I.

INTRODUCTORY

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected
with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-
 an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d
895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive
field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns
the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
[1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the
term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am
quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent
in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important
to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken
up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer."
Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing
Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as
well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one
who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such
as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered
the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a
source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at
least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles,
the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of
these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context
or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of
the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to
legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates
of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and
type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff
large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of
the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved
in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC).
Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted
by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the
Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities;
and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the
firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational
entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing.
The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are
better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle
of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
 First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of
feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems
— physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation,
aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to
which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the
last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities.
And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he
must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp
not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of
his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently
of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge
as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as
key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language
that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction
with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions
which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A
 good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse
open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums;
but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery."
(See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it
stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person
is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of
its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission
by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October
14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is
the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining
a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making
use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on
the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).
Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse,
much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse
the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer
is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her
beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on
his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 II. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious
misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for
estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and
respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant.
Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the
following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose
Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property
in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would
guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name
of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free
and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton. 6

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier,
being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a
deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something
in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him
upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as
complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and
notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary
Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the
Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was
already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his
practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no more
jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is
bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. 10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to
the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the
title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents, 13 including
the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its
transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands 14 by preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and
notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may
be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for
preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty.
Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to
be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from
the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,

vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after
unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and
that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent
and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were
steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta.
Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son,
Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.1 It was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent
first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent
allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's
birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another
woman. Hence, this petition.

Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On
February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to
comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present
case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by
respondent on September 17, 1979.2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated
September 15, 1982.3 In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the
community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a
lawyer.4

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case
for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the
required fees.5

Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainant's
opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality made by
complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also
claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from
the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a
doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held
that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A
grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of respectable members of the community.7

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both
of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent,
is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not find
complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be
respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and
intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then
an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be
easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should
be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the
end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he
worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there
appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus
be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his
oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent
Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained
subsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5)
attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such
that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is
after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in
evading service of the complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty.
Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in
the instant
case. 3

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order.
In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977
upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain
Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him
out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla
and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that
his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol,
Pangasinan. 4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that
Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance
to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a
dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the
fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been
abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital
bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for
hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her
evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another
hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not
appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still
another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail
once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October
1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and
declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda.
Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court.
The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:

Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was
single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law
student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting
her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she
was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she
and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having
secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite
her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they
were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn,
July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in
1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from
his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found
out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp.
21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p.
23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case
No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against
respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where
a prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant
filed an administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic when
respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having gone on absence
without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage
on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981,
respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered
into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.

Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of
nullity was necessary.

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled
complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy
and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the
respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran
counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded
as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted,
he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally
single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went
through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After
respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant
without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not
only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and
responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar
and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as
claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had
made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects
(Article 216, Civil Code). 11

In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a
dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities
while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies,
keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts
"indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and
supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a
second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting,
constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place.
The Court will correct this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll
of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar
Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall
be circularized to all the courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

Federico A. Blay for complainant.

Luciano Babiera for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint
that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times
under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires.
Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her
undergo forced abortion.

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal
knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense,
averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the
Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn,
June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach
respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she would pass the said
subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
 4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him
to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6,
1975); ... ... ... ;

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same
plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to
Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days
(Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);

6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at

San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6,
1975);

7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent
had carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn,
June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);

8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her,

she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn,
June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;

9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was

suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17,
1975); ... ... ...;

10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of
medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p.82,
tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;

11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched
her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil
Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);

12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an
inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1
975);

13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had
already been performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all
over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)

Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant introduced
as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).

Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal examinations and
x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

Edilberto Caban testified that:

1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with

his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila except in December,
1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);

2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13,
tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
 Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:

1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the

latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman
companion of respondent Aznar;

2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him
outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo,
p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar
was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As
special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's
vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of
Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her
subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted
by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal
knowledge of the complainant.

Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that respondent
had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:

From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent
upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she
would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman
of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him.

It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in
Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she
would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1"
to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he
presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with
them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of
them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to
February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent
stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question,
however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial
to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been substantiated
by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation
of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for a period of not less than three (3) years.

On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine whether any
intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar be considered
submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together with the record
of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that respondent
Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral
conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of
the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense imputed upon
him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the
records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less contradict, on material
points, the testimonies of complainant herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with
the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding,
respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper
person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting
moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:

When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics,
by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303,
Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that
duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation
which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he
demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those
who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines
to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him
(Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with respondent to
Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be suspended
from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of
about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three
(3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the
respondent as having been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.

We disagree.

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa
v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the
case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for
sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede,
she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter
had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent
would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in
his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited
period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his
profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral
character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with
upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the
practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality
(Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to
define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral
conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community' (7
C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of
intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the
ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his
position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to
Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she
refused.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

December 7, 1920

In re CARLOS S. BASA

Pedro Guevara for respondent.

Attorney-General Feria for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa.

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands.
Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent,
was found guilt in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was
sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On
appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1

The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole
question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal
Code, involves moral turpitude.

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided
the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature
of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins [1909], 54
Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)

When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so
regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be
lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order
that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be
suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
A.C. No. 8392 June 29, 2010
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175 ]

ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)1 with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct which she
detailed in her Position Paper2 as follows:

After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law wife. In October 2007,
respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a religious
group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of which he was the leader. Although he visited her
daily, his visits became scarce in November to December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran.
Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed
and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members of the group tied her
spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day
by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.

Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she was weak, pale and walking
barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social Welfare
Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her. The religious group refused to
release her, however, without the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S.
Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.

Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally, complainant charges respondent with
bigamy for contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his marriage
to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the following: Affidavit 3 of Delia dated
February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo4 dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the Certificate of
Marriage5 between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract6 between respondent and
Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics Office Certification7 dated April 23, 2008 showing the marriage of Ma. Shirley G.
Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on August 2,
1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution 8 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Naval, Biliran and the Information9 lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for Serious Illegal
Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of herein complainant.

Despite respondent’s receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order10 of the Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit his
Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to "properly make [his] defense in a verified
pleading,"11 he did not file any Answer.1avvphi1

On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly notified, only
complainant’s counsel was present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.

Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and Recommendation12 dated September
29, 2008, found that:

[respondent’s] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are
grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the
complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

xxxx

In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct of
a lawyer like the case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court]
ordered the disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-marital relations with a married woman, and having a
child with her. In the instant case, not only did the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley
Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant) his mistress and
subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is made
of, which [leave] the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty. Danilo S.
Velasquez.13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution14 dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating
Commissioner’s findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.

As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioner’s evaluation and recommendation well
taken.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 15 When a lawyer’s moral
character is assailed, such that his right to continue

practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present evidence,
to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of
Attorneys.16

Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges
brought against him, suggesting that they are true.17 Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that he
would come up with his defense "in a verified pleading," he never did.

Aside then from the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
also violated the Lawyer’s Oath reading:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I
recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God, (underscoring
supplied),

and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The April 30, 2008 Resolution18 of the Provincial Prosecutor on complainant’s charge against respondent and
Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:

[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the complaint) has the effect of strengthening the
allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really physical restraint employed by
Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on the day private complainant was
fetched by the two women and police officers, complainant was already freely roaming around the place and thus,
could not have been physically detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be physically kept within an
enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always accompanied wherever she would wander,
that it could be impossible for her to escape especially considering the remoteness and the distance between Upper
San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran where she is a resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association
had the express and implied orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario
Mecaral and not to let her go freely. That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The
latter being reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant had untangled the cloth tied on her
wrists and feet.19 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal complaint against respondent, his therein co-
respondent corroborated the testimonies of complainant’s witnesses, and that the allegations against him remain
unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of evidence
needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.20

In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct,
respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer. 21

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part of the records of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close
scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of
disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1

Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant)
against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting versions
of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer
to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former
classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant,
respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child
support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for
her congenital heart ailment.

At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual relationship. She
narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the
demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had
progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as
the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for
support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by
respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer 3 ("Affidavit")
categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate 4 of her daughter, he was, in
truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent
supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree
to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the
Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a glance at it." 5

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash
and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning
them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her
the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that
he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the
position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the money
intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against
Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").

Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil case
against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a
compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and
caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her
problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent
allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in
him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was
able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant
complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.

Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file
the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was
also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino,
to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that
because of Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses
were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not
the father of her daughter.

Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the proposal
thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After
several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When
Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly
offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then
proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount
was P188,000.00.

Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the
same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her
allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave
her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former
bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the
settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00,
not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's
fees.

As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies
luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two
consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his
marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant
very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that,
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second,
they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently,
complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to
respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to
2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-
officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member
in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital
status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him
in his campaign.

Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant moved
to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months
passed and the promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received
from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged
him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to
look for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he could not
assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to
Atty. Tolentino.

In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly
financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated
only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June
when her alleged fiancé from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again
asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to
her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was in
need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent.
According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with
the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent
ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.

On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and
recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the
Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation 14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting
the parties' conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and
concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:

Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral character,
putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of
the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.

Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his lascivious
hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house
and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It
signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her
seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.

xxxx

Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic) of
the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x 15

It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be
ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's
obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with
a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to
return P58,000.00 to complainant.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning 18 ("Motion")
dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March
2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events
that transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative
woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that
the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between
them is telling the truth.

In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over
the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.

While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit
brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said
requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.24 It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community.25

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is
not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 28

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is
whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and
in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we
find otherwise.

Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises of financial
security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to
conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself
who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual
congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering
from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part. 29Respondent's
numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it
proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is
rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her
financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.

Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find
credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She
herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow
barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called him
there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in
2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several
occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his
friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who
was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent
whom she had known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to
change [her] life for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of
deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are left with the most
logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans
any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to force her
to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions.
While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.

We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially that
her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent
who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading
a document she knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short
sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.

Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the
consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not
give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of
Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with
Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to
show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate
or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without
any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.

The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to
his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all
available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes
which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the
father of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently
agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart.
Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the settlement
of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no
matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.35

Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her daughter.
Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00
and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount
of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.

We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainant's claim for
support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant
insists that she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that
respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more
than P150,000.00 – but only P38,000.00 more – and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his
attorney's fees.

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks issued
by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount
of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can
keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant
for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation.
He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did
not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.

We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in this
respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the
parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and answer
modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose
favor the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further
reception of evidence solely on this aspect.

We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her child's DNA test
absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to state that an
administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges
as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.39

Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the
extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour, 41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an
innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from
the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty,
such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46 respondent was found
to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding from the Court
pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire.
Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v.
Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence
that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his
retirement during the pendency of the case.

We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion
and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such
severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is
his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the
outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a
FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the
Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 932 June 21, 1940

In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against the respondent Roque
Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.

It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine
consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent,
who was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, after
hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry
again, and asked him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the
respondent right then and there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among other things, that
the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing
or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. After the execution and
acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them
that they were single and as such could contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would
there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said:
"I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit,
on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that the
respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the evidence on this point is not clear and the same
is not material in the resolution of the present case, we do not find it necessary to make any express finding as to
whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the respondent, the service were
rendered free of charge.

The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea that seven years
separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage and for that reason
prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had made a mistake and
for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed the
deed of cancellation Exhibit A.

There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad
Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a
notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the
respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies
disbarment from the practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition
that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to
society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted
with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege
should be declared terminated. In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the
law or carelessly negligent in giving the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and
this is the opinion of some members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow the recommendation
of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in the report of said investigator
and the fact that immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the
parties sign another document cancelling the previous one.

The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE
YSASI, respondents.

F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.

Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding the vinculum of
paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and
private respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace
of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and
negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same
reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.

The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was
successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of
Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other
allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.

As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the
sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all
matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent.
For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily.
He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In
November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his
recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was
confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner
continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the
latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary
from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his
salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.

Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private
respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back
wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner abandoned
his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay
petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the
Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's
ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the
NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit, 5 petitioner filed this petition
presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or
not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether
or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.
The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent,
such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary
amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or
pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.

In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a modification of the decision of
herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No.
0452-84,6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the
Court's resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier
position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8

Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:

This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special
relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could very well go down
(in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed by
an only son, his father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his own
father.9

Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:

. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may justify
why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner
and private respondent had with each other, were personal matters affecting father and son
relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal
relationship to come in the way.10

I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-
observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying
upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.

Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm
administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It
is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the
NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of
the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the
transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and
[d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page references to the records is
a ground for dismissal of an appeal.

Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and
objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in
the interest of due process.

It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a labor
arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was
not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his
decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final
dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. 12

Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted the
hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar
S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which petitioner has not successfully
rebutted.

We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical rules of
procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of
procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private
respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position
cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.

The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except
for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the
causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative
in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by
the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime
or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.

The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before
the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law. 15Suffering
from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to
his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed
separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the
employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment. 17

After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision
of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from
such employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of an
administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which
are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19

The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:

It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982,
cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was
suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical
attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
February 19, 1986 at 20-44).

This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda
Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).

During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the
instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters
of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a
day inside Hacienda Manucao.

xxx xxx xxx

After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic
human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II
may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during
the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant
outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
 xxx xxx xxx

The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:

(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2)
clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer
in Labor and Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).

This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus
Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the
employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of
employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly
pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.

There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First, petitioner's
absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness
and strained family relations. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health.
Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his
intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint
for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that
petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. 20

The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his
various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware
of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even
advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not
petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is
beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by
the attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner,
there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal
to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for
termination of employment.22

With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a
managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why
when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he could
do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours
or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of
his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner
may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at least
a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.

If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is because
that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct
involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private
respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to
matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and
activities.

While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator, petitioner would be
staying at the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal
employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any
transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his residence should
not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per
se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work
after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of
the haciendafor social security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom
until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no
longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed
him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that
time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not
salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private
respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner
had been saying about sending him to jail.

Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's
alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as
expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of
petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private
respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the
administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25

As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even
paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is
further belied by his continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the
last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his
pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness
and capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26 With these,
petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary,
pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm
administrator.27

To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a
concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative
factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.

It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. The
absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of
which private respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer
returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at
such a conclusion.

Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January, 1983, when
private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter
continued to perform services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries,
Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod
through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984
from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31

It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities and operations
of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands for him. In the
present case, however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary
sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that
these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is
familiar with the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had
abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of
place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to
what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can
have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —

xxx xxx xxx

That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter
called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly
accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;

That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all
checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;

That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents

I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

JON de YSASI III

whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place and
stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power
and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for
the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash
the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my proper disposition.

That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my

Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.

That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".

xxx xxx xxx

remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason of
abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries
and benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of
one who has abandoned his work.

We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent, ascribing
statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the
irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private
respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play
dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must
be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.

As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension, allowance or ex
gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform
services in his capacity as farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or
in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment
status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of
allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should
be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.

Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an
implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his
work. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner,
regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee
relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and
solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation
without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very
concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does not square with the
elements constitutive of abandonment.

On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the due process
requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that
Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the
employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any
ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. 40

The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:

Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a
written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In
cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in the
notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford
the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.

Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a
decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.

Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice
to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with
the Regional Branch of the Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office
having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month,
specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of
commencement and termination of employment, the positions last held by them and such other
information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.

Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied his right to due
process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a
chance to be heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of
procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This
fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the
Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41

Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to
be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent
implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial
compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there
is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the
arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of
security of tenure in favor of the employee.42

On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as follows:
 The Labor Arbiter held thus:

While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to
notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as
required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination
by an employer was not complied with. This however, would not work to
invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity
of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that
sanctions must be imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the
notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587).
(Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .

This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the
rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process. The
public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a
mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be
penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner
dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon
his employment because he has a justifiable excuse.43

II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the
Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed
the imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements.
Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that penalty
contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as
required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice
upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.

Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of
tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to
an employee in case of its denial:

Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of actual reinstatement.

Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just cause for
dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the
Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the
practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained relations between
the employer and the employee, payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of
reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial employees are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no
longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the
law accords him.48

We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:

As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA
295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held
that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made between managers and the
ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers
 cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the
difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who
had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of
antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).

In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained
that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible.49

III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from employment was
attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other
employers.

Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such
as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries
spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary
damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the
court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51

We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral damages where
the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages
prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the
aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees
were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.

In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames
which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement
of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the
undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that
each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages
can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.

On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor General:

The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no voluntary
abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such
absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent,
therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not
exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six
months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs.
NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are
equally at fault.54

The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and
invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if
not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we
reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by
advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to
avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein
fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show
that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary,
their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found
favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the
letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable
settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious
records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. The task of resolving
cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for
no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we
have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are
saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured
as parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking,
instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is
the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective
rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on
more convivial terms.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private
respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without
qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the
published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that
her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo
also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and
the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of
The Philippine Star.2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the
Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising
and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that
the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban
on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he
prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is
dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 On June
29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts
would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution
No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo,
Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. 10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003,
stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution
on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum
on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 15 The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity
and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition
rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after
claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his
legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. 17 Ten months later, he caused the
same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18 Such acts of respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage
Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the
case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from
dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would
bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers,
the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same
brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.: 22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place
of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership
and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact
of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity
or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis
and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres
Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth
C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate
the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79
of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because
of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of
the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice
against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required
the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD
found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation
proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however,
he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course
thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and
notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713: 8
 SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx
(emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND,PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. 10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,
that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was
not covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective Local
Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the
private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and
employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
 (1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special
law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and
employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the
governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city
vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice
mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the
performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayanmay
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words,
they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. 14Since the law
itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside
session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person
or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is
that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve
full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. 16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From
The Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
 Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case
of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will
not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed
to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their
paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of
this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis
supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity
of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of
the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession.19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating
his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent
Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD
P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE
HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN,
CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED
BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT
CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING
CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar
to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to
recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with the Central Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various
loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petitionwith
the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation
as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon
C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG,
on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting
and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos,
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry
C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo,
Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc.,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development
Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern
Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings &
Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of
their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions
alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in
the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents
Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedureto
bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. 11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on
behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. 12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former
public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. 13 The PCGG did not seek any
reconsideration of the ruling.14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth
Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991,
and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005.
The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001. 17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any
matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive
the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No.
0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way
and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other
parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not
detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness
in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate,
including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement
alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees
and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those
in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern
attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The
standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation
fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some
standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the
traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-
revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the
same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working
to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail
and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and
statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no
falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence,
loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-
client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of
service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these
standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by
contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in
American legal ethics.21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice
— the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for
lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic
discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike
the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and
oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of
law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the
late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left
off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar
Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members. 22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama
Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's
(ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of
public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its
own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns
was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from
private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and
influence garnered in government service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the
former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer
dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.26 On the other
hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to
former government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added
thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which
disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."29 The rationale
for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be
influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of
parties who might later become private practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933
and 1937, respectively.31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the
"adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial
revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and
were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation
in matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. 34 In the case of Canon
9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth
by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA
adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where
the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give
better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules."
The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by
placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model
Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.37 In particular,
the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the
subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature. 38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to
reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988,
this Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the
word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as
counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest
conflict"sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second,
the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American
Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while
he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the
closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been
made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank
and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been
taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the
court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March
24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at
bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on
the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The
procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the
department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon
finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and
shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as
receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the
assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court
of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of
the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and
recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which
the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a
bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond
of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the
refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are
applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter"contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within
the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza
which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case
No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground
that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central
Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of
the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means,
viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between
points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to
occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) 41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others. 42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene"
includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under
the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings.44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do
not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase
"which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The
1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer,
while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the
reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to
be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville
for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition
filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this
type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role
of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court
litigator protecting the interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the
IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts
especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is
still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account
of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its
end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause
a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to
match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that
situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have
them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in
private practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too
great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty
which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be
disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter."47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to
bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted
"the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel
of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil
cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." 48 Even the United States Supreme
Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In
the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in
the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not
only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with a
disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. 52 The effects of this
prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An
employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He adds: "Any system
that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits
official independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with
a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of
the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their
office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of
law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may
extend to all members of his law firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the
legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well
observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead to
untoward results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in
the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts have abandoned per sedisqualification
based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the
defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers
who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how
to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent
Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of
the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two
sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. 61 The example given
by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently
charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62 In the cautionary words of the Association
of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive." 64 He opines "x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client – the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the
ones who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates." 65 But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised
Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank.
Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of
former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the
rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or
authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x." 67 More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea
that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials
that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends
in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism."68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the
rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that
(1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by
this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot,
by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied
without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.