Case Digests in Special Proceedings Rules 72 100 Atty. Yulo Sunday 3 5PM As of 28 Feb 2019

CASE DIGESTS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Settlement of Estate to Adoption

(Rules 72-100)
A. Settlement of Estate (Rules 72-90)
1) Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr. (G.R. Nos. 208828-29, August 13, 2014)
Tan, Joan L.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction of Probate Court
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration
has the authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale
by the prospective heirs or administrator. x xxIt being settled that property under administration needs the
approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the
estate and is null and void.
FACTS:
1. In 7 October 1987, Sr.’s wife Beatriz died intestate and was survived by 6 heirs, Sr., Edmundo,
Edgardo, Jr., Neilia and Ligaya. This led the heirs to file an SP Proc. No. M-2629 under Rule 74;
2. The Intestate Court (IC) first appointed Edgardo as administrator. The latter withdrew thru a motion in
3 November 1999 which then caused the appointment of Sr. as new administrator;
3. On 3 January 2005, IC replaced Sr. with Jr. as administrator and denied the MR challenging such
order. Thus, IC granted Jr.’s motion to take oath as administrator and expunged Sr.’s inventor report;
4. On 12 December 2005, IC recalled the Order granting letters of administration to Jr. upon Sr.’s motion,
but the same was reinstated through Jr.’s motion for partial consideration for Sr.’s alleged gross violation
of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court;
5. Sr. filed an MR while Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, leading to the reinstatement of
Sr. as administrator due to the declaration of nullity of certain portions of the Orders, for which a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued and made the said portions permanent;
6. Jr. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) before the SC challenging the CA Order but the
same was denied by SC for failure to show sufficient reversible error. MR for the same was likewise denied;
7. With Sr.’s urgent motion, IC reinstated Sr. as administrator. This order was challenged in the first of
three petitions (Rule 45);
8. The second petition challenges the denial of Jr.’s motion for inhibition of Judge Guanlao (of IC) on the
ground of the latter’s partiality as he appeared once as counsel in the intestate proceedings;
9. The third challenged order involves the sale made by Jr. in favor of Citrine of a parcel of land in Intsia
Road, Forbes Park, Makati via a Deed of Absolute Sale (DOAS) executed on 16 October 2007. Another
parcel of land in Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati was sold to Ocampo in 16 September 2010, which
the latter sold to Zee2. Individual titles were issued under the buyers’ names respectively;
10. Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA with prayer for injunction. A TRO was issued on 5
February 2007, and later, a Writ of Prelim. Injunction conditioned upon the posting of a bond of Php
2,000,000.00;
Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

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11. Nelia initially paid the said bond but failed to comply with the other requirements of A.M. No. 04-7-02-
SC. CA Ordered Nelia to comply and increased the bond to Php 10,000,000.00 which the latter did;
12. However, with the issuance of the order reinstating Sr. as administrator (see Fact No. 5), Sr. sought
for a TRO/Pre. Prohibitory Injunction v. Jr., Ocampo and Citrine and their successors-in-interest from
committing any act that would affect the titles issued in their names. Likewise, Sr. sought the IC to declare
the DOAS executed as null and void. IC granted said motions;
13. Jr. filed a consolidated petition for certiorari before the CA challenging the reinstatement of Sr. as
administrator, the denial of Jr.’s motion for inhibition, and the declaration of nullity of the DOAS. CA denied
the first 2 but granted the latter, thereby reversing IC’s declaration of nullity. Hence, the instant petition
(Rule 45).
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in reversing the IC’s declaration that the DOAS and the titles issued to buyers
are null and void.
PROVISION: RULING + RATIO: No. The CA was correct in reversing the IC Decision.
In reversing the IC, CA relied on Jr.’s arguments that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
pertained only to the portion of Sr.’s reinstatement as administrator. It ruled:
x xx In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that
said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded that the
eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to
the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of
whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
x xx
x xx The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the sale of the
three properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and void. x
xx
x xx While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the August 28,
2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), we agree with
the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained
only to the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration
to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have
expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject
properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court denied
with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.’s motion for reconsideration of the February 11, 2009 Resolution
denying his petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).
2) San Luis vs. San Luis (G.R. No. 133743, G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007)
Reyes, Dana Marie D.
Facts: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis contracted three (3) marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia, out of which were born six children. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. After five (5) years, he
married Merry, an American Citizen and begot a child but Merry later divorced Felicisimo. Felicisimo then
married Felicidad. He had no children with her but they were together for eighteen (18) years from the time
of their marriage until his death. Felicidad filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC. Some
of Felicisimo’s children by his first marriage, respondents Rodolfo et. al, filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) for
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. The respondents claim that the petition should have
been filed in Laguna because this is the residence of the decedent prior to his death. They further claim
that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo

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since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry. The RTC initially ruled that the
Letters of Administration be issued to Felicidad but later on reversed its decision. Felicidad appealed before
the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. Aggrieved, the respondents appealed before the Supreme Court (SC).
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the venue was properly laid
(2) Whether or not Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The Petition for Letters of Administration was properly filed in Muntinlupa City. The term "place
of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. The Court was convinced with the documentary
evidences presented by Felicidad proving that Felicisimo’s actual residence at the time of death, was
Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
(2) Yes. Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for Letters of Administration. The SC ruled
that since there was insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry as well as
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA., it is best to remand the case to the
RTC for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry and the marriage of Felicidad
and Felicisimo. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry Felicidad, SC held that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for Letters of Administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation.
3) Agtarap vs. Agtarap (651 SCRA, June 2011)

Caysido, Florida B.
FACTS: Joaquin died intestate leaving two parcels of land in Pasay City. During his lifetime, he contracted
two marriages, first with Lucia and second with Caridad. In the course of settlement of estate, the RTC
convinced that the properties were acquired during the second marriage, appointed Eduardo as regular
administrator and was issued letters of administration and eventually issued the order of partition. Eduardo
and Sebastian appealed the order of partition to the CA contending that the lower court erred in holding
that the parcels of land belongs to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin married to Lucia Agtarap,
notwithstanding their registration under the existing Certificates of Title in the name of Joaquin Agtarap
Casado Con Caridad Garcia Mendietta. CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed RTCs ruling, hence this
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON RTC as an intestate court has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of real properties.
HELD: Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during

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the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of
Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More
importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate
courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
4) Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012)
Lawrence Felix T. Garcia
Facts:
 The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate

 Cristina was survived by her spouse Federico and five grandchildren: three legitimate
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
predeceased his parents.
 Respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate
 Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that:
 as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the
decedent’s estate;
 as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded
preference in the administration thereof;
 Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30)
years;
 the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other
children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita;
 even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and
thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate;
 the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated;
 Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
 Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground that
Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild
of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void.
 Federico eventually died and Emilio III was appointed as administrator of the decedent’s intestate
estate
 However, the appellate court reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court and appointed
respondent as administratrix of the subject estate.

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 The SC modified the ruling of the CA and appointed as joint administrators Isabel and Emilio III
 Isabel now contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the
order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article
992 of the Civil Code must be followed.
Issue:
 Whether or not Emilio III, as an illegitimate child of the decedent’s son, is entitled to be an
administrator of the decedent’s estate?
Ruling:
 No
 the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires
that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator.
 It should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the
law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of
distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled
to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir.
 The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled
does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof.
 Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting
of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with
is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely
to the sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.
5) Lee vs. RTC (423 SCRA, February 2004)

Lee, Ivan
Facts:
 Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on
1956. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of the
subscribed capital stock.
 On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya
Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo,
Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez). <3 Peaches <3
 Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father
which included 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company,
representing 50.725% of the company’s outstanding capital stock.
 Juliana (wife) and Jose (legit child) sold 1,014 and 1,011 shares respectively to FLAG.
 The legal family entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez,
partitioning the estate among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately
sold by them.
 The lower court declared the shares of stock as null and void. CA affirmed.

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 Meanwhile, the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized capital stock of
Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling interest Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, in the
insurance company. Enderes filed an action at the SEC. The SEC hearing officer dismissed the
case acknowledging the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
 Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary of Philinterlife ignored the orders nullifying
the sales of the shares of stock
Issue: WON the sale of the shares of stock of Philinterlife is void.
Ruling: YES. Our jurisprudence is clear that

 (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and
 (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
 An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under NCC
533 which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such
portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate
or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the
devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell
his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein.
 It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlife’s authorized capital stock, approved on the
vote of petitioners’ non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it difficult for Dr.
Ortañez’s estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.
6) Heirs of Ruiz vs. Ruiz (252 SCRA, January 1996)

Mirhan, Jaime Mathew
FACTS:
1. Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs
a. Edmond Ruiz – only son
b. Maria Pilar Ruiz – adopted daughter
c. Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all daughters of
Ruiz
2. Testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond
Ruiz executor of his estate.
3. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately distributed among Ruiz
and respondents.
4. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic
will.
5. 4 years after – Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for the probate and approval of the deceased’s
will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz
a. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue
influence.
6. The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters
was leased out by Edmond to third persons.
7. Probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and
payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property.
8. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of
the estate.
a. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00
9. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will

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a. Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary
to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00
10. Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release
of Funds
a. Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court
b. Montes opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3
granddaughters
c. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due to
Edmond’s lack of opposition
d. Probate Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may
be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the
testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the
inheritance
11. CA sustained probate court’s order.
ISSUE:
W/N the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and
obligations, has the authority:
1. to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren -
NO
2. to order the release of the titles to certain heirs
3. to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
RULING:
1. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate.
a. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity
b. Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased
person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.
2. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and estate tax have been paid; or
b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a
sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations
3. In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the
date of first publication of the notice to creditors
a. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto
been paid, much less ascertained.
b. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate.
i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares
in the inheritance.
ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.

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4. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the
question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law
a. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of
any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated
i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner
before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for
release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order
of the said court.
ii. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees
inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and allegedly
impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother.
iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of
the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall
proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.
5. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed.
— An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well
as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses
for administration.
a. When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he
had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and
maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate
taxes thereon, but he moved again for the release of additional funds for the same
reasons he previously cited
i. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the
necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his
favour
ii. petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from
the Valle Verde property.
iii. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in
his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a
trustee of the highest order.
7) UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA (G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005)
Lugue, Harriete
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez
entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of
the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim
and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five
equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May
31, 1985. On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in
the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford
6600 Agricultural All- Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model
AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of
the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the
loan dated December 13, 1980.

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Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the
estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and
his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors
for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. On August 20, 1981, a Deed of
Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay.
Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No.
18909. Summons was issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was
in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since
she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund
was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner
under the joint agreement. The RTC dismiss the case on lack of merit. It also ruled that the said agreement
executed was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be
no valid partition until after the will has been probated. On appeal, it affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition. The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs
as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the
joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the
obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any
condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out
that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the
complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation and resistance of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioner’s claim amounts to a waiver
of the right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who
executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would
be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the agreement entered by Edmund and Florence is valid?
2. Whether the heirs assumption of indebtedness is binding?
RULING 1: No. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated:
“In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated.
The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice
thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of a will” This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall
be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and
Florence, my children. We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing
provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time

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he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3)
subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The
joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of
their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
RULING 2: No. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: ... This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it,
thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased
and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the
prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs
of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. Perusing the records of the
case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred
by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son
Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
8) AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN (G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013)
Garcia, Maria Angeles Imelda L.
FACTS: Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen.
When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate. In
her petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time
when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. (Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was a bigamous marriage, as said marriage was contracted during
the subsistence of the marriage of Amelita with one Filipito Sandico.)
Amelia Quiazon, together with her two children, on the other hand, filed opposed the issuance of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be the administrator of the estate
RULING 1: The Court ruled that the ruling of the RTC, affirmed by the CA that the venue for the settlement
of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pinas City. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime,

Page 10 of 37
Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue
for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
The term “residence” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute
or rule in which it is employed. In the application of such in Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of court,
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. As generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous. In the context of venue provisions, residence means nothing more than a person’s actual
residence or place of abode, provided therein with continuity and consistency.
RULING 2: Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, (Sec. 6, Rule 78 and Sec. 2,
rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court) is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.
Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully
be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
9) PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES (G.R. No.
150175, February 5, 2007)
Hernandez, Penelope
FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino
died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate. CFI issued
Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate. Subsequently, CFI
issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for
the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by
the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without
the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the
intestate estate of Maximino.
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in favor of the heirs of Maximino.
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision before the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed
the decision. Unsatisfied the Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Donata elevated the case before
the SC. SC reversed the decisions of CA and RTC and dismissed the Complaint for partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment awarding ownership of the properties included in the decedent’s estate
to his surviving wife may be assailed on the ground of fraud after more than 30 years had lapse from the
promulgation of the said judgment.
RULING: The answer is in the negative. The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate
of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between
Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register
the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October
1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and
regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making
Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a
co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband.

Page 11 of 37
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively settled the
intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased
husband. The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings
No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court, reproduced below –
That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence of any clear and convincing
proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties, and to have rendered a judgment valid in every respect; and it could not give credence to
the following statements made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the
court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it
should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem,
and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing
of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the
proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication
requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in
the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were
not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.
10) SABIDONG vs. SOLAS (699 SCRA, June 2013)

Santiago, Cheenee
FACTS: Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of land,
designated as Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Barangay San
Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City. The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Estate
(Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was occupied by PriscilaSaplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an
ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch
4. On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to immediately vacate
the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs.
At the time, respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The
Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s offer in view of an application to purchase already
filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to the
actual occupants in awarding approval of Offers". While the check for initial down payment tendered by
respondent was returned to him, he was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11
and that if he could put up a sufficient down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for approval
of the Probate Court so that the property can be awarded to him "should the occupant fail to avail of the
priority given to them."
The following day, respondent again submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square
meters for the amount of P35,100. Under the Order issuedby the probate court (RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27)
in Special Proceedings No. 1672, respondent’s Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the court’s
observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase the lots
they are occupying up to this date and considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in
favor of the x xxofferors are most beneficial to the estate x xx". The probate court issued another Order
granting respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The writ of possession over
Lot 11 was eventually issued. Consequently, TCT No. T-11836 in the name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled
and a new certificate of title, TCT No. T-107519 in the name of respondent was issued.

Page 12 of 37
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court employee
respondent cannot buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit
deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority.
Court Administrator Benipayo issued an Evaluation and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of
violating Article 1491 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the purchase by certain court officers of property
and rights in litigation within their jurisdiction.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from service. Eventually, the case was assigned
to Judge Roger B. Patricio, the new EJ of the Iloilo City RTC for investigation, report and recommendation.
Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and Recommendation finding respondent liable for grave
misconduct and dishonesty under or the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
The Court noted Judge Patricio’s Investigation Report and referred the same to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation. Then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent liable for serious
and grave misconduct and dishonesty and recommended the forfeiture of respondent’s salary for six
months, which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
ISSUE: Whether Clerk of Court Solas violated the rule on disqualification to purchase property in litigation
RULING: No. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court
from acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision
reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either
in person or through the mediation of another:
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon
an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions;
this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised
by these persons. "In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give
occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done."
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case
No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be
said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate
then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from
the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the estate
under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring
the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts
and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to
show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and terminated at

Page 13 of 37
the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still
deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another court
(RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
11) Thelma Aranas vs. Teresita Mercado (G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014)
Garde, Arnel Q.
Facts: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado
(Teresita), and their five children and his two children by his first marriage namely, Respondenr Franklin L.
Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He
assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in
Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio’s estate which was granted by the RTC.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and
approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real
properties but only personal properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash, furniture and fixtures,
pieces of jewelry, shares of stock of Mervir Realty, and shares of stock of Cebu Emerson.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved
that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted
Thelma’s motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
Teresita filed a compliance with the order, supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks
covering the Mervir Realty shares of stock; the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio involving real
properties Mervir Realty shares of stock; and the certificate of stock issued for shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma)
be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the
supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be
examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the
inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties
should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.
Issue: Are the real properties which have been transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares by
Emigdio during his lifetime be included in the inventory of his estate.

Page 14 of 37
Ruling: Yes. Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted
at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person
dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-
bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three
months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after
his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his
or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his
possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong
to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase
true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the
inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the
probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question
is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues
on ownership.
12) Butiong vs. Plazo (G.R. No. 187524, August 5, 2015)

Mediodia, Tara
Facts: Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife,
respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort and a
family home, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession 5,
respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their coheirs, Pedro’s second wife,
Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria
and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their
knowledge and consent.
Petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and good
faith in acquiring the subject properties.
The trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to
irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the same.
CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment in its Decision.

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A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Petitioner asserting that while the complaint filed by respondents
was captioned as “Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession,” the allegations
therein show that the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering
that settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while
judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by
a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it was
sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction.
Appellate court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution petitioner filed the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether the RTC acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the special proceeding for the settlement
of estate of pedro riñoza and the civil action for annulment of title of the heirs and third persons in one
proceeding.
Ruling: No. In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died
without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate to a special
proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned,
judicially or extrajudicially, by Pereira v. Court of Appeals:32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for
good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. It should be noted that
recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have
good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court,
the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid,
his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is
always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been
uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.33
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special proceeding
for the settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by law. That the complaint contained
allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not mean that there was a prohibited joinder
of causes of action for questions as to the estate’s properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their
status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in
partition proceedings alone.
B. Escheats (Rule 91)
1) CASTORIO ALVARICO vs. AMELITA L. SOLA (GR 138953, June 6, 2002)

Lee, Gerard
FACTS: Fermina Lopez, an awardee and winning bidder of a land auctioned by the Bureau of lands,
executed a Deed of Self Adjudication and Transfer of Rights in favor of respondent Amelita Sola. The
Bureau of Lands approved the transfer of rights and consequently issued an Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) in favor of respondent. Petitioner Alvarico filed Civil Case for reconveyance against Sola claiming
that Lopez donated the land to him in 1984, and he immediately took possession of the same, as such, it
has the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Respondent.

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ISSUE: whether or not a private individual may institute an action for reversion?
RULING: No. A private individual may not institute an action for reversion because only the State can
institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Since Amelita Sola’s title originated
from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly
then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita’s title.
2) MALTOS vs. HEIRS OF BORROMEO (G.R. No. 172720. September 14, 2015)
Torio, Mark Joseph F.
Facts:
- Eusebio Borromeo was issued a Free Patent over a piece of agricultural land
- Well within the five-year prohibitory period, Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos.
- Eusebio Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he allegedly
told his wife, Norberta Borromeo, and his children to nullify the sale made to Eliseo Maltos and
have the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was within the five-
year prohibitory period.
- Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title and
Reconveyance of Title against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of Deeds.
- Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing that the sale was
made in good faith and that in purchasing the property, they relied on Eusebio Borromeo’s title.
Issue: Is Reversion proper?
Ruling: No, Reversion is not proper.
- Laws
o The purpose of reversion is “to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of
to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain.”
o The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic, and the Office of
the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for reversion.
o Since an action for reversion presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the
state, it is proper that the action be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, being the
real party- in-interest.
o Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land Act: SECTION 101.
All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
- Application
o In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to Eusebio Borromeo.
o This shows that he already had title to the property when he sold it to petitioner Eliseo
Maltos.
o Since only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec[tion] 101 of the Public
Land Act and since reversion was not instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting
in his stead, reversion is not proper in the case at bar
3) AURELIA NARCISE vs VALBUECO, INC (G.R. No. 196888; July 19, 2017)
Torio, Mark Joseph F.
Facts:
o Commencement of Action

Page 17 of 37
 Respondent Valbueco, Inc. filed an action for Annulment of the Free Patents,
Certificates of Title and Damages against petitioners Narcise, et al. before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga City, Branch 1. In said Complaint,
respondent alleged that it is the possessor of the subject lots in an actual, peaceful,
adverse and peaceful possession since 1970. Respondent averred that from 1977
until 1999, Original Certificates of Title, Free Patents and Transfer Certificates of
Title covering the lots in question were issued in the name of petitioners. Instead
of filing their respective Answer, they filed several Motions to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action, failure to state cause of action, defect in the
certificate of non-forum shopping and prescription.
o RTC
 The RTC ruled that the instant case is an action for reversion because petitioners
are not qualified to be issued said free patents. As such, the land must revert back
to the State.
o CA
 Respondent filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision, the CA reversed and set
aside the ruling of the RTC. The CA maintained that respondent alleged all the
facts necessary to seek the nullification of the subject free patents.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution.
o SC
 Before the Supreme Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals
Issue: Is the instant case is a reversion case or a case for annulment of free patents and certificates of
title?
Ruling: The instant case is a case for annulment of free patents and certificates of title.
o Laws
 Reversion
 An action for reversion, seeks to cancel the original certificate of
registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer
of certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were
all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. In cancelling and
nullifying such title, it restores the public land fraudulently awarded and
disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public
domain.
 Annulment of Free Patents and Certificates of Title

 On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents and certificates
of title also seeks for the cancellation and nullification of the certificate of
title, but once the same is granted, it does not operate to revert the
property back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the nullity
arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the
Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the
issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
 Reversion v. Annulment of Free Patents and Certificates of Title

 Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as to the
character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In
an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
admit State ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for
annulment of patent and certificate of title, pertinent allegations deal with
plaintiff's ownership of the contested land prior to the issuance of the same

Page 18 of 37
as well as defendant's fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these
documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
o Application of Relevant Facts

 The allegations in the complaint show that respondent asserts its ownership over
the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive prescription is a mode
of acquiring ownership of a real or immovable property by possessor through the
requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. The possession
contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be one under claim of title
or adverse to or in prescription.
 Without going into the merits of the case, We hold that the allegations in the
complaint sufficiently show that respondent claims its ownership right by
expounding on its uninterrupted possession of the same for a period of at least 35
years. Also, respondent's claim of its possession in a public, peaceful and
uninterrupted manner constitutes an allegation of ownership by acquisitive
prescription.
o Conclusion
 In this view, We hold that the action is one of annulment of patents and titles.
C. Guardians and Guardianship (Rules 92-97)
1) GOYENA vs. LEDESMA-GUSTILO

Tan, Joan L.
FACTS: On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a “PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
GUARDIANSHIP” over the person and properties of her sister Julieta, the pertinent allegations of which
read:
• That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the
Makati Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age, general debility, and a “mini”-stroke
which she suffered in the United States in early 1995;
• That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without outside
assistance, and she has to be moved by wheel chair;
• That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and in Western
Visayas, with an aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million Pesos[;]
• That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, and that she needs the assistance of
a guardian to manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises;
• That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely, petitioner
Amparo Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma
Goyena filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship alleging that that Julieta Ledesma is
competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her
person/property and that Amparo-Ledesma is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma
since their interests are antagonistic.
On October 4, 1996, the trial court found Julieta “incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and
her property” and appointed respondent as guardian of her person and properties and appointed Amparo-
Ledesma as the guardian of Julieta.

Page 19 of 37
Goyena file an MR which the trial court denied. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court and
denied Goyena's MR.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is suitable for
appointment as guardian of the person and properties of Julieta?
RULING: No. Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of petitioner’s position require a review
of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the petition at bar. This Court cannot thus be tasked
to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial
court and appellate court were correct in according them superior credit.
Although the general rule is that this Honorable Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing and revising only errors of law, it is nonetheless subject to the exceptions which have been laid
down in a number of decisions of this Honorable Court. Goyena, however, failed to show that the trial court
committed any error.
Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there existed a rift between
the two which amounts to antagonistic interests. The first letter sent by Julieta to respondent merely shows
Julieta’s lack of interest in future investments, not necessarily a business disagreement, and certainly not
per se amounting to antagonistic interests between her and respondent to render the latter unsuitable for
appointment as guardian.
The second letter shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when she was confined at the Makati
Medical Center on account of her stroke, 2) there was disagreement as to who should run the hacienda,
with Julieta favoring a certain ChelingZabaljaurigue, and 3) respondent took over management of the
hacienda with their brother Carlos (Ledesma) supporting her. No inference as to the existence of
antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta can thus be made.
The third letter has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the lower courts erred in finding that
respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian. The letter in fact discloses, that it was Julieta’s
nephew Julio Ledesma, and not respondent, who ignored the “request.”
As for the fourth letter, it has also no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The letter is not even
addressed to respondent but to a certain Connie (a sister-in-law of Julieta).
Petitioner’s assertion that respondent’s intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control
of Julieta’s properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support form the
records. The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That respondent
removed Julieta from the Makati Medical Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does
not necessarily show her hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by the trial court, cited in the
present petition, that Julieta was still placed under the care of doctors after she checked out and was
returned to the hospital when she suffered another stroke.
Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the petition
for the appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she
felt she was disliked by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment
as guardian, and 2) Petitioner concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court,
which is reflective of a lack of good faith.

Page 20 of 37
2) The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA
vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA
ESTRADA (G.R. No. 110427, February 24, 1997)
Badayos, Angelita P.
Facts: Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former
professor, was declared incompetent by judgment of the RTC of Quezon City, in a guardianship proceeding
instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was
appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. Guardian Amparo Evangelista
commenced a suit to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint was
later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo
Evangelista.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Caiza's house since
the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own
family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she
"bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question. The Estradas insist that the devise of the
house to them by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster
would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
Issue 1: Whether or not Caiza’s legal guardian has the authority to bring ejectment action
Ruling: Yes. Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the
"guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA with full authority to take
possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and
to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties ** " By that appointment, it became
Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her
well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right
and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real and personal, it being
recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her
incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof
and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this
purpose.
Issue 2: Whether or not Caiza’s death automatically terminated the guardianship
Ruling: No. While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other
being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court of June 20,
1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance
with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the
deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment
of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

Page 21 of 37
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish
the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian.That action, not being a purely personal one,
survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
3) NERI vs. HEIRS OF UY (G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012)

Martin, Maria Faith Z.
Facts: Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two from her first marriage, namely: Eutropia
and Victoria, and five from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia,
Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Spouses Enrique and Anunciacion acquired several homestead properties
throughout their marriage. Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural
guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed
an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale adjudicating among themselves the
said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying them to spouses Uy. The children of Enrique filed a
complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by
their heirs) before the RTC assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period.
The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria as additional plaintiffs for having been
excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage. The heirs of Uy
countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead
patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement
and sale of the subject properties. The RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others, the annulment of
the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred
beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of
their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children,
Rosa and Douglas. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC.
Issue: whether or not the extra judicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale is valid and
thereby depriving Rosa and Douglas of their inheritance.
Ruling: No (Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
with absolute deed of sale). With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the
transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with
powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their
mother, Anunciacion.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the
natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of
the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the
latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only
with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper
judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance
with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code. Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. Thus, the extrajudicial settlement with sale
is invalid and not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia,
Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have effectively been disposed in favor of spouses Uy.

Page 22 of 37
4) Oropesa vs. Oropesa (G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012)
Manzano, Aimee Rose L.
Facts: The Petitioner, Nilo Oropesa filed a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed
as guardians over the property of his father, the respondent, Cirilo Oropesa. In the said petition, it is alleged
that the respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years
already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory were
impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, he was observed
to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that
due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has
become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly his girlfriend.
The Judge set the case for hearing and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study,
however, the respondent refused to see and talk to the social worker. The respondent filed an Opposition
to the petition for guardianship. Thereafter, the petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his
testimony, his sister and the respondent’s former nurse.
After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Respondent filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner has waived the presentation of his Offer of
Exhibits and Evidence since they were not formally offered.
RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case stating that petitioner has failed to provide sufficient
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer
his properties. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue/s: WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS DEFINED
UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER
GUARDIANSHIP.
Ruling: No, In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward
is proven to be a minor or an incompetent. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that
persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are
incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.
The full text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are
unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy
prey for deceit and exploitation.
With the failure of petitioner to offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s incompetence
consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s
real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their
direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to
convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence
that was filed by respondent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we
had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and
that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental
sanity will suffice."

Page 23 of 37
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa
does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary,
Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1)
performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental
calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and
orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.
5) ABAD VS BIASON (G.R. No. 191993, DECEMBER 5, 2012)

Cruz, Edeva Anica B.
FACTS: Eduardo T. Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura Abad
with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City stating therein that he is Maura’s nephew and that the latter
is already more than 90 years old, single and is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her
business affairs. Leonardo Biason intervened in Eduardo’s petition stating that he is also Maura’s nephew
and that Abad cannot possibly be an efficient guardian as he is residing in Quezon City and Maura is in
Dagupan. The Regional Trial Court awarded the guardianship to Biason prompting Abad to institute an
appeal before the Court of Appeals which also affirmed the lower court’s decision stating that there are no
vices in Biason’s character that will disqualify him to be a guardian and Maura’s choice of Eduardo may be
given weight but not overly so in view of her alleged mental state.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals should be reversed
RULING: During the pendency of the petition, Biason died as stated in the Manifestation and Motion of
Maura filed before the Court. The Court then ruled that with Biason’s demise, it has become impractical
and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship
of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward.
D. Trustees (Rule 98)
1) ABAD VS BIASON (G.R. No. 191993, DECEMBER 5, 2012)

Cruz, Edeva Anica B.
FACTS: Eduardo T. Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura Abad
with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City stating therein that he is Maura’s nephew and that the latter
is already more than 90 years old, single and is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her
business affairs. Leonardo Biason intervened in Eduardo’s petition stating that he is also Maura’s nephew
and that Abad cannot possibly be an efficient guardian as he is residing in Quezon City and Maura is in
Dagupan. The Regional Trial Court awarded the guardianship to Biason prompting Abad to institute an
appeal before the Court of Appeals which also affirmed the lower court’s decision stating that there are no
vices in Biason’s character that will disqualify him to be a guardian and Maura’s choice of Eduardo may be
given weight but not overly so in view of her alleged mental state.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals should be reversed
RULING: During the pendency of the petition, Biason died as stated in the Manifestation and Motion of
Maura filed before the Court. The Court then ruled that with Biason’s demise, it has become impractical
and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship
of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward.

Page 24 of 37
E. Adoption and Custody of Minors (Rules 99-100)
1) Rosario Castro vs. Gregorio (G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014)
Garde, Arnel Q.
Facts: Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated
later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two
daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease,
and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
(Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the
Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the Trial
Court approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Rosario and Joanne allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. They also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates shows
disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO certificates shows the father
to be Larry. They further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth.
Issue: Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?
Ruling: RA 8552 (statute enforced during the adoption) requires that the adoption by the father of a child
born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
(Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born
out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify
her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older (ART.
III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service
of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious
use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never
validly acquired jurisdiction.
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in
this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of
forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.

Page 25 of 37
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption.
Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s
petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion
than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.
2) Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 128)

Belista, Charisa
Facts: Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married and begot three children, namely: Kieth,
Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony. Not long ago thereafter, Anna Marie learned of her husband alleged
extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of the illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation. The Juvenjile and
Domestic Relations Court of Cebu rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang
spouses.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the District Court of
the State of Nevada. The said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three
minor children to Anna Marie. Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became naturalized
American citizen. Eventually, he divirced his American wife and never remarried.
Meanwhile, Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, the brother and sister in law of Anna Marie,
filed a special proceedings for the adoption of the three minor Cang children.
Upon learning of the petition, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition
thereto, alleging that although private respondents are financially capable of supporting the children, he
could not allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his children.
The RTC issued a decree of adoption and held that Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its parents commonly specified by statute as a ground of dispensing with his
consent to its adoption. The CA affirmed the decree of the adoption.
Issue: Whether or not Herbert Cang has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary.
Ruling: During the pendency of the petition of adoption, the Family Code which amended the Child and
Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws.
Based on Article 188 of the Family Code, it is evident that notwithstanding the amendments of the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such
requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake or renounce utterly. The emphasis is on the
finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of
giving up absolutely , with intent never to resume or claim ones right ps or interest. In reference to
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonement imports any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It
means neglect or refusal to preform the natural and legal obligations of care and support.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss

Page 26 of 37
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail
and catered to their whims. Aside from the letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the
United States showing that even prior to the filing of the petition of adoption, he had deposited amounts for
the benefits of his children.
3) TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the Deceased ALFREDO E.
JACOB vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 88602 April 6, 1990)
Baula, Irish Ann
Facts: During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, Pedro Pilapil,
claiming to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, sought to intervene to claim his share of the estate as
Alfredo’s adopted son and sole surviving heir. In support of his claim, he presented an Order issued by then
Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, granting the petition for adoption filed by Alfredo in favor of him. He
also questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Tomasa questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya. According to Judge Moya, he could
no longer remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was
then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from “glaucoma”. According
Bienvenido Albacea, NBI Document Examiner, the questioned and the standard signatures “JOSE L.
MOYA” were NOT written by one and the same person. On the other hand, Pedro Pilapil presented
comparative findings of former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui that the signature
of Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
RTC ruling: The trial court ruled that Pilapil is the legally adopted and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and
sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as
genuine and authentic.
CA affirmed the Ruling of the RTC. Thus, Tomasa filed for Petition for Review with SC.
Issue: Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
Ruling: No. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.
This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by Tomasa shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham.
During the deposition of Judge Moya, he said that he do not remember issuing the Order of adoption. Also,
the signature therein, he categorically declared that it was not his signature. Although he was suffering from
glaucoma, Judge Moya could with medication still read the newspapers; he even read the document shown
to him by the defense counsel. Such declaration was supported by the testimony of handwriting expert
Bienvenido Albacea. Albacea found that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya were not
written by one and the same person.
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made
in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption
cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.
Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his
decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapils
conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that
he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr.
Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila
and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was
no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances
inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.

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4) Republic v. CA, Jaime B. Caranto, and Zenaida P. Caranto (G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996)
Ganto, Sarah Rose T.
Facts: An RTC petition was filed by the spouses Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then 15
years old, who had been living with Jaime since he was 7 years old. When the spouses married, Midael
stayed with them under their care and custody. The spouses thus prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the spouses and that the first name
which was mistakenly registered as "Midael" be corrected to "Michael."
The RTC set the case for hearing, giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Province of Cavite and by service of the order upon the DSWD and OSG.
The OSG opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name to "Michael." He argued that
although the correction concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the
petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108.
The RTC granted the petition, ruling that Rule 108 applies only to the correction of entries concerning the
civil status of persons and the correction of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated
in Rule 108, §2 as "entries subject to cancellation or correction." According to the trial court, the error could
be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the
petitioners.
The OSG appealed, citing as additional ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which
is the name of the minor in his Certificate of Live Birth.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC. Hence this petition for review.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for adoption – Yes.
2. Whether or not the RTC decision, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is valid –
No.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The OSG invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and the notice
published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her
name in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was held that this was a substantial defect in the
petition and the published order of hearing. Indeed, there was a question of identity involved in that
case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common
experience would indicate.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to
be adopted. The correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d." Changing
the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any
confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme and tone. The
purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the
adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this
case.
2. No. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of
errors concerning the civil status of persons. This case falls under Rule 108, §2, letter "(o)," referring to
"changes of name." Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Rule 108 covers "those
harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled."

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Rule 108, §3 further provides:
“§3 Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.”
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was
not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment.
Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by §4. While there was notice
given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption; only the prayer for adoption
of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition, the correction of his name in
the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable
party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for
lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.
5) Reyes vs. Mauricio (G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010)

Ricalde, Marra Antonnette L.
Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by Respondents
(Librada Mauricio, and her alleged daughter Leonida) for annulment of contract between Librada and
Eugenio parties.
Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan. Subject
land herein.Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio, who was the
lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that
through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document
to eject Respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized in Pasig; that Librada never
appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the said contract
(Kasunduan) were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantages of the weakness,
age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan
rendering it void for lack of consent.
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, DARAB ruled in favor of Respondents. On appeal with
the CA, Petitioner assailed the status of Leonida as a legal heir and her capacity to substitute Librada who
died during the pendency of the case. Petitioner averred that Leonida is merely a ward of Librada.
Issue: Whether Leonida’s filiation may be attacked collaterally?
Ruling: No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.
Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. He explained thus:

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“The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action
for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more
clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child
by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest
made in any other way is void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the
code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought
only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.”
The same rule is applied to adoption.
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In
Reyes v. Sotero, this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the
settlement of a decedents estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of
the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot
be subject to collateral attack.
6) In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia (454 SCRA 541, G.R. No. 148311
March 31, 2005)
Villarosa, Alyssa Crizzel R.
FACTS: Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her
surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to
use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie
should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following
reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because under
Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any
confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural
mother should be maintained. Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name. Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name,
which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and
Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that “the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname
of the mother.”
Issue: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother
as her middle name?
Ruling: Yes. Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and

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filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity
and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided
by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry
out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
7) IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE & MICHAEL P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM (G.R. Nos.
168992-93, May 21, 2009)
Padlan. Shaunna Mae
FACTS:
MONINA & PRIMO LIM
- Petitioner Monina is an optometrist by profession who married Primo Lim. They were childless.
LUCIA AYUBAN
- entrusted to the said spouses minor children whose parents were unknown.
MICHELLE AND MICHAEL

- Being so eager to have a child of their own, Monina and Primo Lim registered the children to make
it appear that they were the children’s parents naming them Michelle and Michael. The former
was barely 11 days old and the latter was 11 days old when they were entrusted to the spouses.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children
to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, Primo Lim died.
ANGEL OLARIO
- Two years after her husband’s death, Monina remarried to Angel Olario, an American citizen.
MONINA LIM
- Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of amnesty under RA no. 8552 to rectify the
simulation of births of the children. Petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle
and Michael before the RTC, whom by that time the former was 25 and married; and the latter
was 18 years of age.
- Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent, as well as Michael. The Certifications issued by the DWSD stated that both Michelle
and Michael were abandoned children and their natural parents were unknown.
RTC RULING:
- Dismissed the petitions on the ground that joint adoption by the husband and wife is mandatory
under Section 7(c), Art. III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the FC. Since petitioner had remarried,
she should have filed said petitions jointly with her new husband. Further, petitioner did not fall
under the exceptions in the law abovementioned. Mere consent of Olario would not suffice
because under the law, additional requirements are required such as residency and certification
of his qualification, which the husband must comply with.

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- As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for
the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the
purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights
from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
- Petitioner Monina Lim in the case at bar seeks to set aside the decision of the RTC, Gen. San.
City, Branch 22 via certiorari which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Monina may singly adopt after remarriage.
RULING: NO. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
- Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt: x x x
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: x x x The use of the word
“shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is
the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear.
- The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not
suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must
meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country
has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he
must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt
in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be
waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate or
illegitimate children of petitioner.
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION:
- Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (Art. 236 FC as amended by RA 6809)
(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to
be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname
of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the
legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the
adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.

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8) Melody R. Nery vs. Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana (A.C. No. 10196, September 9, 2014)
Tuason, Miguel Marko S.
CASE LAW/DOCTRINE: The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt in his/her country may be waived if he/she is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his/her spouse a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.
QUICK SUMMARY: Nery engaged the services of Atty. Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and
for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was granted. As for the petition for adoption,
Sampana required Nery to furnish him documents which they would use for her adoption, which the latter
was able to provide, except for the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt. However, after being
informed of purported postponements of the hearing and finding it odd that she did not receive notices from
the court, she eventually found out that Sampana never filed said petition in the court. Nery demanded for
the reimbursement of the amount she paid Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded. Sampana, in
his position paper, alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he was still
waiting for the certification. The SC ruled that Sampana is guilty of malpractice due to having no reason not
to file the petition for adoption since the certification requirement may be waived if the person being adopted
jointly by the alien and his/her Filipino spouse is the latter’s relative within the 4 th degree of consanguinity
or affinity. [Legal basis: Rule on Adoption, A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Section 4, (2), (iii) and Domestic Adoption
Act, R.A. No. 8552, Article III, Section 7, (b), (iii)]
FACTS: Melody R. Nery (Nery) engaged the services of Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana (Sampana) for the
annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was
eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she
had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred
copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Nery then paid Sampana P100,000.
Thereafter, Sampana informed Nery that he already filed the petition for adoption and it was already
published. Sampana further told her that they needed to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently,
Sampana told Nery that the hearing was already set and will be held in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan.
When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was
no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana then told Nery that the hearing
was reset, which made her inquire from the said court about the status of the petition for adoption and
discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. Thus, Nery met with Sampana and sought the
reimbursement of the amount she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee
of P12,000. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was
never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000 from Sampana,
but the demands were left unheeded.
In Sampana’s position paper before the IBP, he argued that Nery’s allegations were self-serving and
unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted receiving “one package fee” from Nery for both cases of
annulment of marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption
because of the old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted.
Thus Sampana suggested that “if the alien adopter would be married to a close relative of Nery, the intended
adoption by an alien could be possible.” Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents, including
the marriage contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy
(certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana alleged that
he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that
Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that
the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to
refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
IBP’s Report and Recommendation: Found Sampana guilty of malpractice, and recommended a penalty of
three (3) months suspension from the practice of law and to return the P100,000 to Nery, with legal interest.

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ISSUE: WON the Atty. Sampana is guilty of malpractice.
RULING: Yes. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise
to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence,
skill, and competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other
lawyers to be candid and fair. In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received “one package fee”
for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving his fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition
for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client.
Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is
disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be
married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act
provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
is waived.
Article III (Eligibility), Section 7. Who may adopt. – The following may adopt:
xxx
(b) xxx Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
xxx
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse;
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of the
petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of
the Code’s (The Code of Professional Responsibility) mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand.
A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public
confidence in the legal profession.
SC: Suspended Sampana from the practice of law for three (3) years and also ordered him to return to Nery
the P100,000 with interest.
NOTES: [A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Section 4, (2), (iii) & R.A. No. 8552, Article III, Section 7, (b), (iii)]
Qualifications for Aliens to Adopt:

(1) Same qualifications as Filipinos:
(a) of legal age
(b) in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights
(c) has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude
(d) emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children
(e) at least 16 years older than the adoptee
XPN: (i) adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or
(ii) adopter is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent
(f) in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family
(2) His/her country has diplomatic relations with the Philippines
(3) He/she has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains residence until the adoption decree is entered (Residency
Requirement)
(4) He/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country and that his/her government allows the adoptee
to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter (Certification Requirement)
XPN: The requirements on residency and certification may be waived if:
(a) He/she is a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the 4 th degree of
consanguinity or affinity

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(b) He/she seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse
He/she is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the 4th
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.
9) Rosario Castro vs. Gregorio (G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014)
Garde, Arnel Q.
Facts: Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated
later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two
daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease,
and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
(Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the
Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the Trial
Court approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Rosario and Joanne allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. They also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates shows
disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO certificates shows the father
to be Larry. They further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth.
Issue : Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?
Ruling: RA 8552 (statute enforced during the adoption) requires that the adoption by the father of a child
born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
(Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born
out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify
her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older (ART.
III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service
of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious
use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never
validly acquired jurisdiction.
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.

Page 35 of 37
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in
this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of
forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption.
Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s
petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion
than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.
10) BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
SERVICES, INC. (G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014)
Mataac, Michael
FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled
under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on
board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina
P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death
benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since
the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s
primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of
the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted
in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law
on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies
the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee,
who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of
their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis
the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the

Page 36 of 37
blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of
parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes. The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the
death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s
sole remaining beneficiary.

Page 37 of 37

Case Digests in Special Proceedings Rules 72 100 Atty. Yulo Sunday 3 5PM As of 28 Feb 2019

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Case Digests in Special Proceedings Rules 72 100 Atty. Yulo Sunday 3 5PM As of 28 Feb 2019

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CASE DIGESTS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Settlement of Estate to Adoption

A. Settlement of Estate (Rules 72-90)

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction of Probate Court

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

3) Agtarap vs. Agtarap (651 SCRA, June 2011)

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

 The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

5) Lee vs. RTC (423 SCRA, February 2004)

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Issue: WON the sale of the shares of stock of Philinterlife is void.

Ruling: YES. Our jurisprudence is clear that

6) Heirs of Ruiz vs. Ruiz (252 SCRA, January 1996)

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

10) SABIDONG vs. SOLAS (699 SCRA, June 2013)

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

12) Butiong vs. Plazo (G.R. No. 187524, August 5, 2015)

CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment in its Decision.

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

B. Escheats (Rule 91)

1) CASTORIO ALVARICO vs. AMELITA L. SOLA (GR 138953, June 6, 2002)

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Issue: Is Reversion proper?

Ruling: No, Reversion is not proper.

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

 Annulment of Free Patents and Certificates of Title

 Reversion v. Annulment of Free Patents and Certificates of Title

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

o Application of Relevant Facts

C. Guardians and Guardianship (Rules 92-97)

1) GOYENA vs. LEDESMA-GUSTILO

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Hence, this petition.

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Issue 2: Whether or not Caiza’s death automatically terminated the guardianship

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

3) NERI vs. HEIRS OF UY (G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012)

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

The full text of the said provision reads:

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

5) ABAD VS BIASON (G.R. No. 191993, DECEMBER 5, 2012)

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals should be reversed

D. Trustees (Rule 98)

1) ABAD VS BIASON (G.R. No. 191993, DECEMBER 5, 2012)

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals should be reversed

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

2) Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 128)

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

Case Digests in Special Proceedings | Sunday, 3-5PM

5) Reyes vs. Mauricio (G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010)

Issue: Whether Leonida’s filiation may be attacked collaterally?