SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R.

ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues
of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-
called “Gloriagate Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.

ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege.
The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must
be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in
aid oflegislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008

FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before
the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive
privilege

RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It
pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-
making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to
a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority. - there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
OSCAR CONSTANTINO et al. vs. HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO
G.R. No. 181508, October 02, 2013

FACTS:
In this case, there are two (2) deed of extrajudicial settlement involving estate properties of Pedro
Constantino, Sr., i.e., one in 1968 involving the 192 sqm and another in 1992 involving the 240 sqm.
The separate Deeds came into being out of an identical intention of the signatories in both to
exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr.

Respondent, who are grandchildren of Pedro Sr. from Pedro Jr., filed a complaint seeking to annul
the 1992 extrajudicial settlement involving the 240sqm lot on the ground that they, who are also
heirs of Pedro Sr., were excluded thereto. On the other hand, Petitioners alleged that the
respondents have no cause of action against them considering that the respondents’ already have
their lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr. by virtue of the 1968 Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Waiver. During the pre-trial, respondents admitted that they executed the 1968 Deed to
partition the 192 sqm which is the share of their predecessor Pedro Jr., in Pedro Sr.’s Estate.

RTC rendered a Decision finding both plaintiffs and defendants in pari delicto. On appeal, CA rule in
favor of respondent and declared that the 1968 Deed covering the 192 sq m lot which actually
belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. Hence, heirs of Pedro Jr. (herein
respondent), did not adjudicate the 192 sqm lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other
heirs of Pedro Sr. Petitioners now assails the erroneous disregard by the CA of stipulations and
admissions during the pre-trial conference

ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made during pre-trial are binding upon the parties.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pretrial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly
provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the
pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the
issues to be tried. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with.

However, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it
and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.
The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and
during the trial
CONRADO C. DOLDOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. NO. 164481, September 20, 2005

FACTS:
Provincial Auditor conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the
Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a
shortage of P801,933.26. The State Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on
their examinations showing his shortages. On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer
requesting that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and cash account, taking exception to the
findings of the State Auditors.

Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On
September 15, 1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was
issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage, as follows:
P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995. However, he
reneged on his promise. Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against
Doldol in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City. Doldol was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not, person convicted of malversation may assail his conviction when he had
already partially paid the alleged shortage.

HELD:
The said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant's commitment to
gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be
treated as an implied admission of appellant's guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing
funds to his personal use.
JOSUE R. LADIANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002

FACTS:
Accused, a member of the Integrated National Police (now PNP), was charged with murder before
the Sandiganbayan (SB) for the death of Fancisco San Juan. During the trial, Cortez, the prosecutor
who conducted the preliminary investigation, testified that the accused executed before him a
counter-affidavit admitting the commission of the crime. Before Cortez was presented as witness,
Defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the
execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before
Cortez.

However, Accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense. The same counter-affidavit became the
basis of SB in convicting the accused. The court a quo held that his
Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim’s
death, may be used as evidence against him.

On appeal with the SC, petitioner argued that the counter-affidavit cannot be considered an
extrajudicial
confession as the same was executed during custodial investigation with the assistance of a counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of the commission of an offense while invoking self-defense in
a Counter affidavit executed during preliminary investigation without the assistance of a counsel
may be admitted as an extrajudicial confession against him.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:

"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.

"SEC. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him."

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of

fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged. 26 Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting
the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is
an admission, not a confession. Petitioner admits shooting the victim — which eventually led to the
latter’s death — but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in
self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY
G.R. NOS. 131799-801, February 23, 2004

FACTS:
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Information were filed against her
uncle, the appellant for qualified rape.

The records also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the
barangay hall where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997.
However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when he was
brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for inquest investigation. Neither did the court a quo
inquire about the circumstances and the appellants reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.

The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay in
evidence to prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997,
the appellant objected thereto on the ground that he was not assisted by counsel and that he was
coerced into signing the same.

The trial court convicted the appellant of rape on the basis of Lucelles sworn statement, the
testimony of her mother, the appellants statement executed in the Barangay Chairmans Office, and
the testimony of Dr. Armie Soreta-Umil.

ISSUE: Whether or not an admission made before a Barangay Chairman without the assistance of a
counsel may be used against the accuse.

HELD:
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the
barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him
because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement.

The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers investigation conducted by police authorities which
will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other
police agencies in our government. The barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer
for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellants statement before the barangay
chairman is inadmissible
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA et al.
G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004

FACTS:
Herein accused were charged with murder. He was arrested pursuant to the testimony of two (2)
eyewitnesses. During his custodial investigation the accused made an extrajudicial confession after
the following was recited to him:

“I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions will be asked to you regarding an incident
last December 2, 1994 at the Rooftop, Brgy. Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, in connection with the
shooting of Joseph Galam, owner of the said Disco House as a result of his death. Before questions
will be asked of you I would like to inform you about your ri[g]hts under the new Constitution of the
Philippines, as follows: That you have the right to remain silent or refuse to answer the questions
which you think will incriminate you; That you have the right to seek the services of a counsel of
your own choice or if not, this office will provide you a lawyer if you wish.”

The appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence
against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial
investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective
because he remained silent during the entire proceedings.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not an extrajudicial confession made during custodial investigation wherein the
rights of the accused were merely recited to him may be admissible in evidence against such
accused.
(2) Whether a counsel who remains silent at the time the extrajudicial confession was made
qualifies as an independent counsel.

HELD:
(1) The answer is in the negative. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving
up of a right is missing. The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and
consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one
like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva
Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous
to the investigation, albeit for another offense.

(2) A counsel who remains silent all throughout the investigation shows that there is lacking of
a faithful attempt at each stage of the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the
consequences of his actions.

The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy
himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import
and consequences of answering the questions propounded. Counsel should be able,
throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring with his
client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty of a lawyer includes
ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused
to remain silent may be invoked at any time.
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The prosecution
alleged that: (1) the petitioner as branch manager caused the preparation of promissory notes (PN)
and cashier’s check in the name of one of their valued client; (2) that by forging the signature of
such client, petitioner was able to obtain the proceeds of the loan evidenced by the PN.

After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative
investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written
statement in the form of questions and answers admitting the commission of the allegations in the
Information. Trial court convicted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed his conviction.

Elevating the case before the SC, petitioner avers that the written statement should not be admitted
as evidence against him as it was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of
the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not a statement of an accused-employee made during administrative

investigation conducted by his employer may not be admitted an evidence against the former on the
ground that it was made without the assistance of a counsel.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission
or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable
only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant manner.

In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the
questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs
manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial
investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his
written statement. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence
and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional
impediment to its admissibility.
MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS y ILAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 190583. December 7, 2015

FACTS:
Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner, Salazar, and Carpon.
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner unlawfully deprived
Cebuana of cash/ money when she took out pawned items and released them to redeeming
pledgors in exchange for redemption payments which she, however, did not turnover to the
pawnshop, and instead pocketed them for her own gain.

She gravely abused the confidence concurrent with her sensitive position as a vault custodian when
she exploited her exclusive and unlimited access to the vault to facilitate the unlawful taking. Her
position entailed a high degree of confidence reposed by Cebuana as she had been granted daily
unsupervised access to the vault. Also, the petitioner knew the combinations of the branch’s vault
and nobody was allowed to enter the vault without her presence. Without the authority and consent
of her employer, she repeatedly took and appropriated for herself the redemption payments paid
for the pawned items with the aggregate appraised value of ₱414,050.00.

The accused submitted pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the redemption
payment by their Respective pledgers. She submitted them during the spot audit along with a
confession letter stating that portions of the ₱1,250,800.00 missing value of jewelry were actually
already redeemed.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible.

HELD:
YES. A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes
evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one
of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime,
unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges
on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case.

The language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could
only be known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s job in an administrative
case is less cumbersome than risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really
commit. It is thus implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing at the mere
prospect of losing his/her job. The petitioner’s declarations to Talampas show that she fully
understood the consequences of her confession. She also executed the letter even before Finolan
came to the Old Balara branch, thus, negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an
administrative sanction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL SANTOS y NARCISO
G.R. Nos. 100225-26, May 11, 1993

FACTS:
Santos was charged and convicted of murder and frustrated murder. On appeal, accused makes the
following assignment of errors: (1) his identification in the police line-up by the two witnesses is
inadmissible as he was not afforded his right to counsel; (2) he questions the trial court for
admitting a sworn statement by one Ronaldo Guerrero, a witness in another criminal case accused
was also charged with the murder which had taken place in the very same site where Bautista and
Cupcupin were ambushed as such accused contends that the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was
hearsay evidence, considering that the prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness
during the trial.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not identification in the police line-up is not admissible on the ground that the
accused was not provided with a counsel.
(2) Whether the trial court may not admit a sworn statement of a witness taken from another
criminal case wherein the accused for both cases are one and the same.

HELD:
(1)
There is "no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police line- up. The customary
practice is, of course, that it is the witness who is investigated or interrogated in the course of a
police line-up and who gives a statement to the police, rather than the accused who is not
questioned at all at that stage. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record of this case which
shows that in the course of the line-up, the police investigators sought to extract any admission or
confession from appellant Santos.

(2)
Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar
thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."

Trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited
purpose for proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that
the particular corner of two (2) particular streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle
and its passengers. As in fact, both in the instant case, as well as the case where Guerrero’s
testimony was originally presented, the scene of the crime is one and the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES
G.R. No. 133888, March 1, 2001

FACTS: Herein accused was charged of raping his eldest daughter. The prosecution presented the
victim as its main witness, while, the defense presented a number of witnesses who testified to
different occasion for which the victim was caught lying. After the trial, trial court, giving credence
to the testimony of the victim, convicted the accused. On appeal, the accused presented series of
letters allegedly written by the victim to the defense counsel asking said counsel to help her father
be acquitted.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a minor witness’ credibility may be assailed by proving that she lies on a
number of occasion
(2) Whether or not letters written by the witness after trial containing details that is contrary to
testimony made in open court constitutes recantation of said testimony.

HELD:

1. NO. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did
not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." While lying
may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming
them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as
charging one’s own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.

Furthermore, as a rule, findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to
be disturbed, for the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the same. Lastly,
jurisprudence dictates that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit,
since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.

2. An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the
testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken
before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his/her
mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place
the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Recantations are frowned upon by
the courts because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.
Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant
consideration.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR.
G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002
‘
FACTS: Respondent Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed Free Patent Application. In relation to the said
application, Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation to the Bureau of Lands.
Less than 3 months after the application, free patent was issued.

Sometime in April 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested for an investigation for
irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of respondent. Isagani
Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, submitted his Report. In that report, Recio supposedly
admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of
land. Thereafter, government instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title
and Reversion against respondent.

Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. In reversing the RTC, CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani
Cartagena’s testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the
free patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony based on a report which relates an admission of a third person
who was not presented as witness is inadmissible in evidence for being a hearsay.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person
— the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith — and the former’s statements may then be
regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. Recio’s alleged admission
may be considered as "independently relevant."

Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross- examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio
may be considered as independently relevant.

The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a

witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for
in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such
fact.

Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his
testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner, a sales representative at Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with estafa for
failure to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company.
During the trial, prosecution, in order to prove that collectibles lawfully belonging to the company
where misappropriated by the accused, submitted the following documentary evidence: (a) the
receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers
listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt
numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan
herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive. Prosecution also presented Guivencan to testify on the entries in the
documentary evidence. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that
the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness pertaining to entries in a document made by another
person constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted as evidence.

HELD: Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a
witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of
a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon
for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.

The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the person from whom the witness derived
the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-
examined. Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assert or becomes the basis of inference,
and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand,
subject to the test of cross- examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the
hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he
heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove
that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words.
This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b)
the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove an asserted fact, i.e., misappropriation on the part
of the accused through documentary evidence of which the witness has no personal knowledge, the
same is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and EDUARDO
QUISAYAS
G.R. No. 198022 April 7, 2014

FACTS: On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way
home when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Dom’s Studio in Poblacion,
Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that the
accused ran away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle.

On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing
their routine patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running
at a fast speed. When asked why they were running, the accused did not answer prompting the
policemen to chase them. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and when it
became evident that they could no longer find them, they continued patrolling the area. There they
saw Januario lying on the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely injured, the policemen
immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital. While
inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that it was "Jay-R and
his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein, while Jay-R is his co-
accused who remains at-large. At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who
found him in critical condition. Three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in
Januario’s body which eventually caused his death. CA affirmed RTC decision hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether Dying Declaration by the victim on this case is admissible evidence.

HELD: No. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the
declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is
made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the
dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.

In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the
records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not
appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the
statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death
and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible.
The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying
declaration.

However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the
act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that
it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS “ABE"
G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015

FACTS: At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-month-old
grandson outside his residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3
Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3 Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching television
when four (4) successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2
Borre's house and saw two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter away from
SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify the
other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled on a motorcycle. PO3 Zapanta, together with
SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital.
On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or
"Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor, Palanas -who shot him. This statement was repeated to his
wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in
the morning of the even date, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot wounds on his head and trunk.

The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that Palanas and his
companion were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre through the positive identification of the
eyewitnesses to the incident. Moreover, SPO2 Borre's statements that Palanas shot him constituted
an ante mortem statement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus, admissible as evidence
against Palanas. It further opined that treachery attended SPO2 Borre's killing as he had no inkling
that the attack would take place, and that he was in no position to mount any feasible defense.

The RTC, however, did not appreciate evident premeditation because of the absence of the following
elements: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between
determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. CA
affirmed the RTC's ruling with modification increasing amounts awarded to the heirs of SPO2 Borre
to F75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether Palanas's conviction for the crime of Murder should be upheld on the basis of Dying
declaration And as part of the res gestae.

HELD: Yes. For a dying declaration24 to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule,25 four
(4) conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant
is conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is
the victim.26 On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae,27 and
thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained
to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity
of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his
own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and
is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless
and false accusation.30 Verily, because the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at
the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the
most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and
awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THEODORE BERNAL et al.
G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997

FACTS:
Accused was charged with Kidnapping Openda, Jr. During trial, the prosecution, in order to prove
that accused has a motive in perpetrating the alleged crime, presented Enriquez, a common friend
of both the accused and the victim, as witness. Enriquez testified that Openda, Jr. confided to him
that the latter is having an affair with accused’s wife. The trial court, giving credence to Enriquez’s
testimony as well as testimony of other witnesses attesting to the circumstances prior to the alleged
abduction, convicted the accused. Accused assailing the decision of the trial court and for admitting
the testimony of Enriquez.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony made by a witness as to a statement made a deceased person that
is against the interest of the latter may be admissible in evidence as against a third person.

HELD: Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:

"Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons."

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:" (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
(3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to
his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true.

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession
to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a
crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his
own detriment.
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON & RENE R. DEZOLLER vs. COURT OF APPEALS & TEODORA
DOMINGO
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997

FACTS: Martin Guerrero, the surviving spouse and only heir of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero (TDG),
sold the property originally owned by the latter to herein respondent Teodora Domingo. Thereafter,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter’s name. When Martin Guerrero died,
herein petitioners, alleging to be TDG’s niece and nephew, filed an action for reconveyance claiming
that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation from
TDG. During the trial, Corazon, one of the petitioners, testified that she is the niece of TDG and
submitted documentary evidence such as pictures, baptismal certificate etc. to prove the alleged
filiation.

Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to
prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. The trial court issued an order
granting the demurrer to evidence. In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals
declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal
certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and
establish filiation

ISSUES: Whether or not testimony as to filiation to a deceased person is inadmissible for being a
hearsay evidence.

(2) The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece. Such
a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person
whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other
than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only
before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis
is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently
corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the
pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other
than such declaration.

Distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very
declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by
evidence aliunde. The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery
against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the
declarant’s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by
the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship,
does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
Arellano University School of Law
Taft cor. Menlo Pasay City

EVIDENCE
(Digested Cases)
Assignment #4

Submitted by:

Arianne Dimaano
Thursday/ 5:30-8:30PM

Submitted to:
Judge Byron San Pedro