 21 of Presidential
Decree No. 66.
The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, on the other hand, does
not specifically exempt the PEZA from payment of real property
taxes.
Nevertheless, we rule that the PEZA is exempt from real property
taxes by virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is
unnecessary. The PEZA assumed the real property exemption of
the EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66.
Section 11 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 mandated
the EPZA “to evolve into the PEZA in accordance with the
guidelines and regulations set forth in an executive order issued
for this purpose.” President Ramos then issued Executive Order
No. 282 in 1995, ordering the PEZA to assume the EPZA’s powers,
functions, and responsibilities under Presidential Decree No. 66
not inconsistent with the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.
The non-profit character of the EPZA under Presidential Decree
No. 66 is not inconsistent with any of the powers, functions, and
responsibilities of the PEZA. The EPZA’s non-profit character,
including the EPZA’s exemption from real property taxes, must be
deemed assumed by the PEZA.
In addition, the Local Government Code exempting
instrumentalities of the national government from real property
taxes was already in force when the PEZA’s charter was enacted
in 1995. It would have been redundant to provide for the PEZA’s
exemption in its charter considering that the PEZA is already
exempt by virtue of Section 133(o) of the Local Government
Code.
As for the EPZA, Commonwealth Act No. 470 or the Assessment
Law was in force when the EPZA’s charter was enacted. Unlike
the Local Government Code, Commonwealth Act No. 470 does
not contain a provision specifically exempting instrumentalities
of the national government from payment of real property
taxes. It was necessary to put an exempting provision in the
EPZA’s charter.
Real properties under the PEZA’s title are owned by the Republic
of the Philippines
Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real
properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt
from real property taxes.
Even the PEZA’s lands and buildings whose beneficial use have
been granted to other persons may not be taxed with real
property taxes. The PEZA may only lease its lands and buildings
to PEZA-registered economic zone enterprises and entities. These
PEZA-registered enterprises and entities, which operate within
economic zones, are not subject to real property taxes. Under
Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, no taxes,
whether local or national, shall be imposed on all business
establishments operating within the economic zones.
EMINENT DOMAIN
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC vs. ERICTA
Doctrine: In Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759, the ordinance
requiring owners of commercial cemeteries to reserve 6% of their
burial lots for burial grounds of paupers was held invalid; it was
not an exercise of the police power, but of eminent domain.
Facts:
 Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled
"ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death, to be determined by competent City Authorities.
The area so designated shall immediately be developed
and should be open for operation not later than six months
from the date of approval of the application."
 For several years, the aforequoted section of the
Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven
years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon
City Council passed the following resolution: "RESOLVED by
the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does
hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to
donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial."
12
 Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the
Ordinance in question –– alleging that the same is contrary
to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local
Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
 The respondent court rendered the decision declaring
Section 9 of Ordinance null and void.
 MR denied, the City Government and City Council filed the
instant petition –– arguing that the taking of the
respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as
it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further
argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its
charter, in the exercise of local police power, "to make
such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred by this Act."
 While, Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or
confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
 The respondent also stresses that the general welfare
clause is NOT available as a source of power for the taking
of the property in this case because it refers to "the power
of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property."
Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police
power
Held: NO.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537,
the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper
place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may
"provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes
the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
This has been the law and practice in the past. It continues to
the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws
and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside
certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are
made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots
are sold to homeowners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general
welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal
corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis
of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad
and liberal interpretation, but we CANNOT STRETCH it to cover
this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was
passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated, received
necessary licenses and permits, and commenced operating.
The sequestration of 6% of the cemetery cannot even be
considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the
private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence
operations.
CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO
Facts:
 On 17 September 1993, Petitioner City of Cebu filed a
complaint for eminent domain against respondents
spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner
alleged that they needed the parcels of land owned by
the respondents for public purpose because they are
planning to construct a public road which will serve as an
access or relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the
General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan
International Hotel Roads in Cebu City.
 However, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint because the purpose of expropriation was not
for public purpose but for the benefit of the Cebu Holdings,
Inc. They alleged that the petitioner could simply buy
directly the property from them at its fair market value just
like what they did with the neighboring lots and the price
offered was very low. They also alleged that they have no
other land in Cebu City.
 From this, a pre-trial was conducted. On 23 August 1994,
the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The
motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September
1994. The parties executed an agreement and submitted
to the trial wherein they declared that they have partially
settled the case in consideration of the stipulations in the
agreement.
 Pursuant to the said agreement, the trial court appointed
Palermo M. Lugo, Alfredo Cisneros and Herbert E. Buot to
be the commissioners to determine the just compensation
of the lots sought to be expropriated. The commissioner’s
report contained that the plaintiff is directed to pay a just
compensation costs P24,865.930.00 to the respondents.
 But the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the commissioner’s report was inaccurate
since it included an area which was not subject to
expropriation. Then the commissioners submit an
amendment which made the just compensation costs
P20,826,339.50 which was later approved by the trial court.
 Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
alleging that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of
just compensation at P20,826,339.50. They also alleged that
just compensation should be based on the prevailing
market price of the property at the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. However, the Court of Appeals
was not convinced and affirmed the lower court’s decision.
 The petitioner filed with a petition for review to the SC. They
asserted that just compensation should be determined on
September 17, 1993, as of the date of the filing of the
complaint and not at the time the property was actually
taken in 1994.
Issue: Whether just compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint.
Held:
No. Just compensation should not be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Governments right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. However, the
Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as
consideration therefor.
13

In this case, the applicable law as to the point of determining the
just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly
provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the
time of actual taking. The Section reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. –– A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and
such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of
the property.
The SC justifies that although the general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as
of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule admits of an
exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of
the date it was taken and not at the date of the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Moreover, both of the parties agreed to be bound by the report
of the commission, so they need to comply on the agreement in
good faith. Also, the petitioner was too late to question the
valuation without violating the principle of equitable estoppel.
And lastly, Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court cannot prevail
over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.
Therefore, the petition was denied.
REPUBLIC vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner (PIA) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a
total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along
MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the
continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter
facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines” project.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally
fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26
February 1979, or more than 9 years after the institution of the
expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order
condemning the property and ordering the plaintiff to pay the
defendants the just compensation for the property.
It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the
respondents the just compensation pursuant to the foregoing
decision. The respondents then filed a manifestation with a
motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In
response, the court issued a writ of execution for the
implementation thereof.
Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20
hectares of the expropriated land to the Bulacan State
University.
Despite the court’s order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid and
no action was on their case until petitioner filed its manifestation
and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount
P4,664,000 by way of just compensation.
The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion to adjust the
compensation from P6/sq.m. as previously fixed to its current
zonal value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the return of the
expropriated property.
The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs declaring its 26
February 1979 Decision to be unenforceable on the ground of
prescription in accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1964/1997
ROC which states that a final and executory judgment or order
may be executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its
entry. RTC denied petitioner’s Motion to Permit Deposit and
ordered the return of the expropriated property to the heirs of
Santos.
Issue:
1. Whether the petitioner may appropriate the property
2. Whether the respondents are entitled to the return of the
property in question
Held:
1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an
ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.
Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires
no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken
as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being
regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the
hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope
matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in
many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State
needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate
interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit
agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the
right to resume the possession of the property whenever the
public interest so requires it.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the
nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation
proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for
the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
condemn or in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title
and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title
or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but
to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the
taking must be for public use, and second, that just
compensation must be given to the private owner of the
property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the
recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the
State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the
other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording
protection to the latter. In determining “public use,” two
approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or
the actual use by the public, and the second is public
advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being
subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society
advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and
each demand is a new use to which the resources of the
individual may be devoted.
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the
continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof
being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan
State University and for the propagation of the Philippine
carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public
purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the
utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out
that its present use differs from the purpose originally
contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The
argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public
character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as
the condemn or and as the owner of the property, is well within
its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only
limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.
14

2. NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property,
respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial
Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. deVillaroya where the unpaid
landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of
the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that
the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to
which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely
delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of
eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No.
7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-
encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of
government. For local governments to be able to wield the
power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the
national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of
eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but
only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real
authority would want it to be.
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners
had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the
expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled -
“The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be
made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the
subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory
judgment in said proceedings, they werecondemned for public
use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x
x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the
expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their
title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover
possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to
the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to
demand the fair market value of the same.
"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such
other remedies, which may be deemed just and equitable under
the premises."
The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso
vs. Pasay City where the recovery of possession of property
taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was
denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were
first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of
recovering compensation for his property computed at its
market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the
State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the
expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of
just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges
the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which
parties, as well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has
occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised
dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The
exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has
amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the
1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by
prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the
return of their property on the basis of non-payment,
respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory
authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to
which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem
proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new
and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to
a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial
process for securing better title against all the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take
into account that the same argument could likewise apply
against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for
payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after
the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long delay
in bringing the action to compel payment against herein
petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule
that one should take good care of his own concern,
respondents should have commenced the proper action upon
the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a
permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the
property.
The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered
to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between one
who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of
the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken
for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value to be computed from the time
the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually
paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of
the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better
than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in
imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be
computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation
proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969. This
allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of
the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an
effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate
the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of
the currency over time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing
that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of
the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation
shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the
contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual
obligations. In other words, a contractual agreement is needed
for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account
to alter the value of the currency.
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01
March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted
beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being
to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not
entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be
paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation
already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26
February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest
thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking"
of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount
shall have been fully paid.
RECLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
DAR vs. SARANGGANI AGRICULTURAL CO.
Facts:
 The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel, Sarangani passed
Resolution No. 97-08 adopting a 10 year comprehensive
development plan of the municipality and its land use. On
January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate the development
and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that
were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-
2005 Land Use Plan of the municipality, from agricultural to
non-agricultural uses
 Later, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani
approved Resolution No. 98-018 or the “Resolution
Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive
Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land Use
Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the
Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08
and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the
15
 Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel.” A portion of the area
involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the
CARP commercial farms deferment scheme
 The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Council (MPDC)
showed that respondents’ properties located at Barangay
Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from
agricultural and pasture land to residential, commercial
institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995-
2005 land use plan of Alabel.
 The respondent then field an application for land use
conversion of certain parcels of land. Meanwhile,
members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR
Secretary oppposing the application for land use
conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members
were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering
that the commercial farm deferment period ended on
June 15, 1998. Later, the PLUTC agreed to recommend the
disapproval of a portion of a property which was still viable
for agriculture. The conversion was deferred subject to the
submission of certain requirements.
 Later, the DAR Secretary denied SACI’s application for land
use conversion.
 On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales,
Jr. denied SACI’s application for land use conversion. SACI
appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the
President dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the
challenged DAR Orders. Respondents’ motion for
reconsideration was denied, so they filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the same
issues.
 The CA granted the petition and ordred DAR to issue a
conversion order. As to the deferred portion, DAR was
directed to expedite the processing and evaluation of
petitioner’s application.
Issue: Whether a notice of coverage is an indispensable
requirement for the acquisition of land
Held: No, Under the circumstances, a notice of coverage is not
an indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire the
subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a
deferment period under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998
Issue: Whether the DAR should use the comprehensive land use
plans and ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary
reference
Held: Yes, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, empowers the local
government units to reclassify agricultural lands. Memorandum
Circular No. 54 “Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20
of R.A. No. 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government
Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify
Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses” issued by President
Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the scope and limitations on
the power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural
lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances authorizing
reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review
and approval of the province in the case of component cities or
municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly urbanized or
independent component cities in accordance with Executive
Order No. 72, Series of 1993.
Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been
reclassified for non-agricultural uses by the local government unit
concerned, the CA is correct in declaring that DAR should refer
to the comprehensive land use plans and the ordinances of the
Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the
subsequent administrative issuances implementing the same, we
are of the opinion that while the DAR retains the responsibility for
approving or disapproving applications for land use conversion
filed by individual landowners on their landholdings, the exercise
of such authority should be confined to compliance with the
requirements and limitations under existing laws and regulations,
such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area] to be
reclassified, ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-
negotiable for conversion and those falling under
environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for conversion
under the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DAR’s power in such cases
may not be exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very
purpose of the LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to
achieve social and economic benefits in pursuit of its mandate
towards the general welfare. Precisely, therefore, the DAR is
required to use the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as primary
references in evaluating applications for land use conversion
filed by individual landowners. In this case, petitioners have
already complied with the standard requirements laid down
under the applicable rules and regulations of the DAR.
The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses
shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only when the
conditions prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are present. In this
regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA that
DAR’s scope of authority in assessing land use conversion
applications is limited to examining whether the requirements
prescribed by law and existing rules and regulations have been
complied with. This holds true in the present case where,
because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in
view of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its provincial capital
which is the Municipality of Alabel, the local government has
reclassified certain portions of its land area from agricultural to
non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No.
72, Series of 1993, and subject to the limitations prescribed by
law, DAR should utilize the comprehensive land use plans in
evaluating the land use conversion application of respondents
whose lands have already been reclassified by the local
government for non-agricultural uses.
This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents
which is included in the comprehensive land use plan of the
Municipality of Alabel shall be automatically granted non-
coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is subject to
the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such
limitation that is present here is that a portion of respondents’
property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion totaling 154.622 [or
154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas and
coconuts, are covered by CARL’s ten-year deferment scheme,
which has expired on June 15, 1998. By law, these lands are
subject to redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon the lapse of
the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of
the CARL or R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way
before the creation of the Province of Sarangani and the
eventual reclassification of the agricultural lands into non-
agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents’
properties are located.
In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the
reclassification that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel
did not operate to supersede the applicable provisions of R.A.
No. 6657.
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification
of lands explicitly states that “[n]othing in this section shall be
construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner
the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.” Thus, where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application.
CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS
SANGALANG vs. IAC
Doctrine: Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a
legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not
shown why the court should hold otherwise other than for the
16
supposed “non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution,
which, as we declared, is secondary to the more compelling
interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown
to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the
reversal of the judgments so appealed.
Facts:
 The mother case (GR 71169) is a petition to hold the vendor
itself, Ayala Corporation, liable for tearing down the
perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had theretofore
closed its commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air
Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the full
“commercialization” of Jupiter Street, in violation of the
very restrictions it had authored.
 The other cases (the rest of the consolidated) are efforts to
enforce the “deed restrictions” in question against specific
residents (private
 respondents in the petitions) of Jupiter Street (and Reposo
Street, in one case). The private respondents are alleged to
have converted their residences into commercial
establishments (restaurant, bakery and coffee shop,
advertising firm, and a construction company) in violation
of said restrictions.
 CA dismissed all five appeals on the basis primarily of its
ruling in Bel-Air Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land Realty Development
Corp, et al.” in which the appellate court explicitly rejected
claims under the same “deed restrictions” as a result of
Ordinance No. 81 enacted by the Government of the
Municipality of Makati, as well as Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance No. 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan
Manila Commission, which two ordinances allegedly
allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for residential and
commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin
measures were valid as a legitimate exercise of police
power.
Issue: Whether IAC may reverse the decision of the trial court
Held: YES
AS TO THE MOTHER CASE:
The questioned zoning ordinances:
 This Court finds as inaccurate the CA’s holding that such
measures, had “in effect, [made] Jupiter Street...a street
which could be used not only for residential purposes,” and
that “[i]t lost its character as a street for the exclusive
benefit of those residing in Bel-Air Village completely.”
 Among other things, there is a recognition under both
Ordinances Nos. 81 and 81-01 that Jupiter Street lies as the
boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation’s
commercial section. And since 1957, it had been
considered as a boundary – not as part of either the
residential or commercial zones of Ayala Corp’s real estate
development projects. Hence, it cannot be said to have
been “for the exclusive benefit” of Bel-Air Villages.
The perimeter wall then standing on the commercial side of
Jupiter Street the destruction of which opened the street to the
public. Petitioners contend that the opening had opened the
floodgates to commercialization. The wall was for the protection
of the peace and privacy of Bel-Air Village and that Ayala Corp
had committed itself to maintain it. If liability existed, Ayala’s
liability, it had been overtaken by the passage of Ordinances
Nos. 81 and 82-01, opening Jupiter Street to commerce.
As before ruled, Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary; not only
for the exclusive use of either block but in favor of both
commercial and residential blocks.
Ayala Corp cannot be liable for damages. (No commitment on
the part of Ayala as evidenced by the records)
AS TO THE REST OF THE CASES:
The court exculpate the private respondents, not only because
of the fact that Jupiter Street is not covered by the restrictive
easements based on the “deed restrictions” but chiefly because
the National Government itself, through the Metro Manila
Commission (MCC), had reclassified Jupiter
Street into a “high density commercial (C-3) zone,” pursuant to
its Ordinance No. 81-01. Hence no cause of action.
It is not that the court is saying that restrictive easements,
especially the easements herein in question, are invalid or
ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned,
they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts,
subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the
greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate
exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of
contract and is said to be the “law between the contracting
parties,” but while it is so, it cannot contravene “law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.” Above all, it
cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed
precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the
common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever
necessary.
Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate
exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why
the court should hold otherwise other than for the supposed
“non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we
declared, is secondary to the more compelling interests of
general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be
capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of
the judgments so appealed.
MMDA vs. BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
Facts:
 Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-
Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air
Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
 Respondent received from petitioner, through its
Chairman, a notice requesting respondent to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. respondent
instituted against petitioner before the RTC for injunction.
After due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a
preliminary injunction.
 Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court conducted an ocular
inspection of Neptune Street and it issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the
MMDA’s proposed action finding that the MMDA has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road.
 Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open
Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of
the state endowed with police power in the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services
is traffic management which involves the regulation of the
use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and
welfare of the general public.
Issue: Whether MMDA exercises police power
Held:
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President
and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. A local
government is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which
is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.”
The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local
government unit as a “body politic and corporate”– one
endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the
17
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the
territorial and political subdivisions of the state.
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government
units in the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is
found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general
welfare clause.
Local government units exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the
provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of
the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the
municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of
the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local
Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang
bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city
or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided
under the Code x x x.” The same Code gives the sangguniang
barangay the power to “enact ordinances as may be necessary
to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or
ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants thereon.”
Metro-wide services” are those “services which have metro-wide
impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to
be provided by the individual local government units comprising
Metro Manila.” There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services
and the scope of these services cover the following: (1)
development planning; (2) transport and traffic management;
(3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and
sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban
protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety.
The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs and
projects is undertaken by the local government units, national
government agencies, accredited people’s organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by
the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to
enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other
cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of
the required services within Metro Manila.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council
to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a “development
authority.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature. It is thus
beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a
public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even
a “special metropolitan political subdivision” as contemplated
in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution.
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity
as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA
has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL vs. JAC LINER, INC.
Facts:
 Respondent JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating
buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena City,
assailed City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as
unconstitutional on the ground that these constituted an
invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private
property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies.
 Ordinance No. 1631: AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO
CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN
A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF
LUCENA
 Ordinance No. 1778: AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-
BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR
THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF
1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995
 The above-mentioned ordinances, by granting an
exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for
another twenty five years, to Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, for the construction
and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal
facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city
proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the
traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the
existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the
city.
 Further, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all
bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those
already existing, and allow the operation of only one
common terminal located outside the city proper, the
franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The
common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are
thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and
use the facilities of petitioner.
 Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the
city, was one of those affected by the ordinances.
 The petitioner via petition for review, sought the wisdom of
Supreme Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police
power when it enacted City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778
Held:
As with the State, the local government may be considered as
having properly exercised its police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to
be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and lawful method.
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the
objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena,
involve public interest warranting the interference of the
State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is
thus present
But the ordinances go beyond what is reasonably necessary to
solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use
of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users
thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede
the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
18
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to
petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium
between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within
the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights.
As for petitioner’s claim that the challenged ordinances have
actually been proven effective in easing traffic congestion:
Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from
whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its
effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the
constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness,
then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they
happen to be effective.
Hence, Ordinance No. 1631 is valid, having been issued in the
exercise of the police power of the City Government of Lucena
insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance, establish, operate and
maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena.
Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 is illegal and ultra vires because
it contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as “The Local Government Code”.
City Ordinance No. 1778 is null and void, the same being also an
ultra vires act of the City Government of Lucena arising from an
invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police
power.
Affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition of
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. is DENIED by the SC.
REQUISITES FOR VALID ORDINANCE
CITY OF MANILA vs. LAGUIO
Facts:
 Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which
was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel.
 June 28, 1993 - MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower
court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza,
and the members of the City Council of Manila (City
Council).
 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
 March 9, 1993 – The City Council enacted the Ordinance
and it was approved by Mayor Lim on March 30, 1993.
 The said Ordinance is entitled — AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to
the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership,
corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita- Malate area
bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft
Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas
Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or
authorized to contract and engage in, any business
providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment,
services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:
1. Sauna Parlors; 2. Massage Parlors; 3. Karaoke Bars; 4.
Beerhouses; 5. Night Clubs; 6. Day Clubs; 7. Super Clubs; 8.
Discotheques; 9. Cabarets ; 10. Dance Halls; 11. Motels; and
12. Inns
 One of the argument of MDTC among many is that the
Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the reason
that the City Council has no power to prohibit the
operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 iv of the Local
Government Code grants to the City Council only the
power to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments.
 Petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City
Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458
(a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code.
 Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was
enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its
police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of
Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)
which reads, thus: Section 18. Legislative powers. — The
Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
(kk)To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this chapter; and to x penalties for
the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos ne or six months' imprisonment, or both such
fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
 Respondent Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of the
Ordinance. Eventually, the Decision was rendered
declaring the said ordinance null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid?
Held: NO. The Ordinance is not valid.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of
its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as
agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the
State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
These delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz: SECTION 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience
of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang
panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the
legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to
19
Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the province/city/municipality provided
under the Code." The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the
validity of the exercise
of such delegated power.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-
reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon;
and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the
enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for
the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive
of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights — a violation of the due process clause.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills
purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate
area
which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of
legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke
bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels.
Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila had already taken judicial notice of the "alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels, which
provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence
and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and
thrill seekers."
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion
and protection of the social and moral values of the community.
Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the
Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police
powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of
Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the
promotion of the moral and social values of the community.
However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the
eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved
through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion
into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social
and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate
the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will
it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs
and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no moment.
We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a
human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places
that it may even take place in the substitute establishments
enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the awed logic
of the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance
that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a
court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of
Manila ordering the closure of the church or court concerned.
Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that
matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because
there are no "pure" places where there are impure men. Indeed,
even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches
continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's
history.
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment,
which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the health
or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the
deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises.
While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual
activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot
be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a
mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were so and if that
were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be
purged of its supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its
soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its
every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of
the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the
core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape
morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral
man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or
establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead
should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the
establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy
which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable
social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish even the
proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent"
establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of
personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those
motels and property in terms of the investments made and the
salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of
Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and
other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations
such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation
of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its
authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;
and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words,
there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired
end.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA (2008)
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN vs. QC
Facts:
 Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement
their curfew ordinances on minors through police
operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan
Rody.
 Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City, through
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02, dated August 26, 1999,
entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na
Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng
Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13, dated June 6, 2002
(Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through
Ordinance No. 8046 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the
Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day as
'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below
20
 Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor;
and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila
Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No.
SP-2301, Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a
[sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00
P.M. to 5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian,
for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31,
2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew
Ordinances).
 Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young
adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just
society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors[10] - filed this present
petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void
for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty
and the right to travel without substantive due process; and
(d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in
rearing the youth without substantive due process. In
addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance
contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630. Petitioners
posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions
or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged
curfew violators.
 They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension
depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus,
subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual
assessment of the alleged curfew violator.
 they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the
range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to
why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or
impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours.
 Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a)
are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not
being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose. They argue that the
prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not
per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare
of children of the community. Petitioners claim that the
Manila Ordinance... contravenes RA 9344's express
command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for
curfew violations.
 Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State
interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even
if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are
available to achieve the same.
Issue: Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.
Held:
The petition is partly granted.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded
the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to
its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving
rights that were legally demandable and enforceable."
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew
Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila,
and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers
on the ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution,
specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of
minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also
claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against
minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the
imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been
held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1)
done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2)
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill
will or personal bias."[31] In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition,
although these governmental actions were not made pursuant
to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as
remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and
executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is
whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must
first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared
with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts],
a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition
Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified. C.
Requisites of Judicial Review.
A. Void for Vagueness. Before resolving the issues pertaining to
the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their children,
this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew
Ordinances are void for vagueness. In particular, petitioners
submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing
sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing
authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions.
They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these
issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark
Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They maintain
that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected
curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and,
thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that
the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the
age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said
ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or
identification of the child to show his age.[47] The arguments are
untenable.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children. Petitioners submit that
the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing
of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they
assert that this right includes the right to determine whether
minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be
allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose
curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the
latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be
compelling.[57] Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
C. Right to Travel. Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of
the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They
claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test.
Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State
interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the
protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive
means for achieving the government's interest.[78] In addition,
21
they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth
by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during
curfew hours.[79] Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the

overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not
claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any
inhibition of speech-related conduct.

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances
have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that
the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned
localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the
second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance
out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to
achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance
provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely
exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew
hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been
construed to include parental permission as a constructive form
of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the
curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to
the discretion of the local government unit. In fine, the Manila
and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and
thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared
as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila
Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances
should always conform with the law, these provisions must be
struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby

declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of
the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the
local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014,
issued by the local government of the Quezon City is declared
CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this
Decision.

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