Professional Documents
Culture Documents
UNIT-I
INTRODUCTION
• Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of an enactment
by giving the words of the enactment their natural and ordinary meaning.
•
It is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute.
The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and therefore there have
been certain principles which have evolved out of the continuous exercise by the
Courts. These principles are sometimes called ‘rules of interpretation’.
Meaning and Object of Interpretation
CLASSIFICATION OF STATUTES
A. Classification with reference to basis of Duration
(i) Perpetual statutes - It is perpetual when no time is fixed for its duration and
such a statute remains in force until its repeal which may be express or implied.
Temporary statutes - A statute is temporary when its duration is only for a
specified time and it expires on the expiry of the specified time unless it is
repealed earlier.
B. Classification with reference to Nature of Operation
(i) Prospective statutes – A statute which operates upon acts and transactions
which have not occurred when the statutes takes effect, that is which regulates
the future is a Prospective statute.
(ii) Retrospective statutes – Every statute takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under the existing laws or creates a new obligation into a new duty or
attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already
passed are deemed retrospective or retroactive statute.
(iii) Directory statutes – A directory statute is generally affirmative in its terms,
recommends a certain act or omissions, but imposes no penalty on non-
observance of its provisions.
(iv) Mandatory statutes – A Mandatory statute is one which compels
performance of certain acts and directs that a certain thing must be done in a
certain manner or form. A type of Mandatory Statute is the Imperative Statute.
C. Classification with reference to Objective
Enabling statutes – These statutes are which enlarges the common law where it
is too strict or narrow. It is a statute which makes it lawful to do something
which would not otherwise be lawful.
Disabling statutes – These statutes restrict or cut down rights existing at
common law.
Prohibitory statute – This type of statute which forbids the doing of certain
things.
Codifying Statute – It presents and orderly and authoritative statement of the
leading rules of law on a given subject, whether those rules are to be found in
statute law or common law.
Consolidating statute – The purpose of consolidating statute is to present the
whole body of statutory law on a subject in complete form repeating the former
statute.
Curative or validating Statute - It is passed to cure defects in the prior law and
too validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public and private
administrative powers which in the absence of such statute would be void.
Repealing Statute – A statute which revokes or terminates another statute is a
repealing statute.
Amending Statute – It is a Statute which makes and addition to or operates to
change the original law so as to effectively carry out the purpose for which the
original law was passed
Intention of the Legislature (SENTENTIA LEGIS)
The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature
enacting it”, South Asia Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. S. Sarup Singh.
The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature
must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not
what may be supposed to have been intended but what has been said. The key to
the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law. Each word, phrase
or sentence, is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act
itself. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context, as they are the
bases of interpretation.
If the text is the texture, context gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. A
particular clause or expression is construed by construing the whole instrument
and any dominant purposes that it may express.
Language Of The Statute Should Be Read As It Is
II Casus Omissus
It is an application of the same principle that a matter which should have been,
but has not been provided in a statute cannot be supplied by courts. (Hansraj
Gupta v. Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway)
To do so, will constitute legislation, and not construction. The duty of the
Court is to interpret the words that the legislature has used. Those words
may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the Court to
travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited.
This principle states that statute should be interpreted ex visceribus actus, that is
within the four corners of the act. Every clause needs to be construed with
reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter.
The conclusion that the language is plain or ambiguous can only be truly
arrived at by studying the statute as a whole. How far and to what extent each
component influences the meaning of the other , would be different in each
given case.
Each word, must however, be allowed to play its role, however significant or
insignificant it may be. in achieving the legislative intent. Each section must be
construed as a whole, whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a
proviso. They may be interdependent, each portion throwing light, if need be on
the rest.
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
O.P. SINGLA V UNION OF INDIA
Rule 7 of delhi judicial service stated recruitment by promotion or by direct
recruitment. The proviso stated not more than one third members would be
appointed by direct recruitment. Rule 8 laid down the seniority of diret
recruitment but subject to provision of rule 7. The court held that while
interpreting the statute as whole rule 8 would have to consider the proviso of
rule 7
Plain words require no construction. This starts with the premise that the words
are plain and that the conclusion can be arrived at after construing the words.
Statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning
and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to
do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable,
unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the test of the statute.” [Bhavnagar
University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : AIR 2003]
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
STATE OF PUNJAB V QAISER JEHAN BEGUM
The respondent made an application to civil court beyond six months of from the
date of award regarding compensation but within six months from the
knowledge of the award. The court while interpreting constructively that it
would be just, fair to compute the period of limitation from date of knowledge
of the award.
The Literal Rule, also known as the Plain-Meaning rule, is a type of statutory
construction.
The literal rule of statutory interpretation should be the first rule applied by
judges.
Under the literal rule, the words of the statute are given their natural or
ordinary meaning and applied without the judge seeking to put a gloss on
the words or seek to make sense of the statute.
The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation in the
absence of a contrary definition within the statute, words must be given their
plain, ordinary and literal meaning.
The courts are enjoined to take the words as used by the legislature and too give
them the meaning which naturally implies as held in Molar Mal (deceased) v.
Kay Iron Works (Pvt.) Ltd.
If the language used by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, a court of law
at the present day has only to expound the words in their natural and ordinary
sense; ‘Verbis plane expressis amnino standum est’.
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
Whitely v Chappel (1868) LR 4 QB 147
A statute made it an offence 'to impersonate any person entitled to vote.' The
defendant used the vote of a dead man. The statute relating to voting rights
required a person to be living in order to be entitled to vote.
Held:
The literal rule was applied and the defendant was thus acquitted.
The defendant had a flick knife displayed in his shop window with a price tag on
it. Statute made it a criminal offence to 'offer' such flick knives for sale. His
conviction was quashed as goods on display in shops are not 'offers' in the
technical sense but an invitation to treat. The court applied the literal rule of
statutory interpretation.
Motipur Zanzindary Company Private Limited v. state of Bihar
The question was whether. sugarcane fell within the term green vegetables in.
Entry 6 of the Schedule and as such no sales tax could be levied under the
Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 on its sale.
The Supreme Court held that while dealing with a taxing statute the natural and
ordinary meaning Of a word should be the 'correct meaning.
In the present instance the word vegetables should be interpreted in its natural
and popular-sense and that dictionary meaning is not of such help here.
Vegetables as the normal people mean by it are those which can-be grown in a
kitchen garden to be used for the table, that is to say, to be eaten during lunch or
dinner. Sugarcane definitely does not fall under this category.
Harris bits of the end of a woman’s nose, the prosecution alleged the bite was
included in ‘stab, cut or wound’.
The court held that under the literal rule the act of biting did not come within the
meaning of stab cut or wound as these words implied an instrument had to be
used. Therefore the defendant's conviction was quashed.
R v Maginnis [1987] AC 303 House of Lords
The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled drug with intent
to supply it to another under s.5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. A
package containing £500 worth of cannabis was found in his car. The defendant
stated the cannabis belonged to a friend and that the friend was picking it up
later. The trial judge convicted him and ruled that his action in handing the
drugs back to the friend was an action of supply.
On Appeal, his conviction was reinstated because "The word "supply," in its
ordinary natural meaning, connotes the mere transfer of physical control of
some chattel or object from one person to another.
This was dissented by a judge stating that either the delivery of goods by a
depositor to a depositee, or the redelivery of goods by a depositee to a depositor,
can sensibly be described as an act of supplying goods to another. In ordinary
language the cloakroom attendant, the left luggage officer, the warehouseman
and the shoe mender do not 'supply' to their customers the articles which those
customers have left with them."
London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman [1946] AC 278
A railway worker was killed whilst oiling the track. No look out man had been
provided. A statute provided compensation payable on death for those 'relaying
or repairing' the track.
Under the literal rule oiling did not come into either of these categories.
This result although very harsh could not to be said to be absurd so the golden
rule could not be applied. There was no ambiguity in the words therefore the
mischief rule could not be applied. Unfortunately the widow was entitled to
nothing.
The court held that the other items mentioned in the statute related to places
indoors whereas plea of enclosure was outside. There was thus no offence
committed.
Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India
Section 6 , in so far as relevant for our purpose, provides that the Chairman and
other members of the council shall hold office for a period of three years. Sub-
section 7 of section 6 of the Press Council Act, 1978 provides: ‘A retiring
member shall be eligible for renomination for not more than one term.’
Question was whether a person who had already been a member of the Council
for two terms earlier is eligible for being nominated
The Supreme Court applied the literal and grammatical meaning of these words
and held that the provision applied to a member “just retiring” and not to a
retired member and that a retired member who had held office for two terms
sometime in the past is not debarred from being nominated again.
According to the notification held that the amounts are to be calculated from 5th
to 30th year as up to five (5) years cashew trees are held to be not fruit bearing
trees. That being so, the Apex Court held that stand of the State Government (as
accepted by the High Court) that the signora rate is for one year and accordingly
fixing it for the 12 year is clearly unsustainable.
The court said that this case dealt with Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act. It was to do with taking a sanction from an appropriate authority .It
considers only the present working employees as employees, those who have
retired are not considered as employees. The court said, “In construing the
provisions of a statute it is essential for a court, in the first instance, to give
effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear
enough.
Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnatli Singh, 14 AIR 1954 SC 749
The Election Tribunal set aside the election of the appellant under section 123(7)
of Representation of the People Act, 1951 on the grounds that. the appellant had
employed more persons than prescribed for electioning purpose and that the
salary of this persons exceeded the maximum election expenditure permissible
under the law.
The contention of the appellant was that all those persons who had campaigned
for him in the election were in the· employment of his father and were thereby
receiving salaries from his father by virtue-of their employment.
As far as he was concerned, he had not made payments to; them exceeding the
permissible limit.
The Supreme Court, following the grammatical interpretation said that the
meaning of section 123 (7) of the Act of 1951 was quite clear and, therefore, as
far as these campaigners were concerned they were merely volunteers
campaigning· for the appellant
Ranjit Udeshi v. State 'Of Maharashtra
the appellant was convicted under Section 292, Indian Penal Code by the High
Court for selling an obscene book titled Lady Chatterley's Lover the sale of
which was banned by the Government of India. the appellant contended before
the Supreme Court that mens rea of the accused had always to :be proved to
maintain conviction under criminal. law.
Since the prosecution had failed to prove mens rea, that is to say, that the
appellant sold ·or kept for selling the obscene book with the knowledge that
the book was obscene, the conviction was unjustified.
He further argued :that there are such a large number 0f books these days in
bookstalls and their contents so different from each other that a book seller
cannot possibly know and is not expected to know the contents of each book and
cannot, therefore, be convicted. in the absence ,of a guilty mind.
The Supreme Court held that knowledge of obscenity was not an essential
element of the offence under Section 292, Indian Penal Code. The section is
plain and its meaning unambiguous. The Court must give natural meaning to the
words used in the section and on this count the contention of the appellant held
no water
Under noscitur a sociis, it was held that the bag could not have been within the
statutory definition, because parliament's intention in using ‘case or container’
was referring to something of the same strength as a canister.
Inland Revenue v Frere [1964]
The respondent sought to deduct the interest paid on a short term loan from his
income for the purposes of assessing his liability to pay tax. The Income Tax Act
of 1952 allowed "the amount of interest, annuities or other annual interest" to be
deducted from the income.
It was held that Under the noscitur a sociis rule, the mention of amount of interest
related only to annual interest as the other items related to annual payments. The
respondent's interest payment was not an annual interest payment and therefore
he could not deduct it from his income and he was required to pay tax on it.
In Commrs. v. Savoy Hotel, (1966) 2 All ER 299.
While dealing with the Purchase Tax Act, which used the expression ‘manufactured
beverages including fruit-juices and bottled waters and syrups etc.’, The
question was whether orange juice unsweetened and freshly prepared comes
within the description or not.
It was held that the description ‘fruit juices, as occurring therein should be
construed in the context of the preceding words and the orange juice
unsweetened and freshly prepared was not within the description
B. CASUS OMISSUS
In Hiradevi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur,
Section 71 of the U. P. Districts Boards Act, 1922, provided that a Board may dismiss
it secretary by special resolution which in certain cases required sanction of
Local Government, and Section 90 conferred a power to suspend the secretary
‘pending enquiry into his conduct or pending orders of any authority whose
action is necessary for his dismissal’. By U.P. Act 1 of 1933, Section 71 was
amended and the amended section provided that a resolution of dismissal was
not to take effect till the expiry of the period of appeal or till the decision of
appeal if it was so presented. No corresponding amendment was, however made
in Section 90 and it was held by the Supreme Court that a suspension resolved
under Section 90 to be operative till appeal against the dismissal was decided,
was ultra- vires the powers of the Board
C. EJUSDEM GENERIS
When particular words pertaining to a class, category are followed by
general words, the general words are construed as limited to the things of the
same kind as those specified. This rule which is known as the rule of ejusdem
generis.
Difference between Noscitur A Sociis and Ejusdem Generis Rule
In Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Harishanker, the Supreme Court has laid
down conditions that needs to be fulfilled for this rule of construction is used.
They are:
The statute contains an enumeration of specific words.
The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category.
The general terms follow the enumeration.
There is no indication of a different legislative intent.
In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the interpretation of Section 6 (4) (a) of the
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 which said: 'State Government may
requisition for the purpose of State or any other public purpose , was
involved. It was contended that under the provision the appellant was entitled to
requisition premises for housing a member of the foreign consulate.
The High Court held that the expression any other public purpose should be read
Ejusdem Generis with purpose of state, and providing accommodation to a
member of the foreign consulate being a purpose of the Union and not of the
State, the State Government had no authority to requisition.
Applying the rule of Ejusdem Generis the Court held that a painted white line on
a road could not be called a traffic sign because devices are things, which a
painted line on road I
In M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India, the
Supreme Court observed that the expressions 'bleaching, mercerizing, dyeing,
printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie
processing, which precede the expression 'or any other process' in Section 2
(f) (v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 contemplate processes which
import a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some
chemical into the fabric or otherwise. 'Any other process' in the section must
share one or the other of these incidents. s not.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCUSIO ALTERIUS
The express mention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another. Where
the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no scope for
applying the rule.
This maxim is also not used to extend the operation of a statute beyond the
operation of a statute beyond the provision that it actually makes, e.g. a law
enacted by Parliament for A, what is already a law for A and others, the new law
will not change the law for others.
GOLDEN RULE
The golden rule of statutory interpretation may be applied where an application
of the literal rule would lead to an absurdity. The courts may then apply a
secondary meaning.
The Golden rule is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge to
depart from a word’s normal meaning in order to avoid an absurd result.
It is a compromise between the literal rule and the mischief rule. Like the plain
meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning.
However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the
legislature’s intention, the judge can depart from this meaning.
Held:
The court applied the golden rule and held that the word 'marry' should be
interpreted as 'to go through a marriage ceremony'. The defendant's conviction
was upheld.
Re Sigsworth [1935] 1 Ch 98
A son murdered his mother. She had not made a will. Under the statute setting
the law on intestacy he was her sole issue and stood to inherit her entire estate.
The court applied the Golden rule holding that an application of the literal rule
would lead to a repugnant result. He was thus entitled to nothing.
An example of the same is S. 125 of the CrPC which deals with maintenance
given to women. The court while interpreting the term ‘wife’ included those
women who have entered into bigamy, talakshuda women and divorced
women. The court has stated that even though a woman may have relinquished
her rights on divorce, she may claim maintenance u/s 125 as she will she be
regarded as a ‘wife’ 10 years after such divorce.
Further, in the case of Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. Vs. Mrs.
Chandrima Das & Ors the courts interpreted that Article 21 shall be available
to non-citizens as well as citizens.
Lee v Knapp
The defendant committed a breach of section 77 (1) of the Road Traffic Act,
1960, which provides, so far as material, that if in any case owing to the
presence of a motor vehicle on a road an accident occurs whereby damage is
caused to a vehicle other than that motor vehicle, the driver of the motor
vehicle shall stop and then move away. The defendant commiteed an
accident, stopped his car and moved away. The golden rule of interpretation
is in case of accident, the person has to stop for reasonable period.
Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the
requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to
enable interested persons to make necessary inquires from him about the
accident at the spot of accident
Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore
The Supreme Court held that the expression “landless person” used in section 14
of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which made provision for grant of land to
landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A landless labour is he
who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural land. The Court further
said that “any landless person” did not include a landless businessman residing
in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which
aimed at distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in
agriculture. A businessman, though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act
Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P.
Sales Tax was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of “cooked
food” under section 3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm
engaged in the business of biscuit manufacture and sale. Whether biscuits
though intended for human consumption, can be construed as “cooked
food” and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the said
provision.
HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION
According to this rule, a statute should be read as a whole and one provision of
the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act
so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
The Courts should avoid “a head on clash”, between the different parts of an
enactment and conflict between the various provisions should be sought to be
harmonized. The normal presumption should be consistency and it should not be
assumed that what is given with one hand by the legislature is sought to be taken
away by the other. (CIT v Hindustan Bulk Carriers)
The High Court rejected the writ petition as well as the writ arising therefrom.
The parties then appealed by special leave to the Supreme Court.
The main contention of the appellants was that Section 17 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 is directory in nature and not mandatory.
A mandatory statute or statutory provision is one which must be followed
in order that the proceeding to which it relates may be valid.
A directory statute or provision is one which need not be complied with in
order that the proceeding to which it partakes may be valid.
It is not always easy to determine whether a particular statute is mandatory or
directory. Ordinarily the words ‘shall’ and ‘must’ are mandatory, and the
word ‘may’ is directory, although they are often used interchangeably in
legislation.
Section 17(1) states, ‘Every award shall within a period of thirty days from the
date of its receipt by the appropriate government be published in such manner
as the appropriate government thinks fit”.
The use of the word ‘shall’, the court observed, is a pointer to Section 17(1)
being mandatory in nature.
Section 17(2) states, ‘Award published under sub-section (1) shall be final and
shall not be called in question by any court in any manner whatsoever.
Section 17A, of the Industrial Disputes Act, provides that the award under
Section 17 becomes enforceable after thirty days of publication, though the
government may declare certain contingencies in which it may not be
enforceable.
Section 18 (1) provides that a settlement arrived at by agreement between
the employer and the workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation
proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
The court read Section 17 and Section 17A together and declared that the
intention behind Section 17 is that the duty cast on the government to publish
the award is mandatory and not directory. And hence, the contention of the
appellants did not hold good.
Though the Supreme Court maintained that Section 17 (1) is mandatory, and
ordinarily the government has to publish an award sent to it by the
tribunal, in special circumstances of the case and with a view to avoid a
conflict between a settlement binding under Section 18 (1), it held that the
only solution is to withhold the publication of the award as this would not in any
way affect the mandatory provision of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.
Raj Krushna Bose vs Binod Khanungo & others.
Two provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951, which were in apparent
conflict, were brought forth in this case. Section 33 (2) says that a Government
Servant can nominate or second a candidate in election but Section 123(8) says
that a Government Servant cannot assist any candidate in election except by
casting his vote.
The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions should be harmoniously
interpreted and held that a Government Servant was entitled to nominate or
second a candidate seeking election in State Legislative assembly. This
harmony can only be achieved if Section 123(8) is interpreted as giving the
govt. servant the right to vote as well as to nominate or second a candidate
and forbidding him to assist the candidate in any other manner.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP v Radha Krishna
Under section 46 (1) c of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958,
criminal prosecution of the respondent partners was sanctioned in this case by
the Commissioner when even after repeated demands the assesse did not pay the
sales tax. The respondent challenged this provision on the ground that there
were two separate provisions under the Act, namely, section 22 (4 – A) and
section 46 (1) c under which two different procedures were prescribed to realize
the amount due but there was no provision of law which could tell that which
provision should be applied in which case.
According to the Supreme Court, the provision prescribed u/s 46 (1) c was more
drastic. It was held that by harmonious construction of these two provisions, the
conclusion drawn is that the Commissioner had a judicial discretion to decide as
to which procedure to be followed in which case. Whenever the Commissioner
will fail to act judicially, the court will have the right to intervene. However, in
this case, the Commissioner had correctly decided that the more drastic
procedure under section 46 (1) c deserved to be followed because of the failure
of the assesse firm in paying sales tax despite the repeated demands by the sales
tax officer.
PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION
To understand the meaning of words in a statute, Courts have to understand the
statute's intent.
The purpose of an Act, i.e. why it was enacted and how it came to be, is not
just a relevant factor in deciding how to give effect to a statute's words, but
is essential to determining its meaning.
Purposive approach to statutory interpretation involved the consideration of
three factors:
the language of the provision;
the context in which the language is used; and
the purpose of the legislation or statutory scheme in which the language is
found.
While the "ordinary meaning" of words still plays a fundamental role in the
judicial interpretation of statutes, Legislative intent will inevitably inform the
Courts' method when analyzing the meaning of statutory provisions.
The purposive approach not just look to see what gap might have existed in
the law previously, but the judges are attempting to identify what they believe
Parliament meant to achieve.
The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the
true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous
material that bears upon the background against which the legislation was
enacted.” (Pepper v Hart)
Rather than participate in the mediation process set out in the Insurance Act, the
insurer started an application in the Ontario Superior Court for a preliminary
determination of issues.
In effect, the insurer's argument was: (i) the dispute resolution process under
section 279 of the Insurance Act could only be triggered "in respect of any
insured person's entitlement to statutory accident benefits"; (ii) to qualify as
an "insured person" under the Schedule, the claimant must have been involved
in an accident; and (iii) the preliminary issue of whether a claimant was
involved in an "accident" and therefore qualified as an "insured person"
under the Schedule had to be determined by the Court first, before the
alternative mediation scheme under section 279 of the Insurance Act applied.
The Superior Court rejected the insurer's argument. The Court, according to
purposive construction, held that the mediation process under the Insurance
Act covered all disputes relating to SABS, including the preliminary question of
whether the claimant was involved in an accident and qualified as an insured
person under the Schedule
Pickstone v Freemans plc
Here, women warehouse operatives were paid the same as male warehouse
operatives. However, Miss Pickstone claimed that the work of the warehouse
operatives was of equal value to that done by male warehouse checkers who
were paid £1.22 per week more than they were. The employers argued that a
woman warehouse operative was employed on like work to the male warehouse
operatives, so she could not bring a claim under section 1(2) (c) of the 1970
statute for work of equal value. This was a literal interpretation of the 1970
statute.
The House of Lords decided that the literal approach would have left the United
Kingdom in breach of its treaty obligations to give effect to an EU directive. It
therefore used the purposive approach and stated that Miss Pickstone was
entitled to claim on the basis of work of equal value even though there was a
male employee doing the same work as her.
Smith v. Hughes
The question arose whether a women soliciting men from inside a building,
committed an offence.
Lord Parker C.J found the text unclear so he looked at the purpose of the
legislation and said “everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up
the street, to enable people to walk along streets without being molested or
solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way it can matter little whether
the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a
balcony, or at a window or whether the window is shut or open.
If the literal meaning of the act was followed the outcome would have been
different and the women would not have been guilty, so this proves that the
purposive approach is much more superior and flexible than the literal rule.
In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. Court while reiterating that courts
will have to follow the rule of literal construction, held that there is an exception
to that rule. This Court observed:
“That exception comes into play when application of literal construction of the
words in the statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown
that the legal context in which the words are used or by reading the statute as a
whole, it requires a different meaning.
Justice G.P. Singh extracts four conditions that should be present to justify
departure from the plain words of the Statute, in his treatise "Principles of
Statutory Interpretation" from the decision of the House of Lords in Stock v.
Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.:
A court would only be justified in departing from the plain words of the statute
when it is satisfied that
(1) there is clear and gross balance of anomaly;
(2) Parliament could not have envisaged such anomaly;
(3) the anomaly can be obviated without detriment to such a legislative
objective; and
(4) the language of the statute is susceptible of the modification required to
obviate the anomaly.”
MISCHIEF RULE
The mischief rule is one of the most firmly established rule for construing an
obscure enactment.
It is another rule of statutory interpretation traditionally applied by English
courts.
The rule was first laid out in a 16th-century ruling of the Barons of the
Exchequer Court in Heydon’s case which have been continually cited with
approval and acted upon.
The main aim of the rule is to determine the “mischief and defect” that the
statute in question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively
implement this remedy.
In applying the Mischief Rule, the court is essentially asking what part of the
law, did the law not cover, but was meant to be rectified by the parliament
in passing the bill.
Mischief Rule laid by the Barons of the Exchequer in the Heydon's case
(Heydon 's case (1584) 3 Co R) as follows, namely- "That for the sure and true
interpretation of all statutes in general four things are to be discerned and
considered:
(1) What was the common law before the making of the Act?
(2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide?
(3) What remedy the Parliament have resolved and appointed to cure it
(4) The true reason of the remedy and the judges to always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy
Pyarali K. Tejani vs Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange
The appellant/petitioner, a dealer in scented supari, was charged with the offence
of having sold and retained for selling scented supari with saccharin and
cyclamate, prohibited artificial sweeteners, in contravention of S. 7(i)(ii) and
rule 47 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and thereby having
committed an offence punishable under section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act.
Court held that Supari is food within the meaning of S. 2(v) of the Act. The Act
defines 'food' very widely as covering any article used as food and every
component which enters into it and even flavoring matter and condiments. In
food offenses mischeif rule to be applied. Appellant will be liable
In the Bengal Immunity case, the mischief rule was applied to the construction
of Article 286 of the Constitution of India, observing that it was to cure the
mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of the inter-State
trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without
any provincial barrier that the Constitution makers adopted Article 286 in the
Constitution.
Smith v. Hughes
The defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon Street,
London, and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4,
1959, between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in
the street, for the purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39
Curzon Street. It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the
balcony was not ‘in a Street’ within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street
Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no offence had been committed.
“The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the appellant was
soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this
form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street
or public place for the purpose of prostitution’.
Considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act, Everybody knows that
this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along
the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in
that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street
or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, Hence she would be liable
Defendant was in charge of a bicycle whilst drunk. The defendant was accused
of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12
made it an offence to be ‘drunk while in charge on any highway . . of any
carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine’.
Held: The Act was to be read purposively. The mischief rule allowed the court to
hold that a carriage included a bicycle. A bicycle is a "carriage" the mischief was
drinking and driving at a high speed on the highway, while being in charge of
transport, amounts to be a mischief which needs to be surpressed.
BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION
Socio-economic legislation which is aimed at social or economic policy
changes, the interpretation should not be narrow.
Beneficial Construction is a tendency and not a rule. The reason is that this
principle is based on human tendency to be fair, accommodating, and just.
Instead of restricting the people from getting the benefit of the statute, Court
tends to include as many classes as it can while remaining faithful to the
wordings of the statute.
In the case of Sant Ram v Rajinderlal, the Supreme Court said that welfare
legislation must be interpreted in a third World perspective favoring the weaker
and poor class. It has also been laid down in the case of labor legislation that
courts should not stick to grammatical constructions but also have regard to the
protective intendment of the legislation.