Grigory K.

Olkhovikov
Inference as Doxastic
Heinrich Wansing Agency. Part I: The Basics
of Justification Stit Logic

Abstract. In this paper we consider logical inference as an activity that results in proofs
and hence produces knowledge. We suggest to merge the semantical analysis of delib-
eratively seeing-to-it-that from stit theory (Belnap et al. in Facing the future: agents and
choices in our indeterminist world, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001) and the
semantics of the epistemic logic with justification from (Artemov and Nogina in Journal
of Logic and Computation 15:1059–1073, 2005). The general idea is to understand proving
that A as seeing to it that a proof of A is (publicly) available. We introduce a semantics
of various notions of proving as an activity and present a number of valid principles that
relate the various notions of proving to each other and to notions of justified knowledge,
implicit knowledge, and possibility. We also point out and comment upon certain principles
our semantics fails to validate.
Keywords: Proofs as acts, Doxastic agency, Epistemic logic, Justification logic, dstit logic.

1. Introduction

It is generally agreed that the application of methods of proof is a reliable

way of attaining knowledge, and if it is assumed that knowledge implies
justified true belief, then applying methods of proof is a reliable way of
attaining justified true beliefs. Moreover, there is the distinction between
proofs as abstract objects and proofs as actions. In the proofs-as-programs
paradigm, proofs are seen as generic actions, i.e., as action types that may or
may not be executed by human or artificial provers. Often, however, proofs
and proving are also viewed as concrete actions. When, for example, it is said
that Kurt Gödel proved that a certain axiom system for classical first-order
logic is sound and complete with respect to the class of all first-order models,
then in the first place the idea is not that Gödel performed a generic action
(executed a certain program) but rather that he came up with a proof, that
he saw to it that a certain proof of the completeness theorem is available.
The understanding of inference as an activity can be traced back to
Gottlob Frege (cf. [30]) and is prominent in the proof-theoretic works of
Dag Prawitz, Per Martin-Löf, and Göran Sundholm, cf. [17,23,31]. We shall

Special Issue: General Proof Theory

Edited by Thomas Piecha and Peter Schroeder-Heister

Studia Logica
c
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-017-9779-z  Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

refer to actions that produce knowledge or belief as doxastic actions. In [19,

p. 134], the notion of doxastic agency is introduced as follows:

It seems that we do indeed exercise doxastic agency. We often, though

by no means always, form, maintain and revise our beliefs . . . through
conscious mental activity. This is the conscious activity of inquiry.
Inquiry is conscious cognition that is directed towards the goal of
making one’s mind up—forming some doxastic attitude—about some
factual question or subject-matter (whether p, say). . . . All going well,
inquiry concludes in an act of judging. This is a basic conscious act
of forming or maintaining a belief, in performing which the subject
achieves the aforementioned goal of inquiry.
In agreement with that conception, when we consider acts of proving, we
shall assume that proving is an activity of inquiry that results in an act of
judging as a conscious formation of a belief.
Note that the logical analysis of actions can take quite different forms,
for a survey see [25]. It may, for instance,
• be carried out by quantifying over actions (or, more generally, events) as
in Davidsonian event semantic [5] and later developments thereof;
• take the form of other first-order formalisms such as the situation calculus
[18,24], the event calculus [29], and the fluent calculus [32];
• be realized by expressing what is the case after a terminating execution
of a program, as in propositional dynamic logic, see [10];
• focus on the effects doxastic actions have on semantical models, as in
dynamic epistemic logic [6];
• proceed by avoiding quantification over actions and by employing modal
operators of concrete agency, as in stit theory, see [3].
In this paper we shall consider logical inference as a form of concrete
agency that results in proofs and hence produces knowledge.1 We shall de-

1
If proving is a source of knowledge, and knowledge, as is generally assumed, implies
truth, then an agent proves that A only if A is true. Note that in natural language ‘to
know’ is factive not only in the sense of entailing the truth of its complement but also
in the sense of presupposing the truth of its complement, as the verb ‘to know’ preserves
truth entailment under negation, see, for example, [7]. This may be seen as a pragmatic
property of ‘to know’; in any case it is not captured by the familiar Kripke semantics for
epistemic logic.
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

velop a semantics of ‘to prove’ as an action verb that merges (i) the seman-
tical analysis of deliberatively seeing-to-it-that from stit theory and (ii) the
semantics of Sergei Artemov and Elena Nogina’s [1] epistemic logic with
justification.2 The general idea is to understand proving that A as seeing
to it that a proof of A is (publicly) available. The paper focuses on a con-
ceptual analysis and on a number of conceptual distinctions the suggested
semantical framework allows one to draw. In Section 2 we will recapture the
required prerequisites, namely dstit logic (Section 2.1) and epistemic logic
with justification (Section 2.2). In Section 3, we shall introduce a semantics
of various notions of proving as an activity. In particular, we present a num-
ber of valid principles that relate the various notions of proving with each
other and with notions of justified knowledge, implicit knowledge, and possi-
bility. We also point out and comment upon certain principles our semantics
fails to validate. Finally, in Section 4 we will come back to the distinction
between proofs as abstract objects versus proofs as acts, and close with a
brief summary and an outlook.

2. Prerequisites

In order to keep this paper self-contained, we here present all the prerequis-
ites needed for our discussion of proving as a form of doxastic agency in
Section 3.

2.1. dstit Logic

The seeing-to-it-that (stit) theory of concrete agency is a theory that assumes
agents as acting in non-deterministic, branching time. The theory was devel-
oped by Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff, starting in the late 1980s (cf. [3]),
and subsequently Ming Xu made substantial formal contributions to it, see,
for example, [37]. In the meantime, stit theory has become a major para-
digm in the logic of action. Initially, Belnap and Perloff considered so-called
achievement-stit operators, the semantics of which separates the moment
of an agent’s choice from the moment at issue in the semantic evaluation
of agentive sentences. We shall here focus on the so-called dstit-operators
used to express that an agent deliberatively sees to it that something is
the case. The dstit-operators were introduced by Franz von Kutschera [13]

2
An interpretation of imagination ascriptions that merges the semantics of deliberat-
ively seeing-to-it-that with the neighbourhood semantics of classical modal logic is pre-
sented in [20, 35]. Other combinations of deliberatively seeing-to-it-that with various modal
operators can be found in bdi-stit logic [26–28], see also [33].
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

and, independently, John Horty [11]. In the more recent past, several other
kinds of stit-operators have been suggested and investigated, among them
Jan Broersen’s xstit-operators [4] that express seeing-to-it that something is
the case in the next moment of time, assuming branching time structures
for discrete time.
Syntax The dstit-operators are definable in terms of the so-called cstit-
operators (Chellas-stit-operators), an operator for historical necessity (also
known as the settled-true-operator), and negation. The language of dstit
logic extends the language of classical propositional logic, for instance in
the connectives ¬ (negation) and ∧ (conjunction). Disjunction, ∨, impli-
cation, →, the biconditional, ↔, and the zero-place connectives  and ⊥
are then introduced as usual. If j is any index from a finite set of agent
indices and p is any propositional variable from a countably infinite set V ar
of propositional variables, then the formulas of dstit logic are defined as
follows: A := p | ¬A | A ∧ A | [c]j A | A.
All agent indices are assumed to stand for corresponding pairwise distinct
agents from a set Ag of agents.3 A formula A is read as “A is settled true”,
and [c]j A is read as “agent j cstit-realizes A”. The expression [d]j A, which
is read as “agent j dstit-realizes A” or “agent j deliberatively sees to it that
A”, is defined as [c]j A ∧ ¬A, and ♦A (“it is possible that A”) is defined
as ¬¬A.
Since dstit-logic extends classical logic, an axiomatic system for it may
make use of any complete axiomatization of classical logic, for example the
one from [12].
Definition 2.1. The axiom system L for dstit logic consists of the following
axioms and rules:
A0 The axioms of classical propositional logic from [12]
A1 The standard S5-axioms for 
A2 The standard S5-axioms for [c]j and every agent index j
A3 A → [c]j A for every agent index j
A4 (♦[c]j1 A1 ∧ . . . ∧ ♦[c]jn An ) → ♦([c]j1 A1 ∧ . . . ∧ [c]jn An ),
provided that all the j1 , . . . , jn are pairwise distinct
R1  A together with  A → B implies B (modus ponens)
R2  A implies  A (necessitation).

3
For every j ∈ Ag we could write j for the agent index corresponding to j, but omitting
the bar will not give rise to any confusion.
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

Semantics A dstit model is a tuple M = T ree, ≤, Ag, Choice, V , where:

T ree is a non-empty set that may be thought of as a set of moments, and
Ag is a finite set of agents. The relation ≤ is a partial order on T ree such
that there is no backward-branching:4
∀m1 , m2 ∃m(m ≤ m1 & m ≤ m2 )
and
∀m1 , m2 , m((m1 ≤ m & m2 ≤ m) ⇒ (m1 ≤ m2 or m2 ≤ m1 )).
We refer to ≤ as the causal order of M. Maximal linearly ordered sets of
moments are called histories, and the set of all histories of M is referred
to as History. A history h is said to pass through a moment m iff m ∈ h,
and the set of all histories passing through m ∈ T ree is denoted by Hm .
Most importantly, Choice is a function mapping every agent-moment pair
(j, m) to a partition of Hm . Intuitively, the partition Choice(j, m) (often
written as Choicem j ) may be thought of as the choice cells of agent j at
moment m, the idea being that j cannot distinguish by her or his activity
at m between histories that belong to one and the same choice cell. The
histories in a choice cell from Choicemj are choice-equivalent for j at m. We
shall write Choicej (h) to denote the set H ∈ Choicem
m
j with h ∈ H. The
function Choice is required to satisfy two conditions. First, it is assumed that
there is no choice between undivided histories: (∀j ∈ Ag) ∀h∀h [(∃m (m <
m & m ∈ h ∩ h )) ⇒ Choicem m 
j (h) = Choicej (h )]. Second, the agents are
taken to be independent of each other in the following sense. If f is a function
m
defined on Ag such that ∀j ∈ Ag (f (j) ∈ Choicej ), then j∈Ag f (j) = ∅.
The idea is that independent agents cannot deprive independent agents from
choices. Moreover, formulas are evaluated as true or false at moment-history
pairs, i.e., M H(M) = {(m, h) | m ∈ T ree, h ∈ Hm } is the set of indices at
which formulas are evaluated. The valuation function V is thus a mapping
from V ar into 2M H(M) .

Definition 2.2. Let M = T ree, ≤, Ag, Choice, V  be a dstit model, and

let A be a formula in the above defined language. The notion “formula A
is true in M at moment-history pair (m, h)”, written as M, (m, h) |= A,
is inductively defined as follows, where “M, (m, h) |= A” is the classical
negation of “M, (m, h) |= A”:

4
For convenience, we often use ‘∀’, ‘∃’, ‘&’, ‘⇒’, and ‘⇔’ in the metalanguage to stand
for universal and particular quantification, and Boolean conjunction, implication, and bi-
implication, respectively.
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

M, (m, h) |= p iff (m, h) ∈ V (p), for every p ∈ V ar

M, (m, h) |= ¬A iff M, (m, h) |= A
M, (m, h) |= (A ∧ B) iff M, (m, h) |= A and M, (m, h) |= B
M, (m, h) |= A iff ∀h ∈ Hm (M, (m, h ) |= A)
M, (m, h) |= [c]j A iff ∀h ∈ Choicem 
j (h)(M, (m, h ) |= A).

Let M = T ree, ≤, Ag, Choice, V  be a dstit model, and let C be any class
of such models. A formula A is said to be true in M (written as M |= A) iff
M, (m, h) |= A for every (m, h) ∈ M H(M), and A is said to be valid with
respect to C (written as C |= A) iff M |= A for every M ∈ C. Let D be the
class of all dstit models.
Theorem 2.3. (Xu) For any formula A, L  A iff D |= A.
Thus the semantics of stit logic extends the traditional modal structure of
states (here named moments) related to one another by a binary accessibility
relation (in this case ≤) by a set of histories and uses the fan Hm of histories
passing through a given moment to represent, for any given sentence A,
a degree in which A’s truth (or falsity) at the given moment m depends
on the future events. Under this reading, a statement like ‘tomorrow there
is going to be a sea-battle’ is true at a given m only for those histories
h ∈ Hm which verify this prediction. In cases such as this one, the truth
value of a sentence, even though evaluated at a given moment-history pair,
depends rather on a history than on a moment. On the opposite end of this
dependence-on-a-future spectrum are statements that deal with ‘hard’ or
accomplished facts like ‘this lawn is green’. Statements of this kind, when
true at a given moment m, will remain true at m whatever happens later.
It is easy to see that statements of the form [d]j A occupy a middle position
between statements of hard facts and statements about future contingencies:
when they are true at a moment, they are true through all of the histories in
a given choice cell of j but not necessarily through other choice cells. Thus
statements like [d]j A behave in a way not unlike statements of accomplished
facts but only within a restricted sub-fan of Hm . It is this idea of agency as
restricted factuality, as something lying in between a hard fact and a mere
contingency, that constitutes a central idea of the stit approach to the logic
of actions.5

5
The idea to distinguish between states of affairs and entities by the degree of their
dependence on future events can also be given an ontological reading. An event is only
dependent on the future when it has not fully revealed itself yet, when it has not yet made it
into being. The lawn revealed itself as green, so future events can not undo this. Tomorrow’s
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

More precisely, let us define that a formula A is a factual truth at m

iff ∀h ∈ Hm (M, (m, h) |= A), which one can also write as M, m |= A. Of
course one can also speak about a formula being factually false at a moment
m; in this case, one would have ∀h ∈ Hm (M, (m, h) |= A), or, in a more
concise form, M, m |= ¬A. Adding all this together, one may say that a
formula A is factual in a dstit model M iff for arbitrary (m, h) ∈ M H(M)
M, (m, h) |= A ⇒ M, m |= A. If A is factual, it is also said to be moment-
determinate, cf. [2, p. 163].
Note that in view of the semantics of  in stit logic, the above condition
can be also given in the following form: M |= A → A. In much the same
way, for any j ∈ Ag one can define a formula A to be j-agentive in a dstit
model M iff for arbitrary (m, h) ∈ M H(M)
M, (m, h) |= A ⇒ ∀h ∈ Choicem 
j (h)(M, (m, h ) |= A),

or, in a more syntactic form: M |= A → [c]j A.

This is in agreement with the so-called stit paraphrase thesis from [3,
p. 7], according to which a sentence A is agentive for an agent j just in
case A can usefully be paraphrased as ‘j sees to it that A’. Note, however,
that under this reading all factual sentences are eo ipso j-agentive for any
j ∈ Ag. Therefore, in order to distinguish between the two kinds of sentences
more sharply, it is convenient to introduce one more notion. We will say
that a formula A is strictly j-agentive in a dstit model M iff for arbitrary
(m, h) ∈ M H(M) M, (m, h) |= A ⇒ (∀h ∈ Choicem 
j (h)(M, (m, h ) |=
A) & ∃h ∈ Hm (M, (m, h ) |= A)). Again, an alternative form of the same
condition is available: M |= A → [d]j A. It is evident that according to
these definitions every strictly agentive sentence will be agentive and non-
factual.

Footnote 5 continued
sea battle has not yet revealed itself at all, therefore, only future can tell us about its
status. And the agentive events described by statements like ‘Smith opens the door’ are
revealing themselves even though they have not quite revealed themselves yet. These are
events in the making, entities in statu nascendi. Unlike future sea battles, they are present
already in the world, but unlike green grass and wooden chairs, they are not a fact yet so
that one can only see their results (like the closed door) or notice their influence on the
world once they are finished. This philosophy is also very manifest in the independence
of agents restriction given above for dstit models: actions, even though present already at
a given moment m, can only lead to something tangible (e.g., influence choices of other
agents) once they have fully revealed themselves but not when they themselves are still in
the making.
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

The distinction between agentive and factual sentences in stit logic re-
flects the use of modalities available in the stit language for formaliz-
ing action descriptions as opposed to descriptions of more static matters
of fact. It is clear that one would prefer to formalize propositions like
‘Smith opens the door’ in such a way that for any dstit model M one gets
that
M |= Smith opens the door → [d]Smith Smith opens the door,

so that the proposition is represented by a strictly agentive formula.6 On

the other hand, statements like ‘2 + 2 = 4’ will be represented by factual
sentences.

2.2. Epistemic Logic with Justification

Syntax Within Sergei Artemov’s Logic of Proofs (LP) it is possible to express
the justification of a proposition by using proof polynomials, terms that
denote proofs. Since we are interested in proofs as doxastic actions, our
presentation follows Artemov and Nogina [1], where proof polynomials are
added to the language of a system of epistemic logic.

Definition 2.4. Proof polynomials are constructed from denumerably

many proof variables (x, y, z, . . .) and denumerably many proof constants
(a, b, c, . . .) by means of the binary operations + (sum) and · (application),
and the unary operation ! (proofchecker).

Let P V ar be the set of all proof variables and let P ol be the set of all proof
polynomials. The language of the Logic of Proofs can again be introduced as
extending the language of classical propositional logic in the connectives ¬
and ∧, the other connectives being defined as usual. If t ∈ P ol and p ∈ V ar,

6
It might seem that
M |= Smith opens the door → [d]Smith the door is open
is a better formalization of the agentive character of a door opening by Smith, whereas
our example seems to be somewhat pleonastic as to Smith’s presence in this whole situ-
ation. However, note that ‘[d]Smith the door is open’ is not quite precise as a presentation
of Smith’s actions; in fact, the latter expression might actually describe a situation where
Smith orders his butler Jones to open the door instead of opening the door himself. At the
same time ‘[d]Smith Smith opens the door’ can only be understood as describing an opening
of the the door by Smith and allows for no alternative readings.
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

the set of formulas of LP is defined as follows: A := p | ¬A | A ∧ A | t:A. A

formula t:A is to be read as “t is a justification for A”.
Definition 2.5. The standard axiomatization of LP consists of the follow-
ing axioms and rules:

LP0 The axioms of classical propositional logic from [12]

LP1 s:(A → B) → (t:A → (s · t):B)
LP2 t:A →!t:t:A
LP3 s:A → (s + t):A, t:A → (s + t):A
LP4 t:A → A
R1  A together with  A → B implies  B (modus ponens)
R3  c:A, if A is an axiom from LP0–LP4 and c is a proof constant.
The axioms LP1–LP4 can be motivated by epistemological considerations
related to the notion of justification. The application axiom LP1 is in line
with uncontentious assumptions underlying the familiar Gettier examples,
and the monotonicity axioms LP3 can be motivated by the no-defeater con-
dition for knowledge suggested by Lehrer and Paxon [14]. According to that
condition, justified true belief is knowledge if there is no defeater, no true
proposition that undermines the doxastic subject’s justification. In the con-
text of LP, a defeater of s:A would be a proof polynomial that undermines
the justification relation between s and A. The axioms LP3 express that
there are no such defeaters. The positive introspection axiom LP2 may be
read as saying that proofs (justifications) are checkable: if t is a proof of A,
then one can construct a justification of t:A, by applying the proofchecker
operation to t. The factivity axiom LP4 is problematic if one grants that
subjects can be justified in false beliefs. However, LP4 can be motivated with
the externalistic, causal theory of epistemic justification by Alvin Goldman
[9]. According to Goldman, a true belief that A is knowledge if the truth
of A has caused the belief that A. With the externalistic understanding of
justification, an expression t:A may also be given an epistemic reading as
“A is known for the reason t”.
Artemov and Nogina’s epistemic logic with justification adds a one-place
operator, K, of implicit knowledge to the language of LP. Its set of formulas
is thus defined as follows: A := p | ¬A | A ∧ A | t:A | KA.
Definition 2.6. The axiom system S4LP for epistemic logic with justifica-
tion consists of the following axioms and rules:
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

All axioms of LP
E1 K(A → B) → (KA → KB)
E2 KA → KKA
E3 KA → A
R1  A together with  A → B implies  B (modus ponens)
R4  A implies  KA
R5  c:A, if A is an axiom from LP0–LP4 or E1–E3,
and c is a proof constant
C1 t:A → KA.
Under the epistemic reading of t:A, the interaction axiom C1 is reminis-
cent of the idea that explicit knowledge implies implicit knowledge.7 Another
interaction axiom considered in [1] is C2: ¬t:A → K¬t:A. With the explicit
negative introspection axiom C2 one can prove the “decidability of evi-
dence”:  Kt:A ∨ K¬t:A. The addition of axiom C2 to S4LP results in
a proof system referred to as S4LPN. If CS = {c1 :A1 , c2 :A2 , . . .}, where
each Ai is an axiom of S4LP (S4LPN) and each ci is a proof constant, then
CS is said to be a constant specification, and S4LPCS (S4LPNCS ) is the sub-
system obtained from S4LP (S4LPN) by restricting the rule R5 to formulas
from CS. We consider the axiom C2 as an additional principle that may or
may not be added to the basic systems S4LPCS
Semantics. A model of epistemic logic with justification, or justification
model, is a structure M = W, R, Re , E, V , where W is a non-empty set of
states (possible worlds), R and Re are reflexive and transitive binary rela-
tions on W , and R ⊆ Re . The relation R is used to interpret the operator
K of implicit knowledge, Re is a binary “evidence accessibility relation” on
W , and E is a function that maps pairs consisting of a world and a proof
term t to sets of formulas. Intuitively E maps a pair (u, t) to the formulas for
which t is admissible evidence at world u. The valuation V is an arbitrary
mapping from propositional variables to subsets of W .

7
The logic of general awareness introduced by Fagin and Halpern in [8] is guided by
the idea that explicit belief is implicit belief plus the agent’s awareness of the proposition
in question, and their semantics of explicit belief imposes a syntactic awareness filter on
implicit belief. Although the notion of awareness is, in general, clearly to be distinguished
from the concept of justification, Fagin and Halpern [8, p. 41] emphasize that “[t]he notion
of awareness . . . in this approach is open to a number of interpretations”, including an
interpretation as the agent’s capability to compute the truth value of a formula within a
certain time or space bound. Artemov and Nogina [1] consider formulas t:A as expressing
both justified and explicit knowledge that A, and their semantics for formulas of the form
t:A, too, imposes a syntactic filter on implicit knowledge, cf. Definition 2.7.
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

Moreover, for every model of epistemic logic with justification W, R, Re ,

E, V , Re and E satisfy the following constraints for all proof terms s and t,
for all formulas A and B, and for all u, v ∈ W :
Monotonicity: uRe v ⇒ E(u, t) ⊆ E(v, t)
Application: (A → B ∈ E(u, s) ∧ A ∈ E(u, t)) ⇒ B ∈ E(u, s · t)
Inspection: A ∈ E(u, t) ⇒ t:A ∈ E(u, !t)
Sum: E(u, s) ∪ E(u, t) ⊆ E(u, s + t).
Definition 2.7. Let M = W, R, Re , E, V . The notion “formula A is true
in M at world w ∈ W ”, written as M, w |= A, is inductively defined as
follows:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p), for every p ∈ V ar
M, w |= ¬A iff M, w |= A
M, w |= (A ∧ B) iff (M, w |= A and M, w |= B)
M, w |= KA iff for all u ∈ W , if wRu, then M, u |= A
M, w |= t:A iff (A ∈ E(w, t), and for all u ∈ W , if wRe u, then M, u |= A).
Let M = W, R, Re , E, V  be any justification model, and let C be any
class of such models. A formula A is said to be true in M (written as
M |= A) iff M, w |= A for every w ∈ W , and A is said to be valid with
respect to C (written as C |= A) iff M |= A for every M ∈ C. If CS is a
constant specification, then a model M meets CS iff for every c:A ∈ CS,
M |= c:A.
Since R ⊆ Re , it is clear that C1 is valid with respect to the class of all
justification models. To ensure that C2 is true in such a model, the rela-
tion Re must be symmetric. Let ACS be the class of all models of epistemic
logic with justification meeting constant specification CS, and let SCS be
the class of all models W, R, Re , E, v from ACS in which Re is symmet-
ric. Artemov and Nogina [1] proved that for all constant specifications CS,
S4LPCS (S4LPNCS ) is sound and complete with respect to ACS (SCS ).
Theorem 2.8. (Artemov and Nogina) For any constant specification CS and
any formula A, S4LPCS  A iff ACS |= A and S4LPNCS  A iff SCS |= A.
Note that the above semantics for formulas of the form t:A boils down
to considering a standard Hintikka-style epistemic operator plus a kind of
awareness condition handled by the E function, cf. Footnote 7. Therefore, in
this setting the relation Re functions as an epistemic accessibility relation
picking all the worlds that are relevant for the evaluation of t as justification
of A. The relation R functions virtually in the same capacity and actually
one can show that identifying R with Re does not change the logic in the
sense that the set of all formulas valid in the class of models satisfying
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

R = Re is still just the set of S4LP theorems. However, a somewhat more

general semantics requiring just R ⊆ Re is normally preferred. Therefore,
the principal division between KA and t:A appears to be not so much the
difference between R and Re but the awareness condition which is required
for t:A but not for KA. This amounts to the difference between explicit
and implicit notions of knowledge, a dichotomy which lies at the core of the
S4LP approach to the representation of epistemic attitudes.

3. Seeing to It That There is a Proof

Acts of proving can be undertaken in multiple different ways which involve

all sorts of non-trivial phenomena arising with respect to any process of
information interaction which may not be perfectly transparent to everyone
involved and is distributed along various locales connected to one another via
less than perfect information channels. The importance of such phenomena
with respect to acts of proving is testified by numerous cases of independent
proofs of one and the same theorem as well as ongoing discussions as to who
can actually claim priority for this or that mathematical result.
However, within our framework, we omit these complications so as to
bring out the semantics of proving as doxastic agency and to discuss its char-
acteristics in a clear-cut, even though somewhat idealized, setting. There-
fore, the logic of proofs as doxastic actions which we are going to consider in
this paper will describe the proving activity of a finite community of agents
which handles proofs from a certain algebra of proofs by making them inter-
subjectively transparent within the community. As a typical example, one
may think of a group of researchers who work within one and the same
proof system and have a reliable system of sharing their findings, say by
immediately cc-ing them via an email system or just by putting them on a
sort of whiteboard in a conference room. We idealize this rather common
situation in two respects. First, we omit from this picture any non-public
proving activity by the agents, and, second, we assume that proofs, once
presented to the community, will forever remain publicly available. Or, to
put it as a slogan, ‘What gets on the whiteboard, stays on the whiteboard’.
We use stit logic as a generic description of agentive activity, hence our
models will extend the above-described notion of a dstit model. We will also
inherit from stit logic the idea that formulas need to be evaluated at moment-
history pairs. On the other hand, we would like to implant into dstit models
the complete machinery of S4LP. A straightforward way to do this would
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

be to identify the evaluation points of stit logic (that is to say, moment-

history pairs) with the worlds in justification models, and to simply impose
R, Re , and E with their attending structural limitations upon the given set
of moment-history pairs. However, one should heed the fact that S4LP will
be interpreted here as logic of statements about proofs and provability. Now
the facts that a given proof is a proof of a given proposition or that a given
proposition is provable certainly fall into the category of ‘hard facts’. They
are an accomplished part of objective reality which cannot be undone by any
future events. In the context of stit logic such propositions about entities
of that kind are normally presented by factual formulas which are true at a
given moment m no matter which of the histories passing through m turns
out to be the actual one. Therefore, the truth of such formulas will already
be determined at the level of moments rather than at moment-history pairs;
these formulas are moment-determinate. With all this in mind, we conjecture
that the right way to proceed would be to interpret the worlds of S4LP as
moments of dstit models, and not as moment-history pairs and consequently
to impose R, Re and E onto T ree rather than M H(M).
Even though relations between proofs and the sentences being proved are
part of the objective world and in this capacity cannot be either made up
or undone by agents, the agents still have power to present proofs to the
community, thus making the community aware of them. This means that at
every given moment our community of agents will be able to observe a total-
ity Act of presented proofs which will assume the functions of a whiteboard
or an email system in the above-mentioned examples of agent communities.
Given that agents may add new proofs to this totality, one has to make Act
dependent not only on the moment, but also on the history, so as to account
for the ‘proofs in the making’ that are being presented to the community
right now.
The set of proofs presented is actually the only new component necessary
to define models of our logic. If we take just one further step and identify
the algebra of proofs being presented by agents to their community with
the set P ol of justification logic, the above motivation yields the following
semantics. We define that a justification-stit model is a tuple M = T ree, ≤
, Ag, Choice, R, Re , E, Act, V , such that:
• T ree, ≤, Ag, Choice, V  is a dstit model;
• T ree, R, Re , E, V  is a justification model;
• Act is a function mapping M H(M) into 2P ol ;
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

• (Expansion of presented proofs).

m < m ⇒ ∀h ∈ Hm (Act(m , h) ⊆ Act(m, h));
 
• (No new proofs guaranteed). h∈Hm (Act(m, h)) ⊆ m <m,h∈Hm
(Act(m , h));
• (Presenting a new proof makes histories to divide).
∀m∀h, h ∈ Hm (∃m > m(m ∈ h ∩ h ) ⇒ (Act(m, h) = Act(m, h ))) ;

• (Future always matters). ≤ ⊆ R ⊆ Re ;

• (Presented proofs are epistemically transparent).
 
(∀m, m ∈ Tree)(Re (m, m ) ⇒ ( (Act(m, h)) ⊆ (Act(m , h ))).
h∈Hm h ∈Hm

The first four conditions in this series, in fact, just explicate what we have
informally stated in this section thus far, where the fourth condition states
the principle that everything getting onto the whiteboard stays on the white-
board. The other conditions might seem less obvious, so we briefly comment
on them. 
No new proofs guaranteed The fact that a proof is in h∈Hm (Act(m, h))
means that a proof is presented at all histories through a given moment.
In other words, the presence of that proof to the community is already an
accomplished fact. This can only happen if this proof was presented at an
earlier moment where its existence was dependent on the actions by some
agents in the community. Otherwise the only option would be that a new
proof which was not presented earlier springs into existence as a hard fact.
This possibility is ruled out by our restriction.
Presenting a new proof makes histories divide This restriction is just an
application of the principle behind the ‘no choice between undivided his-
tories’ restriction of dstit models. Since presenting new proofs is typically
due to activity by agents, the presentation of different proofs already con-
stitutes a choice by the presenting agents and thus enforces the branching
of histories.
Future always matters Those moments which are related to m by the
causal order ≤ are all the variants of the future for m. It is quite natural
that the possible future of a given state m is always relevant to what is
compatible with what is implicitly known in m and to weighing the evidence
in m, and this is exactly what this restriction says in addition to R ⊆ Re .
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

Presented proofs are epistemically transparent This conditions says that

the public availability of a proof is stable w.r.t. evidential alternatives of a
given moment.
We pause to note some connections between the above constraints on jus-
tification stit models. First, note that, within the above system of semantic
constraints, it is possible to deduce the following strengthening of the no
new proofs guaranteed constraint:
 
(Act(m, h)) = (Act(m , h)). (1)
h∈Hm m <m,h∈Hm

Indeed, one half of this is just the no new proofs guaranteed constraint, and
the other half can be shown as follows. Assume that m < m, h ∈ Hm and
that t ∈ P ol is such that t ∈ Act(m , h). Let h ∈ Hm be arbitrary. It is clear
that h is undivided from h at m , therefore, by presenting a new proof makes
histories
 divide constraint, we get that Act(m , h) = Act(m , h ). Hence t ∈
 
h ∈Hm (Act(m , h )). It follows then by the expansion of presented proofs
that also t ∈ h ∈Hm (Act(m, h )).
On the other hand, note that within the above system of semantic con-
straints, one can also equivalently replace the expansion of presented proofs
and no new proofs guaranteed conditions with (1). Indeed, the no new proofs
guaranteed constraint is just one half of (1). As for the expansion of pre-
sented proofs constraint, assume that m < m, h ∈ Hm and that t ∈ P ol is
such that t ∈ Act(m , h). Then:
 
t∈ (Act(m1 , g)) = (Act(m, g)) ⊆ Act(m, h).
m1 <m,g∈Hm g∈Hm

We now proceed to define the language of our logic. It will extend both
the language of dstit logic and the language of S4LP. The semantics of
stit formulas carries over from basic stit logic since justification-stit models
extend dstit models. The semantics for S4LP formulas carries over with the
following minor modifications:
M, (m, h) |= KA ⇔ (∀m ∈ T ree)((mRm & h ∈ Hm )
(2)
⇒ M, (m , h ) |= A)
M, (m, h) |= t:A ⇔ (A ∈ E(m, t) &
(3)
(∀m ∈ T ree)((mRe m & h ∈ Hm ) ⇒ M, (m , h ) |= A)),
where M is a justification-stit model and (m, h) ∈ M H(M).
The new components in the justification-stit language are certain modal-
ities representing the proving activity of agents. W.r.t. these modalities both
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

Agentive Factual
Explicit j proves A by t A has been proven by t
P rove(j, t, A) P roven(t, A)
Implicit j proves A A has been proven
P rove(j, A) P roven(A)

of the above-mentioned crucial dichotomies are relevant, so that one needs to

distinguish both acts of proving vs proofs resulting from these actions and
explicit vs implicit descriptions of acts of proving and their results. This
leads to a four-fold classification of modalities related to acts of proving,
which can be arranged as in the table above.
In each cell of this table we first give a typical (semi-)natural language
context and then a modality representing this context in justification stit
logic. Supplying these modalities with a compelling semantics, however, is a
separate problem which involves some non-trivial choices. We now proceed
to a discussion of a variety of major options which exist w.r.t. the semantics
of modalities for acts of proving.
We start with the implicit modalities. Consider P roven(A). The fact
that A has been proven means that there exists a proof of A; moreover this
proof must exist as an accomplished fact. This intuition is captured by the
following inductive clause:
M, (m, h) |= P roven(A) ⇔ (∃t ∈ P ol)(∀h ∈ Hm )(t ∈ Act(m, h )
& M, (m, h ) |= t:A). (4)
Note that a weaker definition such as e.g.
M, (m, h) |= P roven(A) ⇔ (∀h ∈ Hm )(∃t ∈ P ol)(t ∈ Act(m, h )
& M, (m, h ) |= t:A), (5)
would not be adequate, as it allows for a situation in which different proofs of
A are presented at m w.r.t. different histories through m, but none of these
proofs is presented w.r.t. all histories in Hm . Such a situation would mean
that none of the presented proofs is yet a hard fact; rather these proofs are,
at most, being presented right in the given moment m. But such a situation
is better described as ‘A is being proven’ rather than as ‘A has been proven’.
Turning to the agentive implicit modality, we find that our intuitions are
less clear cut. It seems more or less clear, however, that people are said
to prove things which were not proved before, so that proving something
implies at least a sort of novelty if not outright priority. Thus, when people
are asked who proved this or that theorem, they tend to name the person
who was first to prove it. Therefore, the fact that A has not been proven yet
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

is a negative condition for the truth of the assertion that someone proves
A.8 There is also a positive condition: proving A must ensure that a proof of
A is presented. One way of writing these conditions would be, for instance:
M, (m, h) |= P rove(j, A) ⇔ (∀h ∈ Choicem 
j (h))(∃t ∈ Act(m, h ))
(M, (m, h ) |= t:A)
& (∀s ∈ P ol)(∃h ∈ Hm )(M, (m, h ) |= s:A ⇒ s ∈
/ Act(m, h )).
(6)
The first of the conjuncts in the above clause corresponds to the positive
condition, the second to the negative one. Note the order of quantifiers in
the positive condition: it says that when proving A, an agent ensures that
some proof of A is presented; but this proof may look different depending
on how the future unfolds. In our opinion, this clause captures the creative
character of proving things which manifests itself in the situation that one
cannot typically predict what the final proof will look like before the proving
process is actually finished. The negative clause, on the other hand, says that
none of A’s proofs have yet become an accomplished fact. In this formulation
the matter seems to be simple enough; however, once we try to take a closer
look at the details, the complications begin. Note, for example, that our
clause ensures that no proof of A is established as an accomplished fact;
however it does not exclude a scenario where the process of proving A is an
accomplished fact. Indeed, consider the example in Figure 1.

8
One might feel that our condition of novelty is too restrictive, given the actual usage
of contexts like ‘j proves A’ in natural language. Indeed, it is common to say things like
‘Smith proves Gödel completeness theorem in his Logic 101 course’. However, this type
of situations is already excluded by our setting. Our community is engaged in finding out
new proofs rather then teaching them, and given that every proof, once presented to the
community, remains presented forever, any attempts at exposing known proofs would have
void results, since the state of Act, the community’s whiteboard, would remain unchanged.
Of course, one could still claim that even if the repetition of known proofs makes no sense
in our setting, the presentation of new proofs for already known propositions might well
have it. This latter point is legitimate; however, we also think that in cases of new proofs for
old truths the logical emphasis is naturally on the proof itself rather than the proposition
proved; that is to say, it is far more natural to describe situations of this type in explicit
mode. One does not normally say that Jerzy L  os [16] proved the compactness theorem
for first-order logic since by the time L  os presented his proof, this theorem was known
for some 20 years. The most common description would be something like ‘Los proved
the compactness theorem for first-order logic using the ultrafilter construction’. Thus the
discussions of novel proofs for known truths are better accounted for when dealing with the
semantics of an explicit agentive proving modality, and in fact, our clause for P rove(j, t, A)
takes these considerations into an account.
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

h h

t t
m
Act(m, h) Act(m, h )

Figure 1. Choice cells of agent j at moment m; (∀s ∈ P ol) E(m, s) =

{p}, Re = ≤, (∀m ∈ T ree) (m ≤ m & h ∈ Hm ) ⇒ M, (m, h ) |= p;
P rove(j, p) holds throughout Hm

Examples like this may (or may not) motivate us to consider strengthen-
ing the negative condition for P rove(j, A), say in the following form:
M, (m, h) |= P rove (j, A) ⇔ (∀h ∈ Choicem 
j (h))(∃t ∈ Act(m, h ))
(M, (m, h ) |= t:A) & (∃h ∈ Hm ) (7)
 
(∀s ∈ Act(m, h ))(M, (m, h ) |= s:A).
Here one requires that were it not for the actions of j, the proving agent, A
might not end up being proved. As this alternative and stricter version of an
implicit agentive proving modality also seems to us a legitimate reading of
it, we would like to keep it in our logic. We achieve this by using a somewhat
different notation so as to make it distinguishable from P rove(j, A), which
we interpret according to (6).
We now turn to the explicit proving modalities, beginning with
P roven(t, A). Again, the intuitions behind this factual version seem to be
simple enough: the presentation of t to the community must take place as
an accomplished fact, and further, t must constitute an acceptable proof of
A. These intuitions are then summed up in the following clause:
M, (m, h) |= P roven(t, A) ⇔ (∀h ∈ Hm )
(t ∈ Act(m, h ) & M, (m, h) |= t:A). (8)
With the agentive version of an explicit proving modality, matters are
less clear. When one asserts that j proves A by t, one would at least expect
that j presents t to the community and that t in fact proves A. This is a
positive condition. Then a negative condition would involve at least that t
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

was not presented earlier, for otherwise, given the perfect memory of the
community, j’s actions would have zero influence on the state of discussions
within the community. If we do not add any further conditions, we are left
then with the following definition:
M, (m, h) |= P rove(j, t, A) ⇔ (∀h ∈ Choicem 
j (h))(t ∈ Act(m, h )
(9)
& M, (m, h ) |= t:A) & (∃h ∈ Hm )(t ∈ Act(m, h )).
However, note that this reading of P rove(j, t, A), again, allows for a sit-
uation when (i) A is being proved (possibly by different proofs) throughout
the elements of Hm . Moreover, it even allows for a situation when (ii) A was
actually proved earlier by another proof so that j just announces another
proof of a known fact to the community. While in situations like (i) and (ii)
one can still say, in some sense, that j proves A with t, in other cases this
modality seems to be used in a narrower meaning. Again, one may want to
imply either (a) that A was not proved to the community earlier or (b) were
it not for the efforts of j to present t to the community, A might not have
been proven. Now, these stronger versions of the negative condition were
already discussed w.r.t. implicit agentive proving modalities so we can just
borrow the respective conjuncts from their definitions. This gives us two
further modalities:
M, (m, h) |= P rove (j, t, A) ⇔
(∀h ∈ Choicem  
j (h))(t ∈ Act(m, h ) & M, (m, h ) |= t:A)
& (∀s ∈ P ol)(∃h ∈ Hm )(M, (m, h ) |= s:A ⇒ s ∈
/ Act(m, h )),
(10)

M, (m, h) |= P rove (j, t, A) ⇔
(∀h ∈ Choicem  
j (h))(t ∈ Act(m, h ) & M, (m, h ) |= t:A) &
(∃h ∈ Hm )(∀s ∈ Act(m, h )(M, (m, h ) |= s:A). (11)
Let M = T ree, ≤, Ag, Choice, R, Re , E, Act, V  be any justification-stit
model, and let C be any class of such models. A formula A is said to be true
in M (written as M |= A) iff M, (m, h) |= A for every (m, h) ∈ M H(M),
and A is said to be valid with respect to C (written as C |= A) iff M |= A
for every M ∈ C.
A formula is said to be universally valid (or just valid) iff it is valid with
respect to the class of all justification-stit models.
We now proceed to discussing logical properties of various modalities
defined in our justification stit environment. First, we check that both
modalities for acts of proving and justification stit realizations of S4LP
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

modalities display the intended properties w.r.t. the distinction between fac-
tual and agentive propositions. The matter is summed up in the following
theorem:

Theorem 3.1. The following formulas are valid in any justification-stit

model for arbitrary justification-stit formula A, j ∈ Ag, t ∈ P ol and
π ∈ {P rove, P rove , P rove }:
P rove(j, A) → [c]j P rove(j, A);
P rove (j, A) → [d]j P rove (j, A);
π(j, t, A) → [d]j π(j, t, A);
P roven(A) → P roven(A);
P roven(t, A) → P roven(t, A);
t:A → t:A;
KA → KA;
P roven(A) → KP roven(A);
P roven(t, A) → KP roven(t, A).
However, the following formula is not universally valid:
P rove(j, A) → [d]j P rove(j, A).

Thus, one may observe that all of the above defined factual proving
modalities, as well as the justification stit realizations of modalities bor-
rowed from S4LP turn out to be factual, just as expected. As for agentive
proving modalities, these are seen to be mostly strictly agentive w.r.t. the
proving agent, with the notable exception of P rove(j, A), which is agentive
but not strictly agentive. The reason for this is the weakness of the negative
condition for P rove(j, A) which, as we have already shown, does not preclude
P rove(j, A) from being true throughout a given history fan Hm . Note how-
ever that this weakness does not destroy the property of strict agentiveness
in case of explicit modalities P rove(j, t, A) and P rove (j, t, A) even though
the latter uses the same negative condition as P rove(j, A), and the negative
condition for the former is even weaker. Such are the beneficial effects of
explicitly mentioning the proof polynomial involved in the situation: though
P rove(j, A) can still obtain throughout Hm together with P rove(j, t, A) or
P rove (j, t, A) being true at a given pair (m, h), even the weak negative con-
ditions associated with these explicit modalities are already strong enough
to enforce that even in this case, A will be proved by proofs different from
t in other histories running through m.
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

As we observed earlier, the difference between the S4LP modalities and

modalities for acts of proving is basically that the former treat objective
relations between proofs and the proved sentences, whereas the latter mea-
sure subjective awareness of the community w.r.t. these objective relations.
Therefore, since the semantics of modalities for acts involves this additional
awareness condition, it is natural to expect that implicit (explicit) proving
modalities will entail their implicit (explicit) S4LP counterparts. This is in
fact the case, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 3.2. The following formulas are valid in any justification-stit
model for arbitrary justification-stit formula A, j ∈ Ag, t ∈ P ol:
(P rove(j, A) ∨ P rove (j, A) ∨ P roven(A)) → KA;
(P rove(j, t, A) ∨ P rove (j, t, A) ∨ P rove (j, t, A) ∨ P roven(t, A)) → t:A.
A further metaphysical desideratum concerns the objects of proofs. Since
proofs in themselves are accomplished facts, one would like to see within the
confines of the class of entities w.r.t. which a proof is possible, all the hard
facts that already established themselves as a part of reality, but not the
ephemeral entities which are still in the process of becoming. Thus one would
like to be able to prove things about at least some results of the agents’
activity, but not (except for some special cases) about the activity itself.
For example, after an agent has constructed a number, and this number has
become an established entity, she would like to be able to prove that this
number has or does not have this or that property. However, if a number is
still being constructed, one would say that proofs are only possible w.r.t. its
constructed part. However, as we already said, in special cases one will be
able to say something about the processes as well. For example, when Smith
is trying to prove A and Jones has a proof that ¬A, Jones will be able
(at least in some sense) to prove that Smith’s attempt to prove A will fail.
Thus, it seems that proving failures can sometimes be substantiated by a
proof even before they are actually completed, although this is not the case
for successful acts of proving: at most, Jones will be able to show that a proof
t presented by Smith is a proof of A (say, by constructing a proofchecker).
However, even in this case, it remains for Jones to show that t was actually
presented by Smith, which is only possible after t has been presented to the
community and became an established hard fact, but certainly not before
the presentation of t by Smith is finished and is still described by a strictly
agentive proposition.
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

The above described ideas as to what can be a proper object of a proof

admit of a faithful and detailed enough representation within justification
stit logic. More precisely, the following theorem holds:

Theorem 3.3. (1) Assume that a formula A → [d]j A is universally valid

in justification stit logic for some j ∈ Ag. Then, for any t ∈ P ol,
the formula ¬t:A is also universally valid. This shows, inter alia,
that all of the formulas: ¬t:[d]j A, ¬t:P rove (j, A), ¬t:P rove(j, s, A),
¬t:P rove (j, s, A), ¬t:P rove (j, s, A) are universally valid for arbitrary
A, j ∈ Ag, and s, t ∈ P ol.
(2) The formula ¬t:P rove(j, A) is universally valid in justification stit logic
for arbitrary A, j ∈ Ag, t ∈ P ol.
(3) All formulas t:P roven(A), t:P roven(t, A), t:¬P rove(j, A), t:
¬P rove (j, A), t:¬P rove(j, s, A), t:¬P rove (j, s, A), t:¬P rove (j, s, A)
are satisfiable in justification logic for some A, j ∈ Ag, and s, t ∈ P ol.

Note that part one of this theorem is actually an easy corollary of the
above Theorem 3.1. Indeed, assume that a formula A → [d]j A is universally
valid for some j ∈ Ag. This means that A → ¬A is universally valid
by the definition of the dstit-operator. Assume then, that t:A is satisfied
in some model M at some (m, h) ∈ M H(M). We then get M, (m, h) |=
t:A, therefore, M, (m, h) |= A by Theorem 3. On the other hand, we
get M, (m, h) |= A by LP4 and further, M, (m, h) |= ¬A by validity of
A → ¬A. This gives us a contradiction, therefore t:A cannot be satisfied.
As for Theorem 3.3(2), it is less obvious and its proof is instructive enough
to at least sketch it here, for this proof provides a nice illustration of the
meaning and use of almost all semantical restrictions introduced above. We
have two cases to consider. In Case 1, we assume that m ∈ T ree is the
last moment w.r.t. ≤. This means that there is only one history h passing
through m. But then P rove(j, A) cannot be true at (m, h), and therefore,
by LP4, t:P rove(j, A) cannot hold at (m, h) as well. Indeed, if P rove(j, A)
holds at (m, h) then by the positive condition of P rove(j, A), there must
be an s ∈ P ol such that s ∈ Act(m, h) and s proves A. On the other
hand, by the negative condition for P rove(j, A), since s proves A, there
must be a history h passing through m such that s ∈ / Act(m, h). Since we
already assumed that s ∈ Act(m, h) and h is the only history passing through
m, this is a contradiction, showing that P rove(j, A) is false at (m, h). For
Case 2, we assume that m is not the last moment, that is to say, that
there is a moment m such that m < m . Choose an arbitrary history h
passing through m and assume that t:P rove(j, A) is true at (m, h). Since
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

histories are defined as maximal chains of moments, we may assume that all
histories passing through m are in Choicem j (h) — otherwise we can choose
another m . Since ≤ is subsumed by the evidence relation Re , we know that
P rove(j, A) must be true at (m , h ) for every h passing through m . Now,
by m < m we know that all histories passing through m are undivided at
m, therefore, since presenting new proofs makes histories divide, we know
that the sets Act(m, h ) coincide for all histories h passing through m . By
LP4 we know that P rove(j, A) is true at (m, h) so that in every Act(m, g)
for g in Choicem j (h) we must have a proof s of A present in Act(m, g). Now,
it is the case that all histories passing through m are in Choicem j (h) and
their sets of presented proofs coincide, therefore, we may assume that there
is a proof s of A which is present in Act(m, h ) for all h ∈ Hm . By expansion
of presented proofs, this means that s must be also present in Act(m , h )
for all h ∈ Hm . But, since s is a proof of A, this clearly denies the negative
condition for P rove(j, A) at (m , h ), therefore P rove(j, A) cannot hold at
any such moment-history pair, which gives us a contradiction.
Having shown that proving modalities display some very natural and
expected properties w.r.t. some philosophically meaningful distinctions, we
now turn to a brief characterization of the logical relations among these
modalities. The following theorem sums up entailment relations between
them:

Theorem 3.4. The following formulas are valid in any justification-stit

model for arbitrary justification-stit formula A, j ∈ Ag, t ∈ P ol:
(P rove(j, A) ∨ P rove (j, A)) → ¬P roven(A);
P rove (j, A) → P rove(j, A);
(P rove(j, t, A) ∨ P rove (j, t, A) ∨ P rove (j, t, A)) → ¬P roven(t, A);
P rove (j, t, A) → P rove (j, t, A);
P rove (j, t, A) → P rove(j, t, A);
P roven(t, A) → P roven(A);
P rove (j, t, A) → P rove(j, A);
P rove (j, t, A) → P rove (j, A);
P rove(j, t, A) → (P rove(j, A) ∨ P roven(A)).
However, the following formulas are not universally valid:
P rove(j, t, A) → P rove(j, A);
P rove(j, t, A) → P rove (j, A).
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

Admittedly, the seven above-defined proving modalities yield a relatively

rich system of logical interdependencies and notional distinctions. Whilst
this is just what is to be expected when dealing with such a complex phe-
nomenon as acts of proving, this also tends to complicate the system. One
way to make the relations between modalities for acts of proving more trans-
parent would be to look for definability relations among such modalities,
which would open the way to a reduction in their number. As it turns out,
at least three out of seven modalities turn out to be definable in terms of
the other four, which leaves us with exactly one modality for each cell of the
above table:
Theorem 3.5. The following formulas are valid in any justification-stit
model for arbitrary justification-stit formula A, j ∈ Ag, t ∈ P ol:
P rove (j, A) ↔ P rove(j, A) ∧ ♦¬P rove(j, A);
P rove (j, t, A) ↔ P rove(j, t, A) ∧ ¬P roven(A);
P rove (j, t, A) ↔ P rove (j, t, A) ∧ ♦¬P rove(j, A).
No other reductive definitions of this kind seem to be available; in particular,
the following formulas turn out to be not universally valid:9
P rove (j, t, A) ∧ ♦¬P rove (j, t, A) → P rove (j, t, A)
P rove (j, t, A) ∧ ♦¬P rove(j, t, A) → P rove (j, t, A).
Note that some parts of Theorem 6 can be obtained as immediate corollar-
ies of Theorem 7. This theorem, on the one hand, provides an illustration of
the expressive power of the notions from the set {P roven(t, A), P roven(A),
P rove(j, t, A), P rove(j, A)}, and on the other hand, given that no further
reductions seem to be possible, shows that none of the four major categories
of proving modalities as shown in the above table, is reducible to the other
three categories. This latter observation, however, only applies when prov-
ing modalities are compared to one another in a propositional setting. Had
we introduced quantifiers over P ol, the number of basic modalities would go
down to three, leaving out the category of implicit factual proving modali-
ties. It seems, however, that no further reductions would result even in this
case, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 3.6. The following conditionals hold for arbitrary justification-
stit model M, (m, h) ∈ M H(M) for arbitrary justification-stit formula A,
j ∈ Ag, t ∈ P ol:

9
But note that the inverse implications are in fact valid.
Inference as Doxastic Agency...

M, (m, h) |= P roven(A) ⇔ (∃t ∈ P ol)(M, (m, h) |= P roven(t, A));

(∃t ∈ P ol)(M, (m, h) |= P rove (j, t, A)) ⇒ M, (m, h) |= P rove(j, A)
(∃t ∈ P ol)(M, (m, h) |= P rove (j, t, A)) ⇒ M, (m, h) |= P rove (j, A)
However, the latter two conditionals cannot be reversed.

4. Conclusion

We started with the remark that often a distinction is drawn between proofs
as abstract objects and proofs as actions. The semantics of justification stit
logic does justice to both conceptions of proofs. There is first of all the set P ol
of proof polynomials. This set of proof terms demarcates a set of objectively
given poofs, and for every moment-history pair (m, h) from a justification-
stit model, the function Act provides a subset of P ol representing the set of
proofs that are available to Ag, the assumed scientific community. Moreover,
the semantics allows one to interpret various modalities for acts of proving
and to draw a distinction between agentive and factive ascriptions of proving
as an activity. In particular, we can express that an agent j proves A or
that j proves A by proof t, and we can semantically evaluate such agentive
sentences.
The suggested analysis of proving as doxastic activity may be seen as
affecting our understanding of what proof theory is about. Dag Prawitz [22,
p. 66] famously characterized general proof theory as “a study of proofs in
their own right where one is interested in general questions about the nature
and structure of proofs.” If, in addition, to proofs as objects we are interested
in proving as an activity, general proof theory also encompasses the study
of proofs not only as programs, but also as concrete doxastic actions. The
combination of stit theory and epistemic logic with justification opens a road
to such a study.
Various ramifications and refinements of the basic justification stit logic
of the present paper are possible and will be dealt with in Part II of this
paper [21]. The role of the proof variables in S4LP, S4LPCS , and therefore
also in justification stit logic, remains unclear to some extent. Whilst it is
clear that the proof constants stand for proofs, in S4LP and S4LPCS there
is no variable-binding operation that binds the proof variables, and there is
no assignment function that maps proof variables to proofs from a given,
moment-dependent domain of proofs. In Part II we shall consider what we
call E-notions that allow one to express that a certain proof t or some proof
of a formula A is presented to the assumed community. Moreover, we shall
 G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing

deal with evaluations of proof variables. We also briefly consider lambda-

abstraction in the language of proof polynomials.
An obvious task for future research is obtaining complete axiomatizations
for languages with modalities for acts of proving. Moreover, in addition to
proofs, one may also consider disproofs, understood as demonstrations of
falsity, where falsity may be seen as a separate concept on a par with the
notion of truth, cf. [15,34,36]. We leave such a generalization to future work
as well.

Acknowledgements. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for

her/his useful comments and Claudia Smart for correcting the English.
Also, we would like to acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG, project WA 936/11-1.

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G. K. Olkhovikov, H. Wansing
Department of Philosophy II
Ruhr University, Bochum
Universitätsstraße 150
44780 Bochum
Germany
grigory.olkhovikov@rub.de;
grigory.olkhovikov@gmail.com

H. Wansing
Heinrich.Wansing@rub.de

G. K. Olkhovikov
Department of Philosophy
Ural Federal University
19 Mira street
Ekaterinburg
Russia 620002