TEAM CODE – TC 83

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTEROS

IN THE MATTERS OF:

ANIMAL WELFARE BOARD OF WESTEROS AND OTHERS

V.

THE REPUBLIC OF WESTEROS

WRIT PETITION NOS. ___ /2016

CLUBBED WITH

WRIT PETITION NOS. ___/2016

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF WESTEROS

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVATIONS ................................................................................................... 2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... 3

Books ...................................................................................................................................... 3

Cases....................................................................................................................................... 3

Statues .................................................................................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................................................................................... i

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................ii

ISSUES RAISED..................................................................................................................... iv

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................. v

BODY OF ARGUMENTS ...................................................................................................... a

I. The Court HAs Requisite Jurisdiction to Hear This Petition .......................................... a

1.1. Power under Article 32 of the Constitution of India ............................................... a

1.2. The notification issued by the Ministry is violative of Article 14 ........................... c

II. The Ordinance Promulgated in Lannisport is Repugnant to the Prevention of Cruelty

Act, 1960 ................................................................................................................................ f

2.1. The legal formalities to promulgate the Ordinance were not complied .................. f

2.2. The Doctrine of Occupied Field is attracted in the present case ............................. h

2.3. The Ordinance is repugnant to the law made by the Union ..................................... i

III. Oont Dangal amounts to cruelty under Prevention of Cruelty Act, 1960 ....................... k

3.1. That the event causes unnecessary pain and suffering to Camels ........................... k

3.2. That camels are not performing animals under Section 21 ...................................... l

3.3. That it is the duty of the state and citizens to prevent cruelty ................................ m

PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. vi

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LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

1. A.I.R. All India Reporter

2. All Allahabad

3. Art. Article

4. Bom Bombay

5. Del Delhi

6. Ed. Edition

7. H.C High Court

8. Hon’ble Honourable

9. Inc. Incorporated

10. LR Law Review

11. Ltd. Limited

12. P. Page no.

13. Pvt. Private

14. §/§§ Section/Sections

15. SC Supreme Court

16. SCC Supreme Court Cases

17. US United States of America

18. V. Versus

19. Vol. Volume

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Edition) ................................................................................. 12

DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 3711, (8th Ed., Lexis
Nexis 2008) .......................................................................................................................... 10

CASES

Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 SCC 722 ...................................................................... 14

AK Roy v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 710 ......................................................................................... 19

Amarnath Ashram Trust Society v. Governor of UP, (1998) 1 SCC 591 ............................... 13

Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja and Ors., (2014) 7 SCC 547 ......................... 20

BP Singhal v. Union of India and Anr., (2010) 6 SCC 331..................................................... 13

Chief Secretary to the Govt., Petitioners Chennai Tamil Nadu and Others Etc. v. Animal
Welfare Board and Another, AIR 2016 SC 571................................................................... 18

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 ................................................ 10

DC Wadhwa and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors., 1987 SCR (1) 798 .................................... 16

Deep Chand v. State of UP, AIR 1959 SC 648 ....................................................................... 19

Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 ......................... 13

Direct Recruit Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCR 90 .................... 17

Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 8 SCC 505 .................................................... 17

Grand Kakatiya Sheraton Hotel and Towers Employees and Workers Union v. Srinivasa
Resorts Ltd. and Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 342............................................................................. 17

Himmatlal v. State of MP, AIR. I954 S.C. 403: (1954) S.C.R. 112 ........................................ 12

Indian Aluminium Comp. Limited v. The State of Kerala and Others, AIR 1969 Ker 561 .... 17

Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295 ................................................................... 12

Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 129 .................................................... 12

Laxmidhar Misra v. Rangalal and Ors., AIR 1950 PC 59 ....................................................... 16

Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, 1957 SCR 721 ..................................................................... 21

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Liversidge v. Anderson, 1941 3 All ER 338............................................................................ 16

M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 898 ............................................................. 19

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 ............................................................ 13

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 SCR (2) 621 ............................................................ 17

Mati Shah v. Chandra Kanta Sarkars, AIR 1947 Cal 1 ........................................................... 19

MC Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 ................................................................... 12

N.R. Nair and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors., MANU SC 0284 2001................................. 21

National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan Bhageria, (1988) Supp. SCC 82. .................... 19

Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1993 SC 1960 ........................................................... 12

R.N. Goyal v. Ashwani Kumar Gupta and Ors., 2004 (11) SCC 753 ..................................... 17

Ramachandra Mowa Lal v. State of UP, (1984) 2 SCR 348 ................................................... 17

Ratan Roy v. State of Bihar, AIR 1950 Pat 332 ...................................................................... 16

Ratan Roy v. State of Bihar, AIR 1950 Pat 332. ..................................................................... 16

RD Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 ............................. 13

Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, 1957 SCR 605 ................................................ 16

Shrilekha Vidyarathi v. State, (1991) 1 SCC 212 .................................................................... 13

SKG Sugar Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 1975 SCR (1) 312 ............................................... 16

State of Jammu and Kashmir v. MS Farooqi and Others, 1972 SCR (3) 881 ......................... 17

State of Orissa v. Mamta Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 ........................................................... 14

Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan, AIR 1941 FC 47 ...................................... 17

T Venkata Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1985 SCR (3) 509............................ 16

Thappar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 ................................................................ 12

Village Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh, AIR 1985 SC 1394. ................................................... 16

STATUES

The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, No. 59, Act of Parliament, 1960 ............... 10

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioners approach to the aid of The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India under Article 32
of the Constitution of India, 1950.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

I
BACKGROUND OF LANNISPORT
The Republic of Westeros, is a country in South of Essos. Lannisport in Westeros is known
for its unique culture and religious practices. The state is composed mainly of Lannisters,
who are wealthy, but are in minority in comparison to other population of Westeros. The
State is known for its grand cultural festival called ‘Harvest Feast’ which is celebrated in the
month of March every year. ‘Oont Dangal’ is a traditional event and a part of this festival.

II
OONT DANGAL
In Oont Dangal, the participants try to embrace the camels. Camels are bred specifically by
people of all the villages in Lannisport for the event and attended mainly by the Rajwadi
Camels. A Rajwadi Camel is like the head of all camels in a village and special rituals and
worships are performed for the camel on important days. A Rajwadi camel since ancient days
are trained to fight in battle, these are known for their agility and fierceness. After the event,
tamed weak camels are used for domestic activities and agriculture, while untameable strong
camels are used for mating. Thus, wild generation of camels are inherited to its next
generation, even though these camels are domesticated a very long time ago. Apart from the
traditional values attached to this event various scientific studies have proven that this is one
of the best way of breeding. Further, the studies have shown that calves born from the mating
of Rajwadi Camels and other female camels have higher immunity and less prone to diseases.

III
INITIAL PETITION BY ABW

The Animal Board of Westeros (ABW) filed a case in the Supreme Court of Westeros for an
outright ban on because of the cruelty to animals and threat to public safety involved. It was
claimed by the protestors that ‘Oont Dangal’ is promoted to camel taming it exploits the
camel’s natural nervousness as prey animals by deliberately placing them in a terrifying
situation. In 2010, the Supreme Court permitted the Lannisport government to allow ‘Oont
Dangal’ and directed the District Collectors to make sure that animals that participate in
‘Oont Dangal’ are registered to the Animal Welfare Board and in return the Board would
send its representatives to monitor over the event.
IV

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NOTIFICATION BY MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS

The Ministry of Environment and Forests issued a notification in 2011 that banned the use of
camels as performing animals, thereby banning the event. But the practice of Oont Dangal
continued to be held under the Lannisport Regulation of Oont Dangal Act, 2009. In 2014, the
Supreme Court struck down the State law passed by Lannisport government and banned Oont
Dangal altogether further stating that any violations would bring heavy penalties. The Court
also asked the Centre to amend its law on cruelty to animals to bring camels within its ambit.

V
ORDINANCE BY GOVERNOR OF LANNISPORT

This witnessed wide-spread protests by youths and youngsters across the state of Lannisport.
On January 2016, the Ministry of Environment and Forests through its official notification
permitted the continuation of the tradition under certain conditions, effectively ending the
ban. In addition to this, the Governor of Lannisport also promulgated a special ordinance.
The object and purpose of Ordinance was to protect camels in particular Rajwadi Camels. All
the formalities with respect ordinance was duly complied by the state of Lannisport

VI
PRESENT PETITION

Suspecting the arbitrary and sudden nature of the notification of Ministry of Environment and
Forests, the Animal Welfare Board of Westeros filed a petition in the Supreme Court of
Westeros challenging the constitutional validity of the notification and also challenging the
validity of ordinance promulgated by the Governor. On 16th January 2016, the House of
Lannisters, an NGO working for preservation of cultural rights of Lannisters, filed a separate
petition in the Supreme Court requesting the court to lift the ban immediately as it prevents
them from enjoying their cultural rights. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the contentions
raised & clubbed all petitions together for final oral hearings and arguments. The matter is
listed for final adjudication.

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ISSUES RAISED

-I-
WHETHER THIS COURT HAS THE REQUISITE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS PETITION

-II-
WHETHER THE ORDINANCE PROMULGATED IN LANNISPORT IS REPUGNANT TO THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY ACT, 1960

-III-

WHETHER OONT DANGAL AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY UNDER THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY

ACT, 1960

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

-I-
THAT THIS COURT HAS THE REQUISITE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS PETITION

It is submitted that this Hon’ble Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear the present
petition under the mandate of Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Firstly, the right under
Art. 32 is not subject to the exhaustion of local remedies. Secondly, this Hon'ble Court has a
constitutional duty to entertain the instant petition. Further, the petition is valid under Article
14 of the Constitution of India as the notification issued by the Ministry of Environment and
Forest was arbitrary and unreasonable.

-II-
WHETHER THE ORDINANCE PROMULGATED IN LANNISPORT IS REPUGNANT TO THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY ACT, 1960
It is submitted that the Ordinance promulgated in the State of Lannisport is not valid on
various grounds. Firstly, the Governor did not satisfy the requirement of ‘necessity’ as
contemplated by Article 213. Secondly, the requirement of Presidential assent appears to be
only an empty formality and there is nothing on record to show that the effect of the
Ordinance was brought to his notice. Thirdly, the Doctrine of Occupied Field and the
Doctrine of Repugnancy as present in Article 254 (2) completely applies in the present case.

-III-

WHETHER OONT DANGAL AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY UNDER THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY

ACT, 1960

It is submitted before this Court that the event of ‘Oont Dangal’ does not confirm to the
safeguards provided by the Prevention of Cruelty Act, 1960 and is violative to the same. The
assertion is supported through various arguments. Firstly, the event shall not be allowed as it
causes unnecessary pain and suffering to camels. Secondly, camels are not performing
animals under Section 22 of the Act. Thirdly, it is the duty of the State to protect the life of its
citizens, and thus the event shall not be allowed to be conducted.

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BODY OF ARGUMENTS

I. THE COURT HAS REQUISITE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS PETITION

The counsel on the behalf of the petitioner humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that the
petition before the court holds good and the court has requisite jurisdiction to entertain the
same. The above submission shall further be supported through a two-fold argument.

1.1. Power under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

The Writ Jurisdiction of Supreme Court can be invoked under Article 32 of the Constitution
for the violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Part – III of the Constitution.

The objective of Article 32 is the enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the

Constitution of India. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked in any
case of violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution of India, as
has been observed in the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India.1 The
constitution makers conferred on the Supreme Court the power to issue writs for the speedy
enforcement of fundamental rights and made the right to approach the Supreme Court for
such enforcement itself a fundamental right.2

In this case the, Central Government vide its notification of January 2016 published in the
Official Gazette permitting the continuation of the tradition under certain conditions,
effectively ending the ban. The notification so published was arbitrary in nature and against
the order of this Court which in 2014 held that there should be a complete ban of Oont
Dangal in the State of Lannisport. Thereby the action of the Central Government is erred by
the vice of arbitrariness and unreasonableness, by going against the rule of law established by
this Court in a previous matter pertaining to the validity of Oont Dangal. Therefore, there is
no reasonable nexus between the order passed by the Apex Court which sought to be
achieved and the object of the notification, i.e., to prevent the infliction of unnecessary pain
or suffering on animals.3

Issue of writ of mandamus to quash the notification of the Ministry of Environment and
Forestry and the special ordinance so promulgated by the Governor of State of Lannisport.

1
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
2
DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 3711, (8th Ed., Lexis Nexis 2008).
3
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, No. 59, Act of Parliament, 1960.

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A writ of mandamus (which means “we command” in Latin), or sometimes mandate, is the
name of one of the prerogative writs in the common law, and is “issued by a superior court to
compel a lower court or a government officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial
duties correctly” Mandamus lies to enforce a public duty in the performance of which the
petitioner has a sufficient legal interest.4

A writ of mandamus or remedy is pre-eminently a public law remedy and is not generally
available against private wrongs. It is used for enforcement of various rights of the public or
to compel the public statutory authorities to discharge their duties and to act within the
bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to
perform duties.5 Art. 32 guarantee to every person the right to move the Supreme Court
directly for enforcement of fundamental rights. It provides an inexpensive and expeditious
remedy. In Dr Ambedkar’s own wording

“…with regard to mandamus, Article 32 states that it may be issued where a

fundamental right is infringed by a statute. It may be a statutory order or an
executive order.”

1.1.1. The right under Art. 32 is not subject to the exhaustion of local remedies

The right to approach this Hon'ble Court in case of violation of fundamental rights is itself a
fundamental right enshrined in Article 32. In Prem Chand Garg, it was held that this right is
absolute and may not be impaired on any ground.6 Further, unlike in Article 226, the remedy
under Article 32 is a fundamental right and not merely a discretionary power of the Court.7
Moreover, this Hon’ble Court has on multiple occasions expressly rejected an argument that
called for exhaustion of local remedies.8 Therefore, it submitted that it is not open to this
Court to carve out exceptions when there are none in the text.

Consequently, if there is violation of Article 32 by this Court's rejection of the instant

petition; the petitioners will have absolutely no remedy for such violation of their
fundamental right. Hence, the Petitioner submits that a liberal approach should be adopted,
erring on the side of caution, in cases where the Court rejects a petition under Article 32.

4
Syndicate v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 460.
5
Binny Limited v. V. Sadasivan, 2005 AIR (SC) 3202.
6
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996.
7
Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1457; T. Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898.
8
Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295; Thappar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.

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1.1.2. This Court has a constitutional duty to entertain the instant petition

The Constitutional obligation of this Hon’ble Court as the guarantor of fundamental rights
has been interpreted broadly9 and as one that exists independent of any other remedy that
may be available.10 This is particularly true in cases of grave public importance, such as
environmental litigation where relief may not be denied on mere technical grounds.
Consequently, it is submitted that refusal to entertain the instant petition would be
inconsistent with the aforesaid obligation.11 Mandamus will not, however, be refused when
ordinary civil proceedings or administrative appeals or revision do not provide an equally
effective and convenient remedy.12

1.2. The notification issued by the Ministry is violative of Article 14

The notification issued on January 2016 is violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India
because in was unjust, sudden and arbitrary. The notification is also anti-judiciary, i.e., the
order passed by this Court, whereby, Oont-Dangal was banned has been overturned, due to
exclusion of camels from the ambit of performing animals. Such a step undertaken by the
Central Government undermines the credibility of the judiciary. Earlier, in 2011 the Ministry
of Environment and Forestry issued notification whereby camels where included under the
ambit of performing animals, thereby banning the event.13 And afterwards, the Supreme
Court on the pretext of this particular notification held that the event is banned and struck
down the law passed by the State of Lannisport. The particular notification of January 2016,
overturns the said order and thereby provides a scope for the event to be held against the
order passed, is violative of Article 14 on the following grounds:

1.2.1. The said notification is arbitrary

Arbitrary means in an “arbitrary” manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at the pleasure.

Without adequate determining principle; not founded in the nature of things; non-rational; not
done or acting according to reason or judgment. Ordinarily, “arbitrary” is synonymous with
bad faith or failure to exercise honest judgment and arbitrary act would be one performed
without adequate determination of principle.14

9
MC Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086.
10
Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1993 SC 1960; Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
11
Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 129; Thappar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
12
Himmatlal v. State of MP, AIR. I954 S.C. 403: (1954) S.C.R. 112.
13
Moot Proposition Para 6, RGNUL Intra Moot Court Competition, 2017.
14
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Edition).

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The Central Government through Ministry of Environment and Forestry has erred in issuing
the notification which overruns the order passed by the Supreme Court. The, State action, in
order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness, which is the crux of
Article 14 and basic to the rule of law.15 Absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of
the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by
rule of law, discretion when conferred upon the executive must be confined with the defined
limits.16

The Prevention of Cruelty Act, 1960 confers power under Section 22 (ii) to the Central
Government to specify as an animal which shall not be exhibited or trained as performing
animals through notification. The power so conferred has to be exercised bona fide and not
arbitrarily.17 The action was for appeasement of a particular section of the society through
which the ban on the event is lifted and culture prevails.

The rule inhibiting arbitrary action by Government flows directly from the doctrine of
equality embodied in Article 14.18 Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and
ensures fairness and equality of treatment.19 There should exist a fair play in decision making
process by the executive if the matter pertains to public duty. Because the object of the
notification was to permit the event but what kind of reasons where there by the executive
that they concluded that camels where not performing animals, negating the stance in the
notification of 2011.

All public power including constitutional power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or mala
fide. Where reasons are given, court may interfere if the reasons are found to be irrelevant.
However, when reasons are not given, court may interfere only where the exercise of power
is vitiated by self-denial on wrong appreciation of the full amplitude of the power is arbitrary,
discriminatory or mala fide.20

This Court has in particular hit hard on arbitrariness, in the case of State of Orissa v. Mamta
Mohanty held that;

15
Shrilekha Vidyarathi v. State, (1991) 1 SCC 212.
16
Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101.
17
Amarnath Ashram Trust Society v. Governor of UP, (1998) 1 SCC 591.
18
RD Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489.
19
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
20
BP Singhal v. Union of India and Anr., (2010) 6 SCC 331.

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“The rule of law inhibits arbitrary action and also makes it liable to be invalidated.
Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should not only be fair, legitimate
and above-board but should be without any affection or aversion. It should neither
be suggestive of discrimination nor even give an impression of bias, favouritism
and nepotism. If the procedure adopted by an authority offends the fundamental
fairness or established ethos or shocks the conscience, the order stands vitiated.
The decision-making process remains bad.21

Where there is arbitrariness in State action, whether it be of the Legislature or of the

executive or of an authority under the Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action
and strikes down such State action.22 The action of executive is prejudice to the earlier stance
of the said executive and to the order of this Court. Appeasement of a section of society so
that their cultural rights and tradition do prevail is not a principle which can be the basis of
state action. Here lies the defect which caused or initiated a chain of events which as of now,
the State Government has passed an ordinance to that effect. The root cause which prevents
the AWB from preventing camels from unnecessary pain and suffering can be pointed out
towards the State Action which is laden with arbitrariness.

1.2.2. The said notification is unreasonable

The action so undertaken by the Central Government through Ministry of Environment and
Forestry through issuance of notification in January, 2016 is not based upon any reasonable
ground. The respondents claim that the notification so issued is to permit the continuation of
the tradition under certain conditions, effectively ending the ban. Though this court through
its judgment in 2014 has effectively banned the event altogether, the notification provides a
scope for continuing the event. There is a gross violation of Article 14 which encompasses
that any State action should be bona fide, supported by reasonable grounds when the matter
pertains to public duty.

Hence, it is respectfully submitted that since there has been a violation of the
fundamental rights, the Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

21
State of Orissa v. Mamta Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436.
22
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 SCC 722.

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II. THE ORDINANCE PROMULGATED IN LANNISPORT IS REPUGNANT TO THE

PREVENTION OF CRUELTY ACT, 1960

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the special ordinance in the State of
Lannisport is repugnant to the Prevention of Cruelty Act, 2006. The special ordinance
occupies the field in which there is already a Central legislation in place, and its provisions
are such that makes it directly come in collision with the Central law. The special ordinance
is thus repugnant and should be struck down by this Court. Further, the legal formalities to
promulgate the Ordinance were not complied with by the Governor of Lannisport and thus it
cannot be said to be validly promulgated. The above assertions shall be supported through a
three-fold argument.

2.1.The legal formalities to promulgate the Ordinance were not complied

It is humbly submitted before this Court that the special ordinance as promulgated by the
Governor was not valid as the same was not necessary for promulgation which is a pre-
condition under Article 213. Further, in case Presidential assent is received on a piece of
legislation, the same would not necessarily deem the special ordinance to validly operate
while the Central legislation is in its direct conflict.

2.1.1. There was no necessity to promulgate the Ordinance

Chapter IV under Part VI of the Constitution of India contains a single constitutional

provision that relates to the “Legislative power of the Governor” under Article 213. The
marginal note to Article 213 describes it as a power of Governor to promulgate Ordinances
during recess.

The power conferred to the Governor is not free and is cramped by certain conditions that
keeps the enormous power under check. The discretion exercised by the Governor is called
upon to check its validity, the same would stand the scrutiny of the Court. The following are
the two primary conditions to validly promulgate an Ordinance under Article 213 (i) the
Ordinance can be promulgated only when the state legislature is not in session, and (ii) the
Governor shall satisfy itself as to its necessity in light of existing circumstances.

As stated, it is imperative that the promulgation of special ordinance be necessary in light of

circumstances surrounding its promulgation.

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A Government might falsely say that in its opinion the circumstances required the action
taken. The safeguard may be slender, but it is not nugatory because the Courts can always
enquire if mala fides have become apparent, and it might well be that a Government
unscrupulous enough to make an emergency an excuse for unjust action.

The Governor at the head of it, however constitutional, might even more hesitate, to give a
formal certificate implying honest examination of the circumstances and the formation of an
honest opinion.23 The slenderer the safeguard, the more rigorously must the Courts examine it
and apply it.24 Further, in the case of Ratan Roy v. State of Bihar25, Meredith CJ of the Court
held the following;

It must also be remembered that wherever a legislation uses the word “satisfied”, it
must mean reasonably satisfied. It cannot import an arbitrary or irrational state of
being satisfied. It is, therefore, quite obvious that if it is found on the very face of an
Ordinance that it is an irrational and an unreasonable piece of legislation, a Court
of law would certainly be entitled to hold that the legislation is invalid and
pronounce against its being enforceable.26

The Petitioners contend that the threat to public in consequence of the widespread protest in
the State of Lannisport had significantly curbed down on the issuance of the Ministry of
Environment and Forest notification in January 2016. The Ministry modified its earlier
notification and thus carved out an exception for the State of Lannisport. 27 Thus, the need of
the special ordinance was not at all necessary. The move was thus only to undermine the
authority of the Union and shall thus be struck down by this Court.

2.1.2. Presidential assent was an idle formality

It is submitted by the Petitioners that the assent of the President as contemplated by Article
254 (2) needs to be construed carefully. The State could not take aid from the provisions of
Article 254 (2) of the Constitution.

23
SKG Sugar Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 1975 SCR (1) 312; T Venkata Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, 1985 SCR (3) 509; Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, 1957 SCR 605; Ratan Roy v. State
of Bihar, AIR 1950 Pat 332.
24
Laxmidhar Misra v. Rangalal and Ors., AIR 1950 PC 59; DC Wadhwa and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors.,
1987 SCR (1) 798.
25
Ratan Roy v. State of Bihar, AIR 1950 Pat 332.
26
Liversidge v. Anderson, 1941 3 All ER 338.
27
Moot Proposition Para 10, RGNUL Intra Moot Court Competition, 2017.

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The mere assent of the President may not be adequate and the provision in question, being
directly in conflict with the Central Act, the same cannot be valid.28

This Court in the case of Grand Kakatiya Sheraton Hotel and Towers Employees and
Workers Union v. Srinivasa Resorts Ltd. and Ors. that;

Mechanical assent given by the President may be held to be an idle formality, as

there does not exist any evidence that the possible conflict had been brought to the
notice of the President before his assent was obtained.29

In the instant case, there is nothing apparently put forward by the State of Lannisport that
states that the President was given notice of the conflict that would arise on the
promulgation of the special ordinance.

2.2.The Doctrine of Occupied Field is attracted in the present case

This Court in the case of Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan has held the
following;

We cannot import the doctrine of incidental encroachment in favour of the

provinces, and refuse to import the doctrine of unoccupied field which is in favour
of the Centre. The two must go hand in hand. To allow Provincial Legislature to
encroach upon the exclusive Federal Field, even though in an indirect way, when
there is a Central legislation already occupying the field, would be to give the
former a free hand in nullifying Central Acts relating to matters in the Federal list.
Such a carte blanche could hardly have been contemplated.30

Doctrine of permissibility of incidental encroachment, shall be imported along with the other
allied doctrine also that such an encroachment is permissible only when the field is actually
unoccupied.31

In the instant case, the special ordinance was brought into effect to enable in the State of
Lannisport the conduct of the event of ‘Oont Dangal’.

28
Village Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh, AIR 1985 SC 1394.
29
Ramachandra Mowa Lal v. State of UP, (1984) 2 SCR 348; Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’
Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCR 90; R.N. Goyal v. Ashwani Kumar Gupta and Ors., 2004
(11) SCC 753; Grand Kakatiya Sheraton Hotel and Towers Employees and Workers Union v. Srinivasa
Resorts Ltd. and Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 342.
30
Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan, AIR 1941 FC 47; Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra,
(2004) 8 SCC 505; Indian Aluminium Comp. Limited v. The State of Kerala and Others, AIR 1969 Ker 561.
31
State of Jammu and Kashmir v. MS Farooqi and Others, 1972 SCR (3) 881; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, 1978 SCR (2) 621.

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The conduct of the event though cloaked with the guise of tradition and culture, would
essentially require exploiting the camel’s natural nervousness which is cruelty in terms of the
Prevention of Cruelty Act, 2006. The Prevention of Cruelty Act, 2006 thus already occupies
the field in which the special ordinance is being enacted.

2.3.The Ordinance is repugnant to the law made by the Union

It is the submission of the Petitioners that the special ordinance made by the Governor of
Lannisport is repugnant to the law made by the Union in this respect. The provisions of
Article 254 are attracted in this present case as the Union and the State Legislation are in
direct conflict with each other.

2.3.1. The special ordinance is in collision with the Central enactment

It is the submission of the Petitioners that the provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty Act,
2006 are being completely collided with on the promulgation of the special ordinance. The
principle on which the Central Act has been enacted is to avoid the sufferance of pain to
animals of all kinds and forms. On the promulgation of the special ordinance, these
provisions would undoubtedly be violated as the event principally involves “taming” of the
camels

While analysing the event of Jallikattu, the Court held in Chief Secretary to the Govt.,
Chennai Tamil Nadu and Others v. Animal Welfare Board and Another, held that;

“When we analyze both the enactments in juxtaposition, we find that when a bull is
“tamed” for the purpose of an event, the fundamental concept runs counter to the
welfare of the animal which is the basic foundation of the PCA Act. There is a
frontal collision and apparent inconsistency between the PCA Act and the 2009
Act.” 32

Thus, it is the stand of the Petitioners that there is an apparent and direct collision of the
special ordinance with the Central enactment, and though measures are desirable to settle the
inconsistency, there is absolutely no way for both to operate together. The special ordinance
shall thus be declared invalid.

32
Chief Secretary to the Govt., Petitioners Chennai Tamil Nadu and Others Etc. v. Animal Welfare Board and
Another, AIR 2016 SC 571.

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2.3.2. The test of repugnancy is satisfied

It is the submission of the Petitioners that there is repugnancy in the present case between the
law made by the Union and that made by the State. The best test of repugnancy is that if one
prevails, the other cannot prevail.33 The Supreme Court laid down the conditions which must
be satisfied before any repugnancy could arise, the said conditions are as follows34:-

(i) That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between Central Act and the State
Act.

(ii) That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable.

(iii) That the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such nature
as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is
reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other.

If the provisions of the two laws are such that both cannot be given effect to at the same time,
there is direct conflict between the provisions. There is a clear instance of such a repugnancy
when one law prohibits what the other requires to be done with respect to the same conduct.35
In A.K. Roy v. Union of India36 it was held that the legislative power is subject to the
limitations prescribed under the Constitution. So, if any law is passed by legislature which it
is not competent to be so passed, it is ineffective.

If there is repugnancy between the law made by the State and that made by Parliament with
respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, the law made by Parliament
shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the law made by the State shall, to the extent
of such repugnancy, be void.37

Hence, the Petitioners would humbly submit before this Hon’ble Court to declare
the said Ordinance as invalid and strike it down. The special ordinance encroaches
upon the field of the Union and expressly undermines its authority. The special
ordinance is neither validly promulgated, nor does it stand the test of repugnancy.

33
National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan Bhageria, (1988) Supp. SCC 82.
34
M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 898.
35
Mati Shah v. Chandra Kanta Sarkars, AIR 1947 Cal 1.
36
AK Roy v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 710.
37
Deep Chand v. State of UP, AIR 1959 SC 648.

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III. OONT DANGAL AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY UNDER PREVENTION OF CRUELTY ACT,

1960

It is contended by the counsel that the said festival violates Section 3, 11, 21, and 22 of the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 along with Article 21, Article 51A (g) and Article
51A (h) of the Indian Constitution. It causes unnecessary pain and suffering to camels and
exposes their natural prey instincts which causes mental trauma.

3.1.That the event causes unnecessary pain and suffering to Camels

It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that the festival of Oont Dangal causes
unnecessary pain and suffering to the camels under the preview of Section 11 (1) (a) which
prohibits beating, kicking, overriding and other forms of torture to cause unnecessary pain to
the animal.

3.1.1. Unnecessary pain

Section 11 (1)(a) espouses a duty to prevent the infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering,
meaning thereby, no right is conferred to inflict necessary/unnecessary pain or suffering on
the animals. Section 3 is a preventive provision casting no right on the organizers, but only
duties and obligations. Section 3, as already indicated, confers corresponding rights on the
animals as against the persons in-charge or care, as well as AWBI, to ensure their well-being
and be not inflicted with any unnecessary pain or suffering.38

It is a known fact that victims of accident, crime or disasters recover from their physical
injuries in certain time but mental injuries remain etched for decades, play havoc in day to
day life. Animals, irrespective of the fact whether they can express it or not, in this particular
case were seen going through the same shock and terror as a person goes into in a hostage
situation.39

Oont Dangal is a traditional event involving camels held in the state of Lannisport as a part of
‘Harvest Feast’.40 It is further stated that the festival exploits the camel’s natural nervousness
as prey animals by deliberately placing them in a terrifying situation in which they are forced
to run away from those they perceive as predators and the practice effectively involves
catching a terrified animal.41 By organizing Dangal, organisers are inflicting pain and
suffering on the camels, which they are legally obliged to prevent.
38
Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja and Ors., (2014) 7 SCC 547.
39
Ibid.
40
Moot Proposition Para 2, RGNUL Intra Moot Court Competition, 2017.
41
Moot Proposition Para 4, RGNUL Intra Moot Court Competition, 2017.

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3.1.2. Or otherwise

Section 11 (1)(a) uses the expressions ‘or otherwise’. The Hon’ble Court has held that the
expression “or otherwise” is not used as words of limitation and the legislature has intended
to cover all situations, where the animals are subjected to unnecessary pain or suffering. It
intends to cover other cases which may not come within the meaning of the preceding
clause.42

As stated earlier that this event causes mental trauma to the camels. Hence, it is covered
under the wide ambit of the clause under the expression ‘or otherwise’ which causes pain and
suffering to the camels.

3.2.That camels are not performing animals under Section 21

Section 11(1)(m)(ii) says, if any person, solely with a view to providing entertainment incites
any animal to fight, shall be punishable under the proviso to Section 11(1). In this festival,
camels are fought with for which they are incited solely to be entertainment of spectators.

It is further submitted to the Court that all animals are not anatomically designed to be
performing animals. Camels are recognised as draught animals. They are live-stock used for
farming and agriculture purposes, like ploughing, transportation etc. They are not designed to
fight but are prey animals who run away when they sense danger. It is submitted before the
Hon’ble Court that camels are not performing animals under Section 22 which prohibits their
training and exhibition.

In arguendo, even if we consider camels as performing animals, Rule 8 under Performing

Animals (Registration) Rules, 2001 talks about condition for registration of animal as
performing animal. Rule 8 (vii) specifically cautions that the owner shall train the animal as a
performing animal to perform an act in accordance with the animals’ natural instinct.

In consonance with the above, The Ministry of Environment and Forests issued a notification
in 2011 that banned the use of camels as performing animals, thereby banning the event.43
The reading of the Act as a whole clearly shows that implicit in Section 22 is the necessity for
the Government to come to the conclusion that if a notification under said section is issued
there would be unnecessary pain or suffering in the training or exhibition of the animals. The
existence of the said fact is a pre-condition to the issuance of the Notification.44

42
Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, 1957 SCR 721.
43
Moot Proposition Para 6, RGNUL Intra Moot Court Competition, 2017
44
N.R. Nair and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors., MANU SC 0284 2001.

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3.3.That it is the duty of the state and citizens to prevent cruelty

The Hon’ble Court in the case of Nagraj, held that the rights and freedoms guaranteed to the
animals under Sections 3 and 11 have to be read along with Article 51A (g)(h) of the
Constitution, which is the magna carta of animal rights.

It paid reliance on the guidelines of OIE, recognizes five internationally recognized freedoms
for animals, such as freedom from hunger, thirst and malnutrition, freedom from fear and
distress, freedom from physical and thermal discomfort, freedom from pain, injury and
disease, freedom to express normal patterns of behaviour. It was held that Section 3 and 11
are in consonance with these freedoms and hence, are like the rights guaranteed to the
citizens of this country under Part III of the Constitution of India. Hence, it becomes duty of
state to protect these rights.

Article 21 of the Constitution, while safeguarding the rights of humans, protects life and the
word “life” has been given an expanded definition and any disturbance from the basic
environment which includes all forms of life, including animal life, which are necessary for
human life, fall within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. Animals have also a
right against the human beings not to be tortured and against infliction of unnecessary pain or
suffering. Penalty for violation of those rights are insignificant, since laws are made by
humans.

Hence, it is the submission of the Petitioners that the Court adjudicate this activity
of ‘Oont Dangal’ as an event that inflicts unnecessary harm and suffering on
animals and is thus cruelty under the Prevention of Cruelty Act, 2006.

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the above premises, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased
to adjudicate and declare that:

1. That the impugned notification issued is invalid.

2. That the impugned ordinance is ultra vires to the Constitution.
3. That the stay order must be set aside;

and to pass such other orders and further orders as may be deemed necessary on the facts and
in the circumstances of the case.

For which act of kindness, the petitioner shall be in duty bound, ever pray.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

AT……………………................... FILED BY:- TC-83

DATED……………………………

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