[G.R. No. L-23733. October 31, 1969.
] Issue:
HERMINIO L. NOCUM, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAGUNA
TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, defendant-appellant. l BRUAN
Facts:
 Nocum, who was a passenger in Laguna Tayabas
Bus Company’s Bus No. 120 then making a trip
within Laguna, was injured as a consequence of the
explosion of the firecrackers, contained in a bos,
loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as
containing clothes and miscellaneous items by co-
paseenger.
Trial Court’s Ruling:
 Laguna Tayabas Bus Company did not observe the
extraordinary or utmost diligence of a very cautious
person. If proper and rigid inspection were observed
by the defendant, the contents of the box could have
been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal
by the passenger to have the package opened was
no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher
Cornista, employees should call the police if there
were packages containing articles against company
regulations. Neither was failure by employees of
Laguna Tayabas Bus Company to detect the
contents of the packages of passengers because a
passenger has neither choice nor control in the
exercise of their discretion in determining what are
inside the package of co-passengers which may
eventually prove fatal.
 Whether common carriers have the duty to inspect
passengers’ baggages rigidly when a passenger
declares that the baggage contains mere clothes
and other miscellaneous - NO!
Ruling:
By requiring the highest degree of diligence from
common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers
and by creating a presumption of negligence against them,
the recklessness of their drivers which is a common sight
even in crowded areas and, particularly, on the highways
throughout the country may, somehow, if not in a large
measure, be curbed. It must be considered, that while it is
true the passengers of Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
should not be made to suffer for something over which
they had no control.
Fairness demands that in measuring a common
carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be
given to the reliance that should be reposed on the
sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to
their common safety. It is to be presumed that a
passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to
the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of
his own. Not to be lightly considered be the right to privacy
to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be
subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the
harmlessness of his baggage and nothing appears to
indicate the contrary
 In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to
the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not
outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional
boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service
manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the
passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the
passenger had already declared that the box contained
mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have
justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.
What must be importantly considered here is not so much
the infringement of the fundamental sacred rights of the
particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat
any contrary ruling would pose on the right of privacy of all
passengers of all common carriers, considering how easily
the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and
abuse. Of course, when there are sufficient indications
that the representations of the passenger regarding the
nature of his baggage may not be true, in the interest of
the common safety of all, the assistance of the police
authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force the
passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the
needed investigation consistent with the rules of
propriety and, above all, the constitutional rights of the
passenger. It is in this sense that the mentioned service
manual issued by Laguna Tayabas Bus Company to its
conductors must be understood.
Therefore, Appellant should not be made liable for
damages to the injured passenger.
TOPIC: 10. CARRIAGE BY TRAIN – The Platform Must be Safe
JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.
G.R. No. 12191. October 14, 1918 l TOLENTINO
FISHER, J.
CHARACTERS:
Jose Cangco: Plaintiff- Appellant  Arms were amputated after
falling on the platform
Manila Railroad Co.: - Defendant- Appellee  Employer of Cangco
FACTS:
 Plaintiff Cangco was a clerk of the Manila Railroad Company
with a monthly wage of P25 living in San Mateo, Rizal, which is
located upon the line of the defendant railroad company;
 He used a pass, supplied by the company, in coming daily by
train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he
worked, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains
free of charge. (Rizal Manila)
 January 20, 1915 (around 7-8PM): Cangco was returning
home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to
the station in San Mateo the Cangco arose from his seat in
the second class-car where he was riding and, making his
exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the
coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for
support.
 On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San
Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise
with a moderate gradient some distance away from the
company's office and extends along in front of said office for a
distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches.
(please picture in your mind for Terrie’s Qs)
 As the train slowed down, another passenger, named Emilio
Zuniga, co- employee, got off the same car, alighting safely at
the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the
ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff,
Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet
 came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result
that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on
the platform.
 His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under
the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train
the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full
stop.
 The presence of a sack of melons on the platform: it was the
customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot
had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. They
were contained in numerous tow sacks which had been piled on
the platform in a row one upon another. This row of sacks was
so placed that there was a space of only about two feet
between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform;
and it is clear that the fall of Cangco was due to the fact that
his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment
he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to
see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
 Cangco was drawn from under the car in an unconscious
condition, and it appeared that the injuries which he had received
were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain
hospital in the city of Manila and his arm was amputated but
the result was unsatisfactory, and Cangco was then carried to
another hospital where a second operation was performed and
the member was again amputated higher up near the
shoulder.
-----------------------
CFI:
 Recovery of Damages for Manila Railroad’s Negligence filed by
Cangco
 August 31, 1915: he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manila
to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his
action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of
the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the
platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to
the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains.
 Trial Judge: although negligence was attributable to Manila
Railroad by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so
placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, Cangco himself had failed to use due caution
in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from
recovering.
 Ruled in favor of Manila Railroad
 Cangco APPEALED to SC
ISSUE: Whether or not Cangco has contributory negligence? –
NONE.
MANILA RAILROAD’S CONTENTION:
Even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its
trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by
plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait
until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. It is
negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the
Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own
negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if
the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the
damages should be apportioned.
RULING:
We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form.
The train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown
conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from
the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of persons alight
from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain
no injury where the company has kept its platform free from
dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that
plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as
he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to
perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this
subject is that expressed in THOMPSON’S work on Negligence
(vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
"The test by which to determine whether
the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is
that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of
the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would
have acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care
has been defined to be, not the care which may or
should be used by the prudent man generally, but
the care which a man of ordinary prudence
would use under similar circumstances, to avoid
injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence,
vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, if we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used
by this court in Picart vs. Snith (37 Phil. Rep., 809),
we may say that the test is this; Was there anything
in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the
time he alighted from the train which would have
admonished a person of average prudence that to
get off the train under the conditions then existing
was dangerous ? If so, the plaintiff should have
desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist
was contributory negligence.
The only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that
Cangco was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off
the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the
platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. Cangco was
ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by
the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the
Manila Railroad was bound by reason of its duty as a public
carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from
its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of
some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was
dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part
of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the
plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility conceded that it had a right to
pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of
them in that position gave rise to the duty to light the premises
adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act — that is to say, whether the passenger
acted prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical
condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily
affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly
familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the
train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his
mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the platform where he was
alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of Cangco in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way
was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was
not guilty of contributory negligence.
Cangco, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a
copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently
disabled him from continuing that employment. His expectancy of
life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately
thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for
the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of
P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the
additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services,
and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his
injuries.
The decision of the lower court is REVERSED, and judgment is
hereby rendered Cangco for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs
of both instances. So ordered.
------------------------ YOU MAY DISREGARD THIS. (Baka lang
magtanong si Mareng Terrie)
NOTE: The Court separately examined the conceptions of liability,
the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company
were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform
in the manner above stated; that the sacks’ presence caused the
plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore
constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable
for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the
plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the
contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the
damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due
care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and
immediate, differing essentially, in the legal viewpoint from that
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants (culpa
contractual), imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be
rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code relates only to culpa
aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and
1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction between
"culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the
source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by
any legal tie"; and culpa considered as an "accident in the
performance of an obligation already existing . . .."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to
rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil
Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute
the breach of a contract.
"The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of
the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of
the parties to one another But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi-contract, then
breaches of those duties are subject to articles
1101, 1103 and 1104 of the same code."
The principle of respondent superior —the master would be
liable in every case and unconditionally; in certain cases imposed
upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the
negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not
bound by contract (English Common Law). The liability under the
Spanish law is upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the
Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or
negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the
damage caused. The liability of the master is personal and
direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable
for the acts of the latter, whether done within the scope of his
employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not
amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the
person injured.
Manresa: liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always
based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful
intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in
the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the
qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties
which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with
equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to
whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no
liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even
within the scope of their employment, such third persons suffer
damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law
creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or
direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yields
to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. Rep., 624):
"From this article two things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
may be rebutted. If the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.
"This theory bases the responsibility of the
master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant. This is the notable
peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is,
of course, in striking contrast to the American
doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the
negligence of the servant is conclusively the
negligence of the master."
The liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or
omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or
omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a
contract, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's
negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of
the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the
master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or
contractual.
 Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or
omission of those mutual duties which civilized society
imposes upon its members, or which arise from these
relations, other than contractual, of certain members of
society to others, generally embraced in the concept of
status. The breach of these general duties whether due to
willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury,
gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party.
 The fundamental distinction between obligations of this
character and those which arise from contract, rests upon
the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is
 the “wrongful or negligent act or omission” itself which
creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists independently of the
“breach” of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties
when entering into the contractual relation.
 The legislature has elected to limit extra contractual
liability to cases in which moral culpability can be directly
imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due
care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due
care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants,
or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person
made liable for their conduct.
When the source of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause
of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of
proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence — if he does
not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is
alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is
not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether
the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence
on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of
the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to
warrant a recovery.
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach
of a contract (CULPA CONTRACTUAL) to show that the breach
was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his
servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of the
breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the
negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach
of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action.
RATIONALE OF LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS BY DAMAGE DONE
BY EMPLOYEES: If the negligence of servants or agents could be
invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract,
the anomalous result would be that persons acting through the
medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts,
would be in a better position than those acting in person. xxxx
Juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from
damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by
negligent acts of omission or commission on the part of their
servants, as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through
agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances
that reasonable care had been taken in the selection and direction of
such servants.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Rachrach
Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), the express ground of the
decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with the liability
of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the
distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as
to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence
in the selection or direction of the servants; and that in the particular
case the presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
In the Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though
founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract
of carriage. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's
servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that
defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise
proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was
therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach
of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquilina or
culpa contractual.
Manresa: whether negligence occurs as an incident in the
course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or is
itself the source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission
productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part
of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a
defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care,
either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection
and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in either
ease. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the
court held in the Yamada ease that the defendant was liable for the
damages negligently caused by its servant to a person to whom it
was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the
defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by
implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe
means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate,
and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the
fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
CARRIAGE BY TRAIN: EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING
PASSENGERS/PASSENGERS WHO FELL FROM THE TRAIN
CLEMENTE BRIÑAS, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents. l ALMALBIS
[G.R. No. L-30309. November 25, 1983.]
CFI Quezon: convicted Clemente Briñas for double homicide thru
reckless imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and
FACTS:
Victor Millan.
 In the afternoon of Jan. 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought
a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon
for his 55 yr old mother, Martina Bool and his 3 yr. old
daughter Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio
Lusacan, Tiaong, Quezon.
 At about 2pm, Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with Martina
and Emelita among the passengers. Victor Milan is the
engineman, Clementa Briñas as conductor, and
Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon
approaching Barrio Lagalag at about 8pm, the train slowed
down and the conducter shouted "Lusacan". Thereupon,
Martina walked towards the left front door facing the
direction of Tiaong, carrying Emelita with one hand and
holding her baggage with the other. When Martina and
Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked up
speed. As a result, Martina and Emelita stumbled and they
were seen no more. It took 3 mins. more before the train
stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan, and Martina and
Emelita were not among the passengers who disembarked
thereat.
 Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that 2
corpses were found along the railroad tracks at Barrio
Lagalag. They found the lifeless body of a female child about
2 ft from the tracks, sprawled to the ground with her belly
down, the hand resting on the forehead, and with the back
portion of the head crushed. The investigators also found the
corpse of an old woman about 2 ft away from the tracks with
the head and both legs severed and the left hand missing.
Later, the bodis were identified as those of Martina and
Emelita. Among the personal effects found on Martina was a
train ticket.
 The bodies were autopsied by Dr. Pastor Huertas, who
testified on the cause of death of the victims (traumatic injury
caused by the running over by the wheel of the train).
CA: affirmed the judgment of CFI. CA ruled that Briñas'
announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full 3
minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. In
making the erroneous and premature announcement, Briñas was
negligent. He ought to have known that train passengers invariably
prepare to alight upon notice from the conductor that the destination
was reached and that the train was about to stop.Upon the facts, it
was the Briñas' negligent act which led the victims to the door.
During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the CFI Quezon,
the heirs of the deceased victims filed with the same court, a
separate civil action for damages against the Manila Railroad
Company entitled "Civil Case No. 5978, Manaleyo Gesmundo, et al.,
v. Manila Railroad Company". The separate civil action was filed for
the recovery of P30,350.00 from the Manila Railroad Company as
damages resulting from the accident.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in convicting Briñas under the facts
as found by the CA
2. Whether or not the CA erred in including payment of death
indemnity by Briñas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, after the heirs of the deceased have already commenced
a separate civil action for damages against the railroad company
arising from the same mishap.
RULING:
1. NO.
It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach
where the Briñas was assigned as conductor and that when the train
slackened its speed and Briñas shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan", they
stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that
the train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the
old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no more."
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common
carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or
flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of
the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the train
or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and
proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus
comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because
passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able
to disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.
It was negligence on Briñas’ part to announce the next flag stop
when said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. As the
respondent Court of Appeals correctly observed, "Briñas’
announcement was premature and erroneous."
That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by
the fact that immediately after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly
accelerated to full speed. Briñas failed to show any reason why the
train suddenly resumed its regular speed. The announcement was
made while the train was still in Barrio Lagalag.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature
and erroneous announcement of Briñas. This announcement
prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit.
Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely
seated in their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up
speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous
announcement of Briñas and the deaths of the victims is direct and
natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.
Briñas also argues that it was negligence per se for Martina Bool to
go to the door of the coach while the train was still in motion and that
it was this negligence that was the proximate cause of their deaths.
The Court carefully examined the records and agree with the CA that
the negligence of Briñas in prematurely and erroneously announcing
the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of Martina
Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at
most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal
liability.
2. NO.
The petitioner argues that after the heirs of Martina Bool and Emelita
Gesmundo had actually commenced the separate civil action for
damages in the same trial court during the pendency of the criminal
action, the said court had no more power to include any civil liability
in its judgment of conviction.
The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No.
5978 is culpa contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law.
We also note from Briñas’ arguments and from the title of the civil
case that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and
not petitioner-appellant Briñas.
Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two
distinct sources of obligation.
Briñas argues that since the information did not allege the existence
of any kind of damages whatsoever coupled by the fact that no
private prosecutors appeared and the prosecution witnesses were
not interrogated on the issue of damages, the trial court erred in
awarding death indemnity in its judgment of conviction.
A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the
criminal action for double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not
only reserve their right to file an independent civil action but in fact
filed a separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company.
The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the
filing with it of the separate civil action against the Manila
Railroad Company, it still awarded death indemnity in the
judgment of conviction against Briñas.
It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the
commission of a crime, the following items of damages may be
recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an
indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in proper cases.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and interests are recoverable
separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death. This
indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a crime is fixed
whereas the others are still subject to the determination of the court
based on the evidence presented. The fact that the witnesses were
not interrogated on the issue of damages is of no moment because
the death indemnity fixed for death is separate and distinct from
the other forms of indemnity for damages.
Topic: Absence of Safety Devices and Signs
Philippine National Railways and Honorio Cabardo vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court and Baliwag Transit, Inc.
G.R. No. 70547 January 22, 1993 l ODULIO
Facts:
 A collision happened between a passenger express train of
Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from San
Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila and a passenger
bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to
Hagonoy, Bulacan from Manila
 But upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao,
Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of August
10, 1974, the bus got stalled and was hit by PNR’s express
train causing damages to the bus and its passengers
 Eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) others
suffered physical injuries.
 Plaintiff (respondent) Baliwag Transit, Inc. filed a complaint
for damages against defendant (petitioner) PNR alleging that
the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
imprudence of PNR and its locomotive engineer Honorio
Cirbado
 Baliwag further alleged that PNR operated its passenger
train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores,
signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of
approaching train that would pass through the crossing
 In its defense, PNR alleged that the collision was caused by
the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of the bus
driver, Romeo Hughes
 RTC found petitioners PNR and Cirbado liable for damages
 CA affirmed the RTC
Issue:
Who between Baliwag (bus) and PNR (train) was negligent
in the operation of their respective vehicles?
Held:
 PNR and its driver Cirbado are deemed negligent due to the
following reasons:
 There was no crossing bar at the railroad intersection at
Calumpit, Bulacan at the time of collision
 That there were no signal lights, semaphores, flagman or
switchman thereat; the absence of such devices, the plaintiff
bus company argues constitute negligence on the part of the
Philippine National Railways
 A railroad is not required to have a gate (crossing bar) or a
flagman, or to maintain signals at every intersection; only at
such places reasonably necessary; what is considered
reasonably necessary will depend on the amount of travel
upon the road, the frequency with which trains pass over it
and the view which could be obtained of trains as they
approach the crossing, and other conditions
 As has been amply discussed, the crossroad at the
intersection at Calumpit is one which is a busy thoroughfare;
it leads to the Poblacion at Calumpit and other barrios as
well as the town of Hagonoy; the vicinity is utilized as a
parking and waiting area for passengers of jeepneys that ply
between the barrios, clearly, the flow of vehicular traffic
thereat is huge
 It can be said also that, since there is no other railtrack going
North except that one passing at Calumpit, trains pass over
it frequently
 A portion of the intersection is being used as a parking area
with stalls and other obstructions present making it difficult, if
not impossible, to see approaching trains
 The failure of the Philippine National Railways to put a cross
bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores is
evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the
public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it,
because public safety demands that said devices or
equipments be installed, in the light of aforesaid
jurisprudence.
 In the opinion of this Court the X sign or the presence of
"STOP, LOOK, LISTEN" warnings would not be sufficient
protection of the motoring public as well as the pedestrians,
in the said intersection
 A railroad company has been adjudged guilty of negligence
and civilly liable for damages when it failed to install
semaphores, or where it does not see to it that its flagman or
switchman comply with their duties faithfully, to motorist
injured by a crossing train as long as he had crossed without
negligence on his part
 Moreover, upon impact, the bus loaded with passengers was
dragged and thrown into a ditch several meters away; the
train had stopped only after the engine portion was about
190 meters away from the fallen bus; several passengers
were injured and at least 20 died; such facts conclusively
indicate that the train was speeding, because if it were
moving at moderate speed, it would not run some 190
meters after impact and throw the bus at quite a distance
especially so when it is claimed that the train's emergency
brakes were applied
 There was an intermittent rain at the time of the collision; the
condition of the weather was such that even if for this reason
alone, the train engineer should have foreseen that danger
of collision lurked because of poor visibility of slippery road;
he should have taken extra precaution by considerably
slackening its speed. This he failed to do even if the nature
of his job required him to observe care exercised by a
prudent man
 Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus
driver; it was evident that he had taken the necessary
precautions before passing over the railway track; if the bus
was hit, it was for reasons beyond the control of the bus
driver because he had no place to go; there were vehicles to
his left which prevented him in swerving towards that
direction; his bus stalled in view of the obstructions in his
front where a sand and gravel truck stopped because of a
jeep maneuvering into a garage up front
 Philippine National Railways was not immune from suit
 Concerning the exercise of diligence normally expected of
an employer in the selection and supervision of its
employees, respondent court expressed the view that PNR
was remiss on this score since it allowed Honorio Cabardo,
who finished only primary education and became an
engineer only through sheer experience, to operate the
locomotive, not to mention the fact that such plea in
avoidance was not asserted in the answer and was thus
belatedly raised on appeal
 What exacerbates against PNR’s contention is the authority
in this jurisdiction to the effect that the failure of a railroad
company to install a semaphore or at the very least, to post
a flagman or watchman to warn the public of the passing
train amounts to negligence
[G.R. No. 37044. March 29, 1933.]
CONSOLACION JUNIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs . THE MANILA
RAILROAD
COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
[G.R. No. 37045. March 29, 1933.]
BEATRIZ SOLORIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs . THE MANILA
RAILROAD
COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; PHYSICAL INJURIES CAUSED THROUGH A
DRIVER'S
NEGLIGENCE. — Although the question of whether or not the
negligence of a driver who collides with a train is imputable to the
appellants herein so as to bar them from the right to recover an
indemnity for damages occasioned by the accident, is, perhaps,
raised in this jurisdiction for the 􀀾rst time, it is, nevertheless, a well
recognized principle of law that said negligence on the part of the
driver who, in turn, is found guilty of contributory negligence, cannot
be imputed to his passengers who had exercised no control over him
in the management of the vehicle, and with whom he sustains no
relation of master and servant. This rule is applied more strictly
when, as in the present case, cars for hire or those dedicated to
public service are involved.
2. ID.; ID. — There is nothing of record to show that the appellants
herein have incurred in any negligence imputable to them and there
is no reason whatsoever why they should be made responsible for
the driver's negligence. The appellants are entitled to recover from
the appellee damages occasioned by the accident of which they
were victims.
DECISION
IMPERIAL, J p:
Consolacion Junio, a young woman 22 years of age, and Beatriz
Soloria, anotheryoung woman of 18 years, represented by her father,
Fausto Soloria, who was appointed her guardian ad litem, brought
these actions in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to recover
from the defendant, Manila Railroad Company, damages suffered by
them in an accident that occurred at the railroad crossing situated at
the outskirts of the town of Calasiao, Pangasinan, when the
automobile in which they were passengers collided with a locomotive
belonging to the aforementioned defendant.
This is an appeal taken by them from the judgment rendered by the
trial court absolving the defendant without costs.
The two cases were tried jointly and only one decision was rendered
for both cases.
The trial court summarizes the facts established by the
evidence as follows:
"At about 11.40 o'clock on the night of April 13, 1930, the plaintiffs
herein with some other persons were traveling in a PU-Car on the
road between Calasiao and Santa Barbara. When they arrived at the
intersection of the road and the defendant's railway, the car tried to
cross the track and collided with the engine of the night express
which left Dagupan for Manila at 11 o'clock that same night and
which was then passing over the crossing in question at great speed.
As a result of the collision, the car was thrown some distance,
plaintiff Junio's right leg was amputated and her right arm fractured,
and Soloria received various injuries on her head.
"The aforementioned crossing is situated in the town of Calasiao and
the same is presumed to be dangerous due to the fact that gates
were required at that crossing. (Section 83, Act No. 1459, as
amended by Act No. 2100.)
On the night of the accident, the gates were not lowered and there
was no notice to the effect that they were not operated at night or
that they were temporarily out of order. However, a notice to the
effect that that was a railroad crossing was there.
"As a general rule, the rights and obligations between the public and
a railroad company at a public crossing are mutual and reciprocal.
Both are under mutual obligation to exercise due care to avoid
causing or receiving injury. Each is in duty bound to exercise
reasonable or ordinary care commensurate with the risk and danger
involved.
"In the case under consideration, the driver alleges that he slowed
down from 19 miles an hour, at which rate he was then going, to 16
miles, and that he was on the lookout for any approaching train,
while the engineer insists that he rang the bell and sounded the
whistle before reaching the crossing. Both parties claim to be free
from guilt, and if the defendant company were completely so, the
plaintiffs would have no cause of action against it."
In addition to the facts mentioned above, it has also been proved that
the gate in question was about three hundred (300) meters from the
railroad station at Calasiao; that on each side of the crossing there
was a wooden bar operated only during the daytime by a woman
employee of the defendant, and that just before the crossing on
one side of the road leading from the town of Calasiao there was a
signpost bearing the notice, "RAILROAD CROSSING", written
crosswise.
The evidence also shows that the car driven by the chauffeur, Pedro
Talbo, was an old Ford bearing number plates PU-3636, which
meant that it was a hired car. The plate, Exhibit 2, was found by the
engineer on the side of the engine upon arrival at Paniqui, the next
station, which indicates that it was torn from the front of the radiator
when the auto collided with the right side of the engine of the night
express.
The appellants were passengers who took the car in Bayambang
and were bound for Asingan, via Dagupan.
The plaintiffs' attorney assigns in his brief the following alleged
errors:
"First. The trial court erred in finding that the defendant company was
not negligent in leaving its gates open at the moment of the accident
when a special night express train was passing.
"Second. The trial court erred in holding that the driver of the car
occupied by the plaintiffs was negligent.
"Third. The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiffs were
negligent or in making them responsible for the driver's alleged
negligence.
"Fourth. The trial court erred in holding that the main question in the
accident was the driver's alleged negligence.
"Fifth. The trial court erred in absolving the defendant instead of
ordering it to pay the damages proven which are the subject of these
actions."
From the evidence, it is obvious that the defendant as well as the
driver of the car in which the plaintiffs were passengers were
negligent, the former because, by installing the gates at the place or
crossing where the accident occurred, it had voluntarily imposed
upon itself the obligation to operate them even at night and to close
them every time a train passed in order to avoid causing injury to the
public. It has been said that the gates constitute an invitation to the
public to pass without fear of danger, and failure to operate them
conveniently constitutes negligence on the part of the company.
The driver was, likewise, negligent because he did not comply with
his duty to slacken the speed of the car and to "look and listen"
before crossing the intersection and, above all, because he did not
maintain a reasonable speed so as to permit him to stop any
moment if it were necessary in order to avoid an accident. If, in the
present case, the car had been running at a reasonable speed, there
is no doubt that he could have stopped it instantly upon seeing the
train from a distance of five meters.
If the action for damages were brought by the driver, it is certain that
it would not prosper in view of that fact that he had incurred in a
notorious contributory negligence.
But the persons who instituted the action are the appellants who
were mere passengers of the car.
Therefore, the question raised is whether the driver's
negligence is imputable to them so as to bar them from the right
to recover damages suffered by them by reason of the accident.
Although this question is, perhaps, raised in this jurisdiction for the
first time, it is, nevertheless, a well recognized principle of law that
the negligence of a driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory
negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger who has no
control over him in the management of the vehicle and with
whom he sustains no relation of master and servant. This rule is
applied more strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or
those engaged in public service, are involved.
"The doctrine prevails in a few states that the contributory negligence
of the driver of a private conveyance is imputable to a person
voluntarily riding with him. But the general rule is that the negligence
of the driver of a vehicle is not to be imputed to an occupant thereof
who is injured at a crossing through the combined negligence of the
driver and the railroad company when such occupant is without fault
and has no control over the driver. And the law almost universally
now recognized is that when one accepts an invitation to ride in the
vehicle of another, without any authority or purpose to direct or
control the driver or the movements of the team, and without any
reason to doubt the competency of the driver, the contributory
negligence of the owner or driver of the conveyance will not be
imputed to the guest or passenger, so as to bar him of the right to
recover damages from a railroad company whose negligence
occasions injury to him at a crossing while he is so riding. This rule
has been applied in a number of cases involving the corresponding
relation between the driver of an automobile and an occupant having
no control over him. The rule is not confined to cases of gratuitous
transportation, but has been applied where a conveyance is hired,
and the passenger exercises no further control over the driver than
to direct him to the place to which he wishes to be taken. Nor is any
distinction made between private and public vehicles, such as street
cars and stages." (22 R. C. L., pp. 1047, 1048.)
"As a general rule the negligence of a driver of a vehicle approaching
a railroad crossing, in failing to look and listen for approaching trains,
cannot be imputed to an occupant of the vehicle who is without
personal fault, unless such driver is the servant or agent of the
occupant, unless they are engaged in a joint enterprise whereby
responsibility for each other's acts exists, or unless the occupant is
under the driver's care or control or has the right to direct and control
the driver's actions, or where the driver is of obvious or known
imprudence or incompetency. This rule that negligence of the driver
is not imputable to an occupant only applies to cases in which the
relation of master and servant or principal and agent does not exist
between the parties, or where the occupant has no right to direct or
control the driver's actions, as where the occupant is a passenger for
hire or is the guest of the owner or driver and has no reason to
believe the driver careless or imprudent, or where the occupant is
seated away from the driver or is separated from him by an inclosure
so that he is without opportunity to discover danger and inform the
driver thereof. . . ." (52 C. J., pp. 315, 316 and 317.)
"A passenger in the automobile of another having no control over the
owner driving the car or the operation of the car which he occupied
merely as passenger was not chargeable with contributory
negligence of the owner and driver at a railroad crossing." (Carpenter
vs. Atchison, 195 Pac., 1073.)
"In railroad crossing accident, negligence of truck driver was not
imputable to truck passenger not himself guilty of contributory
negligence." (Lucchese vs. Spingola, 289 Pac., 189.)
In the case of Little vs. Hackett (116 U.S., 366; 29 Law. ed., 652,
654, 657), the United States Supreme Court said:
"That one cannot recover damages for an injury to the commission of
which he has directly contributed is a rule of established law and a
principle of common justice. And it matters not whether that
contribution consists in his participation in the direct cause of the
injury, or in his omission of duties which, if performed, would have
prevented it. If his fault, whether of omission or commission, has
been the proximate cause of the injury, he is without remedy against
one also in the wrong. It would seem that the converse of this
doctrine should be accepted as sound; that when one has been
injured by the wrongful act of another, to which he has in no respect
contributed, he should be entitled to compensation in damages from
the wrongdoer. And such is the generally received doctrine, unless a
contributory cause of the injury has been the negligence or fault of
some person towards whom he sustains the relation of superior or
master, in which case the negligence is imputed to him, though he
may not have personally participated in or had knowledge of it; and
he must bear the consequences. The doctrine may also be subject to
other exceptions growing out of the relation of parent and child, or
guardian and ward, and the like. Such a relation involves
considerations which have no bearing upon the question before us.
"There is no distinction in principle whether the passengers be on a
public conveyance like a railroad train or an omnibus or be on a hack
hired from a public stand in the street for a drive. Those on a hack
do not become responsible for the negligence of the driver, if
they exercise no control over him further than to indicate the
route they wish to travel or the places to which they wish to go.
If he is their agent so that his negligence can be imputed to them to
prevent their recovery against a third party, he must be their agent in
all other respects, so far as the management of the carriage is
concerned; and responsibility to third parties would attach to them for
injuries caused by his negligence in the course of his employment.
But as we have already stated, responsibility cannot, within any
recognized rules of law, be fastened upon one who has in no way
interfered with and controlled in the matter causing the injury. From
the simple fact of hiring the carriage or riding in it no such liability can
arise. The party hiring or riding must in some way have coöperated
in producing the injury complained of before he incurs any liability for
it. 'If the law were otherwise,' as said by Mr. Justice Depue in his
elaborate opinion in the latest case in New Jersey, 'not only the hirer
of the coach but also all the passengers in it would be under a
constraint to mount the box and superintend the conduct of the driver
in the management and control of his team, or be put for remedy
exclusively to an action against the irresponsible driver or equally
irresponsible owner of a coach taken, it may be, from a coach stand,
for the consequences of an injury which was the product of the
coöperating wrongful acts of the driver and of a third person; and that
too, although the passengers were ignorant of the character of the
driver, and of the responsibility of the owner of the team, and
strangers to the route over which they were to be carried.' (18
Vroom, 171.)"
There is nothing of record to show that the appellants herein have
incurred in any negligence imputable to them and we do not see any
reason whatsoever why they should be made responsible for the
driver's negligence.
The doctrine established in the cases cited above should be
applied to the case at bar and it should be held that the
appellants herein are entitled to recover from the appellee
damages occasioned by the
accident of which they were victims.
We shall now proceed to determine the amount of the damages.
With respect to Soloria, we do not find any difficulty because the
evidence shows that she spent only three hundred pesos (P300) for
her treatment and stay in the hospital. Her injuries are not of such a
nature as to entitle her to a further indemnity. The damages to which
she is entitled may, therefore, be assessed at the amount stated
above.
Such is not the case with respect to Consolacion Junio. According to
the evidence presented, she was a dancer earning from six pesos
(P6) to eight pesos (P8) a day for two or three days every week that
she danced. She lost her right leg which was amputated, suffered a
fracture of her right arm and was wounded on her occipital region.
With these details in view, the members of this court are of the
opinion that she may justly be awarded the sum of two thousand five
hundred pesos (P2,500) as damages and five hundred pesos (P500)
as indemnity for expenses incurred by her in her treatment, medical
attendance and stay in the hospital, making the total amount she
is entitled to recover aggregating three thousand pesos (P3,000).
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and it is
ordered that the appellee pay to Consolacion Junio the sum of three
thousand pesos (P3,000) and to Beatriz Soloria three hundred pesos
(P300), with costs of both instances. So ordered.