FLORESTA V. JUDGE UBADIAS, arbitrariness.
(Italics in the original; underscoring
A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1774
27 MAY 2004.
Third Division
[CARPIO-MORALES, J.]
FACTS:
By a Sworn Complaint, then Provincial Prosecutor, now
Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta
(complainant) administratively charged Judge Eliodoro
G. Ubiadas of the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) with “gross ignorance of [the] law, grave abuse of
authority and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.”
Among other grounds, complainant faults respondent for
granting, “without giving notice to the prosecution,” the
petition for bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested
by virtue of a warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court
of Subic, Zambales which found probable cause against
him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act
No. 7610 (“Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act”).
Respondent avers that in Crim. Case No. 271-99, upon
motion filed close to noon time of January 3, 2000, the
prosecutor was furnished a copy of the petition for bail by
Mangohig, who was then under preliminary investigation.
During the hearing set on the following day, or on January
4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m, there was no appearance from the
Prosecutor’s Office. Since the offense for which
Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable offense,
respondent granted him bail.
ISSUE: Is the Judge correct in granting the petition for
bail even without the participation of the Prosecution
during the bail hearing?
HELD: NO, the Judge is not correct.
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if
no charge has yet been filed in court against a respondent-
suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required
to be given to the prosecutor, or at least his
recommendation must be sought. So Fortuna v. Penaco-
Sitaca instructs:
[A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes
the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by
the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first
be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because
by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is
on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be
exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of
procedural due process, that is, after the evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued
in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
supplied)
True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in
Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m.
Given the filing of the petition only the day before, at
close to noontime, it cannot be said that the prosecution
was afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present
evidence after it received a copy of the petition minutes
before it was filed in court. It bears stressing that the
prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to
comment on the application for bail by showing that
evidence of guilt is strong.
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail,
no period is provided as it merely requires the court to
give a “reasonable notice” of the hearing to the prosecutor
or require him to submit his recommendation, and the
general rule on the requirement of a three-day notice for
hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a
court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice,
there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good
cause to call for hearing his petition for bail on shorter
notice. Reasonable notice depends of course upon the
circumstances of each particular case, taking into account,
inter alia, the offense committed and the imposable
penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the
prosecution. In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was
arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610
which is punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua, and subsequently indicted for statutory rape
qualified by relationship which is punishable by death.
Under the circumstances, by respondent’s assailed grant
of bail, the prosecution was deprived of due process for
which he is liable for gross ignorance of the law or
procedure which is a serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule
140 of the Rules of Court.
ZUÑO V. JUDGE CABEBE,
A.M. OCA NO. 03-1800-RTJ
26 NOVEMBER 2004.
Third Division
[SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.]
FACTS:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn
complaint of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño of
the Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C.
Cabebe, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Batac, Ilocos Norte. The charges are knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and
partiality in a case where: The accused filed a motion to
dismiss invoking as ground the right of the accused to a
speedy trial; Respondent judge motu propio issued an
Order granting bail to the accused; Respondent judge
issued the Order without the accused’s application or
motion for bail. The prosecution then filed a motion for
reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon, respondent
judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further
proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was
patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent
judge be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law. In his
comment, respondent denied the charges. While
admitting that he issued the Order granting bail to the
accused without any hearing, “the same was premised on
the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial.”
There was delay in the proceedings due to complainant’s
frequent absences and failure of the witnesses for the
prosecution to appear in court, resulting in the
cancellation of the hearings.
ISSUE#1: Is the Judge correct in granting bail sans the
application or motion for bail and without conducting a
hearing?
HELD#2: NO, the Judge is not correct.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, we held
that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the
procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases
involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of
discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right
or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the
denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion,
hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether
or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the
latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first
conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no
petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to
the accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of
Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure xxx.
[T]he court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain
a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based
thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion as
to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge did not
follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in
Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing before he granted
bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an
opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail.
Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have
conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail
hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural
due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail
ISSUE#2: Is the contention of the Respondent Judge, in
granting bail on the ground that the accused were entitled
to their right to a speedy trial, meritorious?
HELD#2: NO. Respondent’s contention is bereft of
merit.
There is no indication in the records of the criminal case
that the prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of
the case. Even assuming there was delay, this does not
justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter
disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing
has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same
vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be
conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain
professional competence; and by the very nature of his
office, should be circumspect in the performance of his
duties. He must render justice without resorting to
shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent
failed to live up to these standards.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION V. JUDGE OLALIA
AND MUÑOZ
G.R. NO. 153675, 29 APRIL 2007.
En Banc
[SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.]
FACTS:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
“accepting an advantage as agent,” in violation of Section
9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. Petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the extradition of private respondent. After
hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the
petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high “flight risk.” Judge Bernardo, Jr.
inhibited himself from further hearing and the case was
raffled off to another judge. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent
judge. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the
above Order, but it was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE: Is the contention of the Petitioner, that the
potential extraditee has a right to bail under the
Constitution or statutory law, the right being limited
solely to criminal proceedings, tenable?

HELD: NO, the contention is untenable.
The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that
the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable
doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited
only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second
half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts
characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes
against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently,
under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been
persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant
events show that the individual person is now a valid
subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both
international organizations and states gave recognition
and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10,
1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right
to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of
Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective
deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles
set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land.
In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental
among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every
person to life, liberty, and due process.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt
of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of
a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect
for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under
these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right
to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND JINGGOY ESTRADA,
G.R. NO. 158754, 10 AUGUST 2007.
En Banc
[GARCIA, J.]
FACTS:
This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution
of herein respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division)
issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558,
granting bail to private respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy
Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for brevity). Jinggoy was
among the respondents in the crime of Plunder filed by
the Office of the Ombudsman. Jinggoy filed with the
Court an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his
Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian
Considerations. He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed
with the Sandiganbayan. Jinggoy filed before the
Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against
which the prosecution filed its comment and opposition.
Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the
submission by the parties of their respective memoranda.
Petitioner suggests that Jinggoy is harboring a plan to
escape, thus a flight risk. But in a Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan granted Jinggoy’s Omnibus Application
for Bail. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied.
ISSUE: Is the grant of bail in favor of Jinggoy proper on
the ground that he is no longer considered a flight risk?
HELD: YES, the grant of bail is proper.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to
the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may
justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is
great. Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed
Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy
does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a
flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court
wrote in this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy]
has, in general, been consistently respectful of the Court
and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word
or by deed, that he is of such a flight risk that would
necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in mind
his conduct, social standing and his other personal
circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this case
seems remote if not nil.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent
is now almost nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court
takes stock of the fact that those who usually jump bail
are shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the
eyes of the people for as long as they can flee from the
retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a
reputation and a respectable name to protect and preserve
are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure,
cannot accept any suggestion that someone who has a
popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan
to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a
fugitive from justice.
OKABE V. JUDGE GUTIERREZ AND
MARUYAMA,
G.R. NO. 150185, 27 MAY 2004.
Second Division
[CALLEJO, SR., J.]
FACTS:
Maruyama charged Okabe of Estafa. After the
preliminary investigation, an Information was filed and a
warrant of arrest was issued. Petitioner posted a personal
bail bond in the said amount, duly approved by Judge
Demetrio B. Macapagal, the Presiding Judge of Branch 79
of the RTC of Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the
said warrant. The approved personal bail bond of the
petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City on
June 21, 2000. Upon her request, the petitioner was
furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the
resolution and the criminal complaint which formed part
of the records of the said case. Petitioner twice left the
Philippines but returned. The prosecution moved for the
issuance of a hold departure order to hold and prevent any
attempt on the part of the petitioner to depart from the
Philippines. Petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To
Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order and/or allow her to
regularly travel to Japan. Petitioner filed a motion for the
postponement of her arraignment alleging that, in case the
trial court ruled adversely thereon, she would refuse to
enter a plea and seek relief from the appellate court. The
court denied the petitioner’s motions on the ground that
when the petitioner posted a personal bail bond for her
provisional liberty, she thereby waived her right to
question the court’s finding of the existence of probable
cause for her arrest and submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the court, more so when she filed the
motion for the lifting of the hold departure order the court
issued, and the motion to defer the proceedings and her
arraignment.
ISSUE: Is the application for or filing of bail bond a
waiver of one’s right to assail the warrant issued for his
arrest?
HELD: NO, there is no waiver in application for or filing
of a bail.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to
modify previous rulings of this Court that an application
for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant
issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities
thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this
Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature
because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and
curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing
curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by
their essence retroactive in application. Besides,
procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively,
even without express provisions to that effect, to cases
pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to
actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Before the appellate court rendered its decision on
January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure was already in effect. It behooved the appellate
court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioner’s
petition for certiorari and her motion for partial
reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after
posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that
she waived her right to question the finding of probable
cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her
by the respondent judge. There must be clear and
convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish her right to question the existence
of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests
on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily
and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case,
the records show that a warrant was issued by the
respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the
petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the
petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she
posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure
her provisional liberty. Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of
the RTC of Quezon City approved the bond and issued an
order recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner.
Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should
not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest.
 LEVISTE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
189122, 17 MARCH 2010.
Third Division
[CORONA, J.]
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years
and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and
one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed
his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he
filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on
his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the
matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with
grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now
questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his
application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an
appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal
mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any
of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in
Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean automatic grant of
bail in case of appeal.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional
right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject
to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such
discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only
for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in
fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending
appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards
approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in
the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the
language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It
is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial
determination that the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal
laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial
court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of
bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting
bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our
criminal justice system and court processes.
ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND
COMMENTS
G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to
ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is
afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.”
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was
charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis
of his purported involvement in the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an
Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the
Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for
Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to
Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b)
that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender,
the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus
allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his
age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in
its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right
unless the crime charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever
petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable by
reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that
petitioner's guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not
a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of
innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right
is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but no higher than what may be reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment]
and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted
according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of
a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the
original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed
the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may
be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail,
or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of
any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or
life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to
judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the
court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after
the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be
granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is
indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should
primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes
vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing
of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and
8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail.
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's
responsibility to the international community arising from
its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from
Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC
emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and
capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post
bail].
-------------------------
Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very
weak legal basis – the grant of bail over mere
humanitarian grounds. He also claims that the court has
no authority to use humanitarian grounds. Leonen argues
that “[Petitioner's] release for medical or humanitarian
reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to
Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan,” nor were these
grounds raised in the petition in the Supreme Court.
“Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently
provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or
provision of the Constitution.”
Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted
bail as a special accomodation for the petitioner and he
goes on to criticize the decision to wit:
[This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective
justice not based on their legal provisions, but one that is
unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the presence
or absence of human compassion.
xxx
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the
Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with
motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide,
without guidance, whether bail should be granted because
of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded
diseases. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged
with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking,
multiple incestuous rape, … and other crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment...
Procedure for granting bail
Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure outlined for
the lower courts in bail cases in order to demonstrate that
the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying Petitioner's
Motion to Fix Bail. In Cortes vs. Catral the Supreme Court
held:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court
should be besieged with a number of administrative cases
filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there
is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles
involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself,
through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been
including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars
conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the
following duties of the trial judge in case an application
for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing
of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and
8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the version deliberated upon
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
This section of the dissent reveals that the Justices voted
supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
to grant bail based on a substantially different version of
the opinion, one which did not use humanitarian
considerations as a ground for the granting of bail. The
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the
dissent explains that the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the
Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them as
issue of whether or not bail is a matter of right and reveals
well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges
that the copy offered for signature was substantially
cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision
similar to an earlier draft which used humanitarian
rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too
considerations as the basis for the granting of bail. The
frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of cases
dissent makes it clear that this was an irregularity.
on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably
expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
The majority opinion offers no “guidance”
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal The dissent argues that the main opinion is unclear
principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only whether the privilege (humanitarian considerations, right
be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members to bail, etc.) will apply to those who have similar
of the Bench cannot justly be charge with a deficiency in conditions. Whether or not this privilege will only apply
their grasp of legal principles. to those undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this
privilege can be granted to those of advanced age only.
Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan
“The majority has perilously set an unstated if not
grant his bail without any hearing for the purpose of
ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. At the
ground of medical conditions.”
Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution had no opportunity to
present any evidence because of the prematurity of There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if,
Petitioner's Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the dissent asserts when and how bail can then be canceled.
that the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the Motion
based on prematurity. Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced
The reliance of the majority on the case of Government of
Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia is misplaced because this case
Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate referred to extradition cases, hence its increased emphasis
on international law. As applied to crimes charged under
Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on
Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal
humanitarian reasons at the Sandiganbayan. Neither
Declaration of Human Rights must be qualified by the
petitioner nor the prosecution were able to develop their
Constitution's rules regarding bail.
arguments as to this point to establish legal and factual
basis for this kind of bail. Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by
remanding the case back to the lower court for factual
The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the court
determination of whether or not the accused was a flight
to grant bail merely on the basis of the certification of the
risk.
attending physician, Dr. Gonzales, stating that the
Petitioner was suffering from numerous debilitating
conditions. The dissent states that:
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant
of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor's certification.
In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence
by doing away with cross-examination and authentication
of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a
hearing whose main purpose is to determine whether no
kind of alternative detention is possible.
xxx
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our
well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical procedures
for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether
the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined
when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after
petition for bail is filed by accused. The medical condition
of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.