G.R. Nos. 117485-86 April 22, 1996
The offense was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:p
With our recent adjudgment in People vs. Alicando1 as a backdrop, even an initial
perusal of the records of these cases now before us on appeal and/or automatic
review gives a sense of paramnesia or, in the French term more often used, deja vu.
One cannot escape the illusion of remembering events when experienced for the first
time, or of something overly or unpleasantly familiar in the present appellate review.
Indeed, the courtroom dramatis personae in the cases at bar are the same as
in Alicando, that is, the presiding judge, 2 the government counsel de oficio,3 and the
substitute counsel de parte. 4 The cases likewise involve the heinous crime of rape
and were repressed by the sentence of death. The crux of the controversy in both is
identically the validity vel non of the arraignment conducted by the same trial court
which followed closely equivalent procedures in conducting the questioned
proceedings. Hence, as will hereafter be demonstrated, the observations of this Court
will also inevitably converge and move along the same channels of thought.
On May 24, 1994, consequent to five separate complaints, Criminal Cases Nos.
43567, 43568, 43569, 43570 and 43571 were filed in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Iloilo City charging herein appellant, an illiterate laborer, with rape
committed on five separate occasions against his own daughter, complainant Estelita
Estomaca.
The trial court detailed its findings and the prosecution's contentions on the multiple
incestuous rapes, as follows:
Melita is the eldest daughter of the accused, the second husband
of Melita's mother. Melita has a full-blood younger brother
around twelve (12) years old. She has two (2) half-blood sisters
(from) the first marriage of her mother who are residing in
Manila.
Melita claims that she was first raped in July 1993, at their
residence at Barangay Tiolas, San Joaquin, Iloilo. This is now
the subject of Criminal Case No. 43567.
repeated by her father before Christmas of December, 1993
(Criminal Case No. 43568); January 1994 (Criminal Case No.
43569); February 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43570); and on
March 6, 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43571).5
There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually took
place on June 14, 1994 during the arraignment of appellant, assisted by his
government counsel de oficio, Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera. The decision of the court
below, dated July 15, 1994, declares that he entered a plea of guilty to Criminal
Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43567,
43569 and 43570.6 Obviously engendered by the insufficiency of the proceedings
conducted and the imprecision of the notes taken at this stage, this matter will be
further discussed hereafter.
The two criminal complaints, both subscribed by the offended party on April 29,
1994 and which are the subject of the joint judgment of the lower court challenged
in this appellate review, respectively allege:
Criminal Case No. 43568
That sometime in the month of December, 1993, in the
Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, taking advantage of his superior strength, abuse of
confidence and trust, he being the father of the undersigned,
with deliberate intent and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned who, at
that time, (was) 15 years of age.7
Criminal Case No. 43571
That on or about March 6, 1994, in the Municipality of San
Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the father of the undersigned complainant, with deliberate
intent and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse (with) the undersigned, who, at that time, (was) 15
years of age. 8
Proceeding upon the capital nature of the offenses involved, the trial court, after further or, if held, will otherwise be void. We then enjoined the trial courts to review
appellant ostensibly waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, required and reflect upon the jurisprudential and statutory rules which evolved over time in
the prosecution to adduce evidence purportedly to establish appellant's guilt beyond response to the injustice created by improvident pleas acknowledging guilt, at times
reasonable doubt. Thus, on June 29, 1994, the complainant herself, Melita Estomaca, belatedly discovered under the judicial rug, if at all.
appeared in court and testified that she was raped by her father once in December,
1993 and, again, on March 6, 1994. Both incidents, according to her, took place With exacting certitude, Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment
inside their residence at Sitio should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court
Tan-agan, Barangay Tiolas in San Joaquin, Iloilo at nighttime and that, on those two furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of
occasions, she tried to resist her father's assaults to no avail. After the last rape, she witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is
gathered enough courage to flee from their home, and thereafter she reported the known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that
incidents to her mother who was then living separately from them. Apparently, the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and knows
appellant was later apprehended and has since been under detention.9 is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly
followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation
On the authority of Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993, of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
the lower court imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore,
sexual assault supposedly perpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme penalty really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal
of death with respect to the rape allegedly committed on March 6, 1994. In each of thereof. 14 It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
the said cases, he was further ordered to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. 10 2. For a more graphic illustration, and thereby a clearer appreciation of what actually
transpired in the so-called arraignment of appellant in the court below, we quote at
What disconcerts this Court, however, is the alarming consistency of non- length the pertinent transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at that stage, with
compliance by the court a quo of the procedural rules to be observed for the validity emphases on significant portions:
of the arraignment of an accused. Indeed, the importance of this particular stage of a
criminal proceeding, especially when capital offenses are involved, cannot be over- Pros. Nelson Geduspan : For the
emphasized. Hence, we pause at this juncture to once again briefly expound on this prosecution.
vital procedural aspect which the trial court, once in Alicando and again in the case
at bar, appears to have treated with cavalier disregard or frustrating
misapprehension. Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera : For the accused.
Ready for arraignment.
1. In People vs. A. Albert, 11 we traced the developmental antecedents which
culminated and found expression in reglementary form in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Court : The offended party is the daughter.
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense.
We there pointed out that the rationale behind the rule is that courts must proceed Interpreter : (Reading the
with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form — death — for information/complaint to the accused in
the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has Ilonggo/local dialect).
shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. 12
For Crim. Case No. 43567,
We stressed the need to avoid improvident pleas of guilt since the accused may the accused, pleads Guilty.
thereby forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, For Crim. Case No. 43568,
significance and consequences of his plea. 13 We lamented the confused application the accused, pleads Guilty.
adopted or the apathetic indifference in the application of said rule considering the For Crim. Case No. 43569,
paramount importance of a valid arraignment, it being the stage where the issues are the accused, pleads Guilty.
joined in the criminal action and without which the proceedings cannot advance For Crim. Case No. 43570,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43571,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
Court : What is your educational attainment?
Witness : I was not able to finish Grade I.
Court : The court would like to explain to
you in your plea of Guilty. If you plead
Guilty to these five (5) offenses, definitely,
you will have five (5) sentences.
Accused : Yes, your honor.
Court : Under the New Law the least most
probably would be life sentence.
Accused : Yes, your honor.
Court : How old are you now?
Accused : Forty two.
Court : Because of this fact you have no
chance to get back to the new society and
your rights will be affected.
Accused : I know. That's what they told to
me.
Court : Despite of (sic) this fact you still
insist on your plea of guilty in these five
cases?
Interpreter : According to him, he performed
only two (2) acts.
Court : When (were) these two acts
performed?
Accused : December 1993 and March 1994.
Court : The other cases charged against you
(are) not true?
Accused : It is not true maybe it was
committed by her boyfriend then it was
charged against me.
Court : In so far as. . . What is not included
in the plea therefore, is the month of July
1993, January 1994 and the month of
February 1994. You did not commit
these? Why is it that when you were asked
you entered a plea of guilty?
Accused : Because I committed two acts
only.
Court : Why is it that when you were asked
you entered a plea of guilty?
Accused : Because what I recall is that I just
committed two acts of rape.
Court : Not Guilty in the three (3) charges
and Guilty in two (2) charges. Does counsel
and accused agree to pre-trial conference?
Atty. Antiquiera : We dispense (with) the
pre-trial conference.
Court : For the two charges (to) which he
pleads guilty, the court will receive evidence
in order to impose the proper penalty and on
the other charges, the court will receive
evidence for the prosecution. 15 (Emphasis
and corrections in parentheses ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
At the subsequent hearing, just like what happened in Alicando, the presiding judge
went through the same formality of having appellant stand again before him, and
this is what transpired:
Court : Before the court allows the
prosecution to present evidence, accused,
please come here again.
(At this juncture, the accused came near to
the court)
Court : The court informs you as accused
that you are charged (with) the crime of
rape; under the new law which if you plead
guilty, you will be sentence(d) to death
penalty, did you understand that?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : Despite this warning for the second time
by the court to you, do you still insist (o)n
your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : Is this plea your voluntary will without
force or intimidation from anyone else to
include the complaining witness or the
family?
A : No, Your Honor.
Q : So, therefore, the court will allow you to
present evidence if you wis(h) to because
you insist (o)n your plea of guilty. Do you
intend to present evidence.
A : No, I will not present evidence.
Court : Okey, because of this the court will
receive evidence of the prosecution.
In another case, the last time when
arraigned, you admitted that sometime in
December, 1993, you likewise raped your
daughter, do you still confirm and affirm
this?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : In this case, because this was committed
(i)n December 1993, the penalty here
isreclusion perpetua. After learning this as
informed to you by the court, do still insist
on your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, I will admit. I did it.
Q : Do you admit this voluntarily without
force, intimidation or physical injuries or
mauling on you by anyone whomsoever?
A : No, Sir.
Q : In connection with this,
therefore, definitely you will be convicted in
both cases?
A : Yes, your honor.
Q : What is your educational attainment?
A : Grade I.
Q : Being Grade I, the court emphasized
that you are swayed by your own fashion
because of your low education?
A : I am not.
Q : In other words, you still insist on your
plea of guilty?
 A : Yes, sir.
Court : Okey, proceed with the presentation
of prosecution evidence.
Q : In this Criminal Case No. 43568, do you
intend to present evidence?
A : No, Your Honor.
Court : Okey, proceed. 16
xxx xxx xxx
3. At threshold, what strikes this Court as peculiar is that the arraignment appears to
have consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints, synthetically and
cryptically reported in the transcript, thus: "(Reading the information/complaint to
the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect)." Since what was supposed to have been read
was stated in the singular, but there were five criminal complaints against appellant,
this Court is then left to speculate on whether all five criminal complaints were
actually read, translated or explained to appellant on a level within his
comprehension, considering his limited education.
Again, on the presumption of correctness, since this Court has no other bearings to
steer by, it may be assumed that all five complaints were read since the clerk is
supposed to have thereafter announced in cadence and in the consecutive order of
cases that appellant pleaded guilty to all the charges. What, however, punctures this
possible bubble of regularity is that appellant subsequently declared, and the clerk
consequently contradicted her previous recital, that he was not pleading guilty to
three of the complaints. This is hardly a respectable and credible performance in the
solemnity of a court trial of five capital offenses.
We cannot, therefore, be persuaded that on this very basic procedure alone,
involving just the mechanical process of arraignment outlined in Section 1, there
was the necessary degree of compliance by the court below. Other considerations
reveal how flawed the supposed arraignment actually was. For instance, there is no
showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was furnished a copy of
each complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in order that the latter may
duly prepare and comply with his responsibilities. Of more troublous concern is the
fact that appellant was not specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he
would definitely and in any event be given the death penalty under the "New Law,"
as the trial court calls Republic Act No. 7659. He was also not categorically advised
that his plea of guilty would not under any circumstance affect or reduce the death
sentenceas he may have believed or may have been erroneously advised.
Such an erroneous notion on the part of appellant which may have impelled him to
plead guilty is not improbable or conjectural, especially when we consider his
mental state and the environmental situation. This is precisely what People
vs. Dayot 17 cautioned against, thus:
A "searching inquiry," under the Rules, means more than
informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term (because
the accused is aware of that) but so also, the exact length of
imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve
time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony. Not
infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope, as we
said, of a lenient treatment, or upon a bad advice or promises of
the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express "remorse." It is the duty of the judge to see to it
that he does not labor under these mistaken impressions, . . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the complaints
were supposedly read to appellant in "Ilonggo/local dialect." Parenthetically, there
was no statement of record that appellant fully understood that medium of
expression. This assumes added significance since Ilonggo, or properly called
Hiligaynon, is a regional language, 18 spoken in a major part of Iloilo province,
Negros Occidental and, with variations, in Capiz. Within a province or major
geographical area using a basic regional language, there may be other local dialects
spoken in certain parts thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted portion of the
transcript intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a local dialect and was also the
idiom referred to, the same is egregious error; it would be different if "local dialect"
was used to denote an alternative and different medium but, inexplicably, without
identifying what it was.
The significance of this distinction is found right in the provisions of Section 1(a) of
Rule 116 which, cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately
required that the complaint or information be read to the accused in the language or
the dialect known to him, to ensure his comprehension of the charges. The Court
takes judicial notice, because it
is either of public knowledge or readily capable of unquestionable
demonstration, 19 that in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all
the way up to and throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin where the
offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family are natives, the local
dialect is known as "kinaray-a."
Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended social or commercial
intercourse, "kinaray-a" is not readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to
the Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in the areas under its sway for
an appreciable period of time. The converse is true for those whose native tongue is
the dialect of "kinaray-a," since they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo, or
Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but in technical legal
language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the indictments were translated
to Ilonggo and/or to "kinaray-a," or that the appellant was truly and honestly made
aware of the charges and, especially, the consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The
records are silent and do not reveal anything on this point, nor how the dialogue
between the presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet a man's life is at stake
while this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission of official duty.
4. The foregoing discussion brings us to the strict injunction that the trial court must
fully discharge its duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry in such a way as
would indubitably show that appellant had made not only a clear, definite and
unconditional plea, but that he did so with a well-informed understanding and full
realization of the consequences thereof. To ask an accused about his educational
attainment and then warn him that he might have admitted the crime because of his
poor intelligence is certainly not the logical approach in assaying the sufficiency of
his plea of guilty.
In the same manner, a mere warning to him that he could possibly face extreme
retribution in the form of death or face a life sentence in jail is not even
enough. 20 The trial judge should ascertain and be totally convinced that, for all
intents and purposes, the plea recorded has all the earmarks of a valid
and acceptable confession upon which an eventual judgment of conviction can
stand. 21 Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may
go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry," it would be well for the court,
for instance, to require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the
charges against him, or by making him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated
the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of
significance. 22
The trial court should also be convinced that the accused has not been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from
malevolent or avenging quarters and this it can do, such as by ascertaining from the
accused himself the manner in which he was subsequently brought into the custody
of the law; or whether he had the assistance of competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and, ascertaining from him the conditions
under which he was detained and interrogated during the aforestated investigations.
Likewise, a series of questions directed at defense counsel as to whether or not said
counsel had conferred with, and completely explained to the accused the meaning of
a plea and its consequences, would be a well-taken step along those lines. 23
Questions of these nature are undoubtedly crucial and no truer is this than in the case
of appellant for, again, the original records and rollo of this case now under review
are completely bereft of any document or record concerning his apprehension,
detention and prior investigation, whether custodial or preliminary. The foregoing
circumstances must be taken in addition to the appropriate forewarnings of the
consequences of a plea of guilty, as well as the questions by the court regarding the
age, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the accused which may
reveal contributory insights for a proper verdict in the case.
And, on this latter aspect, we are inclined to quote from Alicando since, as stated in
limine the defective arraignment in the cases now before us is virtually a reprise of
what the same trial court with its presiding judge did or did not do in that previous
case:
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new
rule for it merely incorporated the decision of this Court
in People vs. Apduhan Jr. and reiterated in an unbroken line of
cases. The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be
based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching
inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the
voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed
to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor
did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of
the consequences of the plea. The records do not reveal any
information about thepersonality profile of the appellant which
can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free
and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and
educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by
the trial court. . . . . (Citations omitted).
It will be readily observed, if one would analyze appellant's responses during his
irregular arraignment, that his low intelligence quotient and lack of education
combined to deprive him of fully understanding what obviously appeared to him as
mysterious rituals and unfamiliar jargons. This was also what happened, and what
we duly noted, in People vs. Albert, supra.
In the transcripts of said proceeding which are earlier quoted extensively, there are
italicized portions showing not only the grossly inadequate or ambiguous, if not
indifferent, questions of the lower court but also the erratic answers of appellant
which are neither responsive nor rational.. There is no need to belabor them here
since they speak for themselves, but we are not impressed by the formulary
questions posed by the lower court while going through the motions of interviewing
appellant. The Court would want to stress here, therefore, that the judicial
conscience cannot accept as valid a plea of guilty to a charge with a mandatory death
penalty when entered by an accused with a befuddled state of mind at an
arraignment with reversible lapses in law.
5. Adverting once again to Alicando, we reiterated therein that pursuant to Binabay
vs. People, et al.,24 no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment.
Since in Alicando the arraignment of appellant therein was void, the judgment of
conviction rendered against him was likewise void, hence in fairness to him and in
justice to the offended party that case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours with the aforementioned cases on the
particular determinant issue, we have perforce to yield to the same doctrine and
disposition.
Let it be clearly understood, however, especially by the censorious: This Court will
not hesitate to impose the capital punishment when all the requisites therefor have
been met in accordance with the law of the land. It cannot, therefore, hold a life
forfeit, no matter how despicable the offender, when effective protection for his
basic rights was denied because of poverty or ignorance. Nor will the Court render a
death sentence just to make a meretricious obeisance to the vengeful call for blood.
Judicious verdicts evolve from the privacy of reasoned reflection in chambers and
not from the publicity of emotional acclaim on the podium.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and
43571 convicting accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque of two crimes of
rape is hereby SET ASIDE. Said cases are REMANDED to the trial court for further
and appropriate proceedings, with instructions that the same be given appropriate
priority and the proceedings therein be conducted with deliberate dispatch and
circumspection.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari 1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying
for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the
Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.3
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate
amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-
Two Pesos (₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored
upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of
commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific
performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to
Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question" before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action
she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the
suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action
respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her
issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00 and
RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of ₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the
amount of ₱8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving
the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September
1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November
1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000
before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon
City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information
and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon
City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an
Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal
cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon
City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the
decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with
the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they
are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal
action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed
when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint
that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on
16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing
of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.4
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for review5 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was
docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA
for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent
and private complainant to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of
RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and
89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already
prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter
part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the
private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5)
days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had,
pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the
latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before
the proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the
petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only
on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings
referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’,
which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court.
Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date
the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in
consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court,
considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the
prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes8 likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.9
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for
review.1âwphi1 According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23
November 1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it
is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office
of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
charged.10 It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant
Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the
subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 11 that the filing
of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial
proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on
Zaldivia,12 the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence
superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13 the Supreme Court ruled that the filing
of a complaint with the Fiscal’s Office for preliminary investigation suspends the
running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the
informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the
allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of
BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of
the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA
and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the
cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the
City Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on
erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved
felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime
imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special
law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a
distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances
or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint
for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of
prescription of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the
petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of
the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the
record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true
copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the
proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred
in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed,
Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as
amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four
years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than
two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less
than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it
therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The
running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that the filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by
the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. 17 when it held
that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of
the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving
special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the
RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period
of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 18 is not controlling in special
laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante v. CA,21 and
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases involving special laws, this Court held that
the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused
interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court even ruled that investigations
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the
prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in all fours
with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City
Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had
been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not
sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is
the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg.
22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private
complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period
granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16
September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February
2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting
followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on
the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was raised before the Secretary of
Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was
only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation
of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that
caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the
offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite
complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12
March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
24167-24170, 24195-24196,1questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea
bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
March 25, 2004, as follows:
Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this
Court for three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of
₱3,293.00, ₱1,869.00, and ₱13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to
conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear
that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of
Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact,
they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also
indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a
public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty"
and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said
accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of
"guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private
individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser
crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable
the proposal of the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of
public document by a private individual. The prosecution explained:
"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of
the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private
individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto
Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts."
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise
amenable to the offer of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure
of an accountable officer to render accounts because:
"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of
₱18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte
dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already
been restituted x x x.3
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,4 dated March 25, 2004,
denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by
the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify
its approval.5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution dated May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his plea bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an
accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a
"routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only
₱18,860.00, which he already restituted.6
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge.7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment
of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be
considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,8 viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court
shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal
and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements
covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the
court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has
finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is
immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.9
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which
plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor,10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word
may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the
trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.11 Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for
the convenience of the accused.12
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court ruled that the acceptance of an
offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter
of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court,14 viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of
the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437,
450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring
opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA
373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale
or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal
and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former
plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be
nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason for
this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea
for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a
procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.15 (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already
rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial
court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a
capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.16
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground
that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would
redound to the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayanbelieves that approving the
proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them
and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they
are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited
or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities
far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the
deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in
government."171avvphi1
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's
plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play
dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the
judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete
justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power
to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to
do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the
substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts.18
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, 19 in
order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,20 the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated
March 14, 2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the
prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement provided
that the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and promises to
return the amount of ₱25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement,
the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and
whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his
earlier plea of "not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to
a lesser offense; and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in
relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is
Plunder.21
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by
the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the present case. Records
show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum
dated August 16, 2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has
already restituted the total amount of ₱18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage
caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant
cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which
to our mind, merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the
accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual
defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen
our cases against the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon,
who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants
herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman
detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. 22
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to
Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of
Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively,
with which petitioner was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be
established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. 23
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the offender
is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage
of his official position; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) the falsification
was committed in a public or official or commercial document. 24
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the
elements are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or
property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d)
he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or
property.25 Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer to have
duly forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized
officer, "shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal use." In this regard, it has been ruled that once such presumption is
rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to
have existed at all.26
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to
plead guilty of, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public
officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to
a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a period of
two months after such accounts should be rendered.27
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is
included in the other, to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information
constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.28
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient
to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification
of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner
took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and
payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime
of Malversation of Public Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which
make out a case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element
of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render account
was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting
within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case
likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser
offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that
the nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession
or custody of local government funds,29 not to mention that petitioner has already
restituted the amount of ₱18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which
involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,30 and a whopping
₱25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in
comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will
result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to
intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004
and May 31, 2004 are SETASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to
grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO
TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or
Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a.
Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil,
and ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter
Decision convicted the three accused-appellants – namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a.
Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu
Jackie or Zaky – of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The
CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No.
9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its
Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to
move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed
two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the
conductor obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the
two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each
other – one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus.
At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the
eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person near the driver
and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb
struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave
PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back also
paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that the
two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on
asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed
that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front
of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with
something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him.
Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the
police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA,
the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver
initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited
unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave
in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus
and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then
saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall.
After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either
lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement
before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf
Group – Abu Solaiman – announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an
exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the
Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally,
accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the
explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified
the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who
had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group – namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other "John" and "Jane Does" – were then charged
with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali,
and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476),
Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon
arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477),
accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat
pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the
following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali
admitted knowing one another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in
the RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT
terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat
whom he claims taught him how to make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the
February 14 bombing incident.
 6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the
bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and
more or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period
March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news
network admitting their participation in the commission of the said crimes,
subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these
crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a
child in the first bus that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he
gave a television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the
explosive devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus
and which resulted in the filing of these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are
members of the Abu Sayyaf.1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan
and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of
multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge
of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense
counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the
consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and
manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to
them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder. 2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under
training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two
other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told
that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that their first
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other
parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf
leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a
soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he
knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in November
to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT – that is, 2 kilos
on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad
would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly
placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad and
Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February,
he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go
to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been
exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating the
warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from
accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the
mission.3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, "Sa wakas nag success din
yung tinuro ko sayo."
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of the said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the
crimes charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.4
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a
searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The
transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the
Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that
were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not
guilty entered for the frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad
and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas of guilty to the
multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not guilty for the frustrated
multiple murder charges remain… [I]s that not inconsistent considering the
stipulations that were entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will
recall, they admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at
least four people and injury of about forty other persons and so under the
circumstances, Atty Peña, have you discussed this matter with your clients?
………
Atty. Peña : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I haven’t
conferred with them about this with regard to the multiple murder case.
………
Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist the two accused
because if they are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from
your lips.
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and
Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of
their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not
guilty to the frustrated multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the
murder case, then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to
the one of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
………
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in
Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have
withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge
of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there any matters you need to address at
pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and accommodate… 5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges
… must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while
justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the
meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction."6 Thus, trial court
judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's
original plea was "not guilty," the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to "guilty."7 According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a
case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no
room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v.
Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if
the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel;
that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him;
and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. 9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry
remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves
that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty
plea.10 This requirement is stringent and mandatory.11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment
was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the
accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled
guilty to another charge – multiple murder – based on the same act relied upon in the
multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of
plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of
guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as
stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission
(pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it
unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance.
Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of
guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.12
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a
searching inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is
made … loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense
charged."13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is
the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible
evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the
conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for
the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts,
primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of
the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified accused
Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while inside the
bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and
who had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the
other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT
used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and
Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled
with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial
confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial)
that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentine’s Day
bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony
of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of
stenographic notes on the state prosecutor’s direct examination of state-witness
Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what
circumstances did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives,
you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that
Angelo Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive,
sir.
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that
training?
A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month
and two weeks.
………
Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in
training at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any,
with respect to that mission?
………
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other
parts of Metro Manila, sir.16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused
Baharan and Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what
happened to the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you
sometime in November 2004?
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not
explode.
Q : How did you know, Mr. witness? Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you
know if the bomb explode?
A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo
……… Trinidad from me until after I was caught, because I was told by the
policeman that interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos were
planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as
told to you by Trinidad?
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that
Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
………
………
A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on
that date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
………
A : It’s Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he
could detonate a bomb ………

……… Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?

Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
up, with respect to the taking of the explosives from you?
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that
A : There is, sir… Abu Zaky, sir, called up also. explosive?

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up? A : No, sir.

A : He told me that "this is your first mission." Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of
explosives, which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are
referring to? ………

A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Christians.
Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?
………
A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman.
He told me not to leave the house because the explosive that were taken by
Tapay and Angelo Trinidad exploded.
………
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
………
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the
explosive that he took exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb
exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should
coincide with the bombing in General Santos.
………
A : He told it to me, sir… I cannot remember the date anymore, but I
know it was sometime in February 2005.
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the
bombing exploded in Makati, any other call?
………
A : There is, sir… The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful
mission.
………
A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
………
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated
that Abu Zaky called you up the following day, that was February 15, and
congratulating you for the success of the mission. My question to you, Mr.
witness, if you know what is the relation of that mission, wherein you
were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been
indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu
Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the
city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.17
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was
determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger
towards the Christians."18 It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani
and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentine’s Day bombing incident,
months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs
and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was
to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to
Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get
two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were "about to commence" their "first
mission."19 They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to
no avail. The day before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad got another two
kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentine’s Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced
that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their
third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu
Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali then
received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung
tinuro ko sayo."20
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against
Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the
provision on "principal by inducement." The instructions and training he had given
Asali on how to make bombs – coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmat’s confirmation that
Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission – prove the
finding that Rohmat’s co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission
of the crime.21 Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the
crime would not have materialized."22lawphi1
Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al.,
the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the
crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the
principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-
conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was
rendered liable for all the resulting crimes.24 The same finding must be applied to the
case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused
Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the
"collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of
the crime." As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:
Asali’s clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major
points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two
other accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched between
and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to
wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately killing and injuring
civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly
admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with
respect to the latter’s participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it
has been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which established the
existence of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable participation of accused
Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators’ criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused,
which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to
commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the
accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident
and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA
643).25
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in
concluding that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the
defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the
other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of
the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments."26
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a
conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the
existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the
declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. 27 Thus,
in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
… [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him.
A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter
are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony
at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness
stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where
several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-
accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.28
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015
ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
FELIPE GOZON, GILBERTO R. DUAVIT, JR., MARISSA L. FLORES,
JESSICA A. SORO, GRACE DELA PENA-REYES, JOHN OLIVER T.
MANALASTAS, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether there is probable cause to charge respondents
with infringement under Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code. The resolution of this issue requires clarification of the concept of
"copyrightable material" in relation to material that is rebroadcast live as a news
story. We are also asked to rule on whether criminal prosecution for infringement of
copyrightable material, such as live rebroadcast, can be negated by good faith.
ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 to
assail the November 9, 2010 Decision2 and the March 3, 2011 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reinstated the Department of Justice
Resolution dated August 1, 2005 that ordered the withdrawal of the Information
finding probable cause for respondents’ violation of Sections 177 4 and 2115 of the
Intellectual Property Code.6 Respondents are officers and employees of GMA
Network, Inc. (GMA-7). They are: Felipe Gozon (Gozon), GMA-7 President;
Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr. (Duavit, Jr.), Executive Vice-President; Marissa L. Flores
(Flores), Vice-President for New and Public Affairs; Jessica A. Soho (Soho),
Director for News; Grace Dela Peña-Reyes (Dela Peña-Reyes), Head of News and
Public Affairs; John Oliver Manalastas (Manalastas), Program Manager; and others.
The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the homecoming of
Filipino overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz on July 22, 2004. As
summarized by the Court of Appeals:
Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as
a condition for his release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops
in Iraq. After negotiations, he was released by his captors and was scheduled to
return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July 2004. Occasioned by said
homecoming and the public interest it generated, both . . . GMA Network, Inc. . . .
and [petitioner] made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event. 7
ABS-CBN "conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival of
Angelo dela Cruz at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and the
subsequent press conference."8 ABS-CBN allowed Reuters Television Service
(Reuters) to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special embargo agreement. 9
ABS-CBN alleged that under the special embargo agreement, any of the footages it
took would be for the "use of Reuter’s international subscribers only, and shall be
considered and treated by Reuters under ‘embargo’ against use by other subscribers
in the Philippines. . . . [N]o other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed
to use ABS-CBN footage without the latter’s consent."10
GMA-7, to which Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, Soho, Dela Peña-Reyes, and
Manalastas are connected, "assigned and stationed news reporters and technical men
at the NAIA for its live broadcast and non-live news coverage of the arrival of dela
Cruz."11 GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News Network (CNN). It
received a live video feed of the coverage of Angelo dela Cruz’s arrival from
Reuters.12
GMA-7 immediately carried the live news feed in its program "Flash Report,"
together with its live broadcast.13Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or
was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS-CBN.14 GMA-7’s news
control room staff saw neither the "No Access Philippines" notice nor a notice that
the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS-CBN.15
On August 13, 2004, ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright infringement
under Sections 17716 and 21117 of the Intellectual Property Code.18
On December 3, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued the
Resolution19 finding probable cause to indict Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas.20 Consequently, the Information21 for violation of the Intellectual
Property Code was filed on December 17, 2004. It reads:
That on or about the 22nd of July 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each
other, being the Head of News Operations and the Program Manager, respectively,
for the News and Public Affairs Department of GMA Network, Inc., did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use and broadcast the footage of the
arrival of Angelo [d]ela Cruz at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport of which
ABS-CBN holds the exclusive ownership and copyright by then and there using,
airing, and broadcasting the said footage in its news program "FLASH REPORT"
without first obtaining the consent or authority of said copyright owner, to their
damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.22
On January 4, 2005, respondents filed the Petition for Review before the Department
of Justice.23 In the Resolution (Gonzalez Resolution) dated August 1, 2005,
Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez (Secretary Gonzalez) ruled in
favor of respondents and held that good faith may be raised as a defense in the
case.24 The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY GMA-7 in I.S. No. 04-
10458 is considered meritorious and is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby
Dismissed, the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby reversed
and the same is ordered to withdraw the information if any and report action taken to
this office within ten (10) days.25 (Emphasis in the original)
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the Gonzalez Resolution.26
Meanwhile, on January 19, 2005, the trial court granted the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed earlier by Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas.27 The trial court
Order reads:
Perusing the motion, the court finds that a petition for review was filed with the
Department of Justice on January 5, 2005 as confirmed by the public prosecutor.
Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, once a petition
for review is filed with the Department of Justice, a suspension of the criminal
proceedings may be allowed by the court.
Accordingly, to allow the Department of Justice the opportunity to act on said
petition for review, let the proceedings on this case be suspended for a period of
sixty (60) days counted from January 5, 2005, the date the petition was filed with the
Department of Justice. The arraignment of the accused on February 1, 2005 is
accordingly cancelled. Let the arraignment be rescheduled to March 8, 2005 at 8:30
a.m. The accused through counsel are notified in open court.
SO ORDERED.28
On June 29, 2010, Department of Justice Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra
(Secretary Agra) issued the Resolution (Agra Resolution) that reversed the Gonzalez
Resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas for
violation of the Intellectual Property Code.29 Secretary Agra also found probable
cause to indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for the same violation. 30 He
ruled that:
[w]hile good faith may be a defense in copyright infringement, the same is a
disputable presumption that must be proven in a full-blown trial. Disputable
presumptions may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Thus, a full-
blown trial is the proper venue where facts, issues and laws are evaluated and
considered. The very purpose of trial is to allow a party to present evidence to
overcome the disputable presumptions involved.31
The dispositive portion of the Agra Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
(a) The Motion for Reconsideration filed by appellees ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) of our Resolution promulgated on
August 1, 2005 (Resolution No. 364, Series of 2005) and the Petition for
Review filed by complainant-appellant ABS-CBN in I.S. No. 04-10458 on
April10, 2006, are GRANTED and the City Prosecutor of Quezon City is
hereby ordered to file the necessary Information for violation of Section
177 and 211 of Republic Act No. 8293 against GMA-7. Felipe L. Gozon,
Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr., Marissa L.Flores, Jessica A. Soho, Grace Dela
Pena-Reyes, John Oliver T. Manalastas[.]
....
SO ORDERED.32 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondents assailed the Agra Resolution through the Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction on September 2, 2010 before the Court of Appeals. In the Resolution
dated September 13, 2010, the Court of Appeals granted the temporary restraining
order preventing the Department of Justice from enforcing the Agra Resolution. 33
On November 9, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision granting the
Petition and reversing and setting aside the Agra Resolution.34 The Court of Appeals
held that Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolution. Resolving the issue of copyright infringement, the Court of Appeals
said:
Surely, private respondent has a copyright of its news coverage. Seemingly, for The issues for this court’s consideration are:
airing said video feed, petitioner GMA is liable under the provisions of the
Intellectual Property Code, which was enacted purposely to protect copyright First, whether Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction in the Resolution
owners from infringement. However, it is an admitted fact that petitioner GMA had dated June 29, 2010 and, therefore, whether a petition for certiorari was the proper
only aired a five (5) second footage of the disputed live video feed that it had remedy in assailing that Resolution;
received from Reuters and CNN as a subscriber. Indeed, petitioners had no notice of
the right of ownership of private respondent over the same. Without notice of the
"No Access Philippines" restriction of the live video feed, petitioner cannot be Second, whether news footage is copyrightable under the law;
faulted for airing a live video feed from Reuters and CNN.
Third, whether there was fair use of the broadcast material;
Verily, as aptly opined by Secretary Gonzalez in his earlier Resolution, the act of
petitioners in airing the five (5) second footage was undeniably attended by good Fourth, whether lack of knowledge that a material is copyrighted is a defense against
faith and it thus serves to exculpate them from criminal liability under the Code. copyright infringement;
While the Intellectual Property Code is a special law, and thus generally categorized
as malum prohibitum, it bears to stress that the provisions of the Code itself do not Fifth, whether good faith is a defense in a criminal prosecution for violation of the
ipso facto penalize a person or entity for copyright infringement by the mere fact Intellectual Property Code; and
that one had used a copyrighted work or material.

Certainly so, in the exercise of one’s moral and economic or copyrights, the very
provisions of Part IV of the Intellectual Property Code provide for the scope and
limitations on copyright protection under Section 184 and in fact permit fair use of
copyrighted work under Section 185. With the aforesaid statutory limitations on
one’s economic and copyrights and the allowable instances where the other persons
can legally use a copyrighted work, criminal culpability clearly attaches only when
the infringement had been knowingly and intentionally committed. 35 (Emphasis
supplied)
Lastly, whether the Court of Appeals was correct in overturning Secretary Agra’s
finding of probable cause.
I
The trial court granted respondents’ Motion to Suspend Proceedings and deferred
respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment for 60 days in view of
the Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED the suspension of the accused’s arraignment in certain circumstances only:
and the assailed Resolution dated 29 June 2010 REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the earlier Resolution dated 1 August 2005, which ordered the
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.–Upon motion by the proper party, the
withdrawal of the Information filed, if any, against the petitioners for violation of
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code, is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge
SO ORDERED.36 (Emphasis in the original)
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall
order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
ABS-CBN’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.37 It then filed its Petition for purpose;
Review before this court assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.38
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
 (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided,
that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. (12a) (Emphasis
supplied)
In Samson v. Daway,39 this court acknowledged the applicability of Rule 116,
Section (c) in a criminal prosecution for infringement under the Intellectual Property
Code. However, this court emphasized the limits of the order of deferment under the
Rule:
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the . . . provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of
60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign
the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 40
We clarify that the suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits
allowed by law. In Crespo v. Judge Mogul,41 this court outlined the effects of filing
an information before the trial court, which includes initiating a criminal action and
giving this court "authority to hear and determine the case":42
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above
stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to
the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not,
once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may
feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration
of the Court, the only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed
by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum
in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be
designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for
prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case
thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice. The answer is simple.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and
not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts.
Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed
with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court
to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be
convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of
appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private
prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that the
fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn
over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his
direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.43 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The doctrine in Crespo was reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of
Appeals,44 where this court reminded the Department of Justice Secretary to refrain
from entertaining petitions for review when the case is already pending with this
court:
[I]n order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary
of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review
or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in the Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.45
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for
Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on
September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the
interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul
reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the
arraignment "disregards the requirements of due process [and] erodes the Court’s
independence and integrity."46
II
According to ABS-CBN, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that: a motion for
reconsideration was not necessary before a petition for certiorari could be filed; the
Department of Justice Secretary committed errors of jurisdiction since the Agra
Resolution was issued within its authority and in accordance with settled laws and
jurisprudence; and respondents were not liable for copyright infringement.
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals found that respondents committed a
procedural error when they failed to file a motion for reconsideration before filing
the Petition for Certiorari. However, the Court of Appeals held that a motion for
reconsideration was unnecessary since the Agra Resolution was a patent nullity and
it would have been useless under the circumstances: Given that a reading of the
assailed Resolution and the instant records readily reveals errors of jurisdiction on
the part of respondent Secretary, direct judicial recourse is warranted under the
circumstances. Aside from the fact that said Resolution is a patent nullity having
been issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the filing of a motion for reconsideration is evidently useless on account of the fact
that the issues and arguments before this Court have already been duly raised and
accordingly delved into by respondent Secretary in his disposition of the petition a
quo.47 (Emphasis in the original)
In Elma v. Jacobi,48 this court ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is proper when assailing adverse resolutions of the Department of
Justice stemming from the determination of probable cause.49However, grave abuse
of discretion must be alleged.50
In Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,51 this court stressed the prosecutor’s role in
determining probable cause. Judicial review will only lie when it is shown that the
prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction:
A prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish
probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the respondent.
By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has
clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.
Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate only when the prosecutor has exercised
his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 52 (Citations
omitted)
Grave abuse of discretion refers to:
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.53
Resorting to certiorari requires that there be there be "no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[,]"54 such as a motion for
reconsideration. Generally, "a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non
before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for
the [tribunal or officer] to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case."55 However, exceptions to the rule exist:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the Court a quo had no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in
the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial Court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.56(Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)
As argued by respondents, "[a] second motion for reconsideration would have been
useless and futile since the D[epartment] [of] J[ustice] had already passed upon the
same issues twice."57 Equally pressing under the circumstances was the need to
resolve the matter, as the Information’s filing would lead to respondents’ imminent
arrest.58
Moreover, Department of Justice Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, or
the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal, provides that no second motion for reconsideration
of the Department of Justice Secretary’s resolution shall be entertained:
SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party may file a motion
for reconsideration within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of
the resolution on appeal, furnishing the adverse party and the Prosecution Office
concerned with copies thereof and submitting proof of such service. No second or
further motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
The Agra Resolution was the result of respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration
assailing the Gonzalez Resolution. To file a motion for reconsideration of the Agra
Resolution would be superfluous. Respondents were, therefore, correct in filing the
Petition for Certiorari of the Agra Resolution before the Court of Appeals.
III
The Court of Appeals ruled that Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction,
which then required the grant of the writ of certiorari:
So viewed, by ordering the filing of information without proof that probable cause
exists to charge petitioners with a crime, respondent Secretary clearly committed an
error of jurisdiction thus warranting the issuance of the writ of certiorari. Surely,
probable cause cannot be had when the very provisions of the statute exculpates
criminal liability in cases classified as fair use of copyrighted materials. The fact that
they admittedly used the Reuters live video feed is not, as a matter of course,
tantamount to copyright infringement that would justify the filing of an information
against the petitioners.59
Error of jurisdiction must be distinguished from error of judgment:
A line must be drawn between errors of judgment and errors of jurisdiction. An error
of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
An error of jurisdiction renders an order or judgment void or voidable. Errors of
jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari; errors of judgment, only by appeal.60
In People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan61:
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdictionis one where the act complained of was issued
by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.62 (Emphasis
supplied)
This court has adopted a deferential attitude towards review of the executive’s
finding of probable cause.63 This is based "not only upon the respect for the
investigatory and [prosecutorial] powers granted by the Constitution to the executive
department but upon practicality as well."64 Review of the Department of Justice
Secretary’s decision or resolution will be allowed only when grave abuse of
discretion is alleged:
The full discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary
investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of information rests with
the executive branch. Hence, judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice is limited to a determination whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts cannot substitute the
executive branch’s judgment.
....
It is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may
take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals decision may then be appealed to
this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari. 65 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
In this case, it must be shown that Secretary Agra exceeded his authority when he
reversed the findings of Secretary Gonzalez. This court must determine whether
there is probable cause to file an information for copyright infringement under the
Intellectual Property Code.
IV
Probable cause pertains to "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof."66 Preliminary investigation is the inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether there is probable cause.67
In Webb v. De Leon,68 this court ruled that determination of probable cause during
preliminary investigation does not require trial-like evaluation of evidence since
existence of probable cause does not equate to guilt:
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical
rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.
....
. . . A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not
a pronouncement of guilt.69
In Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,70 finding probable cause is not equivalent to
finding with moral certainty that the accused committed the crime:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which
he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense.71
During preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor does not adjudicate on the
parties’ rights, obligations, or liabilities.72
In the recent case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.,73 we reiterated
Webb on the determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation and
traced the history of probable cause as borrowed from American jurisprudence:
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure that the courts are not
clogged with weak cases that will only be dismissed, as well as to spare a person
from the travails of a needless prosecution.
....
. . . In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the
prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be
proved.
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt." McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in
the Carroll opinion. 267 U. S. at 161. And this "means less than evidence which
would justify condemnation" or conviction, as Marshall, C. J., said for the Court
more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348. Since
Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable
cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an
offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162.
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and
unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They
also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their
duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their
part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading
sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical,
non technical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly
hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the
mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.
In the Philippines, there are four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure where probable cause is needed to be established:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is
required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and
one day without regard to the fine;
 (2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether a
warrant of arrest or a commitment order, if the accused has already been
arrested, shall be issued and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice;
(3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113:By a peace officer or a private person
making a warrantless arrest when an offense has just been committed, and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a search
warrant shall be issued, and only upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
In all these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based
only on the likelihood, or probability, of guilt. 74
Estrada also highlighted that a "[p]reliminary investigation is not part of the criminal
action. It is merely preparatory and may even be disposed of in certain situations." 75
To determine whether there is probable cause that respondents committed copyright
infringement, a review of the elements of the crime, including the existing facts, is
required.
V and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press
ABS-CBN claims that news footage is subject to copyright and prohibited use of
copyrighted material is punishable under the Intellectual Property Code. It argues
that the new footage is not a "newsworthy event" but "merely an account of the
arrival of Angelo dela Cruz in the Philippines — the latter being the newsworthy
event":76
To be clear, it is the event itself or the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz which is not
copyrightable because that is the newsworthy event. However, any footage created
from the event itself, in this case the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, are intellectual
creations which are copyrightable. Thus, the footage created by ABS-CBN during
the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, which includes the statements of Dindo Amparo, are
copyrightable and protected by the laws on copyright.77
On the other hand, respondents argue that ABS-CBN’s news footage of Angelo dela
Cruz’s arrival is not copyrightable or subject to protection:
Certainly, the arrival of Angelo [d]ela Cruz, which aroused public attention and the
consciousness of the Filipino people with regard to their countrymen, OFWs
working in foreign countries and how the Philippine government responds to the
issues concerning them, is "news". There is no ingenuity or inventiveness added in
the said news footage. The video footage of this "news" is not copyrightable by any
legal standard as facts of everyday life depicted in the news and items of press
information is part of the public domain.78 (Emphasis in the original)
The news footage is copyrightable.
The Intellectual Property Code is clear about the rights afforded to authors of
various kinds of work. Under the Code, "works are protected by the sole fact of their
creation, irrespective of their mode or form of expression, as well as of their content,
quality and purpose."79 These include "[a]udiovisual works and cinematographic
works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any
process for making audiovisual recordings."80
Contrary to the old copyright law,81 the Intellectual Property Code does not require
registration of the work to fully recover in an infringement suit. Nevertheless, both
copyright laws provide that copyright for a work is acquired by an intellectual
creator from the moment of creation.82
It is true that under Section 175 of the Intellectual Property Code, "news of the day
information" are considered unprotected subject matter.83 However, the Code does
not state that expression of the news of the day, particularly when it underwent a
creative process, is not entitled to protection.
An idea or event must be distinguished from the expression of that idea or event. An
idea has been likened to a ghost in that it "must be spoken to a little before it will
explain itself."84 It is a concept that has eluded exact legal definition.85To get a better
grasp of the idea/expression dichotomy, the etymology of the term "idea" is traced:
The word "idea" is derived from a Greek term, meaning "a form, the look or
appearance of a thing as opposed to its reality, from idein, to see." In the Timaeus,
Plato saw ideas as eternal paradigms, independent objects to which the divine
demiurge looks as patterns in forming the world. This was later modified to the
religious conception of ideas as the thoughts of God. "It is not a very long step to
extend the term ‘idea’ to cover patterns, blueprints, or plans in anyone's mind, not
only in God’s." The word entered the French and English vernacular in the 1600s
and possessed two meanings. The first was the Platonic meaning of a perfect
exemplar or paradigm. The second, which probably has its origin with Descartes, is
of a mental concept or image or, more broadly, any object of the mind when it is
active. Objects of thought may exist independently. The sun exists (probably) before
and after you think of it. But it is also possible to think of things that have never
existed, such as a unicorn or Pegasus. John Locke defined ideas very
comprehensively, to include: all objects of the mind. Language was a way of
translating the invisible, hidden ideas that make up a person’s thoughts into the
external, perceptible world of articulate sounds and visible written symbols that
others can understand.86 (Citations omitted) There is no one legal definition of
"idea" in this jurisdiction. The term "idea" is mentioned only once in the Intellectual
Property Code.87 In Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon,88 a television format (i.e., a dating show
format) is not copyrightable under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 49; 89 it is a
mere concept:
P.D. No. 49, §2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished
works and not to concepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Thus, the new INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
provides:
SEC. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter.—Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections
172 and 173, no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea, procedure,
system, method or operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such,
even if they are expressed, explained, illustrated or embodied in a work; news of the
day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press
information; or any official text of a legislative, administrative or legal nature, as
well as any official translation thereof.
What then is the subject matter of petitioners’ copyright? This Court is of the
opinion that petitioner BJPI’s copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each
episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within the class of works mentioned in P.D. 49,
§2(M),to wit:
Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to
cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;
The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game
show. Accordingly, by the very nature of the subject of petitioner BJPI’s copyright,
the investigating prosecutor should have the opportunity to compare the videotapes
of the two shows.
Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is
insufficient; the presentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable
to the determination of the existence of probable cause. As aptly observed by
respondent Secretary of Justice:
A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a
whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or
dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright/format of
both dating game shows.90 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Ideas can be either abstract or concrete.91 It is the concrete ideas that are generally
referred to as expression:
The words "abstract" and "concrete" arise in many cases dealing with the
idea/expression distinction. The Nichols court, for example, found that the
defendant’s film did not infringe the plaintiff’s play because it was "too generalized
an abstraction from what plaintiff wrote . . . only a part of her ideas." In Eichel v.
Marcin, the court said that authors may exploit facts, experiences, field of thought,
and general ideas found in another’s work, "provided they do not substantially copy
a concrete form, in which the circumstances and ideas have been developed,
arranged, and put into shape." Judge Hand, in National Comics Publications, Inc. v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc. said that "no one infringes, unless he descends so far into
what is concrete as to invade. . . ‘expression.’"
These cases seem to be distinguishing "abstract" ideas from "concrete" tangible
embodiments of these abstractions that may be termed expression. However, if the
concrete form of a work means more than the literal expression contained within it,
it is difficult to determine what is meant by "concrete." Webster's New Twentieth
Century Dictionary of the English Language provides several meanings for the word
concrete. These include: "having a material, perceptible existence; of, belonging to,
or characterized by things or events that can be perceived by the senses; real;
actual;" and "referring to a particular; specific, not general or abstract."92
In Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart, Incorporated,93 this court, citing
the American case of Baker v. Selden, distinguished copyright from patents and
illustrated how an idea or concept is different from the expression of that idea:
In the oft-cited case of Baker vs. Selden, the United States Supreme Court held that
only the expression of an idea is protected by copyright, not the idea itself. In that
case, the plaintiff held the copyright of a book which expounded on a new
accounting system he had developed. The publication illustrated blank forms of
ledgers utilized in such a system. The defendant reproduced forms similar to those
illustrated in the plaintiff’s copyrighted book. The US Supreme Court ruled that:
"There is no doubt that a work on the subject of book-keeping, though only
explanatory of well known systems, may be the subject of a copyright; but, then, it is
claimed only as a book. x x x But there is a clear distinction between the books, as
such, and the art, which it is, intended to illustrate. The mere statement of the
proposition is so evident that it requires hardly any argument to support it. The same
distinction may be predicated of every other art as well as that of bookkeeping.
A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old or new; on the
construction and use of ploughs or watches or churns; or on the mixture and
application of colors for painting or dyeing; or on the mode of drawing lines to
produce the effect of perspective, would be the subject of copyright; but no one
would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the exclusive right to the
art or manufacture described therein. The copyright of the book, if not pirated from
other works, would be valid without regard to the novelty or want of novelty of its
subject matter. The novelty of the art or thing described or explained has nothing to
do with the validity of the copyright. To give to the author of the book an exclusive
property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever
been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the
province of letters patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention of discovery of
an art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office
before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and a patent from the government
can only secure it.
The difference between the two things, letters patent and copyright, may be
illustrated by reference to the subjects just enumerated. Take the case of medicines.
Certain mixtures are found to be of great value in the healing art. If the discoverer
writes and publishes a book on the subject (as regular physicians generally do), he
gains no exclusive right to the manufacture and sale of the medicine; he gives that to
the public. If he desires to acquire such exclusive right, he must obtain a patent for
the mixture as a new art, manufacture or composition of matter. He may copyright
his book, if he pleases; but that only secures to him the exclusive right of printing
and publishing his book. So of all other inventions or discoveries.
The copyright of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings and
illustrations it may contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of drawing
described, though they may never have been known or used before. By publishing
the book without getting a patent for the art, the latter is given to the public.
....
Now, whilst no one has a right to print or publish his book, or any material part
thereof, as a book intended to convey instruction in the art, any person may practice
and use the art itself which he has described and illustrated therein. The use of the
art is a totally different thing from a publication of the book explaining it. The
copyright of a book on bookkeeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make, sell
and use account books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book. Whether the
art might or might not have been patented, is a question, which is not before us. It
was not patented, and is open and free to the use of the public. And, of course, in
using the art, the ruled lines and headings of accounts must necessarily be used as
incident to it.
The plausibility of the claim put forward by the complainant in this case arises from
a confusion of ideas produced by the peculiar nature of the art described in the
books, which have been made the subject of copyright. In describing the art, the
illustrations and diagrams employed happened to correspond more closely than
usual with the actual work performed by the operator who uses the art. x x x The
description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no
foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is
explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright.
The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters
patent."94 (Emphasis supplied)
News or the event itself is not copyrightable. However, an event can be captured and
presented in a specific medium. As recognized by this court in Joaquin, television
"involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio."95 News
coverage in television involves framing shots, using images, graphics, and sound
effects.96 It involves creative process and originality. Television news footage is an
expression of the news.
In the United States, a line of cases dwelt on the possibility of television newscasts
to be copyrighted.97 Most of these cases focused on private individuals’ sale or
resale of tapes of news broadcasts. Conflicting decisions were rendered by its courts.
Noteworthy, however, is the District Court’s pronouncement in Pacific & Southern
Co. v. Duncan,98 which involves a News Monitoring Service’s videotaping and sale
of WXIA-TV’s news broadcasts:
It is axiomatic that copyright protection does not extend to news "events" or the facts
or ideas which are the subject of news reports. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014, 98
S.Ct. 730, 54 L.Ed.2d 759 (1978). But it is equally well-settled that copyright
protection does extend to the reports themselves, as distinguished from the substance
of the information contained in the reports. Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 95;
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed.
211 (1918); see Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Assn., 275 F. 797 (7th
Cir.1921); 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.11[B] (1983). Copyright protects the manner
of expression of news reports, "the particular form or collocation of words in which
the writer has communicated it." International News Service, 248 U.S. at 234, 39
S.Ct. at 70. Such protection extends to electronic news reports as well as written
reports. See17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (5), (6), and (7); see also Iowa State University
Research Foundations, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir.
1980).99 (Emphasis supplied)
The idea/expression dichotomy has long been subject to debate in the field of
copyright law. Abolishing the dichotomy has been proposed, in that non-
protectibility of ideas should be re-examined, if not stricken, from decisions and the
law:
If the underlying purpose of the copyright law is the dual one expressed by Lord
Mansfield, the only excuse for the continuance of the idea-expression test as a
judicial standard for determining protectibility would be that it was or could be a
truly useful method of determining the proper balance between the creator’s right to
profit from his work and the public's right that the "progress of the arts not be
retarded."
. . . [A]s used in the present-day context[,] the dichotomy has little or no relationship
to the policy which it should effectuate. Indeed, all too often the sweeping language
of the courts regarding the non-protectibility of ideas gives the impression that this is
of itself a policy of the law, instead of merely a clumsy and outdated tool to achieve
a much more basic end.100
The idea/expression dichotomy is a complex matter if one is trying to determine
whether a certain material is a copy of another.101 This dichotomy would be more
relevant in determining, for instance, whether a stage play was an infringement of an
author’s book involving the same characters and setting. In this case, however,
respondents admitted that the material under review — which is the subject of the
controversy — is an exact copy of the original. Respondents did not subject ABS-
CBN’s footage to any editing of their own. The news footage did not undergo any
transformation where there is a need to track elements of the original.
Having established the protectible nature of news footage, we now discuss the
concomitant rights accorded to authors. The authors of a work are granted several
rights in relation to it, including copyright or economic rights:
SECTION 177. Copyright or Economic Rights. — Subject to the provisions of
Chapter VIII, copyright or economic rights shall consist of the exclusive right to
carry out, authorize or prevent the following acts:
177.1. Reproduction of the work or substantial portion of the work;
177.2. Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement or
other transformation of the work;
177.3. The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the
work by sale or other forms of transfer of ownership;
177.4. Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or
cinematographic work, a work embodied in a sound recording, a computer
program, a compilation of data and other materials or a musical work in
graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the original or the copy
which is the subject of the rental; (n)
177.5. Public display of the original or a copy of the work;
177.6. Public performance of the work; and
177.7. Other communication to the public of the work.(Sec. 5, P. D. No.
49a) (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 211 of the Intellectual Property Code, broadcasting organizations are
granted a more specific set of rights called related or neighboring rights:
SECTION 211. Scope of Right. — Subject to the provisions of Section 212,
broadcasting organizations shall enjoy the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or
prevent any of the following acts:
211.1. The rebroadcasting of their broadcasts;
 211.2. The recording in any manner, including the making of films or the
use of video tape, of their broadcasts for the purpose of communication to
the public of television broadcasts of the same; and
211.3. The use of such records for fresh transmissions or for fresh
recording. (Sec. 52, P.D. No. 49) (Emphasis supplied)
Section 212 of the Code provides:
CHAPTER XV
LIMITATIONS ON PROTECTION
Section 212. Limitations on Rights. - Sections 203, 208 and 209 shall not apply
where the acts referred to in those Sections are related to:
212.1. The use by a natural person exclusively for his own personal
purposes;
212.2. Using short excerpts for reporting current events;
212.3. Use solely for the purpose of teaching or for scientific research; and
212.4. Fair use of the broadcast subject to the conditions under Section
185. (Sec. 44, P.D. No. 49a)
The Code defines what broadcasting is and who broadcasting organizations include:
202.7. "Broadcasting" means the transmission by wireless means for the
public reception of sounds or of images or of representations thereof; such
transmission by satellite is also "broadcasting" where the means for
decrypting are provided to the public by the broadcasting organization or
with its consent;
202.8. "Broadcasting organization" shall include a natural person or a
juridical entity duly authorized to engage in broadcasting[.]
Developments in technology, including the process of preserving once ephemeral
works and disseminating them, resulted in the need to provide a new kind of
protection as distinguished from copyright.102 The designation "neighboring rights"
was abbreviated from the phrase "rights neighboring to copyright."103 Neighboring
or related rights are of equal importance with copyright as established in the
different conventions covering both kinds of rights.104
Several treaties deal with neighboring or related rights of copyright. 105 The most
prominent of these is the "International Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations" (Rome Convention). 106
The Rome Convention protects the rights of broadcasting organizations in relation to
their broadcasts. Article XIII of the Rome Convention enumerates the minimum
rights accorded to broadcasting organizations:
Article 13
Minimum Rights for Broadcasting Organizations
Broadcasting organisations shall enjoy the right to authorize or prohibit:
(a) the rebroadcasting of their broadcasts;
(b) the fixation of their broadcasts;
(c) the reproduction:
(i) of fixations, made without their consent, of their broadcasts;
(ii) of fixations, made in accordance with the provisions of
Article 15, of their broadcasts, if the reproduction is made for
purposes different from those referred to in those provisions;
(d) the communication to the public of their television broadcasts if such
communication is made in places accessible to the public against payment
of an entrance fee; it shall be a matter for the domestic law of the State
where protection of this right is claimed to determine the conditions under
which it may be exercised.
With regard to the neighboring rights of a broadcasting organization in this
jurisdiction, this court has discussed the difference between broadcasting and
rebroadcasting:
Section 202.7 of the IP Code defines broadcasting as "the transmission by wireless
means for the public reception of sounds or of images or of representations thereof;
such transmission by satellite is also ‘broadcasting’ where the means for decrypting
are provided to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its consent."
On the other hand, rebroadcasting as defined in Article 3(g) of the International
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, otherwise known as the 1961 Rome Convention, of
which the Republic of the Philippines is a signatory, is "the simultaneous
broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another
broadcasting organization."
....
Under the Rome Convention, rebroadcasting is "the simultaneous broadcasting by
one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting
organization." The Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat of the Standing
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights defines broadcasting organizations as
"entities that take the financial and editorial responsibility for the selection and
arrangement of, and investment in, the transmitted content."107 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)
Broadcasting organizations are entitled to several rights and to the protection of
these rights under the Intellectual Property Code. Respondents’ argument that the
subject news footage is not copyrightable is erroneous. The Court of Appeals, in its
assailed Decision, correctly recognized the existence of ABS-CBN’s copyright over
the news footage:
Surely, private respondent has a copyright of its news coverage. Seemingly, for
airing said video feed, petitioner GMA is liable under the provisions of the
Intellectual Property Code, which was enacted purposely to protect copyright
owners from infringement.108
News as expressed in a video footage is entitled to copyright protection.
Broadcasting organizations have not only copyright on but also neighboring rights
over their broadcasts. Copyrightability of a work is different from fair use of a work
for purposes of news reporting.
VI
ABS-CBN assails the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the footage shown by GMA-7
falls under the scope of Section 212.2 and 212.4 of the Intellectual Property Code:
The evidence on record, as well as the discussions above, show that the footage used
by[respondents] could hardlybe characterized as a short excerpt, as it was aired over
one and a half minutes.
Furthermore, the footage used does not fall under the contemplation of Section
212.2 of the Intellectual Property Code. A plain reading of the provision would
reveal that copyrighted material referred to in Section 212 are short portions of an
artist’s performance under Section 203, or a producer’s sound recordings under
Sections 208 and 209. Section 212 does not refer to actual use of video footage of
another as its own.
The Angelo dela Cruz footage does not fall under the rule on Section 212.4 of the
Intellectual Property Code on fair use of the broadcast.
....
In determining fair use, several factors are considered, including the nature of the
copyrighted work, and the amount and substantiality of the person used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole.
In the business of television news reporting, the nature of the copyrighted work or
the video footages, are such that, footage created, must be a novelty to be a good
report. Thus, when the . . . Angelo dela Cruz footage was used by [respondents], the
novelty of the footage was clearly affected.
Moreover, given that a substantial portion of the Angelo dela Cruz footage was
utilized by GMA-7 for its own, its use can hardly be classified as fair use.
Hence, [respondents] could not be considered as having used the Angelo dela Cruz
[footage] following the provisions on fair use.
It is also worthy to note that the Honorable Court of Appeals seem to contradict
itself when it relied on the provisions of fair use in its assailed rulings considering
that it found that the Angelo dela Cruz footage is not copyrightable, given that the
fair use presupposes an existing copyright. Thus, it is apparent that the findings of
the Honorable Court of Appeals are erroneous and based on wrong
assumptions.109 (Underscoring in the original)
On the other hand, respondents counter that GMA-7’s use of ABS-CBN’s news
footage falls under fair use as defined in the Intellectual Property Code.
Respondents, citing the Court of Appeals Decision, argue that a strong statutory
defense negates any finding of probable cause under the same statute.110 The
Intellectual Property Code provides that fair use negates infringement.
Respondents point out that upon seeing ABS-CBN’s reporter Dindo Amparo on the
footage, GMA-7 immediately shut off the broadcast. Only five (5) seconds passed
before the footage was cut. They argue that this shows that GMA-7 had no prior
knowledge of ABS-CBN’s ownership of the footage or was notified of it. They
claim that the Angelo dela Cruz footage is considered a short excerpt of an event’s
"news" footage and is covered by fair use.111
112
Copyright protection is not absolute. The Intellectual Property Code provides the
limitations on copyright:
CHAPTER
LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT
Section 184. Limitations on Copyright. - 184.1. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Chapter V, the following acts shall not constitute infringement of copyright:
....
184.2. The provisions of this section shall be interpreted in such a way as to allow
the work to be used in a manner which does not conflict with the normal exploitation
of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the right holder's legitimate
interests.
....
CHAPTER
LIMITATIONS ON PROTECTION
Section 212. Limitations on Rights. - Sections 203, 208 and 209 shall not apply
where the acts referred to in those Sections are related to:
....
212.2. Using short excerpts for reporting current events;
....
212.4. Fair use of the broadcast subject to the conditions under Section 185.(Sec. 44,
P.D. No. 49a) (Emphasis supplied)
The determination of what constitutes fair use depends on several factors. Section
185 of the Intellectual Property Code states:
SECTION 185. Fair Use of a Copyrighted Work. —
185.1. The fair use of a copyrighted work for criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, and
similar purposes is not an infringement of copyright. . . . In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is fair use, the factors to be considered
shall include:
VIII
a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. Respondents allege that the news footage was only five
(5) seconds long, thus falling under fair use. ABS-CBN belies this
contention and argues that the footage aired for two (2) minutes and 40
seconds.113 According to the Court of Appeals, the parties admitted that
only five (5) seconds of the news footage was broadcasted by GMA-7.114
XV
This court defined fair use as "aprivilege to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without the consent of the copyright owner or as copying the
theme or ideas rather than their expression."115 Fair use is an exception to the
copyright owner’s monopoly of the use of the work to avoid stifling "the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster."116
Determining fair use requires application of the four-factor test. Section 185 of the
Intellectual Property Code lists four (4) factors to determine if there was fair use of a
copyrighted work:
a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
 b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
First, the purpose and character of the use of the copyrighted material must fall
under those listed in Section 185, thus: "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, and
similar purposes."117 The purpose and character requirement is important in view of
copyright’s goal to promote creativity and encourage creation of works. Hence,
commercial use of the copyrighted work can be weighed against fair use.
The "transformative test" is generally used in reviewing the purpose and character of
the usage of the copyrighted work.118 This court must look into whether the copy of
the work adds "new expression, meaning or message" to transform it into something
else.119 "Meta-use" can also occur without necessarily transforming the copyrighted
work used.120
Second, the nature of the copyrighted work is significant in deciding whether its use
was fair. If the nature of the work is more factual than creative, then fair use will be
weighed in favor of the user.
Third, the amount and substantiality of the portion used is important to determine
whether usage falls under fair use. An exact reproduction of a copyrighted work,
compared to a small portion of it, can result in the conclusion that its use is not fair.
There may also be cases where, though the entirety of the copyrighted work is used
without consent, its purpose determines that the usage is still fair. 121 For example, a
parody using a substantial amount of copyrighted work may be permissible as fair
use as opposed to a copy of a work produced purely for economic gain. Lastly, the
effect of the use on the copyrighted work’s market is also weighed for or against the
user. If this court finds that the use had or will have a negative impact on the
copyrighted work’s market, then the use is deemed unfair.
The structure and nature of broadcasting as a business requires assigned values for
each second of broadcast or airtime. In most cases, broadcasting organizations
generate revenue through sale of time or timeslots to advertisers, which, in turn, is
based on market share:122 Once a news broadcast has been transmitted, the broadcast
becomes relatively worthless to the station. In the case of the aerial broadcasters,
advertising sales generate most of the profits derived from news reports. Advertising
rates are, in turn, governed by market share. Market share is determined by the
number of people watching a show at any particular time, relative to total viewers at
that time. News is by nature time-limited, and so re-broadcasts are generally of little
worth because they draw few viewers. Newscasts compete for market share by
presenting their news in an appealing format that will capture a loyal audience.
Hence, the primary reason for copyrighting newscasts by broadcasters would seem
to be to prevent competing stations from rebroadcasting current news from the
station with the best coverage of a particular news item, thus misappropriating a
portion of the market share.
Of course, in the real world there are exceptions to this perfect economic view.
However, there are also many caveats with these exceptions. A common exception
is that some stations rebroadcast the news of others. The caveat is that generally, the
two stations are not competing for market share. CNN, for example, often makes
news stories available to local broadcasters. First, the local broadcaster is often not
affiliated with a network (hence its need for more comprehensive programming),
confining any possible competition to a small geographical area. Second, the local
broadcaster is not in competition with CNN. Individuals who do not have cable TV
(or a satellite dish with decoder) cannot receive CNN; therefore there is no
competition. . . . Third, CNN sells the right of rebroadcast to the local stations. Ted
Turner, owner of CNN, does not have First Amendment freedom of access argument
foremost on his mind. (Else he would give everyone free cable TV so everyone
could get CNN.) He is in the business for a profit. Giving away resources does not a
profit make.123 (Emphasis supplied)
The high value afforded to limited time periods is also seen in other media. In social
media site Instagram, users are allowed to post up to only 15 seconds of video. 124 In
short-video sharing website Vine,125 users are allowed a shorter period of six (6)
seconds per post. The mobile application 1 Second Everyday takes it further by
capturing and stitching one (1) second of video footage taken daily over a span of a
certain period.126
Whether the alleged five-second footage may be considered fair use is a matter of
defense. We emphasize that the case involves determination of probable cause at the
preliminary investigation stage. Raising the defense of fair use does not
automatically mean that no infringement was committed. The investigating
prosecutor has full discretion to evaluate the facts, allegations, and evidence during
preliminary investigation. Defenses raised during preliminary investigation are
subject to further proof and evaluation before the trial court. Given the insufficiency
of available evidence, determination of whether the Angelo dela Cruz footage is
subject to fair use is better left to the trial court where the proceedings are currently
pending. GMA-7’s rebroadcast of ABS-CBN’s news footage without the latter’s
consent is not an issue. The mere act of rebroadcasting without authority from the
owner of the broadcast gives rise to the probability that a crime was committed
under the Intellectual Property Code.
VII
Respondents cannot invoke the defense of good faith to argue that no probable cause
exists.
Respondents argue that copyright infringement is malum in se, in that "[c]opying
alone is not what is being prohibited, but its injurious effect which consists in the
lifting from the copyright owners’ film or materials, that were the result of the
latter’s creativity, work and productions and without authority, reproduced, sold and
circulated for commercial use to the detriment of the latter."127
Infringement under the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum. The
Intellectual Property Code is a special law. Copyright is a statutory creation:
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or
independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right
regulated by the statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the
statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects
and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute.128
The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum
prohibitum.129 "An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal
intent is completely immaterial."130
In contrast, crimes mala in seconcern inherently immoral acts:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that
"as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine".
In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules
that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not,
the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it
is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself
must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by
statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such
acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
[These] guidelines nonetheless proved short of providing a clear cut solution, for in
International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely
classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which
are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which
involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or
not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statue.131 (Emphasis in the original)
"Implicit in the concept of mala in se is that of mens rea."132 Mens reais defined as
"the nonphysical element which, combined with the act of the accused, makes up the
crime charged. Most frequently it is the criminal intent, or the guilty mind[.]"133
Crimes mala in sepre suppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal
intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal
intent:
In the case of mala in se it is necessary, to constitute a punishable offense, for the
person doing the act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and to have a
criminal intent; in the case of mala prohibita, unless such words as "knowingly" and
"willfully" are contained in the statute, neither knowledge nor criminal intent is
necessary. In other words, a person morally quite innocent and with every intention
of being a law abiding citizen becomes a criminal, and liable to criminal penaltes, if
he does an act prohibited by these statutes.134 (Emphasis supplied) Hence, "[i]ntent
to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person
may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit
an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself[.]"135When an act
is prohibited by a special law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the
performance of the prohibited act is the crime itself.136
Volition, or intent to commit the act, is different from criminal intent. Volition or
voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done. On the other hand, criminal
intent — which is different from motive, or the moving power for the commission of
the crime137 — refers to the state of mind beyond voluntariness. It is this intent that
is being punished by crimes mala in se.
Unlike other jurisdictions that require intent for a criminal prosecution of copyright
infringement, the Philippines does not statutorily support good faith as a defense.
Other jurisdictions provide in their intellectual property codes or relevant laws that
mens rea, whether express or implied, is an element of criminal copyright
infringement.138
In Canada, criminal offenses are categorized under three (3) kinds: "the full mens
rea offence, meaning the accused’s actual or subjective state of mind has to be
proved; strict liability offences where no mens rea has to be proved but the accused
can avoid liability if he can prove he took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular
event; [and] absolute liability offences where Parliament has made it clear that guilt
follows proof of the prescribed act only."139 Because of the use of the word
"knowingly" in Canada’s Copyright Act, it has been held that copyright
infringement is a full mens rea offense.140
In the United States, willful intent is required for criminal copyright
infringement.141 Before the passage of the No Electronic Theft Act, "civil copyright
infringements were violations of criminal copyright laws only if a defendant
willfully infringed a copyright ‘for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain.’"142 However, the No Electronic Theft Act now allows criminal
copyright infringement without the requirement of commercial gain. The infringing
act may or may not be for profit.143
There is a difference, however, between the required liability in civil copyright
infringement and that in criminal copyright infringement in the United States. Civil
copyright infringement does not require culpability and employs a strict liability
regime144 where "lack of intention to infringe is not a defense to an action for
infringement."145
In the Philippines, the Intellectual Property Code, as amended, provides for the
prosecution of criminal actions for the following violations of intellectual property
rights: Repetition of Infringement of Patent (Section 84); Utility Model (Section
108); Industrial Design (Section 119); Trademark Infringement (Section 155 in
relation to Section 170); Unfair Competition (Section 168 in relation to Section
170); False Designations of Origin, False Description or Representation (Section
169.1 in relation to Section 170); infringement of copyright, moral rights,
performers’ rights, producers’ rights, and broadcasting rights (Section 177, 193, 203,
208 and 211 in relation to Section 217); and other violations of intellectual property
rights as may be defined by law.
The Intellectual Property Code requires strict liability for copyright infringement
whether for a civil action or a criminal prosecution; it does not require mens rea or
culpa:146
SECTION 216. Remedies for Infringement. —
216.1. Any person infringing a right protected under this law shall be
liable:
a. To an injunction restraining such infringement. The court may
also order the defendant to desist from an infringement, among
others, to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce of
imported goods that involve an infringement, immediately after
customs clearance of such goods.
b. Pay to the copyright proprietor or his assigns or heirs such
actual damages, including legal costs and other expenses, as he
may have incurred due to the infringement as well as the profits
the infringer may have made due to such infringement, and in
proving profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove sales only
and the defendant shall be required to prove every element of
cost which he claims, or, in lieu of actual damages and profits,
such damages which to the court shall appear to be just and shall
not be regarded as penalty.
c. Deliver under oath, for impounding during the pendency of
the action, upon such terms and conditions as the court may
prescribe, sales invoices and other documents evidencing sales,
all articles and their packaging alleged to infringe a copyright
and implements for making them.
d. Deliver under oath for destruction without any compensation
all infringing copies or devices, as well as all plates, molds, or
other means for making such infringing copies as the court may
order.
e. Such other terms and conditions, including the payment of
moral and exemplary damages, which the court may deem
proper, wise and equitable and the destruction of infringing
copies of the work even in the event of acquittal in a criminal
case.
216.2. In an infringement action, the court shall also have the power to
order the seizure and impounding of any article which may serve as
evidence in the court proceedings. (Sec. 28, P.D. No. 49a)
SECTION 217. Criminal Penalties. — 217.1. Any person infringing any right
secured by provisions of Part IV of this Actor aiding or abetting such infringement
shall be guilty of a crime punishable by:
 a. Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000) to One hundred
fifty thousand pesos (₱150,000) for the first offense.
b. Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6)
years plus a fine ranging from One hundred fifty thousand pesos
(₱150,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000) for the
second offense.
c. Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9)
years plus a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000) to One million five hundred thousand pesos
(₱1,500,000) for the third and subsequent offenses.
d. In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of imprisonment and the
amount of fine, the court shall consider the value of the infringing
materials that the defendant has produced or manufactured and the damage
that the copyright owner has suffered by reason of the infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when copyright subsists in a work has
in his possession an article which he knows, or ought to know, to be an
infringing copy of the work for the purpose of: a. Selling, letting for hire,
or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale, or hire, the article;
b. Distributing the article for purpose of trade, or for any other
purpose to an extent that will prejudice the rights of the
copyright owner in the work; or
c. Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall be guilty of an
offense and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment and
fine as above mentioned. (Sec. 29, P.D. No. 49a) (Emphasis
supplied)
The law is clear. Inasmuch as there is wisdom in prioritizing the flow and exchange
of ideas as opposed to rewarding the creator, it is the plain reading of the law in
conjunction with the actions of the legislature to which we defer. We have
continuously "recognized the power of the legislature . . . to forbid certain acts in a
limited class of cases and to make their commission criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer. Such legislative enactments are based on the experience that
repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer’s
knowledge or of his intent are of little use and rarely accomplish their purposes."147
Respondents argue that live broadcast of news requires a different treatment in terms
of good faith, intent, and knowledge to commit infringement. To argue this point,
they rely on the differences of the media used in Habana et al. v. Robles, Columbia
Pictures v. Court of Appeals, and this case:
Petitioner ABS-CBN argues that lack of notice that the Angelo dela Cruz was under
embargo is not a defense in copyright infringement and cites the case of Columbia
Pictures vs. Court of Appeals and Habana et al. vs. Robles(310 SCRA 511).
However, these cases refer to film and literary work where obviously there is
"copying" from an existing material so that the copier knew that he is copying from
an existing material not owned by him. But, how could respondents know that what
they are "copying was not [theirs]" when they were not copying but merely
receiving live video feed from Reuters and CNN which they aired? What they knew
and what they aired was the Reuters live video feed and the CNN feed which GMA-
7 is authorized to carry in its news broadcast, it being a subscriber of these
companies[.]
It is apt to stress that the subject of the alleged copyright infringement is not a film
or literary work but live broadcast of news footage. In a film or literary work, the
infringer is confronted face to face with the material he is allegedly copying and
therefore knows, or is presumed to know, that what he is copying is owned by
another. Upon the other hand, in live broadcast, the alleged infringer is not
confronted with the fact that the material he airs or re-broadcasts is owned by
another, and therefore, he cannot be charged of knowledge of ownership of the
material by another. This specially obtains in the Angelo dela Cruz news footage
which GMA-7 received from Reuters and CNN. Reuters and CNN were beaming
live videos from the coverage which GMA-7 received as a subscriber and, in the
exercise of its rights as a subscriber, GMA-7 picked up the live video and
simultaneously re-broadcast it. In simultaneously broadcasting the live video footage
of Reuters, GMA-7 did not copy the video footage of petitioner ABS-
CBN[.]148 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondents’ arguments must fail.
Respondents are involved and experienced in the broadcasting business. They knew
that there would be consequences in carrying ABS-CBN’s footage in their
broadcast. That is why GMA-7 allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing
ABS-CBN’s ogo and reporter. To admit a different treatment for broadcasts would
mean abandonment of a broadcasting organization’s minimum rights, including
copyright on the broadcast material and the right against unauthorized rebroadcast of
copyrighted material. The nature of broadcast technology is precisely why related or
neighboring rights were created and developed. Carving out an exception for live
broadcasts would go against our commitments under relevant international treaties
and agreements, which provide for the same minimum rights.149
Contrary to respondents’ assertion, this court in Habana,150 reiterating the ruling in
Columbia Pictures,151 ruled that lack of knowledge of infringement is not a valid
defense. Habana and Columbia Pictures may have different factual scenarios from
this case, but their rulings on copyright infringement are analogous. In Habana,
petitioners were the authors and copyright owners of English textbooks and
workbooks. The case was anchored on the protection of literary and artistic creations
such as books. In Columbia Pictures, video tapes of copyrighted films were the
subject of the copyright infringement suit.
In Habana, knowledge of the infringement is presumed when the infringer commits
the prohibited act:
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to
underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a
copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the
copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy,
which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person,
without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do
which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.
....
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the
pirate, in such cases, did not know whether or not he was infringing any copyright;
he at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril.
....
In cases of infringement, copying alone is not what is prohibited. The copying must
produce an "injurious effect". Here, the injury consists in that respondent Robles
lifted from petitioners’ book materials that were the result of the latter’s research
work and compilation and misrepresented them as her own. She circulated the book
DEP for commercial use and did not acknowledge petitioners as her
source.152 (Emphasis supplied)
Habana and Columbia Pictures did not require knowledge of the infringement to
constitute a violation of the copyright. One does not need to know that he or she is
copying a work without consent to violate copyright law. Notice of fact of the
embargo from Reuters or CNN is not material to find probable cause that
respondents committed infringement. Knowledge of infringement is only material
when the person is charged of aiding and abetting a copyright infringement under
Section 217 of the Intellectual Property Code.153
We look at the purpose of copyright in relation to criminal prosecutions requiring
willfulness: Most importantly, in defining the contours of what it means to willfully
infringe copyright for purposes of criminal liability, the courts should remember the
ultimate aim of copyright. Copyright is not primarily about providing the strongest
possible protection for copyright owners so that they have the highest possible
incentive to create more works. The control given to copyright owners is only a
means to an end: the promotion of knowledge and learning. Achieving that
underlying goal of copyright law also requires access to copyrighted works and it
requires permitting certain kinds of uses of copyrighted works without the
permission of the copyright owner. While a particular defendant may appear to be
deserving of criminal sanctions, the standard for determining willfulness should be
set with reference to the larger goals of copyright embodied in the Constitution and
the history of copyright in this country.154
In addition, "[t]he essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual
terms in order to underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof.
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied
by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of
copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the
doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything
the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright."155
Intellectual property rights, such as copyright and the neighboring right against
rebroadcasting, establish an artificial and limited monopoly to reward creativity.
Without these legally enforceable rights, creators will have extreme difficulty
recovering their costs and capturing the surplus or profit of their works as reflected
in their markets. This, in turn, is based on the theory that the possibility of gain due
to creative work creates an incentive which may improve efficiency or simply
enhance consumer welfare or utility. More creativity redounds to the public good.
These, however, depend on the certainty of enforcement. Creativity, by its very
nature, is vulnerable to the free rider problem. It is easily replicated despite the costs
to and efforts of the original creator. The more useful the creation is in the market,
the greater the propensity that it will be copied. The most creative and inventive
individuals are usually those who are unable to recover on their creations.
Arguments against strict liability presuppose that the Philippines has a social,
historical, and economic climate similar to those of Western jurisdictions. As it
stands, there is a current need to strengthen intellectual property protection.
Thus, unless clearly provided in the law, offenses involving infringement of
copyright protections should be considered malum prohibitum. It is the act of
infringement, not the intent, which causes the damage. To require or assume the
need to prove intent defeats the purpose of intellectual property protection.
Nevertheless, proof beyond reasonable doubt is still the standard for criminal
prosecutions under the Intellectual Property Code.
VIII
Respondents argue that GMA-7’s officers and employees cannot be held liable for
infringement under the Intellectual Property Code since it does not expressly provide
direct liability of the corporate officers. They explain that "(i) a corporation may be
charged and prosecuted for a crime where the penalty is fine or both imprisonment
and fine, and if found guilty, may be fined; or (ii) a corporation may commit a crime
but if the statute prescribes the penalty therefore to be suffered by the corporate
officers, directors or employees or other persons, the latter shall be responsible for
the offense."156
Section 217 of the Intellectual Property Code states that "any person" may be found
guilty of infringement. It also imposes the penalty of both imprisonment and fine:
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. - 217.1. Any person infringing any right secured by
provisions of Part IV of this Act or aiding or abetting such infringement shall be
guilty of a crime punishable by:
(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine ranging
from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000) to One hundred fifty thousand pesos
(₱150,000) for the first offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6) years plus a
fine ranging from One hundred fifty thousand pesos (₱150,000) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000) for the second offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years plus a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000) to One million
five hundred thousand pesos (₱1,500,000) for the third and subsequent
offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.
(Emphasis supplied) Corporations have separate and distinct personalities
from their officers or directors.157 This court has ruled that corporate
officers and/or agents may be held individually liable for a crime
committed under the Intellectual Property Code:158
Petitioners, being corporate officers and/or directors, through whose act, default or
omission the corporation commits a crime, may themselves be individually held
answerable for the crime. . . . The existence of the corporate entity does not shield
from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally caused the
corporation to commit a crime. Thus, petitioners cannot hide behind the cloak of the
separate corporate personality of the corporation to escape criminal liability. A
corporate officer cannot protect himself behind a corporation where he is the actual,
present and efficient actor.159
However, the criminal liability of a corporation’s officers or employees stems from
their active participation in the commission of the wrongful act:
The principle applies whether or not the crime requires the consciousness of
wrongdoing. It applies to those corporate agents who themselves commit the crime
and to those, who, by virtue of their managerial positions or other similar relation to
the corporation, could be deemed responsible for its commission, if by virtue of their
relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent the act. Moreover, all
parties active in promoting a crime, whether agents or not, are principals. Whether
such officers or employees are benefited by their delictual acts is not a touchstone of
their criminal liability. Benefit is not an operative fact.160 (Emphasis supplied) An
accused’s participation in criminal acts involving violations of intellectual property
rights is the subject of allegation and proof. The showing that the accused did the
acts or contributed in a meaningful way in the commission of the infringements is
certainly different from the argument of lack of intent or good faith. Active
participation requires a showing of overt physical acts or intention to commit such
acts. Intent or good faith, on the other hand, are inferences from acts proven to have
been or not been committed.
We find that the Department of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when it
resolved to file the Information against respondents despite lack of proof of their
actual participation in the alleged crime.
Ordering the inclusion of respondents Gozon, GMA-7 President; Duavit, Jr.,
Executive Vice-President; Flores, Vice-President for News and Public Affairs; and
Soho, Director for News, as respondents, Secretary Agra overturned the City
Prosecutor’s finding that only respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas are
responsible for the crime charged due to their duties.161 The Agra Resolution reads:
Thus, from the very nature of the offense and the penalty involved, it is necessary
that GMA-7’s directors, officers, employees or other officers thereof responsible for
the offense shall be charged and penalized for violation of the Sections 177 and 211
of Republic Act No. 8293. In their complaint for libel, respondents Felipe L Gozon,
Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr., Marissa L. Flores, Jessica A.Soho, Grace Dela Pena-Reyes,
John Oliver T. Manalastas felt they were aggrieved because they were "in charge of
the management, operations and production of news and public affairs programs of
the network" (GMA-7). This is clearly an admission on respondents’ part. Of course,
respondents may argue they have no intention to infringe the copyright of ABS-
CBN; that they acted in good faith; and that they did not directly cause the airing of
the subject footage, but again this is preliminary investigation and what is required is
simply probable cause. Besides, these contentions can best be addressed in the
course of trial.162 (Citation omitted)
In contrast, the Office of the City Prosecutor, in the Resolution dated December 3,
2004, found that respondents Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho did not have
active participation in the commission of the crime charged:
This Office, however, does not subscribe to the view that respondents Atty. Felipe
Gozon, Gilberto Duavit, Marissa Flores and Jessica Soho should be held liable for
the said offense. Complainant failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
the said respondents conspired with Reyes and Manalastas. No evidence was
adduced to prove that these respondents had an active participation in the actual
commission of the copyright infringement or they exercised their moral ascendancy
over Reyes and Manalastas in airing the said footage. It must be stressed that,
conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be
shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself.163 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The City Prosecutor found respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas liable due
to the nature of their work and responsibilities. He found that:
[t]his Office however finds respondents Grace Dela Peña-Reyes and John Oliver T.
Manalastas liable for copyright infringement penalized under Republic Act No.
8293. It is undisputed that complainant ABSCBN holds the exclusive ownership and
copyright over the "Angelo [d]ela Cruz news footage". Hence, any airing and re-
broadcast of the said footage without any consent and authority from ABS-CBN will
be held as an infringement and violation of the intellectual property rights of the
latter. Respondents Grace Dela Peña-Reyes as the Head of the News Operation and
John Oliver T. Manalastas as the Program Manager cannot escape liability since the
news control room was under their direct control and supervision. Clearly, they must
have been aware that the said footage coming from Reuters or CNN has a "No
Access Philippines" advisory or embargo thus cannot be re-broadcast. We find no
merit to the defense of ignorance interposed by the respondents. It is simply contrary
to human experience and logic that experienced employees of an established
broadcasting network would be remiss in their duty in ascertaining if the said
footage has an embargo.164 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the findings as to respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas. Both
respondents committed acts that promoted infringement of ABS-CBN’s footage. We
note that embargoes are common occurrences in and between news agencies and/or
broadcast organizations.165 Under its Operations Guide, Reuters has two (2) types of
embargoes: transmission embargo and publication embargo.166 Under ABS-CBN’s
service contract with Reuters, Reuters will embargo any content contributed by
ABS-CBN from other broadcast subscribers within the same geographical location:
4a. Contributed Content
You agree to supply us at our request with news and sports news stories broadcast
on the Client Service of up to three (3) minutes each for use in our Services on a
non-exclusive basis and at a cost of US$300.00 (Three Hundred United States
Dollars) per story. In respect of such items we agree to embargo them against use by
other broadcast subscribers in the Territory and confirm we will observe all other
conditions of usage regarding Contributed Content, as specified in Section 2.5 of the
Reuters Business Principles for Television Services. For the purposes of
clarification, any geographical restriction imposed by you on your use of
Contributed Content will not prevent us or our clients from including such
Contributed Content in online transmission services including the internet. We
acknowledge Contributed Content is your copyright and we will not acquire any
intellectual property rights in the Contributed Content.167 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas merely denied receiving the advisory
sent by Reuters to its clients, including GMA-7. As in the records, the advisory
reads:
ADVISORY - - +++LIVE COVER PLANS+++
PHILIPPINES: HOSTAGE RETURN
**ATTENTION ALL CLIENTS**
PLEASE BE ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING LIVE COVER
PLANNED FOR THURSDAY, JULY 22:
....
SOURCE: ABS-CBN
TV AND WEB RESTRICTIONS: NO ACCESS PHILIPPINES.168
There is probable cause that respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas directly
committed copyright infringement of ABS-CBN’s news footage to warrant piercing
of the corporate veil. They are responsible in airing the embargoed Angelo dela Cruz
footage. They could have prevented the act of infringement had they been diligent in
their functions as Head of News Operations and Program Manager.
Secretary Agra, however, committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the
filing of the Information against all respondents despite the erroneous piercing of the
corporate veil. Respondents Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho cannot be held
liable for the criminal liability of the corporation.
Mere membership in the Board or being President per se does not mean knowledge,
approval, and participation in the act alleged as criminal. There must be a showing
of active participation, not simply a constructive one.
Under principles of criminal law, the principals of a crime are those "who take a
direct part in the execution of the act; [t]hose who directly force or induce others to
commit it; [or] [t]hose who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another
act without which it would not have been accomplished."169 There is conspiracy
"when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it":170
Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 While
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all
taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the
community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must
be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of
intentionality on the part of the cohorts.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or
indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission
of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators[.]171 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In sum, the trial court erred in failing to resume the proceedings after the designated
period. The Court of Appeals erred when it held that Secretary Agra committed
errors of jurisdiction despite its own pronouncement that ABS-CBN is the owner of
the copyright on the news footage. News should be differentiated from expression of
the news, particularly when the issue involves rebroadcast of news footage. The
Court of Appeals also erroneously held that good faith, as. well as lack of
knowledge of infringement, is a defense against criminal prosecution for copyright
and neighboring rights infringement. In its current form, the Intellectual Property
Code is malum prohibitum and prescribes a strict liability for copyright
infringement. Good faith, lack of knowledge of the copyright, or lack of intent to
infringe is not a defense against copyright infringement. Copyright, however, is
subject to the rules of fair. use and will be judged on a case-to-case basis. Finding
probable cause includes a determination of the defendant's active participation,
particularly when the corporate veil is pierced in cases involving a corporation's
criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The Department of Justice
Resolution dated June 29, 2010 ordering the filing of the Information is hereby
REINSTATED as to respondents Grace Dela Pena-Reyes and John Oliver T.
Manalastas. Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to
continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-04-131533.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case.
The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. 1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to
assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 2 and August 8, 20143 issued by
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has
been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his
Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that
Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of
the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at
the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , 11 and
his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he
should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established
that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder,
the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying
Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court
shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the
Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused
Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to
fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is
charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him
is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years
old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime
charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken
into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of
the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense
charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is
not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the
Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are
among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail.
However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail
without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not
strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix
Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny
Enrile’s motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a
matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only
upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile,
if ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that
evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to
bail as a matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk. 16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; th at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence
of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into
account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing.
In its Comment the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
,17
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is
mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due
process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, 19 and
further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the
accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 22 Thus, bail
acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the
accused’s presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of
Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may
be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or
is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try
capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or
life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong. 28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial
court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma , 30 "such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty."
It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of
discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution.31The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly
explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in
People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be
granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any
hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its
conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court
granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen,
not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at
the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie
determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably
committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on
whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as
the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence
and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the
nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the
weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the
trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the
accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is
highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte
determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the
court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court
does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. 33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge
is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that
he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose
Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed
upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of mitigating
circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The
relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor. 36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on
the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the
crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua , 37 simply
because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made
by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by
the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising
from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered
to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not
recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was
found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering
from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on
multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the
following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and
vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications.
(Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented
by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip
syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of
the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0,
3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged
prostate on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled
hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including
recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a
future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive
heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in
patients with asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill
health required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General
Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-
charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the
limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES: DR. SERVILLANO:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the
Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital? condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your
Honor.45
DR. SERVILLANO:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
No, Your Honor. should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the
JUSTICE MARTIRES: true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
Enrile at the PNP Hospital ? already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46

PSUPT. JOCSON: x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

No, Your Honor. x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the
illness of the prisoner,
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the
Why? law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of
the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to
PSUPT. JOCSON: bail ;47

Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best. xxx

JUSTICE MARTIRES: Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect
that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of
pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the
you happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the
a vis the facilities of the hospital? petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the People’s Court on the
ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis,
DR. SERVILLANO: and the implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the
Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his
lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and
considering further that the said People’s Court has adopted and applied the well-
JUSTICE MARTIRES: established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among
them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No.
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation? 3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they
were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to SO ORDERED.
their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the
People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the
petitioner on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable
him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the
objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the
trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is
either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that
the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting
the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the
interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the
same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective

of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As
such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion
To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES
the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014
and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan
Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of
₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of
petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.