PUBLIC CORPORATIONS | ATTY.
PASCASIO
SEMA vs COMELEC
Facts:
 ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA
Act 201) creating the Province of Sharif
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the
first district of Maguindanao
 Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the
original nine municipalities constituting Sharif
Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities
to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the
municipalities constituting its second legislative
district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s
first legislative district, is not part of
the Province of Maguindanao.
 Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify
the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of
the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province
under MMA Act 201.
 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March
2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as
part of Sharif Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District
of Maguindanao
 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legislative district in question
as Sharif Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (form
erly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
 Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May
2007 elections for Representative of Sharif Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from
canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that
office. Sema contended that Sharif Kabunsuan is
entitled to one representative in Congress under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
 Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to
the ARMM of the power to create provinces under
Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to
the autonomous regions, through their organic acts,
legislative powers over other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region and (b) as an
amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160. However, Sema
concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional
Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower
than those mandated in RA 7160 in the creation of
provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19
should be construed as prohibiting the Regional
Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not
comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.
 Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the
following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces
was not among those granted to the autonomous
regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
prescribe standards lower than those mandated in
Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces
contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
and the Equal Protection Clause –– COMELEC joined
causes with respondent.
Issue: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional
Held:
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The creation of local government units is governed by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, the creation of
any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions.
First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units afected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant
of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government
Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create
provinces, cities or municipalities
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local
government units is not one of the express legislative powers
granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In
the present case, the question arises whether the delegation
to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with
any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with
the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the
creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative in the House
of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that
may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created
without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more,
requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because
once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city
automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the
power to create a province or city inherently involves
the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a
province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same
time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold
issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts
for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the
negative.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS | ATTY. PASCASIO
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power
to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership
through the creation of legislative districts must be
embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a
law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative
bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative
body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change
the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative
powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did
not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create
legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and
the ARMM Organic Act, as amended.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or
impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts
for Congress.
LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC
Facts:
 During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33
bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
 During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA
9009 –– amended Section 450 of the LGC by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20M to P100M. The
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the
words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
 After the efectivity of RA 9009, the HOR adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from
the P100M income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved
in the 11th Congress. However, the Congress ended
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
 During the 13th Congress, the HOR re-adopted JR No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate
for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the JR. Following the advice of Senator
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16
cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting
all the 16 municipalities from the P100M income
requirement in RA 9009.
 Then, HOR approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills
 The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold
plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of
their municipality into a city.
 Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation
of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the IRA
because more cities will share the same amount of
internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution
Held:
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws
long after the efectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became
th
effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11 Congress.
The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the
cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus,
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respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-
retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application
because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not
being applied retroactively but prospectively.
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government
units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only
one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot
write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern
exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the
charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent
of the Constitution is to ensure that the creation of cities and
other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the
criteria prescribed in the LGC violates Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the LGC to increase the
income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the
creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001.
Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code
required that any municipality desiring to become a
city must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption
from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption
to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills
were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009.
The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the efectivity of RA
9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the
increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such
exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To
be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the
Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair and
equitable distribution of national taxes to all local
government units. (as per Section 6, Article X)
A city with an annual income of only P20M, all other criteria
being equal, should not receive the same share in national
taxes as a city with an annual income of P100M or more. The
criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly
followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are
material in determining the "just share" of local government
units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow
the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the
Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution.
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent
municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various
deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress.
However, Congress did not write this intended exemption
into law. Congress could have easily included such
exemption in RA 9009, but Congress did not. This is fatal to
the cause of respondent municipalities because such
exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to
Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality
into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must
all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress
cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such
criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS | ATTY. PASCASIO
create a city through a law that does not comply with
the criteria or exemption found in the Local
Government Code.
NAVARRO vs. ERMITA
Facts:
 President of the Republic approved into law RA No. 9355
(An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
 Then, COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for
the ratification of the creation of the province under the
LGC. The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes
and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the
people from both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
 Petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also
denied.
 Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for
certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of
Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would
unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a
large chunk of the provincial territory, IRA, and rich
resources from the area. They pointed out that when
the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12
square kilometers only and a population of only
106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
 Movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to
challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the
passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of
Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the
exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended
province consists of two or more islands, includes the
exemption from the application of the minimum land
area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact
Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
 Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
File and to Admit Intervenors’ MR of the Resolution on
the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to
file the said motion was before and not after the
resolution of this case.
Issue: Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991is valid.
“Population or land area Population which shall not be
less than 250k inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land
area which must be contiguous with an area of at least
two thousand 2k square kilometers, as certified by
LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city
or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
province sought to be created shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds.”
Held:
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of
the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then
courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction,
such as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the
implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative
construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the
LGC.
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It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by
the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the
Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section
533 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight
Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules
and regulations necessary for the efficient and
effective implementation of any and all provisions of
this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the
principles of local autonomy as defined under the
Constitution.
Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to
become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land area requirement,
which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be
found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In efect,
pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed
flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No.
9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was
filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of
Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress
definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate
into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement,
with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of
one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-
IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by
way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of
a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that
Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its
average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20M for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results
of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait
accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from
the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental
in stunting such capacity.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of
the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute
although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the
letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a
bit diferently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker
is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal,
courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its
legislators.
MIRANDA vs. AGUIRRE
Facts:
 This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for
PI assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 8528
converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent component city to a component city.
 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No.
8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of
Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda
was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of
the petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of
the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners
Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of
Santiago City.
 Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the
City of Santiago from an independent component city
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS | ATTY. PASCASIO
into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
“creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units,”
therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of
petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court
lacks jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether it is required that the conversion of the city
of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city should be submitted to its people in a proper
plebiscite
Held:
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially
alter boundaries of local government units belongs to
Congress.8 This power is part of the larger power to enact
laws which the Constitution vested in Congress.9 The
exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of
the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the
downgrading of Santiago City from an independent
component city to a mere component city requires the
approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The
resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the
downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A
close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal
that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units involve
a common denominator –– material change in the political
and economic rights of the local government units directly
afected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this
reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the
people in the political units directly afected.
The changes that will result in the downgrading of Santiago
City from being an independent component city, to a
component city cannot be characterized as insubstantial:
taxes collected from the city will be shared with the province,
resolutions and ordinances will have to be reviewed by
Provincial Board, City Government’s share will be diluted
since certain portions will accrue to the Provincial
Government. Downgrading it, without the involvement of the
people, will run against the spirit of Sec 10 Art X of the 1987
Constitution.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or
downward in character, so long as they result in a material
change in the local government unit directly afected,
especially a change in the political and economic rights of its
people.
Having significant changes introduced to the political and
social climate of the province would need a plebiscite for it to
push through, according to Rule II Art 6 Par F (1) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code, because that gravity of changes already
amount to a ‘conversion’. Even the principal author of the
Local Government Code of 1991 agrees that the plebiscite is
absolute and mandatory, since it promotes autonomy to the
local government units.
Dissent (Buena)
 Conversion does not appear in the 1987 Constitution
nor in the Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code. Surprisingly, Rule II, Article 6,
paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules of the LGC
included conversion in the enumeration of the modes of
changing the status of LGUs
 A mere Rule and Regulation intended to implement the
LGC cannot expand the terms and provisions clearly
expressed in the basic law to be implemented.
 During the deliberations in the Senate, the Committee
on Local Government decided to withdraw the proposed
amendment that required plebiscite. The Court thus not
require a plebiscite if Congress did not require it.
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 The Court must consider the ramifications of
declaration of unconstitutionality of RA No. 8528 on RA
No. 6726 (1989) and RA No. 6843 (1990), respectively
allowing the voters of the City of Oroquieta (Misamis
Oriental) and San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to vote and
be voted for any of the respective provincial offices, in
efect downgrading them from independent component
cities to component cities. The resulting confusion on
the political structures of the local government units
involved would surely be disastrous to the order and
stability of these cities.
 Every law has in its favor, the presumption of
constitutionality and in case of doubt, the Court must
exert every efort to prevent the invalidation of the law
and the nullification of the will of the legislature that
enacted it and the executive that approved it.
SAMSON vs. AGUIRRE
Facts:
 President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law RA No. 8535,
creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of
Quezon City.
 Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the
first district of Quezon City, is now before the Court
challenging ITS constitutionality. He also seeks to enjoin
the Executive Secretary from ordering the
implementation of R.A. 8535, the COMELEC from
holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of
Novaliches, and the DBM from disbursing funds for said
plebiscite. Lastly, he prays for the issuance of a PI or
TRO
 Accordingly: (a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the
criteria established by the Local Government Code
particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the
requirements of income, population and land area; seat
of government; and no adverse efect to being a city of
Quezon City, respectively, and its Implementing Rules
as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnishing a
copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay resolution;
and that (b) the said law will in efect amend the
Constitution
Issue: Whether petitioner’s contentions are meritorious
Held:
Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to
have passed through regular congressional processes. A
person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his
allegations clearly and unmistakably. Having this in mind, we
now proceed to examine whether or not petitioner was able
to successfully overcome the presumption of validity
accorded R.A. No. 8535.
The Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section
7:
“SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from
one level to another level shall be based on verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable
standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as
expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total
number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it
comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bounds with
technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for
such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to
by the DOF, NSO and LMB of DENR.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS | ATTY. PASCASIO
Corollary, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code
provide in Article 11:
ART. 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not
be created unless the following requisites on income and
either population or land area are present:
(1) Income an average annual income of not less than
P20M, for the immediately preceding two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,
as certified by DOF. The average annual income
shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not
be less than 150k inhabitants, as certified by the
NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with
an area of at least 100skm, as certified by
LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated
by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province. The land
area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed city is composed of one (1) or more
islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought
to be created shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the
time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be
borne by the petitioners.
Petitioner argues that no certifications attesting compliance
with the foregoing requirements were submitted to Congress,
citing in particular public hearings held by
the Senate Committee on Local Government.
However, we note that the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of
Representatives. Its principal sponsor is Cong. Dante Liban
of Quezon City. Petitioner did not present any proof, but only
allegations, that no certifications were submitted to
the House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual
practice in this regard. Allegations, without more, cannot
substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law
passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had
complied with all the requisites therefor.
Moreover, present during the public hearings held by the
Senate Committee on Local Government were resource
persons from the diferent government offices like NSO,
Bureau of Local Government Finance, LMB, and DBM, aside
from officials of Quezon City itself.
The representative from the Bureau of Local Government
Finance estimated the combined average annual income of
the 13 barangays for the years 1995 and 1996 to be around
P26,952,128.26. Under the LGC, a proposed city must have
an average annual income of only at least P20M for the
immediately preceding two years. The representative from
the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that
would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around
347,310. This figure is more than the 150k required by the
Implementing Rules. There is no need to consider the land
area, given these figures, since under the LGC, the proposed
city must comply with requirements as regards income and
population or land area. Other than the income requirement,
the proposed city must have the requisite number of
inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either
requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial
notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly
urbanized.
Petitioner avers that the oral manifestation made by the
representatives of government offices is not enough
certification. But respondents reply that in the hearings,
particularly by the Local Government Committee headed by
Senator Sotto, the DBM, DILG, and Finance Officials were
present along with other officers armed with official statistics
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and reference materials. In their official capacity, they spoke
and shed light on population, land area and income of the
proposed city. Their official statements could serve the
same purpose contemplated by law requiring
certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as
witnesses in open session of either the Senate or the House
of Representatives give even greater solemnity than a
certification submitted to either chamber routinely.
ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA
Facts:
 Petitioners assail the validity of RA No. 7720 (Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of
Santiago), mainly because the Act allegedly did not
originate exclusively in the HOR as mandated by
Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
 Also, petitioners claim that
the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum
average annual income required under Section 450 of
the LGC of 1991 in order to be converted into a
component city
 They claim that Santiago could not qualify into a
component city because its average annual income for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices falls below the required annual income
of P20M for its conversion into a city –– By dividing the
total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and
1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average annual
income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based
on the 1991 constant prices.
 By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar
years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the
average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices.
 The certification issued by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance of the DOF, which
indicates Santiago’s average annual income to be
P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the IRA
were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners
asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but
transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national
government and that they fluctuate, increase or
decrease, depending on factors like population, land
and equal sharing.
Issue: Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments
(IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average
annual income of a municipality for purposes of its
conversion into an independent component city
Held:
IRAs form part of the income of Local Government Units.
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by
the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income
requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual
explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments
(IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of an LGU and the
principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying
the institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the
local government system.
The practical side to development through a decentralized
local government system certainly concerns the matter of
financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased
responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate
on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn,
entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty,
responsibility and accountability in every local government
unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate
resources to discharge its powers and efectively carry out its
functions. Availment of such resources is efectuated through
the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to
create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right
to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share
being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
(3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS | ATTY. PASCASIO
of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if
any, within its territorial boundaries.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national
wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the
local government and are used to finance its operations
subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided
for in the LGC and its implementing rules and regulations.
For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs
must be set aside for local development projects. As such,
for purposes of budget preparation, which budget
should reflect the estimates of the income of the local
government unit, among others, the IRAs and the
share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are
considered items of income. This is as it should be, since
income is defined in the LGC to be all revenues and receipts
collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of
the LGU.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit.
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the
local government unit. They thus constitute income which
the local government can invariably rely upon as the source
of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a
city, the Department of Finance certified, among others, that
the municipality had an average annual income of at least
Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of
Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said
average annual income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the LGC provides that the
average annual income shall include the income accruing to
the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and
non-recurring income. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular,
recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify
the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a
technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the
Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct
from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code
speaks of funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and GOCCs.
Thus, DOF Order No. 3593 correctly encapsulates the full
import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL
INCOME to be revenues and receipts realized by provinces,
cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local
General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and
other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of
the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as
other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan
proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others. Such
order, constituting executive or contemporaneous
construction of a statute by an administrative agency
charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same,
is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great
weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly
shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the
governing statute, or other laws.
MARIANO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
 At bench are 2 petitions assailing certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional –– "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a HUC to be
known as the City of Makati."
Accordingly:
(1) Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7
and 450 of the LGC;
(2) Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
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(i) it increased the legislative district of Makati only
by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress
within 3 years following the return of every
census;
(ii) the increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and
(iii) the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands
at only 450k
Issue: Whether the petitions can prosper
Held:
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive
how this evil can be brought about by the description made
in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change
even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati
as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that
cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land
area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a
legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of
Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No.
7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of
Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal
department of government, legislators felt that the dispute
should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact
which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they
defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions. We take judicial
notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using
the metes and bounds description of land areas of other
LGUs with unsettled boundary disputes.
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does
not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will
prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude
the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the
cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries
of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness,
made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into
a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at
least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond
to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission
on Elections to commence at the next national elections to
be held after the efectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with
the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which
shall form part of the second district.
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district
in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment cannot
made by a special law, (2) xxx (3) Makati's population, as per
the 1990 census, stands at only 450k
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case
of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through
a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than 250, unless otherwise fixed by
law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS | ATTY. PASCASIO
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No.
7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be
made through a general apportionment law, with a review of
all the legislative districts allotted to each local government
unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where
a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of
time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a
new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450k. Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at
least 250k shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at 450k, its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250k. In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than 250k shall be entitled to at least
one congressional representative.
CAWALING JR. vs. COMELEC
Facts:
 Former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A.
No. 8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By
Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In
The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds
Therefor
 COMELEC thereafter conducted a plebiscite in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification. –– proclaimed the creation of the
City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved
by the majority of the votes cast
 Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the
former Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling,
Jr. seeks to enjoin the further implementation of R.A.
No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending that
creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities
violates Section 450(a) of the LGC (in relation to Section
10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that
only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city among other things
Issue: Whether petitioner’s contention holds water
Held:
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section
450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or
a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least P20M for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it
has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred
(100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original unit or units at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall
be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the
city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two (2) or more islands.
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c) The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of specific
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis
ours)
Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon
City through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by
the Code as to income, population and land area. What he is
assailing is its mode of creation. He contends that under
Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be
created only by converting a municipality or a cluster
of barangays, not by merging two municipalities, as what
R.A. No. 8806 has done. –– This contention is devoid of
merit.
Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code
is erroneous. The phrase A municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city is
not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city
may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his
posture, allows the merger of local government units to
create a province, city, municipality or barangay in
accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus,
Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:
“Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of
existing local government units shall comply with the
same requirements herein prescribed for their
creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not
reduce the income, population, or land area of the local
government unit or units concerned to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided,
further, That the income classification of the original local
government unit or units shall not fall below its current
income classification prior to such division.”
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit
through a division or a merger of existing local government
units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that
such merger, division shall comply with requirements
prescribed by the Code.
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no
compelling reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon
considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already
qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument
goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we
are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission, this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made
it clear that the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. In the exercise
of judicial power, we are allowed only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable and may not annul an act of the political
departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical.
AQUINO III vs. COMELEC
Facts:
 This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo
seek the nullification as unconstitutional of RA No.
9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition
of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts
in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating
a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”
 RA No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took efect on 31 October
2009 creating an additional legislative district for the
Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing
first and second legislative districts of the province.
 The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among 4
legislative districts. Following the enactment of RA No.
9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS | ATTY. PASCASIO
were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
with the second district municipalities of Milaor and
Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
 Petitioners contend that the reapportionment
introduced by RA No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of 250k for the creation of a legislative
district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250k minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far
as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by RA No.
9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250k or only
176,383.
Issue: Whether a population of 250k is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province
Held:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250k minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the
phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires
a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000
minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial
legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it
does not have to increase its population by another 250,000
to be entitled to an additional district.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local
Government Code on the creation of a province which, by
virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local
Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation.
–
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative
addition to the indispensable income requirement.
TAN vs. COMELEC
Facts:
 Petitioners who are residents of the Province of Negros
Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities
therein, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for
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the purpose of stopping respondents COMELEC from
conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in
implementation of BP 885 (Creating a New Province in
the Island of Negros to be known as Negros del Norte)
 The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of
the territory of Negros del Norte. Because of the
exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of
Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change
the prayer of their petition "to the end that the
constitutional issues which they have raised in the
action will be ventilated and given final resolution. At
the same time, they asked that the efects of the
plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until
the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on
the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that
petitioners have brought out.
 Respondents thru the OSG posts that said BP should be
accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that
the said law is not void on its face and that the petition
does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable
demonstration of the supposed infringement of the
Constitution. Respondents state that the powers of the
BP to enact the assailed law is beyond question. They
claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe
the Constitution because the requisites of the Local
Government Code have been complied with.
Furthermore, they submit that this case has now
become moot and academic with the proclamation of
the new Province of Negros del Norte.
 Respondents argue that the remaining cities and
municipalities of the Province of Negros
Occidental not included in the area of the new
Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall within
the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units
affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of
our Constitution.
Issue: Whether creation of new province validly complied
with requisites provided by the Constitution
Held:
It can be plainly seen in Article XI, Section 3 that it makes it
imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
afected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged
and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is
thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the
existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be
substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries
in order that there can be created the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will
demonstrate than that two political units would be afected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental
because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The
other afected entity would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to constitute the
proposed province of Negros del Norte.
The ruling in the abovestated case of Paredes vs. The
Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be
taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is
acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as
petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated
from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters
therein are afected."
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the
aforecited case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked
by respondents, we find very lucidly expressed the strong
dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a
distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his
opinion, which We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units
afected" it means all of the people of the municipality if the
municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or an
of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS | ATTY. PASCASIO

This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the

— forerunner of the ruling which We now consider applicable
to the case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez,
Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022,
May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by
Justice Abad Santos as he therein assailed as sufering from
a constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include
all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum
was intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces
were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan
Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in
the instant case.

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