Title 1
questions
Q: Where can crimes against the law of nations
be tried?
A: It may be tried anywhere because they are
considered crimes against the family of nations.
They are committing crimes against national
security.
Q: If piracy was committed outside the
Philippine waters, will the Philippine courts
have jurisdiction over the offense?
A: YES, for piracy falls under Title I Book 2 of
the
Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to
the
rule on territoriality in criminal law under Article
2.
The same principle applies even if the offenders
were charged, not with a violation of qualified
piracy under the Code but under a special law, PD
532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters
(People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075, September
5,
1997).
TI TLE II.
Classes of arbitrary detention (BAR 2006)
-Detaining a person without legal ground (Art.
124, RPC);
-Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the
proper authorities (Art. 125, RPC); and
-Delaying release (Art. 126, RPC).
Q: X, a police officer, falsely imputes a crime
against A to be able to arrest him but he appears
to be not determined to file a charge against him.
What crime, if any, did X commit?
A: The crime is arbitrary detention through
unlawful arrest (Boado, 2008).
-Delivery (BAR 1990)
It means the filing of correct information or
complaint with the proper judicial authorities. It
does not mean physical delivery or turnover of
arrested person to the court.
Q: Suppose, X, a suspected pusher lives in a
condominium unit. Agents of the PDEA obtained
a search warrant but the name of the person in
the search warrant did not tally with the address
indicated therein. Eventually, X was found but in
a different address. X resisted but the agents
insisted on the search. Drugs were found and
seized and X was prosecuted and convicted by
the trial court. Is the search valid?
A: NO, because the public officers are required to
follow the search warrant by its letter. They have
no
discretion on the matter. Their remedy is to ask
the
judge to change the address indicated in the
search
warrant.
Q: Baes, while holding the funeral of Macabigtas,
in accordance with the rites of a religious sect
known as “Church of Christ” caused the funeral
to pass through the churchyard belonging to the
Roman Catholic Church. The parish priest filed a
complaint against Baes for the violation of
Article 133. Is Baes liable?
A: The SC held that the act imputed to the
accused
does not constitute the offense complained of. At
most, they might be chargeable with having
threatened the parish priest or with having passed
through a private property without the consent of
the owner. An act is said to be notoriously
offensive
to the religious feelings of the faithful when a
person
ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a
religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything
devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or
damages or destroys any object of veneration by
the
faithful. The mere act of causing the passage
through the churchyard belonging to the Church,
of
the funeral of one who in life belonged to the
Church
of Christ, neither offends or ridicules the religious
feelings of those who belong to the Roman
Catholic
Church (People v. Baes, ibid.).
Q: While a “pabasa” was going on at a
municipality in the Province of Tarlac, Reyes
and his company arrived at the place, carrying
bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a
barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. The
chairman of the committee in charge of the
“pabasa” persuaded them to refrain from said
acts. A verbal altercation then ensued. The
people attending the “pabasa” left the place
hurriedly in confusion and the “pabasa” was
discontinued until after investigation. Reyes
and his company, in their defense claim that the
land where the chapel is built belongs to the
Clemente family, of which they are partisans.
Are the accused guilty of the crime under Art.
133?
A: The SC held that Art. 133 of the RPC punishes
acts
“notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful.”
The construction of a fence even though irritating
and vexatious under the circumstances to those
present, is not such an acts as can be designated
as
“notoriously offensive to the faithful.”
In this case, the accused were acquitted of a
violation of Art. 133 of the RPC but they were
found
guilty of a violation of Art. 287 of the RPC for the
circumstances showed that their acts were done in
such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who
had
gathered to celebrate the “pabasa” (People v.
Reyes,
et al., G.R. No. L-40577, August 23, 1934).
Punishable acts under this article (BAR 2002,
2009)- violation of domicile
1.Entering any dwelling against the will of the
owner thereof;
2. Searching papers or other effects found therein
without the previous consent of such owner;
and
3. Refusing to leave the premises after having
surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after
having been required to leave the same.
it was raining heavily. A policeman took shelter in
one person’s house. The owner obliged and had
his daughter serve the police some coffee.
The policeman made a pass at the daughter. The
owner of the house asked him to leave. Does this
fall under Article 128?
-No. It was the owner of the house who let the
policeman in. The entering is not surreptitious.
A person surreptitiously enters the dwelling of
another. What crime or crimes were possibly
committed?
-The crimes committed are (1) qualified trespass
to dwelling under Article 280, if there was an
express or implied prohibition against entering.
This is tantamount to entering against the will of
the owner; and (2) violation of domicile in the
third form if he refuses to leave after being told
to.
Article 129
Personal property to be seized
Subject of the offense;
Stolen or embezzled and the other proceeds or
fruits of the offense; or
Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense [Sec. 3, Rule 126, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Reyes, 2017)].
TITLE III
Q: As a result of the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo,
Elias Lovedioro was charged with and
subsequently found guilty of the crime of
murder. On appeal, Lovedioro claims that he
should have been charged with the crime of
rebellion, not murder as, being a member of the
NPA, he killed Lucilo as a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends. The Solicitor
General, opposing appellant’s claim, avers that it
is only when the defense had conclusively
proven that the motive or intent for the killing of
the policeman was for "political and subversive
ends" will the judgment of rebellion be proper.
Between the appellant and the Solicitor General,
who is correct?
A: The Solicitor General is correct. It is not
enough
that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven.
Both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of
the crime. With either of these elements wanting,
the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. If no
political motive is established and proved, the
accused should be convicted of the common
crime
and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive
relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of
rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice
(People
v. Lovedioro, G.R. No. 112235, November 29,
1995).
Q: For the killing of Redempto Manatad, a
policeman and who was then in the performance
of his official duties, accused Rodrigo Dasig, a
self-confessed member of the sparrow unit, the
liquidation squad of the NPA, was found guilty of
murder with direct assault. On appeal, he claims
that he should be convicted at most of simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault. Is
the appeal meritorious?
A: YES, since the killing of Manatad is a mere
component of rebellion or was done in
furtherance
thereof. It is of judicial notice that the sparrow
unit
is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army
with the objective of overthrowing the duly
constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Manatad was
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the
subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently,
appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not
murder with direct assault upon a person in
authority, as the former crime absorbs the crime
of
direct assault when done in furtherance thereof
(People v. Dasig, et. al., G.R. No. 100231, April
28,
1993).
Q: On May 5, 1992, at about 6:00 a.m., while
Governor Alegre of Laguna was on board his car
traveling along the National Highway of Laguna.
Joselito and Vicente shot him on the head
resulting in his instant death. At that time,
Joselito and Vicente were members of the
liquidation squad of the New People’s Army and
they killed the governor upon orders of their
senior officer Commander Tiago. According to
Joselito and Vicente, they were ordered to kill
Governor Alegre because of his corrupt
practices. If you were the prosecutor, what
crime will you charge Joselito and Vicente? (BAR
1998)
A: If I were the prosecutor, I would charge
Joselito
and Vicente with the crime of rebellion,
considering
that they were members of the liquidation squad
of
the New People's Army and the killing was upon
orders of their commander; hence, politically-
motivated (People v. Avila, G.R. No. 84612,
March 11,
1992).
Q: If a group of persons belonging to the armed
forces makes a swift attack, accompanied by
violence, intimidation and threat against a vital
military installation for the purpose of seizing
power and taking over such installation, what
crime or crimes are they guilty of?(BAR 2002)
A: The perpetrators, being persons belonging to
the
Armed Forces, would be guilty of the crime of
coup
d’etat, under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, because their attack was
against
vital military installations which are essential to
the
continued possession and exercise of
governmental
powers, and their purpose is to seize power by
taking over such installations.
Q: On account of the testimony of the
prosecution’s witness, the accused, together
with some more or less forty persons who were
said to be conspiring to overthrow the
Government, was heard to have said, "What a life
this is, so full of misery, constantly increasing.
When will our wretchedness end? When will the
authorities remedy it? What shall we do?" Is
there a conspiracy?
A: NONE, as the prosecution failed to establish
the
existence of conspiracy to rebel by showing that
there is (1) an agreement and (2) decision to
commit rebellion. Mere words of discontent,
although they reveal dissatisfaction on account of
the evils, real or fictitious, to which they refer, are
not alone sufficient to prove the existence of a
conspiracy to rebel, much less with the aid of
force,
against the constituted Government (U.S. v.
Figueras, et. al., G.R. No. 1282, September 10,
1903).
Q: Accused is the founder and leader of the
Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO). The
theory of the prosecution is that the accused has
conspired with the Communist Party of the
Philippines by giving monetary aid, among
others, to help the Huks. Further, he gave
speeches advocating the principles of
Communism and urging his audience to join the
uprising of laboring classes against America and
the Quirino administration. Is the accused guilty
of conspiracy to commit rebellion?
A: NO, as there was no evidence showing that
those
who heard his speeches there and then agreed to
rise up arms to overthrow the government.
Accused
was merely a propagandist and indoctrinator of
Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring
to
commit the actual rebellion by the mere fact of
his
leadership of the CLO (People v. Hernandez, G.R.
No.
L-6025, May 30, 1964).
Q: VC, JG, and GG conspired to overthrow the
Philippine Government. VG was recognized as
the titular head of the conspiracy. Several
meetings were held and the plan was finalized.
JJ, bothered by his conscience, confessed to
Father Abraham that he, VG, JG and GG have
conspired to overthrow the government. Father
Abraham did not report this information to the
proper authorities. Did Father Abraham commit
a crime? If so, what crime was committed? What
is his criminal liability? (BAR 1994
A: NO, Father Abraham did not commit a crime.
His
failure to report such conspiracy is due to an
insuperable cause, one of the exempting
circumstances under Article 12 of the RPC, as
under
our law, a priest cannot be compelled to disclose
any
information received by him by reason of
confession made to him under his professional
capacity.
Q: As the town president failed to pay their
salaries, the defendant, accompanied by four
armed men, went to the house of the former and
compelled him by force to leave it and go to the
Presidencia. He kept him there confined until
the relatives of the town president had raised
enough money to pay what was due them as
salaries. What crime did the accused commit?
A: The facts constitute the crime of direct assault.
There is no public uprising when the accused,
accompanied by armed men, compelled by force
the
town president to go with them to proceed to the
municipal building and detained him there. By
reason of detaining the town president, he
inflicted
upon a public officer an act of hate or revenge.
This
is one of the objects of sedition, which is
essentially
what the accused intended to attain (U.S. v.
Dirain,
G.R. No. 1948, May 5, 1905).
No liability under Art. 148 for Direct Assault
1.
2.
3.
If the public officer or officer in authority is a
mere bystander;
If the accused did not know that the victim was
a person in authority; or
If the person assaulted was no longer a public
officer at the time of the attack even if the
reason for the attack was due to past
performance of duties.
Q: When the policemen effected the arrest of the
accused, he approached them and hit one of
them in the breast with his hand or fist, at which
instant the policeman seized him by the wrist
and resistance ceased. Is the accused guilty of
direct assault?
A: NO, as when the offended party is agent of
person
in authority, any force or aggression is not
sufficient
constitute to an assault. To come within the
purview
of Art. 148, the force used against the agent of a
person in authority must be of serious character
than that employed in this case. Logic tells us that
resistance is impossible without force (U.S. v.
Tabiana, G.R. No. L-11847, February 1, 1918).
Q: When the news that his carabao, which earlier
destroyed a planted area belonging to another,
was seized and taken to the police station
reached the accused, he confronted and
protested to the municipal president, who was
then inspecting the quarantine of the animals.
The president, upon hearing his protest,
promised to intervene in the matter and to see
whether the carabao could be withdrawn. Upon
hearing this, the accused insulted the president
A: The accused committed direct assault upon a
person in authority. When the offended party is a
person in authority, it is not necessary to ascertain
what force the law requires in order to constitute
an
assault since the law itself defines concretely this
force in providing that it consists in mere laying
of
hands upon the person. The degree of force
employed by the offender against the person in
authority is immaterial as the law simply
mentions
the laying of hands sufficient (U.S. v. Gumban,
G.R.
No. L-13658, November 9, 1918).
Q: Who are deemed to be persons in authority
and agents of persons in authority? (BAR 1995,
2000, 2002)
A: Persons in authority are those directly vested
with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or government
corporation,
board, or commission. Barrio captains and
barangay
chairmen are also deemed persons in authority.
Agents of persons in authority are persons who by
direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, are charged
with maintenance of public order, the protection
and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader
and
any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority.
In applying the provisions of Arts. 148 and 151 of
the RPC, teachers, professors and persons charged
with the supervision of public or duly recognized
private schools, colleges and universities, and
lawyers in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance, shall be deemed persons in
authority.
Q: Lydia and Gemma, were public school
teachers. Lydia's son was a student of Gemma.
Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from
her son that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in
class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and
pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a
wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent
assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her
"maxillary area", as shown by a medical
certificate issued by a doctor, and continued to
experience abdominal pains. To what crime, if
any, is Lydia liable?
A: Lydia is liable for direct assault upon a person
in
authority. On the day of the commission of the
assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance
of
her official duties, that is, she was busy with
paperwork while supervising and looking after the
needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the
classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was
already angry when she entered the classroom and
accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy".
Gemma
being a public school teacher, belongs to the class
of
persons in authority expressly mentioned in
Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
(Gelig v.
People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010).
Q: Because of the approaching town fiesta in San
Miguel, Bulacan, a dance was held in Barangay
Carinias. A, the Barangay Captain, was invited to
deliver a speech to start the dance. While A was
delivering his speech, B, one of the guests, went
to the middle of the dance floor making obscene
dance movements, brandishing a knife and
challenging everyone present to a fight. A
approached B and admonished him to keep
quiet and not to disturb the dance and peace of
the occasion. B, instead of heeding the advice of
A, stabbed the latter at his back twice when A
turned his back to proceed to the microphone to
continue his speech. A fell to the ground and
died. At the time of the incident A was not armed.
What crime was committed? (BAR 2000)
A: The complex crime of direct assault with
murder
was committed. Since A was stabbed at the back
when he was not in a position to defend himself
nor
retaliate, there was treachery in the stabbing.
Hence, the death caused by such stabbing was
murder. The Barangay Captain was in the act of
trying to pacify B who was making trouble in the
dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was
therefore killed while in the performance of his
duties. In the case of People v. Hecto, the
Supreme
Court ruled that "as the barangay captain, it was
his
duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the
barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs,
the enmity of his people who thereafter
treacherously slew him, the crime committed is
murder with assault upon a person in authority”
(People v. Dollantes, G.R. No. 70639, June 30,
1987).
Elements of resistance and serious disobedience
(BAR 1990, 2001)
1.
2.
3.
An agent of a person in authority is engaged in
the performance of official duty or gives a
lawful order to the offender;
The offender disobeys such agent of a person in
authority; and
Such disobedience is not of a serious nature.
A person in authority or his agent is engaged in
the performance of official duty or gives a
lawful order to the offender;
The offender resists or seriously disobeys such
person in authority or his agent; and
That the act of the offender is not included in
the provisions of Arts. 148, 149, and 150
Q: After an unfavorable decision against the
defendant in an action filed against him by one
Sabino Vayson in an action for recovery of land,
the deputy sheriff Cosmo Nonoy, by virtue of a
writ, demanded from the defendant the delivery
the possession of the said land to Vayson which
the former refuse to do so. By reason thereof, the
provincial fiscal filed the Information against
the defendant for gross disobedience to
authorities. Defendant filed a demurrer on the
ground that the facts do not constitute a crime,
which the court sustained. Is the court correct in
doing so?
A: YES, as the defendant did not disobey any
order
of the justice of peace. The disobedience
contemplated in Art. 151 consists in the failure or
refusal of the offender to obey a direct order from
the authority or his agent. Here, the order issued
is
a writ of execution, one that is addressed properly
to a competent sheriff and not to the defendant.
Absolutely no order whatsoever is made to the
latter; the writ or order in question in no wise
refers
to him. Hence, he could not commit the crime he
was
charged (U.S. v. Ramayrat, G.R. No. L-6874,
March 8,
1912).
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---
Q: Defendant appealed from the decision of the
lower court finding him guilty of assault upon
agents of authority when he resisted the arrest
effected by them. The record shows that the
policeman entered the house of the defendant
without permission and attempted to arrest the
defendant without explaining to him the cause
or nature of his presence there. Resisting the
arrest, he called to his neighbours for help,
“there are some bandits here and they are
abusing me." Based on the foregoing, is the
defendant guilty of the crime of assault upon
agents of authority?
A: NO, as the defendant’s resistance is
attributable
to his belief that the policemen were actually
bandits. In order to come within the purview of
the
law, the offender must have knowledge that the
person he is assaulting is an agent of or a person
in
authority. What the law contemplates is the
punishment of persons for resistance of the
authorities who knew to be one. If the defendant
believed that those who had entered his house
were,
in fact, bandits, he was entirely justified in calling
his
neighbors and making an attempt to expel them
from his premises (U.S. v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-
10678,
August 17, 1915).
---
---
Q: Sydeco, the cook and waitress in his
restaurant were on the way home when they
were signaled to stop by police officers who
asked him to open the vehicle’s door and alight
for a body and vehicle search. When Sydeco
instead opened the vehicle window and insisted
on a plain view search, one of the policemen,
obviously irked by this remark told him that he
was drunk, pointing to three empty beer bottles
in the trunk of the vehicle. The officers then
pulled Sydeco out of the vehicle and brought him
to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded
in securing a medical certificate under the
signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting
Sydeco as positive of alcoholic breath, although
no alcohol breath examination was conducted.
Sydeco was detained and released only in the
afternoon of the following day when he was
allowed to undergo actual medical examination
where the resulting medical certificate
indicated that he has sustained physical injuries
but negative for alcohol breath. Is Sydeco
criminally liable under Article 151 of the RPC?
A: NO. Sydeco’s twin gestures cannot plausibly
be
considered as resisting a lawful order. There can
be
no quibble that the police offier and his
apprehending team are persons in authority or
agents of a person in authority manning a legal
checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of
exercising
one’s right against unreasonable searches to be
conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in
context, be equated to disobedience let alone
resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art.
151
of the RPC (Sydeco v. People, G.R. No. 202692,
November 12, 2014).
Q: When is the disturbance of public order
deemed to be tumultuous? (BAR 2012)
A: The disturbance shall be deemed tumultuous if
caused by more than three persons who are armed
or provided with means of violence.
Q: A, a detention prisoner, was taken to a
hospital for emergency medical treatment. His
followers, all of whom were armed, went to the
hospital to take him away or help him escape.
The prison guards, seeing that they were
outnumbered and that resistance would
endanger the lives of other patients, deckled to
allow the prisoner to be taken by his followers.
What crime, if any, was committed by A's
followers? Why? (BAR 2002)
A: They are liable for delivering prisoner from
jail
under Art. 156 of the RPC. The crime is not only
committed by removing the prisoner from an
establishment that the prisoner is confined in but
also by helping said person to escape “by other
means,” such as by allowing the prisoner to be
taken
by those unauthorized to do so, such as in the case
at bar.
Q: On appeal, defendant-appellant questions the
judgment rendered by the CFI of Manila finding
him guilty of evasion of service of sentence
under Art. 157. Defendant maintains that Art.
157 apply only in cases of imprisonment and not
when the sentence imposed upon was
“destierro,” as in his case. Is the defendant
correct?
A: NO, the defendant is not correct. Art. 157 must
be
understood to include not only deprivation of
liberty by imprisonment but also by sentence of
destierro. In the case of People v. Samonte, the
Supreme Court held that "a person under sentence
of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty.”
And a person sentenced to suffer such penalty
evades his service of sentence when he enters the
prohibited area specified in the judgment of
conviction (People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960,
November 26, 1948).
Q: Petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear
on the day of the execution of her sentence. On
the same day, respondent judge issued a
warrant for her arrest. She was never arrested.
More than a year later, petitioner through
counsel moved to quash the warrant of arrest,
on the ground that the penalty had prescribed.
Petitioner claimed that she was convicted for a
light offense and since light offenses prescribe
in one year, her penalty had already prescribed.
Is the motion meritorious?
A: NO, the penalty has not prescribed as she did
not
evade her service of sentence. Under Art. 93 of
the
Revised Penal Code, the prescription of penalties
“shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence.”
To
come within the application of Art. 157, the
culprit
must evade one’s service of sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence. This must be so
for
by the express terms of the statute, a convict
evades
"service of his sentence" by "escaping during the
term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but
another expression of the term "jail breaking”
(Tanega v. Masakayan, G.R. No. 141718, January
21,
2005).