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ULTIMATE FACTS: CRESTITA M.

GARCIA

1. She is a Filipino citizen and of legal age.

a. She is currently residing at Blk. 16 Lot 4, Juana 1, Brgy. San


Francisco, Biñan, Laguna, Philippines.

b. For purposes of this Complaint, she may be served with notices


and other court processes on the address of her counsel at No.
1517 J. Fajardo Street, Sampaloc, Manila City 1008.

2. Respondent (Rudex International Development Corporation) is a


domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business with principal
place of business at 1644 2nd Floor, BS Building Annex, Evangelista
St., Bangkal, Makati City 1200 where it may be served with summons
and other court processes.

3. Sometime in 2003, the complainant was offered a house and lot at St.
Raymond Homes, a subdivision developed by the respondent in Bo.
Calendola, San Pedro, Laguna. After much persuasion, the
complainant decided to buy the property at Blk. 5 Lot 16-A priced
at ₱520,000.00 on installment basis. On April 28, 2003, she
paid ₱10,000.00 as down payment and signed a Reservation
Agreement. She also made subsequent payments of ₱10,000.00 on
May 1, 2003; ₱10,000.00 on May 17, 2003; ₱9,600.00 and ₱10,000.00
on September 15 and 16, 2003, respectively; ₱20,000.00 on
December 9, 2003; another ₱20,000.00 on March 5, 2004 and also
₱20,000.00 on June 30, 2004; and ₱11, 224.00 on July 31, 2004
totaling to an amount of P120,824.00. With these payment,
complainant was able to fully pay the total cash required stated in the
reservation agreement.

4. However, notwithstanding her full payment of the equity


(downpayment), the respondent failed to construct her unit despite her
repeated demands to do so or in the alternative, to refund the amount
she paid. Worse, she learned that said unit was sold by respondent to
another person.

5. Thus, complainant, through counsel, sent a demand letter on June 30,


2007 to respondent reiterating her demand upon the latter to start
constructing her unit within thirty (30) days from receipt of said letter.
Unfortunately, no construction materialized despite such demand.

6. Complainant, through counsel, filed a complaint for specific


performance with damages against respondent. However, due to the
gross negligence of her counsel, said complaint was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna instead of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board resulting in the dismissal thereof on March
12, 2009 upon motion of the respondent on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

7. The Supreme Court held in the case of Callangan vs. People (G.R.
NO. 153414, June 27, 2006) that “the rule that the negligence of
counsel binds the client admits of exceptions, to wit:
(a) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law;

(b) when its application will result in outright deprivation


of the client’s liberty or property; or

(c) where the interests of justice so require.

8. In the instant case, the gross negligence of complainant’s counsel was


unmistakable when he filed the case before the RTC of San Pedro,
Laguna when he was clearly aware that respondent’s failure to
construct the aforementioned unit was “violative of [the Reservation
Agreement] and law, rules and regulations of the HLURB and other
allied laws” as he himself stated in the demand letter he sent to the
latter. It is clear therefore that complainant was, as the High Court held
in the aforecited case, “accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance
by a counsel who did not devote himself to the defense of her cause.
Such action definitely proved infidelity to and abandonment of
[complainant’s] cause.”

NOTES: The action had already prescribed.

Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Tan


G.R. Nos. 145156-57 July 29, 2005

Facts: Solid Homes, Inc., sold to the Spouses Uy a subdivision lot. The
Spouses Uy sold the same lot to herein respondents, the Spouses Tan.
When respondents visited their property a number of times, they discovered
that there was no infrastructure and utility systems for water, sewerage,
electricity and telephone, as announced in the approved plans and
advertisements of the subdivision. Worse, squatters occupy their lot and its
surrounding areas. In short, there has been no development at all.

Accordingly, in a letter dated December 18, 1995, respondents demanded


on petitioner to provide the needed utility systems and clear the area of
squatters and other obstructions by the end of January, 1996 to enable them
to start the construction of their house thereon.

Having received no reply from petitioner, respondents filed with the Field
Office of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)-NCR a
complaint for specific performance and damages therein praying, inter alia,
that petitioner be ordered to provide the needed facilities in the premises and
rid the same of squatters; or, in the alternative, for petitioner to replace
respondents' property with another lot in the same subdivision where there
are facilities and sans squatters. The HLURB rendered a decision against
Solid Homes.

Issue: WON respondents' right to bring the instant case against petitioner
has already prescribed

Held: NO. There can be no debate at all on the legal postulate that the
prescriptive period for bringing action for specific performance, as here,
prescribes in ten (10) years. This is so provided in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code. Article 1144 specifically provides that the 10-year period therein
referred to commences to run only from the time the right of action accrues.

When did the respondent’s cause of action accrue?


Here, it was only on December 18, 1995 when respondents made a written
demand upon petitioner to construct subdivision roads, put up utility facilities
and rid the premises of squatters, obligations which are unquestionably in
the nature of an obligation to do. And under Article 1169 of the Code, a
party who is under obligation to do something incurs delay only from the time
that the obligee demands, either judicially or extrajudicially, for the fulfillment
of the obligation.

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