Sura vs.

Martin
G.R. No. L-25091, November 29, 1968

Facts:

Vicente S. Martin, Sr. was ordered by the CFI Negros Occidental to recognize his natural son and to provide support at P100 per month. Martin
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed said decision. A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The
Sheriff's return of service stated: "The judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at
Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by
the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides." For failure to satisfy the writ of execution, plaintiff's counsel
prayed that defendant be adjudged guilty of contempt of court. The trial court granted the prayer and ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Martin.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of Martin for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the decision requiring him to support his
natural son due to insolvency were violative of his constitutional right against imprisonment for debt.

2. Whether or not Martin's failure to satisfy the judgment amounts to disobedience to be considered indirect contempt.

Held:

1. The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence, the orders for his arrest and imprisonment for failure to satisfy the
judgment in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.

2. The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt for failure to satisfy a judgment to pay past and future support are illegal
because such judgment is a final disposition of the case and is declaratory of the rights or obligations of the parties. Under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, the disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt refers to a special judgment which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, as that which requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or sale or delivery of real or personal property
which must be enforced by proper contempt proceedings.

Morever, the writ of execution issued on the judgment required "the sheriff or other proper officer" to whom it was directed to satisfy the amount out
of all property, real and personal, of the judgment debtor. The writ of execution was, therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to
whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have
committed disobedience to the writ. (Sura vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-25091, November 29, 1968)

SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG

[67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT 1975]

Facts:
Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an
estafa case was filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case
and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that
no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case. (Judge here
committed gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.)

Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt?

Held:
Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no collateral or security
because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay them
and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore
in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and
issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent
grossly failed to perform his duties properly.