INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE

1.

A.C. No. 9698 November 13, 2013

ROLANDO E. CAWALING, PEDRO L. LABAYO, WENCESLAO Q. ARROYO, JR., CLEMENTE B. BUEN, RAMON D.
DERIT, DWIGHT B. DURAN, FELIZARDO R. FRANCISCO, JR., SUSANA G. HABOC, ARNOLD C. PEREZ, VERLAND
E. VERGARA, AMELIA L. ESPINOSA, NOEL P. BOLA, VENERANDO A. PADUA, JR., LAURENCE ALBERT D. AYO,
WILLY B. AQUINO, EDUARDO A. REMPIS, JIMMY A. BUTAC, EDUARDO D. DOCTAMA, and ANTONIO T.
REODIQUE, Complainants,
vs.
NAPOLEON M. MENESE (Retired Commissioner, NLRC-Second Division), RAUL T. AQUINO (Presiding
Commissioner, NLRC-Second Division) and TERESITA D. CASTILLON-LORA (Commissioner, NLRC-Second
Division), Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment/Disciplinary Action dated November 26, 20121 filed against respondents Napoleon
M. Menese,2 Raul T. Aquino and Teresita D. Castillon-Lora, Commissioners of the Second Division of the NLRC, for gross
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Complainants were employees of Bacman Geothermal, Inc. (Bacman), who were dismissed from their employment. They
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Bacman Geothermal, Inc., Danilo G. Catigtig, Ernesto Espinosa and Oscar
M. Lopez.

On January 23, 2011, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision3 in favor of the complainants and declared them to be illegally
dismissed. Bacman appealed and filed an Appeal Memorandum4 on February 22, 2012. The appeal was raffled to the
Second Division of the NLRC where respondents were sitting as Commissioners. There being a monetary award in the
decision, Bacman posted a supersedeas bond issued by Intra Strata Assurance Corporation (Intra Strata) on February 23,
2012.

Meanwhile, Intra Strata filed a Manifestation5 dated February 23, 2012 before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. V of
the NLRC. It stated therein that their certification of accreditation and authority from the Supreme Court had expired on
January 31, 2012, but their application for renewal is pending before the Supreme Court.

Complainants, in their Reply/Opposition to Respondent's Appeal, assailed the regularity of the surety bond. They argued
that considering that the certification of accreditation and authority given to Intra Strata had already expired on January
31, 2012 as admitted in their Manifestation, it no longer has the authority to issue the surety bond.

Complainants further asserted that under Section 6, paragraph 6 of Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure,
respondents were under obligation to verify if the bond is regular and genuine, and shall cause the dismissal of the appeal
should the bond be irregular, to wit:

Section 6. BOND. – x x x

xxxx
Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine, the Commission shall cause the immediate
dismissal of the appeal, and censure the responsible parties and their counsels, or subject them to reasonable fine or
penalty, and the bonding company may be blacklisted.

However, complainants lamented that instead of dismissing the appeal pursuant to the above-mentioned provision,
respondents entertained the appeal of Bacman and even reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in their Decision
dated April 2, 2012. Complainants moved for reconsideration where they pointed out the irregularity in the bond and
claimed that the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. The NLRC, in its Resolution dated August 30, 2012,
denied the same.

Before the promulgation of the decision, respondent Menese had retired from service. Complainants averred that the
acts of respondents in allowing the filing of appeal bond of Bacman despite the expired accreditation of Intra Strata
constitute gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Complainants maintained that the dismissal
of the appeal where the bond is irregular is so elementary, thus, respondents should be familiar with it.

Finally, complainants claimed that respondents, by disregarding the rules of procedure of the NLRC, not only violated
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but also caused injustice to them. Thus, complainants
pray that respondents be disbarred or be imposed with the appropriate disciplinary sanctions.

On January 21, 2013, the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on the complaint against them for gross
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In their Comment6 dated April 12, 2013, respondents denied the charges and accusations against them. Respondents
explained that contrary to the claims of the complainants, the appeal bond is existing and valid. They assert that while at
the time of the filing of the appeal, the surety company's authority to issue judicial bonds had already expired, such fact
was never concealed by the surety company. They added that Intra Strata's filing of Manifestation informing the
Commission of its undertaking to submit the certification as soon as the certification is issued was a sign of good faith.

Respondents stressed that it is a normal occurrence that accreditation of bonding companies takes weeks to process,
thus, the Commission allowed appeals secured by bonds issued by surety companies with pending application for renewal
of their authority to issue judicial bonds. They maintained that what is more important is that they were informed of such
fact and that the surety company committed to submit the certificate as soon as issued.

Respondents further argued that as per Memorandum dated May 16, 2012 issued by the Legal and Enforcement Division
of the NLRC, Intra Strata was listed as accredited by the Supreme Court for the period covering February 1, 2012 to July
31, 2012.

Respondents surmised that complainants merely filed the instant complaint against them as they failed to get a favorable
judgment from the Commission. Respondents, thus, pray that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

RULING

The pertinent portions of Sections 4 and 6, Rule VI of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC read:

SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL – a) The appeal shall be: (1) filed within the reglementary period
provided in Section 1 of this Rule; (2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, as amended; (3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the
arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed
decision, resolution or order; (4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and (5) accompanied by i) proof of
payment of the required appeal fee and legal research fee;
ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv)
proof of service upon the other parties.

SECTION 6. BOND. - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall either
be in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.

In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or
the Supreme Court, and shall be accompanied by:

(a) a joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel, and the bonding company, attesting that the bond
posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until final disposition of the case. (b) a copy of the indemnity agreement
between the employer-appellant and bonding company; and

(c) a copy of security deposit or collateral securing the bond.

A certified true copy of the bond shall be furnished by the appellant to the appellee who shall verify the regularity and
genuineness thereof and immediately report to the Commission any irregularity.

Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine, the Commission shall cause the immediate
dismissal of the appeal.

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a
reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.

The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding paragraph shall not stop
the running of the period to perfect an appeal.7

In a nutshell, the rules are explicit that the filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
The requirement that employers post a cash or surety bond to perfect their appeal is apparently intended to assure
workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the
former’s appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligations
to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims. However, the whole essence of requiring the filing of bond is defeated
if the bond issued turned out to be invalid due to the surety company's expired accreditation.

In the instant case, at the time of the filing of the supersedeas bond no. JCL (15)-HO-001522/509348 on behalf of Bacman
in the amount of Php5,790,543.06,9 Intra Strata was no longer an accredited surety company as it admitted in their
Manifestation dated February 23, 2012. A perusal of Intra Strata's certificate of accreditation and authority would show
that its accreditation was valid only until January 31, 2012. Thus, beyond January 31, 2012, Intra Strata was no longer a
reputable surety company possessing the authority to transact business relative to issuing judicial bonds.

Respondents argued that Intra Strata exhibited good faith in informing them of their expired accreditation.1âwphi1 We
are, however, unconvinced. The defense of good faith does not, in any way, render the issued bond valid. The fact remains
that due to the expired accreditation of Intra Strata, it has no authority to issue the subject bond. It was improper to
honor the appeal bond issued by a surety company which was no longer accredited by this Court. Having no authority to
issue judicial bonds not only does Intra Strata cease to be a reputable surety company – the bond it likewise issued was
null and void.

Necessarily, after being informed of the expired accreditation of Intra Strata, respondents should have refrained from
allowing Intra Strata to transact business or to post a bond in favor of Bacman. It is not within respondents' discretion to
allow the filing of the appeal bond issued by a bonding company with expired accreditation regardless of its pending
application for renewal of accreditation. Respondents cannot extend Intra Strata's authority or accreditation. Neither can
it validate an invalid bond issued by a bonding company with expired accreditation, or give a semblance of validity to it
pending this Court's approval of the application for renewal of accreditation.

It must be the emphasized that it is only the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator,10 which can
give authority and accreditation to surety companies to be able to transact business involving judicial bonds, to wit:

II. ACCREDIT TION OF SURETY COMPANIES: In order to preclude spurious and delinquent surety companies from
transacting business with the courts, no surety company or its authorized agents shall be allowed to transact business
involving surety bonds with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, Regional
Trial Courts, Shari a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Shari a Circuit Courts and other courts which may thereafter be created, unless accredited
and authorized by the Office of the Court Administrator.11

Thus, without the approval of this Court, the bond issued by bonding companies produces no legal effect. Respondents,
by allowing the bonding company with expired accreditation to post bonds, as a consequence, put the litigants at risk, in
the event the Court denies the application for accreditation. It betrays the purpose of the required certification issued by
this Court which seeks to protect the litigants from spurious surety companies.

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised
with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.12 This Court has consistently held that
only a clear preponderant evidence would warrant the imposition of such a harsh penalty. It means that the record must
disclose as free from doubt a case that compels the exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character
of the act done, as well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly demonstrated.13 In disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his
case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.14This complainants failed to do.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint against Napoleon M. Menese, Raul T. Aquino and Teresita D.
Castillon-Lora is DISMISSED.

2.

A.C. No. 10628 July 1, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant,

vs. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by complainant
Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).

The Facts

Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a Complaint2 for damages against his own brother,
Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the said
complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07 /09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893 /Issued
on March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint. Orlando’s IBP O.R. number
should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have
finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.

Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats
and estafa5 against Orlando .. When Maximino was furnished a copy · of the complaint, he discovered that, through text
messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that
he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: " x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track
lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never
appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze
a lot of money from [you]. x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared
a Notice to Terminate Services of CounseI7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximina "x x x has never
done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law
practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's
contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a
Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant
complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the
award of damages.

In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE
compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise
Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned
civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a
"brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith.12

Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust
vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust
vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to
drop his lawyer over a case x x x. "14

IBP Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case
against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in
fact, failure to disclose the required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant
any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo,
who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to be published and known
by third persons.

In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report
and Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings.
Maximino moved for reconsideration17 which was however denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification
deleting the warning.

Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certiorari.19

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality.20 It is a
special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that
a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the
profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach
especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.22

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession.1âwphi1 The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile,"
"carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which
effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing counsel is
considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession.25 In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent
to his brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind,
however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign and
annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word ''polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo
immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation
of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal
case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and
disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a
lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe
such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may
be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is
inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar,
Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom
fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional
conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.28 The Court has consistently
reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
and reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he
maligned Maximino to his client.29

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the
required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not
a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the
expunction thereof from the records.30

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the
entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing
with his professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

3.

A.C. No. 10303 April 22, 2015

JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant,

vs. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD
Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a
notary public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2

The Case

On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint3 with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline,
charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification;

(3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.

In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission4 to the Bar and receipt5 of his notarial
commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002. 6 She also
accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.7

Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-
Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and her parents-in-law.

Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and
violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited
that by appearing against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting
clients' interests.9 Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same
administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno
observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in
one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language,
which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.

In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007,Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial
extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature
were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this
document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his
admission to the Bar.
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use several
notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their
growing number.14 This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.

Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno
engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives
in their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners.15 On this basis, the respondent
should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.

Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings.16

The IBP Proceedings

On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory conference.17 After this, both parties
were required to submit their position papers.

In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo)
found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and
using abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.

He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained several
active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain,
protect and provide for lawful inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently
bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at any given time."19However,
Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held administratively liable for usurping a notary public's
office. The investigating commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this issue is not enough to prove that Atty.
Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition even after his admission to the Bar and
receipt of his notarial commission.20

Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno was indeed Atty. Zaide's former
client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend
them in their annulment of title case. The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its lawyers.21But despite
this previous attorney-client relationship, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable
for representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint
that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.

Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive language when
he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.22 For violating the Notarial Practice Rules,
Commissioner Magpayo recommended that Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months for
employing abusive and insulting language.23

The IBP Board of Governors' Findings

In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the evidence on record fully supports
the findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed
instead the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and
two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public.24

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this was also denied in its
subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.26

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms them.

For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that the parties identified.

Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules

a. Usurpation of a notarial office

As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide
notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial
commission.

It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary public.1âwphi1 Atty.
Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration date
of his notarial commission, were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.

Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true information. However, he denied
that he personally stamped and signed the document. In fact, this document never appeared in his notarial register
and was never included in his notarial report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and
used his notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the one who notarized it.

This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a
notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained
and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his
notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002.

This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the alleged
fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar
admission and receipt of his notarial commission.

We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his Bar admission, were stamped on
the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear from the evidence before us.

b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in several offices.
Because of this practice, the following notarized documents had been irregularly numbered and entered:

Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year

Special Power of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005
Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005
Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005
Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006
Affidavit of Two Disinterested 4/17/06 310 61 25 2006

Persons
Petition for Issuance of Owner's 4/17/06 72 15 25 2006

Duplicate copy
 Affidavit of Parental Consent 4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006
Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006

Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide
for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a
permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only
one active notarial register at any given time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active
notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.

The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial register and ensure that
the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public
from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his
behalf.

Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer the notarial
acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person,
other than the notary public, should perform it.

On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to address and prevent the
rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.

In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain several active notarial registers in
separate offices so he could accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial services.

This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are impressed with
public interest.30 A notary public's office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer
who has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.

Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant violation of
Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."

Representing conflicting interests

The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing conflicting
clients' interests.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.1âwphi1

In Aniñon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting
interests between and among his clients.

One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty.32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment.33

Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's
client.

The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case
where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected to the
complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.

The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the annulment of a
land title. Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the
case where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her
alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in
the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.

There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan engaged his services, he had
already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential
information which he acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.

Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition against the representation
of conflicting interests.

Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings

The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's professional dealings, whether
with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
(emphasis supplied)

As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious
extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate
language in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:

Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the
Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance
as a prosecutor...This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as regard
her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)

This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an officer
of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive
and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive personality and to
refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty of the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED
for one (1) year from the practice of law. SO ORDERED.

4.

A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,

vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to
the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment
but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre
asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the
aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision
on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or
its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in
governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be
an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-
be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme
Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting
members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution,
which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining
the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that
he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."1

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity,
parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune
from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public
good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a
trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as
to the motives.2

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight
functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government,
investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not
interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in
committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not
the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.5

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary
action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her
speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits
of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and
highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should
have taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be
the result.1avvphi1

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith
in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former
Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of
numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the
Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain
the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.7Senator Santiago should have
known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the
courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC.
This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage
once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment
but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and
frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale
of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to
ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and
disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and
the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive
personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an "unjust act" the
JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the
Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-
officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The
Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the
Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art.
VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of
the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics
and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

xxxx

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the
Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving
any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards
the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers
to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."
His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of
a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."13

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted
that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of
official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects
their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the
practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court
speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license
and the law invest in them.16

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently
exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the
orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women
who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel
Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened
the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise
would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely
tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus
granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them,
as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before
the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress against
government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from
using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public
institution."19 But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her
to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules
dictates under such circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that
her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be
undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of
intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect
lawyers owe to the courts.21

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question.
Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has
unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably
to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

5.

G.R. No. 213525 January 27, 2015

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP
LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the Reconsideration1 of the resolution promulgated on August 19,
2014,2 whereby the Court dismissed its petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtdue
to its non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 64, particularly for:(a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-
submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents.3

Antecedents

Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement
concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangaysecretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating
₱4,393,593.60for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA
Antique for pre-audit.4 The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.5 On November 15, 2012, the COA issued its
decision denying the petition,6 holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only
municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for
barangayworkers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act).

The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012,7 and filed its motion for reconsideration on
January 14, 2013.8 However, the COA denied the motion,9 the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.10

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed as
earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August 19,2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-
submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents.

Issues

In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it filed the petition for certiorari within the reglementary
period following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals; 11 and that the petition for certiorari
included an affidavit of service in compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It admits having overlooked
the submission of a verified declaration; and prays that the declaration attached to the motion for reconsideration be
admitted by virtue of its substantial compliance with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule12 by previously submitting a compact
disc (CD) containing the petition for certiorari and its annexes. It disagrees with the Court, insisting that it showed and
proved grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the assailed decision.

Ruling

We deny the motion for reconsideration for being without merit.

Petitioner did not comply with the rule on proof of service

The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari complied with the requirement on
proof of service.

The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two
types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service
is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires
that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the
mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance withthe rule
is mandatory, such that

there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.13

Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared
that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail "under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and
70524 attached tothe appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition."14 The petition only bore, however, the
cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts
themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, nottheir reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did
not substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that
the petitioner did not comply with the requirement of proof of service.15
II

Fresh Period Ruleunder Neypes did not apply to the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review brought
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition
should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new
trial.16

The petitioner’s position cannot be sustained.

There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.

As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question
of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error
of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final order.17 In contrast, the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct
only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the
COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days
to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from
the notice of denial.20

The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed
decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.21 Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the
denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14,
2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25
days too late.

We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections22 that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the
belief that the fresh period ruleshould apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the
same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes23 applied. Rules of procedure may be
relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the prescribed procedure.24 Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.

III

Petition for certiorari further lacked merit

The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit.

The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion, to wit: (1) the challenged
decision was rendered by a divided COA proper; (2) the COA took almost a year before promulgating its decision, and
more thana year in resolving the motion for reconsideration, in contravention of the express mandate of the Constitution;
(3) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was made up of only two sentences; (4) the matter involved a
novel issue that called for an interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code; and (5) in issuing
the resolution, COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and Heidi L. Mendoza made it appear that they knew the Local
Government Code better than former Senator Aquilino Pimentel who offered an opinion on the matter.25

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.26

A close look indicates that the petition for certioraridid not sufficiently disclose how the COA committed grave abuse of
its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the
supposed delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the
mere terseness of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion.
And, lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the Local Government Codein the
Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was
the latter’s adjudication that had any value and decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally
officials entrusted with the authority for that purpose.

It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the petitioner for the further reason of lack of
sufficient publication as required by the Government Procurement Act. In that light, the COA acted well within its
authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.

IV

Petitioner and its counsel exhibited harshness and disrespect towards the Court and its Members

The petitioner contends that the Court erred in appreciating the petitioner’s non-compliance with the requirement of the
proof of service, alleging that even "a perfunctory scrutiny" of the petition for certiorari and its annexes could have easily
shown that it had attached an affidavit of service to the petition. It goes on to make the following statements, viz:

25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the PETITION and its annexes up to its last page, thus,
the erroneous finding that there was non-submission of the proof of service; 26. In turn, the same omission was hoisted
upon the other members of this Honorable Court who took the observation from the office of the Justice-in-charge, to
be the obtaining fact, when in truth and in fact, it is not;27

The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain inability to accept the ill consequences of their own
shortcomings, and instead showed an unabashed propensity to readily lay blame on others like the Court and its
Members. In doing so, they employed harsh and disrespectful language that accused the Court and its Members of
ignorance and recklessness in the performance of their function of adjudication.

We do not tolerate such harsh and disrespectful language being uttered against the Court and its Members. We consider
the accusatory language particularly offensive because it was unfounded and undeserved. As this resolution earlier
clarifies, the petition for certiorari did not contain a proper affidavit of service.We do not need to rehash the clarification.
Had the petitioner and its counsel been humbler to accept their self-inflicted situation and more contrite, they would
have desisted from their harshness and disrespect towards the Court and its Members. Although we are not beyond error,
we assure the petitioner and its counsel that our resolutions and determinations are arrived at or reached with much care
and caution, aware that the lives, properties and rights of the litigants are always at stake. If there be errors, they would
be unintended, and would be the result of human oversight. But in this instance the Court and its Members committed
no error. The petition bore only cut reproductions of the supposed registry receipts, which even a mere "perfunctory
scrutiny" would not pass as the original registry receipts required by the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, should fully explain in writing why they should not
be punished for indirect contempt of court for their harsh and disrespectful language towards the Court and its Members;
and, in his case, Atty. Fortaleza should further show cause why he should" not be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit; ORDERS the petitioner and its
counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court; and FURTHER DIRECTS Atty. Fortaleza to show cause in the same period why
he should not be disbarred. SO ORDERED.

6.

Spouses Manolo and Milinia Nuezca vs. Atty. Ernest V. Villagarcia

A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016

SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V. VILLAGARCIA,Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Spouses Manolo
and Milinia Nuezca (complainants) against respondent Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia (respondent) for grave misconduct,
consisting of alleged unethical conduct in dealings with other persons.

The Facts

In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter2 dated February 15, 2009,
copy furnished to various offices and persons, which contained not only threatening but also libelous utterances.
Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed complainants to its recipients. Complainants likewise
posited that several news clippings3 that were attached to the demand letter were intended to sow tear in them, and
claimed that the circulation thereof caused them sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and besmirched reputation. 4 Thus,
they maintained that respondent should be held administratively liable therefor.

In a Resolution5 dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the verified complaint.
However, for failure to serve the aforesaid Resolution at respondent's address given by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), the complainants were then ordered6 to furnish the Court the complete and correct address of
respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply with the Court's directive; thus, the Court resolved,7 among others, to
refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, which set the case for a mandatory
conference/hearing.8chanrobleslaw

Unfortunately, despite notices,9 complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings. Likewise, the
notices sent to respondent were returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and "RTS Unknown." Thus, in
an Order10 dated October 24, 2014, the IBP directed the parties to submit their respective verified position papers
together with documentary exhibits, if any.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation11 dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the
lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that respondent be declared in contempt of court and fined the amount
of PI,000.00, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.12chanrobleslaw

The IBP found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in their verified complaint. Moreover, despite
repeated notices and directives from the IBP to appear for the mandatory hearings, as well as to file his pleadings,
respondent failed to do so, which was tantamount to defiance of the lawful orders of the IBP amounting to conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. Finding that respondent did not intend to file any comment and in the process, purposely
delayed the resolution of the instant case, the IBP recommended that respondent be held in contempt of
court.13chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution14 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the
May 29, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending respondent from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the
allegations of the verified complaint.

The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and partially concurs with the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Board of Governors.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.15 Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a demand for them to settle
their monetary obligations to respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their character. It also imputed
crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for worthless or bum checks and estafa. The relevant portion of
the demand letter states:
An early check on the records of some courts, credit-reporting agencies and law enforcement offices revealed that the
names 'MANOLO NUEZCA' and/or 'MANUELO NUEZCA' and 'MILINIA NUEZCA' responded to our search being involved,
then and now, in some 'credit-related' cases and litigations. Other record check outcomes and results use we however
opt to defer disclosure in the meantime and shall be put in issue in the proper forum as the need for them arise, [sic]

All such accumulated derogatory records shall in due time be reported to all the appropriate entities, for the necessary
disposition and "blacklisting" pursuant to the newly-enacted law known as the "Credit Information Systems Act of 2008."

x xxx
II. Your several issued BDO checks in 2003 and thereabouts were all unencashed as they proved to be "worthless and
unfounded." By law, you are liable under BP 22 (Boun[c]ing Checks Law) and Art. 315, Par. 2 (d) SWINDLING/ESTAFA,
RPC.

III. For all your deceit, fraud, schemes and other manipulations to defraud Mrs. Arcilla, taking advantage of her
helplessness, age and handicaps to her grave and serious damage, you are also criminally liable under ART. 318, OTHER
DECEITS. RPC.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of complainants to
his client, made the demand for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of criminal offenses against them,
especially considering that there is a proper forum therefor and they have yet to be found criminally liable by a court of
proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and immoderate language put complainants in shame and disgrace.
Moreover, it is important to consider that several other persons had been copy furnished with the demand letter. As such,
respondent could have besmirched complainants' reputation to its recipients.
At this juncture, it bears noting that respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and attend the mandatory
hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainants remain uncontroverted. In Ngayan v.
Tugade, 17 the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the
investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath
of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, ifules of Court."

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of
judicial forum.19 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.20 In this regard, all lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers
of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly.21Thus, respondent ought to temper his words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an
officer of the court.

Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into consideration the case of Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs.
Natividad Celestino v. Jose Concepcion Javier22 where respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) month for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings. In light thereof, and considering
that the IBP's recommended penalty is not commensurate to respondent's misdeed in this case, the Court finds that the
penalty of suspension for one (1) month from the practice of law should be meted upon respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month, effective
upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

7.

Rhodna A. Bacatan vs. Atty. Merari D. Dadula

A.C. No. 10565, September 07, 2016

PROSECUTOR RHODNA A. BACATAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. MERARI D. DADULA, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

In a Complaint1 dated June 16, 2008 submitted to the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Rhodna A. Bacatan, Assistant Cebu City Prosecutor (complainant) charged Atty. Merari D. Dadula (respondent) with
violation of: a) Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; b) the disregard of the duties of attorneys,
particularly under paragraph (d) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court; and c) her lawyer's oath not to do
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any.2

Facts

Between September and October 2007, the following cases were raffled to complainant for preliminary investigation: (1)
a complaint for libel (I.S. No. 4760) filed by Rev. Jose Bailey Bernaldez against Dr. Carlito Impas, Sr.; and (2) a complaint
for falsification (I.S. No. 4999-J) filed by Dr. Carlito Impas, Jr. against Rev. Jose Bailey Bernaldez. Respondent was the
counsel of Carlito Impas, Jr.3 Complainant found probable cause for libel and recommended its filing in court, while the
complaint for falsification was recommended for dismissal for lack of probable cause.4 Both recommendations were
approved by the City Prosecutor.5
Respondent filed a Motion to Determine Probable Cause With Motion to Hold in Abeyance Trial With Motion to Defer
Issuance of Warrant and Motion to Defer Posting of Reduced Bail Bond6 in the libel case. In her pleadings, respondent
accused complainant of manifest partiality and bias against her client when complainant: 1) summarily ruled that the
publication of the letter was libelous but miserably failed to point out, in her Resolution, which portion constituted libel;
2) denied the motion for reconsideration with dispatch in an undated Order; 3) "sat" on the falsification case for she did
not resolve it with dispatch unlike what she did in this libel case;7 4) did not send a copy of the resolution in the libel case
to the accused; 5) dismissed the falsification case even if mere was clear admission from the accused in the case that it
was his signature; and 6) lodged the information in the libel case within the period to appeal the undated
Order.8 Respondent perceived an obvious disparity in her treatment of these two cases and further noticing the swiftness
of her (Prosecutor Bacatan) Resolution and Order in this libel case which is utterly adverse against the accused despite
the glaring fact that no probable cause exists to hold him for libel.9 Respondent then concluded that "[a]ll these adverse
actions of prosecutor Bacatan against herein accused impels him to one inevitable conclusion: the prosecutor must have
been bribed."10

In her Comment,11 complainant denied the charges of undue haste on the libel case and undue delay on the falsification
case. According to her, the two cases were raffled on different dates and received by her office on separate dates.
Adopting a first-in-first-out policy, the libel case, which was raffled first was resolved earlier than the falsification
case.12 Moreover, she did not sit on the falsification case or act with undue haste in the libel case, but merely followed the
procedure in resolving cases at the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office.13 In her Rejoinder,14 respondent claimed that
complainant's undue haste and grave irregularity in handling the case is evident from the Resolution and Information
which she prepared and signed on the same day, November 20, 2007.15

On October 13, 2008,16 the IBP required respondent to file her Answer.17

In her Answer, respondent insisted that complainant follow the regular procedure. She reiterated the arguments raised
in her motion to determine probable cause and in her Rejoinder. She also invoked as an affirmative defense the Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23 of Cebu City (RTC), granting the motion to determine probable cause for the libel
case, dated August 26, 2008.18 She also presented as evidence the RTC Decision19 dated June 29, 2012 acquitting Dr.
Impas, Jr. from the charge of libel.20

Pending the results of the investigation of this Complaint, respondent also filed on December 20, 2010, a Complaint for
Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and a Petition for Disbarment and Imposition of Appropriate
Disciplinary Actions21 before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas and the IBP, respectively. The petition
contained the same allegations made on the motion to determine probable cause and in the Rejoinder, but no new issues
were raised against the complainant.

IBP Investigating Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Commissioner Almeyda), in his Report and
Recommendation,22 stated that it is the practice of the National Prosecution Service that where the resolution is one
finding probable cause for the filing of a case, the investigating prosecutor already prepares the corresponding
information to facilitate the movement of the case, should the reviewing officers affirm the finding of probable cause.
The similarity of dates of the resolution that has yet to be affirmed with the information is inconsequential and hardly
gives room to question the regularity of the process.23

Commissioner Almeyda found that respondent failed to abide by the bounds of courtesy, fairness and candor as provided
in Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She "had overstepped the bounds of fair play and have drawn
herself to the maelstrom of misconduct by dangerously and recklessly including in her pleadings a completely and
irrelevant allegation concerning complainant's character that did not enter into the equation as a factor in the
determination of whether probable cause existed in the matter tasked by the processes to be resolved by
complainant."24 Commissioner Almeyda observed however, that respondent was, "a comparatively new member of the
profession," and reminded her "to be a bit more circumspect in her choice of words in championing the cause of her
client."25cralawred The Commissioner recommended that respondent be "strongly reprimanded, with warning that a
similar or any other future infraction of the Code of Professional Responsibility shall be dealt with more severely."26
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-216,27 adopting and approving
Commissioner Almeyda's Report and Recommendation.

Ruling

The Court concurs with the finding of the IBP but takes exception to the recommended penalty to be imposed, which is
light in relation to the circumstances presented in this case.

Membership in the bar imposes upon lawyers certain obligations to one another, including the observance of honourable,
candid and courteous dealings with other lawyers,28 as well as maintaining fidelity to known and recognized customs and
practices of the bar that make the practice of law a profession.29

The unfavourable resolutions against her client prompted respondent to hurl accusations of irregularity and bribery
against complainant. Strongly worded statements by a lawyer against opposing counsel, if justified by the records, may
not justify disciplinary actions against the former.30 But such is not the case here. Respondent's tirades against
complainant have proven to be baseless.

As found by the IBP, that the dates of the finding of probable cause and that of the filing of the information are the same,
is explained by the prevailing practice in the National Prosecution Service: an information is prepared together with the
resolution finding probable cause to facilitate the movement of the case.31 Respondent could have easily verified this
practice before she resorted to condemning complainant and her actions. Respondent failed to substantiate her bare
allegations and sweeping conclusion of irregularity and charge of bribery, basing her charges purely on her flimsy gut
feeling. It is unethical for a lawyer to accuse another lawyer wantonly and maliciously of a serious misconduct in the
absence of a reasonable cause.32

Further, the attack on the character of the complainant is also completely unnecessary in the motion for determination
of probable cause on the libel case. Contrary to respondent's contention, her misconduct is not cured nor justified by the
eventual acquittal of her client.

We note the IBP's observation that during the times material to the case, respondent was considerably new to the
profession,33 and must have been overzealous in protecting the cause of her client, even akin to overenthusiasm.
Members of the Bar must be reminded that "enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the
other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of
propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government."34

In earlier cases, we meted the penalty of fine for a lawyer's use of intemperate language. Saberon v. Larong35 declared a
lawyer guilty of simple misconduct and imposed upon him a P2,000.00 fine for referring to a party's pleadings as "a series
of blackmail suits" even if the latter were well within their rights to file cases against the clients of the lawyer.36 We ruled
that while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language.37 Although lawyers are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment in the
furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, they should not trench beyond the bounds of
relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment.38 In Ng v. Alar,39 we modified the IBP's recommended
penalty of reprimand to a fine of P5,000.00, after finding that "[s]ubmitting pleadings containing countless insults and
diatribes against the [National Labor Relations Commission] and attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity,
hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer."40 The lawyer also filed disbarment cases against his
opposing counsels for the latter's alleged filing of multiple actions based on the same cause of action, interference in the
normal course of judicial proceeding, and instigating the filing of the disbarment complaint against him. Notably, the IBP
dismissed the disbarment charges against opposing counsels. We ruled that the lawyer clearly violated Canons 8 and 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for "his actions erode the public's perception of the legal profession."41

We find that respondent violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While zeal or enthusiasm in
championing a client's cause is desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming from such zeal or enthusiasm is disfavoured.
When without proof nor enough basis on record, respondent swiftly concluded, based only on gut feeling, that the
complainant has been bribed or had acted for a valuable consideration, her conduct has overstepped the bounds of
courtesy, fairness and candor.

ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Merari D. Dadula GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She is imposed a FINE of P2,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO
ORDERED.

8.

The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche vs. Attys. Restituto S. Lazaro and Rodel R. Morta

A.C. No. 7045, September 05, 2016

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA ASEOCHE REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING PARTNER, ATTY.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Complainant, v. ATTYS. RESTITUTO S. LAZARO AND RODEL R. MORTA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

On 8 February 2006, the Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche (complainant), through its founding partner, Atty.
Francisco M. Chavez, filed a Complaint-Affidavit1 before this Court. Complainant sought the disbarment of Attys.
Restitute S. Lazaro and Rodel R. Morta (respondents) for violation of Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It was alleged that respondents falsely and maliciously accused complainant and its lawyers of antedating
a Petition for Review filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October 2005.2chanrobleslaw

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The circumstances, which led to the filing of this administrative complaint, occurred in connection with Criminal Case
No. Q-05-136678. The latter was a case for libel then pending against Eliseo F. Soriano before Branch 218 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.3 Complainant acted as the legal counsel of Soriano in that case while respondents
represented private complainant Michael M. Sandoval.

On 11 October 2005, lawyers from complainant law firm, led by Atty. Chavez, appeared before the RTC to seek the
cancellation of Soriano's scheduled arraignment.5 During the hearing, Atty. Chavez informed the RTC that a Petition for
Review had been filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October 2005. The Petition questioned the resolution
of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City finding probable cause to indict Soriano for libel. 6 Atty. Chavez
presented an extra copy of the Petition for Review before the RTC, and explained that the main copy of the Petition
stamped received by the DOJ was still with the office messenger, who had personally filed the pleading the day
before.7 Citing the filing of the Petition for Review, Atty. Chavez moved for the suspension of the arraignment for a period
of 60 days pursuant to Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.8 The RTC, however, denied the
motion and proceeded with Soriano's arraignment.

The events that transpired during the arraignment led complainant to conclude that Presiding Judge Hilario Laqui of
Branch 218 was biased against its client.10 Consequently, it filed a Motion for Inhibition on 18 October 2005 requesting
Judge Laqui to voluntary inhibit himself from the case.

On 11 November 2005, respondents filed with the RTC a pleading entitled "A Vehement Opposition to the Motion for
Inhibition"12 (Vehement Opposition) to contradict complainant's motion. The following statements, which have become
the subject of the instant disbarment complaint, were contained in that pleading:
A Vehement Opposition to the Motion for Inhibition

COMES NOW, private complainant, by and through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court respectfully
states:

1. Allegedly, the Presiding Judge exhibited bias, partiality, prejudice and has pre-judged the case against
the accused when he proceeded with the arraignment despite the pendency of a petition for review filed
with the Department of Justice.

2. They alleged that on October 10, 2005, or the day before the scheduled arraignment, they have filed the
petition.

3. They cited Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, where it is provided that
upon motion, the arraignment of the accused shall be suspended when a petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor is pending.

4. We contemplated over this matter. If indeed the petition was duly filed with the DOJ on October 10,
2005, why is it that the accused did not present a copy of the petition stamped "received" by the
DOJ? Why did he not make a manifestation that he forgot to bring a copy? He could have easily
convinced the Presiding Judge to suspend the arraignment upon a promise that a copy thereof will
be filed with the court in the afternoon of October 11, 2005 or even the following day.

5. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the accused was able to antedate the filing or mailing of the
petition.13 (Emphases supplied)

The allegation of antedating was reiterated by respondents in a Comment/Opposition to the Accused's Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the RTC on 6 December 2006:
4. It is our conclusion that the accused and his lawyers were able to antedate the filing or mailing of the petition. We
cannot conclude otherwise, unless the accused and his battery of lawyers will admit that on October 11, 2005 that they
suddenly or temporarily became amnesiacs. They forgot that they filed the Petition for Review the day
before.14 (Emphasis supplied)
In the Complaint-Affidavit it filed with this Court, complainant vehemently denied the allegation of antedating.15 As proof
that the Petition for Review was personally filed with the DOJ on 10 October 2005, complainant attached to its
Complaint-Affidavit a copy of the Petition bearing the DOJ stamp.16chanrobleslaw

In their Comment dated 4 May 2006,17 respondents alleged that the filing of the disbarment complaint against them was
a mere harassment tactic. As proof, they cited the non-inclusion of another signatory to the Vehement Opposition, Public
Prosecutor Nadine Jaban-Fama, as a respondent in the Complaint.18They also contended that the statements they had
made in their pleadings were covered by the doctrine of privileged communication.19chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution dated 7 August 2006, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.20chanrobleslaw

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

In his Report and Recommendation dated 7 July 2008,21 Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco found respondents guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We agree with the complainant that the accusation that they antedated the mailing of the DO.I petition is violative of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the duty of all lawyers to observe civility and propriety in their pleadings. It
was somewhat irresponsible for the respondents to make such an accusation on the basis of pure speculation, considering
that they had no proof to support their accusation and did not even make any attempt to verify from the DO.I the date
and the manner by which the said petition was filed. Moreover, as held in Asa, we will have to disagree with the
respondents argument on privileged communication, the use of offensive language in pleadings filed in the course of
judicial proceedings, constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.
xxxx
In Asa, the Supreme Court found Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo guilty of breach of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and admonished her to refrain from using offensive and improper language in her pleadings. Considering
that the respondents' accusation that the complainant and its lawyers antedated the mailing of Bro. Eliseo Soriano's DOJ
Petition is somewhat more serious than an allegation of wanting additional attorney's fees for opening doors and serving
coffee, we believe that the penalty of reprimand would be proper in this case.
Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel
Morta be reprimanded for using improper language in their pleadings with a warning that a repetition of the same will be
dealt with more severely.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 14 August 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391, which adopted and approved
Commissioner Limpingco's Report and Recommendation:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for using improper
language in their pleadings Atty. Restituto Lazaro and Atty. Rodel Morta are REPRIMANDED with a Warning that a
repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 14 November 2008, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 14 August 2008. They
argued that the Complaint against them should have been dismissed on the following grounds: (a) complainant's failure
to implead the public prosecutor, who must be considered an indispensable party to the case, since the pleading in
question could not have been filed without her conformity; (b) as the subject pleadings had been signed by the public
prosecutor, their contents enjoyed the presumption of regularity and legality, upon which respondents were entitled to
rely; (c) respondents relied in good faith on the review, supervision and direction of the public prosecutor in the filing of
the pleading in question; and (d) the statements in the pleading were covered by the doctrine of privileged
communication.24 Respondents also contended that Atty. Chavez should be disciplined for the derogatory statements
made against them in the pleadings he submitted during the IBP investigation.
Complainant filed a Comment/Opposition25cralawred to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration on 8 January 2009.

On 22 March 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 granting respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration and recommending the dismissal of the instant case on the basis of complainant's failure to implead an
indispensable party:

RESOLVED to GRANT Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, considering that complainant's non-joinder of an
indispensable party makes the presumption that Respondents acted according to regulations and in good faith in the
performance of their official duties. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the case against Respondents is hereby DISMISSED with stern Warning to be more circumspect.
To date, this Court has not received any petition from complainant or any other interested party questioning Resolution
No. XXI-2014-146 of the IBP Board of Governors. However, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court as
amended by Bar Matter No. 1645,26 we must ultimately decide disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar,
regardless of the acts of the complainant.27 This rule is consistent with our obligation to preserve the purity of the legal
profession and ensure the proper and honest administration of justice.28 In accordance with this duty, we now pass upon
the recommendation of the IBP.

OUR RULING

After a judicious examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to SET ASIDE Resolution No. XXI-2014-146
of the IBP Board of Governors. Not only are the grounds cited as bases for the dismissal of the complaint inapplicable to
disbarment proceedings. We are also convinced that there is sufficient justification to discipline respondents for violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Non-joinder of a party is not a ground to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding.

In Resolution No. XXI-2014-146, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the instant case because of complainant's
purported failure to implead an indispensable party. Although this ground for dismissal was not explained at length in its
resolution, the IBP Board of Governors appeared to have given credence to the argument proffered by respondents. They
had argued that the public prosecutor was an indispensable party to the proceeding, and that her non-joinder was a
ground for the dismissal of the case. That ruling is patently erroneous.

In previous cases, the Court has explained that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.29 These
proceedings are neither purely civil nor purely criminal,30 but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its
officers.31 Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied,32 but are construed in a manner that allows us to determine
whether lawyers are still fit to fulfill the duties and exercise the privileges of their office.33chanrobleslaw

We cannot countenance the dismissal of the case against respondents merely because the public prosecutor has not been
joined as a party. We emphasize that in disbarment proceedings, the Court merely calls upon members of the bar to
account for their actuations as officers of the Court.34Consequently, only the lawyer who is the subject of the case is
indispensable. No other party, not even a complainant, is needed.35chanrobleslaw
In this case, respondents are only called upon to account for their own conduct. Specifically, their pleadings contain the
accusation that complainant antedated the filing of a petition before the DOJ. The fact that Public Prosecutor Jaban-
Fama also signified her conformity to the pleadings containing these statements is irrelevant to the issue of whether
respondents' conduct warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.

Respondents cannot utilize the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of the public prosecutor as a defense for
their own misconduct.

Respondents cannot excuse their conduct by invoking the presumption of regularity accorded to official acts of the public
prosecutor. It must be emphasized that the act in question, i.e. the preparation of the pleadings subject of the Complaint,
was performed by respondents and not by the public prosecutor. Hence, any impropriety in the contents of or the
language used in these pleadings originated from respondents. The mere fact that the public prosecutor signed the
pleadings after they were prepared could not have cured any impropriety contained therein. The presumption that the
public prosecutor performed her duties regularly and in accordance with law cannot shield respondents from liability for
their own conduct.

The claim of respondents that they relied in good faith on the approval of the public prosecutor is likewise untenable. As
lawyers, they have a personal obligation to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility. This obligation includes the
duty to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional colleagues, including opposing
counsel. Respondents cannot disregard this solemn duty solely on the basis of the signature of a public prosecutor and
later seek to absolve themselves from liability by pleading good faith.

Respondents violated Canons 8 and JO of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

There being no cause for the dismissal of the instant case, the Court now proceeds to determine whether respondents
have indeed violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We note that the essential allegations of the Complaint-Affidavit have already been admitted by respondents. In the
Comment36 they submitted to this Court, they even reproduced the pertinent portions37 of their pleadings that contained
the allegations of antedating. Accordingly, the only question left for us to resolve is whether their conduct violates the
ethical code of the profession.

After a thorough evaluation of the pleadings filed by the parties and the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Limpingco, the Court finds respondents guilty of violating Canons 838 and 1039 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This Court has repeatedly urged lawyers to utilize only respectful and temperate language in the preparation of
pleadings, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.40 Their arguments, whether written or oral, should be
gracious to both the court and the opposing counsel and should consist only of such words as may be properly addressed
by one honorable member of the bar to another.41 In this case, respondents twice accused complainant of antedating a
petition it had filed with the DOJ without any proof whatsoever. This allegation of impropriety undoubtedly brought
complainant and its lawyers into disrepute. The accusation also tended to mislead the courts, as it was made without
hesitation notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary support. The Court cannot condone this irresponsible and
unprofessional behavior.

That the statements conveyed the perception by respondents of the events that transpired during the scheduled
arraignment and their "truthful belief regarding a perceived irregularity" in the filing of the Petition is not an excuse. As
this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 & 145822:

The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for
inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of
the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they
are charged.

Respondents' defense of absolute privilege is likewise untenable. Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of
judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication thereof is
privileged.43 While lawyers may enjoy immunity from civil and criminal liability for privileged statements made in their
pleadings, they remain subject to this Court's supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of their
duty as members of the legal profession.

We believe, though, that the use of intemperate and abusive language does not merit the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.45 Nonetheless, respondents should be disciplined for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and
sternly warned that the Court will deal with future similar conduct more severely.46chanrobleslaw

A final note. We find it necessary to remind the IBP of its duty to judiciously investigate and evaluate each and every
disciplinary action referred to it by this Court. In making its recommendations, the IBP should bear in mind the purpose
of disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar — to maintain the integrity of the legal profession for the sake of
public interest. Needless to state, the Court will not look with favor upon a recommendation based entirely on technical
and procedural grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 22 March 2014 issued by the IBP Board of Governors is
hereby SET ASIDE. Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel Morta are hereby ADMONISHED to use only respectful and
temperate language in the preparation of pleadings and to be more circumspect in dealing with their professional
colleagues. They are likewise STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

9.

A.C. No. 11616 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2141], August 23, 2017

LITO V. BUENVIAJE, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before us is an Administrative Complaint dated December 28, 2007 filed by Lito Buenviaje 1 (Buenviaje) against
respondent Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo (Atty. Magdamo), docketed as A.C. No. 11616 for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In the instant Complaint dated December 28, 2007, Buenviaje alleged that he was married to the late Fe Gonzalo-
Buenviaje as evidenced by NSO issued Marriage Contract Register No. 87-13503-A.2 Fe died on September 17, 2007.

Meanwhile, Atty. Magdamo was the counsel of Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia Gonzalo, who filed a criminal case for
bigamy against Buenviaje. They claimed that Buenviaje was married to a certain Amalia Ventura in 1978, thus, making
him guilty of bigamy.

In an attempt to protect the rights and interests of his clients in securing the monies of their sibling, deceased Fe Gonzalo,
Atty. Magdamo sent a Notice of Death of Depositor3 dated October 11, 2007 to the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)-
Dagupan Branch where Buenviaje and Fe appeared to have a joint account. The pertinent portion of said Notice reads as
follows:

"x x x x

FE SOLIS GONZALO was formerly an Overseas Filipina Worker (OFW) Nurse in Switzerland whose lifetime savings is
now in an account in BPI-Dagupan. She came back to the Philippines to spend the last days of her life with her family in
San Fabian, Pangasinan. Unfortunately, while she was terminally ill and while residing in Manila so as to be near Saint
Luke's Hospital, a clever swindler by the name of LITO BUENVIAJE made it appear on spurious documents that he is
the husband of Fe Gonzalo when in truth and in fact LITO BUENVIAJE is married to AMALIA VALERA.

xxxx
Moreover, ever since 24 August 2007, LITO V. BUENVIAJE has been a fugitive from justice as he has been hiding from
the criminal charge in People of the Philippines versus Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending in
the City of Manila.
xxxx
Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life. x x x" (Emphasis ours)
Aggrieved, Buenviaje filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Magdamo for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
7 , Rule 7.03 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Buenviaje averred that in Atty. Magdamo's Notice
of Death of Depositor dated October 11, 2007 sent to the BPI-Dagupan Branch, he untruthfully and maliciously quoted
the following statements: (1) "a clever swindler by the name of Lito Buenviaje made it appear on spurious document that he
is the husband of Fe Gonzalo when in truth and in fact Lito Buenviaje is married to Amalia Valero", (2) "since August 24, 2007,
Lito V. Buenviaje has been a fugitive from justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People of the Philippines
versus Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365 pending in the City of Manila", and (3) "Fe never had a husband or
child in her entire life" to his prejudice.

Buenviaje alleged that he discovered the Notice's existence sometime in December 2007 when he inquired about the
remaining balance of his joint account with Fe. He lamented that he was shocked upon reading the letter and felt
humiliated at the words written against him as the bank manager and the other bank personnel might have really thought
that he was a swindler and a fugitive from justice.4

Buenviaje denied Atty. Magdamo's allegation that Fe was never married as they were in fact married in a public civil rites
in the presence of many relatives of Fe. As to his alleged marriage with a certain Amalia Valera, Buenviaje admitted that
he had extramarital relationship with her and that they had two (2) sons. When they separated and he subsequently
worked overseas, it did not stop him from fulfilling his responsibilities as a father to his sons. He was then advised to remit
money to Amalia but he was told that he needed a marriage contract to be able to do so, thus, he asked someone to
make a marriage contract for remittance purposes and that he was told that there would be no record of it. Buenviaje
claimed that at that time, he really believed that no valid marriage took place between him and Amalia and that he was
single up to the time he married Fe.

Buenviaje lamented that Atty. Magdamo employed dirty and dishonest means and tactics to ensure that BPI will prevent
him from withdrawing money from the joint account that he has with his late wife. He averred that in referring to him as
a "swindler", Atty. Magdamo succeeded in intimidating BPI-Dagupan into extrajudicially "freezing" the joint account and
in not transacting with him.

Buenviaje also pointed out that Atty. Magdamo, in referring to him as a fugitive from justice, in effect, made BPI-Dagupan
believe that a criminal complaint was already pending against him when in truth and in fact, the August 24, 2007
complaint for bigamy filed by Lydia and Florenia was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila at
the time that they wrote and served the Notice to BPI-Dagupan.

Buenviaje further added that Atty. Magdamo even made threats to him as evidenced by his text messages to him, to wit:
"Sometime in the morning of 1 October 2007, I sent text messages to Lito's last known Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
number (+639062097612) requesting him to stop his merciless plunder and to voluntarily surrender to the rule of law."

Finally, Buenviaje questioned Atty. Magdamo's fitness to continue in the practice of law as he has displayed lack of ability
to distinguish a fugitive from justice and a respondent in a criminal investigation; employed of dirty and unprofessional
tactics of calling him a "swindler"; and by referring to his marriage contract with his wife as "spurious document". He,
thus, prayed that considering Atty. Magdamo's actuations, he should be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

On January 9, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed Atty. Magdamo to submit his answer on
the complaint against him.5

In its Report and Recommendation6 dated October 23, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Magdamo be
reprimanded for his unethical actuations.

However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in a Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-717 dated October 10, 2014, resolved to
adopt and approve with modification the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and instead suspend Atty.
Magdamo from the practice of law for three (3) months.7

Aggrieved, Atty. Magdamo moved for reconsideration. However, in Resolution No. XXII-2016-3268 dated May 28, 2016,
the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to deny Atty. Magdamo's motion for reconsideration and affirm the latter's
suspension.

We concur with the findings and recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against the opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
In the instant case, Atty. Magdamo's actuations do not measure up to this Canon. The records show that he referred to
Buenviaje as a "swindler". He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that Buenviaje is committing
swindling activities. Even if he was suspicious of Buenviaje, he should have refrained from making such malicious
reference or name-calling for he should know as a lawyer that the mere filing of a complaint against a person does not
guarantee a finding of guilt, and that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Here, other than the criminal
complaint for bigamy which Fe's siblings filed before the prosecutor's office, there were no other cases decided against
Buenviaje.

Atty. Magdamo's malicious imputation against Buenviaje is further aggravated by the fact that said imputation was made
in a forum which is not a party to the legal dispute between Fe's siblings and Buenviaje. He could have just informed BPI-
Dagupan of the death of its client and that there is a pending litigation regarding their client's estate, and he did not have
to resort to name-calling and make unnecessary commentaries in order to support his cause. Undoubtedly, his malicious
imputation against Buenviaje is unfair as the latter was unnecessarily exposed to humiliation and shame even as there
was no actual case yet to be filed in the courts.

Moreover, Atty. Magdamo is likewise out of line when he made inference to the marriage documents of Buenviaje and
Fe as "spurious" as well as his conclusion that "Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life". He should know better
that without the courts' pronouncement to this effect, he is in no position to draw conclusions and pass judgment as to
the existence, and validity or nullity of the marriage of Buenviaje and Fe. That is not his job to do. While his statements
in the Notice given to BPI-Dagupan might be prompted by a good cause, it were nevertheless careless, premature and
without basis. At the very least, Atty. Magdamo's actuations are blatant violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument
of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. (Emphasis ours)
Equally incredulous is Atty. Magdamo's statement in the Notice that "Lito V. Buenviaje has been a fugitive from justice as
he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People vs. Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending in the
City of Manila". Upon review, it appears that case number 7H-103365 is the same bigamy case which Fe's siblings filed
against Buenviaje before the Prosecutor's Office of Manila. At the time Atty. Magdamo made the subjects statement in
the Notice to BPI-Dagupan, he knew that there was no final resolution yet from the prosecutor's office, no case has yet
to be filed in the courts, there was no warrant of arrest against Buenviaje, and more importantly, there was no evidence
that Buenviaje had any intent to flee prosecution as he even filed the instant case and participated in the proceedings
hereto. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. There must
always be sufficient evidence to support the charge.9 As to why Atty. Magdamo made such malicious statements is
beyond this Court's comprehension.

We had an occasion to say that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements by
an attorney in his pleadings or motions is a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the canons of professional
ethics.10 The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial
nature of our legal system.11 Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Magdamo ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only
bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.12

In this case, Atty. Magdamo's statements against Buenviaje were not only improper but it also undoubtedly tended to
mislead BPI-Dagupan into thinking that the latter is a swindler and a fugitive as it was made without hesitation
notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary support. The Court cannot condone this irresponsible and unprofessional
behavior.

As this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 & 145822:13
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for
inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of
the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which
they are charged. (emphasis ours)
Finally, it must be emphasized anew that, in support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the law. However, a client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line
between liberty and license.14 The lawyer's duty to its clients must never be at the expense of truth and justice. As
explained in Choa v. Chiongson:15
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within
the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client's case
with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as it appears to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives
and malicious intentions against the other party.
Based on the foregoing, We cannot countenance Atty. Magdamo's use of offensive and disrespectful language in his
Notice addressed to BPI-Dagupan. He clearly violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for his
actions erode the public's perception of the legal profession. We, thus, sustain the findings and recommendation of the
IBP-Board of Governors.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the October 10, 2014 and May 28, 2016 Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 08-2141 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo
from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon his receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Magdamo's personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land. SO ORDERED.

10.

A.C. No. 10758

ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, ET AL, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent

x-----------------------x

GLENDA ALVARO, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent

x-----------------------x

ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES AND ATTY. AVE.LINO ANDRES, Respondent

x-----------------------x
 ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner
vs. ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, JR, J.:

These are four administrative complaints that were separately filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by and against substantially the same parties, particularly:

(l) CBD Case No. 11-3215 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed by Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-
Torres (Atty. Torres). et al., against Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin (Atty. Dalangin) and docketed before the Court as A.C. No.
l 0758:

(2) CBD Case No. 12-3292 for gross misconduct filed by Glenda Alvaro (Alvaro) against Atty. Dalangin and docketed
before the Court as A.C. No. 10759;

(3) CBD Case No. 12-3369 for gross misconduct, violation of the lawyer’s oath and violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres (Atty. Andres),
docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10760 ; and

(4) CBD Case No. 12-3458 for grave misconduct, dishonesty and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR filed by Atty. Dalangin
against Atty. Torres and docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10761.

The Antecedents

A.C. No. 10758

CBD Case No. 11-3215 is a complaint1 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed against Atty. Dalangin
by the following complainants: (1) Atty. Torres; (2) Felicidad O. Samatra (Samatra); (3) Alvaro; (4) Mary DF. Noveras
(Noveras); and (5) Generosa S. Camacho (Camacho).2

The complaint imputed upon Atty. Dalangin several breaches of his duties as a lawyer. First, it was alleged that Atty.
Dalangin filed against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer groundless suits, which were merely prompted by
his loss in a case and intended to cover up his negligence as counsel. By his acts, Atty. Dalangin committed gross
misconduct, and breached Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Rules 1.02 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Canon 11 of the CPR.3

It appeared that prior to the institution of CBD Case No. 11-3215, a complaint for disbannent was filed against Atty. Torres
by Apolonia Marzan (Marzan) and 1V1elody Valdez (Valdez), who were clients of Atty. Dalangin and the losing parties in
an unlawful detainer case decided by Presiding Judge Efren B. Mallare (Judge Mallare) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Marzan and Valdez later disclosed to Atty. Torres that the filing of the disbarment case
was orchestrated by Atty. Dalangin, who prepared the affidavit and instructed them to sign it even without explaining
the contents and tenor of the document.

When Marzan and Valdez eventually realized that their affidavit was used to file a disbarment complaint with the IBP
against Atty. Torres, they decided to terminate the services of Atty. Dalangin. By their new counsel's advice, Marzan and
Valdez stopped attending the disbarment hearings, and the case was eventually dismissed by the IBP. Atty. Dalangin
also caused Marzan and Valdez's filing of administrative cases against Judge Mallare and Noveras, as the Clerk of Court
of the MTC, which complaints were nonetheless likewise dismissed by the Supreme Court upon the IBP’s
recommendation.4

Second, Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual (Pascual), a clerk
at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where Atty. Dalangin previously worked as district public
attorney. After Atty. Dalangin had left PAO, he retained Pascual as his private secretary, who still remained to be
employed with PAO. Atty. Dalangin and Pascual had a daughter whom they named Julienne, even when each of them
had existing marriages with some other persons.5 The affair between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual, and the paternity of
Julienne, were known to the community, especially the courts.6 Julienne was nonetheless entered in the civil registry as
Pascual and her legal husband's own child so as to conceal the fact that Atty. Dalangin was the real father.7 The foregoing
acts allegedly breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR.

Third, Atty. Dalangin was accused of malpractice for acts that dated back to his prior employment with PAO. He allegedly
collected attorney’s fees from indigent litigants who sought his assistance, like complainant Camacho from whom he
demanded an acceptance fee of ₱8,000.00. When Camacho explained that he could only produce ₱3,000.00, Atty.
Dalangin threw the case records on a table and retorted, "Mabubuhay ba naman ang abogado [ditto]."8 Without prior
authority from his superiors, Atty. Dalangin also willfully appeared in areas outside his jurisdiction as a district public
attorney.9

Fourth, the complaint included charges that pertained to Atty. Dalangin's handling of his court cases. It was claimed that
Atty. Dalangin misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court, which act constituted a breach of Rule 10.02,
Canon 10 of the CPR.10 In a case for robbery filed by Samatra against Pascual, Atty. Dalangin also wielded his influence
and prepared perjured statements from supposed witnesses, a clear violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the
CPR.11 Finally, Atty. Dalangin violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR when he submitted in a civil case fraudulent and
misleading evidence, particularly a certificate of title without the page reflecting the annotations pertinent to the case.12

Atty. Dalangin filed his Answer and refuted all charges.13 He denied having a hand in the preparation of the disbarment
complaint against Atty. Torres, as he argued that neither his name nor his signature appeared in the records thereof. His
relationship with Pascual, on the other hand, was only maliciously misinterpreted. He was only a close friend of the
Pascuals, and some of Pascual’s children, including Julienne, were his godchildren.14

Atty. Dalangin likewise denied the claim that he collected attorney's fees while he worked as a PAO lawyer. Although he
admitted appearing as a public attorney in an area that was beyond his jurisdiction, the appearance 1 was with the
Regional Public Attorney's verbal authority, claimed by Atty. Dalangin to be sufficient under office practice.15Finally, the
alleged mistakes that he committed as counsel in specific cases' presentation of evidence had been rectified in court.16

A.C. No. 10759

CBD Case No. 12-3292, a complaint17 for gross misconduct, was filed by Alvaro against Atty. Dalangin for an incident that
happened on the morning of November 14, 2011, while Alvaro was waiting for the start of a hearing at the lobby of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Upon seeing Alvaro, Atty. Dalangin allegedly hurled
slanderous and defamatory remarks against her, as he spoke at the top of his voice and referred to her as a "certified
swindler." He also confronted and threatened Alvaro for her participation in the filing of CBD Case No. 11-3215, and then
precluded her from visiting the PAO in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Atty. Dalangin’s tirade was heard and witnessed by several
persons, and some of them executed their respective affidavits18 to narrate the incident. The foregoing impelled Alvaro
to seek Atty. Dalangin’s disbarment for a violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, Rule 7.03, Canon 7, and Rule 8.02,
Canon 8 of the CPR.

While Atty. Dalangin admitted in his Answer19 the alleged confrontation, he denied shouting invectives at Alvaro. When
he talked to Alvaro, he merely confronted her for what he claimed were lies declared in her affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-
3215. Atty. Dalangin also warned to seek legal remedies should Alvaro fail to substantiate the truth of her testimonies.

Atty. Dalangin also admitted that he precluded Alvaro from visiting PAO, but explained that this was prompted by his
knowledge that Alvaro was a fixer, who used the name of the office and demanded money from indigent clients. For Atty.
Dalangin, Alvaro filed this complaint to get back at Atty. Dalangin for banning her at the PAO and depriving her of earning
from her illegal activities.20

A.C. No. 10760

The two other complaints, CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, were instituted by Atty. Dalangin.

In CBD Case No. 12-3369,21 Atty. Dalangin sought the disbarment of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for gross misconduct,
violation of the lawyer's oath, and breach of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR. He claimed that both lawyers
conspired with their clients in filing CBD Case No. 11-3215, even as they violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Submitted to support CBD Case No. 11-3215 was Nonilo Alejo’s (Alejo) affidavit, which contained a transcript of a
recorded telephone conversation between Alejo and one Wilma Pineda (Pineda).22 The recording was without the prior
knowledge and consent of Pineda.23

As a backgrounder, Atty. Dalangin was accused in CBD Case No. 11- 3215 of fabricating testimonies against Noveras, who
was claimed to be a vital witness in a criminal case against Pascual. In an affidavit drafted by Atty. Dalangin for Pineda,
the latter complained of Noveras and Alejo’s failure to return in full the cash bond that she posted in a case for violation
of the Bouncing Checks Law, even after the case had been dismissed by the trial court. This allegation was negated in the
disputed transcript, as Pineda allegedly confirmed receiving the full ₱8,000.00, but decided to give half thereof to Alejo
for a "blow-out" after her case’s dismissal.24

Both Atty. Andres and Atty. Torres disputed the complaint. Atty. Andres asserted that CBD Case No. 12-3369 was filed
only to harass and intimidate him, being the counsel of the complainants in CBD Case No. 11- 3215.25 By way of defense,
he adopted a counter-affidavit26 which he submitted in a separate complaint for violation of R.A. No. 4200 that was filed
by Atty. Dalangin with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. Atty. Andres therein argued that on the basis of Atty. Dalangin’s
allegations, the case should have been filed by Pineda against Alejo, being the purported victim and the one who
recorded the conversation, respectively.

Atty. Torres, on the other hand, pointed out that Atty. Dalangin’s reference to R.A. No. 4200 was tantamount to an
admission that the conversation actually transpired. This only confirmed a fault committed by Atty. Dalangin for the
fabrications in Pineda's earlier affidavit, which was executed purposely to destroy the credibility of Noveras. The
submission of the transcript was necessary because Atty. Dalangin’s malpractice was one of the main causes of action in
CBD Case No. 11-3215.27 Moreover, the record of the conversation between Alejo and Pineda could not be considered a
violation of R.A. No. 4200 because no wire or cable was used to tap their cellular phones. Neither party in the conversation
also complained of a supposed wiretapping.28

A.C. No. 10761

The complaint29 docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3458 was filed solely against Atty. Torres for grave misconduct, dishonesty
for violation of Article 18330 of the Revised Penal Code, and breach of Canon 1 of the CPR.

Atty. Dalangin faulted Atty. Torres for submitting in CBD Case No. 11-3215 Marzan and Valdez’s affidavit,31 which
allegedly contained untruthful statements. Marzan and Valdez knew from the beginning that they were complainants in
a disbarment case against Atty. Torres. Atty. Torres, however, later made them issue the perjured statements by using
as a leverage her own complaint32 for perjury against Marzan and Valdez, who were then pressured to sign the affidavits
in exchange for the perjury case’s dismissal.33

In her Answer34 to the complaint, Atty. Torres insisted on the truth of the statements made by Marzan and Valdez in their
affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-3215.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

The four administrative complaints were eventually consolidated and jointly resolved by the IBP.

After the parties ’ filing of their respective position papers and the conduct of a series of hearings, Investigating
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor (Investigating Commissioner) issued a Consolidated Report and
Recommendation35 dated February 11, 2013, which found sufficient bases for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from the
practice of law for three years. Atty. Dalangin’s charges against Atty. Dela Torres and Atty. Andres, on the other hand,
were recommended for dismissal.

Thus, the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation ended as follows:

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing, finding that Respondent Bayani P. Dalangin violated the provisions of the [CPR] and
his Lawyer's Oath specifically on Gross Immorality, and Gross Misconduct in CBD Case No. 11-3215 and CBD Case No. 12-
3292, it is recommended that said Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the period of three (3) years
from receipt of the order with a warning that similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

It is further recommended that the charges against Respondent Rosita L. dela Fuente Torres and Respondent Avelino
Andres in CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, for lack of merit be ordered dismissed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.36

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-768,37 which adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation. The resolution reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supprted by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent Dalangin is guilty of gross immorality and gross misconduct, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin
is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for three (3) years with Warning that repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely. The case against Atty. Rosita L. dela [Fuente] Torres and Atty. Manuel Andres is
hereby DISMISSED.38

Atty. Dalangin filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a
Resolution39 dated August 8, 2014, which reads:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent/Complainant Dalangin’s Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and the Resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated June
1, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.40

On February 26, 2015, Atty. Dominic C. M. Solis, Director for Bar Discipline, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
transmitted the case records to the Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.41

On even date and before the Court could have rendered its final action on the disbarment complaints against Atty.
Dalangin vis-a-vis the records forwarded by the IBP, Atty. Dalangin forthwith filed with the Court a Petition for
Review,42 which questioned the IBP resolutions that, first, declared him administratively liable in CBD Case Nos. 11-3215
and 12- 3292, and second, dismissed his complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres in CBD Case Nos. 12-3369 and
12-3458.

In a Resolution43 dated June 16, 2015, the Court consolidated these cases and, without giving due course to the petition
for review, required the filing of Comments on the petition. Accordingly, a Consolidated Comment on the
Petition44 dated August 5, 2015 was filed by Andres & Associates Law Office, as counsel for Atty. Torres, et al., being the
complainants in CBD Case Nos. 11-3215 and 12-3292, and respondents in CBD Case Nos. 12-3369 and 12-3458. Thereafter,
Atty. Dalangin filed his Reply45 to the consolidated comment.

The Court’s Ruling

Procedure from Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors

The Court finds it appropriate to first address the matter of Atty. Dalangin’s immediate recourse to the Court via a
petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors' resolve to affirm the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action
on the complaints.

When the administrative complaints were resolved by the IBP and the instant petition for review was filed in Court, the
procedure from resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in administrative cases was as provided in the former Section
12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, prior to the amendments introduced by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13,
2015. The old rule read:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of' Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and
shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended
from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations
which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing
such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested
party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Co mi
orders otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied)

In B.M. No. 1755 captioned Re: Clarification of Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the Court applied
this provision to address the issue therein involved, and explained its proper application in a Resolution dated June 17,
2008. The Court set the following guidelines:

In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors (BOG)] that exonerates the respondent or imposes a sanction
less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day
period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for
reconsideration is filed, the decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished this
Court.

If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration of said resolution
with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall thereafter
elevate the assailed resolution with the entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses
without any motion for reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court the
resolution with the entire case records for appropriate action. (Emphases supplied)

Nowhere in his petition did Atty. Dalangin attempt to justify his immediate filing of the petition for review questioning
the IBP resolutions that recommended his suspension. It could nonetheless be inferred from the circumstances that Atty.
Dalangin's chosen course of action was to preclude the forfeiture of his right to question the dismissal of the
administrative cases where he served as complainant, given that Section 12(c) provides that where the respondent is
exonerated, (t)he case shall be deemed terminated unless upon a petition of the complainant or other interested party filed
with Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. For
this reason, the Court refused to make an outright denial of Atty. Dalangin’s petition for review notwithstanding the fact
that it questioned the resolve to suspend him from the practice of law. Considering that the petition likewise covered the
IBP's dismissal of the disbarment cases against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 16,
2015, directed the filing of comments on the petition.

In any case, it must still be stressed that the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s suspension
from the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering that the Court still had to release its final action
on the matter.46 It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.47 The factual findings of the IBP can only be recommendatory. Its recommended penalties are also, by their
nature, recommendatory.48 In light of these precepts, the Court will then not refuse a review of the IBP's recommendation
for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension notwithstanding the premature filing of the petition. In fact, an examination of the IBP
resolutions for his suspension is warranted as a matter of course, even in the absence of a petition, because it is the Court
that has the duty to take a final action on any determination of the IBP for a lawyer's suspension from the practice of law
or disbarment.

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court had in fact been later amended by B.M. No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015. Section 12
thereof now reads:

Sec. 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.

b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court
the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of
the Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.

c) The Board’s resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall be transmitted
to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.

d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.

In Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis,49 the Court emphasized that the amendments reiterated the principle that only the Court
has the power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. Factual findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the IBP are recommendatory, subject to review by the
Court.50

As the Court now reviews the IBP’s resolve to dismiss the complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, it then also
enters its final action on the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of
law for three years, as the IBP cited gross misconduct, violations of the CPR and breach of the lawyer's oath as grounds.

A.C. No. 10758

Gross Immorality
Among several cited grounds, the IBP’s recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for three
years was on the pretext that he publicly and openly maintained a romantic relationship with Pascual even when their
marriages with their respective spouses subsisted.

Allegedly, the affair further resulted in the birth of the child Julienne, who was believed to be Atty. Dalangin’s daughter
even when he turned down a challenge for a DNA test that could prove the child's true filiation.51

In his report, the Investigative Commissioner specifically referred to the following evidence to support his finding of an
immoral relationship between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual:

2. That Complainant Alvaro who executed an affidavit regarding the illicit and immoral relation of [Atty. Dalangin] with
[Pascual] for the reason that she was formerly [close] to [Pascual] and the latter confided to her that she (Pascual) [did]
not love her husband anymore and the child called [Atty. Dalangin] "Papa attorney" (Affidavit of Alvaro as Exh. "F").

3. That Ligaya Agrave[,] a neighbor of [Pascual,] likewise executed an affidavit that the child ["Julienne"] is the daughter
of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual], that she used to see [Atty. Dalangin] taking care of [Julienne] when she was still a baby
and when she grew up already, [Atty. Dalangin] used to accompany the child in their school tour and also her graduation.
That the child as she grew older is a look[-]alike of [Atty. Dalangin]. (Affidavit of Ligaya Agrave marked as Exh. "G").

4. That the illicit affair of [Atty. Dalangin] with his former Clerk in the PAO, Talavera, Nueva Ecija was well known in
Talavera, in the entire judiciary in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and even in the community of Sto. Domingo, Nueva [E]cija[.]
[(L]etter to the Ombudsman dated Aug. 18, 2011 of Felicidad Sumatra is marked as Exh. "H").

5. That [Atty. Dalangin] refused when challenged for a DNA test.

6. Complainants submitted xxx pictures of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual] together with their daughter [Julienne] taken in
far away Puerto Prinsesa marked as Exh. I and I-1.

7. That [Atty. Dalangin] continued to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife shows his lack
of good moral character.52

Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of marriage, the
family, and the community. Illicit relationships likewise constitute a violation of Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State."53 When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the
usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.

Upon the Court’s review, however, it finds no sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed illicit affair with
Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed between them was not adequately proved.

The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The Court explained in Saladaga v. Astorga:54

Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, such as the
ones at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.55

In Reyes v. Nieva, 56 the Court reiterated this rule on the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings, as it held:

Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, which was promulgated just this June 15,
2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that
'amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. x x x.

Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the proper
evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.

The rule is taken in light of other settled principles that apply for a proper disposition of administrative cases. In Advincula
v. Macabata,57 the Court emphasized:

The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary power. Thus, the adage that he who asserts not he who denies, must prove. xxx.58

Further, the Court emphasized in Cabas v. Sususco59 the oft-repeated rule that "mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence."60

With careful consideration of the foregoing tenets, the Court's perusal of the records reveals an insufficiency of evidence
that could warrant the recommended suspension from the practice of law.

To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin’s gross immorality harped
only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledge on the wrongful relationship between Atty.
Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could have led them to their conclusion were scant and unsubstantiated.
The most concrete proof that they could offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the child's birth certificate, a public
document, expressly indicated the girl’s father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty. Dalangin.61 Julienne’s baptismal
certificate62 also provided such fact, along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin’s defense on his closeness to Julienne
for being her godfather.

It would be unfair to Atty. Dalangin, more so for the child whose filiation is in a way needlessly dragged into this case, for
the Court to affirm the assertions in the complaint and the IBP's findings and conclusions on the basis of the available
evidence. The alleged similarities in the physical appearances of Atty. Dalangin and Julienne were but lame and dismal
validations of the complainants’ vehement claim of paternity. Even the photographs 63 of Atty. Dalangin, Pascual and
Julienne in what appeared to be a trip to Pue1io Princesa, Palawan were insufficient to support a conclusion on the
unlawful relations. The lone photo where Atty. Dalangin appeared with Pascual and Julienne, who were apparently
merely waiting for boarding in an airport terminal, utterly failed to manifest any romantic or filial bond among them. It
was also explained through an affidavit64 executed by spouses Dante Capindian and Timotea Jamito that Atty. Dalangin
was a principal sponsor, while Pascual’s family were guests, in their wedding which was held on August 6, 2011 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. Apparently, the photos were taken during the said trip. Pascual’s husband, Edgardo, was also present
for the occasion.

The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally absolved of fault. While he vehemently denied any romantic
relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness with the latter's family, including her children. It was
such display of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful relationship and belief
that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more prudent and mindful of his actions
and the perception that his acts built upon the public, particularly because he and Pascual were both married. "As officers
of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."65 As keepers of public faith, lawyers
are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with great
caution."66

The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should
suffice under the circumstances. The following pronouncement in Advincula v. Macabata67 is pertinent:
While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer,
it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be
controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the
lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.

x x x Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such
nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. x x x68

Gross Misconduct and Malpractice

Atty. Dalangin was also charged, and recommended for suspension from the practice of law, for several other acts
involving use of misleading evidence in court and preparation of affidavits with pe1jured statements to support cases and
complaints for disbarment. When he still served as a public attorney, he likewise allegedly demanded acceptance fees
from indigent clients, and appeared in courts beyond his area of jurisdiction. Even these charges, however, were not
supported by evidence that could warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension. And while there were several other charges
included in the complaint against Atty. Dalangin, the accusations were actually for actions that should be attributed not
to him, but to other individuals like Pascual.

Specifically on the claim that Atty. Dalangin failed to fully explain to Marzan and Valdez the contents of the affidavit that
supported a disbarment case against Atty. Torres, the Court takes note of the fact that the alleged failure to explain did
not necessarily equate to the falsity of the claims therein made. It refers to the joint affidavit executed by Marzan and
Valdez, and which was attached to the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215, whereby affiants merely alleged that they
signed the affidavit even when they were not fully apprised of its contents.69 It was not alleged that they were
fraudulently lured or tricked by Atty. Dalangin into signing the complaint, and that the charges therein hurled against
Atty. Torres were absolutely false. Thus, the claim that Atty. Dalangin knowingly brought a groundless suit against a
fellow lawyer had no leg to stand on.

The charge of malpractice for Atty. Dalangin's supposed demand for attorney's fees while he still worked as a PAO lawyer
also remained unsubstantiated by evidence.1âwphi1 Such serious imputation could not have been adequately
established by an affidavit that was executed in 2010 by a lone person, Camacho, from whom the demand for ₱8,000.00
was allegedly made in 2001.70 Similarly, while Atty. Dalangin admitted to have appeared in courts beyond his area of
jurisdiction as public attorney, he claimed to have obtained permission therefor from the Regional Public Attorney, a
defense which the complainants failed to refute. In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption that the
respondent regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath shall prevail,71 especially as the Court considers it
highly improbable for the courts where appearances were made to fail to notice such patent irregularity, if Atty. Dalangin
was indeed not authorized to perform his acts before their courts as a public attorney.

Anent the failure of Atty. Dalangin to submit all pages of a certificate of title in Civil Case No. 336-SD(04)AF pending with
the RTC, Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and entitled Tamayo v. Philippine National Bank, it has been explained
that the error had been corrected at once during the pre-trial conference.72

Among the other charges imputed against Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, the Court only finds fault for his misquote of
jurisprudence cited in a pleading filed with the RTC, Branch 35, Gapan City for Cad. Case No. 1564-05 entitled Bangko
Luzon v. Diaz. It was narrated in the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215 that:

14. x x x [T]he cited jurisprudence is hereto quoted:

"If a court of competent jurisdiction annulled the foreclosure sale of the property in question, the issuance of a writ of
possession ceases to be ministerial."

15. In the said case of BPI vs. Tampipi, there is nothing mentioned about the cessation of the ministerial function of the
court but instead what is clearly stated in the decision are the following:
"Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a
writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court."73

Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit of the cited ruling.74 As counsel and officer of the court,
however, with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the task of ascertaining the truth, Atty. Dalangin was remiss in
the discharge of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule 10.02 thereof provides:

"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of the
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative
by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved."

The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be an appropriate penalty for the act. While the Court detests
Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited jurisprudence
and, accordingly, calls his attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate.

A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation was Atty.
Dalangin’s own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence. There was no clear indication that the statement was intended
to mislead the court or commit a falsehood; there was no brazen deviation from the principle or doctrine that was
embodied in the jurisprudence's original text.

A.C. No. 10759

In relation to A.C. No. 10759 on Atty. Dalangin’s altercation on November 14, 2011 with Alvaro as the latter was waiting
for the start of a court hearing in the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the records include affidavits executed by
witnesses who did not appear to have any reason to falsely testify against Atty. Dalangin on the incident.

Affiant Josephine Rivera, in particular, who claimed to be also then waiting for a scheduled hearing, allegedly saw Atty.
Dalangin shout and point at Alvaro, as he threatened to file a case against the latter.75 Two security guards stationed at
the trial court, evidently disinterested persons who would not have wrongly testified against Atty. Dalangin, likewise
confirmed that such heated confrontation actually transpired. Pertinent portions of the guards’ affidavit76 read:

1. Na noong ika-14 ng Nobyembre, 2011, ganap na ika-8:45 ng umaga humigit kumulang, ha bang nakaupo si [Alvaro] sa
"bench", upuang mahaba malapit sa aming kinauupuan dito sa pintuan ng Hall of Justice, Regional Trial Court, Baloc, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija at kausap niya ang isa niyang kasama, dumating si Atty. Bayani Dalangin at pagkakita kay [Alvaro]
ay pinagsisigawan ito at maraming sinabi laban kay [Alvaro];

2. Na maraming nakarinig, nakakita at nagulat sa pangyayaring ito;

x x x x77

For the Court, Atty. Dalangin erred in his conduct subject of the complaint, especially since his outburst was carried out
within the court premises and in the presence of several persons who readily witnessed his fit of anger. Part of Atty.
Dalangin’s duties as a lawyer is to maintain the honor that is due the profession. Members of the legal profession should
commit to the mandates of Canon 7, particularly Rule 7 .03 thereof, to wit:

CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD TI-IE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
XX X.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Although Atty. Dalangin, at that instant, could have been stirred by his frustration or resentment for the disbarment case
filed against him by Alvaro, such circumstance could not have absolved him from any responsibility for his conduct. At
most, this only serves to mitigate the penalty that the Court deems appropriate to impose, as it likewise considers its
finding that Alvaro’s allegations in CBD Case No. 11-3215 on the supposed extra-marital affair of Atty. Dalangin with
Pascual were indeed not backed by sufficient evidence. The Court finds it appropriate to impose upon Atty. Dalangin
a fine of ₱5,000.00, with a stem warning that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future.

Although the Court has admonished Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, it finds the imposition of this fine still suitable under
the circumstances, given that A.C. No. 10759, although resolved jointly with A.C. No. 10758, is a distinct administrative
case that covers a separate complaint that was instituted solely by Alvaro. The severity of this offense likewise varies
from the other breaches for which the Court has determined the admonition to be appropriate.

A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761

The Court affirms the decision of the IBP to dismiss the administrative complaints filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty.
Torres and Atty. Andres.

In A.C. No. 10760, Atty. Dalangin sought to support his complaint by referring to the supposed participation of Atty.
Torres and Atty. Andres in a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He asserted that the act also violated the lawyer's
oath, and breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR which reads:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.

The alleged violation of the statute is a serious charge that the Court cannot take lightly, in view of the breach of the basic
and constitutional right to privacy of communication that inevitably results from the act. In brief, the law prohibits any
person "to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder x x x."79 It likewise forbids any person from possessing, replaying or furnishing
transcriptions of communications that are obtained in violation of the law.

In this case, Atty. Dalangin claimed that Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres conspired with Alejo on the wrongful recording of
a private communication with Pineda, along with the use of the transcript thereof to support Alejo’s affidavit in CBD Case
No. 11-3215. However, Pineda's own denial of the truth of the statements in the transcription lends doubt as to the
allegation of a purported secret recording of an actual conversation. While Pineda denied knowledge that her telephone
conversation with Alejo was recorded by the latter, she still refused to acknowledge the veracity of the assertions that
she allegedly made as contained in the transcript,80 which then appears to be a rejection of the supposed conversation.
Given the circumstances, the IBP correctly ruled that Atty. Dalangin failed to substantiate the charges in his complaint
against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.

The same conclusion equally applies in A.C. No. 10761. The commission of perjury was imputed upon Atty. Torres, as the
person who prepared the affidavits of Marzan and Valdez. As witnesses in CBD Case No. 11-3215, Marzan and Valdez
claimed that Atty. Dalangin prepared an affidavit for Atty. Torres' disbarment without fully explaining to them the
contents thereof. The fact that Atty. Torres induced the affiants to make perjured statements, however, was not
established by clear and convincing proof. Even granting that statements of affiants were eventually determined to be
inaccurate and untruthful, it would be wrong to at once ascribe error or fault upon the lawyers who drafted the affidavits,
in the absence of clear and sufficient proof that they actively participated in the intentional commission of a fraud or
declaration of fabricated statements.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:

(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in
handling his personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely;

(2) In A.C. No. 10759, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for his breach of Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed
upon him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future; and

(3) In A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin’s petition for review is DENIED. The
Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated June
21, 2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2014, insofar as the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the following complaints:
(1) CBD Case No. 12-3369 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres; and (2) CBD Case No. 12-
3458 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres. SO ORDERED.

11.

A.C. No. 8208

RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA, Complainant

vs. ATTY. RONALDO ANTONIO V. CALAYAN, Respondent

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

Before the Court is a Counter-Complaint1 filed by complainant (Ret.) Judge Virgilio Alpajora (Complainant) against
respondent Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan (Respondent), which originated from an administrative complaint filed by
the latter against the former before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for ignorance of the law and/or issuance
of undue order. The administrative complaint against Judge Alpajora was dismissed by the Court in a Resolution,2 dated
March 2, 2009, on the ground that the matters raised therein were judicial in nature.

In his Comment/Opposition with Counter-Complaint to Discipline Complainant,3 complainant charged respondent with
(a) filing a malicious and harassment administrative case, (b) propensity for dishonesty in the allegations in his pleadings,
(c) misquoting provisions of law, and (d) misrepresentation of facts. Complainant prayed for respondent's disbarment
and cancellation of his license as a lawyer.

The Antecedents

Prior to this case, an intra-corporate case docketed as Civil Case No. 2007-10 and entitled "Calayan Educational
Foundation Inc. (CEFI), Dr. Arminda Calayan, Dr. Bernardita Calayan-Brion and Dr. Manuel Calayan vs. Atty. Ronalda A.V.
Calayan, Susan S. Calayan and Deanna Rachelle S. Calayan, " was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena
City designated as commercial court and presided by Judge Adolfo Encomienda. Respondent was President and
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of CEFI. He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for himself. Court
proceedings ensued despite several inhibitions by judges to whom the case was re-raffled until it was finally re-raffled to
complainant. Thereafter, complainant issued an Omnibus Order,4dated July 11, 2008 for the creation of a management
committee and the appointment of its members. That Order prompted the filing of the administrative case against the
Judge Alpajora.
The administrative case against complainant was dismissed. The Court, however, referred the comment/opposition with
counter-complaint filed by complainant in the administrative case against him to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action.

The OBC deemed it proper to re-docket the counter-complaint as a regular administrative case against respondent. Thus,
in a Resolution,5 dated June 3, 2009, upon recommendation of the OBC, the Court resolved to require respondent to
submit his comment on the counter-complaint.

In its Resolution,6 dated September 9, 2009, the Court noted respondent's comment and referred the administrative case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

After a mandatory conference before the IBP, both parties were directed to submit their respective verified position
papers.

Position of complainant

Complainant alleged that he partially tried and heard Civil Case No. 2007-10, an intra-corporate case filed against
respondent, when he later voluntarily inhibited himself from it on account of the latter's filing of the administrative case
against him.

The intra-corporate case was previously tried by Presiding Judge Adolfo Encomienda (Presiding Judge Encomienda) until
he voluntarily inhibited after respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Recuse and a Supplement to Defendant's Urgent
Motion to Recuse on the grounds of undue delay in disposing pending incidents, gross ignorance of the law and gross
inefficiency.7 The motions came after Presiding Judge Encomienda issued an order appointing one Atty. Antonio
Acyatan (Atty. Acyatan) as receiver, who was directed to immediately take over the subject corporation.

After Presiding Judge Encomienda inhibited himself, the case was re-raffled to the sala of Executive Judge Norma
Chionglo-Sia, who also inhibited herself because she was about to retire. The case was referred to Executive Judge Eloida
R. de Leon-Diaz for proper disposition and re-raffle.8 The case was finally raffled to complainant.9

Complainant averred that the administrative case against him by respondent was brought about by his issuance of the
omnibus order, dated July 11, 2008, where he ordered the creation of a management committee and appointment of its
members. Meanwhile, the RTC resolved that Atty. Acyatan continue to discharge his duties and responsibilities with such
powers and authority as the court-appointed receiver. The trial court also authorized the foundation to pay Atty. Acyatan
reimbursement expenses and professional charges. Complainant claimed that his order was not acceptable to
respondent because he knew the import and effect of the said order - that he, together with his wife and daughter, would
lose their positions as Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary, respectively, and as members of the Board of Trustees of the
CEFI.10

Complainant further claimed that before the records of Civil Case 2007-10 was transmitted to his sala and after he had
inhibited from said case, respondent filed thirteen (13) civil and special actions before the RTC of Lucena City.11Atty.
Calayan also filed two (2) related intra-corporate controversy cases - violating the rule on splitting causes of actions -
involving the management and operation of the foundation. According to complainant, these showed the propensity and
penchant of respondent in filing cases, whether or not they are baseless, frivolous or unfounded, with no other intention
but to harass, malign and molest his opposing parties, including the lawyers and the handling judges. Complainant also
revealed that respondent filed two (2) other administrative cases against a judge and an assisting judge in the RTC of
Lucena City, which were dismissed because the issues raised were judicial in nature.12

Complainant also disclosed that before his sala, respondent filed eighteen (18) repetitious and prohibited
pleadings.13 Respondent continuously filed pleadings after pleadings as if to impress upon the court to finish the main
intra-corporate case with such speed. To complainant's mind, the ultimate and ulterior objective of respondent in filing
the numerous pleadings, motions, manifestation and explanations was to prevent the takeover of the management of
CEFI and to finally dismiss the case at the pre-trial stage.
Complainant further revealed that due to the series of motions for recusation or inhibition of judges, there is no presiding
judge in Lucena City available to try and hear the Calayan cases. Moreover, respondent filed nine (9) criminal charges
against opposing lawyers and their respective clients before the City Prosecutor of Lucena City. In addition, there were
four (4) administrative cases filed against opposing counsels pending before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.14

Based on the foregoing, complainant asserted that respondent committed the following: (1) serious and gross
misconduct in his duties as counsel for himself; (2) violated his oath as lawyer for [a] his failure to observe and maintain
respect to the courts (Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court); [b] by his abuse of judicial process thru maintaining actions
or proceedings inconsistent with truth and honor and his acts to mislead the judge by false statements (Section 20(d),
Rule 138); (3) repeatedly violated the rules of procedures governing intra-corporate cases and maliciously misused the
same to defeat the ends of justice; and (4) knowingly violated the rule against the filing of multiple actions arising from
the same cause of action.

Position of respondent

In his Position Paper,15 respondent countered that the subject case is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

According to him, the counter-complaint was integrated with the Comment/Opposition of complainant in the
administrative case docketed as A.M. OCA LP.I. No. 08-2968-RTJ filed by respondent against the latter. He stressed that
because no disciplinary measures were levelled on him by the OCA as an outcome of his complaint, charges for
malpractice, malice or bad faith were entirely ruled out; moreso, his disbarment was decidedly eliminated.16Respondent
argued that the doctrine of res judicata was embedded in the OCA's finding that his complaint was judicial in nature.17 He
likewise averred that the conversion of the administrative complaint against a judge into a disbarment complaint against
him, the complaining witness, was hideously adopted to deflect the charges away from complainant. Respondent
insisted that the counter-complaint was not sanctioned by the Rules of Court on disbarment and the Rules of Procedure
of the Commission on Bar Discipline.18

Respondent also claimed that the counter-complaint was unverified and thus, without complainant's own personal
knowledge; instead, it is incontrovertible proof of his lack of courtesy and obedience toward proper authorities and
fairness to a fellow lawyer.19

Further, respondent maintained that complainant committed the following: (1) grossly unethical and immoral conduct
by his impleading a non-party;20 (2) betrayal of his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR);21 (3)
malicious and intentional delay in not terminating the pre-trial,22 in violation of the Interim Rules because he ignored the
special summary nature of the case;23 and (4) misquoted provisions of law and misrepresented the facts.24

Lastly, it was respondent's submission that the counter-complaint failed to adduce the requisite quantum of evidence to
disbar him, even less, to cite him in contempt of court assuming ex gratia the regularity of the referral of the case.25

Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation,26 the Investigating Commissioner noted that, instead of refuting the allegations and
evidence against him, respondent merely reiterated his charges against complainant. Instead of asserting his defense
against complainant's charges, the position paper for the respondent appeared more to be a motion for reconsideration
of the Resolution dated March 2, 2009 rendered by the Supreme Court, dismissing the administrative case against
complainant.27

In any case, based on the parties' position papers, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent violated
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,28 Rules 8.01, 10.01 to 10.03, 11.03, 11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR29 and,
thus, recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years,30 for the following reasons:

First, respondent did not deny having filed four (4) cases against the counsel involved in the intra-corporate case from
which the subject administrative cases stemmed, and nine (9) criminal cases against the opposing parties, their lawyers,
and the receiver before the Office of the Prosecutor of Lucena City - all of which were subject of judicial notice. The
Investigating Commissioner opined that such act manifested respondent's malice in paralyzing these lawyers from
exerting their utmost effort in protecting their client's interest.31

Second, respondent committed misrepresentation when he cited a quote from former Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as
a thesis when, in fact, it was a dissenting opinion. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that describing the
supposed discussions by the judge with respondent's adverse counsels as contemplated crimes and frauds is not only
grave but also unfounded and irrelevant to the present case.32

Third, respondent grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by the filing of multiple actions concerning the same
subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief.33 He admitted filing pleadings indiscriminately, but argued that it
was within his right to do so and it was merely for the purpose of saving CEFI from imminent downfall.34 The Investigating
Commissioner opined that the filing of multiple actions not only was contemptuous, but also a blatant violation of the
lawyer's oath.35

Fourth, respondent violated Canon 11 of the CPR by attributing to complainant ill-motives that were not supported by
the record or had no materiality to the case.36 He charged complainant with coaching adverse counsel on account of their
alleged close ties, inefficiency in dealing with his pleadings, acting with dispatch on the adverse party's motions, partiality
to the plaintiffs because he was a townmate of Presiding Judge Encomienda, and arriving at an order without predicating
the same on legal bases under the principle of stare decisis.37 According to the Investigating Commissioner, these charges
are manifestly without any basis and also established respondent's disrespect for the complainant.38

Based on the findings, the Investigating Commissioner ultimately concluded:

As a party directly involved in the subject intra-corporate controversy, it is duly noted that Respondent was emotionally
affected by the ongoing case. His direct interest in the proceedings apparently clouded his judgment, on account of which
he failed to act with circumspect in his choice of words and legal remedies. Such facts and circumstances mitigate
Respondent's liability. Hence, it is hereby recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years.39

Consequently, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution40 adopting and approving the report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner. It recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2)
years.

Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration.

In a Resolution,41 dated May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent's motion for reconsideration as there
was no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the motion was a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out.

Hence, pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,42 the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
together with the whole record of the case, was transmitted to the Court for final action.

Ruling of the Court

The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession.43
When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not only the rights of their client, but
also of their colleagues and offends due administration of justice, appropriate disciplinary measures and proceedings are
available such as reprimand, suspension or even disbarment to rectify their wrongful acts.

The Court, however, emphasizes that a case for disbarment or suspension is not meant to grant relief to a complainant
as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect
the public and the courts.44 Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not instituted to protect and promote
the public good only, but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by the weeding out of those who have proven
themselves unworthy thereof.45

In this case, perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Calayan has displayed conduct unbecoming of a worthy lawyer.

Harassing tactics against opposing counsel

As noted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not deny filing several cases, both civil and criminal,
against opposing parties and their counsels. In his motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution,
he again admitted such acts but expressed that it was not ill-willed. He explained that the placing of CEFI under
receivership and directing the creation of a management committee and the continuation of the receiver's duties and
responsibilities by virtue of the Omnibus Order spurred his filing of various pleadings and/or motions.46 It was in his
desperation and earnest desire to save CEFI from further damage that he implored the aid of the courts.47

The Court is mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal. However, professional rules impose
limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications.48 The filing of cases by respondent
against the adverse parties and their counsels, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, manifests his
malice in paralyzing the lawyers from exerting their utmost effort in protecting their client's interest. 49 Even
assuming arguendo that such acts were done without malice, it showed respondent's gross indiscretion as a colleague in
the legal profession.

Unsupported ill-motives attributed to a judge

As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court and must refrain from
attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.50

Here, respondent has consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the complainant in his pleadings. He
insisted that complainant antedated the order, dated August 15, 2008, because the envelopes where the order came
from were rubber stamped as having been mailed only on August 26, 2008.51 He also accused the complainant judge of
being in cahoots and of having deplorable close ties with the adverse counsels;52 and that complainant irrefutably coached
said adverse counsels.53 However, these bare allegations are absolutely unsupported by any piece of evidence.
Respondent did not present any proof to establish complainant's alleged partiality or the antedating. The date of mailing
indicated on the envelope is not the date of issue of the said order.

Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR state that:

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.

xxx

Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing unsupported ill-motives to complainant. It must
be remembered that all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence
in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution;
elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.54

Hence, no matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his client's cause, he must not forget to display the
appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member of the legal profession, and to continue to afford proper and
utmost respect due to the courts.

Failure to observe candor, fairness and good faith before the court; failure to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice

It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of
justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before
them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration
of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all.55

In his Motion for Reconsideration56 of the Resolution dated February 10, 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors, respondent
wrote:

Anent, the Respondent's alleged commission of falsehood in his pleadings, suffice it to state that if certain pleadings
prepared by the Respondent contained some allegations that turned out to be inaccurate, the same were nevertheless
unintentional and only arose out of the Respondent's honest misappreciation of certain facts;57

The records, however, showed that respondent's allegations were not brought about by mere inaccuracy. For one of his
arguments against the complainant, respondent relied on Rule 9 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies which provides:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Management Committee. - As an incident to any of the cases filed under these Rules or the
Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, A PARTY MAY APPLY for the appointment of a management committee for
the corporation, partnership or association, when there is imminent danger of: xxx [Emphasis supplied]

He stressed that the courts cannot motu proprio legally direct the appointment of a management committee when
the Interim Rules predicate such appointment exclusively upon the application of a party in the complaint a quo.58

By employing the term "exclusively" to describe the class of persons who can apply for the appointment of a management
committee,59 respondent tried to mislead the Court. Lawyers are well aware of the tenor of a provision of law when "may"
is used. "May" is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion.60 Thus, when the Interim Rules stated that "a
party may apply x x x, " it did not connote exclusivity to a certain class. It simply meant that should a party opt for the
appointment of such, it may do so. It does not, however, exclude the courts from ordering the appointment of a
management committee should the surrounding circumstances of the case warrant such.

Further, as regards his alleged misquotation, respondent argues that he should have been cited in contempt.1âwphi1 He
found justification in Cortes vs. Bangalan,61 to wit:

xxx. The alleged offensive and contemptuous language contained in the letter-complaint was not directed to the
respondent court. As observed by the Court Administrator, "what respondent should have done in this particular case is
that he should have given the Court (Supreme Court) the opportunity to rule on the complaint and not simply acted
precipitately in citing complainant in contempt of court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than
the upholding of a court's honor."

A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on his impartiality even if the judge may have
been insulted therein. While the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction
and preservation not for retaliation or vindication.62

As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the jurisprudence quoted precisely cautions a judge against
citing a party in contempt, which is totally contradictory to the position of respondent. He misrepresented the text of a
decision, in violation of the CPR.

Moreover, in defense of the multiple pleadings he filed, respondent avers that there is no law or rule that limits the
number of motions, pleadings and even cases as long as they are sufficient in form and substance and not violative of the
prohibition against forum shopping.63 He maintains that his pleadings were filed in utmost good faith and for noble
causes, and that he was merely exercising his constitutionally protected rights to due process and speedy disposition of
cases.64

Ironically, Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and criminal cases, and even administrative
cases against different trial court judges relating to controversies involving CEFI, in fact, runs counter to the speedy
disposition of cases. It frustrates the administration of justice. It degrades the dignity and integrity of the courts.

A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he pleases. Limitations can be inferred
from the following rules:

1. Rules of Court

a. Rule 71, Section 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and Hearing. - After charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to
be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxx

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

xxx

2. Code of Professional Responsibility

a. Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.

b. Canon 10, Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.

c. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

d. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 -A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a Judgment or misuse
Court processes.

Respondent justifies his filing of administrative cases against certain judges, including complainant, by relying on In Re:
Almacen (Almacen).65 He claims that the mandate of the ruling laid down in Almacen was to encourage lawyers' criticism
of erring magistrates.66
In Almacen, however, it did not mandate but merely recognized the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and
as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.67 In
addition, the Court therein emphasized that these criticisms are subject to a condition, to wit:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such
a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.68 [Emphasis supplied.]

Indubitably, the acts of respondent were in violation of his duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers and his duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer.69

In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, respondent apologized for not being more circumspect with his remedies and
choice of words. He admitted losing objectivity and becoming emotional while pursuing the cases involving him and the
CEFI. The Court, however, reiterates that a lawyer's duty, is not to his client but primarily to the administration of justice.
To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to, and must always, be scrupulously observant
of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit
of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.70

For having violated the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath, respondent's conduct should be meted with a commensurate
penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Board of
Governors dated September 28, 2013. Accordingly, Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan is found GUILTY of violating The
Lawyer's Oath and The Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby ordered SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of
law for two (2) years, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the: (a) Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of
the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personal records of the respondent. SO ORDERED.

12.

A.C. No. 11326 (Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4305), June 27, 2018

PELAGIO VICENCIO SORONGON, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON Y. GARGANTOS,1 SR., Respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is the Affidavit Complaint2 dated July 1, 2014 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) by complainant Pelagio Vicencio Sorongon, Jr. (complainant) against herein
respondent Atty. Ramon Y. Gargantos, Sr. (respondent). The complainant, a retired businessman and resident of Davao
City, was charged, together with personnel of the Regional Health Office No. XI in Davao City, before the Sandiganbayan
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as Crim. Case Nos. 24483, 24486, and 24488. 3 The
complainant engaged respondent's legal services to represent him in the said cases.4

Antecedents
The complainant alleged that he gave respondent the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as full
payment of the latter's legal services, which, s allegedly agreed upon, would cover the acceptance fee, appearance fees,
and other fees until the resolution of the cases.5 The complainant also alleged that respondent did not give him a receipt
nor did they execute a formal memorandum of agreement (MOA).6 In addition, complainant narrated that they agreed
that if there would be court hearings outside of Quezon City, then complainant would provide respondent's plane ticket,
meals, and hotel accommodation.7 However, should the hearing be at the Sandiganbayan, they would just meet in the
court.8

On June 3, 2014, complainant called the respondent regarding the scheduled hearings on June 4 and 5, 2014 at the
Sandiganbayan.9 The respondent instructed the complainant to pick him up at his residence in Quezon City, otherwise
he would not attend the hearing.10 The complainant complied and they attended the hearing at the Sandiganbayan on
June 4, 2014.11 After the hearing and on their way to respondent's residence, he allegedly demanded "pocket money"
from the complainant since he would accompany his wife to the United States, otherwise, he would not appear in the
hearing the following day and he would no longer serve as complainant’s counsel.12

The next day, June 5, 2014, the complainant went again to the respondent's residence to pick him up for the
hearing.13 However, the respondent allegedly asked him in a harsh voice, "O ano? Dala ma ba yong hinihingi ko? Sinabi ka
na s[a]yo kahap[o]n kung di mo dala di ako sisipot sa hearing mo at layasan kita."14 When the complainant replied that he
did not have the money, the respondent allegedly shouted at him, "Babaliktarin kita. Sasabihin ko na di mo ako
binabayaran at ipakukulong kita. Di mo ako kilala. Umalis [kana] at baka ano pa ang mangyari s[a]yo. Pagdating mo
mamaya sa Sandiganbayan, sabihin at ikwento mo kung ano ang ginawa ko s[a]yo, hindi na ako sisipot ngayong araw at
magreresign na ako bilang abagado mo."15

The complainant alleged that he was traumatized by respondent's acts, and with teary eyes and a cordial voice, he
begged respondent not to abandon him.16 However, instead of listening to him, the respondent ordered him to
leave.17 He then politely replied, "[Sige] po Atty. Alis na po ako. Salamat po."18 During the hearing on that day, the
complainant narrated before the Sandiganbayan the acts of respondent, and informed the court that, being a jobless
senior citizen, he could not afford to hire a new lawyer to represent him.19 At 4:35 p.m. of the same day, respondent filed
a letter informing the Sandiganbayan of his withdrawal as the complainant's counsel.20 Thus, in the abovementioned
Affidavit Complaint, the complainant prayed for the refund of a portion of the amount paid to respondent in order that
he might be able to hire a new counsel.21

In an Order22 dated August 18, 2014, Dominic C.M. Solis, the Director for Bar Discipline (Director Solis), directed the
respondent to submit his Answer to the Affidavit Complaint pursuant to Bar Matter No. 1755 (Re: Rules of Procedure of
the Commission on Bar Discipline), as amended by A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC (Re: Efficient Use of Paper Rule).

In a handwritten letter23 dated November 6, 2014 addressed to Director Solis, the respondent, who stated therein that
he is already 82 years old, requested for a copy of the Affidavit Complaint in order to be able to prepare his Answer
thereof.

On January 9, 2015, IBP-CBD Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor (Commissioner Villamor) issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing24 to the parties, requiring them to attend the mandatory conference/hearing on March 26, 2015, and
to submit their respective briefs at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing.

In compliance therewith, the complainant filed his Mandatory Conference Brief25 dated March 13, 2015, wherein he
reiterated the allegations in his Affidavit Complaint, and expressed his unwillingness to enter into an amicable
settlement.26

In an Order27 dated March 26, 2015, Commissioner Villamor noted that only the complainant appeared for the mandatory
conference, coming all the way from Davao City. His Mandatory Conference Brief was also noted.28 Moreover, the Order
also noted that respondent failed to file his Answer, and thus, he was considered in default and to have waived his right
to be present in the mandatory conference.29 The parties were ordered to file their respective position papers with
supporting documentary exhibits and/or judicial affidavit/s of witness/es, if any, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the said Order.30 After the lapse of the period for submission of position papers, the case would then be deemed
submitted for report and recommendation.31

The complainant filed his Position Paper32 dated May 18, 2015, reiterating the allegations in his Affidavit Complaint and
Mandatory Conference Brief. Meanwhile, aside from the abovementioned handwritten letter dated November 6, 2014,
the respondent failed to file any pleadings, or to participate in the proceedings before the IBP-CBD.

Report and Recommendation of the CBD

In his Report and Recommendation33 (Report) dated May 29, 2015, Commissioner Villamor found respondent to have
violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), particularly Canon 16,34 Rule 16.01,35 and
thus, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and that he should return
all documents and money in his possession over and above his lawful and reasonable attorney's fee with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.36

In his Report, Commissioner Villamor considered the amount of P50,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fee for the time
spent and the extent of the services rendered by respondent during the arraignment of the complainant's case, but
respondent was to return the remaining amount of P150,000.00 to the complainant.37

Moreover, Commissioner Villamor found that the respondent abandoned the complainant, and his withdrawal as counsel
was without good cause.38 He also noted that respondent failed, despite demand, to return the documents to the
complainant.39

Resolution of the Board of Governors of the IBP

On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-581,40 adopting and approving the
above Report, but modified the same by ordering respondent to return the entire amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00) to the complainant.41

Court's Ruling

As found by Commissioner Villamor, the respondent allegedly failed to return, despite demand, the complainant's
documents after he withdrew as his counsel42 in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 which provides that a lawyer shall
account for and hold in trust the money or property from the client. Moreover, despite respondent's legal services having
been allegedly paid in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), which, as allegedly agreed upon, was
to cover the acceptance fee, appearance fees, and other fees until the resolution of the cases, he allegedly abandoned
his client when the latter was not able to give him the "pocket money" he had demanded. This is a serious charge which
the respondent should have addressed and answered, as well as the other allegations, during the IBP proceedings.
However, after requesting for a copy of the Affidavit Complaint in order to be able to prepare his Answer, respondent
failed to participate in the IBP proceedings.

While we adopt the findings of Commissioner Villamor, we note that this is respondent's first offense, and we shall also
take into consideration his advanced age (i.e., he stated that he was already 82 years old in his abovementioned
handwritten letter dated November 6, 2014 addressed to Director Solis). We note that, in several cases,43 the Court, in
determining or tempering the penalty to be imposed, has considered mitigating factors, such as the respondent's
advanced age, health, humanitarian and equitable considerations, as well as whether the act complained of was
respondent's first infraction. In the present case, in view of the respondent's advanced age and the fact that this is his first
offense, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent should also return the legal fees paid to him by the
complainant in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and the documents in respondent's
possession which pertain to the case of the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon Y. Gargantos, Sr., is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely. Respondent Atty. Gargantos, Sr. is ordered to RETURN to complainant Pelagio Vicencio
Sorongon, Jr. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) within ninety (90) days from the receipt of this
Decision, including the documents in respondent's possession which pertain to the case of the complainant. Failure to
comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record
as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

13.

Fernando A. Flora III vs. Atty. Giovanni A. Luna (PDF FILE)

14.
Rodolfo M. Yumang, et al. vs. Atty. Edwin M. Alaestante/Berlin V. Gabertan and Higino Gabertan vs. Atty. Edwin
M. Alaestante

A.C. No. 10992, June 19, 2018

RODOLFO M. YUMANG, CYNTHIA V. YUMANG AND ARLENE TABULA, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN M.
ALAESTANTE, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10993, , June 19, 2018

BERLIN V. GABERTAN AND HIGINO GABERTAN, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN M. ALAESTANTE, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Subject of the present Decision are two administrative cases for disbarment, separately filed against Atty. Edwin M.
Alaestante (respondent lawyer) by complainants Rodolfo M. Yumang (Rodolfo), Cynthia V. Yumang (Cynthia), and
Arlene Tabula (Arlene), in A.C. No. 10992, and Berlin V. Gabertan (Berlin), and Higino Gabertan (Higino), in A.C. No.
10993, (collectively, complainants). Complainants charged respondent lawyer with violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility; gross ignorance of the law; grave misconduct; grave abuse of authority; gross dishonesty; malpractice;
and infidelity to the client.1

Facts

On January 3, 2012, respondent lawyer wrote then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila De Lima (Secretary De
Lima) a letter,2viz.:
Dear Secretary De Lima:

May I respectfully request from your Honorable Office for the conduct of preliminary investigation and/or Prosecution of
respondent Cynthia V. Yumang, et al., for the crimes of syndicated Estafa, Qualified Theft and Grave Threats.

Though mindful that venue/jurisdiction of the alleged crimes is primarily vested with your Public Prosecutor at Marikina
City, we earnestly seek your good favor, and instead take a direct action on our case since respondent Cynthia V. Yumang
is a savvy businesswoman and possesses material wealth and tremendous political clout and influence at Marikina City,
and Complainants have [a] well[-]grounded belief that they could not obtain justice in [the] said venue. Complainants
have already suffered injustice when they [first] lodged their complaint before the local police but they were instead given
[a] run-around and advised for the 9th time to go back and forth to the Marikina Police Headquarters.

Compounding complainant[']s predicament, they are Engineers/Contractors based at Balanga City[,] Bataan and have
no means and method[s] to steal-mate [sic] respondents influence and political clout at Marikina City, except via the
direct intervention of your office.3
On even date, respondent lawyer's clients, Ernesto S. Mallari (Ernesto) and Danilo A. Rustia, Jr. (Danilo), executed a Joint
Complaint Affidavit against herein complainants for syndicated estafa, qualified theft and grave threats cases.4

Claiming that respondent lawyer's January 3, 2012 letter contained scurrilous statements intended to malign and
besmirch Cynthia's reputation and business standing, Cynthia and her husband, the complainant Rodolfo, filed a libel
complaint against respondent lawyer, Ernesto, and Danilo before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office (libel case).5

In their counter-affidavit, Ernesto and Danilo denied any knowledge of, or participation in, the writing of the said letter.6

On the other hand, respondent lawyer admitted that he was the author of the letter.7 He denied, however, that the letter
was libelous or defamatory, and insisted that the same was privileged communication. He claimed that he wrote the
letter to protect and advance the interests of Ernesto and Danilo.8

In a Resolution9 dated October 5, 2015, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig found probable cause to indict
respondent lawyer, as well as Ernesto, and Danilo, for the crime of libel.

In the meantime, in a Resolution10 dated November 28, 2012, the DOJ dismissed for lack of merit, the complaint for
syndicated estafa, qualified theft, and grave threats filed by Ernesto and Danilo against herein complainants.

Based on the foregoing, herein complainants filed on March 7, 2013, two separate disbarment complaints against
respondent lawyer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

In their Joint Affidavit of Complaint/Petition for Disbarment,11 complainants Rodolfo, Cynthia, and Arlene averred that
respondent lawyer violated his Oath of Office and the Code of Professional Responsibility, when he prepared, wrote,
signed, and published the malicious and libelous January 3, 2012 letter.

For their part, complainants Berlin and Higino declared in their Sinumpaang Salaysay12 that they were the respondents
in the alleged syndicated estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases alongside their relatives, Cynthia and Arlene.
They claimed that they had previously engaged respondent lawyer's legal services in other cases; that since they knew
respondent lawyer, they approached him regarding his letter dated January 3, 2012, but respondent lawyer told them
not to worry about the cases mentioned in the said letter, and promised to draft the appropriate pleadings for their
defense; that indeed respondent lawyer drafted their Counter-Affidavit and their Rejoinder by way of defense; and that
in payment for his professional legal services, they issued respondent lawyer a Bank of Commerce check in the amount
of P50,000.00.

Higino stressed that respondent lawyer's act of preparing their responsive pleadings in the syndicated estafa, grave
threats and qualified theft cases was violative of the proscription against lawyers representing conflicting interests since
he was the very same lawyer who initiated and/or drafted the complaint in these cases against them; and that as a
consequence thereof, he (Berlin) moved to discharge respondent lawyer as counsel in another case.13

In his Answer,14 respondent lawyer admitted that he was the author of the January 3, 2012 letter to then DOJ Secretary
De Lima; but he insisted that the letter was privileged because it was written in response to a moral or legal duty, he being
the lawyer for his clients in the cases mentioned in the letter. He denied that he was the defense counsel for Berlin and
Higino in the syndicated estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases, and averred that the P50,000.00 check that was
issued in his favor by Berlin and Higino was just a "petty portion" of the P1.1 million that he previously entrusted to Berlin
and Higino relative to a case that he lawyered for them.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner:

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated September 10, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner16recommended
respondent lawyer's suspension from the practice of law for six months, in connection with the disbarment case filed by
Cynthia, Rodolfo, and Arlene; and suspension from the practice of law for one year, in regard to the disbarment case filed
by Berlin and Higino.

The Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that -

It is admitted that Respondent authored a letter addressed to the Secretary of DOJ on January 03, 2012 and the matter
was investigated by the DOJ but the same was dismissed for lack of merit. x x x

That prior to January 03, 2012 x x x filing of the charges with the DOJ, against herein Complainants, Berlin and Higino
Gabertan engaged the services of Respondent as their counsel in several cases since April 2011 to August 31, 2012.

That Respondent received the amount of P50,000.00 from Berlin and Higino Gabertan thru Bank of Commerce check No.
0000008 dated June 11, 2012 and personally encashed by the Respondent (Exh. H). x x x

That because of that letter filed with the DOJ by Respondent and [which] was [later] dismissed, complainants filed a libel
case with the RTC, Pasig City Branch 157 (Exh. D).
That the letter filed by Respondent with the DOJ [was] correctly ruled by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City,
as not privileged communication as it [was] not made in the course of judicial proceedings. (Exh. C).

That Respondent acted as defense counsel for Berlin and Higino Gabertan whom he charged together with the other
complainants with the DOJ (Exh. L).

Clearly, Respondent violated the prohibition that [a] lawyer should not represent new clients whose interest oppose
those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or totally unrelated cases. (In
Re Dela Rosa, 27 Phil. 258. Lim et al. vs. Villorosa A.C. 5303 June 15, 2006).

It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming
adverse and conflicting interest with that of his original client. (Artezuela vs. Madferazo, A.C. No. 4354 April 22, 2002).

Respondent violated his Lawyer's Oath when he sent unsealed malicious and libelous letter against herein Complainants
without any effort to ascertain the truth thus constituted gross evident bad faith for which act he is liable in CBD Case
No. 13-3767 while for acting as counsel for the complainant in the case before the DOJ and [at] the same time preparing
the counter affidavit of Berlin and Higino Gabertan who were Respondents] in the DOJ case he filed against herein
complainants, thus he is also liable under CBD Case No. 13-3767.
It was found out also [that] the Respondent was the defense counsel of Berlin Gabertan whom he charged before the
DOJ in an ongoing civil case at San Mateo, Rizal RTC Branch 76 but claimed that he was just acting as counsel pro-bono.

Complainants having presented sufficient evidence thus proving their case by clear preponderance of evidenced it is
hereby recommended that Respondent be meted the appropriate penalty for the violation he committed.17
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors (BOG):
Finding the Report and Recommendation supported by law and the evidence, the IBP-BOG adopted and accepted the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation, but with modification as regards the recommended penalty in that
respondent lawyer be suspended from the practice of law for one year in the complaint filed by Cynthia, Rodolfo, and
Arlene; and for two years, in the case filed by Berlin and Higino,18 said penalties to be served successively.

Ruling

These administrative cases bear some factual resemblance to Pacana, Jr. v. Atty. Pascual-Lopez.19 In Pacana, Jr., the
lawyer denied any lawyer-client relationship with the complainant, saying that no formal agreement had been entered
to that effect; also, the therein counsel questioned the admissibility of an electronic mail he sent to therein complainant.
In said case, the lawyer likewise assured the complainant that there was nothing to worry about when the latter expressed
doubts over the propriety of the lawyer's representing conflicting interests. We therein rejected the erring lawyer's
defenses, thus:
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written contract for the
engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant. This argument all the more reveals
respondent's patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an
advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the
parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical tiling which respondent should have done was either to advise
complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to
desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted
to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.20 (Emphasis
in the original)
What is more, administrative cases are sui generis.21 This Court, acting as the legal profession's sole disciplinary body, is
not strictly bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence.22 Indeed, hewing strictly to technical rules of
procedure and evidence could at times thwart this Court's efforts to rid the legal profession of unscrupulous individuals
who use their very knowledge of the law to perpetrate fraud or commit transgressions to the detriment of their clients,
who purposefully have sought their legal opinion and assistance in the hopes of attaining justice.

Here, even disregarding the electronic mail sent by respondent lawyer, we are satisfied that other incontrovertible
evidence supports the allegation that a lawyer-client relationship did exist, or had been established, between respondent
lawyer on the one hand, and Berlin and Higino on the other. For one thing, it was remarkable that respondent lawyer
never refuted or denied Berlin's claim that he (Atty. Alaestante) represented him in a civil case pending before the
Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal (RTC-Rizal). As against a Motion to Discharge Counsel duly filed with the RTC-
Rizal, respondent lawyer's bare denial of the existence of a lawyer-client relationship is of no avail.23 Caught in a web of
lies, Atty. Alaestante even contradicted himself when he stated that "[a]fter having been convinced of the personalities
of Berlin and Higino Gabeitan in relation to counsel'[s] pro bono handling of the case in RTC San Mateo, as well as the
smell of estafa having been committed by Berlin Gabeitan against the plaintiff thereof, counsel decided not to pursue
defending defendant Gabertan."24 That is the problem with fibs, falsehoods, dissemblances, prevarications, and half-
truths. They not only collide with the truth, they also collide with each other.

More than these, guided by the tenor of a Memorandum of Agreement25 (MOA) constituted between or amongst, Berlin,
respondent lawyer, and two other persons, it can hardly be doubted that Berlin and respondent lawyer had a close
relationship with the parties therein, and that he offered his legal expertise to the said parties. This is evident from the
language of the MOA where Berlin and respondent lawyer were collectively referred to as the "second parties" who were
able to secure "a favorable decision dated August 26, 2011 from the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila[,]
Branch 26" and were hired "to recover actual and physical possession over" a parcel of land.26

It is almost a cliche to say that a lawyer is forbidden "from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers are
expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of [impropriety] and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.27

The alleged "non-payment of professional [fees, even if true, would] not exculpate respondent [lawyer] from liability.
[The a]bsence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing
cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established
and extends even beyond the duration of the professional relationship."28

The sending of the unsealed scurrilous letter by respondent lawyer to DOJ Secretary De Lima, was a violation of Rule 8.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which stipulates that "[a] lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper." In that letter, not only did respondent lawyer employ
intemperate or unbridled language, he was also guilty of corner-cutting unprofessionally. His act of directly asking the
Secretary of Justice to intervene immediately in the syndicated estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases showed his
propensity for utterly disregarding the rules of procedure which had been formulated precisely to regulate and govern
legal and judicial processes properly.
Under the circumstances, we find the penalty of suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law, in connection
with A.C. No. 10992, and suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law, in connection with A.C. No. 10993, as
recommended by the Investigating Commissioner, proper and commensurate.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND Atty. Edwin M. Alaestante from the practice of law for six (6) months
in A.C. No. 10992 and for one (1) year in A.C. No. 10993, reckoned from his receipt of this Decision, said penalties to be
sewed in succession, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is also DIRECTEDto append a copy of this
Decision to respondent's record as a member of the Bar. SO ORDERED.

15.

A.C. No. 11871

POTENCIANO R. MALVAR, Complainant

vs. ATTY. FREDDIE B. FEIR, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Disbarment filed by petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar against Atty. Freddie B. Feir for violation of
Canori 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.1

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On February 13, 2015, petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie
B. Feir alleging that on December 17, 2014 and January 22, 2015, he received threatening letters from Feir stating that
should he fail to pay the sum of Pl8,000,000.00 to his client, Rogelio M. Amurao, a criminal complaint for Falsification of
Public Documents and Estafa, a civil complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title, and an administrative
complaint for the revocation of his license as a physician would be filed against him.2 According to Mal var, Feir's demands
were tantamount to blackmail or extortion due to the fact that F eir tried to obtain something of value by means of threats
of filing complaints.3 Said acts are in violation of the Lawyer's Oath which provides that: "I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the. doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
or give aid nor consent to the same."4 In support of his complaint, Mal var submitted the following affidavits executed by:
(1) his staff stating that said staff witnessed Amurao deliver to the office a Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Amurao,
Noemi Amurao, Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima Toribio;5 and (2) Amurao himself stating that he is one of the sellers
indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, that the signature appearing thereon is his, and that he personally witnessed
Noemi Amurao, Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima Toribio sign said document.6

For his part, Feir countered that the said letters merely demanded Malvar to explain how certain parcels of land Malvar
was purchasing from his client, Amurao, were already registered in Malvar's name when Amurao had never executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the same. Feir narrated that sometime in 2008, Amurao was tasked by his co-owners,
spouses Teodorico Toribio and Fatima Toribio, to sell their properties consisting of three. (3) parcels of land located in
Antipolo City for ₱21,200,000.00. The buyer of said properties was Malvar, who initially paid the sum of ₱3,200,000.00
with a promise to pay the remainder of the purchase price after verification of the authenticity of the owner's title to the
properties. For this purpose, Malvar borrowed the original copies of said titles from Amurao. Malvar, however, failed to
return the same despite several demands. To his surprise, Amurao later on learned that the subject properties were
already transferred in Malvar's name despite the fact that he never executed the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale nor
received the balance of the purchase price. Upon further verification, Amurao discovered that there exists a Deed of
Absolute Sale covering the sale of the subject properties in favor of Malvar exhibiting not only the signatures of Amurao
and Teodorico but also the signature of Fatima, who had long been dead.7 But when asked, Malvar could not proffer any
explanation as to the existence of the suspicious Deed of Absolute Sale or the fact that the subject properties were
already in his name. It is for this reason that Amurao consulted Feir on his legal remedies as regards his recovery of the
subject properties and/or collection of the remaining balance of the purchase price. Clearly, therefore, Malvar's complaint
seeking his disbarment appears only to harass and intimidate Feir. The threat to sue Malvar based on the facts presented
to Feir as a lawyer was not groundless as Amurao stands to lose his property while· Malvar enriches himself at Amurao's
expense.8 Interestingly, moreover, it was pointed out that the purported Affidavit executed by Amurao must be a forgery
in view of the fact that he never executed any such document and that his supposed Senior Citizen Identification Number
indicated in the Acknowledgment thereof was left blank.9

After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Feir for lack of merit on February 23, 2016.10On
November 5, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution 11 adopting and approving the recommended
dismissal of the complaint, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the complaint.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor,
which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,12 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.13

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law." Moreover, Rule 19.01 thereof states that "a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure
a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client.14

In the instant case, Malvar claims that Feir sent him the demand letters in order to interpose threats that should he fail
to pay the sum of ₱18,000,000.00, Feir will file criminal, civil, and administrative complaints which were, in truth,
unfounded for being based neither on valid nor relevant facts and law. Such demands, according to Malvar, are
tantamount to blackmail or extortion.

The Court, however, does not find merit in Malvar's contention. Blackmail is defined as "the extortion of money from a
person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints, x x x obtaining of value from a person as a
condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his
prejudice." In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the
exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not
infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to
expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.15

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Malvar is the buyer of the properties subject herein and that Amurao, Feir’s client,
is one of the owners of the same. It is also undisputed that said subject properties are already registered under Malvar’s
name. But according to Amurao, he has yet to receive the remaining balance of its purchase price. To the Court, this fact
alone is enough reason for Amurao to seek the legal advice of Feir and for Feir to send the demand letters to Malvar. As
the IBP held, these demand letters were based on a legitimate cause or issue, which is the alleged failure of Malvar to pay
the full amount of the consideration in the sale transaction as well as the alleged falsified Deed of Sale used to transfer
ownership over the lots subject of the instant case.16 Whether the Deed of Sale used in transferring the properties in the
name of Malvar was, indeed, forged and falsified is another matter for as far as the instant complaint for disbarment is
concerned, Feir was simply acting in compliance with his lawyer's oath to protect and preserve the rights of his client.

It bears stressing, moreover, that the monetary consideration Feir was demanding from Malvar in the amount of
₱18,000,000.00 cannot be considered as the subject of blackmail or extortion. Feir’s demand for said amount is not an
exaction of money for the exercise of an influence but is actually a legitimate claim for the remaining balance subject of
a legitimate sale transaction. Contrary to Malvar’s claims, there is nothing in the demand letters to show that the same
was maliciously made with intent to extort money from him since it was based on a valid and justifiable cause. Indeed,
the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant
to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent,
the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a
letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period.17

In the absence, therefore, of any evidence preponderant to prove that Feir committed acts constituting grounds for
disbarment, such as the violation of Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath, Malvar’s claims must necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Freddie Feir
for utter lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

16.

Pheninah D.F. Washington vs. Atty. Samuel D. Dicen

A.C. No. 12137, July 09, 2018

PHENINAH* D.F. WASHINGTON, Complainant, v. ATTY. SAMUEL D. DICEN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This administrative case is rooted on a Letter-Complaint1 dated September 21, 2015 filed by Pheninah D.F. Washington
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Samuel D. Dicen (Atty. Dicen) for "unethical practice of law, [and] abuse of [the]
privilege and power vested upon him as a lawyer."2

The Antecedent Facts

In her Letter-Complaint, complainant alleged that on August 14, 2015, she went to her house in Dumaguete City, then
occupied by the family of her niece, Roselyn R. Toralde (Roselyn), in order to perform necessary repairs thereon after
discovering that said house was in a dilapidated state and badly infested by termites.3 The repairs, however, did not push
through as planned because the police arrived in the premises and arrested complainant and her
companions.4Complainant claimed that it was Atty. Dicen, Roselyn's uncle and her first cousin, who had ordered her to
be arrested for trespassing even though she was the lawful owner of the property in question.5

In his defense, Atty. Dicen strongly denied that he had given the police officers an order to arrest complainant, as he had
no power or authority to do so.6 He argued that complainant was arrested after she was caught in flagrante
delicto committing acts of coercion by removing the G.I. sheet roofing of Roselyn's house to force the latter and her family
to move out.7

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation8 dated January 20,2017, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Jose Alfonso M. Gomos, found no merit in the allegations of unethical
practice of law against Atty. Dicen. Nevertheless, it recommended that Atty. Dicen be admonished "to be gracious,
courteous, dignified, civil and temperate (even if forceful) in his language."9

The IBP pointed to: (a) Atty. Dicen's Manifestation10 dated October 19, 2016 where he described complainant's actions
as having "no sane purpose,"11 and meant only to "satisfy her crazy quest for revenge,"12 and even characterized
complainant as a "lunatic;"13 and (b) Atty. Dicen's Position Paper14dated November 28, 2016 where he stated:

It is the observation of the respondent that complainant is no longer thinking on her own but has become fixated on her
illicit and immoral, if not adulterous relationship with her ex-husband, Martin Vince, (while current husband is in the
[United States] reportedly recuperating from a surgery), a foreigner who by the latter's manipulation caused her to be
estranged from the entire Flores-Dicen clan.15

The IBP thus concluded that Atty. Dicen had failed to adhere to the duty imposed upon lawyers not to use language
"which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."16 It noted that Atty. Dicen's use of offensive language "and his resort
to gossip to prove a point, fell short of the gracious, gentlemanly, courteous, dignified, civil and temperate (even if
forceful) language required of him as a lawyer."17

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XXII-2017-118518 dated June 17, 2017, resolved to adopt and approve
the January 20, 2017 Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD to admonish Atty. Dicen.

The Issue

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether Atty. Dicen should be held administratively liable for violating Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for his use of intemperate language in his pleadings.

The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of
Governors.
"The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."19

Canon 8 of the CPR in particular, instructs that a lawyer's arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court
and his opposing counsel, and must be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.20 "The
language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive."21

Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Ru1e 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

A thorough review of the records clearly shows that Atty. Dicen had resorted to the use of derogatorylanguage in his
pleadings filed before the IBP in order to rebut the allegations hurled against him.

For instance, in his Manifestation22 dated October 19, 2016, Atty. Dicen referred to complainant as a "lunatic" who was
on a "crazy quest for revenge" against him, viz.:

That evidently, if this affidavit has also been filed with this Honorable Commission, the purpose can only be to misle[a]d
and muddle its findings of facts; otherwise, then it has no sane purpose except to persecute respondent and satisfy
her crazy quest for revenge against respondent who she wants to answer for her arrest and detention when she was
caught by police officers in the act of demolishing the house of her niece, Roselyn Toralde;

That these puzzling moves of the complainant, i.e., demolishing (against the advice of her counsel) the house of her niece
to evict her despite the pendency of an unlawful detainer case and the filing of an administrative case before [the] IBP x
x x because she was unlawfully arrested and detained by the police for her attempt at demolishing a house appear to
be lunatic; x x x 23 (Emphasis supplied)

In the same pleading, Atty. Dicen also called complainant "a puppet and a milking cow" of a certain Martin, who he
suggested was complainant's lover in the Philippines while her husband was in the United States:

That[,] in fact[,] this [sic] puzzling acts of complainant finds some rationality if eyes are set beyond the complainant and
focus[ed] on the man that has made her a puppet and a milking cow.

This man is a certain Martin, a foreigner, [living] with her in her "home alone" while her husband is in the U.S. reportedly
recuperating from some surgery. Since then[,] complainant has become aggressive in pursuing her vendetta against all
her siblings and relatives for imagined ungrateful acts, claiming that their lives have become better because of her, and
therefore should kowtow to her every whims and caprices.24

To make matters worse, Atty. Dicen continued his personal tirades against complainant in his Position Paper25 dated
November 28, 2016 where he stated that:

It is the observation of the respondent that complainant is no longer thinking on her own but has become fixated on
her illicit and immoral, if not adulterous[,] relationship with her ex-husband, Martin Vince, (while current husband is in
the [United States] reportedly recuperating from a surgery), a foreigner who[,] by the latter's manipulation[,] caused her
to be estranged from the entire Flores-Dicen Clan.

Blinded by manipulative lover[,] Martin[,] she had become so hostile and unreasonable, if not unchristian[,] to her
relatives who are members of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)

The totality of these circumstances leads the Court to inevitably conclude that Atty. Dicen violated Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of
the CPR for his use of language that not only maligned complainant's character, but also imputed a crime against
her, i.e., that she was committing adultery against her husband who was, at the time, living in the United States.
Indeed, Atty. Dicen could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to complainant's allegations against him,
explained his participation (or the lack of it) in the latter's arrest and detention, and refrained from resorting to name-
calling and personal attacks in order to get his point across. After all, "[t]hough a lawyer's language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum."27

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Samuel D. Dicen is found GUILTY of violating Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from using language that is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper in his pleadings, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.