a.
All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins,
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997]
MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES
AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Unless legally flawed, a testators intention in his last will and testament is its life and
soul which deserves reverential observance.
The controversy before us deals with such a case.
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites
Agape, Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No. 112
for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in this petition for review the
decision of the Court of Appeals[1] dated November 29, 1995, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from allowing or admitting the
will of Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing the issuance of Letter Testamentary in
favor of petitioner Julio A. Vivares as executor without bond is AFFIRMED but modified in
that the declaration that paragraph II of the Torcuato Reyes' last will and testament,
including subparagraphs (a) and (b) are null and void for being contrary to law is hereby
SET ASIDE, said paragraphs (a) and (b) are declared VALID. Except as above modified,
the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."[2]
The antecedent facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring
therein in part, to wit:
xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the following properties to
wit:
antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in
common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog,
Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan,
Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in
the province of Misamis Oriental.[3]
The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of
three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private
respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity,
his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition
for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The
petitioner was set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a
newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks. Notices were
likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition.
On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana
Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceaseds natural
children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the
following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and
attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle
exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of
the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could never
marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter
was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never
annulled. Thus Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with
Reyes was violative of public morals.
On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an ordering declaring that it had acquired
jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore, allowed the presentation of evidence. After
the presentation of evidence and submission of the respective memoranda, the trial court
issued its decision on April 23, 1993.
The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the
witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes, and, therefore, their relationship
was an adulterous one. Thus:
The admission in the will by the testator to the illicit relationship between him and
ASUNCION REYES EBARLE who is somebody elses, wife, is further bolstered,
strengthened, and confirmed by the direct testimonies of the petitioner himself and his
two attesting witnesses during the trial.
In both cases, the common denominator is the immoral meretrecious, adulterous and
adulterous and illicit relationship existing between the testator and the devisee prior to the
death of the testator, which constituted the sole and primary consideration for the devise
or legacy, thus making the will intrinsically invalid.[4]
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the
will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. Hence, Julio
Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the allegation that the oppositors
failed to present any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to
another person during the period of her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which
affirmed the trial courts decision admitting the will for probate but the modification that
paragraph II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid. The appellee court
stated:
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent, documentary or otherwise
during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was inexistent
or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court
gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and
Testament, as void for being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not
sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very
declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.[5]
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the oppositors filed this petition
for review.
Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals was
contrary to law, public policy and evidence on record. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion Oning
Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree. Witness Gloria Borromeo
testified that Oning Reyes was her cousin as her mother and the latters father were sister
and brother. They were also nieces of the late Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the purported
marriage of the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was void ab initio as it was against
public policy pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family Code. Petitioners further alleged that
Oning Reyes was already married to Lupo Ebarle at the time she was cohabiting with the
testator hence, she could never contact any valid marriage with the latter. Petitioners
argued that the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the personal declaration of the
testator, himself, were sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. To further
support their contention, petitioners attached a copy of the marriage certificate of
Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle.[6]
The petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.[7] Thus, the court merely inquires on its
due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the
testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions.[8] The intrinsic validity is not
considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been
proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic
validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the
probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. [9] The
intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because practical considerations demanded
it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful
legality.[10] Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the
probate court may also do so.[11] Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what
the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.[12]
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of
the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding
were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of
consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the
will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator
that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate
proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the
devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the wills intrinsic validity and which need not
be inquired upon by the probate court.
The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals
(139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator himself,
acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee, to wit:
Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J.
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love an [sic] affection, for all
the things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J.
Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comfort and represent myself
as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind
her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous
marriage.
Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy because the testator admitted
he was disposing of the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.[13] To remand the case would only be a waste of time and money since the
illegality or defect was already patent. This case is different from the Nepomuceno
case. Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of
his personal and real properties to his wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was never an
open admission of any illicit relationship.In the case of Nepomuceno, the testator admitted
that he was already previously married and that he had an adulterous relationship with the
devisee.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated
testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time she
cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and
even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband
of Asuncion. Thus:
The foregoing testimony cannot go against the declaration of the testator that Asuncion
Oning Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government of Tacloban (supra) the Supreme
Court stated that the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of
marriage.
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence, documentary or
otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was
inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the
trial court gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will
and Testament, as void for being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not
sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very
declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.[14]
In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he said-
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force
and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making
the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose
of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men
wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument,
permitted them to do so. xxx All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testators having
meant just what he said. (Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting
belatedly a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their
failure to present the said certificate before the probate court to support their position that
Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the same
evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal, much less in this petition for
review. This Court would no try the case a new or settle factual issues since its jurisdiction
is confined to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by the lower
courts. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will not be
disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record, which petitioners
have not shown in this case.[15]
Considering the foregoing premises, we sustain the findings of the appellate court it
appearing that it did not commit a reversible error in issuing the challenged decision.
ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November 29, 1995, is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG,
CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by
the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the
petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly
signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2
and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano,
who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the
Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the
testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno
as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator
was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children,
Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded
wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5,
1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were
married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his
forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his
entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned
legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita,
both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly
entitled to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my
above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was legally
married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for
reasons and justifications known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one
Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love
and affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the
past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and
consent, did comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth
 and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in
the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous
marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the
Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary
should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as
the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952
until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise
because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in
relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question
declared valid except the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared
null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in intestacy
to the appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction
of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive
portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised
are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement
as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by
the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot
be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings
because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against
everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that
even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a
separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration
of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom
the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament
itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the
testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private
respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine
enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon.
Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that
the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put
in issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in
favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v.
Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of
inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the
resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature.
 xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition
for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary
provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and
the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent
and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts
that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil.
426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the
petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of
this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void.
Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v.
Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal
validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will,
which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the
petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed
with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing
upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135,
December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will.
Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities
required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. The
petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving
the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin
Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex
A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals'
decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the
testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in the
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the
case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a
belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case,
et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the
proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will,
the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
 (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal
offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor
and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same
action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter
vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before
the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez
was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He also
declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In
Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since
1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He
stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact,
as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of
matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo
lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno
contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was
then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in
good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private
respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its
face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the
devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her
alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private
respondents to present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the
legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start
of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had
lived with as man and wife, as already married, was an important and
specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and passed
upon by the Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was
petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in
marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982,
pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the
testimony of petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at
length on the meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN
of August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a
decisive issue right at the inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the
question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner
'were deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that
petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private
respondents respectfully offer the following analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased
testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever
resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of
course, it maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased with private
respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should be
 remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time
and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the
marriage so much so that an action in court was brought concerning the
marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-
30)
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they
were still both single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married
respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner
married the testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of
about 30 years in between. During those 30 years, could it be believed
that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor
contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to
ask her groom before she married him in secrecy, especially so when she
was already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by
itself conclusive demonstration that she new that the man she had openly
lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with already two
children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina
Gomez, is it possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether
or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That
is un-Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the
deceased testator, is it possible that she would not have known that the
mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was
respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of
Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that of respondent
Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They
are, to say the least, inherently improbable, for they are against the
experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings of
human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she
was going to marry whether or not he was already married to another,
knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that would strain
human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was
already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely
his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off
with the deceased during their younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a
donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is
the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient
may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of
FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for
the recovery of certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle,
Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his widow, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno,
bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy
man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising
and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and
personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis
unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D.
Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis
bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte,
exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo
hago en la forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a
continuacion se expresan; .
 OCTAVO: — Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias,
de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta
Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be
deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Said
Clause 12th reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que
tratan de institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de mi
muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar
con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis
herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña
Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding
No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's
estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of
administration, she submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of
November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the project of partition
and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of partition, Exhibit "E", now shows
Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a
considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said project of
partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties
mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the project of
partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio
de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second
marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her
estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the
defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the
estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the
widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal
properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its
eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the
properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of
the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in
clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the
properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by
the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during
her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those
properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the
deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first
half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the
second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of
these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment)
during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was
instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6). 1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis
unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D.
Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis
bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte,
exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo
hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee,
could succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event
that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva,"
and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so
doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as
section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to
every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the
construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars,
such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in
clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous
meaning of his plain words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It
is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-
remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been
unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following: .
 ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical
sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and
that other can be ascertained." .

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the
context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears
that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with
such technical sense. (675a)

In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of
Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at
the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears
that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain
(TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).

La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su

ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y
cumplir fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa
voluntad patente, que no ha menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la
menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse
por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial.
(Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .

The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they involve
cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a
widow. As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably
provided that his widow should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and
did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of
his will, the legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon
the widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the
widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is
accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to
fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor
Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the
properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of
Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for
liquidation, accounting and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against
the Administrator-appellee.