GR No. L-20761 – July 27, 1966 Facts: Private Respondents husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a bus owned by La Mallorca,. Upon arrival at their destination, Private Respondents and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters away from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. He was followed by one of his daughter. While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. His daughter, who was waiting near the bus, was run over and killed. The lower court rendered judgment for the Private Respondents which was affirmed by the A, holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay P6,000.00 plus P400. La Mallorca contended that when the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage had terminated. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner’s contention is correct. Held: It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents. In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage. But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 2. La Mallorca vs Valentin De Jesus GR No. L-21486 – May 14, 1966 Facts: Lolita de Jesus, daughter of Respondent, was a passenger on a bus of La Mallorca & Pampanga Bus Co., when it met a head-on collision with a freight truck resulting to her death. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheels when its left front tire suddenly exploded. Petitioner claimed that the tire blow-out was fortuitous. Issue: Whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to the causative factors, would generate liability. Held: The inner tube of the left front tire, according to petitioner's own evidence and as found by the Court of Appeals was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel. This is a mechanical defect which was easily discoverable if there was a thorough check-up before the trip. The owner of the vehicle is therefore liable for the accident. It was not due to force majeure. Moreover, the bus was running fast. In this jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code. These articles have been applied by this Court in a number of cases, among them Necesito, etc. vs. Paras, et al., L-10605-06, June 30, 1958; Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328-29, Sept. 29, 1961; Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, L-18957, April 23, 1963.
3. M. Ruiz Highway Transit vs Court of Appeals
GR No. L-16086 – May 29, 1964 Facts: Private Respondent spouses, together with their daughter Victoria, were paying passengers in a bus of defendant transportation company driven by co-defendant Buena. While the bus was running, a rear tire exploded, blasting a hole in the very place where Victoria was standing in front of her mother. As a result, the child fell through the hole, and died that same morning from injuries sustained in the fall. The court of first instance dismissed the complaint on the ground that (1) the accident was not due to negligence of the carrier, but was an act of God; and (2) even if negligence was attributable to defendants, their liability had been discharged due to the execution of an affidavit of desistance made by the spouses on the day their daughter died. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not there existed a contract of carriage between the deceased child and petitioner transportation company Held: The alleged lack of a contract of carriage between the deceased child and petitioner transportation company, if true, is a complete defense against claimants' cause of action. However, the issue is now inarguable, it being partly factual, on which the appellate court made its finding. Respondents and the child were paying passengers in the bus; petitioners were duty bound to transport them, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons (Art. 1755, New Civil Code). Therein they failed. The child died because the floor of the bus gave way; this reinforces the presumption that petitioners had neglected to provide a safe conveyance (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). Evidence of the required extraordinary diligence was not introduced to rebut the presumption. On the contrary, the appellate court found that the bus was overcrowded and overspeeding, and the floor thereof was weak — persuasive indications of negligence; and reasoned out that the tire exploded due to one or a combination of the following: "The tire was not strong and safe; the air pressure was not properly checked; the load was heavy; the excessive speed of the bus must have overstrained the tire; and the high velocity generated heat in the tire which could have expanded the already compressed air therein."
4. Spouses Marcelo Landingin vs Pangasinan Transportation Co.
GR No. L-28014-15 – May 29, 1970 Facts: Plaintiffs, in these two cases, averred that their respective daughters were among the passengers in defendant’s bus on an excursion trip from Dagupan City to Baguio and back; that upon reaching an uphill point, the motor ceased to function and the bus slid back unchecked; that the daughters were thrown off the bus and killed. Defendants claim that the daughters after hearing a sound coming from the rear end of the bus, recklessly jumped resulting in their death. CFI found that the malfunction of the motor resulted from the breakage of the cross-joint; concluding that it was a fortuitous event. It absolved defendant from any liability for negligence. However, the court ordered the defendant to pay P6,500.00 and P3,500.00 respectively no in payment of liability because of any negligence but as an expression of sympathy and goodwill. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling out negligence on the part of the defendant. Held: In Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil. 660), this Court held that an accident caused by defects in the automobile is not a caso fortuito. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that "the passenger has neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier." It does not appear, however, that the carrier gave due regard for all the circumstances in connection with the said inspection. The bus in which the deceased were riding was heavily laden with passengers, and it would be traversing mountainous, circuitous and ascending roads. Thus the entire bus, including its mechanical parts, would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be under ordinary circumstances. The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and found to be in order would not exempt the carrier from liability unless it is shown that the particular circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered.
5. Inocencio Tugade vs Court of Appeals
GR No. L-47772 – August 31, 1978 Facts: Rodolfo was driving his owned by the Sta. Ines Corp. and assigned for use of its manager. At the intersection, Rodolfo was going to turn left but he stopped to wait for the left-turn signal and because a jeep in front of him was also at a stop. While in that position, his car was bumped from behind by the Taxi cab driven by Inocencio Tugade causing damage to the Rodolfo’s car, the repairs of which cost P778.10. Tugade was then charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. He pleaded not guilty and while admitting that the collision was caused by faulty brakes of his taxicab, sought to expeculate himself with an explanation that this fault could not and should not be traced to him. The court then found Inocencio Tugade guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with the provisions of Article 39 of the Revised, Penal Code, as amended, to indemnify the Sta. Ines Mining Corporation in the amount of P778.10 by way of actual damages; and to pay the costs. Issue: Whether or not a mishap caused by defective brakes could not be considered as fortuitous in character and thus caged for an acquittal of the driver if subsequently haled to court. Held: As far back as Lasam v. Smith, promulgated more than half a century ago, in 1924 to be exact, this Court has been committed to such a doctrine. Thus; "As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once apparent that this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which could not have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito." Lasam was cited with approval in the two subsequent cases of Son v. Cebu Autobus Co., and Necesito v. Paras.