“SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

ISSUES IN UGANDA: IMPACT, LEGAL

FRAME WORK AND PERSPECTIVES FOR

ACTION”

MBABAZIZE DANIEL

Email,mbabazy@yahoo.com,dbitature7@gmail.com

MARCH 2008

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COPYRIGHT:

(c) 2008 All Rights Reserved

No part of this Dissertation may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system, or transmitted in

any form by any means, without prior permission of the author or Uganda Christian University.

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 DEDICATION:

This work is dedicated to my dear parents, brothers, sisters, Daggie, Kida and to all those who

cared for me and showed interest in all that I endeavored to do in order to succeed.

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

The author would like to take this opportunity to thank his supervisor, Mr. Godard Busingye for

his valuable guidance without which this work would not have been a success. I am also greatly

indebted to Njeri Kimani for her constructive criticism which helped me in the writing of this

work.

I extend my heartfelt gratitude to the staff of the Internal Security Organization, Uganda

People’s Defense Forces, and the National Focal Point of Uganda for the co-operation they

accorded me throughout the period of conducting the field research. Without their assistance this

work would not have been possible.

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 PREFACE

The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons poses a threat to human security and has

intensified conflicts in Eastern Africa. Violent conflicts in major cities like Nairobi; cattle

rustling by pastoral communities in the Karamoja and Somali clusters and armed rebellions in

southern Sudan and northern Uganda illustrate the scope of the problem. Generally, the

proliferation of SALWs emanates from the failure of governance. States that cannot control the

flow of SALWs across their borders are often politically and institutionally weak.

In addition to porous borders, the police and other security forces in such states lack effective

enforcement capacity. An overabundance of SALWs results in communities riddled with crime

and violence, as well as rogue security forces that sometimes perpetuate insecurity and human

rights abuses. This dissertation is an attempt to evaluate the role and effectiveness of the

Ugandan regulatory frame work and law policies. To achieve this goal, this dissertation is

organised in four chapters;

Chapter one accommodates the background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of
the study, hypothesis, scope of the study, significance of the study, literature review and
methodology. Chapter two deals with definitions, sources and the impact of the proliferation of
small arms and light weapons in Uganda with supplementary examples from other African
jurisdictions particularly the horn of Africa and the great lakes region vis a vis related laws.

Chapter three covered the review of the existing law policy on small arms and light weapons,
legal and institutional frame work in Uganda related to the arms sector. The challenges and
strengths will also be identified. Chapter four entailed conclusions and recommendations

5
 LIST OF STATUTES:

Principal Legislation:

1) The Penal Code Act Cap 120 Laws of Uganda 2000.

2) The Prisons Act 2006.

3) The Police Act Cap 303 Laws of Uganda 2000.

4) The Amnesty Act Cap 294 Laws of Uganda 2000.

5) The Anti-Terrorism Act No.14 of 2002.

6) The Constitution of the Republic Of Uganda, 1995.

7) The Explosive Act Cap 298 Laws of Uganda 2000

8) The Fire Arms Act Cap 229 Laws of Uganda 2000

9) The Security Organizations Act Cap 305 Laws of Uganda 2000.

10) Uganda Peoples Defense Forces Acts Supplement 2005.

International Legislation:

1) Convention on Proliferations or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons

Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects,

International Committee of the Red Cross November 2003.

2) Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation

and Trafficking Of Small Arms and Light Weapons 2001.

3) Nairobi Declaration On The Problem Of The Proliferation Of Illicit Small Arms And

Light Weapons In The Great Lakes Region And The Horn Of Africa 2000.

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4) Nairobi Protocol For The Prevention, Control And Reduction Of Small Arms And Light

Weapons In The Great Lakes Region And The Horn Of Africa April 2004.

5) United Nations Programme for Action, 2000.

6) United Nations Fire Arms Protocol 2001

7
 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS:

ADF - Allied Democratic Forces

CMI - Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence

DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo

ESO - External Security Organization

HIV/Aids - Human Immune Virus/ Acquired Immune

Deficiency Syndrome.

I.B.E.A.Co - Imperial British East Africa Company

ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross

IDPs - Internally Displaced Persons

IGAD - Inter Governmental Authority on

Development

ISO - Internal Security Organization

LRA - Lords Resistance Army

NAP - National Action Plan

NCA - National Coordinating Agency

NFP - National Focal Point

NPA - National Point of Contact

NRA - National Resistance Army

NRM - National Resistance Movement

RUF - Revolutionary United Front

SALW - Small Arms and Light Weapons

SAS - Small Arms Survey

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SPLM/A - Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

U.N.L.A - Uganda National Liberation Army

UN - United Nations

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNPoA - United Nation’s Programme of Action

UPC - Uganda People’s Congress

UPDF - Uganda People’s Defense Forces

USD - United States Dollar

VCCU - Violent Crime Crack Unit

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

COPYRIGHT…………………………………………………………………………………….i

DECLARATION………………………………………………………………..……….………ii

DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………………………...iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………….…..………iv

PREFACE………………………………………………………………………………………..v

LIST OF STATUTES…………………………………………………………………………...vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………………………………......ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………………..….x

CHAPTER ONE:...................................................12
INTRODUCTION:....................................................................................................................12
1.1 BACK GROUND TO THE STUDY .................................................................................13
1.1.1 The Amin Era (1971-1979);.........................................................................................14
1.1.2 Obote ‘11’ 1981-1985;.................................................................................................14
1.1.3 The NRM period (1986 to the present);.......................................................................15
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: ................................................................................15
1.3 OBJECTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY:.................................................16
1.3.1 Main objectives:...........................................................................................................16
1.3.2 Specific objectives: ......................................................................................................16
1.3.3 Significance: ....................................................................................................................16
1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY:..................................................................................................17
1.5 SYNOPSIS: ........................................................................................................................17
1.6 HYPOTHESES: .................................................................................................................18
1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW:...................................................................................................18
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: ......................................................................................22
1.8.1 Documentary reviews: ................................................................................................22
CHAPTER TWO:.......................................................................................................................23
DEFINITIONS, SOURCES AND THE IMPACT OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT
WEAPONS:.................................................................................................................................23
2.1 INTRODUCTION: .............................................................................................................23
2.2 DEFINITIONS: ..................................................................................................................24
2.2.1 SMALL ARMS: ..........................................................................................................25
2.2.2 LIGHT WEAPONS: ....................................................................................................26
2.2.3 AMMUNITIONS: .......................................................................................................26
2.2.3.1 Explosives:............................................................................................................26

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 2.2.3.2 Land mine;.............................................................................................................27
2.2.3.3 Booby trap:............................................................................................................27
2.3 SOURCES:..........................................................................................................................27
2.3.1 TRAFFICKING METHODS AND ROUTES: ...........................................................30
2.3.1.1 African production of SALW and ammunition: ...................................................31
2.4 NEGATIVE EFFECTS:....................................................................................................34
2.4.1 Deaths and Injuries:......................................................................................................34
2.4.2 Armed Conflict And Violence: ...................................................................................35
2.4.3 Cattle Rustling:.............................................................................................................36
2.4.4 Poaching and Encroachment: ......................................................................................36
2.4.5 Hampering Of Development:.......................................................................................37
2.4.6 Crime:...........................................................................................................................38
2.4.7 Human Rights Abuse: .................................................................................................39
2.4.8 Gender and SALW:......................................................................................................40
2.5 POSITIVE EFFECTS:......................................................................................................41
2.5.1 Nairobi declaration:......................................................................................................41
2.5.2 National Focal Point (NFP):.........................................................................................41
2.5.3 Industries: ....................................................................................................................41
2.5.4 Unity: ...........................................................................................................................42
2.6 CONCLUSION:..................................................................................................................42
...........................................................................................................42
CHAPTER THREE:...................................................................................................................43
KEY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT...................43
WEAPONS...................................................................................................................................43
3.1 The Nairobi Declaration: ....................................................................................................43
3.2 The Nairobi protocol:..........................................................................................................44
3.3 The UN programme of Action (PoA):................................................................................44
3.4 UN Fire Arms protocol: .....................................................................................................46
3.5 National Focal Points (NFP):..............................................................................................48
3.6 The National Focal Point of Uganda:..................................................................................48
3.6.1 Establishment of the NFP: ...........................................................................................49
3.6.2 Functions of the NFP:...................................................................................................49
3.6.3 Composition of the Uganda NFP:................................................................................50
3.7 The National Action plan (NAP): ......................................................................................51
3.7.1 Reduction of availability of weapons: .........................................................................51
3.7.2 Preventive action: ........................................................................................................52
3.7.3 Implementation: ...........................................................................................................53
3.8 National legislation:............................................................................................................53
3.8.1 Bamako declaration 2001:............................................................................................57
3.9 CHALLENGES:..................................................................................................................59
3.9.1 Lack of transparency: ..................................................................................................60
3.9.2 Slow progress on the United Nations programme of Action: (PoA)...........................61
3.9.3 Policy and legislation:..................................................................................................61
3.9.4 Inadequate commitment of the political Elite:.............................................................62
3.9.5 Poverty:........................................................................................................................63
3.9.6 Weak Early Warning System:......................................................................................63
3.10 Recommendations: ...........................................................................................................64
..........................................................................................................65
CHAPTER FOUR:.............................................................................65
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:..............................................65

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 4.1 SUMMARY: ......................................................................................................................65
4.2 CONCLUSION:..................................................................................................................66
4.3 PERSPECTIVES FOR ACTION (RECOMMENDATIONS): .........................................67
4.3.1 Record keeping and marking: ......................................................................................67
4.3.2 Tracing: .......................................................................................................................68
4.3.2.1 Importance of tracing: ..........................................................................................68
4.3.3 Brokering: ....................................................................................................................69
4.3.4 Trade: ...........................................................................................................................69
4.3.5 Seizure disposal and enforcement: ..............................................................................70
4.3.6 Manufacture and Control of state owned small arms: .................................................71
4.3.7 Penalties: .....................................................................................................................72
4.3.8 Security Sector Reforms:..............................................................................................72
REFERENCES … ………………………………………………………………………..62

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION:
Small arms and light weapons under the fire arms act 1 are defined to mean barreled weapon

(other than an imitation firearm) from which any shot, bullet or other missile capable of causing

injury can be discharged, adapted for the discharge of whatever description designed or adopted

for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing dangerous to human beings, and

includes any component part of any such weapon as a foresaid and any accessory to any such

weapon designed or adapted to eliminate or diminish the noise or flash caused by firing any such

weapon, but does not include any antique firearm which has been rendered incapable of use as a

firearm.

The study aimed at investigating small arms and light weapons issues in Uganda, the impact,

legal framework and perspectives for action. The basis of research was to ascertain qualitatively

and quantitatively the far reaching implications of small arms and light weapons particularly in

Uganda and the areas surrounding it, these include, Kenya, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia

and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

1
The fire arms Act Cap 229 Laws of Uganda 2000.

1
The text book is made up of four chapters, the four chapters covered what small arms and light

weapons are, which types of weapons they are, definitions and the sources2. Only a handful of

African countries have the capacity to manufacture arms and ammunition with the South Africa

topping the list. The biggest sources small arms like assault rifles, machine guns, and rocket

propelled grenades are purchased from corrupt soldiers, stolen from government armories, like

the several coups that occurred in Uganda, civil wars and rebellions. The impacts and what

possible law policies should be sought to combat the trade of illicit small arms and light

weapons, interviews with security sector officials and recommendations.

1.1 BACK GROUND TO THE STUDY

The genesis of illicit small arms and light weapons in Uganda dates back to the pre-colonial

times3. The first guns were brought in Uganda by Arab trade about 1840 and some were sold or

given as gifts to Buganda Kingdom. Omukama Kabalega of Bunyoro (1870-1899) and Kabaka

Mutesa 1 of Buganda (1854-1884) had standing armies equipped with rifles, percussion muskets

and muzzle loaders purchased mainly from Arab traders.

The colonial era saw a new dawn of weapons infiltrating into the African continent. In order to

impose their rule the British had to use force and rule by the barrel of the gun. Notable, was

Captain Frederick Lugard who had armies of Swahili and Nubian soldiers.4 These soldiers were

used to quash resistance from the local kings namely Mwanga and Kabalega. The soldiers were

incorporated in the imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.Co) and maintained as

constant protection. Consequently, the 1897 mutiny by the Nubians that occurred due to the

favoritism of the Swahili soldiers leading to guns being dispersed. The violent events of 1890s

culminated in to the signing of the 1900 Buganda agreement where, there was separation of

powers, creation of the police, army and the gun tax to whoever possessed a gun.
2
Matt Schroeder, Guy lamb; The Illicit Arms trade in Africa,2006
3
Franes Wanyira; Problems and dynamics of small arms in Uganda,2002
4
Ibid

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In the post colonial era, the after math of the two world wars small arms and light weapons

proliferation doubled the world over, due to their flexibility and handy nature.

The Africans struggle for independence saw several rebellions like Mau Mau that necessitated

weapons to fight, thus their increase. In the post independence period there were conflicts of the

two lost counties of Bugangaizi and Buyaga. These conflicts were quelled by the military hand

of Milton Obote the then prime minister of Uganda.

1.1.1 The Amin Era (1971-1979);

In order to dislodge Amin’s murderous army, deposed president Milton Obote organized some

exiled army officers who had fled mainly to Tanzania and together with outraged intellectuals

including Yoweri Museveni, joined the Tanzania army and overran the country. Firearms

became common in Karamoja after the fall of Amin in 1979. Military stores in Moroto were

abandoned and the Karamojong removed all the weapons.

1.1.2 Obote ‘11’ 1981-1985;

The controversial 1980 general election allegedly won by Milton Obote’s UPC, gave birth to a

guerilla war involving several factions in protest of the stolen election results. On 27th July 1985,

the Acholi with the help of former Amin soldiers recalled from their exile in the Sudan, staged a

coup d’état against the elected government of Obote and made General Tito Okello Lutwa the

head of state. The fall of Obote led to another wave of arms finding illicit owners.

1.1.3 The NRM period (1986 to the present);

At the time of the takeover, in January 1986, the NRM boasted over 40,000 former civilians

under arms. When army retrenchment began in the early 1990’s about 100,000 former civilians

1
were under arms (as part of the enlarged NRA). Once again, the defeated U.N.L.A had fled with

their arms. The current source of arms to Kampala is mainly from the Didinga and Toposa

communities and SPLM/A deserters from the Lutukei, Kikilaiyi and chukudum areas of

neighboring southern Sudan.

These practices all tantamount in the proliferation of illicit small areas and light weapons

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

As noted above, 65% of fire arms in Uganda are owned by civilians5. There are laws that were

enacted to regulate the use of small arms. These include; the fire arms Act Cap.299 (with

amendments 2006), the police Act cap 303, (with amendments in 2006), security organization

Act cap 305, prisons Act, 2006, Uganda People’s Defense Forces Acts supplement 2005, the

Anti Terrorism Act No.14 of 2002.

In addition to the above Uganda is a signatory to international agreements to combat the issue of

small arms and light weapons, the Nairobi declaration 2001, the convention on prohibitions or

restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively

injurious or to have indiscriminate effects of the international committee of the Red cross and

the United Nations Programme of Action.

Despite all these national and international legal instruments existent, there is still a lot to be

desired in the enforcement and amendment of the legal policies.

This text book examines the effectiveness of the laws on small arms and light weapons; it is

aimed at answering questions like, what are the impacts of such arms, what are the sources,

5
Daily Monitor, Monday November 5th 2007

1
whether the loopholes in the law encourage these arms and what prospective Action can be taken

to phase out this practice.

1.3 OBJECTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY:

1.3.1 Main objectives:

The study is expected to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the impact of small

arms and light weapons in Uganda, dynamics, concepts and legal frame work for action. The

study emphasizes the need for accommodative legal regime in order to phase out this practice.

1.3.2 Specific objectives:

♦ To ascertain the impact of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the

area of study

♦ To identify effective laws and policies that would help curb this practice

♦ To establish the challenges involved in implementation of laws and policies

♦ To draw conclusions and make recommendations

1.3.3 Significance:
The study will be tasked on examining the weakness in the law and how it can be strengthened.

It will also in an overview relate the problem to the great lakes region which surround Uganda.

To that effect the study is very important at a time when Uganda is preparing for a “civilian-

arms-free-country”. It will enhance knowledge of the general public, legislators, readers at both

local and international levels giving the fact that this area has not been given due coverage like

this study will do.

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1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY:
The study covered the period from 1971 which is very pivotal in Uganda’s military history and

subsequent coup de tat’s taking place, up to date (2008).

The major geographical area of study was Uganda, in particular the most volatile areas like

Karamoja, Gulu and West Nile regions, western Uganda in Bundibugyo and other areas. Suffice

to note, the trafficking in small arms along the Uganda, Sudan and Kenya is thriving to an extent

an AK 476 assault rifle goes for 100,000 a pistol for 50,000. Thus the influence of other great

lakes region was in perspective to aid the research.

The subject scope will cover the impact of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in

Uganda, the underlying legal frame work and policy action.

1.5 SYNOPSIS:
Chapter one will cover background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the

study, hypothesis, scope of the study, significance of the study, literature review and

methodology.

Chapter two will deal with the impact of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in

Uganda, definitions and sources, with supplementary examples from other African jurisdictions

particularly the horn of Africa and the great lakes region vis a vis related laws.

Chapter three will cover the review of the existing law policy on small arms and light weapons,

legal and institutional frame work in Uganda related to the arms sector. The challenges and

strengths will also be identified

Chapter four this will entail conclusions and recommendations

6
www.new.vision.co.ug

1
1.6 HYPOTHESES:
The study seeks to test the following hypothesis:

“That the existing legal frame work in Uganda is not effective in implementing law on small

arms”

“The challenges of this problem have persisted due to lack of a stronger international coalition to

fight the issue of small arms”

“Small arms and light weapons have gained a culture as a method of ruling the masses”

1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW:

From time immemorial as can be noted that small arms and light weapons have a devastating

effect on people and development7, there are more than 600 million small arms and light

weapons in circulation worldwide. More than three quarters of these weapons are in possession

of civilians.

About 30 million are estimated to be in Africa. Never the less the damage these weapons cause

to the African continent and its people is huge. The struggle against the proliferation of small

arms and light weapons in Uganda can claim a number or recent successes. However, the small

arms hurt men and women in different ways. While men are the primary direct victims of

firearms in conflict situations small arms are strong tool often used for sexual violence towards

women. Moreover in such situations, women are affected more than by a the same weapon first

7
Ibid

1
for the perpetuation of the sexual assault, then is a threat to avoid reporting to a health centre or

public learning such crimes unpunished.

While there is wealth of literature on small arms and light weapons generally, no studies have

yet been carried out on the subject in the way this work attempts to. In view of this, a review of

literature has been done for those works which seem to best reflect the problem under study;

Berman (2007)8 discusses how the existence of illicit small arms and light weapons circulation

in Africa as well as to suggest measures to address the problem. However in his research he

focuses on Africa as a whole and rarely points out what loop holes in the law have encouraged

small arms proliferation in Uganda specifically.

Kiflemariam(2001)9 states that in many parts of the Horn of Africa, especially amongst rural

pastoralist societies, the issue of human security is closely linked to small arms. For centuries,

people living in these regions have been taking care of their own security, simply because,

amongst other reasons, the state has not been able to do so.

Even today, the police who are supposed to provide security are simply not visible in most rural

areas. They lack basic things like fuel – even if vehicles are available and functional. Most

police stations and barracks are in an appalling condition, thus police often resort to corruption

and the like to earn their living. Yet the solution does not simply lie in upgrading equipment and

housing of the police force or improving their benefits and payment schemes.

Most pastoralists own small arms and view them as indispensable-working tools to protect their

property as well as water points and lands for their herds to graze. Experience has shown them

8
Illicit trafficking of small arms in Africa, Africa Partnership support unit. Addis Ababa Ethiopia Eric G Berman,
14th March 2007
9
Mr. Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold, Project Leader, A people-centred approach to small arms issues in the Horn of
Africa.” SALIGAD Project, BICC.2001

1
time and again that they can only rely on their arms and group cohesion to do this, and not on an

ill trained, badly equipped and unmotivated police force. Besides, the closest police station is

often kilometres away from rural areas. Human security is, as a result, defined for them by their

lived experience of the security situation. For them to rely on a more or less organized police

force which is hardly equipped to guarantee their security would be a deadly exercise.

Pastoralists also have to protect themselves from other ethnic groups, and at the same time, they

conduct organized cattle raids. In former times they used to have less lethal weapons, but since

the seventies there has been an influx of small arms into the region. Driving forces behind the

acquisition of small arms are:

· Self-protection

· self-esteem, which is sought through the barrel by farmers, pastoralists and citizens alike, even

if they can’t really afford to buy small arms. The researcher agrees to these assertions as will be

elaborated further.

Shroeder and lamb (2006)10 the authors discuss the illicit trade in small arms and light weapon

as opaque, amorphous and dynamic. They further discuss small arms trade as a global enterprise

and majorly deal with the math’s involved other than the law, for example they quote small arms

survey, putting the dollar value of small arms trade at $1bilion (dollars) and 10-20% of global

trade.

Lumpe (1998)11 focuses on the curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as a

“medium politics” on the world agenda. She also looks at preparations for negotiation of a global

protocol against fire arms trafficking.

10
Matt Schroeder and Guy lamb; The illicit arms trade in Africa; a global enterprise; (2006)
11
Lora Lumpe; Curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; peace research institute (1998)

2
Asia Abdulkadir (2001) in his observesations about a great lakes region states that, Eritrea

Small arms and light weapons play a minor role in the social life of Eritrea. Since independence,

Eritrea has been among the most secure countries in Africa, and thus there is much less demand

for small arms in Eritrea compared to a country like Somaliland. However, the widespread

availability of SALW in Eritrea could lead to an increase in the level of crime and violence and

to a potential threat of armed conflicts between different population groups. The excessive and

destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons is closely related to the

increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence. However, due to

the prolonged state of war in the country, small arms are easily available, and weapons get into

the hands of individuals who might be tempted to use them. These arms have already been in use

in armed conflicts between villages.

On the positive side, the government of Eritrea has been making efforts to control the circulation

and accumulation of small arms in the country. It could be said that the government has been

Successful in maintaining internal peace and stability in the country. This may be the reason why

it does not consider SALW as a problem12.

Dr. Scholten (2006)13 focuses on the horn of Africa and the great lakes region, by looking at the

wars and domestic conflicts arising out of that region, being the cause of the small arms and light

weapons proliferation.

12
Asia Abdulkadir; The Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Eritrea, in Cooperation With The National
Union of Eritrean Youth andStudents, Asmara, Eritrea
13
Dr. Jan scholten; A parliamentarian Hand book on the small arms issue;; AWEPA, Nairobi/ Amsterdam ,2006

2
Scholten’s observations have been taken into account by this work when suggesting reforms

which can be adopted in Uganda. There is scarcity of literature pertinent to the effectiveness of,

the law in combating the proliferation of small arms in Uganda as this research aims to do.

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

The researcher mainly used two research techniques namely; documentary review and field

research.

1.8.1 Documentary reviews:

This involved a systematic review of data obtained from text books, journals and newspaper

articles, case law, statutes, internet, material papers, dissertation and thesis as well as

government reports pertinent to the issue of small arms in Uganda. The sources were found in

the Uganda Christian university library, Makerere University Library, National Focal Point

Ministry of Internal Affairs, Action Network on Small Arms.

1.8.2 Field research:

Field research was conducted at Uganda people’s defence forces liaison office in Kololo

Kampala/Defence Reform Secretariat, Internal Security Organization under President’s Office.

Data collection was mainly through qualitative methods of research and oral interviews with the

staff of the above mentioned institutions.

2
 CHAPTER TWO:
DEFINITIONS, SOURCES AND THE IMPACT OF SMALL ARMS AND
LIGHT WEAPONS:

2.1 INTRODUCTION:
The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) poses a threat to human

security and has intensified conflicts in Uganda and East Africa at large. Violent conflicts like

cattle rustling in Karamoja, Pokot and the Somali clusters14 armed rebellions in Northern Uganda

the LRA western Uganda by the Allied democratic forces (ADF) also the armed conflicts in

southern Sudan by the SPLA. Illustrate the scope of the problem. Generally, the proliferation of

SALW’s emanates from the failure of governance by states that cannot control the flow of the

SALWs across their borders are often politically and institutionally weak. In addition to the

porous borders, the police and other security forces in such states lack effective enforcement

capacity. Over abundance of SALW’s results in committed, riddled with crime and violence as

well as rogue security forces that sometimes perpetuate insecurity and human rights abuses15.

Small arms and light weapons have a devastating effect on people and development. They are

cheap, durable, easy to use and widely available. The large majority of firearms circulating in

Uganda and Africa generally are in the hands of people who are not supposed to be carrying

guns. According to the small asses survey in Africa they are distributed among their users as

follows.

79% are in the hands of civilians

16% of the military

3% of the police
14
Small arms surveys; Graduate institute of international studies, Geneva Switzerland 1999
15
Ibid

2
2% of insurgents

SALW’s are weapons of choice for rebels, bandits, big city youth gangs as well as for regular

armies. They are weapons mostly widely used to impose force in this world and cause the most

casualties of all arms16.

2.2 DEFINITIONS:
The term small arms and light weapons (SALW’s) generally refer weapons that are easy to carry

around, easy to use and relatively inexpensive17 under section 1(c)18 there is a general definition

that has been related to the definition that has been related to the definition of fire arms and light

weapons. Weapons19 have been defined to mean a device that is designed or has the capability,

to cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial material damage through the release,

dissemination or impact of toxic chemicals biological agents or toxins or similar substances or

radiation or radioactive material. They range from revolvers and pistols, to shoulder launched

missiles, rocket propelled grenades and mortars. Kalashnikovs or Ak-47’s are probably the best

known and most widely available small arms ammunitions and explosives such as hand grenades

are also considered to belong to the category of SALW’s.

Suffice to note experts usually define small arms as those that can be carried around and used by

one person, while light weapons need two or three people to be operated and can be transported,

by a pack animal or small vehicle. They have been distinguished as below;

16
Dr. Durna A Bekol and Paul Omachi Building peace in Eastern Africa,Entebbe, Uganda 2002
17
Ibid
18
Supra
19
The Anti-terrorism Act No.14 of 2002

2
2.2.1 SMALL ARMS:
Are weapons designed for personal use and shall include: light machine guns, sub machine guns,

including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles and semi automatic rifles20.

They shall also include:

Fire arms: mean;

a). any potable barreled weapons that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to

expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique fire arms and

their replicas. Antique fire arms shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case,

however, shall antique fire arms include: fire arms manufactured after 1889;

b). any other weapon or destructive device, such as an explosive bomb, incendiary bomb or gas

bomb, grenade, rocket launchers, missile21.

2.2.2 LIGHT WEAPONS:

These shall include the following portable weapons designed for the use by several persons

serving a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortars of less than 100mn,

caliber, grenade launchers and air defense weapons.

2.2.3 AMMUNITIONS:
These include grenades, bombs and other like missiles and cartridges blank, tracer, explosive

incendiary, observing or signaling cartridges any other ammunition containing or designed or

adopted to contain shot, bullet or any noxious liquid gas or other thing whether capable of use

with a fire arm or not22. They also include; mobile containers with missile or shells for single-

action and anti air craft and anti tank systems, anti –personnel and anti tank grenades , land

mines and explosives.

20
Nairobi Protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms and light weapons in the great lakes
region and the Horn of Africa April 2004
21
Supra
22
Section 1(b) the fire arms Act cap 299

2
2.2.3.1 Explosives:
It is defined to mean an incendiary weapon or device that is designed, or has the capability to

cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial material damage23.

2.2.3.2 Land mine;

Means a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a

person and that will incapacitate injure or kill one or more persons24.

2.2.3.3 Booby trap:

Means any device or material which is designed constructed or adopted to kill or injure and

which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless

object or performs an apparently safe Act25

2.3 SOURCES:
The single most important source of small arms circulating in Africa is existing stocks of small

arms. These were legally transferred but have subsequently leaked into the illicit market. The

number of arms originating from the ‘official’ arms depots of the armed forces and police is far

bigger than from any other source. Through theft, corruption and negligence, arms from these

depots end up in the hands of rebels and criminals. During civil wars and violent power shifts in

particular, huge numbers of formerly legal arms enter the illicit market. When Idi Amin was

overthrown in 1979, for instance, many of the state armories were broken into and soldiers fled

to Zaire with their weapons. During other violent changes of power in Uganda and several other

countries, arms held by the state have been retained by soldiers of the outgoing regime. With a

change of rule, soldiers once legally in possession of state arms become rebels with illegal arms.

The second source of small arms is local manufacturers. A limited number of African states in

the great lakes region and horn of Africa have some form of manufacturing capability. In Kenya
23
Section 2(a) the anti- terrorism Act No.14 2002
24
Article 2 convention on proliferations or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects ICRC, November 2003.
25
Supra

2
for instance the ordinance factories corporation in Eldoret produces ammunition. According to

Jane’s intelligence review26, the plant, which was partly built by FN herstal of Belgium, has a

capacity of 20,000 to 60,000 bullets per day. Uganda and Tanzania are also known to have arms

of ammunition manufacturing capacity within their borders. Through theft or corruption,

products from these plants occasionally end up in the illicit arms market.

Africa faced new challenges in the years immediately following the cold war27. With the

downsizing of armed forces, and changes in doctrine and procurement associated with military

aliment with the west many eastern European countries found themselves with huge stockpiles

of soviet era small arms and ammunition that were surplus to new requirements. Conflicts in

Africa, such as Angola, the great lakes, region, and West Africa provided attractive small arms

markets for many of these countries to earn much needed revenues from their surplus material.

Security Council commissions created to investigate violations of UN embargoes shed light on

some of this activity. Including victor bout’s transfer of USD 14 million in small arms, light

weapons and ammunition from Bulgaria to primarily DRC and Tanzania from 1997 to 1998 28

and Leonard Mini’s sale of 68 tons of munitions from the Ukraine to Liberia and Sierra Leone in

March 199929. These and similar transfers typified the international flow of illicit arms in the

1990’s –from the global north to the African continent. Arms manufactured from the north

fueled numerous conflicts, killed tens of thousands of causalities, facilitated the displacement of

hundreds of thousands of persons, and enabled widespread, gross human rights violations. For

26
Eric G. Berman Managing Director Small Arms Survey Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms in Africa:
Increasingly a Home-Grown Problem 2005.

27
Ibid
28
UNSC, 2000, p. 12
29
UN Panel, 2000.

2
the most part, the people who benefited financially from these deals were transport companies,

brokers and banks mostly from the north.

Today eastern European surplus arms are not as plentiful as they once were. Many northern

countries have improved their oversight mechanisms and addressed legal and administrative

loopholes. Governments have also destroyed many surplus weapons. But it is correct to say that

much more needs to be done. Surplus weapons from the region continue to flow into conflict-

torn areas30. Where brokering legislation exists, unscrupulous actors continue to exploit

loopholes. Adherence to UN embargoes remains inconsistent.

The small arms survey and many other researchers active on the ground, find that many of the

continent’s problems with respect to illicit trafficking are home-grown. The proliferation of

armed groups, poor stockpile management, corruption and the recirculation of existing stocks on

the continent stem from domestic problems that African governments and policy makers have

yet to appropriately acknowledge.

The unauthorized craft production of firearms by local gunsmiths is a significant source of illicit

small arms in some areas. A recent study of craft production in Ghana by Emmanuel Kwesi

Aning found that the country’s unlicensed gunsmiths have the collective capacity to produce up

to 200,000 firearms a year, some of which are reportedly “of a quality comparable with

industrially produced guns31”

30
Although the transfers in 2004 and 2005 of hundreds of thousands of small arms and millions of rounds of their
ammunition from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Iraq( Amnesty international, 2006) did not involve Africa, this activity
underscores the huge surplus of material that remain, and the willingness to export rather than to destroy it.
31
African analyst 3rd quarter issue 1, 2006

2
Cross-border arms trafficking by members of armed group is also common. Small arms survey

claims that Liberian rebels have reportedly crossed the poorly secured Ivorian border to trade

their weapons for motorcycles. Similarly, anecdotal evidence suggests that members of forces

Nouvelles, an Ivorian rebel group, have smuggled weapons into Mali and Ghana, trading them

for food and other consumer goods.

Arms traffickers on other continents also fly or ship weapons illicitly in to Africa. In fact,

according to researchers Wood and Peleman32, most of illicit small arms used in Africa originate

from china, Israel, and more than 20 OSCE (organization for security and co-operation in

Europe) members. They are either the remnants of large- scale weapons shipments to rebel

movements during the cold war, or are recent supplies from the massive, sanctions- busting

shipments organized by the so called “merchants of death” – the globe-trotting arms brokers who

specialize in the clandestine delivery of weapons to war zones and dictators. Representative of

these transfers is a 68-ton shipment that was flown in to Burkina Faso in March 1999 and later

shipped to Liberia and Sierra Leone’s revolutionary united front (RUF). UN investigators, who

summarized their findings in a July 2000 report, reviewed the shipment and found 715 boxes

containing 3000 assault rifles, 25 rocket-propelled grenades, 50 machines, guns and several

guided anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles33.

2.3.1 TRAFFICKING METHODS AND ROUTES:

As small arms are lightweight, concealable and durable, the ways in which they can be smuggled

are nearly limitless. Long, porous and poorly patrolled land borders facilitate the illicit transfer

of small arms on foot or by truck. Some of this trafficking is large-scale and systematic. UN

experts investigating arms embargo violations in Somalia documented the delivery of arms to

32
Ibid
33
Aminu Bashir Wali, Meeting of states to consider action programme on illicit small arms trade, (2001).

2
Somalia Militias by Ethiopian truck convoys. Similarly Liberia’s Charles Taylor transported

many of the weapons he provided to the RUF across the border in trucks. Rogue soldiers, rebels,

refugees and others also walk across borders with one or two small arms at a time.

Traffickers also smuggle small arms along Africa’s rivers and coasts. Researchers from the small

arms survey claim that Malian arms smugglers pack small arms into waterproof, attach them to

the bottom of boats, and run them up the Niger River. In the Horn, the smugglers that ply the

Gulf of Aden often use dhows

- Large, wooden-hulled vessels with distinctive triangular sails

- To deliver large quantities of small arms from Yemen to Somali warlords. In August 2001, the

dhow Alshadax reportedly delivered nearly 500 assault rifles, grenade launchers and machine

guns to a Somali faction leader, according to UN investigators

2.3.1.1 African production of SALW and ammunition:

Most small arms and ammunition that are used in, and recovered from, armed conflicts or crime

on the continent originate outside of Africa, indeed only some three percent of an estimated 1,

2000 companies producing components of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition

globally are reportedly located in Africa34

SAS (small arms survey) has also found that a lot of small arms and ammunition are not just

locally sourced but locally manufactured, for example the manufacturing of bullets in

Nakasongola by the Ugandan Army35. It is important to acknowledge this under-reported activity

and to examine its role in the illicit trafficking of small arms and ammunition on the continent.

34
Omega 2001 (small arms Survey 2002)
35
www.gunpolicy.org/uganda.

3
As many as one- third of African states factory produce small arms or small arms ammunition or

have done so in the recent past (see table 1). Few such states discuss manufacturing openly and

publicly available literature on the subject is often contradictory. Moreover, it is unclear in some

cases whether factories are operational or dormant36. There is nevertheless, general agreement

that at least 11 countries produced ammunition for small arms and light weapons (from shot gun

shells in the republic of Congo (Brazzaville) to mortar shells in Zimbabwe), 5 countries

produced small arms (from pistols in south Africa to assault rifles in Libya), and 2 countries

produced light weapons (from rocket propelled grenade launchers in Nigeria to surface to air

missiles in Egypt) during the period 1997 to 2006.

African manufacturers of small arms, light weapons and their ammunition (1997-2006)

Country Production

SA LW AMMO

36
Supra

3
01 Algeria □

02 Burkina Faso ■

03 Cameroon ■

04 Congo (Brazz.) ◘

05 Egypt ■ ■ ■

06 Ethiopia ■

07 Guinea ◘

08 Kenya ■

09 Libya ◘

10 Morocco ■

11 Namibia □

12 Nigeria ■ ■

13 South Africa ■ ■ ■

14 Sudan □ ■

15 Tanzania ■

16 Uganda ■

17 Zimbabwe ■ ■

Note: production may not have been ongoing in 2006

Key
■ = confirmed active
□ = unconfirmed
◘ = confirmed, status unclear
Sources: based on Amnesty, 2004; Jones and Cutshaw, 2004; transparency, 2005.

The impact of SALW’s in Uganda has both negatively to (a great extent) and positively to (a

small extent) affected the lives of the communities socially, economically and politically. The

impacts will be discussed negatively and positively (respectively) as elaborated below:

3
2.4 NEGATIVE EFFECTS:

2.4.1 Deaths and Injuries:

The small arms survey estimates that small arms have resulted in hundreds of thousands of death

and millions of injuries each year. They are further responsible for 60 to 90%37 of total conflict

deaths. However, the exact global total is unknown as data is particularly sketchy in those

countries that are in the throes of violent conflict. In the few African countries where reliable

data is available, small arms are leading cause of unnatural deaths. For example, in South Africa,

small arms are the principal cause of unnatural deaths (close to 30% of the total) more than road

accident fatalities. For example a case in point is northern Uganda where the Lord’s Resistance

Army (LRA) in their 21 year old war has been estimated to have caused deaths and injuries to

over 100,000 people in northern Uganda38. The post –independence period saw the deaths of

over a million people in Uganda to an extent, that there has been a recent column that has been

set up to bring, to light all those who lost their loved ones to the gun rule. A case in point is

Mohammed Yusuf Tolo who was snatched away by government soldiers and later killed in

bondo barracks in 198139.

In the majority of these countries, illicit small arms were responsible for injuries and death. That

is the lethality and ready availability of illicit small arms in situations of violent conflict extends

beyond the injury, death and psychological, trauma of individual victims. In Sudan,

approximately two million people have died and six million have been internally displaced

because of the protracted armed conflict- fought primarily with illicit small arms40.

37
Ibid
38
www.newvision.co.ug
39
The monitor news paper April 21 2008.
40
Ibid

3
2.4.2 Armed Conflict And Violence:
The availability of small arms combined with the experience of protracted armed conflict has

resulted in the emergence of a “gun culture” in certain African countries. It entails a socio-legal

system of norms and values where gun ownership is highly valued and is linked to identity and

status. In some societies, gun culture may even result in the perception of armed violence (or the

threat thereof) as an acceptable and legitimate means of social interaction between people. This

is particularly the case in areas where the state is weak, or absent, such as the eastern provinces

of the democratic republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia41. The Karamoja region and Northern

Uganda in particular have been pertinent to such practices where you find the Karamajong trade

their cows for guns in order to protect their cattle. Armed violence can also damage social

structure of societies in terms of family and communal cohesion, gender relations and customary

relations. Also, the LRA by abducting young children, created child soldiers which is the

fundamental abuse of child rights, a case in point is where you find a 14year old boy handling an

AK-47 and saying

“For us an AK-47 or so is like a decoration. It is part of us42”

2.4.3 Cattle Rustling:

Illicit small arms have also led to the violent intensification of inter community tensions and

conflicts over scarce resources. For instance, low scale cattle rustling has been a feature of rural

life in eastern African for centuries, particularly in the border areas of Kenya and Uganda.

However, approximately 20 years ago cattle rustlers began to acquire small arms illicitly. The

nature of the conflict has changed because of the availability of small arms. Hundreds of people

have been killed and numerous communities displaced, with the Karamojong and the Pokot

nomadic cattle herders believed to be the principal perpetrators. In April 2003, 2,000 Pokot

41
Graduate institute of international studies in Geneva 2003
42
DR. Dorina A Bekoe and Dr. Paul Omach ;Building peace in Eastern Africa,Entebbe Uganda December 2002

3
cattle rustlers from Kenya killed 28 people and displaced thousands in eastern Uganda in raid

using illicit firearms43.

2.4.4 Poaching and Encroachment:

Small arms have also been used to engage in poaching activities in poverty stricken areas near

wildlife parks and sanctuaries. For example, nature conservations estimate that between 1977

and 199744 the elephant population in Africa halved in size, largely due to poaching. According

to the United Kingdom parliamentary office on science and technology, the combination of the

lucrative “bush meat” trade- which supplies the meat of wild animals – and ineffective

governance in many central African areas, has encouraged the formation of well-armed

paramilitary poaching groups whose actions have decimated endangered wildlife populations. In

the Congo basin, between one million and three million tons of bush meat is harvested each year.

This in turn has resulted in a down turn for the tourism economies of these areas. In Uganda,

poaching was very evident in game parks like, Queen Elizabeth National park, where poaching

was so rampant that the game wardens had to be armed with live ammunition from bows and

arrows in order to protect the game reserves. More so in Bwindi impenetrable game park the

killing of a US national and robbing of the others property worth 5000 dollars45 necessitated the

arming of the wardens with ammunitions and arms in order to protect the tourists thus

proliferation of arms.

2.4.5 Hampering Of Development:

Not only do small arms cause deaths and injuries, the impact of armed violence on development

is considerable. As United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) points out, every year

small arms kill, maim and injure hundreds of thousands of people, destroy livelihoods and

43
The New Vision April 2003
44
United Kingdom parliamentary office 1998
45
www.monitorpublications.co.ug

3
promote cultures of fear and terror, “compromising the development of many countries

worldwide46”

The proliferation and misuse of small arms is also counter-developmental. A case in point was

the political turmoil Uganda faced from the period of 1966 to 1986. It was once said that Uganda

was at the same development rate as Malaysia and economic strong hold in Asia. The rampant

coup de tats and illicit trafficking of arms greatly hampered the development of the economic

boom that Uganda was once proud of. Also, the 22year old war in Northern Uganda 47 has greatly

affected the development of that area as opposed to other areas like the central and western

regions of Uganda According to the 2005 human development report: “insecurity” linked to

armed conflict remains one of the greatest obstacles to human development. It is both a cause

and a consequence of “mass poverty”. The human development index reflects this, of the 20

countries listed as experiencing the lowest levels of human development48 (all of which are in

Africa) more than 50% have been subject to significant levels of armed violence since 1990.

It also decimates economies and dislocates societies. The reason for this is that armed conflict

seriously disrupts or even destroys food production and distribution processes, with hunger and

malnutrition being the direct result, especially among the most vulnerable population groups. For

example, the civil war in the DRC has resulted in approximately four million deaths- an

estimated 7% of the total population – that is not the direct result of small arms violence, but

instead can be attributed to malnutrition and disease.Thus a negative effect of small arms and

light weapons49.

46
AWEPA Amsterdam March 2006
47
Disarmament programmes in Uganda with special focus on Karamoja case: approaches methods and outcomes by
Brigadier Kale Kayihura chief political commissar UPDF. April 2002
48
Human development report 2005
49
ibid

3
The availability and proliferation of small arms in contexts of violent conflict hinder the ability

of development agencies to provide aid and food relief, for governments to provide security,

enforce the law and repair, damaged or destroyed infrastructure. A recent survey of humanitarian

relief agencies by small arms survey and the centre for humanitarian dialogue revealed that these

organizations were unable to access a quarter of their target population groups due to the

perceived availability of small arms.

2.4.6 Crime:
Rampant crime in urban centers such as Nairobi and even in rural areas along the Ethiopia-

Somali borders is closely linked to the availability of small arms. Observing more and more

localized, often urban crimes, partly as a result of social disintegration which leads to high rates

of crime. Small arms abuse is exacerbated by the lack of effective control and enforcement

capacity, by the presence of high levels of social generated demand for small arms, and by their

ready availability. The absence of local control is in turn exacerbated by the absence of national

norms and standards. The urban citizenry arm themselves in order to avoid being a victim of

crime. This in turn increases the number of small arms in the hands of civilians, which could

become a source of uncontrolled availability and ultimately also usage50. For Uganda’s case

around 2001-2002 there were rampant robberies, carjacking, kidnapping and general theft,

followed by bombings of city suburbs and entertainment areas as was in Makindye, Wandegeya

and the city centre. This was due to proliferation of small arms and light weapons51.

2.4.7 Human Rights Abuse:

Security forces are responsible for providing security to citizens. However, it is widely reported

and fairly well documented that these security forces in several Inter Government Authority on

Development (IGAD) countries are abusing the responsibility given to them. The whole area of
50
Dr. Oliver Kobusingye, director, injury control centre Uganda;The impact of small arms on humanitarian
interventions in Uganda.
51
Ibid

3
the utilization of small arms and light weapons by the security forces, and the type of weapons

they use (often assault rifles), which are not meant to be in the hands of the police, needs

thorough study and the development of viable policy options. In Uganda for example with the

disbandment of two armies i.e. the Uganda national liberation army (UNLA) and the Uganda

national rescue front, arms were stolen and used in abuse of human rights, in northern Uganda

the LRA have on several occasion being accused of maiming victims by cutting off their lips,

amputating, boiling people alive and chopping up bodies into pieces which violates the

fundamental human rights52 as provided for in the constitution of the republic of Uganda 1995.

Without security sector reform- which does not simply mean the reform of the uniformed forces-

the issue of human rights abuse, which may trigger civilians’ demand for small arms as a means

to protect themselves from police and soldiers, will not be solved at all53. Security sector reform

must include the right of civil society to know and comment on the budget of the uniformed

forces and the role and scope of their activities. Without a responsible and well based

relationship between civilians and uniformed forces we shall not be able to mitigate the misuse

of small arms by security forces. The whole range of civil military relations has to be revisited.

2.4.8 Gender and SALW:

Small arms hurt men and women in different ways. While men are the primary direct victims of

firearms in conflict situations, small arms are a strong tool and often used for sexual violence

towards women. Moreover, in such situations, women are affected more than once by the same

weapons, first for the perpetuation of the sexual assault, then as a threat to avoid reporting to a

health centre or to the police54, leaving such crimes unpunished and the perpetuator free to repeat

it. Armed robberies often include sexual violence towards women when present at the scene,

52
The Human rights watch Uganda chapter 2000
53
Supra.
54
A parliamentarians’ hand book on the small arms issue AWEPA March 2006

3
therefore, small arms in such situation could in addition to violating basic human rights,

facilitate the spread of HIV/Aids.

From a gender perspective, how can narrowing the definition of SALW help, when women and

men suffer differently? Surely if we broaden the definition we allow for a better understanding

of how men as rapists are a war weapon? Masculinity and understandings of maleness are at the

center of how rape is used.

In looking at the effects of displacement after conflict, women and children do suffer more but

internally displaced persons (IDPs) are not strongly enough on agenda. The rotation of arms

through illicit trafficking seems to be the biggest finding of Small Arms and Light weapons:

Assessing Issues and Developing Capacity for peace in the Horn of Africa thus far, but this is

still under-researched.55

2.5 POSITIVE EFFECTS:

2.5.1 Nairobi declaration:

It has enhanced the awareness of international efforts to come up as one and fight the vice that

SALWs have brought. A case in point is the Nairobi declaration/ protocol of 2000. where it was

to the effect that the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the

great lakes region and the Horn of Africa and the devastating consequences they have had in

sustaining armed conflict and armed crime, degrading the environment, fueling the illegal

exploitation of natural resources and abetting terrorism and serious crimes in the region56. The

declaration put in place a comprehensive strategy to curb the trade by ensuring that all states

have adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over

the possession and transfer of small arms57.

55
Ms. Ruth Ojambo Ochieng, director, Isis –women’s international cross- cultural exchange (Isis-WICCE), Uganda.
56
Nairobi declaration 2000
57
The New Vision, Monday 19th March 2007

3
2.5.2 National Focal Point (NFP):
Under the establishment of the Nairobi declaration, there was a policy of implementation,

partner states under took to establish national focal points to deal with the problem of small arms

and light weapons in all aspects, and to oversee the implementation of the action plan. Its role

was to ensure national coordination and implementation of the Nairobi declaration and to

develop actions and policies for the implementation of the Nairobi declaration among others. It

has achieved recent successes as to curb the proliferation of SALW as will be discussed later58.

2.5.3 Industries:
The capturing of over 60000 fire arms59 from the Karamoja region has acted to provide the steel

industry with steel and metal in which other metallic conversions can be put to use, for example

the industry in Nakasongola let alone creating employment for the factory workers.

2.5.4 Unity:
This has been evidenced by the people in Karamoja, North western Kenya, southern Sudan,

Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi who have signed the tripartite agreement and the IGAD

programme60 that has helped in enhancing peace and security in the region generally and led to

the change and revision of the arms policy. A case in point is the amendment of the fire Arms

Act 2006

2.6 CONCLUSION:
Small arms and light weapons pose a threat to the stability of a developing or post-conflict state.

The proliferation of weapons may spark or prolong conflict, obstruct relief programs, hinder

development, increase human rights abuses, or undermine peace initiatives. Uganda has begun to

pass legislation and implement programs to combat the illicit use and trade of small arms and

58
National focal point establishment October 2001
59
Ibid
60
Ibid

4
light weapons. In relation States have used three basic approaches to this problem. First, states

have passed domestic legislation on licensing, import, export, use, and production of small arms

and light weapons. Second, states have reached bilateral agreements with other states to work

towards reducing the availability of weapons in society. The third approach includes

implementation of regional or international agreements that provide recommendations on

combating SALW61 as will be elaborated in the following chapters.

61
Ibid

4
 CHAPTER THREE:
KEY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT
WEAPONS
This chapter is aimed at discussing the legal framework (national and international instruments)

that has been responsible for formulating the policies governing the SALWs. The challenges

faced in implementation of the policies, will also be looked at. Imperative to note, Uganda is a

signatory to several key international instruments as regards the proliferation of SALWs as will

be discussed and elaborated:

In the new millennium a significant number of international treaties and agreements have been

signed to limit the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons. Parliamentarians played

a crucial role in the design and ratification of many of them.

3.1 The Nairobi Declaration:

In March 2000, countries of the great lakes region and the Horn of Africa adopted the Nairobi

declaration Burundi, Djibouti, the DRC, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda

signed this political document outlining a series of principles and actions geared towards

stopping the illicit proliferation of small arms62. They were later joined by the Seychelles, Congo

Brazzaville and the Central African Republic. The Nairobi declaration member states promised

to address in a comprehensive manner the elicit proliferation of small arms starting with the

establishment of sub regional coordinating structure, the Nairobi secretariat, manned with a team

of expert managed by a coordinator, and at the country level with the establishment of Nairobi

Focal Points gathering representatives of key ministries and civil society, under a designated

coordinator entrusted with the design and implemented of a national action plan. The Nairobi

Declaration member states major commitment was to put in place adequate laws, regulations and

administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the possession and transfer of small

arms. This was followed by the establishment of the national focal point of Uganda in October

62
Col. Muna Johnson Chief of protocol UPDF in an Interview
200163 and was tasked with facilitating exchange and dissemination of information coordinating

and interacting with other national focal points as will be discussed further by the researcher.

3.2 The Nairobi protocol:

In April 2004 signatory countries to the Nairobi declaration signed the Nairobi protocol, as the

legally binding follow-up to the Nairobi declaration. In September 2005, six of eleven signatory

states had ratified the protocol, which meant it would likely come into force before the end of

2006. The 2004 Nairobi protocol, mainly inspired by the South African Development

Corporation protocol, details the minimal standards for harmonized legislative measures,

interstate cooperation of law enforcement agencies, confirm the role of the Nairobi Secretariat

and welcome the accession of additional member states. In June 2005, the secretariat of the

Nairobi declaration became a regional centre on small arms in the great lakes region and the

Horn of Africa (RECSA), therefore gaining its own independent legal identify as a sub regional

body64.

3.3 The UN programme of Action (PoA):

In December of 1999, the United Nations (UN) passed a resolution to convene a UN conference

on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects65. In July of 2001, the

conference was held and attendees of the conferences approved the programme of action to

prevent combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects66.

The UN programme on Action is significant because some states have relied almost entirely on

the UN programme of Action to establish and implement mechanisms for SALW enforcement.

63
Richard Nabudere Assistant commissioner of police in charge of security organization and fire arms control, The
national focal point of Uganda.
64
Nairobi protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms and light weapons in the great lakes
region and Horn of Africa 2005.
65
United Nations General Assembly resolution 54/54 V. available at http://disarmement.un.org/vote.nsf.
66
Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its
aspects. http://disamement.un.org/cab/poa.html
Other states, on the other hand have complemented other state laws and mechanism with the

requirements of the UN programme of Action.

Under the programme of Action, the Member states resolved “to prevent, combat and eradicate”

the illicit trade of SALW67. Member states resolved to develop or strengthen agreed norms at all

levels and coordinate efforts to combat SALW. They also pledged to implement agreed-upon

international measures, mobilize political will throughout the international community to combat

SALW, and promote responsible action by states.

The programme of action provides recommendations for mechanisms at the state level. These

include among others, passing laws, regulations and administrative procedures to control

production, brokering, import, and export of SALW; establishing them as criminal offenses (as

can be evidenced in the fire arms Act cap 229 laws of Uganda) ; destroying all confiscated,

seized or collected SALW; and developing public awareness and confidence-building

programs68. Member states also agreed to establish national coordination agencies and a national

point of contact to act as a liaison with other states regarding the implementation of the

programme of Action69.

Suffice to note Uganda in implementing the above declaration, in addition to the other

international agreement commitments; Uganda introduced a national focal point. The national

focal point was tasked in creating a national action plan which was to create focus, drive and

coordinate for the initiatives and the problems for small arms and light weapons as will be

elucidated later. However these international agreements are more of political commitments than

legally binding instruments.

67
UN Doc.A/CONE.192/15 part 1 para.22
68
Supra
69
Strengthening small arms control regional and national review.
3.4 UN Fire Arms protocol:
In 2001, the UN also adopted the UN firearms protocol, which is legally binding, came into

force in the summer of 2005, after two thirds of the signatory states had ratified the protocol70.

The firearms protocol commits UN member states to regulate the manufacture, export, import

and transit of firearms. Article 7 of the protocol requires firearms to be marked and records to be

kept for ten years. Destruction of such records that are less than ten years will be held to mean

violation to the above instrument. Kenya, Uganda71, Malawi and Zambia are among the African

countries that ratified the protocol. A protocol will enter into operation 90 days after the 40th

ratification, provided the parent convention has entered into force.

Major review at United Nations to assess progress made and actions needed to further stem

illegal small arms trade:

Imperative to note, in the aftermath of the UN program for Action, (five years after the adoption

of the UN programme of action to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons) some

2,000 representatives from governments, international and regional organizations and civil

society met at UN headquarters from 26 June to 7 July 2006 to review progress made, to address

future co-operation and activities, and to asses challenges on the road ahead72.

By unanimously adopting the programme of Action in 2001, the UN member states committed

themselves to collecting and destroying illegal weapons, adopting and / or improving national

legislation to help criminalize the illicit trade in small arms, regulating the activities of brokers,

setting strict import and export controls, taking action against violators of such laws and better

coordinating international efforts to that end. This can be evidenced in Uganda by the

amendment of police Act cap 303 (with amendment 2006), firearms amendment Act 2006, and

70
Small arm survey 2002
71
Uganda national focal point report , Feb 2007
72
Small arms review conference United Nations, 2006
the Uganda peoples defence forces Acts supplement 2005. A case in point is the burning of over

60000 guns in 2006, 57000 in Nsambya and 3000 in Jinja73

The small arms review conference reinforced the momentum for action among member states,

civil society, international and regional organizations. The conference also welcomed the

establishment of a group of governmental experts that met in November 2006 to tackle the issue

of reigning illegal arms brokers.

In Africa, where illegal small arms have been used to kill directly or indirectly hundreds of

thousands of people in conflict zones, three legally-binding agreements have been developed to

address this issue and to focus on the humanitarian impact: the “Nairobi Protocol” on firearms,

covering East Africa and great lakes region74;

More than 60 countries have collected and destroyed large amounts of illegal small arms.

Different methods have been used, including by “flames of peace” bonfires (Burundi, Cambodia,

the Democratic republic of the Congo75, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, south Africa); by crushing

them with steamrollers, bulldozers or tanks (brazil, the former Yugoslavia Republic of

Macedonia, Paraguay, Sri Lanka); by dismantling weapons ( Argentina, Costa Rica, Timor-

Leste, Uganda); by discarding in deep water (Senegal and others). Other cost effective and

environment friendly methods have also been used.

UN peacekeeping operations have developed and implemented disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration (DDR) programmes in post conflict situations, especially in Africa, helping

73
New vision 30th October 2006.
74
Http://www.un.org/smallarms2006/
75
www.publicinternationallaw.org
thousands of former combatants (including women and children) disarm and return to civilian

life in countries such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The UN protocol against the illicit manufacturing or and trafficking in fire arms, their parts and

components and ammunition came into force in July 2005 as the first legally binding global

instrument on small arms which aims at strengthening cooperation among states to combat illicit

manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms76. The firearms protocol supplements the UN

convention against transnational organized crime and is expected to become a useful tool for law

enforcement in the countries that ratified it.

3.5 National Focal Points (NFP):

In accordance with the Nairobi declaration, National focal points (NFP’s) were set up in the

signatory countries to oversee implementation of the measures. The Nairobi secretariat

supervises implementation of measures at the regional level.

In 2005, the mandate of the Nairobi secretariat77 was widened to include coordination of small

arms programmes initiated by the international conference on the Great Lakes region, an

initiative of 11 states aimed at reaching a peace pact for the region before the end of 2006.

3.6 The National Focal Point of Uganda:

Uganda is a signatory to the Nairobi declaration in which partner states to the protocol dedicate

themselves to comprehensively addressing the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms

and light weapons in the Great lakes region and the Horn of Africa, by jointly developing and

implementing a range of policies and measures as specified in the Action. Under the

implementation plan, partner states undertook to establish national focal points (NFP’s) to deal
76
Kofi Annan, (former UN secretary General) the small arms review conference 2006
77
Nairobi declaration on the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the great Lakes
region and the Horn of Africa (2000).
with the problem of small firearms and light weapons in all aspects, and to oversee the

implementation of the Action Plan78.

This commitment is further reiterated in the Bamako declaration, in which partner states

undertook inter-alia to “put in place where they do not exist, national coordinating agencies or

bodies and the appropriate institutional infrastructure….” The same undertaking is echoed in

the programme of action adopted by the UN conference on illicit trade in small arms and light

weapons in all its aspects, 200179. The NFP is, thus intended to provide the institutional

framework to ensure a sustainable solution to the problem of small arms and light weapons,

through long term coordinated and concerted action. It is a body established to coordinate action

by government agencies, civil society and other stakeholders.

3.6.1 Establishment of the NFP:

A workshop for Uganda coordinated by the Nairobi Secretariat, resolved, inter alia to establish

the Uganda NFP under the Ministry of Internal Affairs as the coordinating agency80. The

workshop made recommendations on the composition of the NFP and proposed a time table for

the development of the National Action Plan.

3.6.2 Functions of the NFP:

• To develop a policy guide;

• To undertake research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the

illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. This should include

such issues as the illicit manufacture, control, trafficking, circulation, brokering, and

trade of SALW, as well as tracing, finance, collection and destruction.

78
Uganda country report on the implementation of the UN programme of Action (2006).
79
Ibid
80
Inter agency workshop for Uganda coordinated by the Nairobi secretariat 8th October 2001
 • Coordinating and interacting with other national focal points

• Coordinating and interacting with the civil society.

• Facilitating the exchange and dissemination of information

• Identifying and applying lessons learned.

• Building capacity for a sustainable approach to the problem of small arms and light

weapons81

3.6.3 Composition of the Uganda NFP:

The composition of the Uganda NFP was agreed to include:

• Office of the president

• Ministry of internal affairs

• Ministry of foreign affairs

• Ministry of information

• Ministry of education

• Ministry of gender and social development

• Ministry of justice and constitutional affairs

• Ministry of trade industry and tourism

• Ministry of defence

• Ministry of finance, planning and economic development

• Prime minister’s office and specifically

- Karamoja development

- Northern Uganda reconstruction

- Disaster preparedness

81
Proceedings of the workshop on small arms and light weapons issues in Uganda, Jinja 14th-17th 2002
 • Civil society

3.7 The National Action plan (NAP):

Uganda passed the National Action Plan (NAP) on small arms and light weapons in June of

2004. The NAP was launched in September of 2005 with a public ceremony, in which 3,000

SALW were destroyed to raise public awareness. The NAP focuses on three areas: (1) the

control and management of existing SALW;

(2) The reduction of the number of SALW in circulation and;

(3) The prevention of proliferation of SALW in the future.82

Management of existing weapons:

To control and manage existing stocks of SALW, Uganda aimed at establishing a normative

frame work for the state to exercise control over SALW transfers and increase the capacity of

enforcement within the state83. Uganda planned to regulate civilian ownership of SALW, control

brokering and shipping agents, and manage the stockpile and surplus of weapons in order to

prevent theft and corruption84

3.7.1 Reduction of availability of weapons:

The NAP focused on reduction of SALW within the state85. Uganda planned to collect weapons

through two mechanisms; police enforcement initiatives and incentives or rewards for

individuals who surrendered SALW’s. The latter initiative attempted to address the root causes

of conflict in the state.

Uganda also proposed working with the civil society to undertake weapons collection programs,

promote information exchange, and build capacity. The reduction of SALW also included public
82
Uganda National Action Plan on small arms and light weapons (2004),
www.safeafrica.org/mapping/ugandaNAP/tenets.php.
83
Uganda National Action Plan on small arms and light weapons(2004) Para 4.1.3 and 4.1.1
84
Uganda National Action Plan on small arms and light weapons(2004) para.4.1.2,4.1.4 and 4.1.5
85
Uganda National Action Plan on small arms and light weapons(2004) Para 4.2
destruction of all weapons, seized and surrendered, within a reasonable period of time. A case in

point is the recent seizure of arms in the West Nile region by the army, among those recovered

were 5 machine guns with 149 bullets, 1 Uzi gun with 177 bullets, 2 grenades.86

3.7.2 Preventive action:

Under the NAP, Uganda provided for preventive action to be taken to combat SALW. The NAP

provided for effective control over the legal trade that aimed at preventing the diversion of

weapons to illicit markets and end users.87 While the majority of the regulations were determined

when Uganda passed legislation, the NAP provided for some mechanisms to be established.

These included licensing procedures; authorization of and certification for exports and imports;

and information exchange among provinces.

Uganda planned to implement the end-use certification and monitoring which included making

the end user certificate a binding contract; revocation of the certificate if a user failed to abide by

it; and a system of follow-up checks that ensured exported goods are not being diverted or re-

exported.88 Additionally, the NAP placed importance on the principles of transparency and

accountability in its management of SALW. This was focused on interagency coordination and

reporting measures, including making information public and implementing mechanisms for

parliamentary oversight.

The NAP established guidelines for making and tracing weapons89. All firearms and ammunition

must be marked with inscriptions that show the type of weapon, serial number, manufacturer,

86
The New Vision March 25 2008.
87
Uganda National Action Plan on small arms and light weapons (2004) Para. 4.3
88
Supra Para 4.3.2
89
Supra Para 4.3.3
and initial purchaser. The NAP also proposed a system of information exchange on national

marking systems and minimum standards for marking.

3.7.3 Implementation:
Implementation in Uganda largely remains to be seen, as the NAP was launched in later 2005.

Uganda held national stakeholders workshops in September and December of 2005. Currently,

the central government is developing a comprehensive national policy on arms management and

control90. This will provide the basis for legislation, regulations and administrative procedures

governing SALW. A draft is currently ready, but both workshop recommendations and best

practices guidelines are being incorporated. The policy will then be presented to the government

for approval, after which parliament will implement the policy through domestic legislation91 as

will be elaborated in the subsequent discussions

3.8 National legislation:

In addition to NFP and NAP, it was pertinent for the government through legislation to regulate

and totally phase out the impact of the small arms and light weapons. The Constitution of the

Republic of Uganda, 1995, the Amnesty Act cap 294, the Security Organization Act cap 305, the

Prisons Act 2006, the explosives Act cap 298 laws of Uganda 2000, the Uganda peoples defence

forces Acts supplement 2005, the Anti-terrorism Act No.14 of 2002 and the two main Acts that

is the police (amendment) Act cap 303, 2006 and the principle Act a firearms (amendment) Act

2006. These legislations are responsible for the regulation of firearms and light weapons in the

republic of Uganda as elaborated below:

90
Ibid
91
Uganda country report on the implementation of the UN programme of Action (2006)
Article 2292 of the constitution of the Republic of Uganda provides for the right to life, Article

2393 provides for the protection of personal liberty against all circumstances other than those

provided in that article.

Article 2494 provides for the respect for human dignity and protection for by the constitution.

From the foregoing, it can be noted that the effects of SALW’s affect the above provisions.

In addition to the above, the protection of these rights was guaranteed by putting into force the

army, the police and prisons service to guard and implement the rights.

Article 2095 of the constitution provides for creation of the UPDF where under

Article 209 the functions inter alia are to co-operate with the civilian authority in emergency

situations. Its roles are further cemented in the Uganda people’s defence forces (Acts

supplement) 2005.

Furthermore Art 21196 provides for the creation of the police which shall work in Tandem with

the UPDF to observe human rights. It further in the police Act cap 303 Sec.28 97 regulates the use

of firearms of the police and limits to special cases like in the instance or an escape of a felon.

Article 21598 provides for the creation of the Uganda prisons service to compliment the police

and the UPDF in ensuring security. Sec. 4099 specifies and regulates the instances where a

prisons officer is warranted to use force and weapons.

92
The constitution of the republic of Uganda 1995
93
Ibid 85
94
The constitution of the republic of Uganda, 1995
95
Ibid
96
Supra
97
The police Act cap 303 laws of Uganda 2000
98
Ibid
99
Prisons Act 2006
However this has been abused by some prison officers who use this privilege to the detriment of

the prisoners. A case in point is in Nyamushekyera prison in Bushenyi, where a prisoner was hit

by a prison’s officer with the butt of a gun because he asked for food brought to him by the wife,

which the officer had apparently eaten100. However no action was taken by the prisoner like

telling the justices of peace about his ordeal, for fear of further mistreatment.

Sec. 75(3)101 prohibits any person carrying a dangerous or offensive weapon at any public

gathering, place that has intoxicating liquor. This to a great extent has been observed. However

in most cases of plain clothed security officials like those working for the Internal Security

Organization (ISO) External Security Organization (ESO) and the Chieftaincy of Military

Intelligence (CMI) have violated this by doing the contrary. This is so because it very hard to

differentiate them from the local public.

In light of the principle Act, the fire arms Act, the following sections have been put in place to

control the proliferation of SALW’s:

Sec. 3102 provides that no person without a valid fire arm certificate shall hold or acquire arms or

ammunition. Failure to do so will amount to imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not

exceeding sixty currency points or both. This is in tandem with Sec 7103 of the explosives Act

where it expressly provides that no other person other than the manufacturer shall sale deal in or

dispose off any explosive unless she or she is in possession of a license granted under that Act.

Sec. 4104 gives the discretion to the chief licensing officer to allow or refuse the issue of the

firearm certificate without giving reason. However in some instances this discretion has been

100
Musimenta Kenivah, eye witness report Bushenyi 2006
101
Penal code Act cap 120 laws of Uganda 2000
102
The fire arms act cap 229 Laws of Uganda 2000
103
Explosives Act cap 298 laws of Uganda 2000
104
Ibid footnote
abused. Also under Sec.8 no fire arm certificate will be renewed or unless the arms are produced

for inspection and bear a mark or number of identification.

Sec. 11 (i)105 prohibits the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. This is done to prohibit the

legal gun-smith and bonafide certificate holder’s rights from being abused.

Also Sec.3106 of the explosives Act restricts the manufacture of an authorized explosives and any

one found in contravention of such shall be imprisoned for 6 months

Sec. 13107 provides for the registration of fire arms dealers and gun-smith. This curtails illegal

trade in such arms

Every firearms dealer or gun smith shall produce and keep at each of his or her work places of

business register of his or all her transactions stipulated under Sec 17108

Sec 18109 provides for the storage of such arms in a secure, enclosed and safe place as the

licensing officer will deem fit. This is in line Sec 5 110 of the explosive Act where storage of arms

should be by authorized people.

In a bid not to let fire arms in the wrong hands, Sec 20 stipulates that no person shall take or

accept any fire arm or ammunition from any other person as security for money lent or faces a

penalty.

105
Supra
106
The explosive act cap 298 laws of Uganda 2000.
107
Ibid
108
Ibid
109
Ibid
110
Ibid
Sec.21111 prohibits and forbids any one with a firearms certificate to engage or indulge in any

other of such arms than those prescribed on their certificate. Also, in a bid to control the transit

of firearms or ammunitions the customs officer after consultation with the minister shall refuse

suspend or revoke transit permits for transportation as provided by Sec.28

Any person that makes an imitation of firearm, threatens violence or apprehends lawful arrests,

displays, discharges firearms commits an offence as prescribed by Sec. 32112

3.8.1 Bamako declaration 2001:

The Bamako declaration Article 3(a) (ii)113 provides for member states to adopt as soon as

possible, where they do not exist, the necessary legislative and other measures to establish as a

criminal offence and the national law, the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in illegal

possession and use of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other measure related

materials.

Under 3b(ii) encourages the codification and harmonization of legislation governing the many

factors, trading brokering, possession and use of small arms and ammunition common standards

could include but not be limited to marking, record keeping and controls governing imports,

exports and the illicit trade.

An innovative feature of both the Bamako declaration and the UNPoA have been the

recommendation that states establish national focal points (NFPs), which are coordination bodies

responsible for devising a national arms control action plan, as well as facilitating small arms

control research, monitoring and the formulation of policy and legislation. Many African

111
Ibid
112
Ibid
113
Bamako declaration on an African common position of illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small
arms and light weapons 2001 s
governments have struggled to have a meaningful impact on illegal transfers as they lack the

capacity to police their borders and points of entry effectively, as well as secure state weapons

stockpiles. Additionally, there is no body at the continental level that regulates the arms trade in

Africa114.

Arms collection and destruction has been popular strategy for reducing the quantity of illicit

small arms in Africa. Countries like Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda,

Sierra Leone, south Africa and Uganda (to name but a few) have destroyed large quantities of

small arms and ammunition that were surplus, obsolete or confiscated by security forces. For

example, the various components of operation Rachel, a joint weapons destruction initiative

between the Mozambican and South African police(for statistical purposes only) has so far

resulted in more than 20,000 small arms and several million rounds of ammunition being

destroyed. In certain countries, voluntary weapons collection programmes have been established,

which usually include an incentive component for people to surrender small arms, such as cash

or farming implements. However the success of these programmes has been limited, as in many

cases mainly old and unserviceable small arms were surrendered.

OPERATION RACHEL COLLECTION RESULTS (1995-2006)

Year Hand Submachine Rifles Light/ heavy Mortars Ammunition

guns guns machine

guns
1995 8 91 981 47 15 23,153

114
Africa partnership forum support unit, small arms survey 2002.
1996 13 68 355 52 44 136,639

1997 79 980 4,345 279 35 3,000,000

1998 353 735 3,313 467 21 155,314

8
1999 453 1,874 8,864 845 115 2,315,106

2000 18 126 2,205 66 70 83,276

2001 372 467 2,943 148 32 486,000

2002 375 562 3,768 225 17 11,004,018

2003 43 231 1,334 29 0 2,200,001

2004 426 223 1,661 143 12 2,100,038

2005 256 159 2,748 26 11 1,666,808

2006 156 49 2,933 29 0 300,000

Total 2,549 5,565 35,31 2,356 372 24,470,353

1
Source: Safer Africa, 2007

3.9 CHALLENGES:
Important to note, it cannot go without say that the government of Uganda and other regional

governments have put all initiatives possible, both through local and international conventions.

However, there is a sizeable number of challenges at hand these as include;

Lack of transparency, inadequate reporting of small arms trade, many guns still remain in kraals,

adamancy of citizens to let off with the gun; weak early warning system, internal cross border

raids inadequate commitment of the political elite poverty and others.

3.9.1 Lack of transparency:
One of the major shortcomings concerns a lack of transparency regarding the production and

transfer of small arms. South Africa is the only country on the continent to have provided a

national arms export report in recent years. That said, although south Africa reported for the

period 2000 to 2002, it has reported nothing since 2003 (South Africa, 2003).

Moreover, relatively few countries on the continent report imports and exports of small arms and

ammunition to the UN commercial trade statistics database (comrade)- an international customs

database that records everything from guns to butter (NISAT, 2007)115.

Figures for 2004, the most recent year for which comprehensive data is available, indicates that

more than half of African countries failed to report either their exports or imports of small arms.

These figures may have changed in light of the January 2006 small arms preparatory committee

meeting and the UN small arms review conference in June and July 2006. It is also worth noting

that some countries can and do issue many reports and yet reveal little substance, while in other

cases the degree of transparency in a single report that is thorough and well thought out can be

extremely significant.116

A case in point is the ever increasing budget of the UPDF in which arms are said to be most

costly. However, with the rampant corruption and creation of ghost soldiers by senior army

officials leaves a lot to be desired for example former ISO director general Brigadier Henry

Tumukunde, former army chief of staff Brig. Nakibus Lakara and formal army commander Maj.

Gen. James Kaziini were all indicted for corruption charges in the army and subsequently his

conviction for three years by the general court martial117.

115
Chapter 10 Small arms survey 2005
116
ibid
117
www.monitorpublications.co.ug
3.9.2 Slow progress on the United Nations programme of Action: (PoA)
In addition to inadequate reporting of small arms trade, many African nations have made little

progress on the programme of action. According to Elli Kytomaki and Valerie Ynakey-Wanye,

by September 2005 (three months after the second biennial meeting of states) 10 of 53 African

UN member states had neither appointed a national point of contact (NPA) (frequently referred

to as a national focal point), nor had they established a national coordinating agency (NCA)- two

provisions called for in the PoA. Only 26 of 53 African UN member states had established both

a NPA and NCA. Fully 13 of the 53 countries had never reported in the first four years after the

PoA was established in July 2001 and 22 of the 53 countries had reported but once (Kytomaki

and Yankey- Wayne 2006)118. Failure to provide the UN with information regarding progress

may be a case of “reporting fatigue”. Many countries in Africa are active in supporting regional

initiatives119, but may put comparatively less emphasis on the PoA. Suffice to say, however,

there remains room for considerable progress in this area.

3.9.3 Policy and legislation:

It is important that Uganda reviews its small arms legislation and policy in order to reach the

international commitment reflected in the said national legislation and legal policy in place to

control small arms. A case in point is the explosives act cap 298 laws of Uganda 2000 that was

enacted in 1936120. This shows the unwillingness of legislators to fully tackle this problem.

Despite all the wars, anarchy and unrest Uganda has faced since that period we are still using a

colonial Act that was merely imposed onto us .In addition to the firearms act, more active

legislation on stocking and stockpiles should be put in place. For example over the years, state

security organizations have purchased and taken into their possession large stocks of fire arms.

Individual citizens have also, for a long period of time, applied for and eventually acquired

118
www.publicinternationallaw.org
119
ibid
120
supra
firearms. Of late private security organizations are countless in number and these possess

firearms which are not properly documented and sometimes being misused121.

3.9.4 Inadequate commitment of the political Elite:

More than once in Uganda we had presidents who come to power through the barrel of the gun.

In order to maintain their stay in power these leaders, use the gun to oppress, suppress and

silence their critics so as to cling on to power for example Idi Amin in Uganda executed his

opponents because of his military might, in Somalia former president Farah Idid armed war lords

to maintain his rule122. It has also been alleged that the Janajwid militia who have been

responsible for human rights abuses in Darfur- Sudan are armed by the government 123. On the

political front, not all governments in a position to donate funds towards small arms control

recognize civilian ownership of arms as a problem.

Weapons collection efforts in the Central African Republic exemplify all of these problems and

more. A general weapons recovery initiative in 1997 and 1998 was targeted at the president’s

adversaries. The individuals and groups concerned have henceforth been wary of participating in

several follow-on programs124. The president also used weapons collected during these initiatives

to arm self appointed, pro-government militias. Record keeping was extremely poor for the

national programme for disarmament and reintegration, and skills training for participants

involved in this initiative were essentially conducted as an afterthought. Although the

government designed the program to target ex-combatants for training, in reality trainees were

those who surrendered weapons in good condition that met a minimum level of reimbursement.

121
Mr Francis Rwego, senior assistant commissioner of police Uganda 2006Fire arms control measures in Uganda-
A law enforcement perspective; 2006
122
ibid
123
Human Rights Watch International 2007
124
Small Arms Survey 2007 pg 4.
3.9.5 Poverty:
From time immemorial, it can be said that “a hungry man is an angry man” Uganda since 1979

has had the declining political infrastructure coupled with social and economical turmoil. The

gap between the rich and the poor is growing day by day. It can be noted that operations, like

wembley which was meant to wipe out the rampant acts of thuggery, robberies and theft in 2001

could not fully phase out the this problem. The introduction of the Violent Crime Crack Unit

(VCCU) (recently the Rapid Response Unit) to take on the roles of the Wembley operations has

also been labeled as being very hostile to the public in its operations.

Also, the adamancy of citizens and the deliberate refusal by citizens to let off with the guns is a

significant challenge. For example in Karamoja the most secretive weapons are women who

never divulge information about the whereabouts of the guns hidden by their men125. Most of

these guns are kept in the kraals126. The guns are used to protect their cattle. In urban centers

these are used to earn income for the poor through robberies, carjacking, murders, for example

the murder of Mrs. Kiyingi a profound lawyer in 2005 and many other crimes.

3.9.6 Weak Early Warning System:

Imperative to note, the inability of the institutions in place to provide adequate information about

pending dangers and their subsequent impacts127. The system is aimed at predicting from several

intelligence agencies, which Uganda boasts of, to act with precision and ably handle pending

security threats like terrorism, internal rebellion, cattle rustling and other arms related crimes.

However these agencies are under funded and cannot efficiently carry out their work to satisfy

the whole Ugandan populace.

On the Uganda- Sudan border for instance, deserters of the Sudan People's Liberation

Army (SPLA), sell an AK 47 rifle in markets in Karamoja region for as little as $ 20

125
Interview with Mr. Vincent Bitature, director National early warning review project internal security organization
presidents office, 2008
126
Ibid
127
ibid
dollars. Traders who buy the rifles later sell them inside Kenya's West Pokot and

Baringo districts at $ 108 dollars. Ugandan security officials, who offer covert support to

the SPLA, claim that On the Uganda-Sudan border for instance claim that the region,

which is semi-arid , is hard to police128.

3.10 Recommendations:
The Nairobi declaration action plan is a comprehensive action plan which recognizes the multi-

dimensional nature of the problem of SALW, and advances a holistic approach to solutions to

tackle the problem129. The action plan embraces a range of strategies and measures which can

only be ranging capacities within the society.

The action plan blends governmental action with the initiatives of civil society in a mutually

supportive fashion. This is reflected in the composition of the membership of the NFP, which

consists of an array of government Ministries and agencies as well as spectrum of civil society

organizations130.

From the fore going, looking at the range of actions specified under the Nairobi Declaration

Action plan, it is possible to distinguish those actions which government is distinctly responsible

for and those actions which may be undertaken by civil society although, in reality, many

overlap131. What might feature as a role for government may require the action of civil society,

through advocacy, to move government agencies to take the required action. However, some of

the primary responsibilities of government which have a bearing on the problem of SALW

include;

128
Inter Press Service,Peter Owour, January 2000
129
supra
130
ibid
131
Capt Kagoro Asingura, Directorate Legal services UPDF. Community involvement in Karamoja disarmament
initiative, UPDF.
The Nairobi declaration of March 2000 and the Bamako Declaration of December 2000 both

provide potential mechanisms to manage the trade of SALWs. Together, they recommend

political, legislative and civil society cooperation in the control of the flow of SALWs. Only

Kenya and Uganda have, however, established the national focal points (NFPs) called for by the

Nairobi declaration to control the proliferation of illicit weapons in this region. Even so, the

NFPs have largely remained inactive, not involved civil society groups, and failed to put in place

mechanisms to address the underlying concerns of human security and poverty that often drive

people to acquire SALWs. Emphasis on the need to involve civil society more actively in NFPs

and also security sector reform, poverty reduction, and joint border patrols to control the illicit

trade in SALWs132.

CHAPTER FOUR:
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

4.1 SUMMARY:
Chapter one covered background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study,

hypothesis, scope of the study, significance of the study, literature review and methodology.

Chapter two dealt with, definitions, sources, and the impact of the proliferation of small arms

and light weapons in Uganda with supplementary examples from other African jurisdictions

particularly the horn of Africa and the great lakes region vis a vis related laws.

132
ibid
Chapter three covered the review of the existing law policy on small arms and light weapons,

legal and institutional frame work in Uganda related to the arms sector. The challenges and

strengths were also discussed.

Chapter four entailed the summary, conclusions and perspectives for actions (recommendations)

4.2 CONCLUSION:
It is recognised that tackling the problem of SALWs requires the comprehensive,

coordinated and concerted action of both government agencies and the civil society. While

governments are assumed to have the power, the institutional framework and resources to

deal with the problem, it is recognised that government action quite frequently falls short

of the commitments to deal with the problem133.

A coordinated independent effort by civil society organisations is necessary both to

133
supra
support and challenge shortfall in government action. There is a need, however, to better

coordinate government action and civil society initiatives. The National Focal Point ,

therefore, provides the institutional mechanisms to consolidate the partnership between state

agencies, civil society organisations and other stakeholders, and to coordinate their actions

and initiatives to deal with the problem of SALW.

4.3 PERSPECTIVES FOR ACTION (RECOMMENDATIONS):

From the foregoing, the key provisions of effective small arms legislation should be all

encompassing and broad based. Members of parliament in designing or amending legislation

aimed at curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons should ensure that at least the

following items are included:

4.3.1 Record keeping and marking:

Uganda and other states should keep record of licenses issued to civilians for the possession of

arms as well as of permits issued to trade in small arms. The manufacture of small arms should

also be registered, so that government agencies know what arms were made at what location

what numbers. Record keeping requires an elaborate administrative system, which must be

updated regularly. Members of parliament and other government bodies, in amending and

implementing the law, should therefore ensure that sufficient manpower and funding is allocated

to such a system. Proper registration is only possible if arms are marked. Sec 8134 provides that

no fire arm certificate will be renewed or unless the arms are produced for inspection and bear a

mark or number of identification.

It should be clearly defined under what conditions civilians are allowed to posses and carry

firearms. A license permit or other firm of special authorization should be required for

134
supra
possession of small arms in all cases. Control on civilian possession of arms is addressed in

article 5 of the Nairobi protocol to which Uganda ratified.

This means that every individual weapon should have a unique serial number punched into it. A

good small arms law stipulates exactly what information should be contained in the marking and

where on the small arms the marking should be placed. In the Nairobi protocol, record keeping

and marking is dealt with in article 7.

4.3.2 Tracing:
Legislation preferably would contain provisions regarding a tracing system. Such a system

obliges buyers and sellers of arms to document how, where and when they bought or sold

arms135. By making every change of ownership of a weapon visible and traceable, authorities

will be able to trace these weapons. A well functioning tracing system by definition requires

international agreement and standardization, because most transaction involves more than one

country. Authorities in one country should be able to access records on the trade of small arms

that occurred previously in other countries.

4.3.2.1 Importance of tracing:

A tracing system, which documents every change of ownership a weapon is submitted to in its

life cycle, will make it possible to hold providers of arms and ammunition responsible for misuse

of weapons. In the massacre in Gatumba in Burundi, for instance, in which 150 people were

killed in 2004, spent cartridges showed that the ammunition used in the attack was manufactured

in china, Bulgaria and Serbia. However, the lack of any tracing mechanism made it impossible to

prove how it got there. Had a tracing mechanism existed, those who sold the ammunition to the

killers could have been held accountable and future supplies could have been stopped.

135
ibid
Imperative also, in the wake of Uganda’s political turmoil in the period of 1970-1986, had there

been a proper and effective tracing system, the proliferation of arms would have been averted.

4.3.3 Brokering:
Uganda should consider establishing a system whereby arms brokers must be registered and are

obliged to obtain authorization for each individual transaction. Such a system would ensure that

brokers operate in a transparent manner and are subject to regular checks. States should also

consider establishing controls over national brokers operating outside national territory136.

Although the Nairobi protocol calls for a brokerage regulating system in article 11, brokering is

a neglected area among states in the Great lakes region and the Horn of Africa. As of writing,

only the Seychelles had legislation in place putting some control over brokers. The Nairobi

protocol includes provisions aimed at limiting arms brokerage. However most states are still

skeptical in totally opening up with details of such brokering. This is so because of the

instabilities that have been in the region for example Uganda and Sudan accused each other of

hosting rebels that is, Uganda the SPLA and Sudan the LRA.

4.3.4 Trade:
As regional and international agreements call for the effective control of traders and small arms

transfers, national parliaments should ensure such legislation is in place at the national level137.

Sec. 13138 provides for the registration of fire arms dealers and gun-smiths. This curtails illegal

trade in such arms.

A license or special authorization must be required to trade in small arms. Legislation should be

accompanied by clear criteria for issuing such licenses, such as standardized tests to assess the

136
supra
137
Small Arms Survey 2005
138
Ibid
applicant’s ability to use, carry and store small arms responsibly and of the applicant’s

knowledge of the laws relating to small arms. Provisions regarding trade are in article 10139.

In general, this can establish patterns of trade, capture or exchange between groups. With

additional field research, ammunition trade routes can be identified quite specifically 140. Most

important is the fact that ammunition that domestic companies produce for the country’s security

forces has finds its way into the hands of non- state actors in protracted conflicts, such as in

Karamoja. Put simply, this means Kenyan ammunition is killing Kenyans and Ugandan

ammunition is killing Ugandans. The problems are not a result of an influx of materials from

Sudan or Ethiopia, but rather they are domestic issues141 stemming from poor stockpile security.

4.3.5 Seizure disposal and enforcement:

Small arms legislation should include provisions for the seizure, confiscation and forfeiture of

small arms, Sec 4142 provides that authorities shall hand over the reporter and weapons seized in

pursuit of amnesty. Provisions for the disposal of seized and confiscated weapons should also be

in strengthened to compliment sec 33143. Destruction of arms is obviously the most secure way of

disposal of small arms, as it prevents the arms from being used ever again. Most countries in the

great lakes region and Horn of Africa have provisions for the seizure of small arms (Djibouti is

an exception) but few have provisions for their disposal. Article 8 and 9 of the Nairobi protocol

provides for the disposal of arms.

139
The Nairobi protocol,2005
140
Ibid
141
International Action Network on Small Arms, July 11, 2003

142
The Amnesty Act cap 294 Laws of Uganda 2000
143
Fire Arms Act cap 299
4.3.6 Manufacture and Control of state owned small arms:
States should consider establishing clear controls over the manufacture of small arms. Licensing

requirements should cover the persons who manufacture small arms as well as the premises in

which manufacture takes place. The legislation should clearly stipulate that manufacturing small

arms without a license is a criminal offence ,this should be in line to strengthen Sec. 13144

provides for the registration of fire arms dealers and gun-smith. This curtails illegal trade in such

arms.

States might also consider introducing a requirement for the registering of gunsmiths and for the

keeping of records in relation to the repair of small arms.

To ensure that state owned small arms are responsibly used and managed and do not therefore

leak into the illicit market, states should consider establishing detailed procedures, where they do

not exist, regarding the issuing of firearms145 to state employees. All states should also consider

introducing mechanisms to identify surpluses of weapons held in stock at police stations or army

barracks. They should introduce programmes for the responsible disposal of small arms rendered

surplus.

Meanwhile, the Uganda Police Force has conducted marking of all firearms owned and

Controlled by the Police, including arms issued to private security organizations. Each fire arm

is marked with a designated code according to the unit or security organization to which a

firearm belongs146.

144
Ibid
145
ibid
146
ibid
4.3.7 Penalties:
Legislation regulating small arms should contain penalties for breaking regulations. Ideally

penalties and fines are roughly the same across the region, to prevent law breakers from

concentrating their activities in the country where penalties are mildest. In Uganda for example

most penalties are sanctioned by imprisonment of 6months and fine not exceeding sixty currency

points147. However the penalty of death in the UPDF Act should be revised to fit the offence

4.3.8 Security Sector Reforms:

In part, small arms and light weapons proliferate because several governments in eastern Africa

have politicized their security forces148. Frequently, security forces have been used by autocratic

regimes to retain political power, protect particular ethnic groups, to monitor the actions of

opposition groups. As a result, human rights are often abused and some groups remain

marginalized and unprotected.

Moreover, as police forces have become weak, many states in the region have seen a rise in mob

justice and vigilantism. Participants urged149 the reform of the security sector as a critical

component in reducing conflict. Reforming the security sector entails deep political restructuring

including democratization; adopting principles of good governance; training police and armed

forces in human rights; and ensuring proportional representation of all ethnic groups in security

forces

147
Firearms (Amendment)Act 2006
148
Oxfam Uganda office report 2006
149
UNDP conference, Mombasa November 2003
4.3.9 Gender and SALW’s:

Gender is overlooked in current frameworks and discussions on SALW we need, therefore, to

ask how people define and articulate gender themselves150. Men and women have different

understandings of what a gender analysis includes, and many resist gender as a western, foreign

ideology that is not appropriate for Africa. Men also tend to resist the idea that gender should be

incorporated in analysis. Gender is, however, essential in understanding SALWs because

addressing gender allows us to understand the politics of exclusion and how this leads to

violence. An engendering framework draws attention to people. It raises a question about the

effects of small arms and challenges the perception of a community as a space in which men and

women equally share resources. It shows that men and women are differently constructed and

therefore differently impacted by SALWs, and allows us an opportunity to addresses inequalities

and to find solutions to them.

150
Zoe Bakoko, Former Gender Minister of Uganda ,2002
 REFRENCES
JOURNALS, REVIEWS AND REPORTS:

1) African Analyst 3rd Quarter Issue 1, 2006

2) Aminu Bashir Wali, Meeting Of States to Consider Action Programme on Illicit Small

Arms Trade, (2001).

3) Brigadier Kale Kayihura, Chief Political Commissar Uganda Peoples Defence Forces,

Disarmament Programmes in Uganda with Special Focus on Karamoja Case:

Approaches Methods and Outcomes. April 2002.

4) Captain Kagoro Asingura, Community Involvement in Karamoja Disarmament Initiative;

Directorate Legal Services Uganda Peoples Defence Forces, 2002.

5) Dr. Durna A Bekol and Paul Omachi, Building Peace in Eastern Africa, Entebbe,

Uganda 2002

6) Dr. Oliver Kobusingye, Director, Injury Control Centre Uganda, the Impact of Small

Arms on Humanitarian Interventions in Uganda. 2002

7) Franes Wanyira, Problems and Dynamics of Small Arms in Uganda; -2002

8) Inter Agency Workshop for Uganda’s Coordinated by the Nairobi Secretariat 8th October

2001.

9) Africa Partnership Forum Support Unit, Small Arms Survey 2002.

10) International Action Network on Small Arms, July 11, 2003

11) Kofi Annan, (Former Un Secretary General) The Small Arms Review Conference 2006.

12) Musimenta Kenivah, Eye Witness Report, Bushenyi 2006.

13) National Focal Point Establishment October 2001.

14) Oxfam Uganda Office Report 2006.

15) Proceedings of the Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons Issues in Uganda, Jinja

14th-17th 2002.

16) International Action Network on Small Arms, July 11, 2003.

17) Lora Lumpe, Curbing the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons; Peace

Research Institute, 1998.

18) Mr Francis Rwego, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police Uganda, Fire Arms Control

Measures in Uganda- A Law Enforcement Perspective 2006.

19) Ms. Ruth Ojambo Ochieng, Director, Isis –Women’s International Cross- Cultural

Exchange (Isis-Wicce), Gender and Conflicts in Uganda, 2002.

20) Peter Owour, Inter Press Service, January 2000.

21) Richard Nabudere Assistant Commissioner of Police In Charge Of Security

Organizations and Fire Arms Control, The National Focal Point Of Uganda, 2005.

22) Small Arms Review Conference United Nations, 2006

23) Small Arms Surveys; Graduate Institute Of International Studies, Geneva Switzerland

1999

24) Uganda Country Report On The Implementation Of The United Nations Programme Of

Action (2006)

25) Uganda National Action Plan On Small Arms And Light Weapons (2004)

26) Uganda National Focal Point Report, Feb 2007

TEXT BOOKS:

1) Dr. Jan Scholten, A Parliamentarian Hand Book On The Small Arms Issue; Awepa,

Nairobi/ Amsterdam (2006)

2) Eric G Berman, Illicit Trafficking Of Small Arms In Africa, Africa Partnership Support

Unit. Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 14th March 2007

 3) Matt Schroeder and Guy Lamb, The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa; A Global Enterprise;

(2006)

NEWS PAPERS AND INTERVIEWS:

1) The Daily Monitor, Monday November 5th 2007

2) The New Vision, Monday 19th March 2007.

3) The New Vision 30th October 2006

4) Interview with Col. Muna Johnson, Chief of Protocol Uganda Peoples Defence Forces,

2008.

5) Interview with Mr. Vincent Bitature, Director National Early Warning Review Project

Internal Security Organization Presidents Office, 2008.

WEB SITES:

http://www.un.org/smallarms2006/

www.new.vision.co.ug

www.publicinternationallaw.org

www.monitorpublications.co.ug

www.safeafrica.org/mapping/ugandanap/tenets.php.

http://disarmement.un.org/vote.nsf.

www.gunpolicy.org/uganda.
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