RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD– Petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES– Respondent

Nature of the case: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated April 25, 2011
and the Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017
upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.

FACTS

PNP,through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto Fajardo, applied with the Manila-RTC for a warrant
to search three caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where
the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be
found. In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola was presented to the RTC and testified
therein that he personally witnessed the killing of six persons in December 2005. Judge William Simon
Peralta, acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant, and thus, issued Search WarrantNo. 09-14407 which was later enforced by the elements
of the PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded
positive results for the presence of human remains.

Herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress
Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the ground that, among others, the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction
to issue Search Warrant which was to be enforced in Davao City. Manila-RTC granted the motion.The
People filed a petition for certiorari which the CA granted.Laud moved for reconsideration, but was later
denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S

3.Whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description were complied with and the
one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was violated—YES.

RATIO

3.YES. In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is
evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally
witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the
victims.

Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the existence
of probable cause had been met. That a "considerable length of time" attended the search warrant’s
appliycation from the crime’s commission does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of the
applicant’s claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly observed, the delay
may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal
case. Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be
personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable
complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the
search warrant’s application does not dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the
probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.

The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement that there
be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." A
description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community.
Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the foregoing standard since it particularly describes the
place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound.

Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note, was intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot
warrants, or those which are issued for more than one specific offense. Hence, given that Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one specific offense – that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6)
counts – it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated
October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Notes

• Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that “[t]he imposition upon an Executive
Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an administrative penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically
operate to divest him of his position as such.”

• (Rule 126) SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following: x xx

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced. x xx

•Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution: he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
•Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court: Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,,vs.MAXICORP, INC.,

FACTS OF THE CASE : This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP
Incfor alleged violation of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC(unfair
competition).Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’spremises
and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.Maxicorp filed a motion to
quash the search warrants alleging that there was noprobable cause for their issuance and that the
warrants are in the form of "generalwarrants." Where the RTC denied the motion and at the same time
denied theirmotion for reconsideration.According to RTC they’ve found a probable cause to issue such
warrant afterexamining the NBI agent and the computer technician who visited Maxicorp.Maxicorp filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set asidethe RTC’s order. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’smotion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration. TheCourt of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion on 29 November 1999. The
Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during thepreliminary examination
conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold thecounterfeit products. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the sales receipt NBIAgent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products
from Maxicorpwas in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

1.Whether or not there’s a probable cause on the part of CA to quash the searchwarrants issued by
RTC2.Whether or not respondent violated the intellectual property right of thepetitioner.

RULING:According to the SC the offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringementunder

Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. Tosupport these charges,
petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano,computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a
civilian. The offenses that petitionerscharged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of
counterfeit products is

but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC howthey personally saw
Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.Probable cause means "such reasons,
supported by facts and circumstances as willwarrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the
means taken inprosecuting it are legally just and proper."Thus, probable cause for a search
warrantrequires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man tobelieve that
an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connectionwith that offense are in the place
to be searched. The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and
documentaryevidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause.From
what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged incopyright infringement
and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. BothNBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear
and insistent that the counterfeit softwarewere not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises,
they were alsoproduced, packaged and in some cases, installed there. The determination of probable
cause does not call for the application of rules andstandards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. Asimplied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned
with probability, notabsolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this
stageproof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonablyprudent
man,not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.No law or rule states that probable
cause requires a specific kind of evidence. Noformula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable
cause is determined inthe light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.

Thus, it was improper for theCourt of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales
receiptevidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.For purposes of
determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners’ software
occurred. During the search warrant applicationproceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge
the computer unit that hepurchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-
installedpetitioners’ software. The Supreme Court held:“xxx No provision of the law exists which
requires that a warrant, partially defectivein specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular
with respect to the otheritems, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains
valid as tothe items specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is severable, theitems not
sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the wholewarrant.”In addition the Highest
Court stated:“xxx The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the constitutionrenders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonablesearches and seizures. Thus,
all items seized under paragraph © after searchwarrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, c, d, e, f,
should be returned to Maxico

Pasion vda de garcia vs locsin

Facts: Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of
Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the
petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for “certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers
relating to her activities as usurer.” The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said
Almeda.

On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine
Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search
warrant to the petitioner’s bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who
was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof

The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board
and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six separate
criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases
and the devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion
for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the
petitioner.

HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search
warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination
of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized.

In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the
applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not
decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the
receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not
delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law.

Instead, they were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against
petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the
petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without
basis.

MATA V. BAYONA G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984

FACTS:

l Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306 "AN ACT GRANTING THE PHILIPPINE JAI-
ALAI AND AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A FRANCHISE TO OPERATE, CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A
FRONTON FOR BASQUE PELOTA AND SIMILAR GAMES OF SKILL IN THE GREATER MANILA AREA".

l The information against herein petitioner alleged that he offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai
Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine
Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."

l During the hearing of the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the warrant is missing from the records of the case.

l This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seizedl The court dismissed his motion stating that the court has made a thorough investigation
and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence
Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP and the court made a certification that the documents
were not attached immediately and that there’s nowhere in the rules which specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records.
l Petitioner’s MR was also deniedl Hence, this petition praying, among others, that this Court declare the
search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as
evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:WON the search warrant is valid.

HELD:

NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Furthermore, While the SC held that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot
be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the
return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

Petition granted.

PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)

FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant
before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in
committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2.
That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to
the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion
issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the
PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid
and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a “Motion to Quash” before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a “Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash” and a “Motion to
SuppressEvidence.” On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied
petitioners’ motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid

HELD:

The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place
to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1)
the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero
Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal
knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be
searched was not described with particularity.

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

Facts:UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake

UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the
clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which
thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding
probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished
products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead,
sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets
of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to
the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The
respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the
seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were
seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

Issue:Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and
Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

Held:It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine.
However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must
adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the
executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in
a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating
evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure

It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It
is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to
present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed
boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and
immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge
whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed
boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain
view doctrine applies to the seized items.

150 People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992]

Third Division, Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt. Province PC Command put up a
checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They stopped and
checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a cream-colored
Ford Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was
driven by Conway Omaweng and had no passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to
inspect the vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they
saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on
the right side of the vehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng
consented to. When they opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic packets of different
sizes containing pulverized substances. The constable gave a packet to his team leader, who, after
sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The Constables thereafter boarded the vehicles and
proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs
were surrendered to the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the substance contained in the plastic packets taken
from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the
violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in a criminal
complaint filed with the MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. Upon his failure to
submit counter-affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared that
he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause against Omaweng,
ordered the elevation of the case to the proper court. On 14 November 1988, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province filed an Information charging Omaweng with the violation of
Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713). After his motion
for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of not guilty during his
arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented 4 witnesses.

Omaweng did not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement,
dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod. On 21 March
1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment convicting Omaweng of the crime of transporting
prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his Constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the
search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of
the PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he chose
not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures
when he voluntarily submitted to a search or consents to have it made in his person or premises. He is
precluded from later complaining thereof right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the
valid search 41 packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant
was necessary for such seizure.

153 People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994]

Third Division, Feliciano (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C.
Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan,
Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both
M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton,
board the bus and seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus
continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being
their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao
inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the
owner of the carton was but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and
S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited Barros to the detachment for questioning as the latter was the
suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton was
opened in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C.
officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana.
Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros
appealed.

Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the moving vehicle,
resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.

Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The evidence secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and
seizure — will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a
judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not
absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of
moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles — automobiles,
trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before
searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant may be sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace
officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants
subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual
inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law offender or
the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds
of some criminal offense. The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a
package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable
volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3)
Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that
prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4)
Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had
in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian,
because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification
papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a
woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana.
Herein, there is nothing in the record that any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably
constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by Barros.
The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-
as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao),
simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable cause. Further, The accused is not
to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest
"simply because he failed to object." To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the
accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein. As the constitutional quaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure
is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. Accordingly, the
search and seizure of the carton box was equally nonpermissible and invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid
search and seizure — i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana —should therefore not have been admitted in
evidence against Barros.