Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.
In view of standing
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes
on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents,
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members
of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Issue: Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for
being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative
Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government,
the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308
involves the all-important freedom of thought.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no
right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen
cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without
the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one
can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O.
No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of
the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation
of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS
funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308
as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,
respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
In view of the need for Legislative Act
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders."
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the
Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate
balance of power and cannot be allowed.
In view of right to privacy
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No.
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be
(PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional
the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also invasions.
raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is
limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General
claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of
population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely
for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes
of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN .

His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions
for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of
building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The
data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast
reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may
be too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information.
Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the
control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction
or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored
within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere
with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much
less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights
seeks to prevent.

In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public
Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application
of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette….
The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA - 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to
rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz: ----Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
PEOPLE vs. MACEREN
79 SCRA 450, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977
FACTS
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which
penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries
Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the
complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive
and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal.
Hence, this appeal to the SC.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the
law itself cannot be extended.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding
to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

Issue:
Whether or not the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid.

Held:
NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law
does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal
provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare
what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.

Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and

boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict
with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power
but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it
should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
 DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacityas
Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR,
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., G.R. No.
127980, December 19, 2007
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes,
Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University
(DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1][1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in
an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity.
On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle,
when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the
comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two
other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at
Manang’s. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and
confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his
testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or
physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an
apology. “Kailangan ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., James Yap went out of the
campus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross
Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He
panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head
with something heavy in his hands – “parang knuckles.” Respondents Reverente and Lee were
behind Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were
also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted;
guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the
group who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said “hindi ko nakita ang
mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.” What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running
with the group.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap
and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,”
while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard
Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint [2][7] with the Discipline Board of
DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault.” Similar complaints[3][8] were also filed by
Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and
Reverente. Thus, cases entitled “De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar
(AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-
APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A.
Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to
answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.[4][9]
Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and
deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written
complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at
the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your
behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline
Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the
sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present
evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of.
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution[5][18] finding private
respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,[6][19]pursuant to
CHED Order No. 4.[7][20] The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-
BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and
RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby
orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the
charge.
I SSUE
Were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown hearing nor
were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them?
H E L D:
Private respondents’ right to due process of law was not violated.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, “[t]here
are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and
with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.”[8][66]
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process.[9][67] Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected
even in administrative proceedings.[10][68] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[11][69] So long as the party
is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be
said that there was denial of due process.[12][70]
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides
of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be
based.[13][71] “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one
may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process.[14][72]
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB
Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the
charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed
of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the
Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and
they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the
parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed
to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v.
National University[15][73] where this Court held that “x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.”
LEVERIZA et al vs. IAC, Mobil oil and CAA After trial, the lower courts rendered judgment:
G.R. No. L-66614
January 25, 1988
1. Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and has therefore ceased
to have any effect as of that date;

FACTS: Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case:
Contract A — a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the Philippines, represented 2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June 28, 1966 because of
by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and. Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of the cancellation of Contract A;
4,502 square meters, for 25 years.
Contract B — a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between Leveriza and Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and 3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that it is still valid and
Contract C — a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff Mobil Oil over subsisting;
the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years.
There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three contracts of lease above
CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease was properly registered
mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is the same parcel of land, with the noted
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the President of the Philippines or an
difference that while in Contract A, the area leased is 4,502 square meters, in Contract B and
officer duly designated by him who could execute the lease contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the
Contract C, the area has been reduced to 3,000 square meters.
Revised Administrative Code; that the Airport General Manager has no authority to cancel Contract
A, the contract entered into between the CAA and Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA
It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it appears that and Mobil was void for not having been approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
defendant CAA as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for durations of time that overlapped to Communications. Said motion was however denied.
two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil Oil, and the latter, as LESSEE, leased the same parcel of
land from two lessors, to wit: (1) Leveriza and (2) CAA for durations of time that also overlapped.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition for Review
on certiorari.
Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now deceased. This is the reason
why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For purposes of brevity, these defendants shall be
ISSUE: There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was a valid contract. The
referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza.
issue therefore is whether or not said contract is still subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the
ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of
Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that CAA and the execution of another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)
Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of Contract A
defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only valid and
subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned.
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed
from is AFFIRMED in toto.
Defendants Leverizas’ claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally YES
cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA
which should be declared void.
Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee specifically “for the
purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by the latter, to serve vehicles going in and
CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by Jurado was out of the airport.”
ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the violation committed by Leveriza in
leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA further
As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises, the provision
asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the Director of Public Works and
of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:
Communications is not valid.
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in such
eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In any event, such
transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of this agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms and conditions of
the contract. Said paragraph reads:
8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and conditions
herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract by the Party of the First Part
without need of judicial demand.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease (Contract B) with
Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of the contract was made in a letter
by Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.
Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation, claiming that the
Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the cancellation. They maintain that it is
only the (1)Secretary of Public Works and Communications, acting for the President, or by
delegation of power, the (2)Director of CCA who could validly cancel the contract. Petitioners argue
that cancelling or setting aside a contract approved by the Secretary is, in effect, repealing an act of
the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the Administrator.
Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such revocation or cancellation
may be made, have already been specifically provided for in Contract “A” which has already been
approved by the Department Head, It is evident that in the implementation of aforesaid contract,
the approval of said Department Head is no longer necessary if not redundant
NOTES:
1. It is further contended that even granting that such cancellation was effective, a subsequent
billing by the Accounting Department of the CAA has in effect waived or nullified the rescission of
Contract “A.”
The billing of the petitioners by the Accounting Department of the CAA if indeed it transpired, after
the cancellation of Contract “A” is obviously an error. However, this Court has already ruled that the
mistakes of government personnel should not affect public interest.
2. Petitioners further assail the interpretation of Contract “A”, claiming that Contract “B” was a
mere sublease to Mobil Oil and requires no prior consent of CAA to perfect the same. Citing Article
1650 of the Civil Code, they assert that the prohibition to sublease must be expressed and cannot
be merely implied or inferred.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners in asserting the non- necessity for a prior
consent interprets the first sentence of paragraph 7 of Contract “A” to refer to an assignment of
lease under Article 1649 of the Civil Code and not to a mere sublease. A careful scrutiny of said
paragraph of Contract “A” clearly shows that it speaks of transfer of rights of Rosario Leveriza to the
leased premises and not to assignment of the lease.
2. Petitioners likewise argued that it was contemplated by the parties to Contract “A” that Mobil Oil
would be the owner of the gasoline station it would construct on the leased premises during the
period of the lease, hence, it is understood that it must be given a right to use and occupy the lot in
question in the form of a sub-lease.
In Contract “A”, it was categorically stated that it is the lessee (petitioner) who will manage and
operate the gasoline station. The fact that Mobil Oil was mentioned in that contract was clearly not
intended to give approval to a sublease between petitioners and said company but rather to insure
that in the arrangements to be made between them, it must be understood that after the expiration
of the lease contract, whatever improvements have been constructed in the leased premises shall
be relinquished to CAA. Thus, this Court held that “the primary and elementary rule of construction
of documents is that when the words or language thereof is clear and plain or readily
understandable by any ordinary reader thereof, there is absolutely no room for interpretation or
construction anymore.
3. <ADMINISTRATIVE LAW>Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of CAA cannot
execute without approval of the Department Secretary, a valid contract of lease over real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines, citing the Revised Administrative Code, which provide
that Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be executed:
(1) by the President of the Philippines, or
(2) by an officer duly designated by him or
(3) by an officer expressly vested by law.
On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA Administrator has the authority to lease
real property belonging to the RP under its administration even without the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, which authority is expressly vested in it by law,
more particularly Section 32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which reads:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. — Subject to the general control and supervision of
the Department Head, the Administrator shall have, among others, the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport
and all government aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including such power and duties as: … (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of
any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold,
purchase, or lease any personal or real property; right of ways, and easements which may be proper
or necessary: Provided, that no real property thus acquired and any other real property of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the approval of the President of the Philippines. …

There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while Republic Act 776 is a
special law nor in the fact that the real property subject of the lease in Contract “C” is real property
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of
Lease for the government under the third category (Art. 567. )Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court
of Appeals, the CAA has the power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of real
properties belonging to the RP, not because it is an entity duly designated by the President but
because the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested in it, which in this case is
RA 776.

Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the
CAA by reason of its creation and existence, administers properties belonging to the RP and it is on
these properties that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter
into, make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation
or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and
easements which may be proper or necessary. (The exception, however, is the sale of properties
acquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of the
President of the Philippines.) The Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of such
proviso in the other transactions contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, that
the Director of the CAA does not need the prior approval of the President or the Secretaryof Public
Works and Communications in the execution of Contract “C.”
In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that
general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable; that specific
statute prevails over a general ; and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to
a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail.

Executive Order No. 292 [Introductory Provisions]

Signed on July 25, 1987
 Introductory Provisions wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
(51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may
SECTION 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as the “Administrative Code of 1987.” be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the
Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers,
functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.
SECTION 2. General Terms Defined. — Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a
(14) “Officer” as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee”, refers to a person whose duties, not
whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:
being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the
functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a
(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power, “officer”
through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that
save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is function.
made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, (15) “Employee” when used with reference to a person in the public service, includes any person in
city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. the service of the government or any of its agencies, divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities.
(2) National Government refers to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished
from the different forms of local governments.
Executive Order No. 292
(3) Local Government refers to the political subdivisions established by or in accordance with the
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987
Constitution.
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a
local government or a distinct unit therein.
(5) National Agency refers to a unit of the National Government.
(6) Local Agency refers to a local government or a distinct unit therein.
(7) Department refers to an executive department created by law. For purposes of Book IV, this
shall include any instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned the rank of a department,
regardless of its name or designation.
(8) Bureau refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department. For purposes of Book IV,
this shall include any principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given or assigned the rank
of a bureau, regardless of actual name or designation, as in the case of department-wide regional
offices.
(9) Office refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major functional unit
of a department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to any position held or
occupied by individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or regulation.
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if
not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-
owned or controlled corporations.
(11) Regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate,
administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private persons, the
principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or
council.
(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State.
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
Republic v. CA (1991) EN BANC
G.R. 90482
PONENTE: DAVIDE
Nature: Appeal by certiorari of the decision of the CA
Petitioners: Republic (acting through the Sugar Regulatory Administration), Republic Planters
Bank
Respondents: RTC Judge, RTC Deputy Sheriffs, Reyes, Treyes and Fudolin
Quick Summary: SRA, an administrative body, cannot represent the Republic of the Philippines
because EO 18 did not give it the powers to do so.
Facts:
 May 16, 1986 (EO 18 took effect May 28, 1986) – Republic Planters Bank (RPB)
filed a complaint in the RTC for sum of money/delivery of personal property with
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against Philippine Sugar
Commission (PHILSUCOM) and the National Sugar Trading Corporation
(NASUTRA)
 They asked the court to order PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA to render a faithful
account of different bank accounts being held; to render a faithful inventory of all
the sugar stocks for the crop year 84- 85; to remit dollar accounts held; to deliver
sugar stocks of crop year 84-85; pay interests and penalties for accounts covered
by unpaid sugar quedans, damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit
 Before PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA could answer, a compromise agreement was
submitted and was approved by the lower court
 Three orders were issued
o First order – dismissed separate petitions for relief from judgment filed
by different sugar associations (National Federation of Sugar Cane Planters,
Sugar Central Inc, Independent Sugar Planters)
o Second order – granted a second motion to resolve a pending motion
for issuance of a writ of execution and allowed the issuance of an alias
writ of execution
o Third order – required officers of the RPB to appear before the court
to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for defying the alias
writ of execution
 CA denied the petition for the nullification of the orders because
o RPB accepted the appointment as Trustee whose obligation is to pay
received benefits by way of trustee’s fees and cannot question the right
of private respondents to attorney’s fees
o SRA may not lawfully bring action on behalf of the Republic because EO 18
says that PHILSUCOM remains a judicial entity for 3 years for the purpose
of prosecuting and defending suits against it.
o Petition should have been filed through the OSG and not through the
OGCC; SRA cannot lawfully represent the Government because it may
only perform powers and functions as may be authorized by the laws
which created them
 SC required respondents to comment and issued TRO directing respondent Judge to
desist and refrain from further proceeding in the civil case
 SC was informed that the Judge was ordering the implementation of an alias writ of
execution
Issue/Held:
Did the CA err in holding that neither OGCC nor SRA can represent the Government in an
action before it? NO
Ratio:
 Sol Gen says:
o SRA has no legal personality to file the instant petition under the name of
the Republic because under EO 18, it is not vested with the legal capacity
to sue.
o EO 18 – abolished PHILSUCOM but its juridical personality was to
continue for three years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
suits.
o CA committed no reversible error
 Private respondents says:
o Almost same with Sol Gen
o RPB – GOCC engaged in the banking business.
o Petitioners have no legal personality to initiate petition because SRA is not
a party in the case before the TC (since it was filed against PHILSUCOM and
NASUTRA).
o It cannot be presumed that SRA had substituted PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA in
the case as both continue to legally exist for the purpose of prosecuting
and defending suits in liquidation of its affairs
 SC says: CA correctly ruled that SRA may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines and that the OGCC does not have the authority to
represent the petitioner in this case.
o EO abolished PHILSUCOM and created SRA but PHILSUCOM was allowed to
continue as a juridical entity for 3 years for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it…under the supervision of the SRA
o Sec 3, EO 18 does not specifically include the power to represent the Republic
nor the power to sue and be sued.
o Sec 4, EO 18 – specific functions does not include the power to represent the
 Republic
o CHARTER DOES NOT GRANT THE SRA THE POWER TO REPRESENT REPUBLIC IN
SUITS FILED BY OR AGAINST IT.
 SC says SRA is an administrative agency
o Administrative agency – only such powers as are expressly granted to it by
law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise; government
body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation
o Power to represent the Republic – withheld from SRA so it cannot institute the
instant petition.
 OGCC also cannot represent SRA or Republic
o OGCC is the principal law office of all GOCCs including subsidiaries; the
president may not allow it to act as lawyer for a specified GOCC or subsidiary.
o Since SRA is neither a GOCC or a subsidiary, OGCC does not have the
authority to represent it
 THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs COURT OF APPEALS
171 SCRA 348
Status and Characteristics
Meaning of Administrative Agency
FACTS: On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against
the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans
Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development
Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino),
Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of
the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said
application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS
Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to
support the application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The
application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated
March 12, 1985.
Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner) went to the Regional Trial Court on a
petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. On April 16, 1985, the
lower court issued the first of its challenged Orders, and held:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157,
158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered to
return and surrender immediately all the personal properties and documents seized by them from
the petitioners by virtue of the aforementioned search warrants. On August 21, 1985, the trial court
denied reconsideration.
On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of
Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Orders of the lower court. In ruling initially for the Task
Force, the Appellate Court held:
Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to
prosecute foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883. The petitioner, in
exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at
bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void. Besides as correctly
pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force is appealable to the Office of the President.
On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the question
primarily of whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible
officer' countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure. The Court of
Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and
subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with "express
powers and functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and
punished under PD No. 1883." "By the very nature of its express powers as conferred by the laws,"
so it is contended, "which are decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct
preliminary investigation on the charges of foreign exchange violations, issue search warrants or
warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, among others, and depending upon the evidence
presented, to dismiss the charges or to file the corresponding information in court of Executive
Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations effective August 26, 1984,
petitioner exercises quasi-judicial power or the power of adjudication ."
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, was of the opinion that "the grant of quasi-
judicial powers to petitioner did not diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation.
The right to interpret a law and, if necessary to declare one unconstitutional, exclusively pertains to
the judiciary. In assuming this function, courts do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is
superior to the two other coordinate branches of the government, but solely on the theory that
they are required to declare the law in every case which come before them."
In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the Resolutions above-
mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in
excess of its appellate jurisdiction,"
ISSUE: Whether or not The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is a quasi-judicial body, and
one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's
jurisdiction
RULING: No. This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts to
question is the Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent's
petition below and its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's
orders of search and seizure, for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly)
coordinate and co-equal with the Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a jurisdiction.
An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's petition shows indeed its
recognition of judicial review (of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its
objection, precisely, is whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the superior courts, that may
undertake such a review.
As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force
is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before
the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals, the Court of Appeals and this Court.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court of law and
other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule making."
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine
rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the
same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is,
to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat
the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone
by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.

The Court sees nothing in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1936 (except with respect to the
Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it
with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its
undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the
filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a
judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's
office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence
exists to justify haling the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot
be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.

If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said
to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes
that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.

In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the
assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.

RATIO: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court of law
and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule making."

---
G.R. No. 160093 July 31, 2007
MALARIA EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MEWAP), v THE
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO
PUNO, CJ.:
FACTS:
President Estrada issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening
and Streamlining Program for the Executive Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on
Executive Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as co-chair.
The DBM issued the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA). PCEG
likewise issued Memorandum Circular No. 62, entitled "Implementing Executive Order No. 102,
Series of 1999 Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health." M.C. No. 62
directed the rationalization and streamlining of the said Department.
Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 136, Series of 2000, ordering the
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau or Service Directors and Program Managers of the
Department of Health to direct all employees under their respective offices to accomplish and
submit the Personal Information Sheet due to the approval of the Department of Health –
Rationalization and Streamlining Plan.
Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union
of affected employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a
complaint with the RTC of Manila seeking to nullify Department Memorandum, the NOSCA and the
Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other issuances implementing E.O. No. 102.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the President has authority under Section 17, Article VIII of the Constitution to effect
a reorganization of a department under the executive branch.
2. WoN the residual powers of the President only refer only to the Office of the President
HELD:
1. Yes.
The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the DOH under the Constitution and
statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and
17 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus,
except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a
particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures.
The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual
powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad
organization powers to implement reorganization measures, viz.:
SEC. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such
other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and
which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law.10
We explained the nature of the President’s residual powers under this section in the case of Larin v.
Executive Secretary, viz.:
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What
law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of
the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which
includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to
standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is] unquestionable.
The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." So far,
there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.12
2. NO. Petitioners argue that the residual powers of the President under Section 20, Title I, Book III of
E.O. No. 292 refer only to the Office of the President and not to the departments, bureaus or offices
within the executive branch. They invoke Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the same
law, viz.:
Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. x x x
The interpretation of petitioners is illogically restrictive and lacks legal basis. The residual powers
granted to the President under Section 20, Title I, Book III are too broad to be construed as
having sole application to the Office of the President. As correctly stated by respondents, there is
nothing in E.O. No. 292 which provides that the continuing authority should apply only to the Office
of the President. If such was the intent of the law, the same should have been expressly stated. To
adopt the argument of petitioners would result to two conflicting provisions in one statute. It is a
basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every
part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

PETITION DENIED