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Disomangcop vs.

Datumanong
FACTS
On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM). Four provinces
voted for inclusion in ARMM, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi. In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990.
The same devolved to the ARMM the power of the DPWH. Consequently, DO 119 entitled
"Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office." was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar
last May 20, 1999, which is in accordance with the E.O 124. It created a DPWH Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national
infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao del
Sur. On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new Engineering District in the first
district of Lanao del Sur was passed by Pres. Estrada entitled “An act establishing an
engineering district as the first district of Lanao Del Sur and appropriating funds
therefor”. On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734 was passed. The
province of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM through said law.
Disomangcop and Dimalotang sin their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and
Engineer II respectively of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del
Sur filed a petition questioning the constitutionality and validity of DO 119 and RA 8999
on the ground that they contravene the constitution and the organic acts of the ARMM.
Moreover they sought mainly the following relief: to prohibit respondent DPWH
Secretary from implementing D.O 119 and R.A 8999 and releasing funds for public work
projects intended for Lanao Del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH.

ISSUE

WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm

HELD

Yes, Republic Act 8999 never became an operative and was superseded or
repealed by Republic Act 9054. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054 which is
a later law. RA 9054, which is anchored on the 1987 Constitution advances the
constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARMM which covers
among others Lanao del Sur. However, RA 8999 ventures to re-establish the National
Government's jurisdiction over the infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999
is patently inconsistent with RA 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective of
devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy of the Constitution to grant
LGUs meaningful and authentic regional autonomy.

DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has


jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violate
of the provisions of EO 426 which implements the transfer of control and supervision of
the DPWH to the ARMM in line with RA 6734. The office created under DO 119 having
essentially the same powers with the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as
created under EO 426, is a duplication. The DO in effect takes back powers which have
been previously devolved under EO 426. RA 9054 however has repealed DO Department
Order 119.

Thus, R.A 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM
Organic Acts. It contravened true decentralization which is the essence of regional
autonomy. And, D.O were issued unconstitutional and were issued grave abuse of
discretion

Municipality of Sogod vs. Rosal


NATURE
Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

FACTS
- On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc,
formerly a barrio of the municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be composed of
the barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu, Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay
and their corresponding sitios.
- A boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc and the municipality
of Sogod with the latter claiming that the former exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios above-
mentioned but also over other ten (10) barrios allegedly belonging to Sogod.
- The Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617 directing the holding of a plebiscite to
determine whether the people in these barrios would like to remain with the municipality of Sogod or
with Bontoc. The plebiscite was conducted on August 1, 1952, and the results thereof show that more
votes were cast in favor of Sogod than those in favor of Bontoc.
- On April 4, 1959, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 519 recommending to the
President of the Philippines and/or to the Congress of the Philippines that Republic Act 522 be
amended so as to include in said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc, the following barrios claimed
by Sogod which are in the heart of Bontoc but not included in said law, namely: Baugo, Himakilo,
Esperanza, Hibagwan, Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o and Maoylab The Board also
recommended that a law be enacted annexing to the municipality of Sogod the following barrios which
are very near Sogod and are claimed by the latter but are included in the law creating Bontoc, namely:
Laogawan, Taa Tuburan, Sta. Cruz and Pangi he board further recommended that the boundary line
between the two municipalities be placed at Granada Creek.
- On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, then President of the Philippines, promulgated Executive
Order No. 368, which approved the recommendation of the provincial board of Leyte, and
reconstituted the barrios and sitios which shall compose the municipalities of Bontoc and Sogod. The
executive order also specified Granada Creek as the boundary line separating Bontoc and Sogod.
- However the President of the Philippines sent a telegram to the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte
suspending the implementation of EO 368.
- The Provincial Board of Southern Leyte passed Resolution No. 62 suspending the implementation
of Executive Order 368. The Board also created a committee to conduct the holding of a plebiscite in
the barrios and sitios affected by Executive Order 368 and to finally settle the boundary dispute.
- The municipality of Sogod filed two civil cases:
1. Certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the provincial board and provincial governor from taking
cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute between the two municipalities and to enjoin the
municipality of Bontoc from exercising territorial jurisdiction over the barrios allegedly belonging to
the municipality of Sogod.
2. For recovery of taxes with receivership against the municipality of Bontoc alleging that the
municipality of Bontoc, without any legal basis, exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios
enumerated in Republic Act No. 522 but also over ten (10) barrios belonging to the complainant
municipality of Sogod. The complaint prayed that the municipality of Bontoc be ordered to pay Sogod
one half of the total amount of taxes collected by the former from the inhabitants of the aforesaid
barrios during the period from 1950 to 1959.
- The trial court issued an order dismissing the two civil cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. MR denied.

ISSUE
WON the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the two cases for lack of jurisdiction.

HELD
NO. The law vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities on the provincial
board pursuant to Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code, which reads:

SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. ? How settled ? Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal
governments over places or barrios shall be decided by the province boards of the provinces in which
such municipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall
be duly heard. From the decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by the municipality
aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior (now the Office of the Executive Secretary), whose decision
shall be final. Where the places or barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different
provinces, the provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an agreement if possible,
but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior (Executive
Secretary), whose decision shall be final. (Municipality of Hinabangan v. Municipality of Wright, 107
Phil. 394).

Reasoning
It is clear from the aforestated legal provision that the authority to hear and resolve municipal
boundary disputes belongs to the provincial boards and not to the trial courts. The decisions of the
boards are then appealable to the Executive Secretary. Records in the instant case show that when
petitioner municipality filed the civil actions in 1970 before the trial court, the provincial board of
Southern Leyte had not yet conducted a plebiscite as ordered by the Executive Department in 1960
or rendered any order settling the dispute. Petitioner municipality should have elevated the matter of
delay to the then Secretary of Interior (now Executive Secretary) for action instead of bringing it to
the trial court. Although existing laws then vested on the provincial board the power to determine or
even alter municipal boundaries, the Secretary of Interior or the Executive Department for that
matter, was not precluded during that time from taking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of
the boundary dispute. In Pelaez v. Auditor General, No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569,
which applied Republic Act No. 2370, known as the Barrio Charter, We held that the power to fix
common boundaries in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities may also partake of an administrative nature that can be decided by the administrative
department, involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the laws creating
said municipalities.

DISPOSITION
The petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the respondent judge are AFFIRMED.
Griño vs. Commission on Elections
FACTS:

Griño and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in relation
to the May 11, 1992 election. Griño is a candidate for Governor of Iloilo where the sub-
province of Guimaras is located. LGC of 1991 took effect requiring the conversion of
existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and Guimaras is one such sub-
provinces, upon approval by majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The plebiscite
favored the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but petitioner questioned
the COMELEC that ballots should have contained spaces to allow voting for Gov, Vice
Gov and members of the Sanggunian of Iloilo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras.

HELD:
The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under the LGC
of 1991, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified
by the people in plebiscite, the President will appoint provincial officials. However, the
voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province so there was
need to undo what COMELEC has done in plebiscite. There ballots in Guimaras
should have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now considered
the case moot and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for the conversion
of Guimaras.

Ceniza vs. Commission on Elections


FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted
Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise
provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and
component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The
City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly
urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot
vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS
(Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB
51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting
being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that
political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51
and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu
is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716
registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu
would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza
also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise
aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly
urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the
provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law
which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and
therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy
of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated
that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation
of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional
requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary
of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a
new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective
in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came
into existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis
of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a
city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively
independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city
has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the
province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need
thecontinued support of the provincial government thus justifying
the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincialofficials in some
instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied
equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote
for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters
in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to
voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates
neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.
Samson vs. Aguirre
DOCTRINE
● Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union: “All presumptions are indulged in favor
of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must
prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.”

SUMMARY
● Samson failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality being enjoyed by RA 8535 an act creating the city of Novaliches

RELEVANT FACTS
● On February 23, 1998, FVR signed RA. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out
of 15 Barangays of Quezon City. Samson, an incumbent city councilor of the 1 st
district of WC assails the constitutionality of the said act
● He seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation of
RA 8535, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite, and the DBM from disbursing
funds for said plebiscite.
● Samson bases his petition on the following grounds
o 8535 failed to conform to criteria in the LGC, sections 7, 11(a), and
450(a), as to requirements of income, population, and land area; seat of
government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City,
respectively, and its implementing rules
o The law will in effect amend the constitution
● Samson asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area were
not presented to congress during the deliberations of RA 8535. He also points out
that there is no certification attesting to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon
City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in
terms of income, population, and land area
● In their comment, respondents thru the OSG said that Samson failed to
substantiate allegations with convincing proof. They claimed that Samson had
the burden of proof to overcome the legal presumption that congress considered
all the legal requirements under the LGC of 1991 in passing RA 8535. Further,
they claim the petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document supporting
Samson’s claim that the assailed act is unconstitutional.
● Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed thru
regular congressional processes

ISSUE
● W/N Samson was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity
accorded to RA 8535

RATIO DECIDENDI – Note the words in bold letters are what I think are the
important ratios

Issue Ratio

W/N Samson was able to NO


successfully overcome
1. His argument that no certifications attesting compliance
the presumption of
with sections 7, 11(a), and 450 (a) of the LGC were
validity accorded to RA
submitted to the public hearings held by the senate
8535 committee on local government is unfounded since the bill
originated in the House of Representatives.
2. Petitioner did not present any proof, but only
allegations, that no certifications were submitted to
the House committee on Local Government → cannot
be substituted for proof!
3. The presumption that the law passed by congress,
based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all
the requisites therefor.
4. In the public hearings held by the Senate Committee
on Local government were resource persons from
relevant government agencies (i.e. NSO, DBM, Bureau
of Local Government Finance, Land Management
Bureau, officials from QC)
a. The rep. from the Bureau of Local Gov. Finance
→ combined average income of 13 barangays for
1995 and 1996 is 26,952,128.26→ LGC
requirement is only 20 Million for the
immediately preceding two years!
b. NSO→ estimated population in the barangays
that would compose Novaliches is around
347,310 → IRR of LGC only requires 150,000!
c. No need to consider land area since under the
LGC, the proposed city must comply with
requirement as regards income and either
population OR land area
d. Note that Novaliches is now highly urbanized
e. Note that the representatives of these agencies
spoke under oath and in their official capacity
5. Samson failed to substantiate his claims that the
representatives present did not also submit written
certifications. He didn’t even bother to present a copy of
said petition if only to prove that it was without the written
certifications attached as required by law → presumption
that these requirements were met in the passage of the act!
6. Samson argues the act falied to specify the seat of
government of the proposed city of Novaliches as required
under section 11 (a) of the LGC → SC said this is not fatal
since under sec. 12 of the LGC, the City of Novaliches can
still establish a seat of government after its creation (the
government center – where government offices are to be
located – can act as the seat of government as well)
a. QC Mayor Mathay was actually present during the
deliberations of the Senate committee on Local
government, and made no mention of anything
concerning such adverse effects → the fact that he
didn’t raise an adverse issue is indicative of the non-
existence of such negative issues
7. The plebiscite to be held will obviously have the
opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on
the cityhood of Novaliches
8. No way the creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way
result in a prohibited amendment of the constitution → the
ordinance appended to the constitution merely apportions
the seats of the House Of Representatives. It doesn’t say
that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17
cities and municipalities

RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed

NOTES
It is settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by LGUs) enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality

Alvarez vs Guingona
City of Pasig vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays and converted into a separate one, the City
Council of Pasig passed and approved an ordinance, creating Barangay Karangalan
scheduling the plebiscite on the creation of said barangay on June 22, 1996. Upon
learning of the ordinance, the Municipality of Cainta filed a petition on June 19, 1996
to the Commission on Elections to suspend or cancel the scheduled plebiscite.
According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangay involve areas included
in the pending case before the RTC Antipolo Rizal, Br. 74 for settlement of boundary
dispute, hence the plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case
shall have been finally decided by the court.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued another ordinance,
creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March
15, 1997. Again the Municipality of Cainta filed another petition on March 12, 1997 to
suspend or cancel the plebiscite on the same ground as for the proposed creation of
Barangay Karangalan.

The COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held
in abeyance until the boundary dispute is settled because it presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided. The City of Pasig filed the petition (G.R. No.
125646) to the Supreme Court, arguing that there is no prejudicial question since the
same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both
cases are civil, as in the instant case.

In the case of Barangay Napico, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for being moot
because the plebiscite was already held and the creation ratified and approved by the
residents. Hence, the Municipality of Cainta filed a petition (G.R. No. 128663) to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute
between the two local governments.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the pending civil case on boundary dispute presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before the creation of the proposed barangays.
While the City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases
are civil, as in the instant case, still in the interest of good order, the Court can
suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely
interrelated or linked to the first.

The decision on whose territorial jurisdiction the areas fall has material bearing to the
creation of the proposed Barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is properly
identified territorial jurisdiction for these define the limits of the exercise of
the governmental powers of the LGU. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires
(beyond the legal capacity). Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding
of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same until
the resolution of the boundary dispute.

In the case of Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the petition of the
Municipality of Cainta has been rendered moot and academic because the plebiscite
was already held. The issues raised are still pending and must first be resolved.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in
abeyance; and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the creation of Barangay
Napico should be annulled and set aside, and any plebiscite thereto is hold in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute.
San Joaquin vs Silva
Tobias vs Abalos
Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment
of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three
provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill
provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of
congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district.
Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the
House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of
Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was
attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number
of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With
regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its
conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this
court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of
representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is
not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of
any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative
districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act
enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
9

Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya


SUMMARY: Kapalong moved to dismiss Sto. Tomas’ complaint for settlement of
boundary. Court held that dismissal was proper, since Sto. Tomas has no legal
personality and cannot be a party to any civil action. Presidents cannot create
municipalities, and Sto. Tomas here was created by Pres. Garcia.
FACTS:
− Pres. Garcia created the Municipality of Santo Tomas from portions of the
Municipality of Kapalong.
− Sto. Tomas now asserts jurisdiction over eight barrios of Kapalong. Sto. Tomas filed
a complaint against Kapalong for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute.
− From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created
Municipality of Sto.Tomas.
− Sto. Tomas now asserts jurisdiction over 8 barrios of Kapalong.
− For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of boundaries between the
two municipalities was brought, at the instance of the Mayor of Sto. Tomas, to the
Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and decide. However, no action was taken
on the same.
− The Municipality of Sto. Tomas eventually filed a complaint against the Municipality
of Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute.
− The Municipality of Kapalong filed a MTD on the ground of lack of legal personality
of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas.

ISSUE: Does Santo Tomas legally exist? NO.


− As ruled in the Pelaez case, the President has no power to create a municipality.
Since Santo Tomas has no legal personality, it cannot be a party to any civil action,
and as such, Judge Moya should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings
would be pointless. The Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.

DISPOSITION: Petitions dismissed for lack of merit.


Cawaling, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the
plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A.
No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of
Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."
The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted
the matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been
ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present
petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period
from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day
extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
conducting the plebiscite.

Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806


unconstitutional ,contending, in essence, that:

1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a)
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city"; and

2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of
Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby
violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.

Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may
be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging
two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon

(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26
(1), Article VI of the Constitution

(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous.
The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to
create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local government unit through
a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the
Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements
prescribed by the Code.

(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are
not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that
"the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may
not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical.”

3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate
and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the
logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the
three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's
acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the
Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the
fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds
for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that
petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
Mariano, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act
Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the


legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4)
requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years
following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the
1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is


unconstitutional

Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law,


such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As
thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing
its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase
in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be
made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province createdby Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not
in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting
that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of 250,000.

Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte vs. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte
AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes
between municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.
Facts: The Petitioner Municipality of Nueva Era seek to reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) to a certain extent that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,
Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
(SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute between the Municipalities of Marcos
and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong,
Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which
were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent
control of a chief. In the virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30,
1916 united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era. The Municipality
of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of
Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas
and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated
from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be
known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast,
by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan;
on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan
River which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and
Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of
Batac and Dingras.
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30
years,7 or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No.
93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an
Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in
the Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval.
In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era
was cut into two parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality
must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer
be considered as its territory but that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was
entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated
northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Niño, Nueva
Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993.
It alleged that since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of
the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the
land being claimed by Marcos must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved
as part of Nueva Era. Nueva Era claimed R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7)
barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should
not go beyond the territory of said barrios.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its
decision. R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise
Marcos, but none of Nueva Era's barangays were mentioned. The SP thus construed,
applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was
included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos.

Issues: Whether or not, CA erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that MARCOS
East is not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras. That it
has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys. Agunit
(Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing and
disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Niño, and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Niño, there lies Abra,
not Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.

Held: No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A.
No. 3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of
territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not
mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything
else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This
rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural
workings of the human mind. Legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to
become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation
or construction be extended to other matters. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned. Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered
by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said
explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. Where
there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory
note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute. Despite
the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter
still contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description
of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly
REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.
SO ORDERED.

Miranda vs. Aguirre


FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela,
into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the
people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA
No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of
Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act
merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a
plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing
of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question
over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed
by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was
the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together
with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their
right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by
the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing
to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.
Jimenez v. Baz (1996)
Mendoza J.

FACTS:
In 1949, pursuant to E.O. 258 of then President Quirino, the Municipality of
Sinacaban was created. Said order provided a technical description1 of Sinacaban’s
metes and bounds, according to which the Municipality would cut into the southern
portion of the Municipality of Jimenez.

• 1988: Pursuant to said technical description, Sinacaban laid with the Provincial
Board a claim to a portion of particular barrios. However, the Municipality of
Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. 258 the disputed area is part of
Sinacaban, asserted jurisdiction over the same areas on the basis of an
agreement it had entered into with the Sinacaban.
o Said agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77 which provided that barrios
Macabayao, Sitio Adorable and site as part of Jimenez.
• The Provincial Board declared the disputed area part of Sinacaban.
o HELD: The resolution approving the agreement between the
municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the
boundaries as fixed in E.O. 258.

Jimenez files a petitioner for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with the RTC.

• Following the Pelaez v. Auditor General doctrine, Jimenez contends that “the
power to create municipalities is essentially legislative, and consequently,

1
Technical Description: On the north by a line starting from point 1, the center of the lighthouse on the Tabo-o point S. 840
30’W., 7,250 meters to point 2 which is on the bank of Palilan River branch; thence following Palilan River branch 2,400 meters
southwesterly 'to point 3, thence a straight line S 870 00’ W, 22,550 meters to point 4, where this intersects the Misamis
Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; on the west, by the present Misamis Occidental- Zamboanga boundary; and on the south by
the present Jimenez-Tudela boundary; and on the east, by the limits of the municipal waters which the municipality of
Sinacaban shall have pursuant to section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code, (Description based on data shown in
Enlarged Map of Poblacion of Jimenez, Scale 1:8:000).
Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order, had no legal personality
and no right to assert a territorial claim.
• RTC ruled in Sinacban’s favor.
o That Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely
organized itself even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate
powers for forty years before the existence was questioned;
o That Jimenez did not have the legal standing to question the existence of
Sinacaban, the same being reversed to the State in quo warranto
proceedings;
o That Jimenez was estopped from questioning the legal existence of
Sinacaban after having entered into an agreement with it;
o That any question as to Sinacaban’s legal existence has been cured by
Sec 442(d) of the LGC, which provides: Municipalities existing as of the
date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as
such.

WoN Sinacaban legally exists (Yes, as a de facto corporations)


Though, as ruled in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the creation of municipal corporations
is essentially a legislative matter and cannot be created by the executive, the court has
since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later
impliedly recognized, its creation can no longer be questioned.

• In the case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr, the SC took
into consideration the following factors:
1. The fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the
municipality had never been challenged;
2. The fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to
question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality;
3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class
municipality in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives.
4. That the Sec. 442(d) of the LGC was curative.
o The same factors exist to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de
facto municipal corporation.
• It must be kept in mind that Sinacaban was created in 1949, and it has
therefore been in existence for already 40 years before it was questioned.
o This is emphasized given that Rule 66(16), on quo warranto suits against
a corporation, must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act
complained of was done.
o On the contrary, the State and Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacaban’s
existence.
▪ Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980: Sinacaban is constituted as
part of the municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
▪ Jimenez-Sinacaban Agreement- Speaks for itself.
▪ Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution: Apportioning
legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban part of the Second District.
o Moreover, indeed, Sec. 442(d) of the LGC is deemed to have cured
whatever doubts there may have been to Sinacaban.

WoN Sec. 442(d) of the LGC is invalid in failing to conform to the constitutional and
statutory requirement of plebiscite in the creation of new municipalities (No)

• First of all, the requirement only applies to new municipalities created under
the 1987 Constitution.
• Secondly, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect.
• Thirdly, the requirement of plebiscite was fist introduced in the 1973
Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be
applied to municipal corporations created before, such as the municipality of
Sinacaban (1949).

WoN the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban (No)

• The barrios enumerated in E.O. 258 are not necessarily exclusive. “Sinacaban
contains…” may include others.
• Whether or not the agreement entered into by Jimenez and Sinacaban is valid
will be determined by the result of the survey.
o Pelaez v. Auditor General: Power of provincial boards to settle boundary
disputes is "of an administrative nature.” Thus it is limited to
implementing the law, and not amending it.
o If any alterations of boundaries were made, Resolution 77 cannot be said
to be merely administrative, nor valid. In gist, if Resolution 77 is contrary
to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be
used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

Ordillo vs COMELEC
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.”
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that
the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao
Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the
provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the
Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent
unit.

Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao,
being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.

Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords —
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is
to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that
the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative
purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To
become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of
the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary
for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced
with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial
officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
League of cities of the Phil vs Comelec
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush”
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However,
the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu
which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws)
on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the
equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are
thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is
a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while
the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities
from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section
450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or


resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of
the equal protection clause.

Narciso vs Mendez
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then
Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive
Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating
from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres,
Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed
through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso,
Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado
Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have
gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that “(t)he conversion
of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was
approved by the House of Representatives.”
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC
which petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of
this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the
new municipality and that the case had become moot and academic with the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .(d)
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to
exist and operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San
Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those
whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.

ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation.

HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was
issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June
1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of
the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the
Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own
closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal
corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by
virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in
existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor
General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be
the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s
recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after
more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the
Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the
income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be
dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats
of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality
of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities
composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective
sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the)
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
Municipality of Candijay, Bohol vs CA
G.R. No. 116702
28 December 1995

FACTS
• The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its
territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia.
• Lower Court: Barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of the
plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and
parcel of its territory and further permanently enjoined defendant municipality
of Alicia to respect plaintiff’s control, possession and political supervision of
barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and
ownership over the same barrio.
• Court of Appeals: rejected the boundary line claimed by petitioner because it
would place practically all of barrio Pagahat and other barrios within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay. Candijay will eat up a big
chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law
creating her. After an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and
respondent submitted as exhibits, that both plans are inadequate insofar as
identifying the monuments of the boundary line between Candijay and the
Municipality of Mabini.
• After weighing and considering the import of certain official acts, including EO
265 (creating municipality of Alicia and Mabini) dated September 16, 1949 and
Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission dated October 31, 1903, concluded
that Barrio Bulawan from where Barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as
one of the barrios constituted as part of the Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they
show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of Candijay. Therefore the CA, applying the
equiponderance rule, dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE
W/N the respondent lacked juridical personality as a result of having been created
under a void executive order? NO.

RATIO
Citing the case of Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez:
Petitioner’s theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been
seasonable brought. EO 353 ‘s validity was only contested after almost 30 years from
its issuance. Granting that the EO was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, peculiar circumstances obtaining
this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San
Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating,
if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Equally significant
is Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts
“organized pursuant to the presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity
of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
The de jure status of the Municipality must now be conceded.
The above-cited case is strikingly similar to the present case. Respondent
municipality of Alicia should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 of the
Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure
municipality.
Camarines Norte vs Quezon
SUMMARY: A 1989 SC decision settled the land boundary dispute between Camarines
Norte and Quezon. As a
consequence, 9 barangays previously located in Calauag, Quezon became part of Sta.
Elena, Camarines Norte. The decision ordered the Government to undertake a survey
in accordance with a 1922 decision of the Executive Board –which was upheld by the
SC as basis for the delineation of the boundary. Upon request of Camarines Norte
Governor Padilla, DENR sent a survey team, which laid down a boundary marker. In
Oct. 1991, Calauag Mayor Lim and Quezon Governor Rodriguez ordered the bulldozing
and removal of the boundary marker. Padilla responded by filing a contempt charge
against the Quezon officials. Pending resolution of that case, COMELEC and other
agencies of the Executive branch issued directives recognizing the jurisdiction of
Camarines Norte over the 9 disputed barangays. Specifically, NSO transferred
jurisdiction to the civil registrar of Sta. Elena; DBM transferred the IRAs of the 9
barangays to Sta. Elena; realty tax records were also ordered transferred; and the
COMELEC authorized the Sta. Elena election officer to change the addresses of the
registered voters in the 9 barangays. Quezon Government thus filed a petition for
certiorari assailing the COMELEC resolutions authorizing the transfer of the voter
registration records in the 9 barangays. This petition was consolidated with the
contempt charge. CA Justice ordered to hear the
contempt case found sufficient basis to cite Rodriguez and Lim in contempt for willful
disregard of the 1989 SC
decision, by contumaciously asserting their own interpretation of the boundary line
and by having the DENR-installed marker removed. SC concurred with the CA.
Rodriguez was guilty of willful disregard of a final and executory SC decision. He even
said in his demurrer to the contempt charge that they would not have ordered the
removal of the marker had the SC decided the case in the way Quezon wanted it
decided. Pasaway kang talaga. SC has rejected their argument with finality and they
must act accordingly. Quezon cannot invoke the plebiscite requirements under LGC
10 and the Constitution because the boundary delineation was merely an
implementation of Sec. 42, Art. II of the RAC, as interpreted by the 1922 EB decision,
which was upheld by the SC in 1989. Neither can the law creating Sta. Elena be
invoked, because the definition of Sta. Elena’s territory in that law was subject to the
delineation of the Quezon-CamNor boundary, which was to be determined by the
DENR by undertaking the SC-mandated survey. Governor Rodriguez and Mayor Lim
were held guilty of indirect contempt. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the transfer of the voter registration records of the 9 barangays
because it was merely complying with the SC decision. Instead of being punished, they
should be commended for doing so. [Anecdote: According to Danicon, counsel for
Camarines Norte went to the Law Center, chanced upon DLC, Sereno, Labitag, Sison,
and Feliciano. They handled the case for CamNor and won. Kaya ginawa raw silang
adopted sons and daughters of Camarines Norte. ^^]

FACTS
• Nov. 8, 1989 – SC rendered a decision in GR No. 80796 (1989 decision) resolving the
long-standing [since
the Spanish period] boundary dispute between Camarines Norte (CAMNOR) and
Quezon in favor of the
former.
o The decision stated in part: “Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Secretary
of the Local
Governments and the Office of the President with the request that surveyors from the
Bureau of
Lands or other appropriate government agency be forthwith designated to survey and
locate, by
latitude and longitude and by metes and bounds, and to monument the Basiad Bay-
Mt. Cadig line
described in the 16 June 1922 decision of the Chief of the Executive Bureau.[1922
DECISION]”
o Mar. 19, 1990 - The 1989 decision became final and executory.
• Pursuant to the directive of the SC, CamNor governor Roy PADILLA asked the DENR
Secretary to
undertake the survey of the Quezon-Camnor boundary line based on the description
in the 1922 decision.
o DENR Secretary Fulgencio FACTORAN, Jr., thus issued Special Order 1179
constituting a
technical working group for the purpose.
• Jan. 31, 1991 – The DENR team informed Quezon Governor Eduardo RODRIGUEZ
about the upcoming
survey.
• Quezon Provincial Secretary Jorge VARGAS objected to the use of the 1922 decision
as the basis of the
survey, asserting that it should be done on the basis of the conditions set forth in Art.
II, §42 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 (Act 2711).
• The DENR team proceeded with the survey anyway, using the 1922 decision as
basis.
• May 28, 1991 – The DENR team went to Brgy. Tabugon, Calauag, Quezon and
installed a monument
marker along the boundary line determined in the survey.
o The marker indicated that the area of 8,032 hectares actually falls within the
jurisdiction of CamNor.
o The area comprises 9 barangays: Kagtalaba, Plaridel, Kabuluan, Don Tomas, Guitol,
Tabugon,
Maualawin, Patag Ibaba, and Patag Iraya.
• Oct. 14, 1991 – Rodriguez and Calauag Mayor Julio LIM had the boundary marker
bulldozed and removed.
The event was covered by the Manila Bulletin.
• In response, Padilla filed a petition for contempt in the SC against Rodriguez and Lim
for disobedience
to a SC decision, which is punishable as indirect contempt under ROC 71§3.
o COMMENT OF RODRIGUEZ & LIM on contempt petition: The placing of the marker
is illegal as
it was installed within Calauag territory and because the DENR team lacked prior
authority from the
Office of the President, as required by the 1989 decision. Their action was a
reasonable use of
force under NCC 429 to protect Quezon territory from a threatened physical invasion.
• SC resolved to direct CA Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy to conduct hearings, receive
evidence, and submit a
report and recommendation on the contempt proceedings.
o After CamNor rested its case, Rodriguez filed a demurrer, contending that the 1989
decision cannot
be implemented in the light of RAC 42 and RA 5480 (which created the Municipality of
Sta. Elena in
CamNor). The demurrer was denied.
o Upon retirement of Justice Sempio-Diy, the case was assigned to CA Justice Teodoro
Regino.
• Pending the contempt proceedings in the CA, the DBM transferred the Internal
Revenue Allotment of the 9
barangays from Calauag to Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte starting in Fiscal Year 1994.
• During the May 6, 1996 SK elections, COMELEC sent the election paraphernalia of
the 9 barangays to Sta.
Elena. COMELEC also issued a resolution directing the Calauag Election Officer to
refrain from exercising
supervision over political exercises in the 9 barangays.
• The Civil Registrar General likewise issued a Memorandum informing the Calauag
Civil Registrar that
registration of vital events occurring in the 9 barangays should now be registered with
the Sta. Elena Civil
Registrar.
• March 18, 1997 – the Department of Finance directed the Quezon Provincial
Treasurer and the Provincial
Assessor to transfer the realty tax records of the 9 barangays to CamNor.
• Jul. 10, 1997 – COMELEC issued a resolution authorizing the Sta. Elena Election
Officer to change the
address in the voting registration records of the 9 barangays from Calauag, Quezon to
Sta. Elena,
Camarines Norte; and to notify the registered voters concerned of such change in
address.
• Sep. 12, 1997 – The Sangguniang Bayan of Calauag passed a resolution opposing
the Jul. 10 COMELEC
resolution.
• Nov. 27, 1997 – COMELEC resolved to note the Calauag SB resolution and deny it
with finality.
• Quezon filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, which was consolidated with the
contempt petition.
• May 3, 2000 - Justice Regino submitted his report and recommendation in the
contempt case.
o Rodriguez and Lim are guilty of contempt of court and should be sentenced to
maximum penalty of
6 months imprisonment and P1000 fine; and be ordered to shoulder the cost of
installing a new
boundary marker to replace the one they had removed.

ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N Rodriguez and Lim are guilty of contempt of court (YES)
2) W/N COMELEC committed GAD in issuing the resolutions assailed by Quezon (NO)
RATIO
1) BULLDOZING & REMOVAL OF MARKER WAS DISOBEDIENCE OF 1989 SC
DECISION; RODRIGUEZ & LIM
(RL) GUILTY OF CONTEMPT
• Regino Report Findings
o RL’s act of removing the monument marker amounts to contumacious conduct
defined under ROC
71§3(b), which declares contemptuous any "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process,
order, or judgment or command of a court."
o The installation of the boundary marker was in compliance with the 1989 SC
decision, which made
the 1922 decision the basis of the boundary line.
o RL have a long record of resisting CamNor’s claim to the disputed area.
o RL’s contumacious refusal was made with full understanding that their acts would
fall under
contempt, as evinced by the following statement made in their demurrer: “The whole
case would
have been different if factually the territory defined in the (1922) Decision of the
Executive Bureau
conformed with the prescription of Section 42 (of Article II, Revised Administrative
Code of 1917)”
• SC agrees with Justice Regino’s findings.
• In effect, Rodriguez was saying in the demurrer that they would not have removed
the boundary marker had
the SC decided the case on the basis on RAC Art. II, Sec. 42.
• This is an act of defiance of the 1989 decision, where it was ruled with finality that
RAC Art. II, Sec. 42 did
not define the entirety of the CamNor-Quezon boundary line in such a manner as to
permit the whole
boundary line to be located on the ground by a surveyor.
• Pertinent part of the 1989 SC decision: "It is pointed out by [CamNor], firstly, that
the particular point on
Basiad Bay that is the terminus of the boundary line is not specifically identified in
Section 42, considering
that the eastern shore of Basiad Bay is 25 kilometers in length, more or less, such
that that terminal point
could in theory be located anywhere along the 25-kilometer shore line. Secondly, the
specific direction or
directions and the varying lengths (the 'metes and bounds') of the various segments of
the boundary line to
be projected from the terminus point on Basiad Bay onto Mt. Cadig's peak, are
similarly not specified in
Section 42. Thus, again, a surveyor on the ground would be unable to locate and
monument the boundary
line from Basiad Bay to Mt. Cadig if all he had was the language found in Section 42 of
the Revised
Administrative Code.
"We agree with [CamNor]'s argument. We consider that to that limited extent, the
Ambos Camarines
Quezon boundary line was `undefined' and that there was thus necessity for the 16
June 22 decision of the
Chief of the Executive Bureau to provide more specific guidance that would permit the
actual identification
or location of the Basiad Bay-Mt. Cadig portion of the boundary line between Ambos
Camarines and
Quezon Province:
'[from the peak of Mt. Cadig] thence a straight line is drawn to the point of intersection
of the interprovincial
road between Camarines Norte and Tayabas (now Quezon) with the Tabugon River,
thence following the
course of the river to each mouth at the Basiad Bay.'"
• The 1989 SC decision clearly upheld the validity and binding effect of the 1922
decision of the Executive
Bureau. Despite this, RL stubbornly insist on their own interpretation of what should
be the correct boundary
line.
• This willful disregard of the SC decision was demonstrated by RL’s causing the
removal of the boundary
marker installed by the DENR.
• Counsels for Quezon have already been reprimanded by the SC for insisting on the
applicability of RAC Art.
II, Sec. 42, as a tactic to delay the implementation of the 1989 SC decision.
• SC said: “This Court does not, as it cannot, always expect counsel of losing litigants
graciously to accept the
correctness of the decisions of this Court. But when such decisions reach finality, it is
the duty of such
counsel as officers of the Court and members of the Bar to obey those decisions,
whatever their personal
opinion may be in respect of the merits of the decisions. It is, of course, open to the
respondents herein to
seek to change those decisions they disagree with by going to the Congress of the
Philippines to try to
secure the enactment of a statute changing the boundary line already declared legally
binding by this Court.
Until such a statute is enacted, however, respondents owe a special duty faithfully and
honestly to comply
with final decisions of this Court. The Court cannot countenance any further disregard
of this duty. It is of
essence of an ordered and civilized community that the function of final resolution of
disputes be located in
a particular institution. In our system, that institution is this Court.”
Quezon cannot invoke RA 5480 [creating the Municipaliy of Sta. Elena] .
• Sec.1 of that law, defined the territory of Sta. Elena as including “Barrios Salvacion,
Bulala, Rizal, San
Lorenzo, Pulong Guitguit, Santa Elena, San Vicente, Basiad and San Pedro up to the
boundary of the
Province of Quezon and the Province of Camarines Norte as defined in Chapter three,
Article II, Section
forty-two of the Administrative Code”
• Quezon: Including the 9 barangays within the disputed area in the territory of Sta.
Elena would violate not
only Sec. 1 of RA 5480, but also Art. X, Sec. 10 of the Constitution and LGC 10 which
require the conducting
of a plebiscite in cases of substantial alteration of territorial boundaries.
• SC: This has been resolved with finality in the 1989 decision: RA 5480 does not
purport to have amended
Section 42 of the Revised Administrative Code nor Section 2 of Act No. 2809, both as
implemented in the
decision dated 16 June 1922 of the Executive Bureau of the Department of Interior.
o Sec. 1 of RA 5480 extends the jurisdiction of Sta. Elena up to the Quezon-CamNor
boundary,
which was defined in the 1922 EB decision; which was in turn ordered enforced by the
SC in its
1989 decision. The enumeration of barangays in Sec. 1 is not a delimitation of
territorial jurisdiction.
o The 1922 decision did not “alter, re-define, or amend” an existing provincial
boundary. All it did was
implement RAC 42. The reliance on the plebiscite provisions of the Local Govenment
Code and
Art. X, Constitution are therefore misplaced.
Authority of the DENR technical team comes from the President through his alter ego,
the SENR
• Special Order No. 1179 issued by the DENR Secretary was the basis for the DENR
team’s authority to
conduct the survey and place boundary markers. The DENR Secretary is the
President’s alter ego; thus the
SENR’s acts are presumed to be acts of the President, unless expressly repudiated by
the latter. The
argument that the survey was conducted without Presidential authority is therefore
baseless.
RL liable for indirect contempt
• RL thus openly disobeyed the 1989 Decision when they caused the removal of the
monument marker
installed by the DENR. The significance of the monument marker cannot simply be
disregarded. As aptly
explained by Engr. Mamerto Infante, it has a technical purpose of preserving the
survey conducted by his
team. In fact the 1989 Decision mandates "...to monument the Basiad Bay-Mt. Cadig
line described in the 16
June 1922 decision of the Chief of the Executive Bureau."
• That RL understood the 1989 Decision is fully borne by the records in these cases
and well attested by their
valiant effort in re-litigating issues already settled by this Court. That same effort,
however, highlighted by
their contumacious destruction of the monument, worked adversely to their cause. It
renders them liable for
indirect contempt.
2) NO GAD COMMITTED IN ISSUING ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS; COMELEC & OTHER
AGENCIES
COMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTING 1989 DECISION
• Quezon: The assailed COMELEC resolutions recognizing CamNor’s jurisdiction over
the 9 disputed
barangays were issued with grave abuse of discretion, being violative of RA 5480, Art.
X, Sec. 10 of the
Constitution and LGC 10.
• COMELEC: The assailed Resolutions were issued in deference to the 1989 decision,
and only after the land
boundary dispute between the two provinces had been settled. The resolutions were
mere compliance with
the SC resolution dated Aug. 4, 1994 in the same case.
• SC fully agrees COMELEC.
• For showing high regard to the SC's Decision and Orders, we commend not only the
COMELEC but also the
Department of Budget and Management, the Department of Finance, the Department
of Environment and
Natural Resources, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the National
Statistics Office.
These government offices and agencies have collectively recognized the subject 9
barangays as part of
Camarines Norte's jurisdiction (bigyan ng jacket).
• It is only Quezon Province and its officials who ignore the finality of the Decision and
Resolutions of the SC.
Their present petition attempts to re-litigate the same issues judiciously passed upon
by the SC with finality.
It is but imperative for the SC to write finis to these cases. Indeed, every litigation
must come to an end;
otherwise, it would become even more intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is
designed to correct.
DISPOSTION: Petition for contempt granted. Rodriguez and Lim fined P1,000. Petition
for certiorari denied.

Malabang vs Benito
Facts:
• Municipality of Balabagan was part of Malabang before but was separated and
made into another municipality by virtue of EO 366 issued by Pres. Garcia
• Petitioner argued that by virtue of the Pelaez ruling, the President cannot create
Municipality anymore by mere executive fiat

• the respondents argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no
application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the
municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized
under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having
been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its
corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action.

• It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de facto status
lay in the absence of any legislative act to give vitality to its creation.
The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute can exist only where
there is some other valid law under which the organization may be effected, or at least
an authority in potentia by the state constitution

• 2. whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation

• NO. in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time
when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de
factocorporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question,
there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.

The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
while the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the
respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province.
Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having been created
on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out
of barrios and sitios1 of the latter municipality.
petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to
restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their
respective office relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General 2 and
Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva
In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled: (1)
that section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960],
by vesting the power to create barrios in the provincial board, is a "statutory denial of
the presidential authority to create a new barrio [and] implies a negation of the bigger
power to create municipalities," and (2) that section 68 of the Administrative Code,
insofar as it gives the President the power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional
(a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it
offends against section 10 (1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the
President's power over local governments to mere supervision , In short, said section
68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be
deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is
utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment."

the respondents argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in
this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of
Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a
statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either
elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate
functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action.
Thus, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into
directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an
individual like the petitioner Balindong.

Issue:
1. whether a statute can lend color of validity to an attempted organization of a
municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared
unconstitutional
2. whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation
3. whether its existence can be collaterally attack

Ruling:
1. No. a statute cannot lend color of validity to an attempted organization of a
municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared
unconstitutional.
An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis:

It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de facto status lay in
the absence of any legislative act to give vitality to its creation.
The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute can exist only where
there is some other valid law under which the organization may be effected, or at least
an authority in potentia by the state constitution
As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be deduced which
seem to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions:
I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal
corporation may be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a
time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its
creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential
existence by the general laws or constitution of the state.
II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially,
such a de jurecorporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.
III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the
invalidity of which is apparent on its face.
IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de
jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper.10

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite
the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be
made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate
vitality to the organization
2. whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation
NO. in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the
statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de factocorporation, as,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation.
In Norton v. Shelby Count, 12 Mr. Justice Field said: "An unconstitutional act is not
a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed
Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done
by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity
because the executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an operative fact
which cannot justly be ignored.
Operative fact Doctrine:
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official

3. whether its existence can be collaterally attack


, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State
in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding.
4 But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal
corporation is at least a de facto corporations. 5 For where it is neither a corporation
de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned
collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests
ate affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are
estopped by their conduct from doing so.

Kananga vs Ormoc City


FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the
City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement.
No amicable settlement was reached.
The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the
boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the same.
RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section
118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because
both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In fact,
both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also
held that Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon
it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.

POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF;


PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A
COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC IS
NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR. —
“Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. —
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
“(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.
“(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
“(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces
concerned.
“(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand
and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities,
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
“(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60)
days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that
effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.”

Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other — or between two or more highly urbanized cities — shall
be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government
units involved. There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under
Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and
operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent
component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with
an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an
independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118
does not apply to them.

SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN


INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT BAR. — Under Section 451 of the
LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an
independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for
provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is
considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both
Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election
Code, which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is
neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the
parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to
Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO
ADJUDICATE ALL CONTROVERSIES EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY WITHHELD FROM
THEIR PLENARY POWERS; CASE AT BAR. — As previously stated, “jurisdiction is
vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties.” It must exist as a
matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It
should not be confused with venue. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no
application to the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be
used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency
over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to
adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers.
They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for
judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at
that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.

Sema vs Comelec
Facts: On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:

Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11.
Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative
district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed


Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City
in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province”
under MMA Act 201.

Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s


Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent
parts:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to


adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the
appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Issue: The petitions raise the following issues:


I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily –
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to
test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No.
177597.

(B) On the merits –


(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled
to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of
Maguindanao (as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]”), despite the creation of the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).

Held: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we
declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city,
municipality or barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a
local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the


Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of
the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under
the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces,
cities or municipalities.

However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the
House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will


violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or


reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any
increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can
enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to
create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An
inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.

In view of certiorari and mandamus


The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other
hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person to perform an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”

In view of mootness
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as
winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City” mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another,
determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
“Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be included in the canvassing of
ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with
the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court’s ruling in these petitions
affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding
elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

In view of the Felwa case


As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that
“when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes
into existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise
— nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment.”
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA
4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-
Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces,
was unconstitutional for “creating congressional districts without the apportionment
provided in the Constitution.”

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly
created legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress
creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in
breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935
Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new
province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does
not emanate alone from Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also
from Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation
of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each province shall have
at least one representative” in the House of Representatives.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to


Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone
component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City
cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000,
it had a population of only 163,849.

Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the
House of Representatives. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM
Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without
regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual
income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers
or minimum population of 250,000. The following scenarios thus become distinct
possibilities:

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction
and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The
Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government
is established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows Section 15,
Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

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