CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays
and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999
FACTS:
 On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that
they be segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City
of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be
known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and
approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan
in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set
for June 22, 1996.
Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its
territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries.[8] Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue
raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise
in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of
such barangays.
The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a
local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.

 Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued
Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City.
Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997
 Upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta filed two
Petitions with the COMELEC to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites
scheduled. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of
the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the
Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the
boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled
plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall
have been finally decided by the court.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the
case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has
already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of
Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo
Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in
abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig
and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same
vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico,
Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.

 In the first petition the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of
Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to
be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary
dispute.

 The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the
Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on
March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast therein.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays
Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending
boundary dispute between the two local governments?
RULING: YES.
The Civil Case involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and
the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before
plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held since the final
outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by
the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny
that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy
shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over
NAPARI, petitioner, vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge, the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 35); and the CITY OF ORMOC, component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of
Represented by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR., respondents. discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to
G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003 adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers.
They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial
FACTS: action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that
 A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable
settlement by a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City
and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga on October 31, 1997.
 No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of the joint
session issued Resolution certifying that both the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga Leyte have failed to
settle amicably their boundary dispute and have agreed to elevate the same
to the proper court for settlement by any of the interested party.
 To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of
Ormoc City.
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim.
 The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. Hence, a petition for Certiorari was filed before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement
of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

RULING: YES.

Jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. It must
exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by
estoppel.

Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a
situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute
with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga
is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city.Clearly then, the procedure
referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.

Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the
general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is
found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Section 19(6) of this law provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

xxxxxxxxx

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., for himself and all other interested parties similarly
situated in Metropolitan Manila, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-56022 May 31, 1985
FACTS:
 Presidential Decree No. 824 was enacted to which created a public
corporation "to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and
attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be
sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property
and such other powers as are necessary to carry out its purposes." P.D. No.
824 was a response to a felt need for a "central government to establish and
administer program and provide services common to" the cities of Manila,
Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities in the
surrounding area.
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. They
rely on this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the unit or units affected.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 824 is constitutional?
RULING: YES
1. Reference was made to the referendum held on February 27, 1975 wherein the
residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local
governments of the four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of
the manager or commission form of government, with the terms and conditions being
left to the discretion of the President. It was then pointed out that the rapid growth of
population and the corresponding increase of social and economic requirements in
the contiguous communities has brought into being a large area that calls for
development both simultaneous and unified. For many public services rendered by
local governments separately for themselves [ought to] be administered more
efficiently and more economically, to the common benefit of the cities and
municipalities in the area, if they are integrated and harmonized, under a system of
central planning.
2. The plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila, having
manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been
satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February,
1975, there was no Local Government Code.
3. Nor is there any question as to the Presidential authority to issue Presidential Decree
No. 824 creating Metropolitan Manila in 1975. There was at the time
no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the President who was then entrusted with
such responsibility.
4. It is a mandamus petition to require respondent Commission on Elections to order
the elections for members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan in the four cities and thirteen towns of Metropolitan Manila. The fact that it is
a suit for mandamus is an admission of the validity of PD No. 824. Nor would
mandamus lie, it being provided therein that "the Sangguniang Bayan shall be
composed of as many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the
Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society
as may be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Commission." This demonstrates that the petition's charge, that there is no duly
constituted Sangguniang Bayan, in Metro Manila Area is untrue, and that the citizenry
therein do have a voice in decision-making, through the respective Sangguniang
Bayans of each of the political units therein." The Decree itself thus supplies the
refutation to the contention of petitioner.
5. The classification to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the
class." All such elements are present. There is no need to set forth anew the
compelling reasons that called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is quite
obvious that under the conditions then existing — still present and, with the continued
growth of population, attended with more complexity — what was done a response
to a great public need. The government was called upon to act. Presidential Decree
No. 824 was the result. It is not a condition for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans
provided for in the four cities and the thirteen municipalities that the membership be
Identical with those of other cities or municipalities. There is ample justification for
such a distinction. There is thus no warrant for the view that the equal protection
guarantee was violated
6. Reference was made earlier to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution where there
is express recognition of the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila. Such is
an express constutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law. Nor was
it the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the creation of Manila
since under the Election Code of 1978, "there shall be 160 regional representatives
to the interim Batasang Pambansa apportioned among the thirteen regions of the
nation in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio" with Region IV with 19 representatives comprising
"Metro Manila as follows: Cities of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and Pasay; and the
municipalities of Valenzuela, Malabon, Navotas, Makati, Paranaque, Las Pinas,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Muntinlupa, Marikina, Pateros, and Taguig."
7. According to Presidential Decree No. 824: "The Commission, the General Manager
and any official of the Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control
of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the President shall
the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act of the
Commission, the General and the Commissioners." 37 It may give rise to doubts as
to its validity insofar as it confers the power of control on the President. His power
over local governments does not go that far. It extends no further than general
supervision. These doubts, however, do not suffice to nullify such a provision. Where,
however, the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly
appertaining to local government functions, the power of the President is confined to
general supervision.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 135962 March 27, 2000
FACTS:
 Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA)
is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-
Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
 Respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated
December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was
apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
 Respondent instituted against petitioner before the RTC for injunction for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the opening of Neptune
Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court
issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
 After due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary
injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals
 On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits
of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of
Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati
by ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MMDA has the authority to mandate to open Neptune Street
to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.
RULING: NO.
The MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is
that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of the metropolis.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units — i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities. With the passage of Republic
Act (R. A.) No. 7924 Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting
the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Metro-
wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local
political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said
services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro
Manila." There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services
cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management;
(3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage
management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services;
(6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety.
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is
composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president
of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors' League and the president of the Metro Manila
Councilors' League. The Council is headed by Chairman who is appointed by the
President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of
the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and
projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said
plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgate the rules and
regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees,
fines and penalties
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A.
No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.
It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section
11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political
subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected." R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of
Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by
the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet
member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned
to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely
exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under
R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the
case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary.
DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU
MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO,
JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS,
representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE,
DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
FACTS:
 The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989,
in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
 These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of
Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that
purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.
 Petitioners contend that R.A. 6734 is unconstitutional and conflict with the
Tripoli Agreement. The Tripoli Agreement is the Agreement Between the
government of the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro
National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial
Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General
of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976.
It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines
within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the
"areas of autonomy."
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 6734 is valid
RULING: YES
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of
administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are
mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres.
dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and political
subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of
the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the
power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision
requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement
of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or
barangays, not to administrative regions.
Moreover, any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should comprise
the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily
carry with it the exclusion of other areas. The Constitution lays down the standards by
which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region.
Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that
share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion.
Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the
Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers. Such
determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the
autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom
may not be inquired into by this Court
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create
an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the
powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government by the
organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the transfer of
certain national government offices and their properties to the regional government
shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that
such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the
regional government. It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are
unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of
organizing an Oversight committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and
properties to the regional government would in effect delay the creation of the
autonomous region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result
of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by
constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region
immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an
oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of
effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee shall cause
an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at
effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional
objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no bases therefore.
CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN et.al petitioners, vs. HON. OSCAR M.
ORBOS, Executive Secretary, et.al respondents. G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
FACTS:
 Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No.
6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling
for a plebiscite to be held in different provinces.
 In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in
favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional
provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.
 On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of
the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, § 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides, “The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.”
creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with
contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may
require.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or
redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating
the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring
the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local
governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that
a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part
of Region IX.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to
the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on
the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot
be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.
Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities
which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by
the President.

 Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. As this Court said in Abbas, administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous
Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for provinces for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political
the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore,
no basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers.
 Petitioners wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They
contended that there is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain
provinces and cities within the existing regions and restructure them to new
administrative regions. The law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the
point, that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote
for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions." The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental
from Region X to Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX,
and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are alterations of the
existing structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization. The
President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be
construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the
rules of statutory construction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioners is tenable

RULING: NO.

The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities
which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President
may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means that while
non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue),
Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-
Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue) et.al, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon.
CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, et.al, Respondents.
G.R. No. 93054. December 4, 1990
FACTS:
 On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
 The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite
showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889
votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676
votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
 Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No.
2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or
ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
 Then the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the
Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.
 On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the
non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely
noted said petition.
 On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160
declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera
Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220
were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.
 The petitioners filed a petition maintaining that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sole province of Ifugao can validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region?
RULING: NO
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that
"region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in
its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the
thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes
are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part
of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas.
It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics.
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766
strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only
one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions
necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of
having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another for regional officials
exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall
then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of
having two legislative bodies — the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan — exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And
since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it
would have too many government officials for so few people. The province of Ifugao
makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I, Section
2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra,
Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City.
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the
letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be
impractical and illogical.
CORDILLERA BOARD COALITION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
AUDIT, respondent. G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990
FACTS:
 The petitioners in this case assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera Administrative
Region, on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic
act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
 During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was
enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and
agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in
Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit: SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the
Cordillera Region Assembly as well as all offices and agencies created under
Execute Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately upon the ratification
of this Organic Act.
ON convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others,
identifying priority projects and development programs To serve as an implementing
body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio City,
provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration,
ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular members and
all regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as ex-
officio members and headed by an Executive Director. The bodies created by E.O. No.
220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that
brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations
in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored by
the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President and appropriate national departments
and agencies to make available sources of funds for priority development programs
and projects recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President
to call upon the appropriate executive departments and agencies of the National
Government to assist the CAR [sec. 24].

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 220 is constitutional.
RULING: YES.
A reading of E.O. No. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment
of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the
ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the
Constitution on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous
region in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The
President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from
a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress
in preparing the organic act for the autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed
by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months from the time
of its organization and enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for
the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only then, after its approval in the
plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.
Moreover, E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or
merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. CAR is not a public corporation or a
territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality,
unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are
normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power
to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc.
CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions.Considering the control and
supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under
E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line
departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than
anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to
the regional development councils which the President may create under the
Constitution.

Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative
powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some
measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the
organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. These
measures we find in E.O. No. 220.

E.O. No. 220 merely created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative
purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of
programs and services. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to