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Quantum of evldenceloroof In administrative cases lnvolvlna lawyers

1. Aba v. De Guzman etc. AC No. 7649 December 14, 2011

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7649 December 14, 2011

SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, and BENJAMIN DANDA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR., WENCESLAO "PEEWEE" TRINIDAD, and ANDRESITO
FORNIER,Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban and Benjamin Danda (complainants)
against lawyers Salvador De Guzman, Jr., Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad, and Andresito Fornier (respondents).
Complainants claim that respondents instigated and filed fabricated criminal complaints against them before the Iligan City
Prosecutor’s Office for Large Scale and Syndicated Illegal Recruitment and Estafa under I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No.
06-1835.1 Complainants pray for the imposition of the grave penalty of disbarment upon respondents. 2 Attached to
complainants’ letter-complaint is the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint3allegedly submitted by
complainants in the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints.

The Facts

Complainants claim that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City Regional Trial Court Judge Salvador P. De Guzman,
Jr. (De Guzman) in Cotabato City.4 De Guzman allegedly persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case (I.S. No.
2006-C-31, Lauban, et al. vs. Alvarez, Amante, Montesclaros, et al.) against certain persons, in exchange for money. 5 De
Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that his group, composed of Pasay City Mayor Wenceslao "Peewee"
Trinidad (Trinidad), Atty. Andresito Fornier (Fornier), Everson Lim Go Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and Stevenson Lim Go
Tian (Go Tian Brothers), were untouchable.6

In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De Guzman a prepared Joint Complaint-Affidavit
with supporting documents, which they were directed to sign and file.7 The Joint Complaint-Affidavit and supporting
documents were allegedly fabricated and manufactured by De Guzman.8

During the I.S. No. 2006-C-31 proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutor’s Office, complainants allegedly received
several phone calls from De Guzman, Trinidad, Fornier, and the Go Tian brothers, all of them continuously telling
complainants to pursue the case.9 When complainants asked De Guzman what would happen if a warrant of arrest would
be issued, De Guzman allegedly replied, "Ipa tubus natin sa kanila, perahan natin sila."10

Complainants claim they were bothered by their conscience, and that is why they told De Guzman and his group that they
planned to withdraw the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31.11 Complainants were allegedly offered by respondents ₱
200,000.00 to pursue the case, but they refused. 12 Complainants were once again allegedly offered by respondents One
Million Pesos (₱ 1,000,000.00) to pursue the case until the end, but they refused again. 13 For this reason, respondents
allegedly orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 06-1676 and
I.S. No. 06-1835) against complainants in Iligan City.14 On 30 November 2006, Aba claims to have received a text
message from De Guzman, saying, "Gud p.m. Tago na kayo. Labas today from Iligan Warrant of Arrest. No Bail. Dating sa
Ctbto pulis mga Wednesday. Gud luck kayo."15
 2

In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint, complainants submitted the allegedly fabricated
complaint,16 supporting documents,17 letter of De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, 18 De Guzman’s
Affidavit of Clarification submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31,19 and other relevant documents. Subsequently, complainants
filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier,20 and prayed that the complaint be pursued
against De Guzman.

Trinidad, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court21 and Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline,22 denied all the allegations in the complaint. Trinidad vehemently declared that he has never communicated
with any of the complainants and has never been to Cotabato. 23 He further claimed that the subscribed letter-complaint
does not contain ultimate facts because it does not specify the times, dates, places and circumstances of the meetings
and conversations with him.24 Trinidad asserted that the complaint was a fabricated, politically motivated charge,
spearheaded by a certain Joseph Montesclaros (Montesclaros), designed to tarnish Trinidad’s reputation as a lawyer and
city mayor.25 Trinidad claims that Montesclaros was motivated by revenge because Montesclaros mistakenly believed that
Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den in Pasay City. 26Trinidad also claims that he, his family members and close
friends have been victims of fabricated criminal charges committed by the syndicate headed by Montesclaros. 27

Trinidad pointed out that this syndicate, headed by Montesclaros, is abusing court processes by filing fabricated criminal
complaints of illegal recruitment in remote areas with fabricated addresses of defendants. 28 Since the defendants’
addresses are fabricated, the defendants are not informed of the criminal complaint, and thus the information is filed with
the court.29 Consequently, a warrant of arrest is issued by the court, and only when the warrant of arrest is served upon the
defendant will the latter know of the criminal complaint.30 At this point, Montesclaros intervenes by extorting money from
the defendant in order for the complainants to drop the criminal complaint. 31 To prove the existence of this syndicate,
Trinidad presented the letter of Eden Rabor, then a second year law student in Cebu City, to the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism and to this Court, requesting these institutions to investigate the syndicate of Montesclaros, who
has victimized a Canadian citizen who was at that time jailed in Cebu City due to an extortion racket. 32 Trinidad also
presented the Decision of Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City on the illegal recruitment charge against his
friend, Emmanuel Cinco, which charge was dismissed because the charge was fabricated, as admitted by complainants
themselves.33

Trinidad further claimed that, in some cases, the Montesclaros syndicate included some of their members as respondents
to divert suspicion.34 Trinidad pointed out that his wife was a victim of this fabricated criminal charge of illegal recruitment
filed in Marawi City.35 Fortunately, when the warrant of arrest was being served in Pasay City Hall, Trinidad’s wife was not
there.36 Lastly, Trinidad declared that Montesclaros has perfected the method of filing fabricated cases in remote and
dangerous places to harass his victims.37

Fornier, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court 38 and Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline,39 claimed that in his 35 years as a member of the bar, he has conducted himself professionally in accordance
with the exacting standards of the legal profession.40 Fornier denied knowing any of the complainants, and also denied
having any dealings or communication with any of them. He likewise claimed that he has not filed, either for himself or on
behalf of a client, any case, civil, criminal or otherwise, against complainants. 41 Fornier claimed that he was included in this
case for acting as defense counsel for the Go Tian Brothers in criminal complaints for illegal recruitment. 42 Fornier claimed
that the Go Tian Brothers are victims of an extortion racket led by Montesclaros.43 For coming to the legal aid of the Go
Tian Brothers, Fornier exposed and thwarted the plan of the group of Montesclaros to extort millions of pesos from his
clients.44 Fornier claimed that the filing of the complaint is apparently an attempt of the syndicate to get even at those who
may have exposed and thwarted their criminal designs at extortion. 45 Fornier prays that the Court will not fall prey to the
scheme and machinations of this syndicate that has made and continues to make a mockery of the justice system by
utilizing the courts, the Prosecutor’s Offices, the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration in carrying out their criminal activities.46 Lastly, Fornier claimed that complainants failed to establish the
charges against him by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, as complainants’ affidavits are replete with pure hearsay,
speculations, conjectures and sweeping conclusions, unsupported by specific, clear and convincing evidence. 47

De Guzman, on the other hand, instead of filing a Comment with this Court, filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint 48on the
ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint attached to the Letter-Complaint, which was made the
basis of this administrative complaint, are spurious. 49 According to the Certification issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Iligan City, complainants Lauban, Lumabao and Aba, who were charged for violation of Republic Act No.
 3

8042 (Migrant Workers Act), which charge was subsequently dismissed through a Joint Resolution rendered by the
Prosecutor, did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection with the charge, nor did they file any Affidavit of
Complaint against any person.50

In his Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,51 De Guzman stated he is an 81-year old retired
Regional Trial Court judge.52 He pointed out that there are no details regarding the allegations of grave and serious
misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, bribery, falsification of documents, violation of lawyers’ oath and other administrative
infractions.53 De Guzman invited the attention of the Investigating Commissioner to his Affidavit of Clarification which he
submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31 to deny any participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint and to narrate in
detail how he became involved in this case which was masterminded by Montesclaros. 54In his Affidavit of
Clarification,55 De Guzman claimed that he had no participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint in I.S. No.
2006-C-31, and he was surprised to receive a photocopy of the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, Atty. Nicanor G.
Alvarez, Lolita Zara, Marcelo Pelisco and Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr., implicating him in the preparation of the
complaint.56 De Guzman stated that he was surprised to find his and his clients’ names in the counter-affidavit, and for this
reason, felt under obligation to make the Affidavit of Clarification. 57 Lastly, De Guzman declared that he has "no familiarity
with the complainants or Tesclaros Recruitment and Employment Agency, nor with other respondents in the complaint, but
he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in
the illegal recruitment business."58

During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 2008 59 and 13 March 2009,60 none of the complainants
appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate the allegations in their complaint despite due notice.61

Report and Recommendation

of the Commission on Bar Discipline

The recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline reads:

In view of the foregoing, the charges against the Respondent Trinidad and Fornier are deemed to be without basis and
consequently, the undersigned recommends DISMISSAL of the charges against them.

As to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court Judge, there is enough basis to hold him administratively
liable. Accordingly, a penalty of SUSPENSION for two (2) months is hereby recommended. 62

The Investigating Commissioner found, after a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint as well as in the
attachments, that complainants failed to substantiate their charges against respondents Trinidad and Fornier. 63Other than
bare allegations, complainants did not adduce proof of Trinidad and Fornier’s supposed involvement or participation
directly or indirectly in the acts constituting the complaint. 64 In addition, complainants, on their own volition, admitted the
non-participation and non-involvement of Trinidad and Fornier when complainants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint
against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only.65 For these reasons, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
charges against Trinidad and Fornier be dismissed for utter lack of merit.

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner stated that De Guzman failed to deny the allegations in the
Letter-Complaint or to explain the import of the same.66 Moreover, De Guzman failed to controvert the "truly vicious
evidence" against him:

But what should appear to be a truly vicious evidence for Respondent is the letter he sent to Orlando D. Badoy, City
Councilor, Cotabato City dated February 16, 2006. This letter was alleged in and attached to the Joint Counter-Affiavit with
Affidavit of Complaint. The letter had confirmed the allegation of his travel to Cotabato City to file charges against persons
he did not identify. He intriguingly mentioned the name Ben Danda as the one to whom he handed the complaint. Danda,
incidentally, was one of those who executed the Letter of Complaint along with Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Benjamin Danda
and Almasis Lauban which was filed before the Supreme Court.67

The Decision of the Board of Governors of the

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Integrated Bar of the Philippines

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation on the dismissal of the charges against Fornier and Trinidad. 68 In De
Guzman’s case, the Board of Governors increased the penalty from a suspension of two (2) months to a suspension of two
(2) years from the practice of law for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases to extort money:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED with modification, and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering that the case against Respondents Trinidad and Fornier is without merit, the same is
hereby DISMISSED. However, Atty. Salvador De Guzman, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases in order to extort money. 69

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Trinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be administratively disciplined based on the
allegations in the complaint.

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
on the dismissal of the charges against Trinidad and Fornier.

We reverse the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with regard to De Guzman’s liability, and likewise dismiss the charges against De Guzman.

Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence

Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed innocent of crime or wrongdoing. This
Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until
the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with
his oath.70

Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. In disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 711avvphi1

Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not determined mathematically by the
numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for the
party on the judge trying the case.72

Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by
clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that
order.73 Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has
consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a
member of the Bar.74

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight
than that of the other.75 It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.76 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of
 5

the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the
decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine. 77

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the
evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.

De Guzman’s Liability

The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner regarding De Guzman’s liability for the following reasons: (a) the documents submitted by complainants in
support of their complaint are not credible; (b) complainants did not appear in any of the mandatory conference
proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint; and (c) complainants were not able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for the purpose of filing fabricated illegal
recruitment charges for purposes of extortion.

The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First, complainants submitted a Joint Counter-Affidavit
and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman, Trinidad and Fornier.
Complainants misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint was submitted to the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut the illegal recruitment charges against them. TheJoint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of
Complaint purportedly appears to be subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. After inquiry by De Guzman, however,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying the submission of this document by complainants:

This is to certify that based on available records of the Office, ALMASIS LAUBAN, MIKO LUMABAO and SIAO ALBA were
among the respondents named and charged with Violation of Republic Act No. 8042 under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254,
Vol. XVI, and I.S. No. 06-1676, Page 240, Vol. XVI, which complaints were dismissed thru a Joint Resolution dated
December 29, 2006 rendered by the Office.

This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection to
the complaints filed against them, and neither did they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any
person.78 (Emphasis supplied)

To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which
contained all their allegations of misconduct, were submitted and sworn to before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt
to the credibility of the other documents complainants submitted in support of their administrative charges against
respondents. Worse, complainants submitted falsified documents to the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of
Governors, and this Court.

Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidad all claim that complainants are part of a syndicate headed by Montesclaros that
has perfected the filing of fabricated criminal charges. Given this claim that complainants are well-adept in filing fabricated
criminal charges supported by fabricated documents, this Court is more cautious in appreciating the supporting documents
submitted by complainants. Complainants bear the burden of proof to establish that all the documents they submitted in
support of their allegations of misconduct against respondents are authentic. Unfortunately, complainants did not even
attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner to identify the documents and substantiate or
narrate in detail the allegations of misconduct allegedly committed by respondents. To make matters worse, the Joint
Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaintcomplainants attached to their Letter-Complaint, which supposedly contained
all their allegations of misconduct against respondents, is spurious, not having been submitted to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan, despite purportedly having the signature and seal of the prosecutor.
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Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their communication with De Guzman. If De Guzman
really called and texted them that a warrant of arrest would be issued, what mobile number did De Guzman use? Out of
the voluminous documents that complainants submitted, where is the warrant for their arrest? What is their occupation or
profession? Who are these complainants? These questions are unanswered because complainants did not even bother to
attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner, despite due notice. For this reason, the
allegations of De Guzman’s misconduct are really doubtful.

Lastly, the supposedly "vicious" evidence against De Guzman, which was a letter he allegedly sent to Cotabato City
Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not credible. This letter states:

Dear Orly,

Thank you very much for a wonderful visit to Cotabato City. I learned much about the South and the way
of life there.

It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the meantime, the son-of-a-gun filed charges
against us in Marawi City! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint directly to your man, Ben Danda, with
instructions for him and the other two complainants to sign the same before an assistant prosecutor and
file with City Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on you to orchestrate the whole thing, from the
prosecutor to the RTC Judge, especially the warrants of arrest.

Thank you and best regards.79

The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the purported letter have material discrepancies. At the
same time, complainants did not even explain how they were able to get a copy of the purported letter. Complainants did
not present the recipients, Orlando Badoy or Atty. Francis V. Gustilo, to authenticate the letter. In addition, none of the
complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their allegations or authenticate the
supporting documents.

The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and credibility into this purported letter:

Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent failed to offer denial of the letter or explain the import of
the same differently from what is understood by the Complainants. But even with that effort, the letter is so plain to
understand. Verily, the undersigned cannot ignore the same and the message it conveys. 80

Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that complainants, whom respondents claim are part
of an extortion syndicate, are consistently involved in the fabrication of evidence in support of their criminal complaints.
Moreover, contrary to the Investigating Commissioner’s observation, De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the
preparation of complainants’ criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of Clarification, De Guzman stated:

5. Undersigned has no participation in the above-captioned complaint, but to his surprise, he recently received a
photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, (b) Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, (c) Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco,
and (e) Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. (his records at the Surpeme Court does not have any "Daryll");

6. Undersigned counsel’s name and that of his clients appear in the counter-affidavit of Atty. Nicanor G. Alcarez
(Montesclaros’ lawyer who appeared in the sala of Pasay RTC Judge Francisco Mendiola as against the undersigned), or
Marcelo Pelisco, a known henchman of Montesclaros and a squatter at the Monica Condominium, and Atty. Amante, and
for this reason, undersigned counsel feels under obligation to make this affidavit of clarification for the guidance of the
Investigating Prosecutor;

xxx

4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros Recruitment & Employment Agency nor with the complainants
(except for Laura Timbag Tuico of Cotabato City), nor with the other respondents, but he believes that Atty. Roque A.
 7

Amante Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment
business.81

For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by complainants in support of their complaint against De
Guzman are not credible. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the charges against De Guzman.

De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or wrongdoing. Complainants have the burden of
proof to prove their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman. Complainants were not able to discharge this burden
because the documents they submitted were not authenticated and were apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not
appear in the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint. In disbarment
proceedings, what is required to merit the administrative penalty is preponderance of evidence, which weight is even
higher than substantial evidence in the hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants were not able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them and persuaded them to file fabricated charges
against other people for the purpose of extorting money. In fact, even if the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced,
the Court must rule in favor of De Guzman according to the equipoise doctrine. For these reasons, the Court reverses the
Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
accordingly dismisses the charges against De Guzman.

Trinidad’s and Fornier’s Liabilities

The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect
to Trinidad’s and Fornier’s liabilities:

A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments to the Joint Counter Affidavit with Affidavit of Complaint
reveals that Complainants failed miserably to substantiate their charges against Respondents. Other than their bare
allegations, the Complainants did not adduce proof of Respondent’s supposed involvement or participation directly or
indirectly in the acts complained of. For instance, they failed to prove though faintly that Respondents had gone to
Cotabato City to personally induce and persuade the complainants to file illegal recruitment charges against Atty. Nicanor
G. Alvarez and sixteen (16) others or that they have prodded and stirred them to do so as they did by any form of
communication. The supposed telephone call the Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made during the
proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutor’s Office to the Complainants is unbelievable and absurd. It is
inconceivable that Complainants could have answered the calls of six (6) persons during a serious proceeding such as the
inquest or preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint before the City Prosecutor. To the undersigned, the fallacy of
the allegation above strongly militates against the reliabiity of Complainants’ charges against Respondents.

xxx

But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition already made unmistakable Respondents’ non-participation or
non-involvement in the charges they have filed when they wittingly filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty.
Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only. The undersigned realizes only too well that the filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in
this Commission, however, any such pleading must be appreciated as to its intrinsic merit. A clear reading of the same
reveals that the Complainants had wanted to clarify that they have erroneously included Respondents Trinidad and Fornier
as parties to the case. In particular, they explained that they had no communication or dealings whatsoever with the said
lawyers as to inspire belief that the latter had some involvement in their charges. The undersigned finds the affidavit
persuasive and for that he has no reason to ignore the import of the same as a piece of evidence. 82

At any rate, we consider the case against Trinidad and Fornier terminated. Under Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, the
administrative case is deemed terminated if the penalty imposed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is less than suspension or disbarment (such as reprimand, admonition or fine), unless the complainant files a
petition with this Court within 15 days from notice:

c. If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such
sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with
the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
 8

Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors dismissing the charges against Trinidad and
Fornier. In fact, complainants filed with this Court a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Against Trinidad and Fornier.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and DISMISS the charges against Attys. Wenceslao
"Peewee" Trinidad and Andresito Fornier for utter lack of merit. We REVERSE the Decision of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, modifying and increasing the penalty in the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly DISMISS the charges against Atty. Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. also for utter
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

2. Rodica v. lazaroet al., AC No. 9259 August 22, 2012

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9259 : March 13, 2013

JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY. EDWIN M. ESPEJO,
ATTY. ABEL M. ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B. LAZARO, ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition1 filed by complainant Jasper Junno F. Rodica of our
August 23, 2012 Resolution2the dispositive portion of which reads:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for disbarment against respondents Atty.
Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin M. Espejo, Atty. Abel M. Almario, Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro and
Atty. Joseph C. Tan is DISMISSED. Atty. Edwin M. Espejo is WARNED to be more circumspect and
prudent in his actuations.

SO ORDERED.3?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

In her Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition, complainant argues that this Court unfairly ignored the
supporting affidavits attached to the Complaint and that this Court should expressly declare whether it is lending credence
to said affidavits or not and why.4?r?l1

Complainant next claims that this Court deviated from usual practice and procedure when it proceeded to resolve the
disbarment Complaint after the separate Comments of the respondents have been filed without giving her the opportunity
to file a Reply. She also faults the Court for deciding the case without first declaring the same to have already been
submitted for resolution. To her, this constitutes denial of due process. 5?r?l1

Lastly, complainant asserts that this Courts reference to her Affidavit supposedly executed on July 21, 2011 as
un-notarized was misplaced. She also insists that the Courts observation that the withdrawal of pending cases should not
have been limited "to the RTC case,"6 is erroneous considering that there were no other pending cases to speak of at that
time. She also maintains that the Court erroneously gave the impression that the decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Kalibo had already become final.7?r?l1
 9

Complainant also prays for the inhibition of the justices who participated in this case in the belief that they have been
biased against her.

Complainants Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition are totally bereft of merit.

The Court considered the affidavits of

Brimar F. Rodica, Timothy F. Rodica
and Atty. Ramon S. Diño in resolving the case.

Contrary to complainants contention, this Court considered the afore-mentioned affidavits as corroborative evidence of the
allegations in the Complaint. Nonetheless, in the proper exercise of its discretion, the Court deemed it unnecessary to
restate in its August 23, 2012 Resolution the material facts contained in each affidavit as the same would only be mere
reiterations of the summarized allegations in the Complaint. In other words, this Court found no necessity to mention the
allegations in each affidavit because they were already spelled out in the Complaint. Besides, this Court is under no
obligation to specifically mention in its Decision or Resolution each and every piece of evidence of the parties. It would
suffice if the Courts factual findings are distinctly stated and the bases for its conclusions clearly spelled out. The Court can
validly determine which among the pieces of evidence it will accord credence and which it will ignore for being irrelevant
and immaterial.

Complainant was not denied due process.

Complainants contention that she was denied due process because she was not allowed to file a Reply deserves scant
consideration. This is equally true of complainants argument that this Court deviated from usual procedure when it
resolved the disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to have been submitted for resolution. The Court will
outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its face, it is clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of
People Against Corruption & Terrorism v. Chief Justice Davide, Jr. (Ret.) 8 the Court, after finding the Complaint insufficient
in form and substance, dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. It took the same stand in Battad v. Senator
Defensor-Santiago,9 where the disbarment Complaint against respondent therein was motu propio dismissed by this Court
after finding "no sufficient justification for the exercise of its disciplinary power." 10 In this case, the Court did not dismiss
outright the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it even required the respondents to file their respective Answers. Then, after a
judicious study of the records, it proceeded to resolve the same although not in complainants favor. Based on the
Complaint and the supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the respective Comments of the respondents, the Court
found that the presumption of innocence accorded to respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer
required complainant to file a Reply since it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same when it can already
judiciously resolve the case based on the pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to complainants mistaken notion, not
all petitions or complaints reach reply or memorandum stage. Depending on the merits of the case, the Court has the
discretion either to proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their respective responsive pleadings or to
dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can proceed to resolve the case without need of informing the parties that
the case is already submitted for resolution.

Also, contrary to complainants contention, this Court is not mistaken in its reference to complainants July 21, 2011 Affidavit
as "un-notarized." The said Affidavit which was attached to the Complaint as Annex "A" consists only of nine pages with no
accompanying jurat. The mention made by the complainant in page 1 of her Complaint that the July 21, 2011 was
"acknowledged before Notary Public Joan Ibutnande and entered as Doc. 83, Page 18, Book No. VI, Series of
2011"11 could not take the place of the jurat itself as written in the Affidavit. Similarly, this Court finds no merit in
complainants argument that the Courts observation that "the withdrawal should not have been limited to the RTC case as it
appears that there are other cases pending with other tribunals and agencies," 12 is erroneous. She claims to be unaware
of any other case pending in other tribunals and agencies. However, this contention is belied by complainants own
declaration in her Sworn Affidavit which was incorporated in her Complaint, viz:cralawlibrary

xxx

1. Sometime in 2010, I filed a civil case against Hillview Marketing Corporation, Stephanie Dornau and
several others, regarding recovery of possession of a certain area that was lost on my property, the illegal
encroachment on my property x x x, for recovery of damages and as indemnity x x x captioned as
 10

JASPER J. F. RODICA v. HILLVIEW MARKETING CORPORATION, et al. and docketed as Civil Case No.
8987, and assigned at the Regional Trial Court Branch VI of Kalibo Aklan;

2. Earlier on, in 2009, I have also filed a case with the HLURB against Hillview Marketing Corporation/its
officers, for unfair/irregular real estate business practices, refund for the purchase price regarding the sale
of the Boracay property made to me by Hillview, and some other matters.

x x x13?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ

Moreover, in the Answer14 filed by Atty. Joseph Tan (Atty. Tan) and Atty. Paolo Deston relative to CBD Case No. 12-3360
pending before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, copy of which was attached to Atty. Tans Manifestation,15 several
cases were mentioned.16 Thus, we wonder how complainant could claim to be unaware of them.

The Motion to Inhibit is denied for lack of basis.

"An inhibition must be for just and valid reason. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground x x x to
inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis."17 In this case, complainant's imputation that her Complaint was
decided by the magistrates of this Court with extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition are DENIED for lack of merit.

No further pleadings or motions shall be entertained in this case. SO ORDERED.

3. Dela Cruz v. Saladero AC No. 6580 August 3, 2005

[A.C. No. 6580. August 3, 2005]

DELA CRUZ vs. SALADERO

SECOND DIVISION

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 3 2005.

A.C. No. 6580 (CBD 03-1175) (Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz vs. Atty. Remegio D. Saladero, Jr.)

A complaint dated December 16, 2003 was filed by Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) charging respondent of violating the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing disbarment,
criminal and administrative cases against complainant without legal and factual bases, for submitting false affidavits, for
refusing his invitation to have a "brotherly" talk as fellow lawyer to clarify the matters between complainant and
respondent's clients and for filing a prohibited pleading.

Specifically, complainant accuses respondent of: filing, through Adoracion Losloso, a baseless disbarment case against
him supported by two false affidavits; sending complainant a letter charging him of estafa and ignoring complainant's reply
thereto; refusing complainant's invitation to a "brotherly" talk; filing an estafa case through falsification of public document
and four other criminal complaints against herein complainant, through Losloso, which were eventually dismissed for being
groundless; filing an HLURB case in behalf of Losloso and Nestor Aguirre without verifying the truth of their claims; filing a
motion to dismiss the ejectment case filed by complainant against Losloso before the barangay knowing that such is a
prohibited pleading; and helping Losloso to file motions to inhibit a prosecutor in Pasig for alleged bias. [1]cralaw
 11

Respondent filed an answer contending that: he merely acted as counsel of the parties who filed cases against
complainant and out of the 17 cases filed by Adoracion Losloso against complainant, respondent only handles four which
are still pending resolution; it would be premature to say that said cases were filed only to harass complainant; there is no
showing that respondent is moved by malice or bad faith in agreeing to act as counsel of Losloso; Losloso also alleged
that it was a public attorney who was assisting her in all her cases by preparing the various pleadings in court; and it is only
because said public attorney could not appear in court that she asked the assistance of respondent and eventually
engaged the legal services of respondent when the public attorney died. [2]cralaw

On February 17, 2004, complainant filed a Reply to the answer reiterating his earlier claims which respondent countered
with a Rejoinder asserting the same denials.[3]cralaw

A mandatory conference was held on April 16, 2004 and on said date, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
directed the parties to submit their respective position papers. [4]cralaw On June 7, 2004, she submitted her report dated
June 7, 2004, finding that:

...In the case at hand, complainant failed to present a clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to prove that respondent
has been moved by malice and bad faith in accepting to serve as legal counsel of Mrs. Adoracion Losloso. Moreover,
records show that the cases, where respondent acted as counsel for Mrs. Losloso have not been resolved, and therefore,
it could not be determined yet whether or not they are meritorious. [5]cralaw

She then recommended that the instant case of disbarment filed against respondent be dismissed for lack of
merit.[6]cralaw

On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-349

CBD Case No. 03-1175
Atty. Miniano B. dela Cruz vs.
Atty. Remegio D. Saladero, Jr.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that the complaint lacks merit, the case is hereby DISMISSED. [7]cralaw

On October 19, 2004, complainant filed before this Court a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that: the report and
recommendation of IBP Commissioner Maala is not based on correct records of the case; Maala's report and
recommendation did not consider the violations of respondent under Sec. 20 of Rule 138[8]cralaw of the Rules of Court,
Canons 1,[9]cralaw 8[10]cralaw and 12,[11]cralaw and Rules 1.02, 1.03, and 1.04 of the Code of Professional
Conduct;[12]cralaw the report and recommendation did not discuss the failure of respondent to conduct an investigation to
ascertain the veracity of the complaint for Estafa, disbarment and complaint before the HLURB, among others; and the
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors erred in approving the incomplete and defective report of Maala and should
therefore be set aside.[13]cralaw

On December 28, 2004, complainant filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration emphasizing the issue that
respondent filed groundless cases against him.[14]cralaw

On April 13, 2005, respondent filed a Comment stating that: complainant, instead of filing a petition from the resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors, pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(c), erroneously filed a motion for reconsideration; contrary to
the allegations of complainant, respondent acted in good faith and studied the supporting documents of Losloso first
before sending complainant the demand letter; respondent was not the one who filed the cases before the HLURB, the
Prosecutors' Office and the IBP; respondent came into the picture long after these cases have been filed; respondent
agreed to handle the said cases based on his honest assessment that there is a valid cause of action against
complainant;[15]cralaw the investigating IBP commissioner was not biased in requiring respondent to submit his position
paper despite his failure to attend the mandatory hearing on time; respondent agreed to the order of Maala requiring both
 12

parties to submit position papers and it was only when the commissioner dismissed his complaint that complainant raised
the issue of bias; respondent enjoys the presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him and complainant has
failed to convincingly prove that respondent has acted in bad faith in the manner by which he has handled the cases
pending between complainant and Losloso, et al.; complainant himself has filed several cases against Losloso
(cancellation of contract, estafa and perjury) which have been dismissed; since these cases were also found to be without
merit, complainant, following his line of reasoning, should also be considered as having harassed Losloso in violation of
his oath as a lawyer.[16]cralaw

First of all, we are treating herein motion for reconsideration as a petition referred to in Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(c).

After reviewing the records of this case, we find the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, to be well-founded.

Well-settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations. If the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of
proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent
is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[17]cralaw

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.[18]cralaw But his guilt cannot be presumed.[19]cralaw A mere charge or allegation of
wrongdoing will not suffice.[20]cralaw There must be sufficient evidence to support the charge.[21]cralaw

In this case, complainant accuses respondent of filing baseless charges against him. Apart from his bare allegations,
however, complainant failed to show that respondent did in fact file baseless cases against him. As borne by the records,
the complaint, as well as the motions for reconsideration of the denial thereof, for estafa through falsification of public
document, was filed by Adoracion Losloso;[22]cralaw the disbarment case before the IBP were filed by Losloso, Sheila
Bones-Lei and Nestor Aguirre;[23]cralaw while the HLURB case was filed by Losloso and Aguirre. [24]cralaw Aside from
complainant's allegations, there is no proof that respondent prodded said individuals to file cases against herein
complainant. Adoracion Losloso even executed a sworn statement expressing that it was Atty. Ramon Vera of the Public
Attorney's Office in Pasig who helped her in filing the cases before the fiscal, the HLURB and the IBP. She also
categorically stated that herein respondent only entered the picture after the said cases had already been filed and that he
did not have any participation in the drafting of said complaints. She also explained that out of the 20 cases filed between
her and herein complainant, respondent only participated in four cases which are still pending resolution. [25]cralaw

Apart from complainant's naked assertions, there is also no proof anywhere in the records that respondent filed false
affidavits to support the disbarment case against complainant in the IBP. Neither is there any showing that respondent filed
a prohibited pleading, In any case, we cannot see how such pleading, if ever one was filed, could be a basis for disbarment.
Neither could respondent's refusal to have a "brotherly talk over a cup of coffee" with complainant or respondent's act of
helping Losloso file a motion to inhibit a prosecutor in Pasig for alleged bias could be a basis for disciplinary action.

What is only clear is that herein respondent sent complainant a letter dated May 17, 2001 demanding that complainant
give Losloso, et al. their commission for the sale of a property in Antipolo based on a Memorandum of Agreement,
otherwise Losloso, et al. would be constrained to file appropriate criminal, civil and administrative complaints against
herein complainant.[26]cralaw We cannot, based on this letter alone, say that respondent was moved by malice or bad
faith.

We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, such as the case at bar, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. This
Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if the complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. In the absence of convincing or clearly preponderant evidence, the complaint for disbarment against respondent
is correctly dismissed[27]cralaw by the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by Atty. Miniano Dela Cruz, is DENIED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
 13

4. Lanuza v. Magsalln AC No.7687 December 3, 2014

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7687 December 3, 2014

RAUL C. LANUZA and REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants,

vs.
ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III and PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 7688

RAUL C. LANUZA and REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants,

vs.
ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III, PETER ANDREWS GO and PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court are two (2) separate administrative cases for disbarment filed by complainants Raul C. Lanuza (Lanuza)
and Reynaldo C. Rasing (Rasing), docketed as A.C. No. 7687, against lawyers Frankie O. Magsalin III (Atty. Magsalin)
and Pablo R. Cruz (Atty. Cruz) and A.C. No. 7688 against Atty. Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Peter Andrew Z. Go (Atty.
Go) for alleged fraud, deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court eventually consolidated the two cases as they both involve the same parties, revolve around the sameset of
facts, and raise exactly the same issues.

The Facts

These disbarment cases stemmed from a labor case filed by complainant Lanuza against Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI),
which operated the Dusit Hotel Nikko (Dusit Hotel), a client of respondents Atty. Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Go, all from
the law firm, P.R. Cruz Law Offices (PRC Law Office). Both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC)decided in favor of PHI. Lanuza appealed the NLRC decision before the Court of Appeals (CA).

A.C. No. 7688

On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 92642, favoring Lanuza and directing PHI to reinstate
him with full backwages.

According to Lanuza, his legal counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia (Atty. Garcia), received the Notice of Judgment and their
copy of the CA Decision on March 28, 2007 at his law office located in Quezon City. Subsequently, Atty. Garcia received
by registered mail the Compliance1 and Motion for Reconsideration,2 both dated April 12, 2007, filed by PHI and signed by
Atty. Magsalin. In the said pleadings, PHI stated that it received Notice of Judgment with a copy of the CA decision on April
10, 2007. This information caused Atty. Garcia to wonder why the postman would belatedly deliver the said Notice of
Judgment and the CA decision to the PRC Law Office, which was also located in Quezon City, thirteen (13) days after he
received his own copies. Afterwards, Atty. Garcia requested the Quezon City Central Post Office (QCCPO) for a
certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the Notice of Judgment with the CA decision by the PRC Law Office. In
the October 31, 2007 Certification,3 issued by Llewelyn F. Fallarme (Fallarme), Chief of the Records Section, QCCPO, it
was stated that the Registered Letter No. S-1582 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by Postman Rosendo
 14

Pecante (Postman Pecante)and duly received by Teresita Calucag on March 29, 2007, supposedly based on the logbook
of Postman Pecante.

With the October 31, 2007 Certification as basis, the complainants lodged the disbarment complaint against Attys.
Magsalin, Go and Cruz, which was docketed as A.C. No. 7688.

A.C. No. 7688

In A.C. No. 7688, the complainants alleged that Teresita "Tess" Calucag (Calucag), secretary of PRC Law Office, altered
the true date of receipt of the Notice of Judgment withthe CA decision when she signed and stamped on the registry return
receipt the date, April 10, 2007, to mislead the CA and the opposing party that they received their copy of the CA decision
on a later date and not March 29, 2007. The complainants added that the alteration was very evident on the registry return
receipt which bore two (2) stamped dates of receipt, with one stamped date "snowpaked" or covered with a liquid
correction fluid to conceal the true date written on the registry return receipt. They inferred that Calucag concealed
whatcould probably be the true date of receipt, and that the respondents must have induced Calucag to alter the true date
of receipt because they stood to benefit from the additional thirteen (13) days to prepare their motion for reconsideration.

In their defense, the respondents denied the complainants’ allegations and countered that they actually received the
Notice of Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on April 10, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt 4 (1st return
receipt) that was sent back to CA. Stamped on the 1st return receipt was "RECEIVED APRIL 10 2007" and signed by
Calucag in front and within the full view of Postman Pecante. The respondents claimed that examining and finding that the
return receipt had been faithfully accomplished and the date indicated therein to be true and accurate, Postman Pecante
accepted the said return receipt. As borne out by the records, the 1st return receipt pertaining to the CA decision was duly
returned to the CA as the sender. Eventually, Atty. Magsalin filed the required Compliance. Considering that Atty. Cruz
was out of the country from April 5, 2007, to May 6, 2007, based on a Bureau of Immigration certification, 5 Atty. Magsalin
requested Atty. Go, a senior associate in their law office, to review PHI’s motion for reconsideration of the decision.
Afterwards, Atty. Go signed the said motion for reconsideration and had it filed with the CA.

Relying on the date indicated in the return receipt, respondents stated the date, April 10, 2007, in the filed compliance and
motion for reconsideration.

To oppose complainants’ assertion of Calucag’s application of "snowpake" in the 1st return receipt allegedly to conceal the
true date of receipt of the CA decision, the respondents secured a Certification 6 from the CA, which stated the following:

This is to certify that the Registry Return Receipt dated March 23, 2007, attached to the dorsal portion of page 209 of the
rollo of the above-captioned case, asper careful observation, reveals no "snowpaked" portion and that the white mark that
appears on the upper, center portion of the subject Registry Return Receipt bearing the stamp mark of receipt ofP.R. Cruz
Law Offices is a part of the white envelope that contained the decisionof this Court which stuck to the said Return Receipt.

A.C. No. 7687

As the records would show, PHI moved for reconsideration of the said CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its
July 4, 2007 Resolution.

On July 10, 2007, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Notice of Resolution from the CA. Thereafter, Atty. Garcia
received by registered mail the Compliance,7 dated July 26, 2007, filed by PHI, through the PRC Law Office. In the said
Compliance, it was stated that the Notice of Resolution was received on July 23, 2007 based on the Registry Return
Receipt8 (2nd return receipt) sent back to the CA.

Again wondering about the delay in the delivery of the registered mail to the respondents, Atty. Garciarequested the
QCCPO to issue a certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the said Notice of Resolution by the PRC Law Office.
Inthe October 25, 2007 Certification9 issued by the QCCPO, Chief of the Records Section Fallarme, stated that the
Registered Letter No. S-114 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by Postman Pecante and duly received by
Calucag on July 16, 2007, based on the logbook of Postman Pecante.
 15

The October 25, 2007 Certification became the basis of the other disbarment complaint against Attys. Magsalin and Cruz
docketed as A.C. No. 7687.

In A.C. No. 7687, the complainants claimed that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz must have induced Calucag to alter the true
date of receipt of the Notice of Resolution or at least had the knowledge thereof when she signed and stamped on the 2nd
return receipt the date- July 23, 2007. They contended that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz stood to benefit from the additional
seven (7) days derived from the alleged altered date asthey, in fact, used the altered date in their subsequent pleading.
Attys. Magsalin and Cruz falsely alleged such in the compliance filed before the CA; the motion for extension of time to file
a petition for review on certiorari;10 and the petition for review on certiorari11 filed before this Court. The complainants
insinuated that Atty. Magsalin and Atty. Cruz deliberately misled the CA and this Court by filing the above-mentioned
pleadings with the full knowledge that they were already time barred.

In their defense, Attys. Magsalin and Cruz denied the allegations in the complaint and retorted that they actually received
the subject Notice of Resolution on the date - July 23, 2007 as indicated in the 2nd return receipt which was also duly
accepted by Postman Pecante and appropriately returned to the CA as sender. Relying on the date, July 23, 2007, as
indicated in 2nd return receipt, Atty. Magsalin, on behalf of PHI, filed the compliance and the other pleadings before the CA
and this Court concerning CA-G.R. SP No. 92642. The respondents asserted that the date in the 2nd return receipt
deserved full faith and credence as it was clearly indicated by Calucag, witnessed by Postman Pecante and ultimately
processed by the QCCPO to be duly returnedto the CA.

Referral to the IBP

In its April 2, 200812 and June 16, 200813 Resolutions, the Court referred the said administrative cases tothe Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP)for investigation, report and recommendation.

The complainants and the respondents all appeared at the scheduled mandatory conference held before the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD). Thereafter, the parties filed their respective position papers.

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

A.C. No. 7687

In its March 9, 2009 Report and Recommendation, 14 Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag)
recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. It gave more credence to the date indicated
in the 2nd return receipt which bore no alteration and was duly accepted by Postman Pecante than the October 25, 2007
Certification issued by the QCCPO. He stated that the 2nd return receipt did not contain any alteration as to the stamping
of the date - July 23, 2007, and that Postman Pecante would not have allowed and accepted the 2nd return receipt from
Calucag if it contained an inaccurate date other than the true date of receipt. Finally, the CBD ruled that the complainants
failed to demonstrate the specific acts constituting deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct by evidence that was clear
and free from doubt as to the act charged and as to the respondents’ motive.

On April 17, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the CBD report and
recommendation through its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-176.15 The complainants moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied.

A.C. No. 7688

In its Report and Recommendation,16 dated March 10, 2009, the CBD recommended that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit. It gave credence to the date indicated in the 1st return receipt as the actual and true date of receipt of the
Notice of Judgment with the attached CA decision by the respondents. It did not subscribe to the complainants’ theory that
Calucag was induced by the respondents to conceal the true date of receipt by applying a liquid correction fluid in the 1st
return receipt. It found the the Certification issued by Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen sufficient to explain the presence of the
white substance appearing on the 1st return receipt.
 16

On April 17, 2009, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the CBD report and recommendation through its
Resolution No. XVIII-2009-178.17 The complainants moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.

With their motions for reconsideration in the two cases denied, the complainants filed their respective petitions for review
before this Court.

ISSUE

The vital issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Attys. Magsalin, Cruz and Go should be held administratively liable
based on the allegations in the complaints.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions lack merit.

The Court deems it appropriate to discuss A.C. Nos. 7687 and 7688 jointly as they essentially revolve around the same
circumstances and parties.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant.1âwphi1 The Court
exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that
warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have
performed his duties in accordance with his oath.18

In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records to be inconclusive, thus, insufficient to hold the respondents
liable for the acts alleged in the complaint.

Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts as to the dates of the CA
receipt of the notices, decision and resolution by the respondents, there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove that
the respondents intentionally and maliciously made it appear that they received the CA notices, decision and resolution
later than the dates stated in the QCCPO Certifications. The complainants would like to impress upon the Court that the
only logical explanation as to the discrepancy on the dates between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return
Receipts was that the respondents must have induced Calucag toalter the true date of receipt by the CA for the purpose of
extending the period to file, the otherwise time barred, motion for reconsideration. Verily, this leap of inference proffered by
the complainants is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not in any way supported by clear substantial
evidence required to justify the imposition of an administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.

Even if the postmaster's certifications were to merit serious consideration, the Court cannot avoid the legal reality that the
registry return card is considered as the official CA record evidencing service by mail. This card carries the presumption
that it was prepared in the course of official duties which have been regularly performed. Jn this sense, it is presumed to be
accurate, unless clearly proven otherwise.

The Court finds merit in the respondents' argument that had Calucag stamped an inaccurate date on the registry return
receipts, Postman Pecante, who witnessed and had full view of the receiving and stamping of the said registry return
receipts, would have called her attention to correct the same or would have refused to receive them altogether for being
erroneous. Here, Postman Pecante having accepted two registry return receipts with the dates, April 10, 2007 19 and .July
23, 2007,20 respectively, can only mean that the said postman considered the dates indicated therein to be correct and
accurate.

While the Court will not avoid its responsibility in meting out the proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to
live up to their sworn duties, the Court will not wield its axe against those the accusations against whom are not indubitably
proven.

Accordingly, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence, the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed.
 17

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaints against Attys. Frankie O. Magsalin III and Pablo R. Cruz, in A.C. No. 7687;
and the administrative complaint against Attys. Frankie O. Magsalin III, Peter Andrew S. Go and Pablo R. Cruz, in A.C. No.
7688, are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

5. Mendoza v. Mendoza and Navarro AC No. 6056 September 9, 2015

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6056, September 09, 2015

FELICISIMA MENDOZA VDA. DE ROBOSA, Complainant, v. ATTYS. JUAN B. MENDOZA AND EUSEBIO P.
NAVARRO, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Juan B. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) for alleged deceitful acts against
his client, and Atty. Eusebio P. Navarro, Jr. (Atty. Navarro) for negligence in the handling of his client's defense in the
collection case filed by Atty. Mendoza.

Factual Antecedents

Eladio Mendoza (Eladio) applied for original registration of two parcels of land (Lot Nos. 3771 and 2489) situated in
Calamba, Laguna before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) at Los Banos, Laguna and
Land Management Bureau (LMB) in Manila.1 While his application was still pending, Eladio died leaving all his children as
heirs to his estate; among them is herein complainant Felicisima Mendoza Vda. De Robosa (Felicisima). Eladio's children
pursued the application and executed a Special Power of Attorney2 (SPA) in favor of Felicisima. Their relative, Atty.
Mendoza, prepared and notarized the said SPA. They also engaged the services of Atty. Mendoza as their counsel in the
proceedings before the CENRO and LMB.

On February 20, 1993, upon the behest of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima signed a Contract for Service 3prepared by Atty.
Mendoza. The said contract stipulated that in the event of a favorable CENRO or LMB resolution, Felicisima shall convey
to Atty. Mendoza one-fifth (1/5) of the lands subject of the application or one-fifth (1/5) of the proceeds should the same
property be sold.

The CENRO and the LMB proceedings resulted in the dismissal of Felicisima and her siblings' application for Lot No. 2489
and the partial grant of their application for Lot No. 3771.4 The Bureau of Lands issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
covering one-third (VV) or about 8,901 square meters of Lot No. 3771 in the names of Felicisima and her siblings.
Subsequently, Felicisima and her siblings sold the land to Greenfield Corporation (Greenfield) and received the amount of
P2,000,000.00 as down payment.

On October 15, 1998, Atty. Mendoza, joined by his wife Filomena S. Mendoza, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tanauan, Batangas a Complaint5 against Felicisima and her siblings (Civil Case No. T-1080). Atty. Mendoza claimed that
except for the amount of P40,000.00, Felicisima and her siblings refused to pay his attorney's fees equivalent to 1/5 of the
proceeds of the sale of the land as stipulated in the Contract for Service.

In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 Felicisima and her siblings denied the "existence and authenticity of the x x x Contract
of Service," adding that it did not reflect the true intention of the parties as they only agreed to pay Atty. Mendoza
PI,500.00 per appearance and up to P1,500.00 for gasoline expenses. They also asserted that, based on quantum
meruit, Atty. Mendoza is not entitled to the claimed attorney's fees because they lost in one case and he failed to
 18

accomplish the titling of the land awarded to them, which would have enhanced the value of the property.

Felicisima and her siblings hired the services of Atty. Navarro as their counsel in Civil Case No. T-1080.

On March 29, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Mendoza and against Felicisima and her siblings. The
RTC ruled that Felicisima failed to substantiate her claim that she did not enter into a contingency contract for legal
services with Atty. Mendoza, and ordered Felicisima to pay Atty. Mendoza P1,258,000.00 (for the land sold at
P7,120,800.00) representing attorney's fees as well as the total cost of suit. 7

Atty. Navarro then filed a Notice of Appeal8 on behalf of Felicisima. However, Atty. Mendoza moved for an execution
pending appeal with the RTC. Since no opposition was filed by Felicisima and her siblings, the RTC granted the said
motion and issued a writ of execution, which resulted in the levy and eventual transfer of Felicisima's properties covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-433859 and T-433860 in favor of Atty. Mendoza as the highest bidder in the execution
sale.9

Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered Felicisima to file an appellant's brief but Atty. Navarro failed to file the same
within the period granted by the CA. Consequently, the CA dismissed Felicisima's appeal for non-compliance with Section
1(e), Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.10

On June 3, 2003, Felicisima filed a complaint-affidavit for disbarment before this Court against Atty. Mendoza for allegedly
deceiving her into signing the Contract for Service by taking advantage of her illiteracy, and against Atty. Navarro for
dereliction of duty in handling her case before the CA causing her properties to be levied and sold at public auction. 11

Felicisima alleges that Atty. Mendoza made her sign a document at her house without the presence of her siblings. Said
document (Contract for Service) was written in English which she does not understand. She claims that Atty. Mendoza told
her the document will shield her from her siblings' possible future claims on the property because she alone is entitled to
the property as her siblings did not help her in processing the application for original registration. She was not given a copy
of the said document and she discovered only during the trial that Atty. Mendoza anchors his claim over Vs of proceeds
from the sale of the land awarded by the CENRO and LMB on the same document she had signed. 12

As to Atty. Navarro, Felicisima claims that her case before the CA was neglected despite repeated follow-ups on her part.
She also points out that Atty. Navarro abandoned her case before the RTC when the latter failed to file an opposition to
Atty. Mendoza's motion for execution pending appeal, which resulted in the loss of her properties.13

In his Comment,14 Atty. Mendoza avers that he has been a lawyer since 1954 and retired sometime in 1983 due to partial
disability. Fie went back to practicing his profession in 1996 on a selective basis due to his disability but completely
stopped a year after. Being 82 years of age at the time of filing his comment, Atty. Mendoza admits that he is now totally
disabled, cannot walk on his own, cannot even write and sign his name, and can only move about with the help of his
family for he has been suffering from a severe case of "acute gouty arthritic attack" which causes extreme difficulty in
moving virtually all his joints. He points out that he had previously handled pro bono a concubinage case filed by Felicisima
against her husband, having yielded to her repeated pleas as she was then financially hard-up and psychologically
distraught. For the application with the CENRO and LMB, he agreed to be paid for his legal services on a contingent basis,
which contract was subsequently found by the RTC to be valid. When it was time to collect his attorney's fees, Felicisima
and her siblings refused to pay him without any justifiable reason and even threatened to shoot him if he continued to
press for his compensation. This left Atty. Mendoza with no other recourse but to avail of the judicial process to enforce his
claim.

Replying to the comment of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima maintains that she did not understand the contents of the Contract
for Service and if it was truly their agreement (contingent basis) they would not have given money to Atty. Mendoza
amounting to P66,000.00. in fact, she points out that Atty. Mendoza failed to recover one of the lands applied for and to
have the land awarded to them titled because he became ill. Further, she denies the allegation that she and her siblings
threatened to shoot Atty. Mendoza for how could they do it to a lawyer who will certainly have them jailed. Besides, he
never mentioned such incident during the hearing of the case.

On his part, Atty. Navarro asserts that he did his best to win Felicisima's case although he was unsuccessful. He explains
that even before handling Felicisima's case, he had been saddled by many cases involving politicians and sympathizers,
 19

having previously served as councilor in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Batangas for two consecutive terms. He thus
emphasized to Felicisima that in order to "keep the case alive", he could file the Notice of Appeal in her behalf, and
instructed her to look for another lawyer who has the time to attend to her case and that she would return to him only when
she failed to get one. However, Atty. Navarro admits that since he was too preoccupied with so many cases in the local
courts, he had altogether forgotten about Felicisima's case, not having seen her again as per their agreement.

Atty. Navarro avers that after a long time Felicisima suddenly showed up at his office complaining why there was no
appellant's brief filed on her behalf at the CA. He claims that Felicisima blamed her and even accused him of conniving
with Atty. Mendoza. Felicisima would not accept his explanation and she obviously failed to understand his earlier
instruction as he had filed the Notice of Appeal precisely to give her enough time to secure the services of a new lawyer
having told her that he was quite busy with his other cases. He therefore pleads for mercy and compassion if he had
somehow committed some lapses considering that this is the first time he was charged administratively in his almost 39
years of law practice and that he is too willing to take complainant's cause if not for such apparent miscommunication
between a lawyer and his client.15

On December 7, 2005, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.16

On November 6, 2006, Felicisima filed a position paper 17 reiterating that Atty. Mendoza clearly abused the trust and
confidence she reposed in him, depriving her of her material possessions by filing suit to enforce the Contract for Service.
She asserted that they could not have entered into a contract with Atty. Mendoza for the conveyance of a portion of the
land to be awarded by the Bureau of Lands as his attorney's fees because they already agreed to pay his fee per hearing
plus transportation expenses and the sum of P40,000.00. She contended that Atty. Mendoza should be held liable for
deceit and misrepresentation for tricking her to sign, to her detriment, a document that she did not understand.

As to Atty. Navarro, Felicisima maintained that he abandoned his responsibility to monitor and keep her updated of the
status of her case before the CA. She also alleges that Atty. Navarro made it appear to her that he had already filed the
appellant's brief when, in fact, there was no such undertaking. She thus prayed that Atty. Navarro be held liable for
negligence in the conduct and manner of handling her case before the CA.

IBP's Report and Recommendation

After two postponements, the mandatory conference was finally held on September 25, 2006 where all parties appeared
except for Atty. Mendoza. Upon termination of the hearing, the parties were required to file their position papers but only
Felicisima complied.

On March 6, 2007, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) submitted her Report
and Recommendation18 finding Atty. Mendoza guilty of taking advantage of Felicisima's ignorance just to have the
Contract for Service signed. She held that Atty. Mendoza violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him,
as well as Rule 20.04, Canon 20 which exhorts lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning matters of
compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. 19

As to Atty. Navarro, the Investigating Commissioner held that his participation in politics affected his law practice and
caused him to forget about Felicisima's case. Having failed to file the appellant's brief as ordered by the CA, Atty. Navarro
even filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance at a very late stage, leaving no time for Felicisima to secure the services of
another lawyer. His infraction caused the eviction of Felicisima and her children from their residence by virtue of the writ of
execution and public auction of her real properties. The Investigating Commissioner further said that Atty. Navarro's acts
showed lack of diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the CPR and his Lawyer's Oath.20

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that both Atty. Mendoza and Atty. Navarro be suspended for two (2) years
from the practice of law.21

On September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 22 modifying the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation by lowering the period of suspension from two (2) years to six (6) months.
 20

Atty. Navarro filed a motion for reconsideration 23 contending that the IBP Board of Governors failed to consider that after
the filing of the Notice of Appeal, there was no more lawyer-client relationship between him and Felicisima. Insisting that
there was a miscommunication between him and Felicisima regarding his instruction that she should engage the services
of another lawyer after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, he stressed that she only later found it difficult to scout for a new
lawyer because she was being charged exorbitant acceptance fees. Hence, Felicisima should be held equally negligent in
not hiring the services of another lawyer despite a clear understanding to this effect. He further cites the lack of
communication between him and Felicisima, which resulted in the late filing of the Notice of Withdrawal that she
volunteered to file a long time ago.

In her comment to Atty. Navarro's motion for reconsideration, Felicisima reiterated that Atty. Navarro should be held liable
for negligence in failing to update her of the status of the case and admitting such oversight. She claims that despite
several demands, Atty. Navarro ignored them and made himself scarce.24

On February 28, 2012, the IBP-CBD forwarded the case to this Court for proper disposition pursuant to Section 12, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court. Among the records transmitted was the Resolution dated January 15, 2012 denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Navarro. 25cralawred

The Court's Ruling

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint.
The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of
the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.26 For the Court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.27

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight
than that of the other.28 It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.29 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

After a thorough review of the evidence and pleadings submitted by the parties, we hold that Felicisima was able to prove
her charges against Atty. Navarro but not Atty. Mendoza.

Contract for Service with Atty. Mendoza

a contract for contingent fees

The Contract for Service dated February 20, 1993 reads:cralawlawlibrary

That the client hereby employs the Attorney as their counsel for the titling and recovery of their two parcels
of land situated at Barangay Maunong, Calamba, Laguna, [Lot] No. 2489 with an area of approximately
21,784 Square Meters and [L]ot No. 3771 with an area of more or less 26,703 and in consideration of the
services of the attorney, the client agrees to pay the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. For the prosecution of said proceedings (titling and recovery of the said parcels of land and hearing at
the Land Management Bureau, Manila, and at the Office of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office at Los Bafios, Laguna the client will give the Attorney one fifth (1/5[)] of the said two
parcels of land or one fifth (1/5[)] of the selling price of the said properties if sold.
 21

Said Attorney hereby accepts said employment on said terms and conditions and to do his best care, skill
and ability, and at all times to protect the rights and interest of said client.

2. That the expenses of the proceedings, and such others as filing fees, expenses of publication, costs
legally taxable and all others shall be for the account of the client. 30chanrobleslaw

We cannot sustain the finding of the IBP that Atty. Mendoza misled Felicisima into signing the above contract which
supposedly was intended to protect her from the claims of her siblings who did not spend for the application with the
CENRO and LMB. Such finding was based solely on the statements of Felicisima in her affidavit-complaint. While
Felicisima made a reference to her testimony before the RTC, she did not attach the transcript of stenographic notes of the
said testimony detailing the circumstances of her signing the Contract for Service. Neither is the receipt by Atty. Mendoza
of the sum of P40,000.00 after Felicisima and her siblings sold the land, by itself an indication of fraud and deceit in the
execution of the Contract for Service.

Upon the other hand, Atty. Mendoza presented the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. T-1080 dated March 29, 2000, the
relevant portions of which state:cralawlawlibrary

It is not disputed that Atty. Mendoza was paid PI,000.00 for every appearance and he was also given
P300.00 for hiring a vehicle and driver for each scheduled hearing. He also received P40,000.00 from
Felicisima Mendoza when defendants' one-third portion of Lot No. 3771 was sold.

Atty. Mendoza filed the instant case to collect one-fifth of the sale price of defendants' land which was sold
for P7,120,800.00 or the amount of P1,424,000.00 minus the amount of P40,000.00 he received, or the
amount of P1,384,000.00.

During her testimony, Felicisima Mendoza admitted the authenticity of the Special Power of Attorney
whereby her brothers and sisters authorized her to secure the services of the plaintiff Juan Mendoza
adding that it was in writing, in English and was explained to her before she signed it; that on the basis of
the authority given her by her brothers and sisters she engaged the services of Atty. Mendoza; that the
signature in the document, entitled Contract of Service, is that of her name which she signed in "his
house."

On the basis of the evidence, the Court finds no ground to support Felicisima's claim that she did not enter
into any written agreement with the plaintiff, Juan Mendoza, for the latter to render legal services and the
corresponding compensation therefor as set forth in the Contract of Service. However, the Court finds that
the amounts received by the plaintiff Juan Mendoza from defendant Felicisima Mendoza during the
course of his legal services for the twenty hearings in the amount of P1,300.00 per hearing or a total of
P26,000.00 should also be deducted from his claim of P1,384,000.00 leaving an unpaid balance of
PI,258,000.00 due plaintiff Juan Mendoza for legal services rendered the defendants. 31chanrobleslaw

Given the above finding of the RTC that Felicisima in fact entered into a contract for legal services with Atty. Mendoza,
thus debunking her defense in her Answer denying the existence and authenticity of the said document, it appears that
Felicisima raised the issue of voluntariness of her signing the Contract for Service only during the hearing when she
supposedly testified that, having reached only Grade IV and trusting completely her lawyer cousin, Atty. Mendoza who told
her that the document will protect her from the claims of her siblings, she actually signed the Contract for Service. 32 The
RTC, however, found the evidence adduced by Felicisima as insufficient to defeat Atty. Mendoza's claim for attorney's
fees. Said judgment had attained finality and even pending appeal was already executed on motion by Atty. Mendoza.

It bears to stress that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and
binding but must be laid down in an express contract.33 The validity of contingent fees depends, in large measure, upon
the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case. 34 Nevertheless, when it is
shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by
any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved
party.35
 22

Apart from the allegations in her affidavit-complaint, Felicisima failed to establish by clear and satisfactory proof of the
deception allegedly committed by Atty. Mendoza when she agreed in writing for the latter's contingent fees. Fraud and
irregularity in the execution of their contingency fee contract cannot be deduced from the fact alone that Atty. Mendoza
filed suit to enforce their contract.

Atty. Navarro 's Gross Negligence

With respect to Atty. Navarro, the facts on record clearly established his failure to live up to the standards of diligence and
competence of the legal profession.

Lawyers engaged to represent a client in a case bear the responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with warmth, zeal
and utmost diligence.36 They must constantly keep in mind that their actions or omissions would be binding on the client.37

In this case, Atty. Navarro agreed to represent Felicisima and her siblings in Civil Case No. T-1080 and as their counsel he
filed the Answer with Counterclaim. He likewise attended the hearings of the case until the RTC rendered an adverse
judgment. However, after filing the Notice of Appeal, nothing was heard of again from him. He did not file any opposition
when Atty. Mendoza moved for execution pending appeal, which resulted in the sale of Felicisima's properties at public
auction and eventual eviction of Felicisima and her children from the said premises. Worse, he failed to file an appellant's
brief despite receipt of the order from the CA directing him to do so within the period specified therein, and to file a motion
for reconsideration when the appeal was dismissed due to non-filing of such brief. His motion for extension of time to
submit an appellant's brief was filed 93 days late and was thus denied by the CA. Barely a week after, he filed a notice of
withdrawal of appearance bearing the conformity of his clients which was granted. It is evident from the foregoing that Atty.
Navarro failed to inform Felicisima of the status of the case so that the latter was surprised upon being served the eviction
order of the court and eventual dismissal by the CA of their appeal.

Canon 18 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further
provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Thus:cralawlawlibrary

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated,
he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney,
it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.38chanrobleslaw

Atty. Navarro's asseveration that he had instructed Felicisima to look for another lawyer and given them the Notice of
Withdrawal of Appearance for them to file in the CA, fails to convince. If it is true that he did not agree to continue being
Felicisima's counsel before the CA, he should have immediately filed the Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance himself after
filing the Notice of Appeal. Despite receipt of the order to file appellant's brief from the CA, he did not inform Felicisima
about it nor did he inquire from the latter whether they already secured the services of a new counsel. That such
withdrawal was filed long after the expiration of the period to file appellant's brief and the denial by the CA of the motion for
extension also belatedly filed by him, clearly indicate that he never updated Felicisima on the status of their appeal, such
information being crucial after Atty. Mendoza succeeded in having the judgment executed pending appeal.

Atty. Navarro, in fact, admitted that he forgot about Felicisima's case due to his political activities. Despite having received
notices from the CA, he allowed the period of filing the appellant's brief to lapse and failed to file a motion for extension
 23

before such period expired. He did file a motion for extension but only three months later and when such motion was
denied, he finally moved to withdraw from the case. There being no appellant's brief filed, the CA granted Atty. Mendoza's
motion to dismiss the appeal. Under the circumstances, Atty. Navarro was grossly negligent in his duties, resulting in great
prejudice to Felicisima who lost her properties to satisfy the judgment in favor of Atty. Mendoza.

We have held that the failure of counsel to submit the appeal brief for his client within the reglementary period
constitutes inexcusable negligence39 an offense that entails disciplinary action.40 The filing of a brief within the period set
by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the court. 41 The failure to file an appellate court brief without any justifiable
reason thus deserves sanction.42

Atty. Navarro's negligent handling of Felicisima's case was exacerbated by his failure to inform her of the status of her
case. There was no mention in his pleadings of any attempt on his part to contact Felicisima at the crucial stages when
Atty. Mendoza moved for execution pending appeal and the CA sent a directive for the filing of the appellant's brief. If
indeed, he had already instructed Felicisima to look for another lawyer, he should have apprised her of these
developments and explained to her the urgency of filing the notice of withdrawal of appearance and entry of appearance of
a new counsel she may have already engaged.

Atty. Navarro's failure to communicate vital information to his client violated Rule 18.04 which provides:cralawlawlibrary

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.chanrobleslaw

The lawyer's duty to keep his client constantly updated on the developments of his case is crucial in maintaining the
client's confidence. Indeed, the relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the
lawyer to inform timely and adequately the client of important developments affecting the client's case. The lawyer should
not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client's interests. 43

In cases involving a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other pleading before an appellate court, this Court has imposed
suspension from the practice of law for periods ranging from three to six months, and in most serious cases, even
disbarment.44

We find the recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors to suspend Atty. Navarro from the practice of law for six
months appropriate under the circumstances. Considering that this is his first administrative offense, such penalty, and not
disbarment as prayed for by complainant, serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the public and the legal
profession. For this Court will exercise its power to disbar only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. 45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eusebio P. Navarro, Jr. GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
upon finality of this Decision, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.
The charges against Atty. Juan B. Mendoza are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

6. Sorreda v. Kho AC No. 10635 August 26,2015

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10635, August 26, 2015

NOEL S. SORREDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, Respondent.

 24

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an administrative case filed by Noel S. Sorreda (Sorreda) against Atty. David L. Kho (Kho) for
malpractice and/or gross misconduct.

The Facts

The records reveal that on 3 October 2006 Marissa L. Macarilay (Macarilay), through her then counsel Sorreda, 1 filed an
administrative complaint2 against Kho before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No.
06-1866 (Macarilay's complaint). Sorreda withdrew as counsel for Macarilay on 10 March 2007. 3 On 5 December 2007,
Sorreda filed with the IBP the present complaint4against Kho, which contained exactly the same allegations in Macarilay's
complaint. Sorreda alleged that: (1) Macarilay, through him as counsel, filed an arbitration case against Candelaria
Kholoma (Candelaria) and Imelda Kholoma (Imelda), Kho's clients, before the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC); (2) Kho notarized Candelaria and Imelda's affidavit in the arbitration case despite being disqualified
under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since Candelaria and Imelda are Kho's sister-in-law and niece, respectively; (3)
Kho did not furnish Macarilay and Sorreda a copy of his comment on their motion for substitution of arbitrator; (4) Kho did
not countervail the manifestation alleging the mendacity of Kho and his clients; (5) Kho intentionally delayed the receipt of
Macarilay's motion for time extension; (6) Kho advised Robert Kholoma (Robert), the husband of Candelaria, to forcibly
eject Macarilay's watchman in the disputed property; (7) Kho notarized the answer filed by the Kholomas in the case for
forcible entry; (8) Kho also notarized the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by the Kholomas, which amounted to
"self-notarization," because "the one being given power is the law firm of Kho Antonio Velasco & Payos Law Offices, of
which [Kho] is the premier partner"; (9) Kho notarized the SPA with only one of the three signatories exhibiting her cedula;
(10) Kho also notarized the petition for review filed by Candelaria and Imelda before the Court of Appeals; and (11) Kho
and his clients deliberately failed to furnish the CIAC with a copy their appeal.

In his Answer,5 Kho admitted that he notarized Candelaria and Imelda's affidavit, answer in the case for forcible entry, SPA,
and petition for review. Kho, however, alleged that he acted in good faith for he believed that the decision in Aznar
Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals,6 where only "those convicted of the crime involving moral turpitude were
disqualified to notarize documents," was still the prevailing rule. Kho pleaded for liberality in the application of the then
recently enacted 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since there was no damage caused by the notarization. He admitted
that he was not yet fully conversant with the new rules. As to the other allegations, Kho claimed that those were
unsubstantiated conclusions, conjectures and speculations. Kho admitted his failure to furnish Sorreda with a copy of the
comment on the motion for substitution of arbitrator and his failure to furnish the CIAC with a copy of his clients' appeal.
However, he alleged that no damage was caused and he immediately furnished the copies of the pleadings upon
discovery of his inadvertence.

Finally, Kho claimed that "Macarilay's penchant for deliberate forum shopping and splitting a cause of action, albeit
baseless and unfounded, must be sanctioned."7 In an Order8 dated 29 January 2009, IBP Commissioner Romualdo A. Din,
Jr. (IBP Commissioner) denied Sorreda's motion to consolidate the present complaint with Macarilay's complaint, because
there was already a report and recommendation by a different commissioner in Macarilay's complaint. On 4 August 2009,
Kho filed an urgent manifestation,9 pleading for the dismissal of the present case. Kho attached a copy of this Court's
Resolution10 dated 30 March 2009, where the Third Division of this Court resolved to close and terminate CBD Case No.
06-1866 (docketed as A.C. No. 8161), considering that no motion for reconsideration was filed against the IBP
Resolution11 dismissing the case for lack of merit, and no petition for review was filed before the Court.

The Ruling of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation dated 31 May 2011,12 the IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the present
complaint against Kho because Sorreda failed to establish his allegations by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.
The IBP Commissioner also found that Sorreda did not establish how Kho's alleged violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, if proven, would damage Macarilay. In Resolution No. XX-2013-10713 issued on 12 February 2013, the IBP
 25

Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, dismissing the
complaint for lack of evidence. In Resolution No. XXI-2014-22114 issued on 2 May 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Sorreda, since the Board found no cogent reason to reverse its
initial findings and the matters raised were reiterations of those which had already been taken into consideration.

The Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the complaint against Kho. Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the Court finds that
the present administrative case becomes dismissible. Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court enunciates the rule of res
judicata or bar by prior judgment.15 It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. 16 A.C. No. 8161 and the present case have substantially
identical parties, refer to the same subject matter, raise the same issue, and claim the same relief. The present complaint
is a mere duplication of Macarilay's complaint in A.C. No. 8161. Thus, the Resolution of this Court in A.C. No. 8161 is
conclusive in the present case. Furthermore, Sorreda failed to discharge the burden of proving Kho's administrative liability
by clear preponderance of evidence.

The legal presumption is that an attorney is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved.17 The burden
of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant, 18 and the burden is not satisfied
when complainant relies on mere assumptions and suspicions as evidence. 19 Considering the serious consequences of
disbarment and suspension, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of administrative penalty.20 In the present case, Sorreda did not substantiate his allegations, and he relied on
his own assumptions and suspicions. Sorreda did not show how Kho's alleged actions amount to malpractice or gross
misconduct, which will subject Kho to administrative sanction. Sorreda cannot shift the burden of proof to Kho by asking
him to rebut his allegations. It is axiomatic that one who alleges an act has the onus of proving it. 21 If the burden of proof is
not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense. 22

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty. David L. Kho. Costs against complainant. SO
ORDERED. Del Castillo, Mendoza Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

7. Chan v.. Coloma-Javier AC No. 9831 March 9, 2016

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9831, March 09, 2016

CHAN SHUN KUEN, Complainant, v. COMMISSIONERS LOURDES B. COLOMA-JAVIER, GREGORIO O. BILOG III,
RAUL TAGLE AQUINO AND ATTY. JOYRICH M. GOLANGCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

The instant disbarment case filed by Chan Shun Kuen (complainant), the General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of
Compromise Enterprises Corporation (CEC), against Commissioners Lourdes B. Coloma-Javier, Gregorio O. Bilog III and
Raul Tagle Aquino, and Deputy Executive Clerk Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco (respondents), all from the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), is an offshoot of the labor case entitled Felisa B. Toribio, et ah, v. Compromise Enterprises
Corporation and/or Margaret So Chan.

The said labor case for illegal dismissal, unpaid service incentive leave and 13 th month pay was decided against CEC;
hence, it was ordered to pay separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the sum of P5,543,807.57. 1 CEC, however, failed to
 26

appeal the said decision, thus it became final and executory. The complainants in the labor case moved for the execution
of the said decision, hence, a Writ of Execution was issued and was duly served. Accordingly, the sheriff levied the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19784 belonging to CEC.

By a Decision2 dated October 16, 2007, the labor case was resolved by the NLRC Third Division in favor of the
complainants therein. CEC filed several motions and appeal before the NLRC but all were ruled against it.

Instead of filing an appeal with the appellate court, the complainant opted to file a series of complaints, administrative and
criminal, against one or several of the respondents of the NLRC before different bodies. 3

Undaunted with the dismissal of all the cases he filed against the respondents, the complainant once again came to this
Court with a Verified Complaint4 for disbarment claiming that the respondents connived with each other in writing its
Decision dated October 16, 2007 for the said labor case and alleging that Commissioner Tito F. Genilo's (Commissioner
Genilo) signature was forged by a personnel of the Third Division, as well as the December 10, 2007 Letter of
Commissioner Genilo regarding his inhibition in the said case.

In compliance with the Court's directive,5 the respondents filed their Comment6 asserting in the main that the complainant
committed forum shopping for having filed identical complaints in various forms, against the same respondents before
different bodies. The respondents branded the complaint as motivated by malice and retorted that the complainant has
been using the Court and several quasi-judicial bodies as a means to overturn the decision of the Labor Arbiter in his
desperate attempt to stop the execution proceedings on his property by maliciously and repeatedly filing baseless,
unfounded and frivolous harassment suits against them.

After examining the instant complaint, the Court resolves to dismiss it outright.

To begin with, the main issue in disbarment cases is whether or not a lawyer has committed serious professional
misconduct sufficient to cause disbarment. The test is whether the lawyer's conduct shows him or her to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor; or whether it renders him or her unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant; and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the
complainant establishes the complaint with clearly preponderant evidence. 7

Guided by the foregoing tenets, the disbarment complaint against the respondents has no leg to stand on. The particular
acts alleged by the complainant against the respondents, which to his mind, were grounds for disbarment, have no merit
and seem too far-fetched. The respondents cannot be disbarred merely on complainant's bare allegation that the
respondents connived with each other in writing its decisions, resolutions and orders against his company, and that
Commissioner Genilo's signature was forged by a personnel of the NLRC Third Division. These acts particularized by the
complainant are mere allegations and he has nothing but hollow suppositions to bolster his complaint.

Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of the respondents, there was no evidence to show that the
respondents committed the acts complained of. No specific incidents and sufficient evidence can be gathered to show that
the respondents had committed misconduct, dishonesty, falsehood, or had misused the rules of procedure. There was no
indication whatsoever of any connivance or manifest partiality to prejudice the complainant. Neither was there proof that
the decisions, resolution, or orders of the respondents were attended by bad faith, malice or gross negligence. As it turned
out, the charges levelled against the respondents were imaginary and unworthy of serious consideration because it was
clear from the start that the acts particularized in the complaint pertain to the respondents' capacity as NLRC
commissioners. Besides, the sincerity of the charge against the respondents is cynical.

Upon scrutiny of the records of this case, it would reveal that the complaint was an ill-motivated bid to disbar the
respondents, who were merely exercising their judicial function as NLRC Commissioners. Hence, there is a veneer of truth
in the allegation of the respondents that the complaint is a vindictive charge of the complainant meant to vex, harass,
humiliate and punish them in performing their duty, as well as to get even with them for deciding the labor case against the
complainant. The Court had already held that "[t]o allow complainant to trifle with the Court, to make use of the judicial
process as an instrument of retaliation, would be a reflection on the rule of law." 8

The Court also noted that the instant complaint is a virtual duplicate of previous administrative complaints which this Court
had already dismissed in A.C. No. 80409 and A.C. No. 8621,10 there being no prima facie case. Clearly, all the cases filed
 27

by the complainant before the different bodies essentially revolve around the same circumstances and parties involving
the decisions, resolutions, and orders relative to the abovementioned labor case.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the case should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Nonetheless, the complainant's
propensity in incessantly filing baseless complaints against the respondents should be curtailed. To allow every party who
lost in a case to file multiple suits against those who did not decide in his favor would unreasonably clog the dockets of the
court with unscrupulous cases. Considering that this has already been complainant's third attempt to file a baseless suit
against the respondents before this Court, it is deemed proper to admonish him and sternly warn him that he shall be dealt
with more severely should he commit a similar act against a member of the Bar.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the disbarment complaint against Commissioners Lourdes B.
Coloma-Javier, Gregorio O. Bilog III, Raul Tagle Aquino, and Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco for lack of merit. Complainant
Chan Shun Kuen is hereby ADMONISHED for filing the malicious complaint, WITH STERN WARNING that a repetition
shall be dealt with more severely as indirect contempt of the Court.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibraryVelasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

8. Campugan v. Tolentino et al.AC No. 8261 March 11,2015

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY.
RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.

A.C. No. 8725

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR., AND
ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of
respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala
and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their
annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon
City.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Antecedents

Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a civil action they brought to seek the
annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of
January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as
defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be
annotated on TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
was the counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.

In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261), 2 the complainants narrated
that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their
 28

parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; 3 that on August 24, 2006, they
discovered that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they
immediately caused the annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.

It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in order
to end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and the proceeds thereof would be equally
divided between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as
the plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint dated February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the
defendants' lack of objection thereto and the defendants' willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim. 7

The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they could no
longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and visits to his office; that they found out
upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546,
specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of
the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the arinotation of the
decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the
complainants' Motion to Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 addressed to Atty.
Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.

Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice
of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on
March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or before
such scheduled hearing.10However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or
remained pending at the LRA.

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for his professional
services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. They submitted that the cancellation of their
notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted
from the connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of
their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan,
the acting Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.

On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified complaint. 11

Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert Torres had been actively
involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the mediation process; that the complainants,
after having aggressively participated in the drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now claim that they had been
deceived into entering the agreement in the same way that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained
therein; that he did not commit any abandonment as alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for
the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be held responsible for their representation in other
proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that the only payment he had
received from the complainants were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.

In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing that he was not
acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of
Deeds, he had no knowledge about how said letter-request had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the
present complaint was the second disbarment case filed by the complainants against him with no other motive except to
harass and intimidate him.

Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of
Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse
 29

claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the
regular course of official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity
occurred or was performed in the cancellation of the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the case.

Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15

As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.'s signature that
appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010
alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C.
No. 8725, and was later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because the complaints involved the same parties and
rested on similar allegations against the respondents.

Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the arguments he had
made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted Atty. Quilala's Comment. 19

Ruling

We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 20 Verily,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of
the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional
Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts and omissions are insufficient to establish any censurable conduct
against them.

Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the general duties of the Register
of Deeds, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - x x x

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He
shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and that the same are
properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of
his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature. 21 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty
is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official
 30

discretion nor the exercise of judgment.22

In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that registration is a merely ministerial act of the Register
of Deeds, explaining:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of
Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the
documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.

In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty.
Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT
No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been
falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for
registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request
and the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and t]o be in conformity with existing requirements, it
became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay. 24

Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of duty, complainants were not bereft of any remedy because
they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter by way of consultawith the LRA, as provided by
Section 11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was
ultimately within the province of a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a
document registered by the Register of Deeds.

The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each other to guarantee that
the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of the
affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty.
Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their cause since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008.

The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.

Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be
inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be
established by clear and convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in this regard. Outside of their bare assertions
that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to cause the dismissal of the complaint
and then discharge of the annotations, they presented no evidence to support their allegation of conspiracy. On the
contrary, the records indicated their own active pjarticipation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had
themselves entered into.

Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated ahd participated in the settlement of the case, there
was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement.

In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the complainants and the defendants in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 subsisted.28

Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
 31

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.

There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance, the complainants obtained a fair
settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds
accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on
the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable
for abandonment.

Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to the termination of
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time during the engagement, the
complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his
representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite
service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and
the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to the complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with his
whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued to come under the
professional obligation towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty.
Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarySereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

9. Foster v. Agtang AC No. 10579 En Banc December 10,2014 En Banc

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dated March 23,
2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of
respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered
the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a complaint2, dated May
31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful” 3 acts as
a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of the order.
Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the
Investigating Commissioner issued the Order 5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011.
It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified
Answer.6
 32

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of documents
contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the
said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents on file. The Minutes 8 of the mandatory
conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal Trial Court in Small
Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her
husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December
8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal problem regarding a
deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion,
complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a
contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses. 11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter 12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal problem referred
by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for
the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount
without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had
previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for
reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from
complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee. 14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the
high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to
the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65,
entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one who
notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that
he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by
respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty
were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the
complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies
she complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during
the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or
P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of
P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be
given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she
eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt, 17 stating that “it is understood that the balance
of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent
insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was
allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent, complainant learned
of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went to
 33

the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. On
January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by
Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would
not accept the documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using
false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him that the
matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered
that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s
directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told
that oral arguments on the case had been set the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a letter of
termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra
Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he
received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law since March
1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the
Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He
likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee
and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the
behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his
services. The transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the
amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was suggested by the
complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having
said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved
of the amount. In the same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received
P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would
rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other
party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent saw
nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in the handling of
cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was
aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just
compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts in her
possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also
emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent was employed as
Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several
documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty.
Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012,
issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for estafa. 23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

 34

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical
impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of
suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of
P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging
respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified the penalty of
his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise
ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent’s
violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on
representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than
the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra
expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to
depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only
to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is
highly improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that
would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an
exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the excessive
amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound
to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all
members of the legal profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.” 28Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. 29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from complainant but he
could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon
demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to
the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in
him by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render
 35

an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does
not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client. 31

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent displayed a
reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit
of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he
initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount
at the time the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily
warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used
as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining
the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of
the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer
indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be
overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would
not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment.
To tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture, respondent proved
himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally
inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first
time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored
her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only given
P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of
which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly
unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and
confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it
implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were
surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were
given to him out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate
behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are
indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to
complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations.32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which,
albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on
both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s
“lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.
 36

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client
should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her
lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard
is to avoid representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a
lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of
interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for representing
conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered
services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which
was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the
parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was
made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in
the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed
document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its
provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he
was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation
of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients
who had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties
involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has
the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is
abused or violated the entire profession suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the
lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. 35 For the practice of law is “a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good
moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of
the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of
his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months recommended
by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the
respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him
as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for
maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire
judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment. 38
 37

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private capacity.
In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted
in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link
to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer
of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination
of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with
the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required
in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed.
Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. 41Furthermore, the Court has to
consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule,
imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the balance of
the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship between them.
Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as representation expenses for
the handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his
professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the
benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he
contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.” 43 The Court
likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by “purging the profession of members who, by
their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts. SO ORDERED. Sereno, (Chief Justice), Carpio, Velasco, Jr.,
Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur. Brion, J., on
leave. Peralta, J., no part. Bersamin, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.

10. Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy AC No. 9115 September 17, 2014

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
 38

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and unethical
conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca),
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).

The Facts

Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita). 1 She was adjudged as the
sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order 2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in
several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company,
Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty
Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3

In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent, her alleged
illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the
successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends
and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations. 7 She added that
respondent mortgaged a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in
favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00, 8 despite an existing Trust Agreement9 executed on
October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized
her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.10Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property
by executing the corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the
proceeds therefrom, but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she
had already instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the subject property
to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12

In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the affirmative
defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue
on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also contended that the parties’ transactions in this case
were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and
instituted various suits covering the same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for
the payment of moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim. 15

On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for the reason that "the
facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their
dispute."17

However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for Intervention,18praying that
the investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal profession.19

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner issuedhis Report and
Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months. 21

On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion to withdraw did notserve as a bar
for the further consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
 39

same." Separately, the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary cases are
sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22

On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the good moral character
required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust
agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent.
In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the
above-stated penalty was recommended.23

In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an overriding prohibition
against any form of misconduct, viz.:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the factual circumstances
of each case.

Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case largely constitutes an
internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebecca’s motion to withdraw
filed in this case as well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject
property’s alleged disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to complywith the
demands of Rebecca – which she takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as well as
respondent’s acts of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from his own assertion of the
rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the Court’s
determination,for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca
even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the
real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent
of her inheritance x x x toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint
has no basis in fact and in law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of the
Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of "serious misconduct"
which would warrant its recommended penalty.1âwphi1

Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted,
mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own
claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed
himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's
reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as
a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by
 40

the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first
offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of
this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

11.Valdez v. Dabon AC No.7353 November 16, 2015 En Banc

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015

NELSON P. VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Nelson P. Valdez (Nelson) against Atty. Antolin Allyson M.
Dabon, Jr. (Atty. Dabon) anchored on the ground of grossly immoral and indecent conduct which transgressed the high
moral standards required for membership in the Bar.

The Position of the Complainant

Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals (CA), with gross
immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous relationship with his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia), which was
made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation.

In his Affidavit-Complaint,1 dated September 13, 2006, Nelson averred, among others, that he married Sonia on January
28, 1998 in Paniqui, Tarlac; that Sonia was employed as Court Stenographer of the CA from 1992 until her resignation on
May 15, 2006;2 that Sonia admitted to have had an adulterous and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon, from 2000 to
2006, a span of more than five years; that he came to know of the relationship only on April 18, 2006 after receiving an
anonymous text message hinting/stating about the existence of an illicit affair between the two; and that initially, Sonia
denied the affair but eventually broke down and admitted her sexual liaison with Atty. Dabon when confronted with a text
message he received from Atty. Jocelyn Dabon (Atty. Joy), the wife of the respondent, on May 4, 2006 at about 9:47
o'clock in the morning, which stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Nelson, Jun and I were separating I will file an annulment anytime soon, although I'm in great pain, I ask
for your apology and forgiveness for everything he is leaving for US and I hope he evolves into a strong
and mature person there. D cya masamang tao, just emotional and easily manipulated. Sana don't blame
him entirely bee. he is d type that never initiate things. He is passive and tame. He was honest with me
and I hope Sonia would find d courage to tell d truth to you. I just pray for peace and fresh start for all of us.
I just want to go on with my life and use above all these for my son's sake. I love jun and I appeal to you n
 41

asana wala ka maisip sa atin lahat. Just as I have accepted everything. Salamat sa panahon at
pangunawa. God bless.3cralawlawlibrary

Nelson also asserted that Sonia confessed her infidelity and described her extramarital affair with Atty. Dabon to have
been attended by sexual assaults and maintained through intimidation and threats of exposure, humiliation and
embarrassment.

In her own Affidavit,4 dated September 13, 2006 and attached to the complaint, Sonia narrated that her illicit relationship
with Atty. Dabon started sometime in November 2000 and ended in March 2006 when she, bothered by her conscience,
decided to break it off; that Atty. Dabon relentlessly pursued her for years and even admitted that he fell in love with her the
first time he laid eyes on her; that on November 13, 2000, Atty. Dabon lured her to what appeared to be a mere friendly
lunch date, managed to put sleep-inducing drug into her food or drink causing her to feel drowsy and weak and, thereafter,
brought her to Victoria Court Motel where he sexually molested her while she was asleep; that she opted to keep silent
about the incident for fear of its adverse repercussions of shame and embarrassment to her and her family; that she
pleaded with Atty. Dabon to leave her and forget what had happened, but the respondent instead taunted her by laughing
at her misery; that since then, Atty. Dabon succeeded in having repeated carnal knowledge of her once or twice a week
through intimidation and threats; that Atty. Dabon threatened her that he would tell everyone that she had been playing
around with him, if she would not yield to his lascivious cravings; and that she suffered in silence for years and submitted
herself to the bestial desires of Atty. Dabon, until she even thought that she was in love with him.

Sonia further claimed that after years of living in deception and infidelity, she decided to call it quits with Atty. Dabon
sometime in March 2006 but he could not let go of their relationship; that Atty. Dabon started pestering and threatening her
through phone calls and handwritten messages in vile attempts to persuade her to continue their illicit affair; that despite
their break-up, Atty. Dabon still pursued his lustful quest by bringing her to Anito Motel, along Quirino Avenue on March 10,
2006, but she foiled his plan when she went ballistic prompting the respondent to drive her back to the CA; that on March
13, 2006, Atty. Dabon forcibly boarded her car and pleaded for forgiveness and reconciliation but she remained firm in her
resolve to end the affair; that she had to seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty. Heiddi Venecia Barrozo (Atty.
Barrozo) and Atty. Aileen T. Ligot (Atty. Ligot), just to convince Atty. Dabon to alight from her car as the said incident had
already drawn the attention of several employees within the vicinity of the CA parking lot; that Atty. Dabon used the
members of his staff to relay his messages and deliver his handwritten letters to her; that Atty. Dabon, angered by her
repeated rejection, went berserk and sent her a letter which stated, among others, that he could no longer stand her
constant avoidance of him and that he would divulge their illicit relationship to her husband; that it numbed her with fright,
so she called Atty. Joy, without disclosing her identity, and told her that Atty. Dabon was harassing an employee at the CA;
that Atty. Dabon sent a text message to Nelson telling him of the extramarital affair; that Atty. Joy called up Nelson and
informed him that her husband, Atty. Dabon, had confessed to her the illicit relationship; and that when she was asked by
Nelson, she initially denied the affair for fear of reprisal but, afterwards, admitted the truth and explained to him that sh e
was merely a victim of Atty. Dabon's threat and intimidation which led to their illicit relationship.

Nelson further stated that Atty. Dabon's willful, flagrant and shameless conduct was in gross defiance of the customs,
values and sense of morality of the community. He prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Dabon whose immoral acts showed
his lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor and, hence, unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. Nelson alleged that he had previously filed an administrative complaint for "Gross Immorality" against Atty. Dabon
before the CA.

Together with Sonia's Affidavit, Nelson also attached to his Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment, the Joint
Affidavit5 executed by Atty. Barrozo and Atty. Ligot on May 19, 2006; the Affidavit 6 of Virginia D. Ramos (Ramos), dated
May 19, 2006; and the Affidavit7 of Marie Iris Magdalene Minerva (Minerva), dated May 22, 2006, wherein the said affiants
corroborated the declaration of Sonia in her affidavit.

The Position of Atty. Dabon

Respondent Atty. Dabon strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming that the same was baseless and unfounded
and that the complaint for disbarment was merely calculated to harass, annoy and besmirch his reputation.

In his Comment,8 Atty. Dabon denied the charges of grossly immoral and unlawful acts through sexual assaults, abuses,
 42

threats and intimidation. He posited that the allegations of spouses Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits were
nothing but pure fabrication solely intended to malign his name and honor. In support of his prayer for the dismissal of the
present disbarment case, Atty. Dabon proffered the following arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

First, complainant Nelson had no personal knowledge of the alleged illicit relationship between him and Sonia. He relied
heavily on the sworn statement of Sonia which was replete with inconsistencies and incredible and preposterous claims
which defied logic and common sense, thus, revealing the fallacy of the subject complaint. He contended that it was highly
improbable for him, a married lawyer at that, to suddenly turn crazy and abandon all cares just to satisfy his purported
lustful hungerness by sexually assaulting Sonia, "an ordinary plain-looking 43-year old woman with two (2) teen aged
children."9

Second, nowhere in the administrative complaint of Nelson previously filed before the CA was there any mention of any
sexual assault he allegedly committed against Sonia or of an adulterous relationship that was maintained through threats
and intimidation. Surprisingly, such allegations were included in the present complaint for disbarment. He also pointed out
that Nelson did not attach to his administrative complaint before the CA the September 13, 2006 Affidavit of Sonia
containing grave imputations against him. Such omissions were indicative that the serious charges against him were mere
concoctions and afterthoughts designed to attain Nelson's desire to come up with a graver accusation against him. The
filing of the complaint for disbarment was motivated by vengeance against him as Nelson was consummed by his
suspicion that he had seduced Sonia which led to the deterioration of their marriage. He was a victim caught in the
crossfire between the troubled couple, Nelson and Sonia.

Third, there was no truth to Sonia's allegation that he was attracted to her from the first time he saw her much less pursued
her relentlessly. He and Sonia were just close friends. He was Sonia's confidante. She would usually confide in him her
personal woes and problems especially those concerning her husband, Nelson. It was Sonia who aggressively sought his
companionship and frequented his office, bringing food, fruits and other goodies. The said visits were attested to by Mary
Jane Tulalian and Imelda Adan in their respective affidavits, 10 both dated April 30, 2008. His friendship with Sonia turned
sour when she learned of his plan to settle for good in the Unites States with his family. Sonia began to avoid him. He
exerted efforts to make her understand his decision, but to no avail.

Fourth, the cards expressing Sonia's affection towards him as well as the expensive gifts she gave him belied her claim
that she was sexually assaulted and that she resisted his alleged sexual advances.

Fifth, it was unlikely that Sonia would not tell anyone the grave injustice and abuses that she allegedly suffered in his
hands or report the matter to the police considering her length of service in the Judiciary and her familiarity on how the
criminal justice system worked.

Sixth, he denied Nelson's allegation that he confessed to his wife, Atty. Joy, his illicit relationship with Sonia. He also
denied that the alleged text messages, quoted by Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits, were sent by him or his
wife. All were part of an elaborate scheme to force him to immediately resign as Division Clerk of Court from the CA.

Lastly, it was not true that he harassed Sonia through text messages and phone calls. It was he who was the victim of
harassment from Nelson, who orchestrated a series of events that compelled him to leave the country earlier than
scheduled for fear that an untoward incident might happen to him.

On August 15, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.11

After the parties had submitted their respective verified position papers, Investigating Commissioner Manuel T. Chan
(Investigating Commissioner Chan) of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) rendered his Report and
Recommendation,12 dated October 2, 2008, finding that the charge against respondent Atty. Dabon had been sufficiently
proven. The recommendatory portion of the report reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, this Commissioner, after a thorough and exhaustive review of the facts and applicable
legal provisions, recommends that respondent be found guilty of gross immoral conduct and, accordingly,
be disbarred and dropped from the Roll of Attorneys.13cralawlawlibrary
 43

On December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the recommendation and issued
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-653, the pertinent portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct, Atty.
Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED and his name be stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

Atty. Dabon filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-653, but it was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XX-2012-550,15 dated December 14, 2012.

After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard
the Bar's integrity,16 and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard
the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the
court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. 17

The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit18 that "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards." Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or
private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant suspension or disbarment.19

In the case at bench, the Court subscribes to the IBP's opinion that there was substantial evidence showing that Atty.
Dabon did have an illicit relationship with Nelson's legal wife.

To begin with, the Court notes from the respondent's Comment that he appeared to be perplexed as to whether or not he
would admit his extramarital liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan stated in his report, Atty. Dabon
interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at the same time, he seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit
affair only that it was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also observed that he devoted
considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat
or intimidation was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself.

In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of substantial facts in
the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where
a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are
literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted.20 It is clear
from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his denial only pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a
categorical denial thereof, he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.

More telling of the existence of a romantic relationship are the notes and cards 21 that Sonia sent to Atty. Dabon containing
personal and intimate messages in her own handwriting. The messages conveyed Sonia's affection towards him as she
even referred to him as "hon" or "honey." There were also gifts she gave him on special occasions such as signature
shoes, watch and shirts. It also appeared that Sonia frequently visited him in his office either to bring him food, fruits and
other goodies or to invite him to lunch which apparently displayed her emotional attachment to him. Curiously, the
 44

foregoing was never refuted by Sonia. Such "ego-boosting admissions"22 of Atty. Dabon indeed proved that a consensual
relationship between him and Sonia existed.

It has not escaped the Court's attention either that Atty. Dabon really tried hard to win back Sonia because he could not let
go of their relationship, even to the point of pestering her with his persistent pleas for reconciliation. In one instance, Atty.
Dabon boarded Sonia's car and refused to alight unless she would talk to him. Sonia had to seek the assistance of her
officemates, Atty. Barrazo and Atty. Ligot, who pleaded with him to alight from the vehicle. Moreover, Atty. Dabon made
several attempts to communicate with Sonia in the hope of rekindling their relationship through letters and phone calls but
she remained firm in her stand to avoid him. Such incident was recounted by Ramos and Minerva in their respective
affidavits.

Incidentally, vis-a-vis Nelson's overwhelming evidence of said harassments, he offered only denials which was
self-serving and weak under the law on evidence. Other than his general claim that Atty. Barrazo, Atty. Ligot, Ramos, and
Minerva were biased witnessess because they were former officemates of Sonia, the respondent did not even bother to
proffer his own version of the supposed harassment incidents.

In light of the above disquisition, the Court finds Sonia's allegation that the illicit relationship was made possible by sexual
assaults and maintained through threat and intimidations, to be untrue. Certainly, a sexually abused woman could not be
expected to lavish her oppressor with expensive gifts or pay him affectionate compliments or words of endearment. The
natural reaction of a victim of a sexual molestation would be to avoid her ravisher. In this case, however, it appeared that
Sonia continually remained in the company of Atty. Dabon for more than five years, even inviting him for lunch-outs and
frequenting his office to bring food whenever the latter was preoccupied with his workload and could not go out with her to
eat. Verily, Sonia's actuations towards Atty. Dabon are in stark contrast to the expected demeanor of one who had been
repeatedly sexually abused.

Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never reported the alleged sexual abuse to the police, if such was the truth.
She could have placed the respondent behind bars and put an end to her claimed misery. Also, the Court cannot lend
credence to Sonia's claim that she merely succumbed to the respondent's sexual advances because of his continuous
threats of public exposure and humiliation. It must be stressed that Atty. Dabon would be in a much more precarious
situation if he would carry out such threats, as this would exposed himself to countless criminal and administrative charges.
The Court believes that Nelson's allegation of sexual assaults and continuing threat and intimidation was not established
by clear preponderant evidence. The Court is left with the most logical conclusion that Sonia freely and wittingly entered
into an illicit and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon sans any threat and intimidation.

Consequently, the Court quotes with approval the following observations of Investigating Commissioner Chan on this
score, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sorting out the maze of technicalities, denials and evasions of the respondent as well as the oftentimes
exaggerated language of complainant or his wife, Sonia, and the self-exculpatory declarations of Sonia,
this Commissioner considers the following facts as established:

1. Respondent and Sonia are both married, not to each other, but to other persons, and each is
aware of this fact, or should have known such fact at the start of their illicit relationship because
they were officemates at that time;

2. Respondent and Sonia engaged in an intimate and sexual relationship, intermittent perhaps, for a
period of about six years starting 2000 up to 2006;

3. Respondent and Sonia, despite protestations of Sonia that respondent assaulted her using drugs
and employing threats and blackmail to maintain the relationship, appeared to have entered into
such illicit relationship voluntarily and also appeared to have been fueled by their deep emotional
needs, if not mutual lust, as shown by the fact that the illicit relationship lasted for six long years;

4. Respondent and Sonia, despite the protestation of Sonia to the contrary, were not really ready to
give up the illicit relationship even if they were fully aware of its immorality or its devastating effect
 45

on their respective marriages and careers as shown by the fact that both respondent and Sonia
did not voluntarily confess to their respective spouses their dark secret, but were only discovered
by complainant through other channels.23

cralawlawlibrary

For what ethical breaches then may Atty. Dabon be held liable?

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.cralawlawlibrary

Morality in our liberal society today is probably a far cry from what it used to be. Notwithstanding this permissiveness,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution.24 Indeed, those who have taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice
should be more possessed of the consciousness and the will to overcome the weakness of the flesh.

It has been repeatedly held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral.25 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community.26

In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife showed his moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It manifested his disrespect for the laws on the
sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, he has fallen below the moral bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a
disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
of marriage are considered disgraceful and immoral as they manifest deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 27

In Advincula v. Macabata,28 the Court elucidated as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer
found guilty of misconduct. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Xxx. "When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of
disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the
integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. Disciplinary proceedings
are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important
function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an
erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice,
but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence
of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his
brethren in the profession and to the public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of
misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
 46

member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or
suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only
justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's
unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of
the offense should also be considered.cralawlawlibrary

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment, depending on the circumstances
of the case.29 In case of suspension, the period would range from one year 30 to indefinite suspension, as in the case
of Cordova v. Cordova,31 where the lawyer was found to have maintained an adulterous relationship for two years and
refused to support his family. On the other hand, there is a string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty
of disbarment, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In Toledo v. Toledo,32 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited
with another woman who had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,33 a lawyer was disbarred after the complainant proved that he had abandoned her and
maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. The Court declared that the respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,34 the respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three children,
lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a
foreign land.

In Dantes v. Dantes,35 disbarment was imposed as a penalty on the respondent lawyer who maintained illicit relationships
with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant. The Complainant's testimony, taken in
conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that the respondent breached the high and exacting
moral standards set for members of the law profession.

In Villatuya v. Tabalingcos,36 the respondent lawyer was disbarred because he was found to have entered into marriage
twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. The Court declared that he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.

In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's misconduct and unrepentant demeanor clearly showed a serious flaw in his character,
his moral indifference to the sanctity of marriage and marital vows, and his outright defiance of established norms. All
these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril.
Accordingly, the Court finds the need for the imposition of the extreme administrative penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. GUILTY of Gross Immorality, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law.

Let respondent's name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all court throughout the country with copies of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, CJ., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., cocnur.
 47

12. Ricafort v. Medina AC No. 5179 May 31,2016 En Banc

EN BANC

May 31, 2016

A.C. No. 5179

DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against respondent Atty. Rene 0. Medina on December 10,
1999.2

Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida
Street in Surigao City.3 Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped at
complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap complainant, and
then left.4

Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's car. 5 Complainant later
learned that the driver of the car was Atty. Rene 0. Medina, a provincial board member of Surigao del Norte. 6

According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated." 7 Respondent's act showed arrogance and
disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross misconduct. 8

Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit, 9 Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit, 10 and a letter11 dated October 27, 1999
signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte Chapter. In her
letter, Mayor Navarro stated that respondent slapped complainant and caused him great humiliation. 12 Thus, respondent
should be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of authority:

Dear Mr. Chief Justice:

This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in Surigao City, committed
by Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina.

The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort, a tricycle driver, causing great
humiliation on the person. We believe that such conduct is very unbecoming of an elected official.
Considering the nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted that appropriate action be
taken on the matter as such uncalled for abuse consists of gross misconduct and abuse of authority.

Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the Municipal Mayors League of
Surigao del Norte.

Thank you very much for your attention and more power.
 48

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13

(Emphasis in the original)

Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in
Surigao Del Norte.14 In his Comment, 15 respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the incident happened
while he was bringing his 10-year-old son to school. 16 He further alleged that complainant's reckless driving caused
complainant's tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's car. 17 When respondent alighted from his car to check the
damage, complainant approached him in an unfriendly manner. 18 Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend
himself. 19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move against his son and himself, respondent asked
complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic officer. 20 Both parties agreed that they
were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a sketch. 21 No traffic officer was present during the
incident.22

Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on radio programs by the Provincial
Governor's allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver. 23 He alleged that complainant's Affidavit was caused to be
prepared by the Provincial Governor as it was prepared in the English language, which was unknown to
complainant.24 Respondent was identified with those who politically opposed the Provincial Governor. 25

According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out of the incident during the
conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Washington, Surigao City. 26During the
proceedings, respondent explained that he pushed complainant because of fear that complainant was carrying a weapon,
as he assumed tricycle drivers did.27 On the other hand, complainant explained that he went near respondent to check if
there was damage to respondent's car.28 As part of the settlement, respondent agreed to no longer demand any indemnity
for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car.29

Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification 30 dated October 27, 2006 of the Officer-in-Charge Punong
Barangay stating that the case had already been mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was amicably
settled by the parties.31

On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation.32

Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 20, 2007.33
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted the
Certification from Barangay Washington, Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had already been
settled. 34

Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the reason why the complainant has not been
appearing in this case[.]"35 The Mandatory Conference was reset to September 21, 2007.36

In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent appeared. 37 Hence, the Commission
proceeded with the case exparte.38

In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for 60 days from notice for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:
 49

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for the suspension of Atty. Rene O. Medina
from the practice of law for a period of sixty ( 60) days from notice hereof due to misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to discredit the legal
profession. 40 (Emphasis in the original)

Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a slapping incident. 41 The
slapping incident was witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit attached
to complainant's complaint;42 and (2) the signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999 of the Surigao
Mayors who believed that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and should be held
administratively liable.43

On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the Resolution 44 adopting and
approving with modification Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A "; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and violation of Canon 7. 03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O. Medina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for thirty (30) days.45 (Emphasis in the original)

Respondent moved for reconsideration 46 of the Board of Governors' August 14, 2008 Resolution. The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Board of Governors in the Resolution47 dated March 22, 2014.

We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held administratively liable.

There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.

Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened. 48 He stresses complainant's seeming
disinterest in and lack of participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative case is politically motivated. 49

It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with
baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if allegations of misconduct are
established.50 A lawyer is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the presumption
that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath.51 Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant to prove his
or her claim.52

In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of evidence, 53 or evidence that is
superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the other."54

In this case, complainant discharged this burden.

During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors also adoptedfound that the slapping incident actually occurred. 55

The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized Affidavit;56complainant's
Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit57 of a traffic aide present during the incident. It was even
the traffic aide who informed complainant of respondent's plate number. 58

In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,59 Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the letter sent by the
League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal profession eroded" 60 because of respondent's act of
slapping complainant.61 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this
finding.
 50

The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's allegations. Contrary to
respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced complainant's credibility and
motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects the
public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.

The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers who are no longer fit for
the profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and harassment committed by its officers.

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a character that disregards the
human dignity of another.1awp++i1 Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?"

("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying,
harassment, and discrimination.

This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the
nobility of the profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to serve the public, not to
bully them to submission.

Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. 62 This Court has the power to impose disciplinary sanctions to
lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them unworthy to remain
officers of the court. 63

This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. 64 They are neither
civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a matter of
public interest and as a means to determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a court officer.
In Tiaya v. Gacott:65

Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 66

As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere witnesses. They are not
indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of administrative liability that are important
in disciplinary proceedings. 67

Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a bar against a
finding of administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are ADOPTED and APPROVED. Respondent
Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent as attorney, and be furnished to the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.
 51

13.Vazquez v. Lim AC No. 9492 July 11,2016

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9492, July 11, 2016

PLUTARCO E. VAZQUEZ, Complainants, v. ATTY. DAVID LIM QUECO KHO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

This case for disbarment was filed by complainant Plutarco E. Vazquez (Vazquez) against respondent Atty. David Lim
Queco Kho (Atty. Kho). In his verified Complaint1 filed with this Court on 11 July 2012, Vazquez alleges that Atty. Kho
violated the lawyer's oath that he "will do no falsehood. 2" He further claims that respondent transgressed Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.3chanrobleslaw

FACTS

Vazquez and Atty. Kho were both members of the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (Coalition),
an accredited party-list group that participated in the national elections of 10 May 2010. The Complaint arose from an
allegedly false statement made in respondent's Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination for the Coalition. Complainant
contested the truth of the statement made under oath that Atty. Kho was a natural-born Filipino citizen.4chanrobleslaw

In his Complaint, Vazquez asserted that respondent was a Chinese national. He reasoned that when Atty. Kho was born
on 29 April 1947 to a Chinese father (William Kho) and a Filipina mother (Juana Lim Queco), respondent's citizenship
followed that of his Chinese father pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. Moreover, Vazquez argued that since respondent
has elected Filipino citizenship, the act presupposed that the person electing was either an alien, of doubtful status, or a
national of two countries.5chanrobleslaw

Upon receipt of the Complaint, the Court through its First Division issued a Resolution6 dated 26 November 2012 requiring
Atty. Kho to file his comment on the Complaint within 10 days from receipt of the Notice. Alleging he received the Court's
Resolution on 18 February 2013, he filed his Comment 7 on 27 February 2013. As to the alleged falsity of his statement,
Atty. Kho countered that when he was born on 29 April 1947, his Filipina mother was not yet married to his Chinese father,
and that his parents only got married on 8 February 1977 or some 30 years after his birth. He then averred that according
to the 1935 Constitution, his citizenship followed that of his Filipina mother, and thus he was a natural-born Filipino
citizen.8chanrobleslaw

On the matter of his electing Filipino citizenship, respondent explained that since he was already a natural-born Filipino,
his subsequent election of Philippine citizenship on 25 February 1970 was superfluous and had no effect on his citizenship.
Having established his natural-born status, he concluded that he had not committed any falsehood in his Certificate of
Acceptance of Nomination, and that complainant had no cause of action to have him disbarred. 9chanrobleslaw

Apart from defending his natural-born status, Atty. Kho also moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of forum
shopping. He claimed that Vazquez had filed three (3) cases in which the latter raised the issue of respondent's citizenship:
(1) the present disbarment case; (2) a quo warranto proceeding with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); and (3) a criminal complaint for perjury lodged with the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Atty. Kho alleged that both
the quo warranto and the perjury cases had already been dismissed by the HRET 10 and the City Prosecutor
respectively.11 Finally, he raised jurisdictional questions, arguing that the proper remedy to attack his citizenship was not a
disbarment case, but rather quo warranto.12chanrobleslaw
 52

In answer to respondent's Comment, Vazquez filed with the Court a Reply to Comment 13 on 11 March 2013. He claimed
therein that at the time of election of Philippine citizenship by respondent on 25 February 1970, the latter's mother was
already a Chinese national by virtue of her marriage to respondent's father who was Chinese. Complainant also opposed
respondent's assertion that the latter's parents were not yet married when he was born on 29 April 1947. 14 Complainant
further cited respondent's Certificate of Live Birth, which stated that the latter's parents were married at the time he was
born.15chanrobleslaw

That being so, complainant averred that at the time Atty. Kho was born, his mother was already a Chinese national. Thus,
complainant concluded that respondent's election of Filipino citizenship was fatally defective, since the latter's parents
were both Chinese at the time of his election.16 Furthermore, complainant alleged that the marriage of respondent's
parents on 8 February 1977 was just a ploy to put a semblance of legitimacy to his prior election of Filipino citizenship.
Lastly, complainant denied the forum shopping charge, saying the three cases he had filed against respondent had
different causes of action and were based on different grounds.17chanrobleslaw

On 8 April 2013, the Court issued a Resolution referring the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. 18 At the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the
case was docketed as CBD Case No. 13-3885. Commissioner Victor Pablo C. Trinidad (Commissioner Trinidad) was
designated as investigating commissioner. In a Notice dated 14 August 2013, he set the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on 19 September 2013 and ordered the parties to submit their mandatory conference
briefs.19chanrobleslaw

With both parties present at the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing, Commissioner Trinidad ordered them to submit
their respective position papers within ten (10) days, after which the case would be deemed submitted for report and
recommendation.20 Only the respondent submitted a conference brief21 and position paper.22chanrobleslaw

IBP'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On 3 November 2013, Commissioner Trinidad promulgated his Report and Recommendation (Report) 23finding Atty. Kho
"innocent of the charges" and recommended that the case be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Upon weighing the
evidence presented by both parties, Commissioner Trinidad found no merit to the allegation that respondent had
committed dishonesty and deceitfulness when he indicated in his verified Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination that he
was a natural-born citizen.24chanrobleslaw

Commissioner Trinidad said that respondent Atty. Kho, as a natural-born Filipino citizen, fell under the category of
someone who was born of a Filipino mother before 17 January 1973, and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.25cralawred On the matter of jurisdiction, the IBP-CBD said that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter,
since the issue was whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath and the relevant provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Although it acknowledged that citizenship cannot be attacked collaterally, it ruled that it had to make a
finding thereon, since the alleged dishonesty hinged on that very matter. The IBP-CBD clarified though, that its ruling was
limited and "cannot strip or sustain the respondent of his citizenship." 26chanrobleslaw

Lastly, the IBP-CBD found Vazquez guilty of forum shopping since in all the three cases he had filed, he was questioning
whether or not respondent was a natural-born citizen. It said that the actions filed by complainant involved the same
transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances, as well as identical subject matter and issues. 27chanrobleslaw

On 10 August 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-519, which adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case against Atty. Kho.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

We adopt and approve the IBP Report and Recommendation and dismiss the instant administrative case against
respondent for lack of merit.

This disbarment case centers on whether Atty. Kho violated his lawyer's oath that he shall do no falsehood and that he
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. According to complainant, a violation occurred when
 53

respondent declared in his verified Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Although the question of one's citizenship is not open to collateral attack,28 the Court acknowledges the IBP-CBD's
pronouncement that it had to make a limited finding thereon, since the alleged dishonesty hinged on this issue.

We have constantly ruled that an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity.29 A disbarment case is definitely not the proper venue to attack someone's citizenship. For the lack of any ruling
from a competent court on respondent's citizenship, this disbarment case loses its only leg to stand on and, hence, must
be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant Administrative Complaint for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility filed against Atty. David Lim Queco Kho is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.cLeonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

14. Dumanlag v. Blanco AC No. 8825 August 3, 2016

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8825, August 03, 2016

BUDENCIO DUMANLAG, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME M. BLANCO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before this Court is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment against respondent Atty. Jaime M. Blanco for rejecting
complainant's claim over a parcel of land based on a Spanish Title.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 79146,1 El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc. (EMIDCI) appears to
be the registered owner of the land it occupies at the corner of Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard and C. de Dios Street in
Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property).

Complainant Budencio Dumanlag sent a letter dated 9 August 2010 to EMIDCI's President, Victoriano Chung, claiming to
be an agent of the Heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro (the Heirs of San Pedro) based on a Special Power of Attorney dated
14 October 1999.2 Complainant asserted that the Heirs of San Pedro, and not EMIDCI, owned the Sampaloc property,
predicating such claim on a Spanish Title, Titulo de Propriedad No. (T.P.) 4136.3 He further stated in the letter that the
Heirs of San Pedro were selling the Sampaloc property, and that he had given EMIDCI the option to buy it.

Victoriano Chung referred the matter to EMIDCI's counsel, respondent 4 Atty. Jaime M. Blanco, Jr. (Atty. Blanco), who
rejected the claim. In a letter5 dated 16 August 2010, the latter explained that the Supreme Court had declared T.P. 4136
null and void in Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals. 6 Demand was made
on Dumanlag and his principals to cease and desist from further harassing EMIDCI.

Complainant sent another letter to Mr. Chung dated 1 September 2010.7 While acknowledging the Court's decision, the
former alleged that Intestate Estate excluded the Heirs of San Pedro from the enumeration of persons prohibited from
selling lands covered by T.P. 4136, including the Sampaloc property.
 54

Atty. Blanco rejected complainant's claim once more through another letter 8 dated 13 September 2010. He reasoned that
the Supreme Court Decision held that the heirs were specifically prohibited from exercising any act of ownership over the
lands covered by T.P. 4136.

On 22 October 2010, complainant filed this administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Blanco, alleging that Mr.
Chung was a squatter on the Sampaloc Property and Atty. Blanco had unjustly prevented the exercise of complainant's
rights over the same.9chanrobleslaw

In his Verified Comment,10 Atty. Blanco alleged that the Complaint was frivolous, unfounded and retaliatory. He averred,
among others, that complainant, in his second demand letter to Mr. Chung, had attached two draft pleadings. The first was
a draft petition for certiorari against the latter;11 the second, a draft complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Blanco.12 According to respondent, these drafts were meant to intimidate him and Mr. Chung. True enough, after Atty.
Blanco sent his second letter to complainant, the latter filed with the Court of Appeals the draft petition, which was later
dismissed. Complainant subsequently filed the Complaint for Disbarment.

Atty. Blanco also moved that the Court direct complainant to show cause why the latter should not be cited for indirect
contempt. Respondent stated that Intestate Estate declared in its fallo that agents of the Heirs of San Pedro were
disallowed from exercising any act of ownership over lands covered by T.P. 4136.

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER

Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) rendered a Report and
Recommendation13 for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the complaint
was patently frivolous, and 2) it was intended to harass respondent. He recommended that the Court issue an order
directing complainant Dumanlag to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. 14chanrobleslaw

The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-418 adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the investigating commissioner.15chanrobleslaw

No petition for review has been filed with this Court.

RULING OF THE COURT

The Complaint must be dismissed for utter lack of merit.

A lawyer is charged with the duty to defend "the cause of his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion."16 Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility circumscribes this duty with the limitation that lawyers
shall perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law. 17 In this case, Atty. Blanco performed this duty to his client
without exceeding the scope of his authority.

As early as 1996, this Court declared in Intestate Estate that T.P. 4136 was null and void.18 In said case, the Heirs of San
Pedro claimed ownership of a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares on the basis of a Spanish title, Titulo de
Propriedad Numero 4136 dated 25 April 1894. The claim covered lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal,
Laguna and Quezon, and even cities in Metro Manila such as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and
City of Manila.

This Court dubbed the theory of the petitioners therein as "the most fantastic land claim in the history of the
Philippines."19 In discarding the claim, We relied on Presidential Decree No. 892, which abolished the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and directed all holders of Spanish Titles to cause their lands to be
registered under the Land Registration Act within six months from date of effectivity of the law or until 16 August 1976. The
Heirs of San Pedro failed to adduce a certificate of title under the Torrens system that would show that T.P. 4136 was
brought under the operation of P.D. 892. We therefore declared that the T. P. was null and void, and that no rights could be
derived therefrom.

Given the nullity of T.P. 4136, the claim of the Heirs of San Pedro against EMIDCI has no legal basis. On the other hand,
 55

the records reveal that the Sampaloc property is registered in the name of EMIDCI as TCT 79146 under the Torrens
system. As such, the TCT enjoys a conclusive presumption of validity. 20chanrobleslaw

Hence, complainant had a baseless claim, which Atty. Blanco correctly resisted. In writing the two letters rejecting
complainant's claim, he merely acted in defense of the rights of his client. In doing so, he performed his duty to EMIDCI
within the bounds of law.

Consequently, there was no misconduct to speak of on the part of Atty. Blanco. In fact, he should even be commended as
he remained steadfast, in maintaining the cause of his client even as he was subjected to harassment. As will be
discussed below, complainant, in his second demand letter, threatened Atty. Blanco with the filing of a disbarment case.

Complainant maliciously filed the

complaint.

As a rule, a complainant should not be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate. 21 But the rule applies only if the
right is exercised in good faith.22 When a groundless complaint is filed in bad faith, the Court has ' to step in and penalize
the erring complainant.23chanrobleslaw

The policy of insulation from intimidation and harassment encourages lawyers to stay their course and perform their duties
without fear.24 They are better able to function properly and ultimately contributes "to the efficient delivery and proper
administration of justice."25cralawred On the other hand, failure to shield lawyers from baseless suits serves "only to
disrupt, rather than promote, the orderly administration of justice."26chanrobleslaw

In this case, complainant knew fully well that his complaint was totally unfounded. We note that he acknowledged the
existence of Our ruling in Intestate Estate, in his second letter to Chung. Complainant unquestionably knew of the nullity of
the Spanish title in favor of his principals; yet, he insisted on his unfounded claim by sending a second demand letter to
Chung. Complainant even had the audacity to state that Intestate Estate excluded the Heirs of San Pedro from the
enumeration of persons prohibited from selling lands covered by T.P. 4136. The dispositive portion of the Decision clearly
states that the heirs, as well as the agents of the estate of San Pedro, were enjoined from exercising any act of dominion
over the lands covered by T.P. 4136. At this juncture, it is appropriate to quote the pertinent portion of the fallo of the
Decision, which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x

(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership or
to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them
are in possession thereof.

Given the above considerations, the Complaint filed against respondent is nothing but an attempt to intimidate, harass and
coerce him into acceding to the demands of complainant. This is the only logical conclusion that can be derived from the
filing of a Complaint for Disbarment that is baseless — a fact that complainant was very much aware of.

Complainant even admitted during the mandatory conference before the investigating commissioner that he had attached
the draft of the administrative complaint against respondent to his second letter to Mr. Chung.27 Undoubtedly, the
attachment of the draft complaint to the letter was meant to intimidate Atty. Blanco. It was a threat should he reject the
demand of Dumanlag.

The penalty for filing a malicious complaint varies from censure to a fine as high as P5,000.

In Lim v. Antonio,28 the Court censured the complainant who was motivated by revenge and bad faith when he filed an
unfounded complaint for disbarment against the respondent lawyer. In Scares, Jr. v. Gonzales-Alzate, 29 we likewise
censured the complainant for filing a disbarment complaint that was similarly motivated.
 56

For the filing of an unfounded complaint against a clerk of court, the Court issued a stern warning to the complainant
lawyer in Dela Victoria v. Orig-Maloloy-on.30The latter was found to have been in contempt of court and was fined in the
amount of P2,000.

The Court imposed a stiffer penalty of P5,000 on the complainant attorneys in Prieto v. Corpuz31 and Arnado v.
Suarin. Their complaints against a judge and a court sheriff, respectively, were found to be groundless.

Considering the circumstances present in this case, complainant appears to be devious, persistent and incorrigible, such
that mere censure as penalty would not suffice. He has trifled with the Court, using the judicial process as an instrument to
willfully pursue a nefarious scheme. The imposition of a P5,000 fine is appropriate.

Complainant Defied the Order in

Intestate Estate.

For making a demand on EMIDCI to recognize the claim of ownership of the Heirs of San Pedro, complainant appears to
have disobeyed the order of the Court in Intestate Estate, insofar as the Court enjoined agents of the estate from
exercising any act of possession or ownership over the lands covered by the T.P. For this reason, the Court finds it
appropriate to direct the complainant to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt for failing to comply
with the order given in that Decision. Indirect contempt is committed when there is "[disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court." 33chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to: (a) DISMISS the administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jaime M.
Blanco for utter lack of merit; (b) IMPOSE a FINE of P5,000 on complainant Budencio Dumanlag for filing a malicious
complaint; and (c) DIRECT complainant to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be cited for indirect contempt for failing to
comply with our final and executory Decision dated 18 December 1996, insofar as it enjoins agents of the Estate of
Mariano San Pedro from exercising acts of possession or ownership or to otherwise dispose of any land covered by T. P.
4136.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

15. Cruz v. Reyes AC No. 9090 August 31,2016

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9090, August 31, 2016

TEODORO B. CRUZ, JR., Complainant, v. ATTYS. JOHN G. REYES, ROQUE BELLO AND CARMENCITA A.
ROUS-GONZAGA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration1 of the Resolution2 of the Court dated 22 August 2012 finding respondent Atty. John
G. Reyes guilty of "negligence of contumacious proportions" and suspending him from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year.

The Facts

The present case arose out of a petition for disbarment filed by Atty. Teodoro B. Cruz, Jr. (complainant) charging
respondent Atty. John G. Reyes (respondent) with intentional misrepresentation, knowingly handling a case involving
 57

conflict of interest, falsification, knowingly alleging untruths in pleadings and unethical conduct, based on the following
incidents:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryThe First Incident

(Intentional Misrepresentation and Knowingly Handling a Case Involving Conflict of Interest)

Complainant alleged that respondent entered his appearance as counsel for Mayor Rosito Velarde (Mayor Velarde) of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, in an election protest case that was on appeal before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The case, entitled "Racquel 'BIBI' Reyes de Guzman, Protestant, versus Mayor Rosito Velarde, Protestee,"
originated from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calabanga, Branch 63, Camarines Sur. According to the petition for
disbarment, "an incident occurred" in the course of the trial which forced Mayor Velarde to bring an incident up to the
COMELEC on certiorari.3chanrobleslaw

While the case was being tried at the RTC level, protestant Raquel Reyes De Guzman (De Guzman) was represented by
the Sales Law Office of Naga City, although Atty. Roque Bello (Atty. Bello), who indicated in the pleadings that his address
is in Cainta, Rizal, was the chief counsel. Mayor Velarde, on the other hand, was represented by Atty. Gualberto Manlagnit
(Atty. Manlagnit) from Naga City. Atty. Manlagnit prepared the pleadings in connection with the appeal to the COMELEC
but, according to complainant, unknown to Atty. Manlagnit, another pleading was filed before the COMELEC, which
pleading was apparently prepared in Cainta, Rizal but was signed by respondent whose given address is in Quezon
City.4chanrobleslaw

Complainant explained that De Guzman used to be allied with former Speaker Arnulfo Fuentebella (Speaker Fuentebella)
under the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) party, whereas Mayor Velarde was a member of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) party, led by Camarines Sur Governor Luis R. Villafuerte (Gov. Villafuerte). The
Fuentebellas and the Villafuertes are known to be politically at odds with each other. However, De Guzman subsequently
changed her political allegiance and became affiliated with the Villafuertes by transferring to the LDP party. Mayor Velarde,
on the other hand, became an ally of the Fuentebellas under the NPC. 5chanrobleslaw

According to complainant, Atty. Bello agreed to represent De Guzman in the election pro

test case because she was a political ally of Speaker Fuentebella. Complainant emphasized that Atty. Bello has always
represented the political interests of the Fuentebellas. There is, therefore, no doubt that Atty. Bello is the lawyer of the
Fuentebellas.6 As a result, with the sudden shifting of the political loyalty of De Guzman and Mayor Velarde, Atty. Bello
suddenly stopped appearing for De Guzman in the protest case without formally withdrawing as her counsel. 7 Mayor
Velarde now had to be defended by Atty. Bello because he is already an ally of the Fuentebellas. However, Atty. Bello
cannot actively defend Mayor Velarde because he appeared for De Guzman before the RTC. 8 Thus, complainant
concluded, Atty. Bello found the expedient of passing the case to his clandestine partner, respondent Atty. Reyes, making
the latter guilty of representing conflicting interests,9 in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Second Incident

(Falsification, Knowingly Alleging Untruths in Pleadings and Unethical Conduct)

On or before 15 December 2003, former Speaker Fuentebella filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Congressman of
the 3rd District of Camarines Sur. Complainant also filed a COC for the same position. Subsequently, a certain Ebeta P.
Cruz (Ebeta) and a certain Marita Montefalcon Cruz-Gulles (Marita) likewise filed their respective COCs for the
aforementioned position. The former is an indigent laundry woman from San Jose, Camarines Sur, while the latter was a
former casual laborer of the municipal government of Tigaon, Camarines Sur. 10 Clearly, both Ebeta Marita had no real
intention of running for the position for which they filed their COC, but were merely instigated to do so in order to confuse
the electorate of the district, to the disadvantage of complainant. Consequently, complainant filed a petition to declare
Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates.11chanrobleslaw

In connection with the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates, complainant filed a Memorandum with
the COMELEC through the Office of the Camarines Sur Provincial Election Supervisor (PES). Pertinent portions of the
Memorandum were quoted by the complainant in his petition for disbarment, 12 to wit:
 58

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. Complainant received a copy of the Verified Answer of Marita signed by respondent as
counsel, whose given address is in Quezon City;

2. From the Answer, it was made to appear that Marita caused the preparation thereof, read the allegations therein
contained, and understood them. It was also made to appear that Marita signed the verification;

3. During the hearing at the PES in San Jose, Pili, Camarines Sur, on 23 January 2004, respondent appeared
and:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

a.) on record, admitted that the signature appearing on the Verified Answer is his;

b.) officially manifested that he was hired by Marita as her counsel to prepare the Verified Answer;

c.) officially confirmed that the allegations in the Verified Answer were supplied by Marita;
and cralawlawlibrary

d.) said that Marita was in his office in Quezon City when she "signed" the Verified Answer.

4. Marita arrived at the hearing to file a formal withdrawal of her COC. She was immediately put on the witness stand
wherein she testified that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

a.) she did not know respondent;

b.) she never solicited his legal services, particularly, to file the Verified Answer;

c.) she never supplied the allegations contained in the Answer;

d.) the signature appearing in the Answer is not her signature; and cralawlawlibrary

e.) she could not have signed the verification in the Answer in Quezon City on 15 January 2004 because
she was in Bicol on that date.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The petition for disbarment also alleged that respondent admitted to Attys. Adan Marcelo Botor and Atty. Manlagnit -
complainant's counsels in the petition for disqualification before the PES-COMELEC — that Atty. Bello merely gave the
Verified Answer to him already signed and notarized. 14chanrobleslaw

For his part, respondent narrated the following version of the events:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAnent the first incident, respondent alleged that he first met Atty. Bello sometime in May, 2003
when the latter was introduced to him by a friend. A few months after their meeting, Atty. Bello called him up to ask if he
could handle a case to be filed with the COMELEC since Atty. Bello had so many cases to handle. The case would be to
secure a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction from the
COMELEC.15chanrobleslaw

According to respondent, he informed Atty. Bello that he has never before handled an election case, much less one with
an application for a TRO with Preliminary Injunction. Atty. Bello assured him that things would be difficult at first, but he
would assist respondent and things will tuna out easier. Due to the assurance given and his desire for a more
comprehensive experience in law practice, respondent agreed to accept the case. Since he made it clear from the start
that he has no knowledge or experience in election cases, he was never part of the preparations in connection with the
case. Atty. Bello simply called him up for a meeting when the pleading was ready so that he could sign the same. They
agreed to meet somewhere in Timog, Quezon City and after he read the pleading and sensing that there was no problem,
he signed the same inside Atty. Bello's car. Thereafter, he attended the initial hearing of the case, during which, the parties
were required to submit their respective Memoranda.16chanrobleslaw

Respondent claimed that up to that point, there were no indications about the true nature of the case. However, when he
was preparing the required Memorandum, he found telltale signs. After his two appearances before the COMELEC and
 59

the submission of the Memorandum, respondent declared that he never knew what happened to the case as he formally
withdrew therefrom immediately upon knowing the circumstances of the case. He maintained that he cannot be held guilty
of representing conflicting interests because he never handled any previous case involving either of the parties in the
COMELEC case. Moreover, he was not properly apprised of the facts and circumstances relative to the case that would
render him capable of intelligently deciding whether or not to accept the case. He likewise did not receive a single centavo
as attorney's, acceptance or appearance fees in connection with the case. He agreed to handle the same simply to
accommodate Atty. Bello and to improve his skills as a lawyer and never for monetary considerations. 17chanrobleslaw

With respect to the second incident, respondent related that he was at home in Pangasinan on 17 January 2004 when he
received a call from Atty. Bello asking him to attend a hearing in Camarines Sur. He declined the request three times due
to his tight schedule. Atty. Bello pleaded, saying that even on Saturdays, hearings could be scheduled. Thus, even if he
did not want to attend the hearing due to its distance and because of his full calendar, he could not refuse because he
really did not schedule appointments and/or hearings on Saturdays. All that was told him regarding the case was that a
congressional candidate was being disqualified and a lawyer is needed to defend him and his candidacy. Respondent
alleged that according to Atty. Bello, the candidate was qualified and financially capable of funding his campaign.
Nevertheless, he clarified from Atty. Bello if the candidate is not a nuisance candidate and Atty. Bello allegedly replied:
"Qualified na qualified naman talaga eh." Respondent added that it was not disclosed to him that the disqualification case
involved a candidate for the third congressional district of Camarines Sur. He was simply informed that the scheduled
hearing of the disqualification case would be on 23 January 2004 in Naga City. 18chanrobleslaw

Since respondent was in Pangasinan and due to the fact that the deadline for the filing of the necessary pleading was
nearing, Atty. Bello advised respondent that he would just prepare the Answer and sign for respondent's name in the
pleading. Respondent maintained that he would not have agreed to Atty. Bello's proposal, had it not been for the pressed
urgency, trusting that he would not get into any trouble.19chanrobleslaw

While waiting for the scheduled date of the hearing to arrive, he wondered why he has not been furnished a copy of the
pleading or given additional instructions relative to the case. Atty. Bello, in the meantime;, has ceased to communicate with
him and suddenly became inaccessible. He thus toyed with the impression that he was being left out of the case for
reasons he could not then understand.20chanrobleslaw

According to respondent, he was able to get a copy of the Answer only when he was already in Naga City and it was only
then and there, while reading it, that he realized that the case was, in reality, about a nuisance candidate and that the
client he was to appear for was, indeed, a nuisance candidate. What was even more surprising to him was that the copy of
the Answer that was given to him was unsigned: neither by him nor by his supposed client. It was likewise not notarized.
Finding the indefensibility of his client and in order not to make matters worse, he opted to appear and just submit the case
for resolution. To prove this point, respondent alleged that all he had with him for the hearing were only the unsigned and
unnotarized Answer, the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates, his case calendar and nothing else.
Fie had not in his person any evidence whatsoever in support of the defense of his client. Respondent added that even at
this point, he had no knowledge that his supposed client "had already jumped ship." More importantly, he did not know that
her signature on the Answer was forged, precisely because the copy of the Answer that1 was given to him was
unsigned.21chanrobleslaw

Before the start of the hearing, respondent started looking for his client but she could not be found. He, nevertheless,
proceeded to the hearing for it was immaterial to him whether she was present or not as ho had already planned to simply
submit the case for resolution. Unfortunately, respondent claimed, the proceedings before the PES started as a casual
conversation with the lawyers for herein complainant and went on to a full trial, "wittingly or unwittingly." 22chanrobleslaw

Respondent admitted that, during the hearing, he acknowledged; that the signature appearing on the Answer was his. He
alleged that despite his personal aversion and objection to certain allegations in the Answer, he could not anymore deny
the signature above his printed name, even if it was only signed for and in his behalf, because he had previously agreed,
although unwillingly, that his name be signed in the pleading. It, therefore, came as a surprise to him that of all the
questions that can be asked of him during the trial, he was questioned about his signature. Belatedly he realized that he
should have objected to the line of questioning as he was being presented as an unwilling witness for therein petitioner.
However, without sufficient exposure in the legal practice and wanting of the traits of a scheming lawyer, he failed to
seasonably object to the line of questioning.23chanrobleslaw
 60

Nevertheless, respondent vehemently denied complainant's allegation that he admitted having seen Marita sign the
document in his presence. According to him, he vividly recalls his response to the then query whether or not Marita signed
the document in his presence as: "I suppose that is her signature." Likewise, when queried further on the ideal that the
pleading should be signed by Marita in his presence as her counsel, he allegedly responded: "While it is the ideal,
sometimes we lawyers, like you and I, sign documents even if the client is not around due to our busy schedules." He
pointed out to the two lawyers of herein complainant that whether Marita signed the Answer in his presence or not is
inconsequential since he was not the notary public who notarized the Answer. He argued that his signature pertains to the
allegations in the Answer, while the signature of his client forms part of the verification and certification and that it is the
duty of the notary public to see to it that the person signing the pleading as a party is really the person referred to in the
verification/certification.24chanrobleslaw

Finally, respondent declared that except for the modest appearance, cum transportation fees that he received, there was
no monetary consideration for handling the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates. He explained that
when the case was offered to him, it was in haste and under a tenor of urgency that the only impression he got was that
the client was well-to-do and could wage a decent campaign and was really a qualified candidate. He repeated the words
of Atty. Bello: "qualified na qualifed sya." He emphasized that all he wanted was to expand his experience and practice as
a lawyer.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

In his report and recommendation dated 17 April 2007, Investigating Commissioner Edmund T. Espina found respondent
guilty of the charges against him and recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for one (1) month. The
report, in part, reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It taxes the undersigned Commissioner's imagination, however, that respondent disclaims any knowledge
in the above incidents and that he was just a "willing victim" of the rather scheming tactics of a fellow
lawyer, who, surprisingly he did not even thought (sic) of running after and holding liable, even after all
these charges filed against him. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that respondent himself had
knowledge of and allowed himself to be used by whoever should be properly held liable for these fraud
and misrepresentation.

As regards the second incident, respondent argues that he could not be held guilty of forgery,
misrepresentation, and other related offenses. x x x If at all, respondent was forced to unwittingly
represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the name of accommodation. Undersigned Commissioner disagrees.

Respondent violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent
should have evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be counsel for an unknown client. x x x

Undersigned Commissioner finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for the
various misrepresentations and later, admissions before the COMELEC when confronted with his
"supposed client", claiming that it was Arty. Roque [sic] who merely gave him instructions and whose
requests he merely accommodated. x x x

His shortcomings when he accepted to be a counsel for an unknown client in the COMELEC protest (first
incident) is in itself, already deplorable but to repeat the same infraction in the petition for disqualification
(in the second incident) constitutes negligence of contumacious proportions. It is even worse that
respondent has attempted to mitigate his liability by professing ignorance or innocence of the whole thing,
a matter that, too, is inexcusable. Clearly, it is a lame excuse that respondent did offer. By his own
confession, he was woefully negligent.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 19 September 2007, Resolution No. XVIII-2007-99 was passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) resolving to adopt and approve the above report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
It thereafter forwarded the report to: the Supreme Court as required under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.27chanrobleslaw

On 22 August 2012, the Court issued the questioned Resolution adopting the above-quoted findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner. The Court, however, increased the period of suspension from the recommended one (1)
month to one (1) year. The same Resolution also resolved to:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 61

xxxx

2. IMPLEAD Attys. Roque Bello and Carmencita A. Rous-Gonzaga in this administrative proceedings;
and cralawlawlibrary

3. REMAND the whole records of this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further Investigation,
report and recommendation with respect to the charges against ATTY. ROQUE BELLO and ATTY.
CARMENCITA A. ROUS-GONZAGA.

Respondent is now before us seeking a reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution insofar as the penalty imposed
against him is concerned.

Respondent points out that from the very start, he had been very candid as to the factual backdrop of the present case. He
never denied that he should have evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be a counsel for an unknown client. He
does not refute, nor does he argue against, the finding of the Commission on Bar Discipline that he was remiss in his
duties as a lawyer when he accommodated the requests of a fellow lawyer to represent an unknown client. However,
respondent argues, such negligence is not the negligence "of contumacious proportions" warranting the imposition of the
penalty of suspension. Likewise, such negligence is not tantamount to having knowledge of the alleged fraud and
misrepresentation, for the simple reason that he did not know the details of the election case until its hearing on 23
January 2004 in Naga City. He maintains that if such fraud and misrepresentation really exists, his "only fault was that he
allowed himself to be duped to unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the name of accommodation."

Our Ruling

We find respondent's motion for reconsideration partially meritorious.

Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or the suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the said administrative penalties 28 and the burden of proof rests upon the
complaint.29 "Preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has a greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
compared to the presented contrary evidence."30 In the case at bar, complainant failed to present clear and preponderant
evidence in support of his claim that respondent "knowingly" handled a case involving conflict of interest, "knowingly"
alleged untruths in pleadings, and that he "intentionally" committed misrepresentation and falsification.

In connection with the first incident, complainant alleged that respondent perpetrated acts constituting intentional
misrepresentation and knowingly handling a case involving conflict of interest when he appeared as counsel for Mayor
Velarde in the COMELEC case. Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts." Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of this rule is present in a given case, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the
same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's argument for one client has to be
opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer
would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous employment.31 (Emphasis omitted)

Based on the foregoing criteria, there must be a previous lawyer-client relationship in order for the liability to attach. Clearly,
respondent cannot be held liable under any of the three aforementioned tests because he was never a counsel for either
party in the COMELEC case prior to the filing of the said action. Complainant, however, would have us believe that
respondent is the "furtive" or "clandestine" partner of Atty. Bello so as to justify his accusation that respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests. Complainant, however, failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his allegation.
 62

The mere fact that respondent agreed to handle a case for Atty. Bello does not - alone - prove that they are indeed
partners. This Court is inclined to give more weight and credence to the explanation proffered by respondent: that is, he
accepted the case without being fully aware of the real facts and circumstances surrounding it. His narration is
straightforward enough to be worthy of belief, especially considering that he withdrew from the case after he realized its
true nature, as evidenced by the "Withdrawal as Counsel" 32 he filed before the COMELEC.

With respect to the charge of intentional misrepresentation, complainant failed to specify which act of respondent
constituted the alleged offense. If the alleged misrepresentation pertains to the act of respondent of signing the pleading
prepared by Atty. Bello, we do not agree with complainant and the same cannot be considered as misrepresentation since
respondent specified in his Comment that he read the pleading before he affixed his signature thereto. He was, therefore,
aware of the statements contained in the pleading and his act of signing the same signifies that he agreed to the
allegations therein contained. On the other hand, if the misrepresentation alleged by complainant refers to the allegations
in the pleading filed by respondent before the COMELEC, again, it cannot be said that there was "intentional"
misrepresentation on the part of respondent since, as admitted by respondent and as complainant himself asserted, the
allegations therein contained were supplied by Atty. Bello, which allegations, at that time the pleading was signed,
respondent did not know were inaccurate. As pointed out above, as soon as the true nature of the situation revealed itself,
respondent withdrew from the case.

Regarding the second incident, complainant claimed that, in connection with the petition to declare Marita as a nuisance
candidate, respondent committed falsification and knowingly alleged untruths, not only in Marita's Verified Answer to the
disqualification case against her, but during the hearing of the case, as well. As with the first incident, respondent
maintained that he accepted the case without being fully aware of the circumstances relative thereto, this time because of
the insistence and urgency with which Atty. Bello made the request.

We earlier noted respondent's candor in explaining his cause. His candidness about the events leading to this
administrative complaint against him is demonstrated by the following declarations he made: (1) having agreed to have his
name signed in the pleading on his behalf, he cannot now deny the signature above his printed name; 33 (2) he believed the
assurances of his fellow lawyers (counsels for herein complainant) that whatever may have been said in confidence
between them will not be revealed to anybody for whatever reason; 34 and (3) he failed to seasonably object to the line of
questioning relative to his signature on Marita's Answer, thereby incriminating himself and making him an unwilling witness
for the opposing party, because of his insufficient experience in the legal practice and as a result of his lack of the traits of
a scheming lawyer.35 These straightforward statements, coupled with the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proven,36 keep us from treating respondent's proffered explanation as an
indication of mendacity.37 This Court is, therefore, compelled to give him the benefit of the doubt and apply in his favor the
presumption that he acted in good faith, especially considering the failure of complainant to present clear and convincing
evidence in support of his allegations.

Thus, with respect to the charge that respondent "knowingly" alleged untruths in the supposed Verified Answer of Marita,
he admitted that

Marita's Answer was prepared by Atty. Bello, whom respondent likewise authorized to sign his name on the pleading on
his behalf. This statement was corroborated by complainant himself when he alleged in his petition for disbarment that
"Atty. John Reyes admitted to the two counsels of then candidate Teodoro Cruz, Jr. x x x that the Answer was merely
passed to him by Atty. Bello already signed and notarized." Consequently, respondent cannot be held liable for
"knowingly" alleging untruths for the simple reason that the allegations in the Answer were not supplied by him.

Neither can respondent be held guilty of falsification in connection with the forged signature of Marita. "The basic rule is
that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence."38 Complainant merely alleged that Marita's signature in the Answer "was forged either
by Attorney Roque Bello or respondent x x x"39 and that respondent falsified or caused the falsification of the signature
because "he is the one who presented the same to the COMELEC, hence, presumed to be the one who falsified the
same."40 Other than this presumption and bare allegation, complainant has not adduced any proof in support thereof. As a
result, this Court cannot give any merit to his accusation.

The same is true in connection with complainant's allegation that respondent falsely testified and made misrepresentations
during the nuisance candidate case hearing before the PES by manifesting that he is the lawyer of Marita, that the
 63

allegations in the Answer were supplied by Marita and that Marita was in his office when she signed the Answer's
verification. Apart from his allegations, complainant has not presented any evidence, as for instance, the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes (TSN) of the proceedings, to prove that respondent indeed made the statements attributed to him and
to enable this Court to properly evaluate the transgressions ascribed to respondent.

It is well to note that respondent vehemently denied having admitted seeing Marita sign the Verification before his
presence in his office in Quezon City. He insisted that his response, when queried about Marita's signature, was that: "I
suppose that is her signature." This Court finds it unreasonable - illogical, even - that after having admitted the blunders he
committed in this case, he would now deny this particular circumstance, unless he was in fact telling the truth. In any case,
as explained by respondent, it is of no moment whether or not he saw Marita sign the Verification since he was not the
notary public who notarized the Answer. Respondent's signature in the Answer refers to the allegations therein, whereas
the signature of Marita forms part of the Verification which states that "she has caused the preparation of the foregoing
Answer and has read the contents thereof which are true and correct of her own personal knowledge." Respondent is,
therefore, correct when he pointed out that it is the responsibility of the notary public administering the oath to make sure
that the signature in the Verification really belongs to the person who executed the same.

It must be emphasized that "the Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes [his] case by
clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. x x x When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when
doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party carrying
the burden of proof."41chanrobleslaw

The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be said that respondent has no liability at all under the circumstances. His folly,
though, consists in his negligence in accepting the subject cases without first being fully apprised of and evaluating the
circumstances surrounding them. We, nevertheless, agree with respondent that such negligence is not of contumacious
proportions as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension. This Court find the penalty of suspension for one (1)
year earlier imposed on respondent too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed. "The power to disbar or
suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a
penalty."42 The penalty to be meted out on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion taking into
consideration the facts surrounding each case.43chanrobleslaw

In this connection, the following circumstances should be taken into consideration in order to mitigate respondent's
responsibility: first respondent exhibited enough candor to admit that he was negligent and remiss in his duties as a lawyer
when he accommodated the request of another lawyer to handle a case without being first apprised of the details and
acquainted with the circumstances relative thereto; and second, since this is his first offense, respondent "is entitled to
some measure of forbearance."44chanrobleslaw

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of
the Court dated 22 August 2012 is hereby modified in that respondent Atty, John G. Reyes is REPRIMANDED for his
failure to exercise the necessary prudence required in the practice of the legal profession. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

. 16.Reyes v Nieva AC No. 8560 September 6, 2016 En Banc

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8560, September 06, 2016

CARRIE-ANNE SHALEEN CARLYLE S. REYES, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON F. NIEVA, Respondent.

DECISION
 64

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint 1 dated March 3, 2010 filed by complainant Carrie-Anne Shaleen Carlyle S.
Reyes (complainant) against respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva (respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred for
sexually harassing her.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that she has been working at the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as an
Administrative Aide on a Job Order basis since October 2004. Sometime in January 2009, she was reassigned at the
CAAP Office of the Board Secretary under the supervision of respondent, who was then acting as CAAP Acting Board
Secretary. During complainant's stint under respondent, she would notice that during office hours, respondent would often
watch "pampagana" videos saved in his office laptop, all of which turned out to be pornographic films. Complainant also
averred that whenever respondent got close to her, he would hold her hand and would sometimes give it a kiss. During
these instances, complainant would remove her hands and tell him to desist. According to complainant, respondent even
offered her a cellular phone together with the necessary load to serve as means for their private communication, but she
refused the said offer, insisting that she already has her own cellular phone and does not need another one. 2

Complainant also narrated that at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of April 1, 2009, respondent texted her to wait for him at
the office. Fearing that respondent might take advantage of her, complainant convinced two (2) of her officemates to
accompany her until respondent arrived. Upon respondent's arrival and seeing that complainant had companions, he just
told complainant and the other two (2) office staff to lock the door when
they leave.3

Complainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2, 2009, respondent called her on her cellular phone, asked
if she received his text message, and told her he would tell her something upon his arrival at the office. At about 9:30 in the
morning of even date, respondent asked complainant to encode a memorandum he was about to dictate. Suddenly,
respondent placed his hand on complainant's waist area near her breast and started caressing the latter's torso.
Complainant immediately moved away from respondent and told him "sumosobra na ho kayo sir." Instead of asking for an
apology, respondent told complainant he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own pocket and even gave
her a note stating "just bet (between) you and me, x x x kahit na si mommy," referring to complainant's mother who was
also working at CAAP. At around past 11 o'clock in the morning of the same day, while complainant and respondent were
left alone in the office, respondent suddenly closed the door, grabbed complainant's arm, and uttered "let's seal it with a
kiss," then attempted to kiss complainant. This prompted complainant to thwart respondent's advances with her left arm,
raised her voice in order to invite help, and exclaimed "wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo magagalit, sir may
asawa ako." After respondent let her go, complainant immediately left the office to ask assistance from her former
supervisor who advised her to file an administrative case4 against respondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum
and Investigation (CODI).5

Finally, complainant alleged that after her ordeal with respondent, she was traumatized and was even diagnosed by a
psychiatrist to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression.6 Eventually, complainant
filed the instant complaint.

In his defense,7 respondent denied all of complainant's allegations. He maintained that as a 79-year old retiree who only
took a position at the CAAP on a consultancy basis, it was very unlikely for him to do the acts imputed against him,
especially in a very small office space allotted for him and his staff. In this regard, he referred to his
Counter-Affidavit8 submitted before the CODI, wherein he explained, inter alia, that: (a) while he indeed watches
"interesting shows" in his office laptop, he never invited anyone, including complainant, to watch with him and that he
would even close his laptop whenever someone comes near him; 9 (b) he never held and kissed complainant's hand
because if he had done so, he would have been easily noticed by complainant's co-staffers;10 (c) he did offer her a cellular
phone, but this was supposed to be an office phone which should not be used for personal purposes, and thus, could not
be given any sexual meaning;11 (d) he did tell complainant to wait for him in the afternoon of April 1, 2009, but only for the
purpose of having an available encoder should he need one for any urgent matter that would arise; 12 and (e) he would not
do the acts he allegedly committed on April 2, 2009 as there were other people in the office and that those people can
attest in his favor.13 Respondent then pointed out that the administrative case filed against him before the CODI was
 65

already dismissed for lack of basis and that complainant was only being used by other CAAP employees who were
agitated by the reforms he helped implement upon his assumption as CAAP consultant and eventually as Acting
Corporate Board Secretary.14

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated August 14, 2012, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint against respondent. 16 He found that
complainant failed to substantiate her allegations against respondent, as opposed to respondent's defenses which are
ably supported by evidence. Citing respondent's evidence, the Investigating Commissioner opined that since the CAAP
Office of the Board Secretary was very small, it is implausible that a startling occurrence such as an attempted sexual
molestation would not be noticed by not only the other occupants of said office area, but also by those occupying the office
adjacent to it, i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which is separated only by glass panels. Further, the Investigating
Commissioner drew attention to the investigation conducted by the CODI showing that the collective sworn statements of
the witnesses point to the eventual conclusion that none of the alleged acts of misconduct attributed to respondent really
occurred.17

In a Resolution18 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) unanimously reversed the aforesaid
Report and Recommendation. As such, respondent was found guilty of committing sexual advances, and accordingly,
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

In view of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,19 the IBP Board referred the case to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) for study, evaluation, and submission of an Executive Summary to the IBP Board. 20

In the Director's Report21 dated July 8, 2014, the IBP-CBD National Director recommended that the current IBP Board
adhere to the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner as it is supported by the evidence on record;
on the other hand, the reversal made by the previous IBP Board is bereft of any factual and legal bases, and should
therefore, be set aside. In this light, the current IBP Board issued a Resolution22 dated August 10, 2014 setting aside the
previous IBP Board's Resolution, and accordingly, dismissed the administrative complaint against respondent.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court's Ruling

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The provision instructs that "[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."23

In similar light, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR states:

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
 66

shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Good moral character is a trait that every practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may be defined as "what a person
really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which
he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds
to objective reality."24 Such requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes, namely: (a) to protect the public; (b) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (c) to protect prospective clients; and (d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.25

In Valdez v. Dabon,26 the Court emphasized that a lawyer's continued possession of good moral character is a requisite
condition to remain a member of the Bar, viz.:

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest
degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds
and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than
the highest degree of morality.

The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and
an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a
mistress but must also behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards." Consequently, any errant behavior of the
lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. 27 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their
legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from
the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.28

After due consideration, the Court reverses the findings and recommendations of the IBP, and finds respondent
administratively liable for violations of the CPR, as will be explained hereunder.

To recapitulate, the IBP found that as compared to complainant's purposedly bare and uncorroborated allegations,
respondent's evidence point to the conclusion that none of the alleged sexual advances made by respondent against
complainant actually occurred. As such, it absolved respondent from any administrative liability. In support of such finding,
the IBP largely relied on the following: (a) the five (5) photographs29 respondent submitted to the CODI to show that
respondent's office space was so small that any commotion caused by a sexual harassment attempt would have been
easily noticed by the other occupants thereof;30 and (b) the investigation conducted by the CODI per the
Transcript31 submitted by respondent where the witnesses said that they did not notice anything out of the ordinary on April
2, 2009, the date when respondent's alleged sexual advances against complainant were committed. 32However, the
foregoing evidence, taken as a whole, did not actually refute complainant's allegation that at around past 11 o'clock in the
morning of April 2, 2009, respondent closed the door, grabbed complainant's right arm, uttered the words "let's seal it with
a kiss" and attempted to kiss complainant despite the latter's resistance.

A careful perusal of the aforesaid Transcript shows that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, there was
a time that complainant and respondent were indeed left alone in the office:

Mr. Mendoza: Ngayon, puwede mo bang idescribe sa amin nung 9:30 to 11:00 sinu-sino kayo doon?

Witness 1: Tatlo (3) lang kami sir po dun. Si Ma'am Carrie Anne [complainant], si sir Nieva
[respondent] tsaka aka po.
 67

Mr. Mendoza: So ikaw lang ang witness, ang taong naroon 9:30 to 11?

Witness 1: Yes sir.

xxxx

Mr. Mendoza: Saan kayo kumakain ng lunch?

Witness 1: Sa loob po kami naglulunch.

Mr. Mendoza: Pag nag-order ng pagkain minsan may natitira pa bang iba?

Witness 1: Itong po yung dalawa yung natira nung umalis po aka. Um... pagbalik ko po wala na po
si Ma'am Caan [complainant] si Ma'am Amy nalang po ang nandoon.

Mr. Mendoza: So siya [complainant] nalang at tsaka si Atty. Nieva [respondent] ang naiwan doon
sa room? Eh nasaan na yung ibang OJT pa?

Witness 1: Tatlo lang po kasi kami nun sir, nasa Land Bank po yung dalawa.

Mr. Mendoza: So nasa Land Bank sila. So totoong may nangyari na naiwan silang dalawa[complainant
and respondent] na time na silang dalawa lang ang naiwan sa kuwarto?

Witness 1: Opo nung mga quarter to 12 siguro po nun.

Mr. Mendoza: Ilang beses na may nangyayaring ganun na silang naiiwan doon sa kuwarto?

Witness 1: Yun lang po kasi yung natatandaan ko po sir na time na naiwan sila eh.

xxxx

Mr. Abesamis: Umalis ka sa room para bumili ng pagkain nandoon si Atty. Nieva [respondent]?

Witness 1: Andoon pa po silang dalawa [complainant and respondent]. Pero tapos na po silang magtype
nun tas nag decide na maglunch na eh.

Mr. Abesamis: Saan? Sino ang naiwan?

Witness 1: Dalawa pa lang sila sir pagbalik ko tatlo na sila pero wala naman po si Ma'am Caan
[complainant]. Nung umalis po ako si sir Nieva [respondent] tsaka si Ma'am Caan yung nandoon then
pagbalik ko po wala na si Ma'am Caan, si sir Nieva tsaka silang dalawa na po yung nandoon.

Mr. Abesamis: Ok. So wala na silang kasamang iba?

Witness 1: Opo.33

The same Transcript also reveals that the CODI interviewed the occupants of the adjacent office, i.e., the CAAP
Operations Center, which, according to the IBP Investigating Commissioner, was only separated from complainant and
respondent's office, i.e. the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary, by glass panels. Pertinent parts of the interview read:

Mr. Borja: Nung oras ng mga alas onse (11) pagitan ng alas onse (11) hanggang alas dose(12), nasaan
ka joy [Witness 4]?

Witness 4: Andun po sa ORCC [CAAP Operations Center].

Mr. Borja: Si ano naman Donna [Witness 5] ganun din? Kasi sinasabi dito noong bandang ganung
 68

oras past eleven (11) parang nag-advance yata si Atty. Nieva [respondent] kayMs. Reyes (Caan)
[complainant] ngayon nung chinachansingan siya parang ganun ang dating eh "Iraised up my voice also,
so that the OPCEN personnel will hear of the alarm" may narinig ba kayo na sumigaw siya?

Witness 4: Eh kasi sir wala pong braket yun yung time na ano yung RPCC 764 so nag-cocoordinate
kami...

Mr. Borja: Ano yung 764?

Witness 4: Yung sa Tuguegarao yung nawawala siya so may alerfa tapos ditressfa so intransi po kami...
opo...

Mr. Borja: So busing-busy ka sa telepono?

Witness 4: Opo lahat kami.

Mr. Borja: Pati ikaw?

Witness 5: Opo.

Mr. Borja: Sinong walang ginagawa nun?

Witness 4: Wala kasi kanya-kanya kami ng coordination lahat kami nasa telepono.

Mr. Borja: Kaya kapag kumakalampag yung pader [sa] kabila hindi niyo maririnig?

Witness 4: Hindi siguro sir kasi kung nakasara din sila ng pinto tapos kanya-kanya kaming may kausap sa
telepono eh.

Mr. Borja: Kung hindi kayo nakikipag-usap ngayon wala kayong ginagawa, narinig niyo ang usapan doon
sa kabila.

Witness 5: Yes sir.

Atty. Gloria: Lalo na pag malakas.

Mr. Borja: Pag malakas pero therein normal voice lang level.

Witness 4: Kasi minsan malakas din yung radio nila eh. Kung minsan kasi sir may mga music sila. Eto sir
yung time na kinuha... Dami nila eh... Lumabas nakita naming mga ano mga 10:45 na yan nabasa sir.

Mr. Borja: Pero ang pinag-uusapan natin lagpas ng alas onse (11) ha bago mag-alas dose(12) ang
pinaka latest message mo dito 02/03/06 11:06. So between 11:06 to 12 wala kayong...

Witness 4: Kasi nakikipag-coordination talaga kami kahit... kami lang nandoon sa telepono.

Mr. Borja: Written pero voice coordination niyo sa telepono kayo?

Witness 4: Tsaka naka log-in sa log book.

xxxx

Mr. Abesamis: Ma'am Joy [Witness 4] sabi niyo kanina naririnig niyo si sir [respondent] sa kabila kung
wala kayong kausap lalong-lalo na kapag malakas yung salita?

Witness 4: Opo.
 69

Mr. Abesamis: So ibig sabihin kahit hindi malakas may possibility na maririnig niyo yung usapan kung
walang radio? Siguro if intelligible or knowledgeable pero maririnig mo sa kabila?

Witness 4: Kung mahina o normal yung usapan?

Mr. Abesarnis: Normal na usapan, conversation.

Witness 4: Hindi siguro pag sarado sila.

Mr. Abesamis: Pero kung halimbawa sisigaw?

Witness 4: Maririnig siguro kasi kapag nagdidictate si Attorney [respondent] minsan naririnig namin.

Mr. Mendoza: Maski sarado yung pinto?

Witness 4: Ah opo.

Mr. Mendoza: Naririnig?

Witness 4: Kung malakas.

Mr. Mendoza: Ah kung malakas?

Witness 4: Opo.

Mr. Abesamis: So wala kayong naririnig man lang kahit isang word na malakas doon sa kanila during the
time na nangyari ito?

Witness 4: Nung time na iyan wala kasi kaming maalala...

Mr. Abesamis: Walang possibility na narinig niyo pero mas busy kayo sa telephone operation.

Witness 4: Busy kami.

Mr. Abesamis: Hindi makikilatis yung ano...

Witness 4: Kasi may time na sumigaw na babae nga pero kala lang namin ah...

Mr. Abesamis: Nung date na iyon o hindi?

Witness 4: Hindi, hindi pa sigurado eh kasi...

Mr. Abesarnis: Hindi yung date bang iyon ang sinasabi mo?

Witness 4: Hindi kasi busy talaga kami sa coordination nung ano eh nung time na iyon. Nasabay kasi eh
nung time na iyon hinahanap pa namin yung requirement.

Mr. Mendoza: Pero bago yung bago mag April 2, meron ba kayo na tuligan na nag-aanuhan ng ganun,
nagrereklamo tungkol kay Atty. Nieva [respondent], wala? May narinig kayong movie na parang sounding
na porno ganun?

Witness 4: Wala music lang talaga sir.

Mr. Mendoza: So music.

 70

Witness 4: Kung minsan kasi binubuksan nila yung door pag mainit yung kuwarto nila.

Mr. Borja: At that time hindi bukas iyon?

Witness 4: Kami ano eh may cover ng ano cartolina na white.

Mr. Borja: Makakatestify lang kayo sa audio eh, kasi wala kayong nakikita.34

The above-cited excerpts of the Transcript show that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, complainant
and respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary as complainant's officemates were all out on
errands. In this regard, it was error on the part of the IBP to hastily conclude from the testimonies of complainant's
officemates who were interviewed by the CODI that nothing out of the ordinary happened. Surely, they were not in a
position to confirm or refute complainant's allegations as they were not physically in the office so as to make a credible
testimony as to the events that transpired therein during that time.

Neither can the testimonies of those in the CAAP Operations Center be used to conclude that respondent did not do
anything to complainant, considering that they themselves admitted that they were all on the telephone, busy with their
coordinating duties. They likewise clarified that while their office is indeed separated from the CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary only by glass panels, they could not see what was happening there as they covered the glass panels with white
cartolina. In light of their preoccupation from their official duties as well as the fact that the glass panels were covered, it is
very unlikely for them to have noticed any commotion happening in the adjacent CAAP Office of the Board Secretary.

Furthermore, the IBP should have taken the testimonies of the witnesses in the CODI proceedings with a grain of salt. It
bears noting that all those interviewed in the CODI proceedings were job order and regular employees of the CAAP.
Naturally, they would be cautious in giving any unfavorable statements against a high-ranking official of the CAAP such as
respondent who was the Acting Board Secretary at that time - lest they earn the ire of such official and put their career in
jeopardy.

Thus, the IBP erred in concluding that such Transcript shows that respondent did not perform the acts complained of. On
the contrary, said Transcript proves that there was indeed a period of time where complainant and respondent were left
alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary which gave respondent a window of opportunity to carry out his acts
constituting sexual harassment against complainant.

More importantly, records reveal that complainant's allegations are adequately supported by a Certificate of Psychiatric
Evaluation35 dated April 13, 2009 stating that the onset of her psychiatric problems - diagnosed as post-traumatic stress
disorder with recurrent major depression started after suffering the alleged sexual molestation at the hands of respondent.
Moreover, complainant's plight was ably supported by other CAAP employees 36 as well as a retired Brigadier General of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines37 through various letters to authorities seeking justice for complainant. Perceptibly,
complainant would not seek help from such supporters, and risk their integrity in the process, if none of her allegations
were true. Besides, there is no evidence to establish that complainant was impelled by any improper motive against
respondent or that she had reasons to fabricate her allegations against him. Therefore, absent any competent proof to the
contrary, the Court finds that complainant's story of the April 2, 2009 incident was not moved by any ill-will and was
untainted by bias; and hence, worthy of belief and credence.38 In this regard, it should be mentioned that respondent's
averment that complainant was only being used by other CAAP employees to get back at him for implementing reforms
within the CAAP was plainly unsubstantiated, and thus, a mere self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. 39

In addition, the Court notes that respondent never refuted complainant's allegation that he would regularly watch
"pampagana" movies in his office-issued laptop. In fact, respondent readily admitted that he indeed watches "interesting
shows" while in the office, albeit insisting that he only does so by himself, and that he would immediately dose his laptop
whenever anyone would pass by or go near his table. As confirmed in the Transcript 40 of the investigation conducted by
the CODI, these "pampagana" movies and "interesting shows" turned out to be pornographic materials, which respondent
even asks his male staff to regularly play for him as he is not well-versed in using computers.41

Without a doubt, it has been established that respondent habitually watches pornographic materials in his office-issued
laptop while inside the office premises, during office hours, and with the knowledge and full view of his staff. Obviously, the
Court cannot countenance such audacious display of depravity on respondent's part not only because his obscene habit
 71

tarnishes the reputation of the government agency he works for - the CAAP where he was engaged at that time as Acting
Corporate Secretary - but also because it shrouds the legal profession in a negative light. As a lawyer in the government
service, respondent is expected to perform and discharge his duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence, and skill, and with utmost devotion and dedication to duty.42 However, his aforesaid habit miserably fails to
showcase these standards, and instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack of respect to the government
position he was entrusted to hold. His flimsy excuse that he only does so by himself and that he would immediately close
his laptop whenever anyone would pass by or come near his table is of no moment, because the lewdness of his actions,
within the setting of this case, remains. The legal profession - much more an engagement in the public service should
always be held in high esteem, and those who belong within its ranks should be unwavering exemplars of integrity and
professionalism. As keepers of the public faith, lawyers, such as respondent, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. Indeed, those who have taken the oath to
assist in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the consciousness and the will to overcome the
weakness of the flesh, as respondent in this case. 43

In the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, the quantum of
proof by which the charges against respondent were assessed was preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence "means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
it."44 Generally, under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, this evidentiary threshold applies to civil cases:

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the
facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider
the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
(Emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon45 cited by the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
the Court had pronounced that the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence in disbarment proceedings is upon the
complainant.46 These rulings appear to conflict with other jurisprudence on the matter which contrarily hold that substantial
evidence is the quantum of proof to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.47 The latter standard was applied
in administrative cases such as Foster v. Agtang,48 wherein the Court had, in fact, illumined that:

[T]he quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence
required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance
of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." In
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than
a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.49(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Similarly, in Peña v. Paterno,50 it was held:

Section 5, in [comparison with] Sections 1 [(Preponderance of evidence, how proved)] and 2

[(Proofbeyond reasonable doubt)], Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 51 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco,52 which was promulgated just this June
15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
 72

allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence. 53 (Emphasis
supplied)

Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the proper
evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.

Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to preponderance of evidence - is more in keeping
with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates,
"[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor." 54

With the proper application of the substantial evidence threshold having been clarified, the Court finds that the present
charges against respondent have been adequately proven by this standard. Complainant has established her claims
through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion - that is, that
respondent had harassed her and committed despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In fine,
respondent should be held administratively liable and therefore, penalized.

Jurisprudence provides that in similar administrative cases where the lawyer exhibited immoral conduct, the Court meted
penalties ranging from reprimand to disbarment. In Advincula v. Macabata,55 the lawyer was reprimanded for his
distasteful act of suddenly turning the head of his female client towards him and kissing her on the lips. In De Leon v.
Pedreña,56 the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for rubbing the female
complainant's right leg with his hand, trying to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand, grabbing her hand and forcibly
placed it on his crotch area, and pressing his finger against her private part. While in Guevarra v. Eala57 and Valdez v.
Dabon,58 the Court meted the extreme penalty of disbarment on the erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs.
Here, respondent exhibited his immoral behavior through his habitual watching of pornographic materials while in the
office and his acts of sexual harassment against complainant. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court
deems it proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance and be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney. SO
ORDERED. Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Leonen,
Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur. Brion, J., on leave. Bersamin, J., on official leave Reyes, J., on official leave.

17.Flores-Salado v. Villanueva AC No. 11099 September 27, 2016 En Banc

EN BANC

A.C. No. 11099, September 27, 2016

 73

LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES LURA, AND FE V. FLORES, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROMAN A.
VILLANUEVA, JR. Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery of public documents should not be the occasion to establish the
falsification or forgery. Such bases should first be duly and competently established either in criminal or civil proceedings
appropriate for that purpose.

The Case

We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment complaint lodged against Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for allegedly
falsifying a public document concerning realty, and for allegedly concealing his true age m order to secure his appointment
as state prosecutor.

Antecedents

Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, Anacorito Flores, Angel Flores, Jr., and Fe Flores presented their adverse
claim1 on the parcel of land situated in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 7919 of the Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte under the names of Spouses Roman Villanueva, Jr. and Rosario L.
Alipao.2 The Register of Deeds annotated the adverse claim on January 23, 2007 as Entry No. 67251. 3 On December 27,
2007, an affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, which appeared to have been signed by them,4 was also annotated on TCT No.
7919 as Entry No. 72573.5 On March 26, 2008, the Register of Deeds canceled TCT No. 7919,6 and issued two new TCTs
in the name of the respondent.7chanrobleslaw

On October 29, 2009, complainants Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores Lura, and Fe Flores lodged their complaint with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with gross dishonesty on the basis of their assertion
therein that they had not signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal.8 They thereby further charged him with dishonesty for
concealing his true age in order to secure his appointment in 2006 as a state prosecutor. They avered that he was
disqualified for the position because he had already been 70 years old at the time of his appointment,9 having been born
on June 26, 1936; that they submitted as proof: (1) the residence certificate issued in the name of "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr.,"
whom they claimed was the respondent himself, stating June 26, 1936 as his birthdate;10 (2) the deed of extrajudicial
partition of the estate of Roman Villanueva, Sr. showing that the respondent was 14 years old when he signed the
document as "Isabelo Villanueva";11 (3) the certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Tupi, South
Cotabato12 showing that he was 26 years old when he got married on December 24, 1961; and (4) the affidavits
respectively executed by his siblings, Francisca V. Flores 13 and Tarcela V. Sajulan.14chanrobleslaw

The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-motives to the complainants in filing the disbarment complaint against
him.15 He contended that the complainants did not present sufficient proof showing that he had falsified the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal; and asserted that the basis for the partition of the contested property had been the compromise
agreement entered into by him and his siblings, including Francisca, the complainants' mother; 16 and that he had been
born on November 29, 1943, as indicated in his birth certificate.17chanrobleslaw

IBP Report and Recommendation

After due hearing, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) submitted his
report and recommendation18 finding the respondent liable for gross misconduct in relation to the forged the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal, and recommended his two-year suspension from the practice of law. Commissioner Fernandez
dismissed the charge of dishonesty in relation to the respondent's age because his birth certificate prevailed over the
documents submitted by the complainants.19chanrobleslaw

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-27820 adopting the report and
 74

recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-278

CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al. vs.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it 1s hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that Respondent was guilty of gross misconduct when he falsified
an Affidavit of Waiver/Withdrawal by reason of which TCT Nos. RT-8320 and 8381 in his
name were issued, Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years. However, the charge of falsifying his age to qualify as
DOJ Prosecutor is hereby Dismissed for lack of merit.21 (Bold emphasis in the original)

The pat1ies respectively sought reconsideration.22 On June 6, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's
motion for reconsideration but granted that of the complainants, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-417

CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent

reason to reverse the findings and resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration.

RESOLVED FUTHER, to GRANT the Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration,

considering Respondent's gross dishonesty by making himself younger when he applied
as Public Prosecutor in the Department of Justice. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-278,
dated March 20, 2013, is hereby AFFIRMED with modification, increasing the penalty
imposed on Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. to Suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) years.23 (Bold emphasis in the original)

Issue

Should the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and gross dishonesty?

Ruling of the Court

We reverse the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors considering that the charges were not
competently substantiated.

I
Falsification must be proved in the
 75

appropriate criminal or civil proceeding,

not in the disbarment proceeding

The complainants support their allegations of falsification by presenting the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal itself and its
annotation on TCT No. 7919; and by denying their having signed the same. However, such proof was inadequate to
establish that the respondent had been the author of the alleged falsification of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal.

We emphasize that allegations of falsification or forgery must be competently proved because falsification or forgery
cannot be presumed.24 As such, the allegations should first be established and determined in appropriate
proceedings,25cralawred like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by such proceedings that the last word on the falsity or
forgery can be uttered by a court of law with the legal competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to
determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply because the sole issue to be addressed and determined therein is
whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of
justice.26 Accordingly, we decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed the supposed falsification of
the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal in the absence of the prior determination thereof in the appropriate proceeding.

Moreover, the complainants have hereby challenged the due execution and authenticity of the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal, a notarized document.27 In view of this, the complainants' mere denial of having signed the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal did not suffice to overcome the positive value of it as a notarized document. 28 It is settled that
notarization converts a private document into a public document, whereby the document becomes entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face.29 The notarized document then has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the
presumed regularity of its execution, whoever alleges the contrary should present evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant.30chanrobleslaw

II
The birth certificate is the best evidence
of the respondent's date of birth

The complainants have also charged the respondent with dishonesty for having concealed his true age in order to secure
his appointment as a state prosecutor. They have presented in support of the charge the residence certificate issued in the
name of one "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr."; an extrajudicial settlement signed by one "Isabelo Villanueva"; the certificate issued
by the Local Civil Registrar of Tupi, South Cotabato showing that the respondent was 26 years old when he got married in
1 961; and the affidavits of the respondent's two siblings.

In contrast, the respondent submitted his certificate of birth that indicated his birthdate as "November 29, 1943."

Still, the complainants doubted the veracity of the respondent's bit1h certificate on the ground of its having been belatedly
registered at his own instance.

The Court nonetheless finds for the respondent.

Firstly, as previously emphasized, the allegation of the falsity of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal should first be
determined in the appropriate criminal or civil proceeding, not in this proceeding for disbarment. Consequently, we desist
from definitively ruling on the weight of the evidence presented by the complainants.

Secondly, a birth certificate consists of entries related to the fact of birth in public records, and is made in the performance
of duty by the local civil registrar as a public officer.31 It is thus treated as the prima facie evidence of the fact of one's birth,
and can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 32 As such, the birth certificate submitted by the
respondent was decisive on the date of his birth in the absence of clearer and more convincing contrary evidence.

Thirdly, the veracity of the respondent's birth certificate cannot be successfully assailed on the basis alone of its being
belatedly entered in the local civil registry. This is because the State expressly allows the late registration of births not only
at the instance of the father, mother, or guardian in case the person whose birth is to be registered is under 18 years of
age, but also at the instance of the person himself when already of age. 33chanrobleslaw
 76

To accord with such policy of the State, the fact of late registration of the respondent's birth should not adversely affect the
validity of the entries made in his birth certificate.

And, finally, it is fitting to state that the complainants bore the burden of proof in this disbarment proceeding against the
respondent. They must establish their charges of falsification and dishonesty by convincing and satisfactory
proof.34 Surmises, suspicion and conjectures are not bases of finding his culpability. 35 The foregoing disquisitions on the
falsification show that the complainants did not discharge their burden of proof thereon. They also did not convincingly
establish that the respondent had willfully adjusted his true age to secure his appointment as a state prosecutor. Indeed,
the appointment happened on February 22, 200636 but his late registration of his birth occurred on July 3, 2006. 37 If the
intention for the late registration was to make it appear that he st ill met the age requirement for public prosecutors, he
should have effected the late registration prior to the appointment, not several months subsequently. In addition, he
submitted a "Voter Certification" showing him to be a registered voter of Balagtas (Bigaa), Bulacan on September 20, 2003,
and to have been born on November 29, 1943.38Under the circumstances, that he had intentionally adjusted his birthdate
to enable himself to meet the age requirement for the position of state prosecutor three years later became plainly
improbable.

III

Disbarment or suspension complaints against lawyers

in the public service involving their qualifications
should be initially investigated by the agencies or offices
having administrative supervision over them

The Court finds the need to clarify that although it may entertain a disbarment or suspension complaint brought against a
lawyer employed in the government service whether or not the complaint pertained to an act or conduct unrelated to the
discharge of his official functions,39 the investigation should be carried out by the agency or office having administrative
supervision over him or her when the allegations of the complaint relate to the qualifications of the respondent to be
appointed to the public office.

Accordingly, any questions pertaining to the qualifications of the respondent to be appointed as a state prosecutor should
be directed to the Secretary of Justice who had administrative supervision over him under the law, 40 and not to this Court
in the guise of the disbarment complaint. The complaint for disbarment is sui generis, and the proceeding thereon should
focus only on the qualification and fitness of the respondent lawyer to continue membership in the Bar. 41chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint against Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for lack of factual
and legal merit.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno, C.J, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ.,
concur. Carpio, J., wellness. Leonardo-De Castro, J., official leave. Brion, J., on leave. Reyes, J., sick leave.

18.Arsenio v. Tabuzo AC No. 8658 April 24, 2017

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 8658, April 24, 2017

FRANCIS C. ARSENIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOHAN A. TABUZO, Respondents.

 77

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Before this Court is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated June 18, 2010 filed by Francis C. Arsenio (Arsenio), seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo (Atty. Tabuzo) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

The Facts

This case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Arsenio before the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) against JS Contractor, a recruitment agency. 2 During a scheduled hearing on May 10, 2000, Atty.
Tabuzo, the Overseas Employment Adjudicator who was assigned to hear the case, asked him to sign three blank sheets
of paper to which Arsenio complied.

A week after the scheduled hearing, Arsenio asked Atty. Tabuzo the reason why he was made to sign blank sheets of
paper. Atty. Tabuzo angrily said, "Bwiset! Napakakulit mo, doon mo malaman mamaya pagdating ng kalaban mo!"
Thereafter, Arsenio called up the office of Senator Rene Cayetano who advised him to make a clarification regarding the
signed sheets of blank paper. Arsenio then approached Atty. Tabuzo but the latter again shouted at him saying, "Bwiset!
Goddamit! Alam mo ba na maraming abogado dito sa POEA na nagbebenta ng kaso?" Atty. Tabuzo further said, "Sabihin
mo sa Cayetano mo at abogado mo na baka masampal ko sa mga mukha nila ang pinirmahan mong blanko! Sabihin mo
na ang pangalan ko ay Atty. Romeo Tabuzo at kung hindi ka bumalik bukas ay mawawala ang kaso mo!''3

Arsenio later on discovered that his case against JS Contractor was dismissed. Hence, he filed a complaint against Atty.
Romeo Tabuzo before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. "

In a Resolution4 dated February 1, 2002, Graft Investigation Officer II Wilfred Pascasio ordered that an Information be filed
against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo upon finding of probable cause against him.

Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging, among others, that there is no Atty. Romeo Tabuso in the POEA
and that he was never handed any copy of summons. He claimed that he was merely taking the initiative in filing the said
motion to clear his name as he believed he was the person referred to in the earlier Order of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Nonetheless, such motion was subsequently denied in an Order dated July 16, 2002.

Meanwhile, in a Decision dated December 6, 2011, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City acquitted
Atty. Tabuzo for violation of RA No. 3019.

Subsequently, Arsenio filed the present Complaint-Affidavit before this Court. In a Resolution5 dated November 24, 2010,
this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) docketed the case as CBD Case No. 11-2912, entitled "Francis C.
Arsenio v. Atty. Johan Tabuzo".

In his Omnibus Comment with Motion to Dismiss,6 Atty. Tabuzo denied the accusations against him, claiming that the
alleged unethical acts are baseless. He averred that he had never acted in any conduct unbecoming of a public officer or
uttered invectives and other alleged acts. To support his claim, he attached the Affidavits 7 of two (2) Overseas
Employment Adjudicators (OEA) who occupied the tables immediately adjacent to him in the Recruitment Regulations
Branch. In said Affidavits, the OEAs attested to the effect that no such incident or any untoward event that called for
attention transpired. Atty. Tabuzo also said that his constitutional right to due process was violated since he was not
notified of the case against him before the Office of the Ombudsman as he was never served nor had personally received
Orders from such Office.

The Resolutions of the IBP Commissioner and Board of

Governors
 78

In his Report and Recommendation,8 Investigating Commissioner Atty. Eldrid Antiquierra recommended that reprimand be
imposed upon Atty. Tabuzo. The Investigating Commissioner ruled in such wise on the basis of the sworn affidavit of
Arsenio and the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.

In a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the
said Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner upon finding that Atty. Tabuzo violated the Lawyer's
Oath and Rule 8.019 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, the IBP Board of Governors suspended Atty.
Tabuzo from the practice of law for three months.

Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. 10

The Issue

Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Tabuzo.

The Court's Ruling

After examining the records of this case, the Court resolves to dismiss the instant disbarment complaint.

A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is
intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts.11

Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.12 In the recent case of Reyes v. Nieva,13 this Court had the occasion to clarify that the proper evidentiary
threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence.

In this case, noteworthy is the fact that the reason advanced by the IBP-CBD in recommending reprimand against Atty.
Tabuzo is its consideration of the: (1) Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, which states that there was
probable cause against Atty. Tabuzo for violating RA 3019; and (2) Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio, which alleges that Atty.
Tabuzo made offensive statements.

However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented reveals that the degree of proof indispensable in a disbarment case
was not met.

Firstly, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is predicated on the fact that the allegations of Arsenio were
uncontroverted; hence, the Office of the Ombudsman concluded that such allegations were true. However, there was a
seeming discrepancy as to the name of Atty. Tabuzo when a case against him was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Undisputedly, the case before said Office was filed against a certain Atty. Romeo Tabuso, when the name of
herein respondent is Atty. Johan Tabuzo. As such, the respondent claimed that he failed to controvert Arsenio's claims
because he never received any notice or order from the Office of the Ombudsman. In fact, the said Resolution of the Office
of the Ombudsman was made on the basis of the complaint of Arsenio alone since Atty. Tabuzo failed to file his
answer.14 However, a reading of the RTC Decision reveals that Arsenio was able to verify the identity of Atty. Johan
Tabuzo, not as Atty. Romeo Tabuso, even before he filed his complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman. It is
confusing, therefore, why there was discrepancy as to the name of herein respondent when a clarification was already
made. Nevertheless, Atty. Tabuzo was acquitted15 in a criminal case filed against him on the basis of the Resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

Despite such acquittal, a well-settled finding of guilt in a criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, the acquittal does not necessarily exculpate one administratively. 16 Thus, it is proper to
deal with the other evidence presented by Arsenio.
 79

The Court, thus, finds that the Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio failed to discharge the necessary burden of proof. In his
Sworn Affidavit, Arsenio merely narrated that Atty. Tabuzo uttered offensive statements and no other evidence was
presented to substantiate his claim. Emphatically, such Complaint-Affidavit is self-serving.

Summarily, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman together with the Affidavit of Arsenio cannot be
considered as substantial evidence. For one, the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was decided on the basis of
the failure of Atty. Tabuzo to controvert the allegations of Arsenio. Also, the Complaint-Affidavit was not sufficient as no
evidence was further offered to prove the allegations contained therein.

While the quantum of evidence required in disbarment cases is substantial evidence, this Court is not persuaded to
exercise its disciplinary authority over Atty. Tabuzo.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolved to DISMISS the disbarment complaint against Atty. Johan A.
Tabuzo.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

19.Fuji v. de la Cruz AC No. 11043 March 8, 2017

SECOND DIVISION

March 8, 2017

A.C. No. 11043

LIANG FUJI, Complainant

vs
ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the immigration records of an alien, which resulted in the alien's wrongful
detention, opens the special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration to administrative liability.

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 dated November 23, 2015 filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji) and his family, against
Bureau of Immigration Special Prosecutor Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz (Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz) for gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her issuance of a Charge Sheet against Fuji for overstaying.

Through a letter2 dated December 8, 2015, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa directed
the complainants to file a verified complaint "with supporting documents duly authenticated and/or affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts alleged"3 in the complaint.
 80

Complainants replied4 by furnishing this Court with copies of the Verified Petition to Reopen S.D. O. No. BOC-2015-357
(B.L.O. No. SBM- 15-420) and for Relief of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for Immediate Consideration, and Administrative
Complaint (Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint),5 which Fuji filed with the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Immigration, and prayed that the same be treated as their verified complaint. Complainants further informed this
Court that they had difficulty obtaining certified true copies of the November 21, 2013 Order of the Board of
Commissioners, which granted Fuji's Section 9(g) visa, Summary Deportation Order dated June 17, 2015, and Warrant of
Deportation from the Bureau of Immigration personnel who just gave them the "run[-]around."6 They alleged that the
Bureau of Immigration personnel were not particularly helpful, and did not treat Fuji's case with urgency. 7

The facts of this case show that in a Summary Deportation Order 8 dated June 17, 2015, Fuji, a Chinese national, was
ordered deported for overstaying. From the Order, it appears that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz was the special
prosecutor who brought the formal charge against Fuji and another person upon her finding that Fuji's work visa had
expired on May 8, 2013, with extension expired on December 6, 2013. 9 Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz found that Fuji had
overstayed for one (1) year and six (6) months in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 37(a)(7). 10 Her
investigation was triggered by a complaint-affidavit dated April 30, 2015 of a certain Virgilio Manalo alleging that Fuji and
another person had defrauded him.11

On June 29, 2015, Fuji filed his Motion for Reconsideration. 12

On July 28, 2015, the Bureau of Immigration Intelligence Division served Fuji's Warrant of Deportation, and thereafter
arrested him at Brgy. Maloma, San Felipe, Zambales with the assistance from local police. 13 Fuji was brought to and
detained at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Facility, National Capital Region Police Office, Taguig City. 14

On October 9, 2015, the Board of Commissioners denied Fuji's Motion for Reconsideratios. 15

On November 23, 2015, Fuji filed his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint.16 Subsequently, on March 10, 2016,
Fuji filed an Omnibus Motion to Reopen and Lift S.D.O. BOC-2015-357, and Release on Bail through counsel.17

On March 22, 2016, the Board of Commissioners issued a Resolution dismissing the deportation charge against Fuji on
the ground that "[t]he records show that Liang has a working visa valid until 30 April 2016 under Jiang Tuo Mining
Philippines, Inc. as Marketing Liason."18 Fuji was directed to be released from Bureau of Immigration-Warden's Facility on
March 23, 2016.19

In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due process were violated since he was not afforded any
hearing or summary deportation proceedings before the deportation order was issued against him. 20 Fuji further alleged
that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in discharging her duties because a simple initial review of the Bureau
of Immigration records would have revealed that he was not overstaying because his Section 9(g) work visa was valid until
April 30, 2016.21

In her August 25, 2016 Comment,22 respondent Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she committed any grave
misconduct.23 She claimed that Fuji was accorded due process during the summary deportation proceedings. 24 He was
directed, through an Order dated May 14, 2015 of the Legal Division, to submit his Counter-Affidavit/Memorandum, which
he failed to do.25 Fuji was also able to file his motion for reconsideration and verified petition to reopen the case. 26

Respondent further claimed that the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the Bureau of Immigration - Management
Information System (BI-MIS) constituted a substantial evidence of Fuji's overstay in the country, hence, her formal charge
had legal basis.27

Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of her
duties.28 She had no intention to violate any law and did not commit any flagrant disregard of the rules, or unlawfully used
her station to procure some benefit for herself or for other persons.29 Respondent pointed out that the Ombudsman had in
fact dismissed the complainant's charges against her.30 She added that Fuji stated in his March 29, 2016 Affidavit of
Desistance that he had mistakenly signed some documents including the administrative complaint. 31
 81

We find respondent administratively liable for her negligence in her failure to ascertain the facts before levying
the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying.

Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in government service
arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint first either to the proper administrative body that has
disciplinary authority over the erring public official or employee or the Ombudsman.32

For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales,33 this Court dismissed the disbarment complaint against former Secretary of
Justice Raul M. Gonzalez, former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and former

Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, holding that the respondents were public officials being charged for actions
involving their official functions during their tenure, which should be resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman. 34 In that
case, one (1) of the respondents sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum-shopping because he allegedly
received an order from the Office of the Ombudsman directing him to file a counter-affidavit based on the same
administrative complaint filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant. 35

Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay,36 the Court dismissed the complaint against respondents -
government lawyers in the Civil Service Commission. The Court held that the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint
were "connected with their . . . official functions in the [Civil Service Commission] and within the administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction of their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman." 37 It would seem that the complainant directly instituted a
disbarment complaint with this Court instead of filing an administrative complaint before the proper administrative body.

This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records here show that the
Office of the Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative complaint due to the pendency of his Verified
Petition and Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of Immigration, and considered the case closed.38

The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition to reopen his case and ordered his release. However, it
was silent as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled by Fuji.

Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman and the apparent
inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's administrative complaint, this Court considers it proper to take
cognizance of this case, and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to discipline respondent under its "plenary
disciplinary authority"39 over members of the legal profession.40

Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of Desistance is not sufficient cause to dismiss this
administrative complaint. This Court has previously held that proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or
terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same."41 The primary object of disciplinary proceedings is to determine the fitness of a
member to remain in the Bar. It is conducted solely for the public welfare,42 and the desistance of the complainant is
irrelevant. What will be decisive are the facts borne out by the evidence presented by the parties. In Rayos-Ombac v.
Rayos:43

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 44
 82

II

Respondent Dela Cruz claimed that she issued the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying on the basis of the
Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the BI-MIS.45 A copy of the Memorandum with attachments was attached to
respondent's Comment.46

However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated that Fuji "overstayed" or that "Liang's working visa expired on 8 May
2013 and his TVV expired on 6 December 2013"47 as respondent claims. Relevant portions of the Memorandum read:

For : ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ

From : ACTING CHIEF, MIS DIVISION

REQUEST FOR IMMIGRATION STATUS; VISA EXTENSION PAYMENT,

LATEST TRAVEL AND DEROGATORY OF THE FOLLOWING:

Re : 1. MR.IMS. LIANG FUJI

2. MR./MS. CHEN XIANG HE

3. MR.IMS. JACKY CHANG HE

Date : 04 June 2015

Further to your request for verification of Immigration Status; Visa Extension

Payment and TRAVEL RECORD/S, please find the result/s as follows:

...
1. LIANG FUJI

- Derogatory Record Not Found

- Latest Travel Record Found (Please see the attached files for your ready
Result reference. NOTE:
:
/s
DOB: 18 October 1991)

- Immigration Status Found

- Latest Payment Record Found in BI-Main (Please see the attached files
for your ready reference. NOTE: DOB: 18 October 1991)48

The Memorandum merely transmitted copies of immigration records showing details of filing of applications, such as
official receipts, - and travel record of Fuji. It was respondent Dela Cruz who made the determination that Fuji overstayed
on the basis of the documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS.

Among the documents transmitted by the BI-MIS were computer print-outs showing details of official receipts dated June
14, 2013, August 7, 2013, and November 19, 2013 for temporary visitor visa extension and official receipt dated July 15,
2013 for an application for change of immigration status. Also, the travel records of Fuji show the following details:

Date & : 4 June 2015 3:05 PM

 83

Time

Verifier : DIMARUCOT J

Databa
: TRAVEL-ARRIVAL
se

TRAVEL DATE TRAVEL FLIGH IMMIG PORT OFFICER ACTION REMARK

TIME T NO. STATUS S

10-FEBRUARY-2 11:34P CZ377 9G NAIAI MIJARES ALLOWED

014 M

06-JANUARY-201 11:51P CZ377 9A NAIAI PARANGU ALLOWED

2 M E

22-SEPTEMBER- l 1:25PM CZ377 9A NAIAI NUNEZ ALLOWED49

2011

Fuji's travel records as of June 4, 2015, show his arrival in the Philippines on February 10, 2014 under a work visa
immigration status.50 Simple prudence dictates that respondent Atty. Dela Cruz should have verified whether or not the
July 15, 2013 application for change of status had been approved by the Bureau of Immigration Commissioners, especially
since she had complete and easy access to the immigration records.

Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. Special prosecutors in the Bureau of Immigration should
exercise such degree of vigilance and attention in reviewing the immigration records, whenever the legal status and
documentation of an alien are at issue. For while a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, it is however, a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a
person.511âwphi1

Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her review of the documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS,
especially as it may ultimately result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective deportee. She should not have simply
relied on the handwritten note by a personnel from the BI-MIS at the bottom portion of the receipt dated November 19,
2013 for 9A visa extension stating "Valid until: 06-Dec-2013." Had she inquired further, she would have discovered that
Fuji's application dated July 15, 2013 for conversion from temporary visitor visa (9A) to work visa (9G) was approved by
the Board of Commissioners on November 21, 2013 - or one (1) year and seven (7) months earlier - with validity until April
30, 2016. Thus, even if Fuji's temporary visitor (9A) visa had expired on December 6, 2013 his stay in the country was still
valid under the 9G work VISa.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of her duties as a government official. 52 However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a
violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility, 53 then she may be subject to disciplinary
sanction by this Court.1avvphi1

Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." As a
special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration, she is the representative, not of any private party, but of the State. Her
task was to investigate and verify facts to determine whether a ground for deportation exists, and if further administrative
action - in the form of a formal charge - should be taken against an alien.
 84

Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she would have found out about the approval of Fuji's application,
which would negate her finding of overstaying. Because of her negligence, Fuji was deprived of his liberty for almost eight
(8) months, until his release on March 23, 2016.

Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to, give attention to a task due to carelessness or indifference. 54 In this case,
respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the fundamental right of every person, including aliens, to due process
and to the consequences of her actions.

Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations consistent with the
time-honored principle of public office being a public trust.55 The ethical standards under the Code of Professional
Responsibility are rendered even more exacting as to government lawyers because they have the added duty to abide by
the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and professionalism in public service. 56 In this
case, respondent's negligence evinces a failure to cope with the strict demands and high standards of public service and
the legal profession.

The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this Court. 57 Under the Civil Service Rules,58 the penalty for simple neglect
of duty is suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. In previous cases,59 this Court imposed the
penalty of suspension of three (3) months to six (6) months for erring lawyers, who were negligent in handling cases for
their clients. We find appropriate the penalty of suspension of three (3) months considering the consequence of
respondent's negligence. This suspension includes her desistance from performing her functions as a special prosecutor
in the Bureau of Immigration.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz 1s SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall immediately serve her suspension. She shall formally manifest to
this Court that her suspension has started, and copy furnish all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where she has entered her
appearance, within five (5) days upon receipt of this Resolution. Respondent shall also serve copies of her manifestation
on all adverse parties in all the cases she entered her formal appearance.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela
Cruz's personal record. Copies of this Resolution should also be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
proper disposition, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

20.Chua v. Tan-Sollano et al AC No 11553 June 6, 2017 En Banc

EN BANC

A.C. No. 11533, June 06, 2017

SPOUSES EDWIN AND GRETA CHUA, Complainants, v. SACP TERESA BELINDA G. TAN-SOLLANO, DCP MARIA
GENE Z. JULIANDA-SARMIENTO, SDCP EUFROSINO A. SULLA, SACP SUWERTE L. OFRECIO-GONZALES, AND
DCP JOSELITO D.R. OBEJAS, ALL OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MANILA, RELATIVE TO I.S.
NO. XV-07-INV-15J-05513, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:
 85

For resolution is the administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Greta A. Chua (Greta) and Edwin S.
Chua (Spouses Chua) against Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa Belinda G. Tan-Sollano (SACP Tan-Sollano),
Deputy City Prosecutor Maria Gene Z. Julianda-Sarmiento (DCP Julianda-Sarmiento), Senior Deputy City Prosecutor
Eufrosino A. Sulla (SDCP Sulla), SACP Suwerte L. Ofrecio-Gonzales (SACP Ofrecio-Gonzales), and DCP Joselito D.R.
Obejas (DCP Obejas) (collectively, the respondents) for grave abuse of discretion, ignorance of the law, abuse of power or
authority, and gross misconduct.

Antecedent Facts

On October 12, 2015, Spouses Chua filed a Complaint2 for Perjury and False Testimony against Atty. Rudy T. Tasarra
(Atty. Tasarra), Luz O. Talusan (Talusan), Po Yi Yeung Go, Jessica W. Ang, Ricky Ang, Eden C. Uy, and Ana Tiu, before
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila docketed as XV-07-INV-15J-05513.

Spouses Chua alleged before the OCP of Manila that Talusan deliberately and wilfully committed perjury when she
narrated in her Complaint-Affidavits that on July 11, 2009, Spouses Chua issued 11 post-dated checks in favor of Chain
Glass Enterprises, Inc. (CGEI), with an amount of P112,521.00 each, as payment for assorted glass and aluminum
products. According to Spouses Chua, however, the said statement is not true because the said 11 post-dated checks
were actually issued on February 23, 2009 by Greta in replacement of their previous bounced checks. Likewise, Atty.
Tasarra and the members of the Board of Directors of CGEI were likewise impleaded therein for offering Talusan's
testimony.3

In a Resolution4 dated December 28, 2015, SACP Tan-Sollano recommended the dismissal of the charges against therein
respondents for lack of probable cause. The same was recommended for approval by DCP Julianda-Sarmiento and SDCP
Sulla.

A Motion for Reconsideration5 was filed by Spouses Chua but the same was denied in a Resolution6 dated August 9, 2016
issued by SACP Ofrecio-Gonzales and approved by DCP Obejas after finding no cogent reason to reverse the Resolution
dated December 28, 2015 of SACP Tan-Sollano.

Aggrieved with such findings, Spouses Chua instituted the instant case and averred that the dismissal of
XV-07-INV-15J-05513 was inappropriate and highly irregular considering that the prosecution offered an "airtight
case/evidence."7

Ruling of the Court

After a careful review of the records of the present case, the Court finds that Spouses Chua failed to attribute clear and
preponderant proof to show that the respondents committed infractions in contravention with the standards provided for by
the Code of Professional Responsibility which would have warranted the imposition of administrative sanctions against
them.

"In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving with substantial evidence the allegations in the
complaint. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."8

Here, considering that Spouses Chua failed to present substantial proof to show the prosecutors' culpability, the Court
cannot rule out the possibility that the instant administrative case was ill motivated being retaliatory in nature and aimed at
striking back at them for having participated in the dismissal of XV-07-INV-15J-05513, either as investigating prosecutor or
approving officer. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the prosecutors involved
herein have regularly performed their official duties.

Moreover, in Maquiran v. Judge Grageda,9 the Court held that alleged error committed by judges in the exercise of their
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed through
judicial remedies.10 Here, the same principle applies to prosecutors who exercise adjudicative functions in the
determination of the existence of probable cause to hold the accused for trial in court.
 86

Verily, an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion
for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari.11 In the present case, as narrated by Spouses Chua,
XV-07-INV-151-05513 is still pending and active. As such, Spouses Chua still has remedies to contest said ruling.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondents Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa Belinda
G. Tan-Sollano, Deputy City Prosecutor Maria Gene Z. Julianda-Sarmiento, Senior Deputy City Prosecutor Eufrosino A.
Sulla, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Suwerte L. Ofrecio-Gonzales, and Deputy City Prosecutor Joselito D.R. Obejas
is DISMISSED and this case is considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, Caguioa, and Tijam, JJ., concur. Mendoza, J., on official leave. Martires, J., on leave.

21.Capinpin v. Cesa AC No.6933 July 5, 2017

THIRD DIVISION

July 5, 2017

A.C. No. 6933

GREGORIO V. CAPINPIN, JR., Complainant

vs.
ATTY. ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainant Gregorio Capinpin, Jr., praying for the suspension
from the practice of law or disbarment of respondent Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for violating the Canons of Professional
Ethics in connection- with the foreclosure of complainant's properties.

Factual Antecedents

On February 14, 1997, complainant executed a real estate mortgage (REM) 2 on his two lots in favor of Family Lending
Corporation (FLC) as security for a loan amounting to PhP 5 Million with interest at two percent (2%) per month.

On April 29, 2002, due to complainant's default in payment, FLC, through its President Dr. Eli Malaya (Dr. Malaya),
initiated foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged properties.3

Complainant availed of legal remedies to stop the said foreclosure proceedings, to wit: (1) he filed a case for damages and
injunction and also moved for the suspension of the sheriffs sale, wherein such motion for suspension was granted but the
injunctive relief was denied after hearings. Complainant's motion for reconsideration (MR) therein was also denied; (2) he
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) with the Court of Appeals (CA), wherein no TRO was granted due to some deficiencies in the
petition; (3) he also filed an annulment of REM with prayer for a WPI and/or TRO before the trial court, wherein-this time a
WPI was issued to stop the auction sale.4 This prompted FLC to file a petition for certiorari before the CA, questioning the
trial court's issuance of the injunctive writ. The CA nullified the said writ, mainly on the ground of forum shopping, which
was affirmed by this Court on review.5 For these cases, FLC engaged respondent's legal services.
 87

The complaint alleges that during the above-cited proceedings, respondent, without the knowledge of his client FLC,
approached complainant to negotiate the deferment of the auction sale and the possible settlement of the loan obligation
at a reduced amount without resorting to the auction sale. Respondent allegedly represented himself as being capable of
influencing the sheriff to defer the auction sale, as well as his client FLC through Dr. Malaya to accept the amount of PhP 7
Million to fully settle the loan obligation. For this, the complaint alleges that on April 13, 2005, respondent demanded
payment of professional fees amounting to Php 1 Million from complainant. 6 In fact, complainant already gave the
following amounts to respondent as payment of such professional fees: (1) PhP 50,000 check dated April 13, 2005; (2)
PhP 25,000 check dated April 18, 2005; (3) PhP 75,000 check dated April 22, 2005; (4) PhP 20,000 check dated May 16,
2005; (5) PhP 200,000 on June 30, 2005; and (6) PhP 30,000 on August 17, 2005. 7 Despite such payments, the auction
sale proceeded.8 Hence, the instant complaint.

For his part, respondent denies that he was the one who approached complainant for negotiation, the truth being that it
was complainant who asked for his help to be given more time to raise funds to pay the loan obligation.9Respondent
further avers that he communicated the said request to his client. 10 Aside from the checks dated April 13, 18, 22 and May
16, 2005, which respondent claims to be advance payments of his attorney's fees, respondent avers that he did not
receive any other amount from the complainant.11 All these, according to the respondent, were known to his client.12 In fact,
in a Letter dated April 22, 2005 signed by the complainant and addressed to FLC through Dr. Malaya, complainant
expressly stated that he will negotiate for the payment of respondent's fees as FLC's counsel. 13

On July 16, 2007, this Court referred the instant administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. 14

Report and Recommendation

of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In his Report and Recommendation15 dated June 4, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to complainant's
allegations that respondent, without the knowledge of his client, negotiated with the complainant for the settlement of the
loan obligation, and that the respondent demanded and received professional fees in negotiating the said settlement.

According to the Investigating Commissioner, respondent's act of negotiating with the complainant on the deferment of the
auction sale and the settlement of the loan for a substantially reduced amount was highly improper as respondent's
primary duty, being FLC's counsel, was to protect the interest of FLC by seeing to it that the foreclosure proceedings be
done successfully to obtain the best amount possible to cover the loan obligation.16 The Investigating Commissioner
explained that if a lawyer can collect professional fees or advanced payment thereof from the adverse party, it results to a
conflict of interest.17 From the foregoing, the respondent was found to have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. 18

The report further stated that the amounts collected by the respondent should be considered as money received from his
client; as such, he has the duty to account for and disclose the same to his client in accordance with Canon 16, Rule 16.01
of the said Code.19 The Investigating Commissioner found nothing on record that showed that respondent made such
accounting for or disclosure to his client.20

Hence, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent was liable for malpractice and recommended that he
be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion, this Commissioner finds the respondent liable for
malpractice and, accordingly, recommends that respondent be meted a penalty of ONE (1) YEAR
suspension from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with
more severity.21

Resolutions of the Board of Governors

Integrated Bar of the Philippines
 88

On September 28, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XX-2013-84,22 which states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03,
and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent's MR24 was denied in the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution No. XXI-2014-28025 dated May 3, 2014 as
follows:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration.

Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-84 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.26

Necessarily, We now give Our final action on this case.

Issue

Should Atty. Cesa, Jr. be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint and evidence on record?

The Court's Ruling

We are in full accord with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03
and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the CPR.

CANON 15 - A LA WYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

Based on the records, We find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the
said Code.1âwphi1 It must be stressed that FLC engaged respondent's legal services to represent it in opposing
complainant's actions to forestall the foreclosure proceedings. As can be gleaned from respondent's position paper,
however, it is admitted that respondent extended help to the complainant in negotiating with FLC for the reduction of the
loan payment and cessation of the foreclosure proceedings. 27 The case of Hornilla v. Salunat28 is instructive on the
concept of conflict of interest, viz.:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
 89

used. x x x. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double[-]dealing in the performance thereof.29

Evidently, respondent was working on conflicting interests - that of his client, which was to be able to foreclose and obtain
the best amount they could get to cover the loan obligation, and that of the complainant's, which was to forestall the
foreclosure and settle the loan obligation for a lesser amount.

Indeed, the relationship between the lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyer's duty to his client is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.30 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 31

Respondent's allegation that such negotiation was within the knowledge of his client will not exonerate him from the clear
violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR. Respondent presented a number of documents to support his allegation that all the
communications between him and the complainant were relayed to his client but We find no record of any written consent
from any of the parties, especially from his client, allowing him to negotiate as such.

Respondent's admission that he received advance payments of professional fees from the complainant made matters
worse for him. As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner, it was highly improper for respondent to accept
professional fees from the opposing party as this creates clouds of doubt regarding respondent's legal practice. As aptly
stated by the Investigating Commissioner, if a lawyer receives payment of professional fees from the adverse party, it
gives an impression that he is being paid for services rendered or to be rendered in favor of such adverse party's interest,
which, needless to say, conflicts that of his client's.

Simply put, respondent's professional fees must come from his client. This holds true even if eventually such fees will be
reimbursed by the adverse party depending on the agreement of the parties. Respondent cannot justify his act of
accepting professional fees from the complainant by alleging that such was in accordance with the arrangement between
his client and the complainant as there is no clear proof of such arrangement. The April 22, 2005 Letter 32 signed by the
complainant and addressed to FLC through Dr. Malaya, invoked by the respondent, does not, in any way, prove that there
was an agreement between complainant and FLC. Moreover, the fact that respondent was already receiving several
amounts from the complainant even before the date of the said Letter, supposedly stating an agreement between the
complainant and FLC as regards the settlement of the loan obligation and the payment of his professional fees, is also
suspicious. Such circumstance reveals that even before the complainant and FLC have come to such purported
agreement, he was already receiving professional fees from the complainant. Respondent's allegations to the effect that
negotiations had already been going on between the parties through him via phone calls even before that Letter do not
hold water. To be sure, it would have been easy for the respondent, as a lawyer, to present documentary proof of such
negotiation and/or arrangements but respondent failed to do so.

At any rate, even assuming that there was indeed an arrangement between FLC and complainant that respondent's
professional fees shall be paid by the complainant, which will be later on deducted from whatever the latter will pay FLC for
the settlement of his loan obligation, respondent's act of accepting such payments from the complainant and appropriating
the same for his professional fees is still reprehensible. The said payments from the complainant are still considered FLC's
money; as such, respondent should have accounted the same for his client. As correctly found by the Investigating
Commissioner, there is nothing on record, aside from respondent's bare and self-serving allegations, that would show that
respondent made such accounting or disclosure to his client. Such acts are in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the
CPR above-cited.

In addition, this Court is baffled by the idea that complainant opted to pay respondent's professional fees first before his
loan obligation was even taken care of, and that FLC would actually agree to this.

This Court cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold, at all times, the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and
 90

nobility in the course of their practice of law. Clearly, in this case, respondent failed to uphold such ethical standard in his
practice of law.

In view of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governor's Resolution No.
XX-2013-84 dated September 28, 2013 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-280 dated May 3, 2014 and ORDERS the
suspension of Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. from the practice of law for one (1) year effective immediately upon receipt of
this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

22. Ignacio v. Alviar AC No. 11482 July 17, 2017

THIRD DIVISION

July 17, 2017

A.C. No. 11482

JOCELYN IGNACIO, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. DANIEL T. ALVIAR, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is an administrative case filed by complainant Jocelyn Ignacio against respondent Atty. Daniel T. Alviar for violation of
Canon 11 , Rule 1.012 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for his alleged refusal to refund the amount of
acceptance fees; Canon 123, Rule 12.044 and Canon 185 Rule 18.036 for his alleged failure to appear in the criminal case
he is handling and to file any pleading therein.

The Facts

In March 2014, respondent was referred to complainant for purposes of handling the case of complainant's son who was
then apprehended and detained by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in Quezon City. Respondent agreed
to represent complainant's son for a stipulated acceptance fee of PhPl00,000. Respondent further represented that he
could refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the alleged illegal arrest made on complainant's
son.7

After the initial payments of PhP20,000 and PhP30,000 were given to respondent, the latter visited complainant's son at
the PDEA detention cell.8 There, respondent conferred with complainant's son for some 20 minutes. After which,
respondent left.9
 91

Respondent, through his secretary, secured from the Office of the Pasay City Prosecutor plain copies of the case records.
Respondent also verified twice from the Hall of Justice if the case was already filed in court. 10 It was at this time that
respondent asked, and was paid, the remaining balance of PhP50,000. Subsequently, respondent filed his notice of
appearance as counsel for complainant's son.11

Sometime in April 2014, complainant informed respondent that her son's arraignment was set on April 29, 2014.
Respondent, however, replied that he cannot attend said arraignment due to a previously scheduled hearing. He
committed to either find a way to attend the hearing or ask another lawyer-friend to attend it for him.

On April 26, 2014, complainant wrote a 1etter12 to respondent informing the latter that she had decided to seek the
intercession of another lawyer owing to the fact that respondent cannot attend her son's scheduled arraignment.
Complainant then requested that respondent retain a portion of the PhP 100,000 to fairly remunerate respondent for the
preparatory legal service he rendered. Respondent denies having received said letter. 13

On the date of the arraignment, neither respondent nor his promised alternate, appeared. When asked, respondent replied
that he forgot the date of arraignment.14

This incident prompted complainant to write another letter15 dated May 6, 2014 to respondent, requesting the latter to
formally withdraw as counsel and emphasized that respondent's withdrawal as counsel is necessary so that she and her
son can hire another lawyer to take his stead. In said letter, complainant also reiterated her request that a portion of the
PhPl00,000 be remitted to them after respondent deducts his professional fees commensurate to the preparatory legal
service he rendered.16

When respondent failed to take heed, complainant filed on June 16, 2014, the instant administrative complaint before the
Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

At the proceedings therein, respondent failed to attend the initial mandatory conferences and to file his responsive
pleading, citing as reason therefor the persistent threats to his life allegedly caused by a former client.17 Upon finally
submitting his Answer18 , respondent denied having neglected his duties to complainant's son.

Report and Recommendation

of the Commission on Bar Discipline

On January 21, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent liable for negligence under Rule 18.03 of the CPR
and recommended a penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law. The Investigating Commissioner observed
that while respondent performed some tasks as lawyer for complainant's son, such do not command a fee of PhPl00,000.
It was also emphasized that respondent's failure to attend the arraignment shows the latter's failure to handle the case with
diligence.19

As such, the Investigating Commissioner disposed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned recommends that respondent be meted out
with the penalty of suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law and ordered to restitute the
amount of One Hundred Thousand (Phpl00,000) Pesos to the complainant.

Respectfully Submitted.20

Resolution of the Board of Governors

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

On February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-17821 lowering the recommended
penalty to reprimand with stem warning, thus:
 92

RESOLVED to ADOPT with modification the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner reducing
the penalty to REPRJMAND WITH STERN WARNING.22

Pursuant to Rule 139-B, the records of the administrative case were transmitted by the IBP to the Court for final action.
Complainant further seeks a review23 of the Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated February 25, 2016.

The Issue

The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of negligence in handling the case of complainant's son.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court affirms the Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated February 25, 2016 of the IBP Board of Governors, reducing the
recommended penalty from six months to reprimand with stem warning. However, on the undisputed factual finding that
respondent only performed preparatory legal services for complainant's son, he is not entitled to the entire PhP 100,000
but only to fees determined on the basis of quantum meruit, Section 24, Rule 138, and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the CPR
and that the remainder should be restituted to complainant.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client's cause.24 Canon 1825 of the CPR mandates that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is the lawyer's duty to
serve the client with competence and diligence.

In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Atty. Bautista26 , the Court citing Santiago v. Fojas27 expounds:

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish
to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of [his] client, the lawyer owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of the law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.28

We agree with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent failed to competently and diligently attend to
the legal matter entrusted to him. It is undisputed that respondent came to see complainant's son, his client, only once for
about 20 minutes and no more thereafter;29 it is likewise undisputed that respondent failed to attend the scheduled
arraignment despite the latter's commitment to either find a way to attend, or send a collaborating counsel to do so; 30 that
he forgot the date of arraignment is an equally dismal excuse.

Equally revealing of respondent's negligence was his nonchalant attitude towards complainant's request for a refund of a
portion of, not even the entire, PhPl00,000. In his Answer before the IBP, respondent simply denied having received any of
the letters sent by complainant.31 Respondent's claim that it was complainant who failed to talk to him and his admission
that he "forgot about complainant"32 reveal his rather casual and lackadaisical treatment of the complainant and the legal
matter entrusted to him.
 93

If it were true that complainant already failed to communicate with him, the least respondent could have done was to
withdraw his appearance as counsel. But even this measure, it appears, respondent failed to perform. His failure to take
such action speaks of his negligence.

In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to warrant disciplinary sanctions. Substantial evidence
is consistently defined as relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.33 While the Court finds respondent guilty of negligence, We cannot ascribe to him any unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct nor causing undue delay and impediment to the execution of a judgment or misusing court
processes. As such, and consistent with current jurisprudence, We find the penalty of reprimand with stem warning
commensurate to his offense.34

As regards the restitution of the acceptance fees, We find it necessary to first distinguish between an attorney's fee and an
acceptance fee as the former depends on the nature and extent of the legal services rendered, while the other does not.

On one hand, attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. 35 In its ordinary concept,
attorney's fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. While, in its
extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as
indemnity for damages.36 In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner referred to the attorney's fee in its ordinary
concept.

On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for mere acceptance of the case. The
rationale for the fee is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the
opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. The opportunity cost of mere acceptance is thus indemnified
by the payment of acceptance fee. However, since acceptance fee compensates the lawyer only for lost opportunity, the
same is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered. 37

In this case, respondent referred to the PhPl00,000 as his acceptance fee while to the complainant, said amount answers
for the legal services which respondent was engaged to provide. Preceding from the fact that complainant agreed to
immediately pay, as she, in fact, immediately paid the sums of PhP20,000, PhP30,000 and PhP50,000, said amounts
undoubtedly pertain to respondent's acceptance fee which is customarily paid by the client upon the lawyer's acceptance
of the case.

Be that as it may, the Court had not shied from ordering a return of acceptance fees in cases wherein the lawyer had been
negligent in the handling of his client's case. Thus, in Carino v. Atty. De Los Reyes,38 the respondent lawyer who failed to
file a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor's office, returned the PhPl 0,000 acceptance fee paid to him and was
admonished to be more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. Likewise, in Voluntad-Ramirez v.
Baustista,39 the respondent lawyer was ordered to return the PhP14,000 acceptance fee because he did nothing to
advance his client's cause during the six-month period that he was engaged as counsel.

This being the case, the next query to be had is how much of the acceptance fee should respondent restitute.1âwphi1 In
this regard, the principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may serve as a basis for determining the
reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without working for it.

Also, Section 24, Rule 138 should be observed in determining respondent's compensation, thus:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on
its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
 94

The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered in assessing the proper amount of
compensation that a lawyer should receive.40 Canon 20, Rule 20.01 provides:

CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he
belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Here, respondent only conferred once with the complainant's son for 20 minutes, filed his entry of appearance, obtained
copies of the case records and inquired twice as to the status of the case. For his efforts and for the particular
circumstances in this case, respondent should be allowed a reasonable compensation of PhP3,000. The remainder, or
PhP97,000 should be returned to the complainant.

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Daniel T. Alviar LIABLE for violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and he is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely. Atty. Daniel T. Alviar is ordered to RESTITUTE to complainant the amount of PhP97,000 out of
the Phpl00,000 acceptance fee.

SO ORDERED.

23. Castro v. Bigay and Siapno AC No. 7824 July 19, 2017

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7824, July 19, 2017

ELIEZER F. CASTRO AND BETHULIA C. CASAFRANCISCO, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOHN BIGAY, JR. AND ATTY.
JUAN SIAPNO, JR., Respondents.
 95

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is a disbarment case against respondents Atty. John Bigay, Jr. (Atty. Bigay) and Atty. Juan Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno)
filed by complainants Eliezer F. Castro (Eliezer) and Bethulia C. Casafrancisco (Bethulia).

The Facts

Originally, the complaint1 filed directly to this Court imputed several violations, criminal and administrative in nature,
against respondents such as perjury, estafa through falsification of public documents, obstruction of justice, deceit, and
grave misconduct, among others. The case was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) for investigation and recommendation. Upon preliminary conference, it was agreed upon that the
issues, stipulations, and admissions shall be limited to the pleadings filed before the said office. 2 Thus, the factual
backdrop of the case is as follows:

The complaint alleged that sometime in August 1989, Bethulia engaged Atty. Bigay's legal services for the settlement of
her late father's estate, which includes a 411-square meter parcel of land situated in Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Atty. Bigay also represented Bethulia in several cases related to the estate's settlement. 3

The complainants, however, discovered that Atty. Bigay had vested interest in having a share in the subject inheritance.
According to the complainants, Atty. Bigay, with the cooperation of Atty. Siapno, was able to transfer an 80 sq m portion
(subject property) of the said parcel of land to his and her wife's name by simulating contracts of sale, to wit: (1) a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 1, 2005, covering the sale of the subject property to spouses Peter and Jocelyn Macaraeg
(Spouses Macaraeg); and (2) a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 4, 2006, covering the sale of the subject property to
Atty. Bigay and his wife. These deeds were notarized by Atty. Siapno on the said dates.4

The instant complaint is, thus, filed against Atty. Bigay for having an interest in a property subject of litigation/s which he is
handling and for forging and simulating deeds to the prejudice of his client and the latter's coheirs.5

For his part, Atty. Bigay denied being Bethulia's counsel in 1989, averring that he passed the bar exam only in
1992.6 Further, he averred that the subject estate had long been settled and the property subject of the deeds of sale had
been apportioned to Bethulia way back in 1984 through extrajudicial partition.7To show Bethulia's ownership of the 411-sq
m parcel of land prior to his and his wife's acquisition of the 80 sq m portion thereof, Atty. Bigay presented: (1) a Tax
Declaration under Bethulia's name; (2) annotations showing that Bethulia mortgaged the property to the bank in 1992 and
1996; (3) the Deed of Sale which shows that Bethulia sold the subject property to Macaraeg; (4) and a deed of donation
which shows that Bethulia donated the remaining 331 sq m portion of the said parcel of land in 2005.8These circumstances,
according to Atty. Bigay, clearly show that there was no irregularity in his and his wife's acquisition of the said portion,
contrary to complainants' imputations.

For his part, Atty. Siapno denied having notarized the subject deeds of sale. Specifically, Atty. Siapno averred that the said
deeds are falsified, that his signatures therein as notary public were forged, and that he has never met Atty. Bigay,
Bethulia, and Macaraeg.9

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD

Relying upon Atty. Siapno's claim that his signatures in the subject deeds were forged and that he had never personally
met Atty. Bigay, Bethulia, and Macaraeg, the IBP-CBD was persuaded that the said deeds were falsified. Then, by virtue
of Atty. Bigay and his wife's notorious claim over the property, the IBP-CBD theorized that the said spouses are the only
persons Interested in the property and the only beneficiary of the said simulated sales. The IBP-CBD then proceeded to
conclude that only a person who has a legal mentality would be able to formulate such tactic to make it appear that
Spouses Bigay were buyers in good faith. In addition, the IBP-CBD cited the principle that the person who is in possession
of a forged/falsified document and made use and benefited from the same is presumed to be the forger/falsifier. Pinning
the guilt mainly on Atty. Bigay, the IBP-CBD recommended in its November 6, 2009 Report and
Recommendation,10 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 96

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that respondent John L. Bigay, Jr. be SUSPENDED
for six (6) months from the active practice of law. For respondent Juan C. Siapno, Jr., he is WARNED to
be extra careful with his notarial paraphernalia.11

The IBP Board of Governors Resolutions

On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-131,12 which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and for using a falsified Deed of Sale and benefiting
(sic), Atty. John L. Bigay, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and
Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby WARNED to be circumspect in his notarial transaction. (Emphasis
supplied)

Atty. Bigay's Motion for Reconsideration13 was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XXI-2014-18714 dated March 23, 2014, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX- 2013-131 dated February 13, 2013 is
hereby AFFIRMED.15

Having a final say on the matter of disciplining members of the bar, We now resolve the instant complaint.

Issue

Should the respondents be held administratively liable based on the allegations in the pleadings of all parties on record?

Our Ruling

It is well to remember that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the Court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory
proof.16

It is settled that considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court
has consistently held that preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a
member of the Bar.17 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to
or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.18

In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer subsists and the complaint against
him must be dismissed.19

The IBP-CBD found Atty. Bigay guilty of forging the subject deeds of sale and using the same for his benefit, hence, it
recommended the latter's suspension from the practice of law for six months. Atty. Siapno, on the other hand, was merely
warned to be extra careful with his notarial paraphernalia, the IBP-CBD relying on the latter's allegations and denial.

However, the findings and conclusions of the IBP lack factual and legal support.

As can be gleaned from the report and recommendation of the IBP CBD quoted hereunder, its findings were merely based
on bare allegations, assumptions, conjectures, and disputable legal presumption. Pertinent portions of the said report and
recommendation read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 97

Respondent John Bigay, Jr. was retained by complainant/petitioner Bethulia Casafrancisco as legal
counsel/adviser of the heirs of the late Luis M. Castro, for possible division/settlement of their inheritance
among the said nine heirs. x x x.

Respondent Juan Siapno claimed that his signatures were falsified in [the subject deeds]. He
further claimed that he had not met personally respondent John Bigay. Also, Bethulia Casafrancisco,
Peter Macaraeg, and Jocelyn Macaraeg did not appear before him.

On the other hand, respondent John Bigay with the use of alleged falsified Deeds of Absolute Sale made
it appear that complainant Bethulia Casafrancisco sold portion of 80 square meters to Peter M. Macaraeg
to simulate the sale not a direct sale from Bethulia Casafrancisco to the spouses respondent John Bigay
and Glenda Lee Bigay.

Spouses Atty. John L. Bigay and Glenda Lee J. Bigay are the only two persons appearingto have interest
and benefited on the sale x x x as clearly manifested in their Affidavit of Adverse Claim, Notice of Rights
and Ownership and photographs of the property showing that said property is already acquired by them. x
x x.

Being the interested and now the owners of the above-mentioned portion of land, Atty. John L. Bigay and
wife Glenda Lee J. Bigay are presumed to know who really made the alleged forgery/falsification in
this case. If it were true that there was an agreement between Atty. Bigay and his client Bethulia C.
Casafrancisco as to the payment of his legal services to be taken from her share on the properties subject
of litigations, why the [sic] diversionary tactic employed in the first Deed of Absolute Sale from Bethulia C.
Casafrancisco to the alleged fictitious spouses Peter and Jocelyn Macaraeg and the latter to spouses Atty.
John L. Bigay and Glenda Lee J. Bigay? This tactic, for sure, was planned by one of legal mentality just to
make it appear that they (Bigay) appear to be buyers in good faith and for value.

The facts and circumstances above explained squarely fall on that leading case of People v.
Manansala were the court held that "He who is in possession of a forged/falsified document and made use
and benefited from the same is presumed to be the forger/falsifier." x x x.20 (Emphasis supplied)

After a careful review of the factual backdrop of the case and available evidence on record, the Court finds that the
evidence submitted by the complainants, even if considered together with those presented by Atty. Siapno, fell short of the
required quantum of proof. Aside from bare allegations, no evidence was presented to clearly and convincingly establish
that Atty. Bigay engaged in unlawful and dishonest conduct, specifically, in forging and/or falsifying deeds of sale for his
benefit and dealing with the property of his client under litigation.

To begin with, the allegation of forgery was not clearly substantiated. There is nothing on record that would show that the
contracts were simulated, much less that the same were forged and/or falsified by Spouses Bigay. Atty. Siapno may have
corroborated complainants' claim of forgery by alleging that he did not notarize and had never met the parties in the said
deeds. We, however, could not accept hook, line, and sinker, the unsupported and self-serving claims and denial of Atty.
Siapno. The complainants likewise did not adduce any evidence to support their imputations against Atty. Bigay.

On the other hand, Atty. Bigay presented sufficient evidence against the accusations of forgery and engaging in the
prohibited practice of dealing with properties under litigation. He presented the notarized deeds of extrajudicial settlement
of estate and partition executed by Bethulia and her sisters in 1984, which shows that the 411 sq m portion of the subject
parcel of land had already been allocated to Bethulia way back in 1984 as her share in the estate. This was affirmed by the
deed of quitclaim and renunciation of rights executed by Bethulia and her sister Minerva in the same year. A tax
declaration was then issued in the name ofBethulia over the said property.

Further, the notarized Deed of Sale of the subject properly clearly states that the same was sold by Bethulia to Macaraeg.
Although the validity of the said deed was disputed, no sufficient proof was presented to support the claim of forgery or
irregularity in the execution of the same. That the subject property was no longer available for disposal, as the same was
already sold to Macaraeg, is affirmed by the deed of donation executed by Bethulia in favor of her children which covers
only 331 sq m of the 411-sq m parcel of land. Lastly, the Deed of Sale executed between Macaraeg and Spouses Bigay
over the subject property is existent albeit its validity was disputed, but then again, no proof was presented to support the
 98

claim of invalidity.

Let it be made clear, however, that neither the IBP nor this Court has the authority to inquire into or determine the rights of
the parties, specifically the complainants and Atty. Bigay, over the property involved herein. We also do not attempt to
make any determination as to the validity or otherwise of the subject documents, or the regularity or otherwise of the
subject sales. Our function in this administrative case is limited to disciplining lawyers. 21 The pronouncements that We
make in this case, thus, are not determinative of any issues of law and facts regarding the parties' legal rights over the
disputed property.

At any rate, whether or not We take into consideration such pieces of evidence, the fact still remains that the records are
barren of any proof to support the accusations against Atty. Bigay in the instant administrative case.

Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that every person is presumed innocent of a crime or
wrongdoing. Thus, this Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he or she is innocent
of the charges against him or her until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have
performed his duties in accordance with his oath.22

Thus, without such required proof to overcome the presumption of innocence, this Court will not hesitate to dismiss an
administrative case against a member of the Bar.

As to Atty. Siapno's liability, from his own admissions, it cannot be doubted that he is guilty of dereliction of duty as a
notary public. It was admitted that the questioned deeds of sale bore the impression of his notarial seal. He, however,
maintains that he did not notarize the said documents and that his signatures therein were forged, which, however, were
not proven in this case. He admitted that he has no sole access and control of his notarial seal as other persons could
make use of the same without his consent or knowledge.

In Gemina v. Atty. Madamba,23 the Court held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgment and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts,
the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial
seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as
evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution.

A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. 24

The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require a duly commissioned notary public to refrain from
committing any dereliction or any act which may serve as a cause for the revocation of his commission or the imposition of
administrative sanctions.25 Thus, Atty. Siapno's excuse cited above cannot absolve him from liability.

Anent the penalty, considering that this is Atty. Siapno's first infraction and that it was not clearly proven that there was
indeed an illegal transaction in this case or that he participated therein, We find that the appropriate penalty is reprimand.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant administrative case against Atty. John Bigay, Jr. is DISMISSED. On the
other hand, Atty. Juan Siapno, Jr. is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and is accordingly, meted out the penalty
of REPRIMAND, with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to
respondent's record as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Jardeleza, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
 99

24. Alicias v. Baclig AC No. 9919 July 19, 2017

THIRD DIVISION

July 19, 2017

A.C. No. 9919

DR. EDUARDO R. ALICIAS, JR., Complainant

vs.
ATTY. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Before Us is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by complainant Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. against Atty. Vivencio S. Baclig (Atty.
Baclig) for violation, of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and/or Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

The case stemmed from the amended complaint2 for declaration of nullity of void documents, recovery of ownership and
possession, accounting of the natural, industrial fruits derived from the illegal occupation of the subject property, exercise
of the right of legal redemption with damages, and application for a writ of preliminary injuction filed by Eleuterio Lamorena,
Higinio Rene Lamorena, Oscar Lamorena and Eloisa Lamorena, duly represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Marissa L.
Pefia, and Marissa L. Pefia, in her own behalf (Lamorena, et.al.) against Robert R. Alicias (Robert) and Urvillo A. Paa
(Paa), and herein complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Vigan City. Said complaint was filed in September
2012 and Atty. Baclig was hired by Lamorena, et. al. as their counsel.

In said amended complaint, Lamorena, et.al. questioned the occupancy of complainant and his co-defendants of a certain
parcel of land. Lamorena, et.al. claimed that they are entitled to possession of the same, being the surviving heirs of the
lawful owners of the subject property, Vicente spouses and Catalina Lamorena (Catalina).

Complainant and his co-defendants filed their Answer,3 stressing, among others, that they legally acquired the subject
property by virtue of a contract of sale from its lawful owner, Catalina, as the same is her paraphemal property.

It appears, however, that in February 2010, an amended complaint4 for reconveyance, annulment of deeds and quieting of
title was filed by Lamorena, et. al. against herein complainant and Urvillo Paa before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) in Vigan City. However, it was not Atty. Baclig who acted as counsel in this case.

On May 14, 2013, the complainant filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Baclig before Us.

In said administrative complaint, the complainant averred that Atty. Baclig consented to false assertions when his clients
allegedly made false statements in their amended complaint. Complainant also stated that Atty. Baclig knowingly filed an
action which was: (1) already barred by resjudicata and laches; and (2) without the jurisdiction of the RTC where such
complaint was filed. Lastly, complainant claimed that Atty. Baclig consented to the filing of a complaint, which asserted
similar relief, when a similar case was filed before the MTCC.

In his Comment,5 Atty. Baclig contended that the allegations in the subject complaint contained absolutely privileged
communication, which insulates him from liability. Also, the issues as to whether or not the assertions in the subject
complaint are false statements and whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action are yet to
be decided; hence, the complaint against him holds no water.

Issue
 100

Is Atty. Baclig administratively liable?

Our Ruling

A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is
intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts.6

Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.7 In the recent case of Carrie-Anne Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes v. Atty. Ramon F Nieva,8 this Court had the
occasion to clarify that the proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence.

The gist of the complaint before Us is the alleged false assertions in the amended complaint, to which Atty. Baclig has
consented to. Complainant alleged that Atty. Baclig consented to falsehood when the allegations in the amended
complaint specified, among others, that the subject property is a hereditary property when in fact it is a paraphemal
property; that the property is unregistered property; and that it was inherited in 1952 when it was not.

However, noteworthy is the fact that such assertions are the matters in dispute in the case before the RTC. In other words,
the assertions as to the nature of the property and the time when it was inherited also deal with the main issue of the case.
To recall, Lamorena, et.al.'s main contention is that the subject property is a hereditary property, being the property of their
parents. On the other hand, complainant alleged that they brought the property from Catalina and the latter had every right
to sell it even without words, the issue in the amended complaint is who between Lamorena, et. al. and complainant herein
has the right of possession over the subject property. Hence, Atty. Baclig cannot be faulted for consenting to his clients' act
of asserting such statements.

At any rate, it must be considered that Atty. Baclig's pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against
him as an attorney.9

As regards res judicata, laches, and jurisdiction, We note that the same are not founded on substantial evidence.

However, as to the matter of forum shopping, We find that Atty. Baclig resorted to the same.

In forum shopping, the following requisites should concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.10

In this case, it must be noted that an amended complaint was filed by Lamorena, et.al. against herein complainant and
Paa before the MTCC in February 2010. In sum, such amended complaint sought for the nullification of the mortgage
contract and deed of sale which transferred the property to herein complainant and his co-defendants and the declaration
of Lamorena, et.al. as the absolute owners of the subject property. Eventually, the casebefore the MTCC was dismissed
with prejudice in an Order11 dated November 9, 2012.

However, on September 19, 2012, another amended complaint was filed by Lamorena, et.al. against complainants,
Robert and Paa, but this time, before the RTC. A cursory reading of the complaint reveals that the reliefs sought pertain to
the nullification of any and all the documents in the form of a written agreement which may be executed without the
consent of Lamorena, et.al. In esse, such complaint before the RTC prayed for similar reliefs as those which were sought
for in the complaint before the MTCC.

On this note, We rule that there was forum shopping in this case, for while the case before the MTCC was pending, Atty.
Baclig consented to the filing of another complaint before another forum, i.e., RTC. Such cases deal with the same parties
and same reliefs. Thus, a ruling in one case would resolve the other, and vice versa.
 101

Moreover, regardless of the fact that Atty. Baclig did not act as counsel in the case before the MTC, it would not exempt
him from culpability.1âwphi1 Atty. Baclig did not categorically deny the allegations of complainant regarding the
commission of forum shopping. Moreover, it is surprising that he was able to answer the 10 causes of action raised by
complainant, except the issue on forum shopping. Hence, he is deemed to have admitted that he has knowledge of the
pendency of a similar complaint before the MTC when a complaint before the RTC was filed. 12

In this regard, We emphasize that the filing of another action concerning the same subject matter runs contrary to Canon 1
and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the CPR. Canon 1 of the CPR requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 prohibits the undue delay of
a case by misusing court processes.13

We reiterate that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court's processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.

A former member of the judiciary need not be reminded of the fact that forum shopping wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
process and clogs the courts' dockets.14 As a former judge, Atty. Baclig must be mindful not only of the tenets of the legal
profession but also of the proper observance of the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find the complaintmeritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty. Vivencio S.
Baclig for violating Canon 1 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is STERNLY
WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to
respondent's record as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

25. Yagong v. Magno Garcia AC No. 10333 November 06, 2017

Second DIVISION

November 6, 2017

A.C. No. 10333

CORNELIO V. YAGONG, Complainant

vs.
CITY PROSECUTOR NEOPITO ED G. MAGNO and ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR DON S. GARCIA, Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The present case is an administrative complaint filed by Cornelio V. Yagong against City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno
and Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia for alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

The relevant facts of the case are as follows:

 102

David Flores charged complainant Cornelio V. Yagong and his neighbor, Jimmy Coronel, with violation of Presidential
Decree (PD) 16121 and theft, respectively, before the City Prosecution Office of Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del
Norte. Yagong claimed that when he filed his Counter-Affidavit on January 2, 2012, respondents City Prosecutor Neopito
Ed G. Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia had already come out with their Resolution indicting them of
said criminal cases. He contended that Magno and Garcia were bias and partial, and into the scheme of money-making for
a favorable resolution. Thus, he filed the present administrative complaint.

On the other hand, Magno and Garcia insisted that in resolving cases filed before their office, they are only guided by the
concepts of prevailing laws and jurisprudence in conducting Preliminary Investigations. They filed the proper Information
against Yagong in the performance of their official functions. As a matter of procedure, the complaint against Yagong and
Coronel was raffled among the associate prosecutors for Preliminary Investigation. The case was then assigned to Garcia
for evaluation as to the existence of probable cause to warrant indictment. After a thorough examination of all the evidence
adduced by the parties, Garcia found the existence of probable cause. In his capacity as the Approving Authority, Magno
authorized the consequent filing of the Criminal Information for Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against Yagong.

On January 30, 2016, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against Magno and Garcia, to wit: 2

WHEREFORE, the instant complaint filed against respondents - City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno
and Associate City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia is hereby DISMISSED.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

On September 24, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-542,3 which adopted the foregoing
recommendation, hence:

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
dismissing the complaint.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings and recommendation of the IBP that the instant
administrative complaint must be dismissed.1âwphi1

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised
with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges proffered against him until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of
the court, he has performed his duties in accordance with his oath. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon
the complainant and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment, this Court has consistently
held that only a clear preponderant evidence would warrant the imposition of such a harsh penalty. It means that the
record must disclose as free from doubt a case that compels the exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers. The
dubious character of the act done, as well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly demonstrated. 4

Here, Y agong miserably failed to discharge said burden.

Indubitably, Magno and Garcia were only performing their official duties of ascertaining whether or not probable cause
exists in the case before them, and filing the necessary Information if probable cause is found present. A preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his Complaint or Information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no objective except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the respondent is guilty thereof. In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not decide
whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A prosecutor merely determines the
 103

existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so. In the exercise of their powers
and in the discharge of their functions and responsibilities, prosecutors enjoy the presumption of regularity. This
presumption of regularity includes the public officer's official actuations in all the phases of his work. 5

The Court reiterates that protection is afforded to members of the Bar who are at times maliciously charged. Yagong's
failure to discharge its burden of showing that the acts of the respondent lawyers truly violated the CPR and the Lawyer's
Oath warrants the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court DISMISSES the instant Complaint against City Prosecutor
Neopito Ed G. Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

26. Torres, et al.,v. Dalangin AC No. 10758 December 5, 2017 En Banc

EN BANC

December 5, 2017

A.C. No. 10758

ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, ET AL, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent

x-----------------------x

GLENDA ALVARO, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent

x-----------------------x

ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES AND ATTY. AVE.LINO ANDRES, Respondent

x-----------------------x

ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, JR, J.:

These are four administrative complaints that were separately filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by and against substantially the same parties, particularly:
 104

(l) CBD Case No. 11-3215 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed by Atty. Rosita L.
Dela Fuente-Torres (Atty. Torres). et al., against Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin (Atty. Dalangin) and docketed
before the Court as A.C. No. l 0758:

(2) CBD Case No. 12-3292 for gross misconduct filed by Glenda Alvaro (Alvaro) against Atty. Dalangin
and docketed before the Court as A.C. No. 10759;

(3) CBD Case No. 12-3369 for gross misconduct, violation of the lawyer’s oath and violation of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres and Atty.
Avelino Andres (Atty. Andres), docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10760 ; and

(4) CBD Case No. 12-3458 for grave misconduct, dishonesty and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR filed by
Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres and docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10761.

The Antecedents

A.C. No. 10758

CBD Case No. 11-3215 is a complaint1 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed against Atty. Dalangin
by the following complainants: (1) Atty. Torres; (2) Felicidad O. Samatra (Samatra); (3) Alvaro; (4) Mary DF. Noveras
(Noveras); and (5) Generosa S. Camacho (Camacho).2

The complaint imputed upon Atty. Dalangin several breaches of his duties as a lawyer. First, it was alleged that Atty.
Dalangin filed against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer groundless suits, which were merely prompted by his
loss in a case and intended to cover up his negligence as counsel. By his acts, Atty. Dalangin committed gross misconduct,
and breached Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Rules 1.02 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Canon 11 of the CPR. 3

It appeared that prior to the institution of CBD Case No. 11-3215, a complaint for disbannent was filed against Atty. Torres
by Apolonia Marzan (Marzan) and 1V1elody Valdez (Valdez), who were clients of Atty. Dalangin and the losing parties in
an unlawful detainer case decided by Presiding Judge Efren B. Mallare (Judge Mallare) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Marzan and Valdez later disclosed to Atty. Torres that the filing of the disbarment case was
orchestrated by Atty. Dalangin, who prepared the affidavit and instructed them to sign it even without explaining the
contents and tenor of the document.

When Marzan and Valdez eventually realized that their affidavit was used to file a disbarment complaint with the IBP
against Atty. Torres, they decided to terminate the services of Atty. Dalangin. By their new counsel's advice, Marzan and
Valdez stopped attending the disbarment hearings, and the case was eventually dismissed by the IBP. Atty. Dalangin also
caused Marzan and Valdez's filing of administrative cases against Judge Mallare and Noveras, as the Clerk of Court of the
MTC, which complaints were nonetheless likewise dismissed by the Supreme Court upon the IBP’s recommendation.4

Second, Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual (Pascual), a clerk at
the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where Atty. Dalangin previously worked as district public
attorney. After Atty. Dalangin had left PAO, he retained Pascual as his private secretary, who still remained to be
employed with PAO. Atty. Dalangin and Pascual had a daughter whom they named Julienne, even when each of them had
existing marriages with some other persons.5 The affair between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual, and the paternity of Julienne,
were known to the community, especially the courts.6 Julienne was nonetheless entered in the civil registry as Pascual and
her legal husband's own child so as to conceal the fact that Atty. Dalangin was the real father. 7 The foregoing acts
allegedly breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR.

Third, Atty. Dalangin was accused of malpractice for acts that dated back to his prior employment with PAO. He allegedly
collected attorney’s fees from indigent litigants who sought his assistance, like complainant Camacho from whom he
demanded an acceptance fee of ₱8,000.00. When Camacho explained that he could only produce ₱3,000.00, Atty.
Dalangin threw the case records on a table and retorted, "Mabubuhay ba naman ang abogado [ditto]."8 Without prior
 105

authority from his superiors, Atty. Dalangin also willfully appeared in areas outside his jurisdiction as a district public
attorney.9

Fourth, the complaint included charges that pertained to Atty. Dalangin's handling of his court cases. It was claimed that
Atty. Dalangin misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court, which act constituted a breach of Rule 10.02, Canon
10 of the CPR.10 In a case for robbery filed by Samatra against Pascual, Atty. Dalangin also wielded his influence and
prepared perjured statements from supposed witnesses, a clear violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR. 11 Finally,
Atty. Dalangin violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR when he submitted in a civil case fraudulent and misleading
evidence, particularly a certificate of title without the page reflecting the annotations pertinent to the case. 12

Atty. Dalangin filed his Answer and refuted all charges. 13 He denied having a hand in the preparation of the disbarment
complaint against Atty. Torres, as he argued that neither his name nor his signature appeared in the records thereof. His
relationship with Pascual, on the other hand, was only maliciously misinterpreted. He was only a close friend of the
Pascuals, and some of Pascual’s children, including Julienne, were his godchildren. 14

Atty. Dalangin likewise denied the claim that he collected attorney's fees while he worked as a PAO lawyer. Although he
admitted appearing as a public attorney in an area that was beyond his jurisdiction, the appearance 1 was with the
Regional Public Attorney's verbal authority, claimed by Atty. Dalangin to be sufficient under office practice.15Finally, the
alleged mistakes that he committed as counsel in specific cases' presentation of evidence had been rectified in court. 16

A.C. No. 10759

CBD Case No. 12-3292, a complaint17 for gross misconduct, was filed by Alvaro against Atty. Dalangin for an incident that
happened on the morning of November 14, 2011, while Alvaro was waiting for the start of a hearing at the lobby of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Upon seeing Alvaro, Atty. Dalangin allegedly hurled
slanderous and defamatory remarks against her, as he spoke at the top of his voice and referred to her as a "certified
swindler." He also confronted and threatened Alvaro for her participation in the filing of CBD Case No. 11-3215, and then
precluded her from visiting the PAO in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Atty. Dalangin’s tirade was heard and witnessed by several
persons, and some of them executed their respective affidavits 18 to narrate the incident. The foregoing impelled Alvaro to
seek Atty. Dalangin’s disbarment for a violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, Rule 7.03, Canon 7, and Rule 8.02,
Canon 8 of the CPR.

While Atty. Dalangin admitted in his Answer19 the alleged confrontation, he denied shouting invectives at Alvaro. When he
talked to Alvaro, he merely confronted her for what he claimed were lies declared in her affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-3215.
Atty. Dalangin also warned to seek legal remedies should Alvaro fail to substantiate the truth of her testimonies.

Atty. Dalangin also admitted that he precluded Alvaro from visiting PAO, but explained that this was prompted by his
knowledge that Alvaro was a fixer, who used the name of the office and demanded money from indigent clients. For Atty.
Dalangin, Alvaro filed this complaint to get back at Atty. Dalangin for banning her at the PAO and depriving her of earning
from her illegal activities.20

A.C. No. 10760

The two other complaints, CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, were instituted by Atty. Dalangin.

In CBD Case No. 12-3369,21 Atty. Dalangin sought the disbarment of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for gross misconduct,
violation of the lawyer's oath, and breach of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR. He claimed that both lawyers
conspired with their clients in filing CBD Case No. 11-3215, even as they violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Submitted to support CBD Case No. 11-3215 was Nonilo Alejo’s (Alejo) affidavit, which contained a transcript of a
recorded telephone conversation between Alejo and one Wilma Pineda (Pineda). 22 The recording was without the prior
knowledge and consent of Pineda.23
 106

As a backgrounder, Atty. Dalangin was accused in CBD Case No. 11- 3215 of fabricating testimonies against Noveras,
who was claimed to be a vital witness in a criminal case against Pascual. In an affidavit drafted by Atty. Dalangin for
Pineda, the latter complained of Noveras and Alejo’s failure to return in full the cash bond that she posted in a case for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, even after the case had been dismissed by the trial court. This allegation was
negated in the disputed transcript, as Pineda allegedly confirmed receiving the full ₱8,000.00, but decided to give half
thereof to Alejo for a "blow-out" after her case’s dismissal.24

Both Atty. Andres and Atty. Torres disputed the complaint. Atty. Andres asserted that CBD Case No. 12-3369 was filed
only to harass and intimidate him, being the counsel of the complainants in CBD Case No. 11- 3215.25 By way of defense,
he adopted a counter-affidavit26 which he submitted in a separate complaint for violation of R.A. No. 4200 that was filed by
Atty. Dalangin with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. Atty. Andres therein argued that on the basis of Atty. Dalangin’s
allegations, the case should have been filed by Pineda against Alejo, being the purported victim and the one who recorded
the conversation, respectively.

Atty. Torres, on the other hand, pointed out that Atty. Dalangin’s reference to R.A. No. 4200 was tantamount to an
admission that the conversation actually transpired. This only confirmed a fault committed by Atty. Dalangin for the
fabrications in Pineda's earlier affidavit, which was executed purposely to destroy the credibility of Noveras. The
submission of the transcript was necessary because Atty. Dalangin’s malpractice was one of the main causes of action in
CBD Case No. 11-3215.27 Moreover, the record of the conversation between Alejo and Pineda could not be considered a
violation of R.A. No. 4200 because no wire or cable was used to tap their cellular phones. Neither party in the conversation
also complained of a supposed wiretapping.28

A.C. No. 10761

The complaint29 docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3458 was filed solely against Atty. Torres for grave misconduct,
dishonesty for violation of Article 18330 of the Revised Penal Code, and breach of Canon 1 of the CPR.

Atty. Dalangin faulted Atty. Torres for submitting in CBD Case No. 11-3215 Marzan and Valdez’s affidavit,31 which
allegedly contained untruthful statements. Marzan and Valdez knew from the beginning that they were complainants in a
disbarment case against Atty. Torres. Atty. Torres, however, later made them issue the perjured statements by using as a
leverage her own complaint32 for perjury against Marzan and Valdez, who were then pressured to sign the affidavits in
exchange for the perjury case’s dismissal.33

In her Answer34 to the complaint, Atty. Torres insisted on the truth of the statements made by Marzan and Valdez in their
affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-3215.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

The four administrative complaints were eventually consolidated and jointly resolved by the IBP.

After the parties ’ filing of their respective position papers and the conduct of a series of hearings, Investigating
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor (Investigating Commissioner) issued a Consolidated Report and
Recommendation35 dated February 11, 2013, which found sufficient bases for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from the
practice of law for three years. Atty. Dalangin’s charges against Atty. Dela Torres and Atty. Andres, on the other hand,
were recommended for dismissal.

Thus, the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation ended as follows:

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing, finding that Respondent Bayani P. Dalangin violated the provisions of
the [CPR] and his Lawyer's Oath specifically on Gross Immorality, and Gross Misconduct in CBD Case No.
11-3215 and CBD Case No. 12-3292, it is recommended that said Respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the period of three (3) years from receipt of the order with a warning that similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
 107

It is further recommended that the charges against Respondent Rosita L. dela Fuente Torres and Respondent Avelino
Andres in CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, for lack of merit be ordered dismissed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.36

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-768,37 which adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation. The resolution reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supprted by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent Dalangin is guilty of gross
immorality and gross misconduct, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of
law for three (3) years with Warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely. The case against Atty. Rosita L. dela [Fuente] Torres and Atty. Manuel Andres is
hereby DISMISSED.38

Atty. Dalangin filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a
Resolution39 dated August 8, 2014, which reads:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent/Complainant Dalangin’s Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and the Resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated June 1, 2013
is hereby AFFIRMED.40

On February 26, 2015, Atty. Dominic C. M. Solis, Director for Bar Discipline, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
transmitted the case records to the Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.41

On even date and before the Court could have rendered its final action on the disbarment complaints against Atty.
Dalangin vis-a-vis the records forwarded by the IBP, Atty. Dalangin forthwith filed with the Court a Petition for
Review,42 which questioned the IBP resolutions that, first, declared him administratively liable in CBD Case Nos. 11-3215
and 12- 3292, and second, dismissed his complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres in CBD Case Nos. 12-3369 and
12-3458.

In a Resolution43 dated June 16, 2015, the Court consolidated these cases and, without giving due course to the petition
for review, required the filing of Comments on the petition. Accordingly, a Consolidated Comment on the Petition 44 dated
August 5, 2015 was filed by Andres & Associates Law Office, as counsel for Atty. Torres, et al., being the complainants in
CBD Case Nos. 11-3215 and 12-3292, and respondents in CBD Case Nos. 12-3369 and 12-3458. Thereafter, Atty.
Dalangin filed his Reply45 to the consolidated comment.

The Court’s Ruling

Procedure from Resolutions

of the IBP Board of Governors

The Court finds it appropriate to first address the matter of Atty. Dalangin’s immediate recourse to the Court via a petition
for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors' resolve to affirm the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action on
the complaints.

When the administrative complaints were resolved by the IBP and the instant petition for review was filed in Court, the
procedure from resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in administrative cases was as provided in the former Section
 108

12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, prior to the amendments introduced by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13,
2015. The old rule read:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of' Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should
be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith
be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less
than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless
upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Co mi orders otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A
copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied)

In B.M. No. 1755 captioned Re: Clarification of Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the Court applied
this provision to address the issue therein involved, and explained its proper application in a Resolution dated June 17,
2008. The Court set the following guidelines:

In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors (BOG)] that exonerates the respondent or
imposes a sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a
petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision shall
become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished this Court.

If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for
reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall
first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate the assailed resolution with the entire case
records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses without any motion for reconsideration
having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court the resolution with the entire case
records for appropriate action. (Emphases supplied)

Nowhere in his petition did Atty. Dalangin attempt to justify his immediate filing of the petition for review questioning the
IBP resolutions that recommended his suspension. It could nonetheless be inferred from the circumstances that Atty.
Dalangin's chosen course of action was to preclude the forfeiture of his right to question the dismissal of the administrative
cases where he served as complainant, given that Section 12(c) provides that where the respondent is exonerated, (t)he
case shall be deemed terminated unless upon a petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with Supreme
Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. For this reason,
the Court refused to make an outright denial of Atty. Dalangin’s petition for review notwithstanding the fact that it
questioned the resolve to suspend him from the practice of law. Considering that the petition likewise covered the IBP's
dismissal of the disbarment cases against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 16, 2015,
directed the filing of comments on the petition.
 109

In any case, it must still be stressed that the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from
the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering that the Court still had to release its final action on the
matter.46 It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. 47 The
factual findings of the IBP can only be recommendatory. Its recommended penalties are also, by their nature,
recommendatory.48 In light of these precepts, the Court will then not refuse a review of the IBP's recommendation for Atty.
Dalangin’s suspension notwithstanding the premature filing of the petition. In fact, an examination of the IBP resolutions for
his suspension is warranted as a matter of course, even in the absence of a petition, because it is the Court that has the
duty to take a final action on any determination of the IBP for a lawyer's suspension from the practice of law or disbarment.

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court had in fact been later amended by B.M. No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015. Section 12
thereof now reads:

Sec. 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.

b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the
Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the
respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and
distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submission of the
Investigator's report.

c) The Board’s resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall
be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.

d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.

In Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis,49 the Court emphasized that the amendments reiterated the principle that only the Court has
the power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. Factual findings and recommendations of the Commission
on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the IBP are recommendatory, subject to review by the Court.50

As the Court now reviews the IBP’s resolve to dismiss the complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, it then also
enters its final action on the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law
for three years, as the IBP cited gross misconduct, violations of the CPR and breach of the lawyer's oath as grounds.

A.C. No. 10758

<p" style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128); font-family: arial, verdana; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal;
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color:
rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">Gross Immorality

Among several cited grounds, the IBP’s recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for three years
was on the pretext that he publicly and openly maintained a romantic relationship with Pascual even when their marriages
with their respective spouses subsisted.

Allegedly, the affair further resulted in the birth of the child Julienne, who was believed to be Atty. Dalangin’s daughter
even when he turned down a challenge for a DNA test that could prove the child's true filiation. 51

In his report, the Investigative Commissioner specifically referred to the following evidence to support his finding of an
immoral relationship between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual:
 110

2. That Complainant Alvaro who executed an affidavit regarding the illicit and immoral relation of [Atty.
Dalangin] with [Pascual] for the reason that she was formerly [close] to [Pascual] and the latter confided to
her that she (Pascual) [did] not love her husband anymore and the child called [Atty. Dalangin] "Papa
attorney" (Affidavit of Alvaro as Exh. "F").

3. That Ligaya Agrave[,] a neighbor of [Pascual,] likewise executed an affidavit that the child ["Julienne"] is
the daughter of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual], that she used to see [Atty. Dalangin] taking care of [Julienne]
when she was still a baby and when she grew up already, [Atty. Dalangin] used to accompany the child in
their school tour and also her graduation. That the child as she grew older is a look[-]alike of [Atty.
Dalangin]. (Affidavit of Ligaya Agrave marked as Exh. "G").

4. That the illicit affair of [Atty. Dalangin] with his former Clerk in the PAO, Talavera, Nueva Ecija was well
known in Talavera, in the entire judiciary in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and even in the community of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva [E]cija[.] [(L]etter to the Ombudsman dated Aug. 18, 2011 of Felicidad Sumatra is
marked as Exh. "H").

5. That [Atty. Dalangin] refused when challenged for a DNA test.

6. Complainants submitted xxx pictures of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual] together with their daughter
[Julienne] taken in far away Puerto Prinsesa marked as Exh. I and I-1.

7. That [Atty. Dalangin] continued to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife
shows his lack of good moral character.52

Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of marriage, the family,
and the community. Illicit relationships likewise constitute a violation of Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which
states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State."53 When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual recourse is
for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.

Upon the Court’s review, however, it finds no sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed illicit affair with
Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed between them was not adequately proved.

The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The Court explained in Saladaga v. Astorga:54

Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in administrative
cases, such as the ones at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt
as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 55

In Reyes v. Nieva, 56 the Court reiterated this rule on the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings, as it held:

Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, which was promulgated
just this June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence,
i.e., that 'amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. x x x.

Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further confusion
on the proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.

The rule is taken in light of other settled principles that apply for a proper disposition of administrative cases. In Advincula v.
Macabata,57 the Court emphasized:
 111

The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the
exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. Thus, the adage that he who asserts not he who denies,
must prove. xxx.58

Further, the Court emphasized in Cabas v. Sususco59 the oft-repeated rule that "mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence."60

With careful consideration of the foregoing tenets, the Court's perusal of the records reveals an insufficiency of evidence
that could warrant the recommended suspension from the practice of law.

To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin’s gross immorality harped
only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledge on the wrongful relationship between Atty.
Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could have led them to their conclusion were scant and unsubstantiated.
The most concrete proof that they could offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the child's birth certificate, a public
document, expressly indicated the girl’s father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty. Dalangin. 61 Julienne’s baptismal
certificate62 also provided such fact, along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin’s defense on his closeness to Julienne for
being her godfather.

It would be unfair to Atty. Dalangin, more so for the child whose filiation is in a way needlessly dragged into this case, for
the Court to affirm the assertions in the complaint and the IBP's findings and conclusions on the basis of the available
evidence. The alleged similarities in the physical appearances of Atty. Dalangin and Julienne were but lame and dismal
validations of the complainants’ vehement claim of paternity. Even the photographs 63 of Atty. Dalangin, Pascual and
Julienne in what appeared to be a trip to Pue1io Princesa, Palawan were insufficient to support a conclusion on the
unlawful relations. The lone photo where Atty. Dalangin appeared with Pascual and Julienne, who were apparently merely
waiting for boarding in an airport terminal, utterly failed to manifest any romantic or filial bond among them. It was also
explained through an affidavit64 executed by spouses Dante Capindian and Timotea Jamito that Atty. Dalangin was a
principal sponsor, while Pascual’s family were guests, in their wedding which was held on August 6, 2011 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. Apparently, the photos were taken during the said trip. Pascual’s husband, Edgardo, was also present
for the occasion.

The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally absolved of fault. While he vehemently denied any romantic
relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness with the latter's family, including her children. It was such
display of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful relationship and belief that
Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more prudent and mindful of his actions and the
perception that his acts built upon the public, particularly because he and Pascual were both married. "As officers of the
court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community." 65 As keepers of public faith, lawyers are
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with great caution." 66

The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should suffice
under the circumstances. The following pronouncement in Advincula v. Macabata67 is pertinent:

While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an
erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice,
but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence
of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his
brethren in the profession and to the public.

x x x Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while
those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser
sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to
continue in the practice of law. x x x68
 112

Gross Misconduct and

Malpractice

Atty. Dalangin was also charged, and recommended for suspension from the practice of law, for several other acts
involving use of misleading evidence in court and preparation of affidavits with pe1jured statements to support cases and
complaints for disbarment. When he still served as a public attorney, he likewise allegedly demanded acceptance fees
from indigent clients, and appeared in courts beyond his area of jurisdiction. Even these charges, however, were not
supported by evidence that could warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension. And while there were several other charges
included in the complaint against Atty. Dalangin, the accusations were actually for actions that should be attributed not to
him, but to other individuals like Pascual.

Specifically on the claim that Atty. Dalangin failed to fully explain to Marzan and Valdez the contents of the affidavit that
supported a disbarment case against Atty. Torres, the Court takes note of the fact that the alleged failure to explain did not
necessarily equate to the falsity of the claims therein made. It refers to the joint affidavit executed by Marzan and Valdez,
and which was attached to the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215, whereby affiants merely alleged that they signed the
affidavit even when they were not fully apprised of its contents. 69 It was not alleged that they were fraudulently lured or
tricked by Atty. Dalangin into signing the complaint, and that the charges therein hurled against Atty. Torres were
absolutely false. Thus, the claim that Atty. Dalangin knowingly brought a groundless suit against a fellow lawyer had no leg
to stand on.

The charge of malpractice for Atty. Dalangin's supposed demand for attorney's fees while he still worked as a PAO lawyer
also remained unsubstantiated by evidence.1âwphi1 Such serious imputation could not have been adequately established
by an affidavit that was executed in 2010 by a lone person, Camacho, from whom the demand for ₱8,000.00 was allegedly
made in 2001.70 Similarly, while Atty. Dalangin admitted to have appeared in courts beyond his area of jurisdiction as
public attorney, he claimed to have obtained permission therefor from the Regional Public Attorney, a defense which the
complainants failed to refute. In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption that the respondent regularly
performed his duty in accordance with his oath shall prevail,71 especially as the Court considers it highly improbable for the
courts where appearances were made to fail to notice such patent irregularity, if Atty. Dalangin was indeed not authorized
to perform his acts before their courts as a public attorney.

Anent the failure of Atty. Dalangin to submit all pages of a certificate of title in Civil Case No. 336-SD(04)AF pending with
the RTC, Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and entitled Tamayo v. Philippine National Bank, it has been explained
that the error had been corrected at once during the pre-trial conference.72

Among the other charges imputed against Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, the Court only finds fault for his misquote of
jurisprudence cited in a pleading filed with the RTC, Branch 35, Gapan City for Cad. Case No. 1564-05 entitled Bangko
Luzon v. Diaz. It was narrated in the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215 that:

14. x x x [T]he cited jurisprudence is hereto quoted:

"If a court of competent jurisdiction annulled the foreclosure sale of the property in question, the issuance
of a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial."

15. In the said case of BPI vs. Tampipi, there is nothing mentioned about the cessation of the ministerial
function of the court but instead what is clearly stated in the decision are the following:

"Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court." 73

Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit of the cited ruling. 74 As counsel and officer of the court,
however, with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the task of ascertaining the truth, Atty. Dalangin was remiss in the
discharge of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule 10.02 thereof provides:
 113

"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of the opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved."

The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be an appropriate penalty for the act. While the Court detests Atty.
Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited jurisprudence and,
accordingly, calls his attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate.

A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation was Atty.
Dalangin’s own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence. There was no clear indication that the statement was intended to
mislead the court or commit a falsehood; there was no brazen deviation from the principle or doctrine that was embodied in
the jurisprudence's original text.

A.C. No. 10759

In relation to A.C. No. 10759 on Atty. Dalangin’s altercation on November 14, 2011 with Alvaro as the latter was waiting for
the start of a court hearing in the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the records include affidavits executed by witnesses
who did not appear to have any reason to falsely testify against Atty. Dalangin on the incident.

Affiant Josephine Rivera, in particular, who claimed to be also then waiting for a scheduled hearing, allegedly saw Atty.
Dalangin shout and point at Alvaro, as he threatened to file a case against the latter. 75 Two security guards stationed at the
trial court, evidently disinterested persons who would not have wrongly testified against Atty. Dalangin, likewise confirmed
that such heated confrontation actually transpired. Pertinent portions of the guards’ affidavit 76 read:

1. Na noong ika-14 ng Nobyembre, 2011, ganap na ika-8:45 ng umaga humigit kumulang, ha bang
nakaupo si [Alvaro] sa "bench", upuang mahaba malapit sa aming kinauupuan dito sa pintuan ng Hall of
Justice, Regional Trial Court, Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija at kausap niya ang isa niyang kasama,
dumating si Atty. Bayani Dalangin at pagkakita kay [Alvaro] ay pinagsisigawan ito at maraming sinabi
laban kay [Alvaro];

2. Na maraming nakarinig, nakakita at nagulat sa pangyayaring ito;

x x x x77

For the Court, Atty. Dalangin erred in his conduct subject of the complaint, especially since his outburst was carried out
within the court premises and in the presence of several persons who readily witnessed his fit of anger. Part of Atty.
Dalangin’s duties as a lawyer is to maintain the honor that is due the profession. Members of the legal profession should
commit to the mandates of Canon 7, particularly Rule 7 .03 thereof, to wit:

CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD TI-IE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION XX X.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Although Atty. Dalangin, at that instant, could have been stirred by his frustration or resentment for the disbarment case
filed against him by Alvaro, such circumstance could not have absolved him from any responsibility for his conduct. At
most, this only serves to mitigate the penalty that the Court deems appropriate to impose, as it likewise considers its
finding that Alvaro’s allegations in CBD Case No. 11-3215 on the supposed extra-marital affair of Atty. Dalangin with
Pascual were indeed not backed by sufficient evidence. The Court finds it appropriate to impose upon Atty. Dalangin
a fine of ₱5,000.00, with a stem warning that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same
or similar offense in the future.
 114

Although the Court has admonished Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, it finds the imposition of this fine still suitable under
the circumstances, given that A.C. No. 10759, although resolved jointly with A.C. No. 10758, is a distinct administrative
case that covers a separate complaint that was instituted solely by Alvaro. The severity of this offense likewise varies from
the other breaches for which the Court has determined the admonition to be appropriate.

A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761

The Court affirms the decision of the IBP to dismiss the administrative complaints filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty.
Torres and Atty. Andres.

In A.C. No. 10760, Atty. Dalangin sought to support his complaint by referring to the supposed participation of Atty. Torres
and Atty. Andres in a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He asserted that the act also violated the lawyer's oath, and
breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR which reads:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

The alleged violation of the statute is a serious charge that the Court cannot take lightly, in view of the breach of the basic
and constitutional right to privacy of communication that inevitably results from the act. In brief, the law prohibits any
person "to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder x x x."79 It likewise forbids any person from possessing, replaying or furnishing
transcriptions of communications that are obtained in violation of the law.

In this case, Atty. Dalangin claimed that Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres conspired with Alejo on the wrongful recording of a
private communication with Pineda, along with the use of the transcript thereof to support Alejo’s affidavit in CBD Case No.
11-3215. However, Pineda's own denial of the truth of the statements in the transcription lends doubt as to the allegation of
a purported secret recording of an actual conversation. While Pineda denied knowledge that her telephone conversation
with Alejo was recorded by the latter, she still refused to acknowledge the veracity of the assertions that she allegedly
made as contained in the transcript,80 which then appears to be a rejection of the supposed conversation. Given the
circumstances, the IBP correctly ruled that Atty. Dalangin failed to substantiate the charges in his complaint against Atty.
Torres and Atty. Andres.

The same conclusion equally applies in A.C. No. 10761. The commission of perjury was imputed upon Atty. Torres, as the
person who prepared the affidavits of Marzan and Valdez. As witnesses in CBD Case No. 11-3215, Marzan and Valdez
claimed that Atty. Dalangin prepared an affidavit for Atty. Torres' disbarment without fully explaining to them the contents
thereof. The fact that Atty. Torres induced the affiants to make perjured statements, however, was not established by clear
and convincing proof. Even granting that statements of affiants were eventually determined to be inaccurate and untruthful,
it would be wrong to at once ascribe error or fault upon the lawyers who drafted the affidavits, in the absence of clear and
sufficient proof that they actively participated in the intentional commission of a fraud or declaration of fabricated
statements.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:

(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in handling
his personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely;
 115

(2) In A.C. No. 10759, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for his breach of Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be
imposed upon him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future; and

(3) In A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin’s petition for review is DENIED. The
Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated June
21, 2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2014, insofar as the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the following complaints:
(1) CBD Case No. 12-3369 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres; and (2) CBD Case No.
12-3458 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres.

SO ORDERED.

27. Rico v. Salutan AC No. 9257 March 5, 2018

SECOND DIVISION

March 5, 2018

A.C. No. 9257

[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3490]

EDGAR M. RICO, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. REYNALDO G. SALUTAN, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The present case was initiated through a letter complaint to Judge Antonio P. Laolao, Sr., Presiding Judge of Municipal
Trial Court, Branch 6, Davao City, against respondent Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan for purportedly misleading the court and
for contempt of court.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Complainant Edgar M. Rico explained that his · relatives were plaintiffs in a civil case for Forcible Entry before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Davao City. The court had ordered the defendants to restore plaintiffs'
possession of the subject properties, remove all structures that had been introduced on the same, and to pay reasonable
sum for their occupation of the properties.

Milagros Villa Abrille, one of the defendants in the aforementioned case, filed a separate case for Unlawful Detainer
against Rico covering the same property. On November 6, 2001, the MTCC ordered Rico to vacate the premises.
Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTCC ruling and issued a Writ of Execution.

On July 9, 2004, the court's sheriff executed a Return Service stating that the writ could not be served on Rico since the
property subject of the case was different from the lot which Rico was occupying. Thereafter, Villa Abrille, through her
counsel, respondent Atty. Salutan, filed a motion for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution. On May 15, 2007, the
sheriff executed a Return of Service again since the alias writ could not be enforced for the same reason as the first time.
On April 4, 2008, Villa Abrille once again filed a motion for the issuance of another Alias Writ of Execution, which, this time,
 116

the MTCC denied. Hence, Villa Abrille went to the Court for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus to compel the MTCC to
issue another Writ of Execution and for the sheriff to implement the same. The Court, however, dismissed the case.

For the fourth (4th) time, Villa Abrille filed another motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. This time, the MTCC
granted it. Consequently, the court sheriff issued a Final Notice to Vacate to Rico on June 10, 2010. On June 15, 2010, the
same sheriff led the demolition of the house and other improvements on the property. Thus, Rico filed the administrative
complaint against Atty. Salutan.

For his part, Atty. Salutan denied the charges and argued that he merely advocated for his client's cause and did the same
within the bounds of the law and of the rules. He merely did what a zealous lawyer would naturally do in representation of
his client.

On January 2, 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan, to wit:

Foregoing premises considered, the undersigned believes and so holds that the complaint is without merit.
Accordingly, he recommends DISMISSAL of the same.1

On March 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-357,2 which adopted the
abovementioned recommendation, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

Thereafter, Rico moved for reconsideration of said Resolution. On March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed
another resolution, Resolution No. XXI-2014-183,3 denying said motion for reconsideration and approving its 2013
Resolution, to wit:

RESOLVED to DENY Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been.
threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-357 dated March 21, 2013 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendation of the IBP that the instant
administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan must be dismissed.

In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 4

Here, despite the charges hurled against Atty. Salutan, Rico failed to show any badge of deception on the lawyer's part.
There was no court decision declaring that Villa Abrille’s title was fake or that it had encroached on Rico's property. All that
Atty. Salutan did was to zealously advocate for the cause of his client. He was not shown to have misled or unduly
influenced the court through misinformation. He merely persistently pursued said cause and he did so within the bounds of
the law and the existing rules. He succeeded at finally having the writ of execution, albeit at the fourth (4 th ) time,
implemented.

The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against
him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath. Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to
 117

present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.5

Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, ·is not determined mathematically by the
numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends on its practical effect in inducing belief for the
party on the judge trying the case.6

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, which is that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
cannot be given credence. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to preponderance of
evidence - is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As
case law elucidates, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it also involves neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the. profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 7

In the case at bar, Rico seriously failed to discharge said burden of proof. He failed to establish his claims through relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion - that is that Atty. Salutan indeed misled
the court, directly or indirectly, in the course of championing his client’s cause.

In a court battle, there must necessarily be a victor and a vanquished. A vain effort from the vanquished litigant should not,
however, cause him to immediately accuse the victor of resorting to deceptive ploy or tactics, especially when he had been
given sufficient opportunity to counter every move of the victor in court. One should be magnanimous enough to
acknowledge the triumph of one who had waged a fair legal battle against another in a court of law.

Members of the Bar must be reminded that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is no less a virtue, if channelled in the right
direction.1âwphi1 However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper
place of courts in our system of government. While zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's cause is desirable,
unprofessional conduct stemming from such zeal or enthusiasm is always disfavored. 8 Such undesirable conduct,
however, is not shown to be extant in this case.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the instant Complaint against Atty. Reynaldo G.
Salutan for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

28. Zarcilla and Bumanglag v. Quesada AC No. 7186 March 13, 2018 En Banc

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018

ROMEO A. ZARCILLA AND MARITA BUMANGLAG, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR., Respondent.

DECISION
 118

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated February 9, 2006 filed by complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla (Zarcilla) and
Marita Bumanglag (Bumanglag) against respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada) for gross misconduct.

The facts are as follows:

On August 5, 2002, complainant Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-Complaint2 against respondent Atty. Quesada and
complainant Marita Bumanglag, among others, for falsification of public documents docketed as I.S. No. 02-128-SF.
Zarcilla alleged that Bumanglag conspired with certain spouses Maximo Quezada and Gloria Quezada (Spouses Quezada)
and Atty. Quesada to falsify a Deed of Sale 3 dated April 12, 2002 by making it appear that his parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla
and Tarcela A. Zarcilla, sold a parcel of land under TCT No. T-18490 in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite knowledge
that his parents were already deceased since March 4, 2001 and January 9, 1988, respectively, as per Death
Certificates4issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Santo Tomas, La Union. Said signing of deed of sale
was allegedly witnessed by a certain Norma Zafe and Bumanglag, and notarized by Atty. Quesada.

Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also claimed that on March 20, 2002, the Spouses Quezada filed a
petition for the administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 18490 where they presented the Joint Affidavit
of his then already deceased parents, the spouses Perfecto Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla as the petitioners. 5 Said
Joint-Affidavit of the Spouses Quezada was again notarized by Atty. Quesada.

However, on October 9, 2002, Bumanglag executed a Counter-affidavit6 in the same case where she claimed to be the
real owner of the property after Perfecto Zarcilla sold the same to her mother. Bumanglag also stated therein that she
facilitated the sale transaction to the Spouses Quezada which, in effect, exonerated her co-respondents, including Atty.
Quesada, the pertinent portion of which reads:

xxxx

6. That after the death of my mother I needed money to pay for the expenses she incurred when she was
sick and need medication and all the (sic) to pay for the expenses of her burial. I offered to sell the
property to Spouses MAX QUEZADA and GLORIA QUEZADA. I showed them the Deed of Sale between
PERFECTO ZARCILLA and my mother. I also showed them the paper that my mother signed giving me
the land;

7. That the Spouses Quezada told me that they will buy the land provided I will be the one to transfer the
said land to their name. They gave me an advance payment so that I could transfer the land to them. I
made it appear that PERFECTO ZARCILLA sold the property to the said spouses because the title
of the land was still in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla. I did not have [any] criminal intent when I did
it because the land no longer belong to Perfecto Zarcilla. I did all the subsequent acts like Petition for
Reconstitution in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla because then, the title was still in his name. However, there
was no damage to the heirs of PERFECTO ZARCILLA because the land had long been sold to my mother
and the sons and daughters no longer had no legal claim to the said land;

8. That SPOUSES MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA did not falsify any document because
I was the one who facilitated the transaction knowing that the land I was selling really belonged to
me. Not one of my brothers and (sic) sisters never (sic) complained when I sold the land. I just
delivered the document to the Spouses MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA including the
title in their name. I was paid the balance after the Certificate of Title in their name was finally delivered. 7

All other respondents in the said falsification case, except for Atty. Quesada, also filed their respective counter-affidavits
where they reiterated Bumanglag's admission.8
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In a Resolution9 dated April 14, 2003, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union held Bumanglag only to undergo
trial. All other respondents, including Atty. Quesada who did not even file his counter-affidavit, were exonerated for
insufficiency of evidence.

Both Zarcilla and Bumanglag filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but both were denied. Consequently,
Bumanglag was indicted for four counts of falsification of public documents before the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas,
La Union, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3594, 3595, 3597, and 3598.

However, Zarcilla later on withdrew said cases when he learned that Bumanglag was not aware of the contents of her
counter-affidavit when she signed the same. He also found out that Bumanglag was deceived by her co accused, including
Atty. Quesada. Thus, upon the motion of Zarcilla, in an Order 10dated July 27, 2005, the court dismissed all falsification
cases against Bumanglag.

In a Resolution11 dated June 26, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada to file a comment on the complaint
against him.

On August 28, 2006, Atty. Quesada file a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment 12 due to voluminous workload. On
September 18, 2006, Atty. Quesada filed a second motion for extension to file comment. In a Resolution13 dated
November 20, 2006, the Court granted Atty. Quesada's motions for extension with a warning that the second motion for
extension shall be the last and that no further extension will be given.

On September 26, 2007, due to Atty. Quesada's failure to file a comment on the complaint against him within the extended
period which expired on October 17, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada to (a) show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt from such failure, and (b) comply with the Resolution dated June 26,
2006 by submitting the required comment.14

Due to Atty. Quesada's failure to comply with the Show Cause Resolution dated September 26, 2007, the Court resolved
to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada, a fine of P1,000.00, and (b) require Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated
June 26, 2006 by filing the comment required therein.15

No payment of fine was made as of January 13, 2009 as evidenced by a Certification 16 which was issued by Araceli
Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer.

Again, failing to comply with the directives of the Court to pay the fine imposed against him and to submit his comment, the
Court, in a Resolution17 dated February 16, 2009, resolved to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada an additional fine of
P1,000.00, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fines are not paid within 10 days from notice, and (b) order
Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 to submit his comment on the complaint against him.
Atty. Quesada was also warned that should he fail to comply, he shall be ordered arrested and detained by the National
Bureau of Investigation until he shall have made the compliance or until such time as the Court may order.

Despite repeated notices and warnings from the Court, no payment of fine was ever made as of September 3, 2010 as
evidenced by a Certification18 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer. On
December 28, 2010, another Certification19 was issued anew showing no record of payment of fine by Atty. Quesada.

Thus, in a Resolution20 dated March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to (1) increase the fine imposed on Atty. Quesada to
P3,000.00, or imprisonment often (10) days if such fine is not paid within the prescribed period; and (2) require Atty.
Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required comment on the complaint.

No payment of fine was made as of July 12, 2011, as evidenced by a Certification21 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga,
Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer.

It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the numerous Resolutions of the Court to pay the fine imposed upon
him and submit comment on the complaint against him, in a Resolution22 dated August 24, 2011, the Court ordered the
 120

arrest of Atty. Quesada, and directed the NBI to arrest and detain him until he shall have compli[ed] with the Court's
Resolution dated March 9, 2011. Subsequently, the Court issued a Warrant of Arrest.23

Apparently forced by his looming detention, after five (5) years, Atty. Quesada filed his Comment 24 dated October 10, 2011,
in compliance with Resolution dated June 26, 2006. He claimed that he is a victim of political harassment, vengeance and
retribution, and that the instant case against him was filed solely for the purpose of maligning his person. Attached to his
compliance was postal money order in the amount of P3,000.00 as payment for the fine imposed upon him.

In a Letter25 dated October 10, 2011, Atty. Ricardo S. Pangan, Jr., Regional Director of the NBI, informed the Court that
Atty. Quesada voluntarily surrendered before the agents of the NBI on October 11, 2011, and claimed that he had already
complied with the Resolution of the Court. Atty. Quesada submitted a copy of his comment and payment of fine, thus, on
the same day, Atty. Quesada was immediately released from custody.

On February 1, 2012, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.26

During the mandatory conference before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), only Bumanglag and her
counsel appeared. Atty. Quesada failed to appear thereto, thus, the mandatory conference was reset to July 11, 2012.
However, on July 11, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the mandatory conference was reset anew to July
25, 2012. Meanwhile, Bumanglag informed the IBP-CBD that co-complainant Romeo Zarcilla passed away in 2005.

On July 23, 2012, Atty. Quesada requested that the mandatory conference be reset due to health reasons. He submitted
his Medical Certificate dated May 2, 2012 showing that he underwent a head operation and that he is still on recovery
period.

On July 25, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the parties were directed to appear on August 23, 2012 and
submit their respective verified position papers. However, on August 23, 2012, only Bumanglag and her counsel appeared,
and Atty. Quesada failed to appear anew. Thus, considering that the parties were duly notified of the hearing, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.

On May 30, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Quesada be
disbarred from the practice of law.

In a Resolution No. XXI-2015-097 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

RULING

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers.27 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of
the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the
desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent
to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.

However, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. As in this case, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 28
 121

Thus, in the instant case, the allegations of falsification or forgery against Atty. Quesada must be competently proved
because falsification or forgery cannot be presumed. As such, the allegations should first be established and determined in
appropriate proceedings, like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by such proceedings that the last word on the falsity or
forgery can be uttered by a court of law with the legal competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to
determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply because the sole issue to be addressed and determined therein is
whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Accordingly, We decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the
subject affidavit in the absence of the prior determination thereof in the appropriate proceeding. 29

We, however, noted that Atty. Quesada Violated the notarial law for his act of notarizing the: (1) Deed of Sale 30 dated April
12, 2002 purportedly executed by and between the spouses Maximo F. Quezada and Gloria D. Quezada, the buyers, and
complainant Zarcilla's parents, the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla; and the (2) Joint Affidavit 31 dated March
20, 2002 purportedly executed by the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla for the reconstitution of TCT No.
T-18490, when in both occasions the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla could no longer execute said
documents and appear before Atty. Quesada since they have long been deceased as evidenced by their death certificates.
Tarcela Zarcilla died on January 9, 1988, while Perfecto Zarcilla died on March 4, 2001. 32

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal appearance
before the notary public:

xxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable
to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free
act or deed. Here, Atty. Quesada's act of notarizing the deed of sale appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud.
This is more evident when he certified in the acknowledgment thereof that he knew the vendors and knew them to be the
same persons who executed the document. When he then solemnly declared that such appeared before him and
acknowledged to him that the document was the vendor's free act and deed despite the fact that the vendors cannot do so
as they were already deceased, Atty. Quesada deliberately made false representations, and was not merely negligent.

Thus, by his actuations, Atty. Quesada violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized
the deed of sale without all the affiant's personal appearance. His failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not
only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public
and in degrading the function of notarization. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the
oath in an acknowledgment orjurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath
under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. 33

Time and again, We have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.34
 122

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.35

Aside from Atty. Quesada's violation of his duty as a notary public, what this Court find more deplorable was his defiant
stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of the Court's directives to file his comment on the
complaint. Despite several Court resolutions, notices, directives and imposition of fines for Atty. Quesada's compliance
and payment, he ignored the same for more than five years. Consequently, this case has dragged on for an unnecessary
length of time. More than five (5) years have already elapsed from the time the Court issued the first Resolution dated
June 26, 2006 which required Atty. Quesada to file his comment until his eventual submission of comment on October 10,
2011. It took a warrant of arrest to finally move Atty. Quesada to file his Comment and pay the fines imposed upon him.
While the Court has been tolerant of his obstinate refusal to comply with its directives, he shamelessly ignored the same
and wasted the Court's time and resources.

And even with the submission of his comment, he did not offer any apology and/or any justification for his long delay in
complying with the directives/orders of this Court. We surmised that when Atty. Quesada finally complied with the Court's
directives, his compliance was neither prompted by good faith or willingness to obey the Court nor was he remorseful of
his infractions but was actually only forced to do so considering his impending arrest. There is, thus, no question that his
failure or obstinate refusal without justification or valid reason to comply with the Court's directives constitutes
disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of Court, amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect.36

Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is in itself alone is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. His cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Atty. Quesada's obstinate refusal to comply with the
Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful
orders which this Court will not tolerate."37

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect
for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to court orders and processes. 38 Considering Atty. Quesada's
predisposition to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. Worse, with his repeated disobedience to this Court's
orders, Atty. Quesada displayed no remorse as to his misconduct which, thus, proved himself unworthy of membership in
the Philippine Bar. Clearly, Atty. Quesada is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the
ultimate penalty of disbarment.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find respondent ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA JR. GUILTY of gross misconduct
and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is,
thus, ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken-off of the Roll of Attorneys, effective
 123

immediately. We, likewise, REVOKE his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him
from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of
respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof
to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED. Carpio,*Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur. Sereno, C.J., on leave.

29. Goopio v. Maglalang AC No.10555 JuJy 31, 2018 En Banc

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10555, July 31, 2018

EVELYN T. GOOPIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARIEL D. MAGLALANG, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a petition1 filed by respondent Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang (Atty. Maglalang) challenging the Resolution 2 dated
December 14, 2012 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors (IBP Board) which imposed upon
him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered the restitution of P400,000.00 to
complainant Evelyn T. Goopio (Goopio).

The case originated from a disbarment complaint[3 filed by Goopio charging Atty. Maglalang with violation of Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

In her disbarment complaint, Goopio primarily alleged that sometime in 2005, in relation to her need to resolve property
concerns with respect to 12 parcels of land located in Sagay City, Negros Occidental, she engaged the services of Atty.
Maglalang to represent her either through a court action or through extra-judicial means. Having been employed in
Switzerland at the time, she allegedly likewise executed a General Power of Attorney4 on June 18, 2006 in favor of Atty.
Maglalang, authorizing him to settle the controversy covering the properties with the developer, including the filing of a
petition for rescission of contract with damages.5

Goopio further alleged that Atty. Maglalang supposedly informed her that the petition for rescission was filed and pending
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, and that as payment of the same, the latter requested and received
 124

the total amount of P400,000.00 from her.6 Goopio similarly alleged that Atty. Maglalang presented an official
receipt7 covering the alleged deposit of the P400,000.00 with the court.8

Goopio further contended that Atty. Maglalang rendered legal services in connection with the petition, including but not
limited to, appearances at mediations and hearings, as well as the preparation of a reply between the months of December
2006 and April 2007, in relation to which she was supposedly billed a total of P114,000.00, P84,000.00 of which she paid
in full.9

Goopio also claimed that she subsequently discovered that no such petition was filed nor was one pending before the RTC
or any tribunal,10 and that the purported inaction of Atty. Maglalang likewise resulted in the continued accrual of interest
payments as well as other charges on her properties.11

She alleged that Atty. Maglalang admitted to all these when he was confronted by Goopio's representative and niece,
Milogen Canoy (Canoy), which supposedly resulted in Goopio's revocation12 of the General Power of Attorney on May 17,
2007. Goopio finally alleged that through counsel, she made a formal demand 13 upon Atty. Maglalang for restitution, which
went unheeded; hence, the disbarment complaint. 14

In his verified answer,15 Atty. Maglalang specifically denied Goopio's claims for being based on hearsay, untrue, and
without basis in fact. He submitted that contrary to Goopio's allegations, he had not met or known her in 2005 or 2006, let
alone provided legal services to her as her attorney-in-fact or counsel, or file any petition at her behest. He specifically
denied acceding to any General Power of Attorney issued in his favor, and likewise submitted that Goopio was not in the
Philippines when the document was purportedly executed. He further firmly denied receiving P400,000.00 from Goopio,
and issuing any receipts.16 He also added that he had not received any demand letter.17

Clarifying the capacity in which he knew Goopio, Atty. Maglalang explained that Ma. Cecilia Consuji (Consuji), Goopio's
sister and his client since 2006, introduced him to Goopio sometime in 2007, where an altercation ensued between them. 18

As special and affirmative defenses, Atty. Maglalang further countered that without his knowledge and participation,
Consuji surreptitiously used his name and reputation, and manipulated the supposed "engagement" of his services as
counsel for Goopio through the execution of a falsified General Power of Attorney. Atty. Maglalang likewise submitted that
Consuji collected huge sums of money from Goopio by furtively using his computerized letterhead and billing statements.
In support of the same, he alleged that in fact, Consuji's name appeared on the annexes, but there was no mention of her
in the actual disbarment complaint for purposes of isolating her from any liability. 19

To bolster his affirmative defense that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and Goopio, Atty. Maglalang
submitted that in fact, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City had earlier dismissed two complaints filed by
Goopio against him for charges of falsification of public documents and estafa by false pretenses, 20 alleging the same set
of facts as narrated in the present disbarment complaint. Atty. Maglalang submits that in a Resolution dated February 14,
2008, the City Prosecutor summarily dismissed the complaints for being hearsay. 21

In a Report and Recommendation22 dated August 13, 2010, IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez) found that a lawyer-client relationship existed between complainant Goopio and Atty. Maglalang. This was
found to be sufficiently proven by the documentary evidence submitted by Goopio. Commissioner Fernandez did not give
any credence to the specific denials of Atty. Maglalang. Moreover, the IBP held that the demand letter of Attys. Lily Uy
Valencia and Ma. Aleta C. Nuñez dated June 5, 2007 sufficiently established Atty. Maglalang's receipt of the amount of
P400,000.00. Commissioner Fernandez held that had Atty. Maglalang found the demand letter suspect and without basis,
he should have sent a reply denying the same.23

He recommended that Atty. Maglalang be found guilty of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended from the practice of law for two years, and ordered to return to
Goopio the amount of P400,000.00, under pains of disbarment.24

In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board affirmed with modification the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Fernandez, to wit:
 125

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's violation of
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Ariel D. Maglalang is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years and Ordered to
Return to complainant the amount of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made.25

Atty. Maglalang filed a motion for reconsideration26 of the IBP Board's Resolution. In said motion for reconsideration, Atty.
Maglalang prayed for full exoneration on the ground that he was also merely a victim of the manipulations made by his
former client, Consuji, further contending that if any fault could be attributed to him, it would only be his failure to detect and
discover Consuji's deceit until it was too late. The same motion was denied in a Resolution27 dated March 22, 2014. Hence,
this petition.

In his petition, Atty. Maglalang reiterated his defense of specific denial, and further claimed that his efforts to locate Consuji
to clarify the complaint were exerted in vain. He likewise additionally submitted that in demonstration of his desire to have
the case immediately resolved, and with no intentions of indirect admission of guilt, he agreed to pay complainant the
amount she was claiming at a rate of P50,000.00 per month.28

Atty. Maglalang's forthright actions to further the resolution of this case is noted. All claims and defenses considered,
however, we cannot rule to adopt the IBP Board's findings and recommendations.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions,29 and so delicately affected it is with public interest that both the
power and the duty are incumbent upon the State to carefully control and regulate it for the protection and promotion of the
public welfare.30

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession, and regular payment of membership fees to the IBP are the conditions required for remaining
a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Beyond question, any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients must
repose in him, and renders him unfit to continue in the exercise of his professional privilege.31 Both disbarment and
suspension demonstrably operationalize this intent to protect the courts and the public from members of the bar who have
become unfit and unworthy to be part of the esteemed and noble profession.32

However, in consideration of the gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the bar, we
have consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint through substantial evidence. 33 A complainant's failure
to dispense the same standard of proof requires no other conclusion than that which stays the hand of the Court from
meting out a disbarment or suspension order.

Under the facts and the evidence presented, we hold that complainant Goopio failed to discharge this burden of proof.

First. To prove their lawyer-client relationship, Goopio presented before the IBP photocopies of the General Power of
Attorney she allegedly issued in Atty. Maglalang's favor, as well as acknowledgement receipts issued by the latter for the
amounts he allegedly received. We note, however, that what were submitted into evidence were mere photocopies, in
violation of the Best Evidence Rule under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 130 provide:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

(a)
 126

When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part
of the offeror;

(b)

When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c)

When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and

(d)

When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Sec. 4. Original of document. —

(a)

The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.

(b)

When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all
such copies are equally regarded as originals.

(c)

When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the
time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.

Although a disbarment proceeding may not be akin to a criminal prosecution, if the entire body of proof consists mainly of
the documentary evidence, and the content of which will prove either the falsity or veracity of the charge for disbarment,
then the documents themselves, as submitted into evidence, must comply with the Best Evidence Rule, save for an
established ground that would merit exception. Goopio failed to prove that the present case falls within any of the
exceptions that dispense with the requirement of presentation of an original of the documentary evidence being presented,
and hence, the general rule must apply.

The necessary import and rationale behind the requirement under the Best Evidence Rule is the avoidance of the dangers
of mistransmissions and inaccuracies of the content of the documents. 34 This is squarely true in the present disbarment
complaint, with a main charge that turns on the very accuracy, completeness, and authenticity of the documents submitted
into evidence. It is therefore non-sequitur to surmise that this crucial preference for the original may be done away with or
applied liberally in this case merely by virtue of Atty. Maglalang's failure to appear during the second mandatory
conference. No such legal license was intended either by the Rules on Evidence or the rules of procedure applicable to a
disbarment case. No such effect, therefore, may be read into the factual circumstances of the present complaint.

The Notice of Mandatory Conference itself stated that "[n]on-appearance at the mandatory conference shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to participate in the proceedings."35 At most, Atty. Maglalang's non-appearance during the rescheduled
mandatory conference dated March 12, 200936 merited the continuation of the proceedings ex parte.37Nothing in the face
of the notice provided that in case of Atty. Maglalang's non-appearance, a leniency in the consideration of the
evidence submitted would be in order.38 Nowhere in the subsequent Order of Commissioner Soriano, which
remarked on the non-appearance of Atty. Maglalang in the last mandatory conference, was there a mention of any
form of preclusion on the part of Goopio to further substantiate her documentary evidence. 39 Atty. Maglalang's
waiver of his right to participate in the proceedings did not serve as a bar for Goopio to submit into evidence the original
copies of the documents upon which her accusations stood.
 127

Furthermore, consistent with Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,40 Atty. Maglalang's non-appearance at the mandatory conference was deemed a waiver
of his right to participate in the proceedings, and his absence only rightly ushered the ex parte presentation of Goopio's
evidence. The latter's belated feigning of possession and willingness to present the original copies of the documents were
betrayed by the fact that even when she was ordered by the investigating commissioner to produce the original of her
documentary evidence, and absent any bar in the applicable Rules for presentation of the same, she still failed to bring
forth said originals.

To be sure, it is grave error to interpret that Atty. Maglalang's absence at the second mandatory conference effectively
jeopardized Goopio's opportunity to substantiate her charge through submission of proper evidence, including the
production of the original General Power of Attorney, acknowledgment receipts, and the billing statements. Viewed in
another way, this line of reasoning would mean that Atty. Maglalang's non-appearance worked to excuse Goopio's
obligation to substantiate her claim. This simply cannot be countenanced. Goopio's duty to substantiate her charge was
separate and distinct from Atty. Maglalang's interests, and therefore, the latter's waiver would not, as in fact it did not,
affect the rights and burden of proof of the former.

In fact, the transcript of the initial mandatory conference recorded the Commissioner's pointed instruction that Goopio and
counsel have the concomitant obligation to produce the originals of the exhaustive list of documents they wish to have
marked as exhibits.41 The records positively adduce that the duty to produce the originals was specifically imposed on the
party seeking to submit the same in evidence; there was no such bar on the part of Goopio to furnish the Commission with
the originals of their documentary evidence submissions even after Atty. Maglalang's non-appearance and waiver.

It is additionally worth noting that during the mandatory conference, counsel of Goopio signified that they did not in fact
have the original copies of the pertinent documents they were seeking to submit into evidence. In the preliminary
conference brief submitted by Goopio, she further annotated in the discussion of the documents she wished to present that
"[o]riginal copies of the foregoing documents will be presented for comparison with the photocopies during the preliminary
conference."42 Despite such statement of undertaking, however, and borne of no other's undoing, Goopio was never able
to present the originals of either the General Power of Attorney or the acknowledgement receipts, the authenticity of which
lie at the crux of the present controversy.

In our ruling in Concepcion v. Fandiño, Jr.,43 a disbarment case which involved as documentary evidence mere
photocopies of the notarized documents upon which the main allegation stood, we aptly reiterated how even in disbarment
proceedings which are sui generis in nature, the Best Evidence Rule still applies, and submission of mere photocopies of
documentary evidence is unavailing for their dearth of probative weight.

In Concepcion, the basis for the complaint for disbarment was the allegation that the lawyer therein notarized documents
without authority. Similarly involving a disbarment proceeding that centered on the authenticity of the purported documents
as proof of the violative act alleged, what we said therein is most apt and acutely instructive for the case at bar, to wit:

A study of the document on which the complaint is anchored shows that the photocopy is
not a certified true copy neither was it testified on by any witness who is in a position to
establish the authenticity of the document. Neither was the source of the document
shown for the participation of the complainant in its execution. x x x This fact gives rise to
the query, where did these documents come from, considering also the fact that
respondent vehemently denied having anything to do with it. It is worthy to note that the
parties who allegedly executed said Deed of Sale are silent regarding the incident.

xxxx

x x x We have scrutinized the records of this case, but we have failed to find a
single evidence which is an original copy. All documents on record submitted by
complainant are indeed mere photocopies. In fact, respondent has consistently
objected to the admission in evidence of said documents on this ground. We cannot, thus,
find any compelling reason to set aside the investigating commissioner's findings on this
 128

point. It is well-settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests

upon complainant. x x x

xxxx

The general rule is that photocopies of documents are inadmissible. As held in Intestate Estate of
the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,44 such document has no probative
value and is inadmissible in evidence.45 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In both Concepcion and the case at bar, the allegations at the core of the disbarment complaints both involve alleged
violations, the truth or falsity of which relies on a determination of the authenticity of the documents that serve as the paper
trail of said punishable acts.

In Concepcion, the basis for the disbarment depended on whether or not the lawyer therein did, in fact, notarize the 145
documents without authority,46 which, if proven, would have merited the punishment prayed for. Similarly, in the case at
bar, the grounds for the disbarment of Atty. Maglalang centered chiefly on the truth and genuineness of the General Power
of Attorney which he supposedly signed in acceptance of the agency, and the acknowledgment receipts which he
purportedly issued as proof of receipt of payment in consideration of the lawyer-client relationship, for proving the
authenticity of said documents would have unequivocally given birth to the concomitant duty and obligation on the part of
Atty. Maglalang to file the petition on behalf of Goopio, and undertake all necessary measures to pursue the latter's
interests. Both cases are further comparable in that both sets of photocopies of documents offered into evidence have
been impugned by the lawyers therein for being false, without basis in fact, and deployed for purposes of malice and
retaliation, which in effect similarly placed the motives of the complainants within the ambit of suspicion. Finally, in
both Concepcion and the case at bar, the complainants therein failed to submit the original of their documentary evidence,
even though the same would have clearly redounded to the serving of their interests in the case, and despite having no bar
or prohibition from doing the same.

In both cases, the documentary evidence was the causal link that would chain the lawyers therein to the violations alleged
against them, and in the same manner, both central documentary evidence were gossamer thin, and have collapsed under
the probative weight that preponderance of evidence requires.

Long-standing is the rule that punitive charges standing on the truth or falsity of a purported document require no less than
the original of said records. Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such
as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has
been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded,
being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence. 47

We are not unaware that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis; they involve investigations by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.48Being neither criminal nor civil in nature, these are
not intended to inflict penal or civil sanctions, but only to answer the main question, that is whether respondent is still fit to
continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.49 In the present case, this main question is answerable
by a determination of whether the documents Goopio presented have probative value to support her charge.

The irreversible effects of imposed penalties from the same must stand on sufficiently established proof through
substantial evidence. Such quantum of proof is a burden that must be discharged by the complainant, in order for the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.50 In the present case, substantial evidence was not established when Goopio
failed to comply with the Best Evidence Rule, and such failure is fatal to her cause. Such non-compliance cannot also be
perfunctorily excused or retrospectively cured through a fault or failure of the contending party to the complaint, as the full
weight of the burden of proof of her accusation descends on those very documents. Having submitted into evidence
documents that do not bear probative weight by virtue of them being mere photocopies, she has inevitably failed to
discharge the burden of proof which lies with her.

This principle further finds acute importance in cases where, as in the one at bar, the complainant's motives in instituting
 129

the disbarment charge are not beyond suspicion,51 considering Atty. Maglalang's contention that his signature in the
General Power of Attorney was forged.

Neither will Atty. Maglalang's offer to restitute to Goopio the monetary award pending finality of the decision be deemed as
his indirect admission of guilt. After receiving notice of the IBP Board's Resolution suspending him from the practice of law
for three years and ordering the return of the P400,000.00 he allegedly received from Goopio, Atty. Maglalang filed a
motion for reconsideration which mentioned his honest desire to have the instant case resolved at the soonest possible
time:52

3. That with all due respect to the findings and recommendation of the Board of Governors, Respondent
would like to seek for reconsideration and ask for lesser penalty if not total exoneration from the sanction
imposed on the ground that he is also a victim of the manipulations made by his former client, Ma. Cecilia
Consuji who happens to be the sister of complainant, Evelyn Goopio;

xxxx

6. That Respondent is left with no other option but to face the accusation and if there is any fault
that can be attributed to him, it is his supposed failure to discover the manipulations of his former
client before the matter became worse;

7. That for lack of material time to produce necessary evidence on the validity of the Alleged General
Power of Attorney, Respondent is asking for a reconsideration for a lesser sanction of stern warning or
reprimand and despite the non-finality of the subject Resolution because of the filing of the instant Motion
for Reconsideration, the undersigned counsel will make arrangements with counsel for complainant how
he will be able to restitute the money award as soon as possible x x x as a show of his honest desire to
have the instant case resolved and as a tough learning experience to always cherish his privilege
to practice law.53 (Emphasis supplied.)

An examination of Atty. Maglalang's offer to restitute would clearly show that there was no admission of the acts
being imputed against him. His offer was made "as a show of his honest desire" to have the case resolved
immediately, and his admission, if any, was limited to his failure to immediately discover the manipulations of
complainant's sister. If anything, his earnest desire to restitute to Goopio the amount of the monetary award only
reasonably betrayed his considerateness towards someone who was similarly deceived by Consuji, as well as his need to
protect his reputation, which may be tarnished if the proceedings were to be protracted. It would be unjust to fault Atty.
Maglalang's efforts to protect his reputation, especially in light of the verity that the success of a lawyer in his profession
depends almost entirely on his reputation, and anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. 54

Moreover, as expressed in Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in the context of civil cases
may not be taken as an admission of any liability. Demonstrably, this Court articulated the ratio behind the inadmissibility
of similar offers for compromise in Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55 where we reasoned that since the
law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger of
being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail.56 Conversely, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against
a person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented, and unnecessary litigation would result since no prudent
person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of
weakness57 or an indirect admission of guilt.

In legal contemplation in the context of a disbarment proceeding, any offer or attempt at a compromise by the parties is not
only inadmissible as evidence to prove guilt on the part of the offeror, but is in fact wholly extraneous to the proceeding,
which resides solely within the province of the Court's disciplinary power. Any offer for compromise, being completely
immaterial to the outcome of the disbarment complaint, may not hold sway for or impute guilt on any of the parties involved
therein.

Seen in a similar light, Atty. Maglalang's prayer for the modification of penalty and reduction of the same may not be
 130

interpreted as an admission of guilt. At most, in the context in which it was implored, this may be reasonably read not as a
remorseful admission but a plea for compassion—a reaction that is in all respects understandable, familiar to the common
human experience, and consistent with his narration that he was likewise a victim of fraudulent representations of Goopio's
sister. Furthermore, this prayer for a kinder regard cannot by any course limit the Court's independent disciplinary reach
and consideration of the facts and merits of this case as has been presented before it.

This degree of autonomy is in no small measure due to the fact that administrative proceedings are imbued with public
interest, public office being a public trust, and the need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the
government, its agencies, and its instrumentalities demands that proceedings in such cases enjoy such level of
independence.58 As we maintained in Reyes-Domingo v. Branch Clerk of Court,59 the Court cannot be bound by any
settlement or other unilateral acts by the parties in a matter that involves its disciplinary authority; otherwise, our
disciplinary power may be put for naught.

In the case at bar, the fact that Atty. Maglalang offered to restitute to Goopio the money award in no way precludes the
Court from weighing in on the very merits of the case, and gauging them against the quantum of evidence required. No
less than the public interest in disbarment proceedings necessitates such independent, impartial, and inclusive
contemplation of the totality of evidence presented by the parties. Regrettably for the complainant in this case, her failure
to comply with the elementary Best Evidence Rule caused her probative submissions to be weighed and found severely
wanting.

As has been avowed by the Court, while we will not hesitate to mete out the appropriate disciplinary punishment upon
lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, we will, on the other hand, protect them from accusations that have failed
the crucible of proof.60

Accordingly, all premises considered, we cannot find Atty. Maglalang guilty of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court as the case levelled against him by Goopio does not have any evidentiary leg to stand on. The latter's allegations
of misrepresentation and deceit have not been substantiated as required by the applicable probative quantum, and her
failure to present the best evidence to prove the authenticity of the subject documents places said documents well within
the ambit of doubt, on the basis of which no punitive finding may be found. The General Power of Attorney allegedly issued
in favor of Atty. Maglalang, and the acknowledgment receipts purportedly issued by the latter as proof of payment for his
legal services are the documents which constitute the bedrock of the disbarment complaint. Goopio's failure to
substantiate their authenticity with proof exposes the claims as those that stand on shifting sand. Her documentary
evidence lacked the required probative weight, and her unproven narrative cannot be held to sustain a finding of
suspension or disbarment against Atty. Maglalang. Hence, the dismissal of the disbarment complaint is in order, without
prejudice to other remedies that Goopio may avail of for any monetary restitution due her, as the courts may deem proper.

However, we find that by his own recognition, Atty. Maglalang's "failure to discover the manipulations of his former client
before the matter became worse"61 is material negligence, for which the penalty of reprimand,62 under the circumstances
of the case at bar, may be consequently warranted.63 Veritably, a lawyer must at all times exercise care and diligence in
conducting the affairs of his practice, including the observation of reasonable due vigilance in ensuring that, to the best of
his knowledge, his documents and other implements are not used to further duplicitous and fraudulent activities.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang is hereby REPRIMANDED, but the disbarment complaint against him is
nevertheless DISMISSED for lack of merit. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his records.

SO ORDERED. Carpio,* Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

30. BSA Tower Condominium Corporation v. Reyes AC No. 11944 June 20,2018

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 11944 (Formerly CBD No. 12-3463), June 20, 2018
 131

BSA TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, Complainant, v. ATTY. ALBERTO CELESTINO B. REYES

II, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The extant case originated from a disbarment complaint which the complainant BSA Tower Condominium Corporation
filed against respondent Atty. Alberto Celestino B. Reyes II.

The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant BSA Tower Condominium Corporation alleged that it hired respondent Atty. Alberto Celestino B. Reyes II
sometime in November 2005 to settle its real estate tax problems with the City of Makati. Between December 2006 and
January 2007, Reyes obtained P25 million from BSA Tower, from which he may draw amounts for legitimate expenses in
carrying out his official duties. However, out of the said amount, Reyes was only able to account for P5 million. This clearly
violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Also, on June 22, 2011, Reyes entered his appearance as counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case 09-089 entitled Marietta K.
Ilusorio v. BSA Tower Condominium Corp. and Waldo Flores before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62.
Said case was an action for reimbursement of the amount of P500,000.00 which Ilusorio supposedly gave BSA Tower in
advance for the payment of its electric and water bills. Later, Reyes took the witness stand and testified against BSA
Tower. He likewise admitted that at the time Ilusorio's purported advances were made, he was BSA Tower's Corporate
Secretary. Thus, on October 11, 2011, BSA Tower filed a Motion to Expunge the Testimony against Reyes. It contended
that although the subject matter of the civil case involved information which Reyes had acquired by virtue of his former
professional relationship with BSA Tower or about which he had been advising the company, he never obtained its written
consent or waiver in the matter of him representing Ilusorio in said case. Accordingly, he violated Rules 15.03 and 21.02 of
the CPR on conflict of interest.

On the other hand, Reyes denied the charges against him. He explained that when BSA Tower engaged his services, its
liability stood at P31 million and the land was set to be sold at public auction. Their agreement was that Reyes would be
paid 10% of whatever savings BSA Tower would generate through his efforts. Thereafter, BSA Tower's annual realty tax
was reduced from P5 million to only P2 million per year beginning 2007. Reyes asserted that BSA Tower's total savings
reached P21 million, apart from the amount of P25 million when the settlement was forged. However, BSA Tower never
paid him his contingent fee. Hence, he filed a complaint with the Makati RTC to collect his fee, and the court later ordered
BSA Tower to pay him the amount of P1,920,000.00, plus legal interest from January 2007, until fully paid.

As to his appearance as counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 09-089, Reyes claimed that he had asked BSA Tower's
authorized representative if she or the corporation had any objection to his appearance as Ilusorio's counsel. The
representative said that she had none. Likewise, when he formally entered his appearance in said civil case, BSA Tower
did not object. Yet, it later filed a Motion to Expunge his testimony. The court, however, denied said motion.

On June 13, 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the
dismissal of the disbarment complaint against Reyes, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the disbarment complaint filed
by complainant BSA Tower Condominium Corporation against respondent Atty. Alberto Celestino B.
Reyes II be DISMISSED.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.1

On June 5, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2015-377,2 which adopted the aforementioned
recommendation, thus:
 132

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A," finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and
applicable laws. Thus, the case against Respondent is hereby DISMISSED.

Unfazed, BSA Tower filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On April 19, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XXII-2017-968,3 which provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration there being no new reason and/or new argument
adduced to reverse the previous findings and decision of the Board of Governors.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendation of the IBP that the present disbarment
complaint against Reyes must be dismissed.

In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 4

BSA Tower claims that Reyes violated Rules 16.01, 15.03, and 21.02 of the CPR. Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR
provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

While Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the CPR states:

Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client
with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

In Aniñon v. Atty. Sabitsana, Jr.,5 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting
interests between and among his clients. One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 6

On the matter of the alleged failure of Reyes to account for BSA Tower's funds, the Makati RTC, Branch 133 had ruled that
BSA Tower is even the one that is liable to pay Reyes the amount of P1,920,000.00. With regard to the purported conflict
of interest, the Makati RTC, Branch 146 had also ruled in favor of Reyes, saying that there was no conflict of interest in his
appearance as counsel of Ilusorio. There was no convincing evidence that would show that, at the time that he was acting
as Ilusorio's counsel, Reyes indeed used any confidential information that he had obtained from BSA Tower when he was
still the corporation's Corporate Secretary. The dispute between Ilusorio and BSA Tower was contractual in nature such
that his new relationship with Ilusorio would not require him to disclose matters obtained during his engagement as the
Corporate Secretary or counsel of the corporation. Neither would his acceptance of Ilusorio as a new client prevent the full
discharge of his duties as a lawyer or invite suspicion of double-dealing. In other words, the matters being put in issue by
BSA Tower in this case had already been submitted for judicial resolution and the courts had decided against it. It seems,
 133

therefore, that the instant disbarment case against Reyes is just a mere attempt to bring the courts' rulings for an indirect
review through an administrative case, which is an improper remedy. To rule that there is conflict of interest and that there
is misappropriation of BSA Tower's funds would, in effect, reverse the rulings of the lower courts.

The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against
him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath. Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.7

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, which is that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
cannot be given credence. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence – as opposed to preponderance of
evidence – is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As
case law elucidates, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it also involves neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 8

Here, BSA Tower seriously failed to discharge said burden of proof. The issues which BSA Tower presented in this case
had already been submitted for judicial resolution and the courts had ruled in favor of Reyes. Hence, the Court finds that
the acts of Reyes are not tantamount to a violation of any of the CPR provisions.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the instant Complaint against Atty. Alberto Celestino B.
Reyes II for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

31. Rico v. Salutan AC No. 9257 March 5, 2018

SECOND DIVISION

March 5, 2018

A.C. No. 9257

[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3490]

EDGAR M. RICO, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. REYNALDO G. SALUTAN, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
 134

The present case was initiated through a letter complaint to Judge Antonio P. Laolao, Sr., Presiding Judge of Municipal
Trial Court, Branch 6, Davao City, against respondent Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan for purportedly misleading the court and
for contempt of court.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Complainant Edgar M. Rico explained that his · relatives were plaintiffs in a civil case for Forcible Entry before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Davao City. The court had ordered the defendants to restore plaintiffs'
possession of the subject properties, remove all structures that had been introduced on the same, and to pay reasonable
sum for their occupation of the properties.

Milagros Villa Abrille, one of the defendants in the aforementioned case, filed a separate case for Unlawful Detainer
against Rico covering the same property. On November 6, 2001, the MTCC ordered Rico to vacate the premises.
Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTCC ruling and issued a Writ of Execution.

On July 9, 2004, the court's sheriff executed a Return Service stating that the writ could not be served on Rico since the
property subject of the case was different from the lot which Rico was occupying. Thereafter, Villa Abrille, through her
counsel, respondent Atty. Salutan, filed a motion for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution. On May 15, 2007, the
sheriff executed a Return of Service again since the alias writ could not be enforced for the same reason as the first time.
On April 4, 2008, Villa Abrille once again filed a motion for the issuance of another Alias Writ of Execution, which, this time,
the MTCC denied. Hence, Villa Abrille went to the Court for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus to compel the MTCC to
issue another Writ of Execution and for the sheriff to implement the same. The Court, however, dismissed the case.

For the fourth (4th) time, Villa Abrille filed another motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. This time, the MTCC
granted it. Consequently, the court sheriff issued a Final Notice to Vacate to Rico on June 10, 2010. On June 15, 2010, the
same sheriff led the demolition of the house and other improvements on the property. Thus, Rico filed the administrative
complaint against Atty. Salutan.

For his part, Atty. Salutan denied the charges and argued that he merely advocated for his client's cause and did the same
within the bounds of the law and of the rules. He merely did what a zealous lawyer would naturally do in representation of
his client.

On January 2, 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan, to wit:

Foregoing premises considered, the undersigned believes and so holds that the complaint is without merit.
Accordingly, he recommends DISMISSAL of the same.1

On March 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-357,2 which adopted the
abovementioned recommendation, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

Thereafter, Rico moved for reconsideration of said Resolution. On March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed
another resolution, Resolution No. XXI-2014-183,3 denying said motion for reconsideration and approving its 2013
Resolution, to wit:

RESOLVED to DENY Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been.
threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-357 dated March 21, 2013 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
 135

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendation of the IBP that the instant
administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan must be dismissed.

In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.4

Here, despite the charges hurled against Atty. Salutan, Rico failed to show any badge of deception on the lawyer's part.
There was no court decision declaring that Villa Abrille’s title was fake or that it had encroached on Rico's property. All that
Atty. Salutan did was to zealously advocate for the cause of his client. He was not shown to have misled or unduly
influenced the court through misinformation. He merely persistently pursued said cause and he did so within the bounds of
the law and the existing rules. He succeeded at finally having the writ of execution, albeit at the fourth (4 th ) time,
implemented.

The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against
him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath. Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.5

Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, ·is not determined mathematically by the
numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends on its practical effect in inducing belief for the
party on the judge trying the case.6

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, which is that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
cannot be given credence. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to preponderance of
evidence - is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As
case law elucidates, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it also involves neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the. profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.7

In the case at bar, Rico seriously failed to discharge said burden of proof. He failed to establish his claims through relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion - that is that Atty. Salutan indeed misled
the court, directly or indirectly, in the course of championing his client’s cause.

In a court battle, there must necessarily be a victor and a vanquished. A vain effort from the vanquished litigant should not,
however, cause him to immediately accuse the victor of resorting to deceptive ploy or tactics, especially when he had been
given sufficient opportunity to counter every move of the victor in court. One should be magnanimous enough to
acknowledge the triumph of one who had waged a fair legal battle against another in a court of law.

Members of the Bar must be reminded that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is no less a virtue, if channelled in the right
direction.1âwphi1 However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper
place of courts in our system of government. While zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's cause is desirable,
 136

unprofessional conduct stemming from such zeal or enthusiasm is always disfavored. 8 Such undesirable conduct,
however, is not shown to be extant in this case.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the instant Complaint against Atty. Reynaldo G.
Salutan for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

32. Ready Form Incorporated v. Castillon AC No. 11774 March 21,2018

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 11774 (Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4186), March 21, 2018

READY FORM INCORPORATED, Complainant, v. ATTY. EGMEDIO J. CASTILLON, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint 1 filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (CBD-IBP) by Complainant Ready Form, Inc. (Ready Form) against Respondent Atty. Egmedio J. Castillon, Jr.
(Atty. Castillon), for his alleged violation of Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he allegedly used Ready Form's Income Tax Return (ITR) in filing a Petition for Suspension and
Blacklisting2 (Petition for Blacklisting) against Ready Form before the National Printing Office (NPO).

The Factual Antecedents

Ready Form was one of the companies who participated in a public bidding conducted by the NPO on October 17, 2008.
Thereafter, the NPO Bids and Awards Committee (NPO-BAC) required all bidders to re-submit their eligibility documents,
which includes the bidders' past ITRs and financial documents stamp received by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR).3 After reviewing these submissions, the NPO-BAC imposed a suspension of one (1) year against Ready Form
effective from December 22, 2008 to December 21, 2009 4 due to the supposed misrepresentation and misdeclaration it
committed when it submitted alleged false ITRs and financial statements for the calendar year 2007.

Subsequently, on September 18, 2009, Eastland Printink Corporation (Eastland) filed a Petition for Blacklisting with the
NPO against Ready Form, wherein Eastland alleged that Ready Form had committed other violations, such as (1)
misrepresentation, when it also filed with the NPO false ITRs for the year 2006, (2) unlawfully soliciting printing jobs and
services from various local government offices or agencies, and (3) undermining the authority and jurisdiction of the NPO
by disseminating letters which suggested that the NPO no longer has exclusive jurisdiction over printing services. 5 As
Eastland's counsel, Atty. Castillon signed the Petition on behalf of his client.

The NPO then asked both parties to file position papers in relation to the Petition for Blacklisting. Eastland filed a position
paper6 which stated that:

The figures declared by respondent in its financial statement submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission indicate that (sic) a total net sale of P78,639,134.73, but respondent net sales with NPO
alone yielded P80,063.932, (sic) or a discrepancy of P1,424,797.27. The figures speak for themselves
where false statements and/or information were clearly resorted to by the respondent. These documents
are material for eligibility requirements which bespeak of respondent's deliberate act of misrepresentation.
 137

The respondent has intentionally and consciously falsified its Financial Statement and Income Tax Return
for 2006 by stating and declaring the reduced and wrong amount of annual net sales to gainfully reduce
payment of taxes due the government.

It has been a pattern of respondent in reporting the reduced and incorrect net sales for two (2) years in a
row. It did in 2006 and 2007. In fact, it was duly reflected in its 2006 and 2007 falsified Financial
Statements submitted before the Securities and Exchange Commission.7

On December 1, 2009, the NPO issued a Resolution8 suspending and blacklisting Ready Form for a period of five (5)
years after finding, among others, that:

Respondent (sic) 2006 Financial Statement contains false information; hence, it is a falsified
document. As part of its eligibility requirements, respondent submitted to NPO its 2006 Financial
Statement (earlier submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission in compliance with its
reportorial requirements) which contains false information. Evidently, the same is (sic) fictitious, false and
falsified document.

Respondent intentionally reported the reduced amount of its net sales for 2006 in its Financial Statement
by declaring only Seventy Eight Million Six Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand One Hundred Thirty Four
and Seventy Three Centavos (P78,639,134.73). However, its net sales alone in NPO reached Eighty
Million Sixty Three Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Two and Twenty Nine Centavos
(P80,063,932.29). The under declaration was not only conscious and deliberate but also it was purposely
done by respondent two (2) years in a row solely intended to evade payment of correct taxes due to
government.

Its (sic) worth recalling that in 2007, respondent also under declared its nets (sic) sales by stating in its
2007 Financial Statement the amount of Seventy Four Million Three Hundred Seventy Seven
Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Three Pesos and Twenty Three Centavos (P74,377,593.23). But in
truth and in fact, its net sales for NPO alone hit One Hundred Seven Million Three Hundred One
Thousand Twelve Pesos and Ninety Four Centavos (P107,301,012.94). In fact, the respondent was
suspended for one (1) year from 22 December 2008 up to 22 December 2009 for that reason. An appeal
was filed by respondent to the Office of the Press Secretary. However, the appeal was dismissed and the
imposition of administrative sanction of one (1) year was affirmed. The same has already become final
and executory since respondent neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a Petition for Review to the
Court of Appeals timely filed.9 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

On April 4, 2014, Ready Form filed a Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint) before the CBD-IBP praying that Atty. Castillon be
disbarred due to allegedly violating Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
alleging as a ground therefor Atty. Castillon's supposed unlawful use of Ready Form's ITRs. Complainant alleges that this
is in violation of Sections 4 and 278 of Republic Act No. 8424, 10 otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), which state that:

SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. - The power to
interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.

The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions
thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.

xxxx

SEC. 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. Any person who causes or procures an
officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to divulge any confidential information regarding
the business, income or inheritance of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the
discharge of his official duties, and which it is unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who publishes or
 138

prints in any manner whatever, not provided by law, any income, profit, loss or expenditure appearing in
any income tax return, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Two thousand pesos (P2,000), or
suffer imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, or both. (Emphasis and
italics in the original)

Complainant further alleges that Atty. Castillon's supposed act was in violation of Section 30.1 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No. 918411 or the Government Procurement Reform Act which mandates that the Bids
and Awards Committee concerned shall use a non discretionary "pass/fail" criterion in determining the eligibility of bidding
documents submitted to it. The said section states that:

The BAC shall open the first bid envelopes in public

to determine each bidder's compliance with the
documents required to be submitted for eligibility
and for the technical requirements, as prescribed in
this IRR. For this purpose, the BAC shall check the
submitted documents of each bidder against a
checklist of required documents to ascertain if they
30.
are all present, using a non discretionary "pass/fail"
1.
criterion, as stated in the Instructions to Bidders. If a
bidder submits the required document, it shall be
rated "passed" for that particular requirement. In
this regard, bids that fail to include any requirement
or are incomplete or patently insufficient shall be
considered as "failed." Otherwise, the BAC shall
rate the said first bid envelope as "passed."

During the mandatory conference of the case before the CBD-IBP, the parties agreed to limit the issue on whether or not
Atty. Castillon's act of attaching Ready Form's audited financial statements in the Petition for Blacklisting he filed with the
NPO constitutes a violation of Sections 4 and 238 of the NIRC. 12Consequently, the answer to the said question also
determines whether Atty. Castillon violated Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Atty. Castillon, in his position paper submitted to the CBD-IBP, stressed that what was submitted in support of the Petition
for Blacklisting with the NPO was Ready Form's audited financial statements which were acquired from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Atty. Castillon categorically denied that he acquired, much less attached, an ITR of
complainant Ready Form.13

After due proceedings, Commissioner Maria Editha A. Go-Biñas (Commissioner Go-Biñas) rendered a Report and
Recommendation14 on July 21, 2016, absolving Atty. Castillon from the charges filed by Ready Form. Commissioner
Go-Biñas found that Ready Form's claims were unfounded, as there is no proof that Atty. Castillon procured Ready Form's
ITR, or that he used it in the Petition for Blacklisting. The dispositive portion of Commissioner Go-Biñas' Report and
Recommendation reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant
case be dismissed for utter lack of merit.15

On September 23, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting the findings of fact and
recommendation of Commissioner Go-Biñas and resolved to dismiss the complaint, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
dismissing the complaint.16

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the Court finds no compelling reason to diverge
from the factual findings of Commissioner Go-Biñas as adopted by IBP Board of Governors.
 139

Ready Form's central issue against Atty. Castillon is that he allegedly violated the law, particularly the NIRC, when he
supposedly attached a copy of its ITR for 2006 when he filed the Petition for Blacklisting. A perusal of the records will
reveal, however, that what Atty. Castillon attached in the Petition for Blacklisting is Ready Form's audited financial
statement for the year 2006 and not the latter's ITR. Ready Form harps on the fact that the following paragraphs, which
mentions Ready Form's ITR, were in the Petition for Blacklisting signed by Atty. Castillon: 17

4. The aforecited suspension was brought about by the misrepresentation and misdeclaration committed
by herein respondent on its Income Tax Return and Financial Statement and other documents submitted
before this Office covering the period 2007;

5. Previous to the said violation, respondent had committed acts of similar nature in their Income Tax
Returns and Financial Statements and other documents submitted before this office covering the year
2006, among other things, which underscores a deliberate scheme of submitting false declarations. A
photocopy of the 2006 Financial Statement is hereto attached and marked as Annexes "B" and made
integral part hereof.18

Ready Form repeatedly made an issue out of the fact that its ITR was mentioned in the Petition for Blacklisting, and later
on in the Position Paper filed by Eastland, both signed by Atty. Castillon. They did not, however, offer proof to substantiate
its claims that its ITR was attached to the Petition for Blacklisting despite the clear and express statement therein that only
its audited financial statement, which is available to the public through the SEC, was attached thereto. During the
mandatory conference, it was clear that only an audited financial statement was attached by Atty. Castillon. Ready Form
only wants the IBP, and consequently this Court, to hold that Atty. Castillon used confidential information by doing such
act:

ATTY. MISON [counsel for Ready Form]:

This is Annex "G" to the complaint. Also paragraph 5 if I

may mention, previous to this a photocopy of the 2006
Financial Statement is hereto attached and marked as
Annex "B" so that is admitted?

ATTY. CASTILLON:

That Financial Statement no ITR as mentioned

previously.

ATTY. MISON:

But the premise of the paragraph it made mentioned

(sic) of that.
 140

ATTY. CASTILLON:

There is that phrase, Your Honor, but meaning

attaching ITR there really was none, Your Honor.

xxxx

COMM. BINAS:

If any of these pleadings that you have there and the

cases, I'm sure you have the files, right?

ATTY. MISON:

Yes.

COMM. BINAS:

Did you notice any attachment about the ITR as

submitted by the respondent? Because I'm sure it
should have been an annexed (sic) there or ........

ATTY. MISON:
 141

Well, Your Honor, if the Commission should take

somehow judicial notice that the financial statement is
attached to the ITR, the ITR merely contains the
summary, the total amount but the details of the total
amount appearing in the Income Tax Return, they are
all reflected in the Financial Statement. Meaning, the
Financial Statements contains the details while the ITR
itself is just a summary. So, you cannot say, o (sic) I just
filed the financial statement I did not file the ITR. But all
the information appearing on the Financial Statement
necessarily appears in the ITR.

xxxx

COMM. BINAS:

So, as of now the complainant is pounding on the fact

that there was this use of confidential data.

ATTY. MISON:

Yes, Your Honor.

COMM. BINAS:

That is the meat of the complaint.

 142

ATTY. MISON:

Yes, Your Honor. Violation and not only that, Section 4,

Your Honor, where no person has the power to interpret
even to make allegations that base (sic) on financial
statements falsified, they have usurp (sic) the power
exclusively vested to the BIR and the Court of Tax
Appeals, Section 4 of R.A. 8424 and Section 278 of
R.A. 8424.

COMM. BINAS:

So, insofar as the complainant is concerned the act of

using the confidential tax data emanated from the fact
that he submitted the financial statement.

ATTY. MISON:

Yes, Your Honor. And we contend, Your Honor, that the

financial statement contains a more detailed figures
vis-a-vis the income tax return.19

Clearly, therefore, the complainant wants this Court to penalize the respondent for using a publicly-available document to
support allegations in a pleading signed by him. This, the Court refuses to do.

The Court takes judicial notice20 of the fact that audited financial statements submitted by corporations, as required by
Section 141 of the Corporation Code, are made available to the public by the SEC. Hence, the Court fails to see how Atty.
Castillon violated any law when he attached a copy of Ready Form's audited financial statements in the Petition for
Blacklisting he filed with the NPO.

Thus, the Court agrees with Commissioner Go-Biñas when she correctly said:

He who alleges should prove his case in a very clear and convincing manner.

An individual should not be allowed to claim relief just because a lawyer is aiding or was hired by an
opponent. To do so would create more injustice and lead to an even more erroneous practice.

"While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up
to their sworn duties, they will on the other hand, protect them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied
litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends most entirely on his reputation. Anything
 143

which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons and particularly disgruntled
opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent
their rancor on members of the Bar" (Santos vs. Dichoso, Adm. Case No. 1825, August 22,
1978).21 (Emphasis in the original)

All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support the allegations against Atty. Castillon. As
such, the Court fails to see how Atty. Castillon had violated Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, the Court affirms the IBP's recommendation to dismiss the Complaint.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint filed by Ready Form, Inc. against Atty. Egmedio J. Castillon, Jr. is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. Carpio,*Acting C. J., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

33. Dimayuga v. Rub a AC No. 8854 July 3, 2018 En Banc

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8854, July 03, 2018

JULIETA DIMAYUGA, Complainant, v. ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA, Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

For Our resolution is a Complaint1 for disciplinary action, charging Atty. Vivian G. Rubia (respondent) with gross
negligence, misrepresentation, and violation of the lawyer's oath.

Julieta Dimayuga (complainant) averred in her Complaint that sometime in June 2002, she and her family engaged
respondent's legal services to effect the transfer of their deceased father's property to them, which services were
supposed to include preparation, notarization, and processing of the transfer document and payment of taxes and other
fees for such transfer. Respondent prepared a document denominated as Amended Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Waiver of Rights,2 which they signed on June 17, 2002.3 However, the transfer did not happen soon thereafter. Upon
inquiry, her family learned that respondent paid the transfer tax only on October 25, 2007;4 the donor's tax was paid on
April 2, 2007;5 and contrary to her representations with the complainant's family, respondent only entered the Amended
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights with the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur only on November 28,
2007 and re-entered on December 1, 2008. It is complainant's theory that respondent may have misappropriated the
money that the family paid for her services on June 17, 2002 for her personal use, hence, the belated payment of the
required taxes and fees.6

Complainant also alleged that in June 2003, she also sought respondent's legal services for the purchase of a real
property in Digos City. However, contrary to her representation that the property shall be registered in their names after
one month, the title was not transferred to them.7 Moreover, the Deed of Absolute Sale 8 dated June 27, 2003 for the
purchase of a 600-square meter parcel of land prepared by respondent, was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. CARP-03000,9 coming from Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00394433. The title was issued on
February 5, 1997 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Sur on February 6, 1997. Being a land covered
by CLOA, the following limitation was stated on the face of the TCT, viz.:
 144

[S]ubject to the condition that it shall not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary
succession, or to the Government, or to the Land Bank of the Philippines, or to other qualified
beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years, x x x.10

Thus, on June 27, 2003, the sale of the property was still prohibited. Complainant averred that they merely relied on the
ability and knowledge of respondent as lawyer, who should not have assented to the sale of the said property due to the
prohibition.11

Hence, complainant prayed that respondent be administratively disciplined for her actions.

In a Resolution12 dated January 31, 2011, the Court required the respondent to comment on the complaint within ten days
from notice.

Respondent moved for an extension of time to file her comment,13 which was granted by the Court in its Resolution14 dated
August 15, 2012.

However, within the period of the granted extension, respondent still failed to file the required comment. Hence, in a
Resolution15 dated July 14, 2014, the Court imposed upon respondent a fine of P2,000 and reiterated its order requiring
respondent to file her comment.

Respondent neither paid the fine nor filed a comment. Hence, in a Resolution16 dated January 13, 2016, the Court
imposed upon respondent an increased fine of P4,000 and again, required respondent to file comment.

On April 7, 2016, respondent paid the imposed increased fine and explained that her failure to pay the original fine was
because the first notice was lost. Respondent also informed the Court of her transfer of office. 17

On June 29, 2016, the Court noted respondent's compliance. However, We reiterated Our order in the January 13, 2016
Resolution, considering that per Office of the Bar Confidant' (OBC), no postal money orders were enclosed in the
aforesaid compliance.18

In its September 19, 2016 Resolution,19 the Court noted the OBC's Letter20 dated July 26, 2016, stating the return to
respondent of the two postal money orders for being received by the Court's cashier beyond the 90-day period from its
validity. The Court also resolved to await respondent's compliance with the June 29, 2016 Resolution.

On November 14, 2016 Resolution,21 the Court noted respondent's remittance of two postal money orders as replacement
for the expired ones. Respondent still failed to file her comment, thus, the Court also required her to show cause why she
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and, again ordered her to comply with the January
31, 2016 Resolution.

On December 27, 2016, respondent complied with the show cause order, explaining that she suffered from trauma and
stress due to the previous cases filed against her and also that she had undergone lifethreatening situations due to some
high-profile cases that she handled, hence, her failure to file her comment. 22

However, respondent still failed to file her comment to the Complaint. Thus, on June 28, 2017 Resolution, 23 while the Court
noted her explanation, the Court again required her to file a comment in compliance with the January 31, 2011 Resolution.
Despite receipt of the June 28, 2017 Resolution, respondent still failed to file the required comment. 24

Necessarily, this Court will now act on the resolution of the Complaint.

Preliminarily, We shall address respondent's apathetic attitude towards this case, to which this Court has been very
tolerant. We have given respondent several opportunities to file her comment and explain her side on the accusations
against her since 2011 but, up to present, respondent has yet to file the required comment. This Court cannot, anymore,
accept respondent's excuses for such defiance, i.e., trauma, stress, and life-threatening situations, considering that she
was able to file pleadings stating such explanation but still failed to file the required comment. Nothing can be concluded
therefrom but that respondent's acts or inaction for that matter, were deliberate and manipulating, which unreasonably
delay this Court's action on the case. These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which,
 145

not only works against her case as she is now deemed to have waived the filing of her comment, but more importantly is in
itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment pursuant to Section 27, 25 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such
attitude constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. "A Court's Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request,
nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."26

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,27 the Court, considered the failure to comply with the court's order, resolution, or directive as
constitutive of gross misconduct and insubordination.28

Proceeding to the merits of the Complaint, We find that the allegations of delay in the performance of duty and
misappropriation of funds were not sufficiently substantiated. "In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."29 Corollary to this is the established rule that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it for
mere allegation is not evidence. "The complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in the
complaint."30

In this case, complainant alleged that she and her family gave respondent P150,000 on June 17, 2002, inclusive of
respondent's attorneys fees and the legal fees necessary for the transfer of the property. Despite that, respondent did not
pay the transfer tax and donor's tax until 2007. However, there is nothing on the records, except for complainant's bare
allegation, which proves that such amount was indeed given to respondent on the claimed date. Hence, We cannot
judiciously rule on the alleged delay and misappropriation without relying upon assumptions, surmises, and conjectures.

What is apparent in the Complaint, however, is the fact that respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale, covering a
parcel of land, which was evidently prohibited to be sold, transferred, or conveyed under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.

Time and again, We have held that a lawyer's conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics.31 CANON 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws, and promote respect for law and legal processes. Also, Rule 15.07 thereof mandates a lawyer to impress
upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of fairness.

Indeed, in preparing and notarizing a deed of sale within the prohibited period to sell the subject property under the law,
respondent assisted, if not led, the contracting parties, who relied on her knowledge of the law being their lawyer, to an act
constitutive of a blatant disregard for or defiance of the law.

Moreover, respondent likewise displayed lack of respect and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an
Acknowledgment as her act of notarizing such illegal document entitled it full faith and credit upon its face, when it
obviously does not deserve such entitlement, considering its illegality due to the prohibition above-cited. In the case
of Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty. Pascua,32 We aptly explained:

[W]hile respondent's duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the
voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its consummation. Rule IV, Section 4 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any notarial act for
transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit:

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules
for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:

(a)

the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;

x x x x33

It cannot be over-stressed that notarization is not an empty or meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may be commissioned to perform the same.34

In all, for these acts of misconduct, "the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers with suspension from the practice of law,
 146

revocation of the notarial commissiOn and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment."35

Considering that this is not the first time that respondent was administratively sanctioned by this Court, We have already
warned her that future infractions shall be dealt with more severely. 36 However, We are also reminded that "disbarment
should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as reprimand, fine, or suspension would accomplish the
end desired."37

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, CANON 1 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years effective immediately with a STERN
WARNING that future infractions shall be dealt 'Yith more severely. She is likewise DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of three (3) years and her notarial commission, if currently existing, is
hereby REVOKED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as
attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

34. Gubaton v. Amador AC No. 8962 July 9, 2018

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8962, July 09, 2018

JILDO A. GUBATON, Complainant, v. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case arose from an affidavit-complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Jildo A. Gubaton
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador (respondent) on the ground of gross immoral conduct
and/or immorality.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that respondent, a former Assistant Prosecutor at the City Prosecutor's Office in Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, was having an illicit romantic relationship with his wife, Ma. Bernadette R. Tenorio-Gubaton (Bernadette), since
2005 up to the present.2

He averred that it was in the early part of 2008, while working in the United States of America (USA), when he discovered
the illicit relationship. Complainant and Bernadette's house helper informed him through a phone call that a man whom she
knows to be "Fiscal Amador" often visits Bernadette. The house helper also told him that respondent spends nights at their
house and stays with Bernadette in their bedroom. When complainant called Bernadette's dental clinic to verify the
information, it was the secretary who took his call. Upon inquiry, the latter confirmed that respondent and Bernadette have
been carrying on an illicit affair.3
 147

Sometime in August 2009, complainant returned to the country. On his first night home, despite his pleas, Bernadette
refused to lie and sleep with him; instead, she demanded that he sleep in another room, to which he acceded in order to
avoid any argument. Since then, Bernadette has refused to sleep with him. Further, complainant discovered some
birth-control pills and condoms in their house, in Bernadette's dental clinic, and in her handbag. When he confronted her
about it, she merely denied ownership thereof. He also alleged that Bernadette wrote love letters/notes 4 to respondent, as
in fact, one of these letters had the word "fiscal"5 on it.6

Complainant likewise alleged that he personally saw respondent and Bernadette together in various places in Malaybalay
City. At one instance, he saw them kissing while inside a vehicle; when he approached to confront them, respondent ran
away.7

The illicit affair of respondent and Bernadette was known to other people as well. Complainant's sister, Nila Canoy, 8 told
him about it during phone calls while he was still in the USA, 9 as narrated in her affidavit.10 Likewise, Carlos Delgado
(Delgado), Chief of Barangay Public Safety Office in Poblacion, Malaybalay City, and one Edgar Navarez (Navarez), an
employee of the Bureau of lnternal Revenue (BIR) and a resident of Casisang, Malaybalay City, knew of the affair and
executed their respective affidavits11relative thereto.

In defense,12 respondent denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that he was merely acquainted with
Bernadette and they would only see each other on various occasions and social gatherings. He also denied the incident
where complainant allegedly saw him and Bernadette kissing inside a vehicle. 13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After due proceedings, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), through
Commissioner Jose Alfonso M. Gomos (Commissioner Gomos), issued a Report and Recommendation 14 dated June 27,
2012 recommending the dismissal of the affidavit-complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

Commissioner Gomos found that the information supplied by complainant and Bernandette's house helper, Bernadette's
clinic secretary, and complainant's sister, Nila, about the alleged illicit affair were purely hearsay. Likewise, the supposed
love letters/notes offered in evidence did not prove that the same were written by Bernadette to respondent. Similarly, the
affidavit executed by Delgado did not positively refer to respondent, while that of Navarez contained general statements of
an affair between respondent and Bernadette.15 As for the affidavit executed by Nila, the same is clearly biased in view of
the latter's relationship with complainant.16 Finally, with respect to the incident where complainant allegedly saw
respondent and Bernadette kissing inside a vehicle and attempted to confront them, Commissioner Gomos found the
same to be contrary to human experience, reasoning that an offended husband would be expected to do more than just
confront them under the circumstances.17

In a Resolution18 dated June 22, 2013, however, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the June 27, 2012 Report and
Recommendation, and instead, suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Respondent
moved for reconsideration,19 which was denied in a Resolution 20 dated April 20, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's consideration is whether or not grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be held administratively
liable with modification, however, as regards the penalty to be imposed.
 148

It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.21

In this case, substantial evidence exist to prove complainant's claim that respondent had illicit affairs with Bernadette and
hence, should be adjudged guilty of gross immorality.

As per complainant's own account, he actually saw respondent and Bernadette together on various intimate occasions. In
fact, he attempted to confront them at one time when he saw them kissing inside a vehicle, although respondent was able
to evade him.22 The Court is inclined to believe that complainant's imputations against respondent are credible,
considering that he had no ill motive to accuse respondent of such a serious charge – much more a personal scandal
involving his own wife – unless the same were indeed true.

Complainant's statements were corroborated by the affidavit executed by Navarez, who works in BIR, Malaybalay City as
a messenger and therefore, goes around the city in relation to his work. Navarez categorically stated that respondent and
Bernadette have been carrying on an illicit affair while complainant was in the USA, and further averred that he had seen
them together on different intimate occasions. He even saw them kissing each other at one instance.23 Notably, it must be
highlighted that Navarez is a neutral and disinterested witness and hence, his declarations deserve ample consideration.

Moreover, complainant's sister, Nila, described to complainant, while the latter was in the USA, how respondent would
often visit Bernadette and spend the night in their residence, while she was still living with Bernadette and their children
thereat. She narrated that Bernadette first introduced respondent to her as a "cousin" from Davao City. However, the two
would often have lunch in the house and thereafter, respondent would even spend some time with Bernadette inside the
latter's bedroom. Nila likewise recounted that whenever the two of them arrived home in one vehicle, they would kiss each
other before alighting therefrom.24

In this relation, it may not be amiss to point out that complainant offered in evidence love letters/notes supposedly written
by Bernadette to respondent to prove the existence of their illicit relationship. The authenticity of these love letters/notes,
although not expressly shown to be written by Bernadette or received by respondent, were not refuted. Consequently, they
lend credibility to complainant's claim.

Finally, it should be clarified that while the information supplied by complainant and Bernadette's house helper and
Bernadette's clinic secretary about the alleged illicit affair constitute hearsay, the same should not be completely
disregarded. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is
relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or
falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself
it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Accordingly, the hearsay rule
does not apply, and hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. 25 Verily, complainant personally attests that the
information about the illicit affair between respondent and his wife have been relayed to him by complainant's house helper
and Bernadette's clinic secretary. Clearly, the making of such statements is circumstantially relevant to this case and
therefore, may be considered in evidence against respondent. Besides, in Re: Verified Complaint dated July 13, 2015 of
Umali, Jr. v. Hernandez:26

The relaxation of the hearsay rule in disciplinary administrative proceedings against judges and justices
where bribery proceedings are involved is not a novel thought in this Court; it has been advocated in the
Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in the administrative case of Justice Ong before
this Court. The Opinion essentially maintained that the Court could make a conclusion that bribery had
taken place when the circumstances – including those derived from hearsay evidence – sufficiently prove
its occurrence. It was emphasized that [t]o satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for
administrative cases, hearsay evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by
other evidence that are not hearsay.27(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Given that the purported hearsay are supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay, the Court
 149

finds no cogent reason not to apply the same pronouncement to this particular case.

For his part, respondent only proffered a bare denial of the imputed affair. He insists that he was merely acquainted with
Bernadette and that they would only see each other during social gatherings or by pure accident. The thrust of his denial
was that, although they would see each other on occasion, such meetings were innocent, as in instances when she gave
him a short ride from his office to the trial court, the times when he visited her dental clinic for a procedure and during its
anniversary celebration, and when he "bumped" into her at a department store and she apologized to him for her
husband's jealousy.28

Suffice it to say that "[d]enial is an intrinsically weak defense. To merit credibility, it must be buttressed by strong evidence
of non-culpability. If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence [as in this case] it is negative and self-serving,
deserving no greater value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters." 29 In any event, the
Court observes that the alleged "accidental" and "innocent" encounters of respondent and Bernadette are much too many
for comfort and coincidence. Such encounters actually buttress the allegations of the witnesses that they carried on an
illicit affair.

All told, the Court finds that substantial evidence – which only entail "evidence to support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise" – exist to prove complainant's accusation of gross immorality
against respondent.

Based on jurisprudence, extramarital affairs of lawyers are regarded as offensive to the sanctity of marriage, the family,
and the community. When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual
recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.30 This is because possession of
good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession.31 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the integrated bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment, depending on the circumstances
of the case. In case of suspension, the period would range from one year 32 to indefinite suspension.33 Under the given
circumstances, the Court sees fit to impose on respondent a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year.34

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador is found guilty of gross immorality. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Respondent's suspension from the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. He
is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts
and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in respondent's personal records as
a member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED. Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
 150

35. Guanzon v. Dojillo AC No.9850 Second Division August 6, 2018

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9850, August 06, 2018

ATTY. MA. ROWENA AMELIA V. GUANZON, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOEL G. DOJILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment1 dated September 25, 2007, filed by Atty. Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon (Atty.
Guanzon) against Atty. Joel G. Dojillo (Atty. Dojillo), for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules
of Court on confidentiality of documents and proceedings, gross misconduct, discourtesy, unfairness, malicious and
unethical conduct towards a fellow lawyer.

The facts are as follows:

Complainant Atty. Guanzon was the counsel of Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (Rosalie) and her minor children when they filed a
Petition for Temporary Protection Order under R.A. No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against Women and
their Children Act of 2004 against Jesus Chua Garcia (Garcia), Rosalie's husband. Later, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC),Branch 41 of Bacolod City granted the temporary protection order (TPO) and financial support in favor of the
clients of Atty. Guanzon.

Subsequently, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Garcia then filed a disbarment complaint against herein
complainant Atty. Guanzon docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1710 and Administrative Case No. 7176 for immorality, grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar. In the said disbarment complaint, Garcia submitted the
affidavits of Sheryl Jamola, former "yaya" of their child and a certain Bernadette Yap (subject documents), who both
alleged that Atty. Guanzon has "romantic and pecuniary interest" on Rosalie and the financial support which was ordered
by the court.

On June 13, 2006, Atty. Guanzon filed a case for Damages against Garcia and docketed as Civil Case No. 802-C before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Cadiz City. On September 27, 2006, Atty. Guanzon filed anew a case for
Unjust Vexation against Garcia and docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-10-12695 before the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod
City. On October 12, 2006, Atty. Guanzon filed a case for Grave Oral Defamation against Garcia and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-10-12696 before the MTCC, Branch 5, Bacolod City.

In Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavits in the aforesaid three (3) complaints, respondent Atty. Dojillo as counsel of
Garcia, attached the documents in the disbarment case, i.e., the affidavits of Sheryl Jamola and Bernadette Yap against
Atty. Guanzon. Thus, the filing of disbarment complaint against Atty. Dojillo for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 18, Rule 139 on the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings and documents.

Atty. Guanzon lamented that Atty. Dojillo knew that there was a disbarment suit filed by his client against her, yet, with
malice and bad faith, he submitted the subject documents as part of Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavits. By doing so,
Atty. Dojillo caused the exposure of confidential records in the disbarment case which damaged her good reputation.

On September 27, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)resolved to require
Atty. Dojillo to submit his answer on the charges against him.2
 151

In his Answer3 dated October 26, 2007, Atty. Dojillo averred that he was compelled to attach the subject documents as
part of Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavit to establish Atty. Guanzon's motive since he surmised that the three (3)
cases filed by the latter against his client was merely an afterthought and her way of revenge for filing the disbarment
complaint against her.

Atty. Dojillo further argued that Atty. Guanzon herself attached the very same subject documents in her Complaint for
Contempt against him and his client Garcia, docketed as Civil Case No. 824-C before the RTC, Branch 60, Cadiz City. Atty.
Dojillo asserted that if Atty. Guanzon's act of attaching the subject documents in the said contempt case is not a violation
of the confidentiality rule, then he has not violated the same rule also when he attached the same subject documents in
Garcia's defense. Finally, Atty. Dojillo maintained that there was neither malice nor willful violation of the Rules of Court on
the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he submitted the subject
documents to the courts.

In its Report and Recommendation,4 the IBP-CBD recommended that the instant disbarment complaint against Atty.
Dojillo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Upon investigation, the IBP-CBD was unconvinced that Atty. Dojillo is liable for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court on confidentiality of disbarment proceedings. It observed that Atty. Dojillo, as
counsel, merely found it necessary to submit said subject documents in order to defend his client by establishing Atty.
Guanzon's real motive in filing the civil and criminal cases against Garcia.

The IBP-CBD also opined that Atty. Guanzon's successive filing of cases against Garcia gives the impression that she
merely wanted to overwhelm Garcia with several cases and exhaust his resources in order to get back at him for filing the
disbarment case against her.

It likewise noted that in the unjust vexation case which Atty. Guanzon filed against Garcia, entitledPeople of the Philippines
v. Jesus Chua Garcia, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-10-12695, the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City, similarly believed
that Atty. Guanzon filed several cases against Garcia merely in retaliation for the latter's filing of disbarment case against
her. The IBP-CBD, thus, further recommended that Atty. Guanzon be censured for filing harassment and baseless suits.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-645 5 dated December 11, 2008, the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss complaint against Atty. Dojillo
due to insufficiency of evidence. It further resolved to warn Atty. Guanzon to refrain from filing groundless complaints.

Atty. Guanzon moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the IBP-Board of Governors in Resolution
No. :XX-2013-126 dated January 3, 2013. It likewise affirmed the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-645 dated December 11,
2008.7

Thus, on April 10, 2013, Atty. Guanzon filed the instant petition for review of IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-12.8

RULING

The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

In the instant case, we find that Atty. Guanzon failed to provide clear and convincing evidentiary support to his allegations
against Atty. Dojillo. As the IBP aptly concluded, Atty. Dojillo cannot be faulted in attaching the disbarment records in his
client's Answer and Counter-Affidavit in the three cases which Atty. Guanzon filed against his client as he found it
necessary to establish factual basis on the motive of Atty. Guanzon in filing said cases against his client. In effect, Atty.
Dojillo's act of attaching said subject documents to his client's Answer was to defend his client's cause which is his duty as
counsel. In the absence of proof that Atty. Dojillo was motivated by malice or bad faith, or intent to harass or damage Atty.
Guanzon's reputation, the instant disbarment complaint deserves no merit.

As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is
proved. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant. Considering the
 152

serious consequence of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty. Preponderance of evidence means
that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. Thus, not
only does the burden of proof that the respondent committed the act complained of rests on complainant, but the burden is
not satisfied when complainant relies on mere assumptions and suspicions as evidence. 9

It must also be pointed out that the confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to be applied,
under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature. 10 The confidentiality rule requires only that proceedings against
attorneys be kept private and confidential. The rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of
disciplinary actions.11 Thus, Atty. Dojillo, in attaching the subject documents to his client's Answer, did not per se violate
the confidentiality rule as the purpose was to inform the court of its existence.

Moreover, the subject documents become part of court records which are protected by A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC,12 to wit:

CANON II

CONFIDENTIALITY

SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential information
acquired by them while employed in the Judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or
unauthorized sources.

Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending
cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to
pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.

The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order
shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made public.

SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific individuals by reason of statute, court rule or
administrative policy shall be disclosed only by persons authorized to do so.

SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated authority, court personnel shall not disclose
confidential information given by litigants, witnesses or attorneys to justices, judges or any other person.

SEC. 4. Former court personnel shall not disclose confidential information acquired by them during their
employment in the Judiciary when disclosure by current court personnel of the same information would
constitute a breach of confidentiality. Any disclosure in violation of this provision shall constitute indirect
contempt of court.13

Thus, in view of the above-quoted policies, even if Atty. Dojillo attached said subject documents to Garcia's Answer and
Counter-Affidavit filed before the courts, the same remains private and confidential. In fact, even after the decision,
resolution, or order is made public, such information that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution, or
order shall remain confidential.14

In fine, since Atty. Guanzon failed to discharge the onus of proving her charges against Atty. Dojillo by clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence, her present petition for review of the IBP's dismissal of her complaint must fail.

This Court will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who are shown to have failed to live
up to their sworn duties, but neither will it hesitate to extend its protective arm to them when the accusation against them is
not indubitably proven.15
 153

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. Carpio,16 (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

36. Robinol v. Bassig AC No. 11836 November 21,2017 En Banc

EN BANC

November 21, 2017

A.C. No. 11836

CARLINA P. ROBIÑOL, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig (Atty. Bassig) for violation of Code of Professional
Responsibility and Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant Carlina Robiñol (Robiñol) alleged that respondent rented a house from her in Brgy.
Tanong, Marikina City, for a monthly rental of ₱8,500.00. Said lease, without any written contract, was for a period of two
years, or from June 12, 2010 to August 12, 2012. Upon the start of the lease agreement, it was agreed that Atty. Bassig
will pay a one month advance and another one month deposit, both of which are equivalent of one month rental payment.
However, he did not comply with the same. Atty. Bassig instead paid the monthly rental from June 13, 2010 to July 13,
2010.1

Atty. Bassig then paid his rents belatedly from July 2010 to January 2012. However, after said period, he stopped making
any payment, to wit2 :

Month/s covered Payment date Amount paid

July 13, 2010 to August 13, 2010 August 12, 2010 PhP 8,500.00

August 13, 2010 to October 13, 2010 November 24, 2010 PhP 17,000.00

October 13, 2010 to November 13, 2010 October 13, 2010 PhP 8,500.00

November 13, 2011 to December 13, 2011 January 4, 2012 PhP 8,500.00
 154

December 13, 2011 to January 13, 2012 March13, 2012 PhP 8,500.00

Robiñol alleged that the last payment in the amount of ₱l7,000.00, for two months' rent was made in July 2012, but no
receipt was issued upon Atty. Bassig's instruction. Atty. Bassig told Robiñol that he will be receiving a big amount from his
client and that he will thereafter pay the remaining unpaid rent.3

Believing that Atty. Bassig will remain truthful to his promise, Robiñol allowed him to stay in the premises. However, when
Typhoon Habagat struck Marikina City, Atty. Bassig left the house because of the heavy flood. When he left, he neither
informed Robiñol of his intended destination nor satisfied his unsettled obligation. 4

When the situation in Marikina City got better, Atty. Bassig still failed to return to his rented house. 5

Later on, Robiñol chanced upon Atty. Bassig's daughter and learned that Atty. Bassig was living with her. Robiñol then
went to the said house and demanded payment from Atty. Bassig. As a consequence, he executed a promissory
note6 dated August 18, 2012, undertaking to pay the amount of ₱127,500.00 on installment basis. The promissory note
indicates that half of the amount due would be paid on August 31, 2012 and the other half on September 30, 2012.
However, Atty. Bassig reneged on his obligation.7

Because of the foregoing incidents, Robiñol was constrained to hire a counsel to protect her interest.1âwphi1 Thus, a
demand letter8 was sent to Atty. Bassig on December 8, 2012.

In an unverified answer, Atty. Bassig acknowledged his obligation to Robiñol and promised to pay the same within the next
two months after the answer was filed. He maintained that he had difficulty in managing his finances as· he was paying for
his son's medical expenses and his car's monthly amortizations.9

A Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing10 dated January 21, 2015 was issued by the IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala. However, the Orders dated February 25, 2015 11 and March 25, 201512 issued by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) reveals that only Robiñol appeared in the scheduled mandatory
conferences. The latter Order also expunged the answer filed by Atty. Bassig for lack of verification. In view thereof, the
parties were directed to file their respective position paper.

In a Report and Recommendation dated November 20, 2015 13 , the IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of Atty.
Bassig from the practice of law for a period of two years. The IBP Commissioner ruled that Atty. Bassig's failure to file his
answer despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings showed his resistance to lawful orders and illustrated
his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction. The fallothereof reads:

IN VIEW THEREOF, we respectfully recommend that respondent, ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG, be

SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from receipt hereof, from the practice of law and as
member of the Bar.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.14

In a Resolution No. XXII-2016-165,15 CBD Case No. 14-4447, entitled Carlina P. Robiñol v. Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig,
dated February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the IBPCBD and disposed thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner imposing a penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years considering that there was a previous sanction of
suspension of two (2) years against the same Respondent in another disbarment case.

As this Court has disciplinary authority over members of the bar, We are tasked to resolve the instant case against Atty.
Bassig.
 155

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant16 and the proper evidentiary threshold is
substantial evidence.17

Here, Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. For one, the evidence submitted were inadmissible. It must be noted
that the receipts showing payment of Atty. Bassig to Robiñol and the promissory note executed and signed by Atty. Bassig
were photocopies of the original.

A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.18 Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC.5 When original document is unavailable.-When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

In the case of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Antonio Lagman19 , the Court held that:

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of
the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of
bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. xxx 20

In this case, nowhere in the record shows that Robiñol laid down the predicate for the admission of said photocopies. Thus,
aside from the bare allegations in her complaint, Robiñol was not able to present any evidence to prove that Atty. Bassig
failed to pay his rent and that he had in fact leased a house from Robiñol.

Moreover, We cannot deem Atty. Bassig's failure to file his verified answer and to attend in the scheduled mandatory
conferences as an admission of the allegations in the complaint. The consequences of such omission are clearly laid down
in Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, to wit:

Section 5. Non-appearance of parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings.- a) Non-appearance at the

mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
participate in the proceedings. Ex parte conference or hearings shall then be conducted. Pleadings
submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating Commissioner.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis-neither purely civil nor purely criminal. They do not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 21 While these proceedings
are sui generis, compliance with the basic rules on evidence may not be altogether dispensed with. More so, in this case
when the evidence in consideration fails to comply with basic rules on admissibility.

Nevertheless, Atty. Bassig is not completely exculpated from any administrative liability.

It must be noted that Atty. Bassig, despite due notice, repeatedly failed to abide by the orders of the IBP, i.e. filing a
verified answer, appearing in two mandatory conferences and filing of position paper. In fact, when the IBP ordered him to
file a position paper, it is in view of the expunction of his answer. Notwithstanding, Atty. Bassig still ignored the directive.

For his behavior, Atty. Bassig committed an act in violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.

His attitude of refusing to obey the orders of the IBP indicates his lack of respect for the IBP's rules and regulations 22 , but
also towards the IBP as an institution. Remarkably, the IBP is empowered by this Court to conduct proceedings regarding
 156

the discipline of lawyers.23 Hence, it is but proper for Atty. Bassig to be mindful of his duty as a member of the bar to
maintain his respect towards a duly constituted authority.

Verily, Atty. Bassig's conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and
processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the
court.24 In disregarding the orders of the IBP, he exhibited a conduct which runs contrary to his sworn duty as an officer of
the court.

As a final note, We commiserate with Robiñol, a nonagenarian, on her unfortunate circumstances as she should no longer
be dealing with this kind of anxiety. Nevertheless, We sanction Atty. Bassig to pay a fine in the amount of ₱l0,000.00 for
his arrant neglect to maintain acceptable deportment as member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00) with the STERN WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

SO ORDERED.

37. Santiago v. Santiago & Tolentino AC No. 3921 June 11,2018

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 3921, June 11, 2018

DELFINA HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ZOSIMO SANTIAGO AND ATTY. NICOMEDES
TOLENTINO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* J.:

We resolve the administrative case for disbarment1 filed by complainant Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago against
respondents Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino, charging them with deceit, gross misconduct and
violating their oaths as members of the Bar.

During the time when the material events transpired in this case, complainant was the City Personnel Officer of Caloocan
City while respondents Santiago and Tolentino respectively held the positions of City Legal Officer and Legal Officer II in
the City Government of Caloocan.

In 1988, complainant applied for, and was granted, a sick leave of absence with commuted pay covering 240 days from
January 25 to December 31, 1988.2 Sometime in February 1988, complainant received a Memorandum 3 from then Mayor
Macario A. Asistio, Jr., which cancelled all leaves of absence of city officials and employees. She also received a
memorandum,4 detailing her to the Office of the Secretary to the Mayor. Complainant apparently paid no heed to said
memoranda. She was later directed to return to work in a letter 5 dated April 21, 1988 signed by respondent Tolentino,
which pertinently state:

On February 5, 1988 you were served with a [Memorandum] from the Office of the Mayor that all [leaves]
of absence of city officials and employees were cancelled in the interest of public service. [In spite] of the
aforesaid memo you did not return to work thereby, ignoring the memo of the Hon. Mayor Macario A.
Asistio, Jr.
 157

In this [regard], we are giving you another five (5) days from receipt hereof to report for work, otherwise,
the undersigned may be constrained to take drastic action against you.

Complainant replied with a handwritten note,6 asking for ten days within which to answer and/or act on the letter. She,
however, did not return to work. At the end of her leave, she tendered her resignation. 7She subsequently received a
memorandum 8 dated May 18, 1989 from Mayor Asistio terminating her employment. Enclosed therewith was
a Resolution9dated December 19, 1988 signed by respondents Santiago and Tolentino, which recommended her
dismissal from service.

Complainant then filed the present case, accusing the respondents of making deceitful statements in said Resolution,
committing gross misconduct and violating their Attorney's Oath for recommending her dismissal without just cause or due
process. Quoted hereunder is the aforesaid resolution with emphasis on the allegedly false statements:

RESOLUTION

This is a case involving Atty. Delfina H. Santiago, Asst. City Administrator, indorsed to this office by the
Hon. Mayor, Macario A. Asistio, Jr. for appropriate action.

The facts of the case are as follows:

1. In 1972, Atty. Delfina H. Santiago was, per court decision, dismissed illegally as Asst.
City Administrator on Personal Matters.

2. In 1976, Atty. Santiago, was appointed Chief, Administrative Office, a position of lower
rank.

3.In 1983, Atty. Santiago was charged administratively for UNAUTHORIZED

ABSENCES, in violation of Civil Service laws. Upon recommendation of the Office of
the City Legal Office, Atty. Santiago was validly and lawfully ordered to be dropped from
the rolls which was subsequently approved and affirmed by the Civil Service Commission
in the latter's order dated October 1983 x x x.

xxxx

4. In 1985, the Supreme Court, in affirming an RTC decision, ordered the reinstatement of
Santiago as Asst. City Administrator on Personal Matters and declaring the 1972
dismissal as illegal.

5. In 1986, Atty. Santiago was appointed by Mayor Martinez as Asst. City Administrator,
her former position, pursuant to the Supreme Court decision.

6. In January 1988 Atty. Santiago filed a leave of absence (Sick Leave & Vacation
Leave) on advice of her Doctor, a Med. Cert. was attached thereto and the duration of the
leave was 240 days starting January 25 up to December 31, 1988.

The said leave of absence was initially approved but later disapproved by the Hon. Macario A. Asistio, Jr.
when the latter issued a Memorandum dated February 5, 1988 cancelling all leave of absence of which
Memo Atty. Santiago was duly served with. However despite service of the said Memo to Atty. Delfina H.
Santiago she failed and refused to report for work [continuously] up to the present. There was not even a
semblance of showing that she would comply with the memorandum.

At this juncture the office of the City Mayor indorsed this case against Atty. Delfina H. Santiago for
appropriate action. This office conducted an investigation and summoned Atty. Delfina H. Santiago
for several times to appear before the undersigned; present her evidence and explain her side in
 158

consonance with the due process mandated by the constitution. Despite several notice sent to
Delfina Santiago the latter did not heed the said notices, thereby, leaving the undersigned without any
alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the evidence available and the records pertaining to Atty.
Delfina Santiago.

FINDINGS

The records disclosed that the memorandum dated February 5, 1988 issued by the Hon. City Mayor,
Macario A. Asistio, Jr. to all employees of the City Government cancelled all leave of absences in the
interest of service effective 5 February 1988. There is no doubt a so that Atty. Santiago was duly served
with the said memo as appearing on the said memo is her signature, an evidence of receipt thereof.
Having received the said memo Atty. Santiago was fully aware of the cancellation of her leave of absence
and therefore as a prudent employee she should have obeyed the memorandum of the City Mayor by way
of reporting for work as called for. What happened instead was that Atty. Santiago never showed-up,
thereby, neglecting her duty as Asst. City Administrator and committed, in effect, insubordination.

What is nagging and aggravates the predicament of Atty. Santiago is that the instant case is
already her second violation which places her in the category of incorrigible employees. The first
is when she was charged of UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES, punished for said act and made to
suffer the corresponding penalty thereof.

Under the Civil Service Law, Art. 9, Section 36 Par. 3, "No office or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended except for the cause as provided by law and after due process".

The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

x x x x 3. Neglect of Duty x x x

27. Insubordination

The actuations of the respondent Atty. Santiago squarely falls on the aforequoted grounds for dismissal
as her failure to report for work amounts to [willful] disobedience to her superior officer. Nothing can be
more important to the upholding and maintenance of the public service in its integrity and good name than
the enforcement of the reasonable discipline of laws. In the discharge of an official duty and obligation Atty.
Santiago as a government employee is expected to obey the order and instruction of the duly constituted
authorities and she should not ignore or disregard a legitimate official order. Her act is inimical to the
public service. To tolerate Santiago to get away with it would be tantamount to allowing her to act as she
suits and satisfies her personal convenience in violation of her superior's order. An act which would be
certainly demoralizing to the public service. As may be gleaned from the foregoing discussions Atty.
Santiago had [willfully] ignored her superior's order without any attempt to comply with it and
therefore insubordination is clearly present aside from neglect of duty.

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, the instant case being the second [infraction] of the Civil Service law by Atty. Santiago, it
is respectfully. recommended that the latter be dismissed from service. 10(Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

Complainant contended that she was not administratively charged for any offense in 1983 or in 1988. Thus, she was not
an incorrigible employee. Instead of being sent a notice or summons, she received respondent Tolentino's letter dated
April 21, 1988, but the same neither stated that an administrative case had been filed against her nor did it require her to
appear in any investigation. Since she was on a sick leave of absence, not a vacation leave, she could not be guilty of
neglect of duty as she had no duties to perform. She was also not in a position to defy any lawful order, which would have
amounted to insubordination. Annexed to the complaint were copies of: (a) the Resolution December 19, 1988; (b) Mayor
 159

Asistio's dismissal order dated May 18, 1989; (c) complainant's resignation letter; (d) her approved sick leave of absence
application; and (e) the commutation voucher showing the payment of her salaries.

In respondent Santiago's comment11 to the complaint, he argued that the allegedly deceitful statements in the above
Resolution were not malicious imputations of falsehoods. If the statements were inaccurate, the same may have been
caused by a misappreciation of facts or evidence. As to whether complainant was formally charged for unauthorized
absences in 1983, the material point considered was that she was dismissed because of unauthorized absences. It also
did not matter that she filed a sick leave of absence, not a. vacation and sick leave, as the issue of the investigation was
whether she was liable for disobeying Mayor Asistio's directives.

Respondent Santiago further alleged that Mayor Asistio indorsed12 to the City Legal Office the matter of complainant's
noncompliance with the Mayor's return to work order and this referral was equivalent to an administrative complaint.
Complainant was sent a notice regarding her failure to report for work, thereby informing her that she could be subjected to
disciplinary action. Her failure to answer indicated her intent to disregard Mayor Asistio's order and her option not to
participate in the investigation. Respondents' investigation proceeded ex parte and the assailed Resolution was issued on
the basis of the evaluation of the evidence at hand. Without proof of bad faith or adverse personal motives, respondents
cannot be held administratively liable for issuing the Resolution in the discharge of their official duties even if the same
turned out to be erroneous.

In respondent Tolentino's comment,13 he likewise argued that Mayor Asistio's referral of the case to the City Legal Office
was treated as a complaint. Complainant was apprised of the nature thereof and she even requested ten days within which
to answer the same. After the City Legal Office conducted an investigation wherein complainant failed to participate,
respondents decided the case on the basis of records and evidence available. Anent the charge that she was not
administratively charged in 1983, what was considered was that she did incur unauthorized absences that led to her
dropping from the rolls. That she filed a sick leave of absence, not sick leave and vacation leave, was immaterial as Mayor
Asistio's memorandum did not qualify the nature of the leaves of absence being cancelled.

Among the documents attached to respondent Tolentino's comment were copies of: (a) Mayor Asistio's letter 14 to
complainant dated August 4, 1982 about her sick leave of absence; (b) Mayor Asistio's letter 15 to complainant dated July 5,
1983 about her unauthorized absences; (c) letter 16 dated August 4, 1982 of Administrative Officer Soriano to Mayor Asistio,
seeking advice on the action to be taken on complainant's situation; (d) Mayor Asistio's indorsement 17 dated October 5,
1983 to the City Legal Office of complainant's case; (e) the indorsement18 from the City Legal Office dated October 6, 1983,
recommending that complainant be dropped from the roll of employees; (f) the order 19 of Mayor Asistio dated October 19,
1983 regarding complainant's separation from service; and (g) the Orders 20 dated October 27, 1983 and November 3,
1983 from the office of the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-National Capital Region (NCR),
approving the complainant's dismissal.

Complainant insisted in her Consolidated Reply21 that the indorsement of Mayor Asistio was not at all signed by the Mayor
and it was merely an indorsement of documents for study and recommendation. She was also not informed of said
document. She asked for a period of ten days within which to answer and/or act on respondent Tolentino's letter dated
April 21, 1988 and she did report to Atty. Enrique Cube, the Mayor's secretary to explain why she cannot go back to work
yet. As no administrative case was filed against her in 1988, there could not have been a valid investigation under
Presidential Decree No. 807.22Yet, respondents made up fictitious statements of facts and conclusions of law in
recommending her dismissal.

The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 23

The IBP Report and Recommendation

IBP Investigating Commissioner Mario V. Andres issued a Report and Recommendation 24 dated April 4, 2008, which
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. Commissioner Andres found that complainant failed to
present convincing evidence that respondents acted in bad faith in rendering the Resolution dated December 19, 1988.
Thus, they were held to be entitled to the legal presumption of innocence.
 160

According to Commissioner Andres, respondents concluded that complainant was previously charged for unauthorized
absences by relying on existing records that showed that she was dropped from the rolls in 1983. Complainant's letter
asking for a period of ten days to reply to respondents' April 21, 1988 letter also meant that she understood that an
investigation was underway. When she failed to respond, respondents assumed that she waived her right to present
evidence. Respondents may have only been careless in their choice of words when they wrongly assumed that
complainant was administratively charged in 1983 and they used the term summons in referring to the letter dated April 21,
1988. Still, respondents cannot be held liable for deceit without proof that they deliberately worded their Resolution to
mislead Mayor Asistio into dismissing complainant.

Respondents were also not found guilty of misconduct as their actions neither indicated moral depravity, nor did it affect
their qualifications as lawyers. Respondents may have erred in failing to follow the procedure under Section 38 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 807 and they may be investigated for such lapses as government officials before some other
venue. However, absent evidence showing respondents' moral depravity in issuing the said Resolution, they cannot be
penalized therefor as members of the Bar.

Lastly, Commissioner Andres ruled that respondents did not violate their oath as members of the Bar, particularly the oath
to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court." 26 The falsehood contemplated in the Attorney's Oath is one
that is intentional or committed with malice. Although the allegedly deceitful statements in respondents' Resolution may
not be wholly accurate, the same were found to be based on documents and made in the discharge of respondents' official
functions as City Legal Officers.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-22527 passed on May 22, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors approved Commissioner
Andres's recommendation.

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Vacate Resolution of the IBP, 28 which the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) of the Supreme Court referred to the IBP for appropriate action. 29

In an Order30 dated September 30, 2008, the IBP required the respondents to comment on the above motion. Only
respondent Tolentino commented31 thereon, praying that it be denied for being a mere rehash of complainant's previous
pleadings and issues that had already been passed upon.

Complainant filed before this Court an Ex Parte Motion to Vacate IBP Order dated September 30, 2008/to Declare this
Case Submitted for Decision,32 arguing that the Court's referral of her complaint to the IBP did not include the latter's
authority to decide it. She averred that the IBP was also not in a position to take cognizance of her motion for
reconsideration since the pleading was not addressed to the latter. Moreover, since respondents failed to present their
case before the IBP, they were allegedly precluded from presenting any evidence in their behalf and any comment to
complainant's motion for reconsideration will not serve any purpose.

In a Resolution33 dated March 11, 2009, the Court referred to the IBP complainant's Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Vacate Resolution of the IBP and her Ex Parte Motion to Vacate IBP Order dated September 30, 2008/to
Declare this Case Submitted for Decision.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-41334 passed on June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied complainant's motion for
reconsideration as it found no cogent reason to reverse its previous ruling.

The IBP then transmitted the record of the case to the Court for final action.

Undaunted, complainant filed with this Court a Motion to Disregard IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-413 dated June 26,
2011,35 arguing that the IBP had no jurisdiction to dismiss her complaint or to rule on her motion for reconsideration. She
insisted that the Resolution Nos. XVIII-2008-225 and XIX-2011-413 of the IBP Board of Governors should have only been
recommendatory in nature and the IBP should not have arrogated unto itself the power of the Court to decide on her
complaint.

The Ruling of the Court

 161

The Court finds no merit in the complaint.

At the outset, we reject complainant's contention that the IBP infringed on this Court's jurisdiction in dismissing her
complaint and denying her motion for reconsideration thereon.

The case was initiated upon the filing of the complaint for disbarment with this Court and the same was subsequently
referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation in accordance with Section 1, Rule 139-B36 of the Rules
of Court. The Resolution Nos. XVIII-2008-225 and XIX-2011-413 of the IBP Board of Governors embody their
recommendation to this Court. As succinctly stated in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma37 :

Clearly, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is merely recommendatory. The "power to
recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made." Necessarily, the "final action" on
the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors still lies with this Court. x x x (Citation omitted.)

Verily, there is nothing in the IBP resolutions that would suggest that the same already constituted the final determination
of the case and were beyond the power of the Court to review.

After thoroughly reviewing the record of this case, the Court affirms the recommendation of Commissioner Andres and the
IBP Board of Governors that the instant complaint should be dismissed.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x

In this case, complainant accused the respondents of deceit, gross misconduct and of violating their Attorney's Oath in
issuing the Resolution dated December 19, 1988 that allegedly contained false statements and which was arrived at
without her being informed of the charges or given the opportunity to present evidence.

As Commissioner Andres correctly ruled, deceit covers intentional falsehoods or false statements and representations that
are made with malice or with the intent to do wrong. Gross misconduct, on the other hand, is "any inexcusable, shameful
or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to
the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose."38 Similarly, on the charge of the alleged violation of the Attorney's Oath,
the settled rule is that:

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing
the conduct of lawyers '"shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official,
he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath [as] a
member of the legal profession.39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Before the Court may impose against respondents the severe disciplinary sanction of disbarment, complainant must be
able to establish by substantial evidence the malicious and intentional character of the misconduct complained of that
 162

evince the moral delinquency of respondents. Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.40

Except for complainant's allegations, however, she failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate her complaint. The
Court agrees with the findings of Commissioner Andres that complainant has not proffered any evidence that tended to
show that respondents intentionally and deliberately made false statements in the Resolution dated December 19, 1988 in
order to deceive and induce Mayor Asistio to dismiss complainant from service. She neither offered any documentary
evidence to buttress her arguments nor presented any witness to corroborate her claims.

Quite the contrary, complainant herself revealed her lack of certainty as to the malicious intent or other ill motives of
respondents when she made the following statements on her Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Vacate Resolution
of the IBP before the Court:

[Respondents] knew that there was never a first nor a second administrative case against her. Yet they
twisted their facts and language to suit their purpose. Whether they misled the Hon. Mayor Asistio to
dismiss her from the service, or they conspired to engineer her removal from the service, or
followed a directive from Mayor Asistio to justify her dismissal, she does not specifically know.
But certainly, their Resolution is not an honest mistake of judgment, as shown by the malicious
warp and woof of the Resolution itself.41 (Emphasis supplied.)

We find such line of argumentation distinctly wanting. Complainant cannot simply rely on speculations and suspicions, no
matter how deep-seated, without evidence to support the same. We held in Osop v. Fontanilla42 that charges meriting
disciplinary action against a lawyer generally involve the motives that induced him to commit the act charged and that, to
justifY disbarment or suspension, the case against the lawyer must be clear and free from doubt, not only as to the act
charged but as to his motive. Furthermore, in Cabas v. Sususco,43 we ruled that "mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence."

As a final point, the Court deliberately dispensed with any discussion regarding the validity of the Resolution dated
December 19, 1988. Commissioner Andres aptly pointed out that complainant may file in the proper tribunal a separate
case against respondents, as City Legal Officers, for possible lapses in the procedure undertaken by them in the
administrative investigation of the charge against her and/or the propriety of her dismissal. On this matter, complainant
admitted in her complaint and consolidated reply that she had indeed filed administrative cases against respondents
before the CSC, as well as a separate administrative case against Mayor Asistio, in order to impugn the validity of her
dismissal from service. However, the specific details, stages and/or outcome of said cases were not properly manifested
before this Court. Complainant merely stated that she was not satisfied with these other proceedings so she opted to file
the instant case for disbarment.44

The Court cannot allow this to be done.

What is at once clear is that this case for disbarment cannot be resorted to as another remedy in order to attack the legality
of said Resolution or to nullify its consequences. The only issue that should be determined in this case is whether
respondents committed misconduct that put into question their moral character and moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law. As previously discussed, this issue had been answered in the negative.

Considering that complainant failed to discharge the burden of proof to warrant the imposition of administrative penalty
against respondents Santiago and Tolentino, we dismiss the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondents Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. Del Castillo, Jardeleza, and Gesmundo,**JJ., conur. Tijam, J., on official leave.

- end.