GAME THEORY 2018-19

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3 Games in strategic form and Nash equilibria

Exercise 30. Find the values of (a, b) such that the following game has an outcome determined by
elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
 
(3, 3) (a, b) (4, 2)
 (2, 2) (6, 3) (3, 1) 
(5, 4) (7, 8) (6, 1)

Exercise 31. Find the equilibria in pure strategies of the following game
 
(5, 4) (1, 6) (0, 3) (5, 1)
 (5, 3) (3, 2) (1, 0) (4, 3) 
(2, 5) (4, 0) (1, 5) (2, 1)

Exercise 32. Consider the following game in strategic form:

 
(1, 2) (1, 3)
(0, 2) (a, b)
Find the Nash equilibria in pure strategies for different values of a and b.
What are the conditions on a and b for the game to be derived from a game in extensive form with
perfect information?

Exercise 33. Find the Nash equilibria for the Battle of Sexes.

Exercise 34. Find the equilibria in pure and mixed strategies of the following game
 
(3, 3) (−1, −3)
(3, −1) (1, 1)

Exercise 35. Given the bimatrix:  

(1, 1) (1, 1)
,
(0, 1) (2, 2)
apply the indifference principle to find Nash equilibria. Do the same by drawing the best reaction
multifiunctions and compare the results.

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Exercise 36. Find the Nash equilibria of the following game
 
(5, 5) (0, 5)
(5, 0) (1, 1)

Exercise 37. Consider the game in extensive form in Figure 1. Apply backward induction to solve the
game. Then, write the game in strategic form and find the Nash equilibria.

I
A B

II
(2, 0)
C D

(3, 2) (1, 2)

Figure 1: Exercise 37

Exercise 38. Given the bimatrix game:

 
(3, 2) (0, 1)
A= ,
(2, 3) (2, 3)

find the pure Nash equilibria of the game. Then, find a game in extensive form with perfect information
such that A represent its strategic form and solve the game by using backward induction. Compare the
results.

Exercise 39. Consider the following bimatrix game. Show that, by solving the game through the
elimination of weakly dominated strategies, some equilibria are ruled out.
 
(3, 2) (0, 1)
 (3, −1) (1, 3) 
(2, 0) (−1, 2)

Exercise 40. Find the equilibria of the following game:

 
(3, 4) (2, 3) (3, 2) (5, 1)
 (6, 1) (0, 2) (3, 3) (2, 0) 
(4, 6) (3, 4) (4, 5) (8, 3)

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Exercise 41. Find the equilibria in pure and totally mixed strategies of the following game:
 
(−2, −4) (5, −2) (1, 4)
 (−3, −3) (2, 1) (3, 4) 
(2, 3) (1, 1) (3, −1)

Exercise 42. Let X = Y = [0, 10] be the set of the strategies of two players with utility function

f (x, y) = −x2 + 2xy + 4 g(x, y) = −y 2 + 4xy − 4y.

Find the best response of the two players and the Nash equilibria of the game.

Exercise 43. Let X = Y = [0, +∞) be the set of the strategies of two players with utility function

f (x, y) = −x2 + 2xy − 2x + 7 g(x, y) = −y 2 + 2xy + 2y.

Find the Nash equilibria of the game.