University Of San Jose – Recoletos

Magallanes Street, Cebu City, Philippines

Special Proceedings (Saturday 3:30pm – 5:30pm)

Submitted by: Jake Zhan C. Adriano
Submitted to: Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

I. Case Digests
a. In RE: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR Nos. 168992-993, May 21, 2009
Facts: Monina Lim, petitioner, an optometrist was married with Primo Lim
but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia,
whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The
spouses registered the children making it to appear as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an
American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to
adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate
petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18
years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael
and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
Issue/s: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
Ruling: NO. Petitioner cannot singly adopt.
The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not
present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall
jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that
joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not
suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an
American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA 8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.
Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It
includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
 efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character
and well-being.

b. Lahom vs Sibulo GR NO. 143989, July 14, 2003

Facts: A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up
as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and
ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose
Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her
husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and
continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the
institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference,
ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition
in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously
issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there
was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was
provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code"
(Section 19).
Issue/s: WON the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative,
WON the adopter’s action prescribed.
Ruling: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be
resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed
an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the
new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter
under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom
after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set
aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of
the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right
 within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered
vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested
right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a
privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may
deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the
adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of
action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has
been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his
legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

c. Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz GR No. L-19391, September 29, 1964

Facts: An appeal was taken from an order of CFI Pangasinan dismissing

the petition for revocation of adoption of Manuel J. (Aquino) de la Cruz,
filed by his adoptive parents in accordance with Article 348 of the Civil
Code. The basis of their claim is that the adopted minor repudiated the
adoption by open display of defiance, animosity, revulsion and
disobedience to petitioners and had for more than 3 years abandoned
petitioners’ home by living with his natural mother. Then, a special
appearance was entered by counsel in behalf of the minor with a motion to
dismiss the petition on the ground that 1) court lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter; 2) court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
adopted minor; 3) venue was improperly laid; and 4) the petition did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Issue/s: WON venue was improperly laid since the adopted minor having
moved from their former residence in Ilocos Sur.

Ruling: The provisions of the Civil Code on revocation of adoption do not

specify the court where the proceedings should be filed. The Rules of
Court designate the venue of proceeding for adoption, which is the place
 where the petitioner resides (Section 1, Rule 99), but is silent with respect
to the venue of proceeding for rescission and revocation of adoption (Rule
100). It is clear that the two proceedings are separate and distinct from
each other. In the first what is determined is the propriety of establishing
the relationship of parent and child between two persons not so related by
nature. For that purpose the court inquires into the qualifications and
disqualifications of the adopter; the personal circumstances of the person
to be adopted; the probable value and character of his estate; the other
proceeding either the adopting parent or the adopted seeks to severe the
relationship previously established, and the inquiry refers to the truth of
the grounds upon which the revocation is sought.
Once the proper court has granted a petition for adoption and the
decree has become final the proceeding is terminated and closed. A
subsequent petition for revocation of the adoption is neither a continuation
of nor an incident in the proceeding for adoption. It is an entirely new one,
dependent on facts which have happened since the decree of adoption.
The venue of this new case, applying Rule 99 in a suppletory character, is
also the place of the residence of the petitioner. In the present instance
petitioners reside in Pangasinan, having moved there from their former
residence in Ilocos Sur.

II. Comparison

a. Habeas Corpus vs Habeas Data vs Writ of Amparo

As to nature, scope and function, in habeas corpus, all cases of
illegal confinement and detention any person is deprived of his liberty; or
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled. In writ
of amparo, it involves right to life, liberty and security violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee or a private individual or entity. It covers extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats. Whereas in habeas data, it
involves the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party
and covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
As to limitation, in habeas corpus, it may be suspended in cases of
invasion or rebellion when public safety requires it. Whereas in, writ of
amparo, it shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
Whereas in, habeas data, its limitation is same as the writ of amparo.
As to who may file, in habeas corpus, there must be a petition
signed and verified by the party for whose relief it is intended or by some
person on his behalf. Whereas in, writ of amparo, the petition is filed by
the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following
order: 1) any member of the immediate family; 2) any ascendant,
descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved within the 4 th civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity; 3) any concerned citizen, organization,
association or institution. Whereas in, habeas data, it may be filed by any
aggrieved party. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearance, the petition may be filed by: 1) any member of the
immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; 2) any descendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
As to where filed, in habeas corpus, in the Supreme Court or any
member thereof, on any day and at any time, in Court of Appeals or any
member thereof, in instances authorized by law, in RTC or judge thereof,
on any day and at any time, enforceable only within his judicial district and
in MTC or first level courts, in the absence of RTC judges in a judicial
region. Whereas in, writs of amparo, it may be filed on any day and at any
time with Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals, Supreme Court, or any justice
of such courts and in RTC of place where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any element occurred. Whereas in, habeas data, the petition
may be filed with the RTC, where petitioner or respondent resides or that
which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is
gathered, collected or stored, at the option of petitioner. If public data files
of government offices, petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or Sandiganbayan.
As to enforceability, in habeas corpus, if SC or CA issues,
anywhere in the Philippines. If granted by the RTC or judge thereof, it is
enforceable in any part of the judicial region where the judge sits.
Whereas in, writs of amparo and habeas data, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
As to how and who serves the petition, in habeas corpus, it may be
served in any province by the 1) sheriff; 2) other proper officer; 3) or
person deputed by the court or judge. Service is made by leaving the
original with the person to whom it is directed and preserving copy on
which to make return of service. If that person cannot be found, or has not
the prisoner in his custody, service shall be made on any other person
having or exercising such custody. Whereas in, writs of amparo and
habeas data, the writ shall be served upon the respondent by: 1) a judicial
officer; or 2) a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall
retain a copy in which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot
be served personally, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
 As to who is the respondent, in habeas corpus, it may or may not
be an officer. Whereas in, writs of amparo, the respondent is a public
official or employee or a private individual or entity. Whereas in, habeas
data, the respondent is a public official or employee or a private individual
or entity, who is engaged in gathering, collecting or storing data.

As to burden of proof required, in habeas corpus, preponderance of

evidence is sufficient. Whereas in, writs of amparo, substantial evidence is
sufficient, if respondent is a private individual or entity, ordinary diligence.
If respondent is a public official or employee, extraordinary diligence is
required. Whereas in, habeas data, substantial evidence is required to
prove the allegations in the petition.

As to when appeal should be taken from the decision of the

petition, in habeas corpus, within 48 hours from notice of the judgment of
the final order appealed. Whereas in, writs of amparo and habeas data,
within 5 working days from the date of notice of adverse judgment; rule 45
of filed with the SC.

As to when shall the petition be decided, in writs of amparo and

habeas data, the court shall render judgment within 10 days from the time
the petition is submitted for decisions. Whereas in, habeas corpus, there is
none.

b. AM-03-04-04 Custody of Minor vs Habeas Corpus

As to who may file the petition, in the rule of custody of minor, a
verified petition for the rightful custody of the minor may be filed by any
person claiming such right. Whereas in, habeas corpus, there must be a
petition signed and verified by the party for whose relief it is intended or by
some person on his behalf.
As to where to file the petition, in the rule of custody of minor, the
petition shall be filed in the family court of the province or city where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found. Whereas in, habeas
corpus, in the Supreme Court or any member thereof, on any day and at
any time, in Court of Appeals or any member thereof, in instances
authorized by law, in RTC or judge thereof, on any day and at any time,
enforceable only within his judicial district and in MTC or first level courts,
in the absence of RTC judges in a judicial region.
As to enforceability, in the rule of custody of minor, if granted, the
writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Whereas in, habeas
corpus, if SC or CA issues, anywhere in the Philippines. If granted by the
RTC or judge thereof, it is enforceable in any part of the judicial region
where the judge sits.
As to the contents of the petition, in the rule for custody of minor, 1)
the personal circumstances of the petitioner and respondent; 2) the name,
age, and present whereabouts of the minor and his or her relationship to
the petitioner and respondent; 3) the material operative facts constituting
deprivation of custody; and 4) such other matters which are relevant to the
custody of the minor. Whereas in, habeas corpus, 1) the person in whose
behalf whose the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty; 2) name of the person detaining another or assumed appellation;
3) place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and 4) cause
of detention, or allegation that there is none.
As to the award of custody, in the rule for custody of minor, the
order of preference shall be observed: 1) both parents jointly; 2) either
parent, taking into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the minor over 7 years of age and of sufficient discernment
unless the parent chosen is unfit; 3) the grandparent or if there are several
grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over 7 years of age
and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or
disqualified; 4) the eldest brother or sister over 21 years of age, unless the
former is unfit or disqualified; 5) the actual custodian of the minor over 21
years of age, unless the former is unfit or disqualified; or 6) any other
person or institution the court may deem suitable to provide proper care
and guidance for the minor. Whereas in, habeas corpus, to the person
who has rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled.