Administrative Proceedings

198 SCRA 748 July 3, 1991

1. PAL V. NLRC

FACTS: Petitioners sought the reversal of NLRC’s decision to reinstate PR Carmencita Nannette G. De
Veyra[Duty Manager]. In this case, PR filed a complaint against PAL for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal
and unpaid wages with claim for reinstatement; actual, moral and exemplary damages. PAL suspended
De Veyra after discovering that she and her dependents’ travel documents were tampered to show that
they’re entitled to a higher priority and space classification, which enabled De Veyra and her dependents
to travel first class despite not being entitled to the privilege. De Veyra was administratively charged for
the use of such travel passes.

De Veyra’s defense was that the documents were prepared by Minda Santiago of Sanyo Travel, who
claimed to be close to the top executives of PAL, thus, she and her husband had no control over the tickets.
Labor Arbiter and NLRC found that De Veyra was illegally dismissed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON PAL’s dismissal of De Veyra was arbitrary for not granting her a hearing on the charge against
her, which is in total disregard of PAL’s Code of Discipline.

HELD: No. The Code of Discipline provides that upon filing of an administrative charge, the department
head shall set a date for hearing. However, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was
conducted where a chance to explain a party's side of the controversy was accorded to him. What is
frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.

Since De Veyra admitted in her sworn statement having used tickets bearing the upgraded priority
classification; the documentary evidence of PAL already proved the falsity of the tickets; and De Veyra
was aware of this falsity, there was no necessity for the parties to undergo the ritual of holding a hearing.
The fact that she has worked with PAL for 20 years reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty. Loyalty that she
should have strengthened instead of betrayed.
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2. OCAMPO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Fact: Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation
Administration. Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) wrote a letter to NIACONSULT requesting
a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation development.

Petitioner as the training coordinator of the NIACONSULT, sent a letter on January 31, 1989 to Dr. Peiter
Roeloffs of ADBN confirming the availability of NIACONSULT to conduct the training program and formally
requesting advance payment of thirty (30%) percent of the training fee in the amount of US $9,600.00 or
P204,960.00. NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers. ADBN, thru
its representative paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in two installments of P61,488.00 and
P143, 472.00. NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner
demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner personally received.
Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT to file an
administrative case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful
breach of trust.

While the case is pending, petitioner filed a Manifestation on May 24, 1997 stating that the criminal
complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave
rise to the administrative case, was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on February 24, 1997. With the
dismissal of the criminal case, petitioner manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on its
own and therefore should be dismissed.

And petitioner asserts that he was denied the opportunity to be heard when the court issued an order
declaring him to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit

Issue: 1. Whether the dismissal of the Petitioner’s of the Criminal Case warrants dismissal of the Criminal
Case?

2. W/N petitioner was denied the opportunity to be heard

Held: 1. No, The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against
petitioner. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The lack or absence of
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is
another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is
adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the “substantial evidence”
rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. ~Relief from criminal liability does not carry with it
relief from administrative liability

2. No. The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict
 Administrative Proceedings
judicial sense. Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to
answer the complaint against him. In fact, petitioner was given considerable length of time to submit his
counter-affidavit. It took more than one year from February 17, 1992 before petitioner was considered to
have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and the formal presentation of the complainant's
evidence was set. The March 17, 1993 order was issued to give the petitioner a last chance to present his
defense, despite the private respondent's objections. But petitioner failed to comply with the second
order.

3. LUMIQUED VS. EXEVEA

282 SCRA 125

FACTS:

Three complaints for malversation, violation of COA rules and regulations, and harassment were filed
before the Department of Justice against Arsenio Lumiqued. A committee was constituted to investigate
the complaints against Lumiqued. During the hearings of the investigating committee, Lumiqued was not
assisted by counsel. Despite the repeated reminder by the investigating committee about Lumiqued’s
right to counsel, the latter insisted that he would be able to represent himself.

The investigating committee found the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish
Lumiqued’s guilt for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, Malversation through Falsification of
Official Documents, and Harassment. Accordingly, the investigatingcommittee recommended Lumiqued's
dismissal or removal from office, without prejudiceto the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against
him.

Consequently, then President Ramos eventually dismissed Lumiqued from the service, withforfeiture of
his retirement and other benefits.

Lumiqued then filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he wasdenied the
constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. The motion was denied, prompting Lumiqued to file a
petition before the Supreme Court.

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel
during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in
writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended the hearing
and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was
not possible, the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to counsel is an indispensable requirement in administrative proceeding

 Administrative Proceedings
RULING:

No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of
counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation and may not be invoked
by a respondent in an administrative investigation.

In the case at bar, the Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime
in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of
determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.

As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution.
This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at
the filing of a criminal case for malversation through falsification of public documents in its report and
recommendation.

4. UY VS. CA

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed
a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to
sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest
that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot
4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such
decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on
summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition
made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father.
As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it
should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural
due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that
Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife”
contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should
not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon
the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering
him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
 Administrative Proceedings

HELD:

NO.

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where
the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found
that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.
The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties
as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal
property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and
not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to
provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

5. PHILCOMMSAT V. ALCUAZ

180 SCRA 218

Facts: The petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the NTC which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner
for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further
reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law. Petitioner was
exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent
NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No.
196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge
rates therefor. Petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue operating
and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to
continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since
1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also
applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned
facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. Petitioner was
granted a provisional authority which was valid for six (6) months which was extended 3 times, but the
last extension directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen
percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON NTC violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing
in exercising its power to fix the rate of PhilCommSat.
 Administrative Proceedings
Ruling:

Yes. In the exercise of quasi-legislative powers should be given guidelines as to when notices and hearings
are essential, as much more than Congress.

Congress never passes truly important legislation without holding public hearings. Yet, administrative
officials who are not directly attuned to the public pulse see no need for hearings. They issue rules and
circulars with far reaching effects on our economy and our nation’s future on the assumption that the
head of an agency knows best what is good for the people. I believe that in the exercise of quasi-legislative
powers, administrative agencies, much, much more than Congress, should hold hearings and should be
given guidelines as to when notices and hearings are essential even in quasi-legislation.

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel,
et al.10 to wit:

“It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice
of hearing is not required by due process of law x x x It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and
Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: ‘Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an
administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved.
In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be
stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action
where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions;
but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular
and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected
by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.”
 Administrative Proceedings
6. ARTEZUELA VS MADERAZO

381 SCRA 419

FACTS:

Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Mandaue City when he was driving a car owned by a
Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his brother-in-law, Jun
Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita Artezuela which
destruction caused the cessation of the operation of her small business, resulting to her financial
dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial constraints, stopped sending her
two children to college.

Complainant engaged the services of the respondent. A damage suit was filed against Echavia, and
Villapez. For his services, complainant paid the respondent. However, the case was dismissed. Because of
the dismissal, complainant filed a civil case for damages against the respondent but was dismissed.

Artezuela filed a verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that
respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to represent her interests with zeal and
enthusiasm. According to her, respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties were
present. Notwithstanding complainants persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do
anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant’s consent.

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests and further
averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into
thinking that the dismissal was with her consent. Respondent denied the complainants allegations and
averred that he conscientiously did his part as the complainant’s lawyer.

This Court referred the complaint to the IBP Bar Discipline which formed an Investigating Committee
to hear the disbarment complaint. The respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests
and the IBP Board of Governors upheld the findings of the Committee.

The respondent contends that the Investigating Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not
able to confront and examine the witnesses against him. After carefully examining the records, as well as
the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, this Court is inclined to uphold the IBP’s resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement of notice and hearing connotes full adversarial proceedings in
administrative case.

RULING:

No. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a
 Administrative Proceedings
need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due process is fulfilled
when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of
their arguments.

In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the
hearings, prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainants evidence ex parte and to set
the case for resolution after the parties have submitted their respective memorandum.

For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors of the
IBP recommended the suspension from the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for
the period of 6 months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondent represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

7. NPC (NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION) VS NLRC

272 SCRA 704

Facts: The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), as owner of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Unit
No. I (PNPP-I), entered into an agreement with private respondents Westinghouse International Projects
Company as principal contractor and Power Contractors Inc. (PCI) as sub-contractor for the construction
of the power plant in Morong, Bataan.

Pursuant to respondent PCI's sub-contract with co-respondent Westinghouse, over six thousand workers
were hired on various dates to undertake the civil works for the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP). After
the completion of certain phases of work at the power plant, the services of private respondent workers
were terminated. The dismissed employees did not receive any separation pay. As a consequence, twenty-
seven cases for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits were filed before the Labor Arbiter against
respondent PCI. These cases, which involved more than six thousand workers who are private
respondents herein, were eventually consolidated. The NLRC ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering
the aforesaid corporations to pay all the named complainants herein and all those similarly situated their
separation/termination pay equivalent to 1 month for every year of service, a fraction of 6 months
equivalent to 1 year of service. Westinghouse raised the issue of its liability under the Labor Arbiter's
decision. It maintains that the Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction over it since it was not served with
summons; nor did it voluntarily appear before the Honorable Arbiter.

Issue: WON NLRC has jurisdiction over Westinghouse.

Ruling: No. Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by his voluntary appearance or submission to the court
or by the coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons. Section 4, Rule
II of the NLRC Rules of Procedure states that summons "shall be served on the parties to the case." The
mandatory character of the provision is evident from the use of the word "shall." Even if administrative
 Administrative Proceedings
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by procedural requirements, they are still
bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process. The Court held in
another case: "Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere
technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a
very vital and indispensable ingredient of due process."

There is nothing on record to prove that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over private respondent
Westinghouse. No summons was served on private respondent Westinghouse. While a few Orders were
served on the ACCRA Law Firm, purportedly as counsel for Westinghouse, the firm lost no time in
manifesting that it never entered its appearance as counsel for private respondent. This being the case,
private respondent Westinghouse's contention that public respondent Labor Arbiter did not acquire
jurisdiction over it is meritorious. Accordingly, the decision of the Labor Arbiter is, with respect to
Westinghouse, null and void, having been rendered in violation of the latter's right to due process. The
Latin maxim, res inter alios acta nocere non debet, or things done between strangers ought not to injure
those who are not parties to them, is applicable to Westinghouse's predicament for its interests should
not be affected by a proceeding to which it was a stranger. We hold that the December 29, 1988 decision
of the Labor Arbiter cannot be enforced against private respondent Westinghouse as the former did not
acquire jurisdiction over it.

8. GARCIA VS PAJARO

FACTS:

Petitioner was the Revenue Collector of the City Treasurers Office. He was ordered suspended by
Respondent, the City Treasurer, because of the Formal Charge filed against him. He resumed work as Local
Treasury Officer III.

He had been reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted
as the complainant, investigator and judge and there was no complaint against him from the Office of the
City Mayor. He did not believe in the Order; he did not submit himself for investigation. He was not paid
his salary because of the suspension order.

Evidence for Respondent PAJARO tends to show that petitioner has been rating Unsatisfactory in his
performance for several semesters which is the reason a [Formal] Charge was filed against him and, as a
matter of procedure, if the charge is a major offense, by civil service laws, he was preventively suspended
for ninety (90) days. Then an investigation was scheduled and a subpoena was issued to petitioner to
appear and testify but he did not Answer and refused to honor the subpoena. So Respondent proceeded
with ex-parte investigation and gathered and submitted testimonies to support the allegations in the
Formal Charge then submitted the result of their findings to the Department of Finance for decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s right to Due Process was violated

RULING: NO
 Administrative Proceedings
Due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in the strict judicial sense.
The Administrative Code of 1987 is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the
government. This Code enumerates that they may be removed or dismissed summarily “(1) [w]hen the
charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a recidivist x x x; and (3)
[w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable.” Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied.

The power to commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is

granted by the Administrative Code to the secretary of a department, the head of office of equivalent
rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with
a sworn written complaint; The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and
cities.

The city treasurer may institute motu propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or
employee.

In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s
side; Due process is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
an action or a ruling. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also—
and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably—through pleadings. So long as the parties
are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied
with. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.

Parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against them cannot
complain of a denial of due process. Petitioner’s refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due
notice, was at his own peril. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated.

A public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the
performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
 Administrative Proceedings
9. CORONA VS. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSO. OF THE PHIL

Facts: In issuing AO no. 04-92 limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to
yearly renewal or cancellation compared to when the AO was yet to be passed the harbor pilots were
entitled to enjoy their profession until they retire at the age of 70.

Respondent questioned such AO. The Office of the Philippines issued an order directing the PPA to hold
in abeyance the implementation of PPA AO. The OP, through Asst. Executive Secretary Renato Corona,
dismissed the appeal. He concluded that the said order applied to all Harbor Pilots and for all intents and
purposes was not an act of the PPA GM Dayan but of the PPA, which was merely implementing P. D. 857
mandating it to control, regulate, and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and damages before the RTC.

Issue: w/n PPA AO 04-92 is constitutional or valid

Ruling: NO the court is convinced that PPA AO 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondent’s right
against deprivation of property without due process of law. The SC said that in order to fall within the
aegis of this provision, 2 conditions must concur, namely that there is a deprivation and that such
deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as
the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body
exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions such as
issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice
and hearing.

There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of property right. It is readily
apparent that PPA-AO 04-92 unduly restricts the rights of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before
their compulsory retirement.

10. BATANGAS LAGUNA BUS COMPANY VS CADIAO

Petition for mandamus and contempt with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order by petitioner
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, "the holder of several certificates of public convenience for the
operation of bus service" in several southern Luzon provinces extending to Manila, 1 is to compel
respondent Land Transportation Commission to act on its letters of January 24, February 2 and February
8, 1968, 2 wherein it sought deferment of action on any request of respondent Eastern Tayabas Bus
Company, Inc. for the issuance of plates covering units involved in its lease agreement with petitioner.

Petitioner contends that this order of November 2, 1967 is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent
Public Service Commission, acting through respondent Commissioner Cadiao, on the ground that the
matter therein involved is pending resolution in an arbitration proceeding by virtue of a decision of this
Court on August 31, 1966, the dispositive portion of which declared that the Public Service Commission
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was without jurisdiction to continue with cases between then petitioner Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company.

Respondent Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. immediately signified its intention to file a motion to dismiss.
In a resolution of March 1, 1968, this Court required petitioner to serve immediately upon the aforesaid
respondent a copy of its petition for mandamus and contempt with a prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and to give the aforesaid respondent up to March 4, 1968 within which it could file its
motion to dismiss. The motion for restraining order as well as the motion to dismiss were both set for
hearing on March 5, 1968.

Issue: Whether or not the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction of the resolution?

Ruling: No, The Public Service Commission cannot act on an application which involves the resolution of
a dispute of the parties as to the terms of a lease agreement as that would amount to exercising functions
of a purely judicial tribunal. It has jurisdiction over the private aspect of the lease agreement, the private
rights of the parties in their relation to each other as lessor and lessee. But where the matter involves the
public interest or the public aspect, the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction.

Where the petition is to acquire and register the units or trucks required to operate the lines of
respondent Eastern Tayabas Bus Co., Inc., after the latter had decided not to renew or extend its lease
contract with petitioner, such matter is cognizable by the Public Service Commission. Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Cadiao, 22 SCRA 987, No. L-28725 March 12, 1968