Kinds of Tort Liabilities

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, GR. 97336

3. Civil Law; Damages; The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.-

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.

4. Civil Law; Damages; Article. 21 of the Civil Code designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-
delict in this jurisdiction grants adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.-

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish
in the statute books.

5. Civil Law; Damages; Damages pursuant to Article 21 may be awarded not because of promise to
marry but because of fraud and deceit behind it-

ln the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Exxon vs. Baker

Held:

1. Because the Court is equally divided on whether maritime law allows corporate liability for punitive
damages based on the acts of managerial agents, it leaves the Ninth Circuit’s opinion undisturbed in this
respect. Of course, this disposition is not precedential on the derivative liability question. See, e.g., Neil
v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 192. Pp. 7–10.

2. The Clean Water Act’s water pollution penalties, 33 U. S. C. §1321, do not preempt punitive-
damages awards in maritime spill cases. Section 1321(b) protects “navigable waters … , adjoining
shorelines, … [and] natural resources,” subject to a saving clause reserving “obligations … under any …
law for damages to any … privately owned property resulting from [an oil] discharge,” §1321(o). Exxon’s
admission that the CWA does not displace compensatory remedies for the consequences of water
pollution, even those for economic harms, leaves the company with the untenable claim that the CWA
somehow preempts punitive damages, but not compensatory damages, for economic loss. Nothing in
the statute points to that result, and the Court has rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from
their causes of action, see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 255–256. There is no clear
indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies, nor is it likely that
punitive damages for private harms will have any frustrating effect on the CWA’s remedial scheme. Pp.
10–15.

3. The punitive damages award against Exxon was excessive as a matter of maritime common law. In
the circumstances of this case, the award should be limited to an amount equal to compensatory
damages. Pp. 15–42.

(a) Although legal codes from ancient times through the Middle Ages called for multiple damages for
certain especially harmful acts, modern Anglo-American punitive damages have their roots in 18th-
century English law and became widely accepted in American courts by the mid-19th century. See, e.g.,
Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371. Pp. 16–17.

(b) The prevailing American rule limits punitive damages to cases of “enormity,” Day v. Woodworth,
13 How. 363, 371, in which a defendant’s conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence, willful,
wanton, and reckless indifference for others’ rights, or even more deplorable behavior. The consensus
today is that punitive damages are aimed at retribution and deterring harmful conduct. Pp. 17–21.

(c) State regulation of punitive damages varies. A few States award them rarely, or not at all, and
others permit them only when authorized by statute. Many States have imposed statutory limits on
punitive awards, in the form of absolute monetary caps, a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages, or, frequently, some combination of the two. Pp. 21–23.

(d) American punitive damages have come under criticism in recent decades, but the most recent
studies tend to undercut much of it. Although some studies show the dollar amounts of awards growing
over time, even in real terms, most accounts show that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory
awards remains less than 1:1. Nor do the data show a marked increase in the percentage of cases with
punitive awards. The real problem is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards. Courts are concerned
with fairness as consistency, and the available data suggest that the spread between high and low
individual awards is unacceptable. The spread in state civil trials is great, and the outlier cases subject
defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding compensatories. The distribution of
judge-assessed awards is narrower, but still remarkable. These ranges might be acceptable if they
resulted from efforts to reach a generally accepted optimal level of penalty and deterrence in cases
involving a wide range of circumstances, but anecdotal evidence suggests that is not the case, see, e.g.,
Gore, supra, at 565, n. 8. Pp. 24–27.

(e) This Court’s response to outlier punitive damages awards has thus far been confined by claims
that state-court awards violated due process. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 425. In contrast, today’s enquiry arises under federal maritime jurisdiction and
requires review of a jury award at the level of judge-made federal common law that precedes and
should obviate any application of the constitutional standard. In this context, the unpredictability of high
punitive awards is in tension with their punitive function because of the implication of unfairness that an
eccentrically high punitive verdict carries. A penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so
that even Holmes’s “bad man” can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing
one course of action or another. And a penalty scheme ought to threaten defendants with a fair
probability of suffering in like degree for like damage. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 113. Pp.
28–29.

(f) The Court considers three approaches, one verbal and two quantitative, to arrive at a standard for
assessing maritime punitive damages. Pp. 29–42.

(i) The Court is skeptical that verbal formulations are the best insurance against unpredictable
outlier punitive awards, in light of its experience with attempts to produce consistency in the analogous
business of criminal sentencing. Pp. 29–32.

(ii) Thus, the Court looks to quantified limits. The option of setting a hard-dollar punitive cap,
however, is rejected because there is no “standard” tort or contract injury, making it difficult to settle
upon a particular dollar figure as appropriate across the board; and because a judicially selected dollar
cap would carry the serious drawback that the issue might not return to the docket before there was a
need to revisit the figure selected. Pp. 32–39.

(iii) The more promising alternative is to peg punitive awards to compensatory damages using a
ratio or maximum multiple. This is the model in many States and in analogous federal statutes allowing
multiple damages. The question is what ratio is most appropriate. An acceptable standard can be found
in the studies showing the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards. Those studies reflect the
judgments of juries and judges in thousands of cases as to what punitive awards were appropriate in
circumstances reflecting the most down to the least blameworthy conduct, from malice and avarice to
recklessness to gross negligence. The data in question put the median ratio for the entire gamut at less
than 1:1, meaning that the compensatory award exceeds the punitive award in most cases. In a well-
functioning system, awards at or below the median would roughly express jurors’ sense of reasonable
penalties in cases like this one that have no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness. Accordingly, the
Court finds that a 1:1 ratio is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases. Pp. 39–42.

(iv) Applying this standard to the present case, the Court takes for granted the District Court’s
calculation of the total relevant compensatory damages at $507.5 million. A punitive-to-compensatory
ratio of 1:1 thus yields maximum punitive damages in that amount. P. 42.
 Quasi Delict, NCC: Article 2176

Andamo vs. IAC, GR.

2. Civil Law; Action; Quasi-delicts; Elements of quasi-delict.-

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

3. Civil Law; Action; Quasi-delicts; There is an assertion of a causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners; Case at bar.-

Clearly, from petitioners’ complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

4. Civil Law; Action; Quasi-delicts; The recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence
and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no preexisting contractual obligation
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.-

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of
the instant case is privately owned, the fact ramains that petitioners’ complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances
built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage
to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or
negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

5. Civil Law; Action; Quasi-delicts; A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted provided that the offended
party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores.-

Article 2176, whenever it refers to “fault or negligence”, covers not only acts “not punishable by law”
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
6. Civil Law; Action; Quasi-delicts; The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code.-

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime—a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrele- vant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the
event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not
exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.

7. Civil Law; Action; Property; Adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require
that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others.-

It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual
and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care
so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Child Learning vs. Tagonio, GR. 150920

2. Actions; Torts; Requisites; Words and Phrases; “Fault,” and “Negligence,” Explained.-

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the damages incurred. Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission
which causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to
repair such damage. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Fault
requires the execution of a positive act which causes damage to another while negligence consists of the
omission to do acts which result in damage to another.

3. Actions; Torts; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Schools and Universities; The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would
not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence, (2) the accident must have been caused by
an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with
negligence complained of, and, (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured; The fact that a student had to go through the window,
instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door.-

The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened
from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the
door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1)
the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except
for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of;
and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school
toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window,
instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door.

4. Actions; Torts; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Schools and Universities; Petitioners, with the due
diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a
non-working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out.-

As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend that there was no such requirement
under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves point
out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds the
regular exit, the door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family,
should have anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use
the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is
sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners’ part.

5. Actions; Torts; Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the
employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, not when the liability is under Article 2176, premised on the fact of the defendant’s own diligence
in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.-

Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees is applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.
6. Actions; Torts; Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; Elements.-

We, however, agree with petitioners that there was no basis to pierce CLC’s separate corporate
personality. To disregard the corporate existence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) Control by the individual
owners, not mere majority or complete stock ownership, resulting in complete domination not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect to a transaction so that the corpo- rate entity as
to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) such control must
have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory
or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in contravention of the plaintiff’s legal right;
and (3) the control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
The absence of these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil. The evidence on record fails to
show that these elements are present, especially given the fact that plaintiffs’ complaint had pleaded
that CLC is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.

Huang vs. Philippine Hotelier, GR. 180440

3. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Words and Phrases; Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase
which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself”; The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies where, (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.-

—Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.”
It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the
occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of
negligence when direct evidence is lacking. Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there is
direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the creative reason for the said doctrine
disappears. Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; If the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged
because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence.-
—Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that “burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law.” It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant
to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because
of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence.

5. Same; Quasi-Delicts; Actions; In an action based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove the presence of the following requisites before the defendant can be held liable, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.-

—As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence
of the following requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts
he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi-delict,
the negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof
is upon petitioner.

6. Civil Law; “Quasi-Delicts” and “Breach of Contract,” Distinguished.-

—In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-
delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct,
substantive and independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the
performance of the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation. In quasi-delict,
the defense of “good father of a family” is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians
and employers are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in
the selection and supervision of employees. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it
is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s
complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be
proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there
was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is
followed.

Lucas vs. Tuano, GR. 178763

Physicians; Medical Malpractice; Negligence; Damages; Burden of Proof; The present controversy is a
classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on the latter’s professional
negligence, and in this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is required to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning
possessed by other persons in the same profession, and that as a proximate result of such failure, the
patient or his heirs suffered damages.—Petitioners’ position, in sum, is that Peter’s glaucoma is the
direct result of Dr. Tuaño’s negligence in his improper administration of the drug Maxitrol; “thus, [the
latter] should be liable for all the damages suffered and to be suffered by [petitioners].” Clearly, the
present controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on the
latter’s professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is
required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill,
care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of
such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.

Same; Same; Same; Elements; For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence
committed by members of the medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on
the alleged violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code; In medical negligence cases, also called medical
malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and the victim.—For
lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of the medical
profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, which states that: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist
a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding
for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation,
must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the
physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.

Same; Same; Same; When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship
is generated; In treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to the former to exercise that degree of
care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line
of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases, which standard level of care, skill and diligence is
a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care in a medical
malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the field.—When a patient
engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated. And in accepting a
case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the needed training and skill
possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training,
care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to
[the former] to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.
Stated otherwise, the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any other
reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition under similar circumstances. This
standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony,
because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge
of experts in the field.

Same; Same; Same; There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of
such duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this]
constitutes the actionable malpractice; In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be
shown that the “injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes”—that is, the negligence must be the proximate cause
of the injury.—There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such
duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes
the actionable malpractice. Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon the testimony of an expert
witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice
ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the
attending physician is insufficient, for there must be a causal connection between said breach and the
resulting injury sustained by the patient. Put in another way, in order that there may be a recovery for
an injury, it must be shown that the “injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct
and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes”; that is, the negligence must
be the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; Medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions
of expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon.—Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same,
in order to establish the proximate cause [of the injury] by a preponderance of the evidence in a medical
malpractice action, [the patient] must similarly use expert testimony, because the question of whether
the alleged professional negligence caused [the patient’s] injury is generally one for specialized expert
knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson; using the specialized knowledge and training of his
field, the expert’s role is to present to the [court] a realistic assessment of the likelihood that [the
physician’s] alleged negligence caused [the patient’s] injury. From the foregoing, it is apparent that
medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference
of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians [or surgeons] stems from the former’s realization
that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating; hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.

Same; Same; Same; The mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad result occurs does not
in itself indicate failure to exercise due care.—We cannot but agree with Dr. Tuaño’s assertion that
when a doctor sees a patient, he cannot determine immediately whether the latter would react
adversely to the use of steroids; all the doctor can do is map out a course of treatment recognized as
correct by the standards of the medical profession. It must be remembered that a physician is not an
insurer of the good result of treatment. The mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad
result occurs does not in itself indicate failure to exercise due care.The result is not determinative of the
performance [of the physician] and he is not required to be infallible.

Same; Same; Same; The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal
connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff’s injuries.—Even if
we are to assume that Dr. Tuaño committed negligent acts in his treatment of Peter’s condition, the
causal connection between Dr. Tuaño’s supposed negligence and Peter’s injury still needed to be
established. The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal
connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff’s injuries. The
plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he has been injured and defendant has been at fault, but
also that the defendant’s fault caused the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on
speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based
upon competent expert testimony.

Same; Same; Same; Glaucoma; Words and Phrases; In Open-angle glaucoma, which is characterized by
an almost complete absence of symptoms and a chronic, insidious course, halos around lights and
blurring of vision do not occur unless there has been a sudden increase in the intraocular vision.—Dr.
Tuaño does not deny that the use of Maxitrol involves the risk of increasing a patient’s IOP. In fact, this
was the reason why he made it a point to palpate Peter’s eyes every time the latter went to see him—so
he could monitor the tension of Peter’s eyes. But to say that said medication conclusively caused Peter’s
glaucoma is purely speculative. Peter was diagnosed with open-angle glaucoma. This kind of glaucoma is
characterized by an almost complete absence of symptoms and a chronic, insidious course. In open-
angle glaucoma, halos around lights and blurring of vision do not occur unless there has been a sudden
increase in the intraocular vision. Visual acuity remains good until late in the course of the disease.
Hence, Dr. Tuaño claims that Peter’s glaucoma “can only be long standing x x x because of the large C:D
ratio,” and that “[t]he steroids provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier” was a blessing in
disguise “as [Peter] remained asymptomatic prior to steroid application.”

Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician
are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the
necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless
the contrary is sufficiently established.—It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a
physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he
takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. In making the judgment call of treating Peter’s EKC
with Maxitrol, Dr. Tuaño took the necessary precaution by palpating Peter’s eyes to monitor their IOP
every time the latter went for a check-up, and he employed the best of his knowledge and skill earned
from years of training and practice.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Evidence; Quantum of Proof; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and
Phrases; The concept of “preponderance of evidence” refers to evidence which is of greater weight or
more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it—in the last analysis, it means probability
of truth, it is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.—The plaintiff in a civil case has the burden of proof as he alleges the
affirmative of the issue. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s
prima facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. The party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. The concept of “preponderance of
evidence” refers to evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it; in the last analysis, it means probability of truth. It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Rule 133, Section 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus: In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the
court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The
court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; It seems basic that what constitutes proper medical
treatment is a medical question that should have been presented to experts—if no standard is
established through expert medical witnesses, then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic
issue of breach thereof by the physician or surgeon.—It seems basic that what constitutes proper
medical treatment is a medical question that should have been presented to experts. If no standard is
established through expert medical witnesses, then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic
issue of breach thereof by the physician or surgeon. The RTC and Court of Appeals, and even this Court,
could not be expected to determine on its own what medical technique should have been utilized for a
certain disease or injury. Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in
speculations. Lucas vs. Tuaño, 586 SCRA 173, G.R. No. 178763 April 21, 2009

Quasi- Delict vs. Breach of Contracts/ Culpa Contractual

Air France vs. Carrasco, 18 SCRA 155

1. Common carriers; Contracts; First class tickets.-

A written document speaks a uniform language; the spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only
to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the terms of a ticket
is desirable.

2. Common carriers; Damages; Moral damages; Trial; Bad faith in breach of contract of carriage.-

Where at the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard that he intended to
prove that, while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, the respondent was ousted .by petitioner's manager,
who gave his seat to a white man, and evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
presented without objection on the part of the petitioner, it is therefore unnecessary to inquire as to
whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence.

3. Common carriers; Exemplary damages.-

The New Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-
contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first
class seat fits into this legal precept.

4. Common carriers; Attorney's fees.-

The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorney's fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and
equitable that attorneys’ fees be given. We do not intend to break tradition that discretion well
exercised—as it was here—should not be disturbed.

Philippine School Business Administration vs. CA, GR. 84698

1. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that the damage should have been
caused by pupils or students of the educational institution.-

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more
recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article
2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants
of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.

2. Civil Law; Contracts; An academic institution enters into a contract when it accepts students for
enrollment; The contract between school and student is one "imbued with public interest".-
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students
with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore
the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

3. Civil Law; Human Relations; Article 21; Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.-

Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to
forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better
right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was
the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From
the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith
and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. In the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of
the school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Manila Railroad vs. La Compania Transatlantica, GR. 11318

1.CARBIERS; CONTRACTS; LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE DONE IN DISCHARGING CARGO.—A steamship

company is liable upon its contract of carriage for damage resulting- to cargo by reason of the
negligence of a contracting company in discharging the freight from the ship's hold; and the
circumstance that the steamship company had used due diligence in selecting a competent person to
discharge the cargo does not exempt the ship's company from liability. The failure to comply with a
contractual obligation cannot be excused by proof that the damage was due to the negligence of one
whom the contracting party has selected to perform the contract.

2.NEGLIGENCE; EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.—A contract exempting a party from
liability for the damages consequent upon accidents occurring in the course of certain operations will
not be construed to extend to damages resulting from the negligence of the contracting party or its
servants in conducting such operations, unless the contract is so explicit as to leave no room for doubt
that the parties so intended. Contracts against liability for negligence are not favored in the law and
should be strictly construed, with every intendment against the party claiming "the benefit of the
exemption from such. liability.

3.ID. ; ID. ; CASE AT BAR.—A contracting company was employed by a steamship company to lift a
number of heavy steamboilers from the ship's hold and place them on a lighter alongside, with the
understanding that while the contracting company would use due care in getting the boilers out, no
responsibility would be assumed by it for accidents due to any hidden defect in the lifting apparatus or
other unforeseen occurrence. There was no express reservation with. regard to damage attributable to
the negligence of the contracting company, or - its agents in the lifting operations. In the course of
discharging the boilers, serious damage was done to one of them by reason of the negligence of the
person in charge of the lifting operations. Held: That the contracting company was liable for the damage
thus done in the performance of its contract and could not be exempted by reason of the fact that it had
used due care in selecting the servant whom it had placed in charge of the work.

4.ID.; "CULPA CONTRACTUAL" AND "CULPA AQUILIANA" DISTINGUISHED.—Negligence incident to the

performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) is entirely distinct from negligence
considered as an independent source of liability in the absence of special relation. The latter species of
negligence is the culpa, aquiliana of the civil law; and liability arising therefrom is governed by articles
1902-1904 of the Civil Code; while the liability incident to the performance of contractual obligations 'is
governed by articles 1101 et seq. and other special provisions relative to contractual obligations.

5.ID.; LlABILlTY OF OFFICIOUS MEDDLER (GESTOR OFICIOSO).—A party who, in the absence of any
contract whatever, officiously under takes to do a service with respect to the property of another, as in
moving it from one place to another, is liable for any damage resulting thereto by reason of negligence
on his part or that of his servants in performing such service.

6.CONTRACTS; PRIVITY OF CONTRACT; ACTION BY OWNER FOR DAMAGB IN DISCHARGE OP FREIGHT.—A

contracting company which undertakes to remove freight ,from a ship's hold, subject to certain
conditions defined in a contract made with the steamship company, is not liable to the owner of freight
for damage done thereto in the lifting operations. In such case the owner of the freight must Ipok for
redress to the ship's company and for lack of privity cannot maintain an action on the contract made
between the ship's company and the other. Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compania Trasatldntica., 38 Phil.
875, No. 11318 October 26, 1918

LRTA vs. Navidad, 397 SCRA 75

1. Civil Law; Contracts; Contract of Carriage; The law requires common carriers to carry passengers
safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.-
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are
within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.

2. Civil Law; Contracts; Contract of Carriage; Instances when a common carrier becomes liable for death
of or injury to passengers.-

The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or willful acts of its employees or b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

3. Civil Law; Contracts; Contract of Carriage; Presumption of Negligence; In case of such death or injury,
a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent.-

In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, andby
simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of
the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

4. Civil Law; Obligations; Tort; The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on
the part of the employee.-

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions
of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise,
however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault
is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that
the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its
employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.

5. Civil Law; Obligations; Tort; In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is
that which breaches the contract.-

A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury,
one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well
apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

6. Civil Law; Damages; Nominal Damages; It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist
with compensatory damages.-
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.

Quasi Delict vs. Delicts/ Culpa criminal

Barredo vs Garcia and Almario, GR. No. 48006, July 8, 1942

1. Damages; Quasi-delict or "Culpa Aquiliana"; Primary and Direct Responsibility of Employers under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.-

—A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela resulted in the death of a 16-year-old boy, one of
the passengers of the carretela. A criminal action was filed against the taxi driver and he was convicted
and sentenced accordingly. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. Thereafter the parents of the deceased brought suit for damages
against the proprietor of the taxi, the employer of the taxi driver, under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Defendant contended that his liability was governed by the Revised Penal Code, according to which his
responsibility was only secondary, but no civil action had been brought against the taxi driver. Held: That
this separate civil action lies, the employer being primarily and directly responsible in damages under
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.

2. Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Practice of Relying Solely on Civil Responsibility for a Crime.-

—The harm done by such practice is pointed out, and the principle of responsibility for fault or neg-
ligence under articles 1902 et seq., of the Civil Code is restored to its full vigor.

3. Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Expeditious Remedy.-

—The primary and direct responsibility of employer under article 1903, Civil Code, is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs. Such primary and direct responsibility of employers is calculated to
protect society.

4. Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Degree of Proof.-

—There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt,
but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910, Civil Code. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

5. Id.; Id.; Id.; Foundations of Doctrines Above Set Forth; Literal Meaning of the Law.-
— The Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence; if it should be held that
articles 1902-1910, Civil Code, apply only to negligence not punishable by law, culpa aquiliana would
have very little application in actual life. The literal meaning of the law will not be used to smother a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana.

6. Id.; Id.; Id.; Decisions of this Court.-

—Decisions of this Court are also cited holding that, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a
euasirdelito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for. which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for his civil liability arising
from his crime.

7. Id.; Id.; Id.; Sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.-

—The decision cites sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain upholding the principles above set
forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution,
independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under
article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.

8. Id.; Id.; Id.; Opinions of Jurists.-

—The decision sets out extracts from opinions of jurists on the separate existence of cuasi-delicts and
the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

9. Id.; Id.; Id.; Distinction between Crimes under the Penal Code and the "Culpa Aquiliana" or "Cuasi-
Delito" under the Civil Code.-

— A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-
delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or
culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which
remedy to enforce. Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are enumerated in the decision.

10. Id.; Id.; Id.-

—The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the
five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos * *
* en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind
of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-1910. This
portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.

11. Id.; Id.; Id.-

—The individuality of cuati-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In
fact, in Spanish legal términology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas
also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code: for instance,
Law 6, Title 16, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, cómo quier que el non fizo a
sabiendas el daño al otro, pero acaesció por su culpa."

12. Id.; Id.; Id.-

—A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.
Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and
direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

Elcano vs. Hill, May 26, 1977

1. Civil law; Damages; Quasi-delicts; The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character, whether voluntary or negligent.-

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia—that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplates only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts—deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact is actually extends to
fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that
obligations “which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by
law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter 11, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)”
And it is precisely the underlined qualification, “not punishable by law,” that Justice Bocobo emphasized
could lead to an undesirable construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that “killeth, rather
than the spirit that giveth life” hence, the ruling that “(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as
culpa aquiliana or causi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.” And so, because Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted
the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the
Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, “not punishable by law,” thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or negligent.
2. Civil law; Damages; Quasi-delicts; A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the victim do not
recover damages on both scores.-

. . . It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

3. Civil law; Damages; Quasi-delicts; The vicarious liability of the parents on account of a delict
committed by their minor child is not extinguished by the fact that said, child who is Hiring with and
dependent upon said parents is married.-

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald’s emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. . . . . It must be borne in
mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue
or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id.,
Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a
minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent, (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in Our considered
view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty.
Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.

Proscription Against Double Recovery, NCC: Articles 2177

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom, Sept. 5, 2002

1. Civil Law; Negligence; Quasi-delict; Requisites to sustain a claim for quasi delict.-

To sustain a claim based on quasi delict, the following requisites must be proven: (a) damage suffered by
the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

2. Civil Law; Negligence; Quasi-delict; Offended party cannot “recover damages twice for the same act or
omission” or under both causes.-
These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed of, subject to the ca- veat that
the offended party cannot “recover damages twice for the same act or omission” or under both causes.
Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and independent of each other, the failure to recover in one
will not necessarily preclude recovery in the other.

3. Civil Law; Negligence; Quasi-delict; Damages; Motor Vehicle Law; Petitioner held liable for the deaths
and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the
accident on July 17, 1994; Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the
lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; In contemplation of law, the
owner I operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being
considered as merely its agent.-

We hold petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered
owner of the tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994. The Court has consistently ruled that,
regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the
public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer
of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent. The same principle
applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service.

Lim vs. Ping, August 23, 2012

1. Civil Liability; A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender-

—(1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued
independently of the criminal proceedings.―A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended
party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender. ―(1) civil liability ex
delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on “an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach
of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the
Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”).

Negligence, NCC: Articles 1172 – 1174

Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil 809 (1918)

1. NEGLIGENCE; CRITERION FOR DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF NEGLI-GENCE.-

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results
to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to
take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is the
constitutive fact in negligence.

2. NEGLIGENCE; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; SUCCESSIVE NEGLIGENT ACTS.-

Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by
an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.

3. NEGLIGENCE; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; CASE AT BAR.-

The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge, Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse
over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however, guided his car toward the
plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He then turned to the right but
passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the
passing car. Held: That although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the
bridge, the defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as
he had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident af ter he realized the situation created by the negligence
of the plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the plaintiff could by no means then
place himself in a position of greater safety.

Corliss vs. Manila Rail Road, March 28, 1969

2. Damages; Negligence; One is liable for damages for act of negligence causing damage to another.-

The Civil Code making clear .that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done. (Art. 2176) Unless it could be satisfactorily
shown, therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence, then it could not be held liable.

3. Damages; Negligence; Definition.-

Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care
is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.

4. Damages; Negligence; Where victim has duty to stop despite failure of appellee’s employer to put
down crossing bars.-

The f irst two assigned ‘errors would make much of ,the failure of the lower court to hold that the
crossing bars not having been put down and there being no guard at the gate-house, there still was a
duty on the part of the- victim to stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that main witness of defendant-
appellee, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the time of the accident. For one cannot
just single out a circumstance and then confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance.
Considered separately, neither of the two above errors assigned would call for a judgment different in
character. Nor would a combination of acts allegedly impressed with negligence suffice to alter the
result. The quantum of proof required still had not been met. The alleged errors fail of their desired
effect. The case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it was, had not been improved. There is no justification
for reversing the judgment of the lower court.

5. Damages; Negligence; Criminal negligence; May be attributed to a person who does not exercise
precaution and control in crossing railroads.-

A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who
does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost
immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs
and injury results.

6. Damages; Negligence; Where facts of the case show it was incumbent upon the victim to stop his
vehicle.-

Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff s witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his
familiarity with the set up of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks, and on the further fact that the
locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is dear that the victim
was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a
possible accident—and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the
train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner. This,
unfortunately, the victim failed to do.

Gaid vs. People, April 7, 2009

Civil Law; Negligence; Definition of Negligence; Elements of Simple Negligence; Standard test in
determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another.—Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements of simple
negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. The standard test in
determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Definition of Proximate Cause; In order to establish
a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle; it must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.—Assuming
arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it
must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of
the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.

Pacis vs. Morales, February 25, 2010

1. Quasi-Delicts; Torts and Damages; Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, an injured party may enforce
his claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code or he may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code; Unlike
the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a person’s own negligence.-

—This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of
the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from
the crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file an independent civil action
for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the
homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages
against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter,
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article
2176 states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

2. Same; Same; Gun Stores; A gun store owner is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety
and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm
or injury to others.-

—As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should
have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should
be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely
because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been
stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that
it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm
from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon
is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was
negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which
authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade
firearms.

3. Same; Same; A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his
control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or
substances.-

—A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.

Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. CA and Ernest Simke, November 8, 1988

3. Administrative Law; Functions of the CAA; Torts and Damages; Due Diligence; In the discharge of its
functions, the CAA is duty bound to exercise due diligence in overseeing the construction and
maintenance of the viewing deck of the airport.-
Hence, the CAA cannot disclaim its liability for the negligent construction of the elevation since under
Republic Act No. 776, it was charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping,
expanding, improving, repairing or altering aerodromes or such structures, improvements or air
navigation facilities [Section 32, supra, R.A. 776.] In the discharge of this obligation, the CAA is duty-
bound to exercise due diligence in overseeing the construction and maintenance of the viewing deck or
terrace of the airport.

4. Administrative Law; Functions of the CAA; Torts and Damages; Due Diligence; Quasi-
Delict;Negligence; Failure of the CAA to have the dangerous elevation repaired in order to eliminate
existing hazards constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict
under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code.-

The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article 2176 of the Civil Code
which provides that "(w)hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done...." As the CAA knew of the existence of the
dangerous elevation which it claims though, was made precisely in accordance with the plans and
specifications of the building for proper drainage of the open terrace [See Record on Appeal, pp. 13 and
57; Rollo, p. 39], its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the existing hazard
constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon CAA.

5. Administrative Law; Functions of the CAA; Torts and Damages; Due Diligence; Quasi-
Delict;Negligence; Contributory Negligence; Applying the test formulated in Picart vs. Smith (37 PHIL
809) private respondent is not guilty of contributory negligence because he could not have reasonably
foreseen the harm that would befall him considering the circumstances.-

The Court finds the contention that private respondent was, at the very least, guilty of contributory
negligence, thus reducing the damages that plaintiff may recover, unmeritorious. Contributory
negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of
the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being the defendant's lack of due care. In the instant case,
no contributory negligence can be imputed to the private respondent, considering the following test
formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918): The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that. x x x The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not
have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual
circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in
question could not easily be noticed because of its construction.

6. Administrative Law; Functions of the CAA; Torts and Damages; Due Diligence; Damages; The grant
upon the CAA of the power to sue and be sued necessarily implies that it can be held answerable for
damages for its tortious acts or any wrongful act for that matter.-

Finally, petitioner appeals to this Court the award of damages to private respondent. The liability of CAA
to answer for damages, whether actual, moral or exemplary, cannot be seriously doubted in view of the
conferment of the power to sue and be sued upon it, which, as held in the case of Rayo v. Court of First
Instance, supra, includes liability on a claim for quasi-delict. In the aforestated case, the liability of the
National Power Corporation to answer for damages resulting from its act of sudden, precipitate and
simultaneous opening of the Angat Dam, which caused the death of several residents of the area and
the destruction of properties, was upheld since the grant of the power to sue and be sued upon it
necessarily implies that it can be held answerable for its tortious acts or any wrongful act for that
matter.

7. Administrative Law; Functions of the CAA; Torts and Damages; Due Diligence; Damages; Actual or
Compensatory Damages; The law mandates that actual or compensatory damages should be proven.-

With respect to actual or compensatory damages, the law mandates that the same be proven. Art. 2199.
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages [New Civil Code]. Private respondent claims P15,589.55 representing medical
and hospitalization bills. This Court finds the same to have been duly proven through the testimony of
Dr. Ambrosio Tangco, the physician who attended to private respondent (Rollo, p. 26) and who
identified Exh. "H" which was his bill for professional services [Rollo, p. 31]. Concerning the P20,200.00
alleged to have been spent for other expenses such as the transportation of the two lawyers who had to
represent private respondent abroad and the publication of the postponement notices of the wedding,
the Court holds that the same had also been duly proven. Private respondent had adequately shown the
existence of such losses and the amount thereof in the testimonies before the trial court [CA decision, p.
8.]

8. Administrative Law; Functions of the CAA; Torts and Damages; Due Diligence; Damages; Moral
Damages; Because of the physical suffering and injuries of private respondent as a result of petitioner's
negligence, the former is entitled to moral damages.-
With respect to the P30,000.00 awarded as moral damages, the Court holds private respondent entitled
thereto because of the physical suffering and physical injuries caused by the negligence of the CAA [Arts
2217 and 2219 (2), New Civil Code].

9. Administrative Law; Functions of the CAA; Torts and Damages; Due Diligence; Damages;Exemplary
Damages; The wanton disregard of the CAA of the safety of the people using the viewing deck, makes it
guilty of gross negligence and justifies the award of exemplary damages.-

Gross negligence which, according to the Court, is equivalent to the term "notorious negligence" and
consists in the failure to exercise even slight care [Caunan v. Compania General de Tabacos, 56 Phil. 542
(1932)] can be attributed to the CAA for its failure to remedy the dangerous condition of the questioned
elevation or to even post a warning sign directing the attention of the viewers to the change in the
elevation of the floorings notwithstanding its knowledge of the hazard posed by such elevation [Rollo,
pp. 28-29; Record on Appeal, p. 57]. The wanton disregard by the CAA of the safety of the people using
the viewing deck, who are charged an admission fee, including the petitioner who paid the entrance
fees to get inside the vantage place [CA decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 25] and are, therefore, entitled to expect
a facility that is properly and safely maintained—justifies the award of exemplary damages against the
CAA as a deterrent and by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of P40,000.00 by
the trial court as exemplary damages appropriately underscores the point that as an entity charged with
providing service to the public, the CAA, like all other entities serving the public, has the obligation to
provide the public with reasonably safe service.

10. Administrative Law; Functions of the CAA; Torts and Damages; Due Diligence; Damages;Attorney's
Fees; Attorney's fees may be awarded whenever exemplary damages are awarded.-

Finally, the award of attorney's fees is also upheld considering that under Art. 2208 (1) of the Civil Code,
the same may be awarded whenever exemplary damages are awarded, as in this case, and, at any rate,
under Art. 2208 (11), the Court has the discretion to grant the same when it is just and equitable.

11. Administrative Law; Executive Order No. 778 (E. O. 778); The liabilities of the now defunct CAA have
been transferred to NAIA pursuant to E.O. 778.-

However, since the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) has taken over the management and
operations of the Manila International Airport [renamed Ninoy Aquino International Airport under
Republic Act No. 6639] pursuant to Executive Order No. 778 as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 903
(1983), 909 (1983) and 298 (1987) and under Section 24 of the said Exec. Order 778, the MIAA has
assumed all the debts, liabilities and obligations of the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), the liabilities of the CAA have now been transferred to the MIAA.
 Makati Shangri-La vs. Harper, GR. 189998

1. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed if
strict adherence to their letter will result in absurdity and in manifest injustice, or where the merits of a
party’s cause are apparent and outweigh considerations of non-compliance with certain formal
requirements.-

—The principle of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies and situations do occasionally
demand some flexibility in the rigid application of the rules of procedure and the laws. That rules of
procedure may be mandatory in form and application does not forbid a showing of substantial
compliance under justifiable circumstances, because substantial compliance does not equate to a
disregard of basic rules. For sure, substantial compliance and strict adherence are not always
incompatible and do not always clash in discord. The power of the Court to suspend its own rules or to
except any particular case from the operation of the rules whenever the purposes of justice require the
suspension cannot be challenged. In the interest of substantial justice, even procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance are frequently relaxed. Similarly, the procedural rules
should definitely be liberally construed if strict adherence to their letter will result in absurdity and in
manifest injustice, or where the merits of a party’s cause are apparent and outweigh considerations of
non-compliance with certain formal requirements. It is more in accord with justice that a party-litigant is
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his claim or defense than for him to lose his life,
liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. Truly, the rules of procedure are intended to promote
substantial justice, not to defeat it, and should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.

2. Civil Law; Filiation; Evidence; The Court sustained the Cabais petitioners’ stance that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) had apparently erred in relying on the baptismal certificate to establish filiation, stressing
the baptismal certificate’s limited evidentiary value as proof of filiation inferior to that of a birth
certificate; and declaring that the baptismal certificate did not attest to the veracity of the statements
regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized.-

—The Court sustained the Cabais petitioners’ stance that the RTC had apparently erred in relying on the
baptismal certificate to establish filiation, stressing the baptismal certificate’s limited evidentiary value
as proof of filiation inferior to that of a birth certificate; and declaring that the baptismal certificate did
not attest to the veracity of the statements regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized. Nevertheless, the
Court ultimately ruled that it was respondents’ failure to present the birth certificate, more than
anything else, that lost them their case, stating that: “The unjustified failure to present the birth
certificate instead of the baptismal certificate now under consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by
any other means recognized by law weigh heavily against respondents.”

Same; Hotelkeepers; The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to the persons and
belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business.―The hotel business is
imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging
for their guests but also security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes
the essence of the business. Applying by analogy Article 2000, Article 2001 and Article 2002 of the Civil
Code (all of which concerned the hotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as to the personal
effects of their guests), we hold that there is much greater reason to apply the same if not greater
degree of care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests are involved.
Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers have unrestricted access to all the
hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors of the guests, without being held liable should anything
untoward befall the unwary guests. That would be absurd, something that no good law would ever
envision.

Dyteban vs Jose Ching, GR. 161803

Civil Law; Damages; Quasi-Delict; Requisites to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict.—Article 2176 of
the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-
delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by plaintiff.

Same; Same; Same; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Definition of Negligence; Test of negligence stated
in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith.—Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The Supreme Court stated the
test of negligence in the landmark case Picart v. Smith as follows: The test by which to determine the
existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. (Italics supplied) The
test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary
reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking
the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary reasonable person would
have used in the same situation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court of Appeals reliance on Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 256
SCRA 746 (1996), as authority for the proposition that kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute
early warning device is misplaced.—Anent the absence of an early warning device on the prime mover,
the CA erred in accepting the bare testimony of Limbaga that he placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the
front and rear of the prime mover. The evidence on records belies such claim. The CA reliance on
Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 746 (1996), as authority for the proposition that
kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute early warning device is misplaced.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Definition of Proximate Cause; There is no exact
mathematical formula to determine proximate cause.—Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that
cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a
sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or
far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable
result of the act or omission.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary.—Even granting that the
passenger bus was at fault, it’s fault will not necessarily absolve private respondents from liability. If at
fault, the passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private respondents. The liability of joint
tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages
from the collision.

Associated Bank vs. Tan, GR. 156940

1. Commercial Law; Banks and Banking; The right of a collecting bank to debit a client’s account for the
value of a dishonored check that has previously been credited has fairly been established by
jurisprudence.-

A bank generally has a right of setoff over the deposits therein for the payment of any withdrawals on
the part of a depositor. The right of a collecting bank to debit a client’s account for the value of a
dishonored check that has previously been credited has fairly been established by jurisprudence. To
begin with, Article 1980 of the Civil Code provides that “[f]ixed, savings, and current deposits of money
in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.”

2. Commercial Law; Banks and Banking; The relationship between banks and depositors has been held
to take place.-

The relationship between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor and debtor. Thus,
legal compensation under Article 1278 of the Civil Code may take place “when all the requisites
mentioned in Article 1279 are present,” as follows: “(1) That each one of the obligors be bound
principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) That both debts consist
in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same
quality if the latter has been stated; (3) That the two debts be due; (4) That they be liquidated and
demandable; (5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third
persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.”

3. Commercial Law; Banks and Banking; By the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat
the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care.-

In BPI v. Casa Montessori, the Court has emphasized that the banking business is impressed with public
interest. “Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and
performance are even required of it. By the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat
the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care.”

4. Commercial Law; Banks and Banking; The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a
good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors is
concerned; The standard applies, regardless of whether the account consists of only a few hundred
pesos or of millions.-

Also affirming this long standing doctrine, Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals has held
that “the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family where the
fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned.” Indeed, the banking business is
vested with the trust and confidence of the public; hence the “appropriate standard of diligence must
be very high, if not the highest, degree of diligence.” The standard applies, regardless of whether the
account consists of only a few hundred pesos or of millions.

5. Commercial Law; Banks and Banking; It is indeed arguable that “in signing the deposit slip, the
depositor does so only to identify himself and not to agree to the conditions set forth at the back of the
deposit slip”.-

This reservation is not enough to insulate the bank from any liability. In the past, we have expressed
doubt about the binding force of such conditions unilaterally imposed by a bank without the consent of
the depositor. It is indeed arguable that “in signing the deposit slip, the depositor does so only to
identify himself and not to agree to the conditions set forth at the back of the deposit slip.”

6. Commercial Law; Banks and Banking; Negotiable Instruments Law; Under the provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law regarding the liability of a general indorser and the procedure for a notice
of dishonor, it was incumbent on the bank to give proper notice to respondent.-

Under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law regarding the liability of a general indorser and
the procedure for a notice of dishonor, it was incumbent on the bank to give proper notice to
respondent. In Gullas v. National Bank, the Court emphasized: “x x x [A] general indorser of a negotiable
instrument engages that if the instrument—the check in this case—is dishonored and the necessary
proceedings for its dishonor are duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder (Sec. 66) It has
been held by a long line of authorities that notice of dishonor is necessary to charge an indorser and
that the right of action against him does not accrue until the notice is given.

Francisco vs. Chemical Bulk Carriers, GR. 193577

1. Words and Phrases; Standard of Conduct; Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and
place.-

—Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and place. The most common standard of
conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a reasonably prudent person. To determine the
diligence which must be required of all persons, we use as basis the abstract average standard
corresponding to a normal orderly person.

2. Same; Estoppel; In order that there may be estoppel, the owner must, by word or conduct, have
caused or allowed it to appear that title or authority to sell is with the seller and the buyer must have
been misled to his damage.-

—The exception from the general principle is the doctrine of estoppel where the owner of the goods is
precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell. But in order that there may be estoppel, the owner
must, by word or conduct, have caused or allowed it to appear that title or authority to sell is with the
seller and the buyer must have been misled to his damage.

3. Same; The owner of the goods who has been unlawfully deprived of it may recover it even from a
purchaser in good faith.-

—Moreover, the owner of the goods who has been unlawfully deprived of it may recover it even from a
purchaser in good faith. Thus, the purchaser of property which has been stolen from the owner has
been held to acquire no title to it even though he purchased for value and in good faith.

4. Sales; The general principle is that a seller without title cannot transfer a better title than he has. Only
the owner of the goods or one authorized by the owner to sell can transfer title to the buyer.-

—The general principle is that a seller without title cannot transfer a better title than he has. Only the
owner of the goods or one authorized by the owner to sell can transfer title to the buyer. Therefore, a
person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire
no more than what the seller can legally transfer.

Phil Hawk Corp vs Vivian Tan, GR. 166869

4. Damages; Loss of Earning Capacity; The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is
awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money; As a rule, documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity;Exceptions.-

—The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil
Code. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn
money. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.

5. Same; The Court of Appeals is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision
of the case.-

—Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 8. Questions that may be
decided.—No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the
judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment
of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save
as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors. Philippine National Bank v. Rabat, 344 SCRA 706
(2000) cited the book of Justice Florenz D. Regalado to explain the section above, thus: In his book, Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on this section, thus: 1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the
former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now includes some substantial changes in the rules on assignment of errors.
The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the
court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been
added errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein. Also, even
if the error complained of by a party is not expressly stated in his assignment of errors but the same is
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in his brief, such error may
now be considered by the court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin. 2. The procedure in the
Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise indicated (see
Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that the latter is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary
in arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error closely related to an error properly
assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or upon which the determination of the question
raised by error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, L-28773, June
30, 1975; Soco vs. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28, 1983). It may also be observed that under
Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is authorized to consider a plain error, although it was not
specifically assigned by the appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649), otherwise it would
be sacrificing substance for technicalities.
6. Same; Same; Same; Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection or supervision of its employees.-

—Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee,
an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. The Court
upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent,
since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct
behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner’s tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical
fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents.

7. Torts; Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence-

—to be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably
subjected to a general but definite class of risks.—A review of the records showed that it was
petitioner’s witness, Efren Delantar Ong, who was about 15 meters away from the bus when he saw the
vehicular accident. Nevertheless, this fact does not affect the finding of the trial court that petitioner’s
bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple negligence as affirmed by the appellate court.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or
failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of
certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks. In this case, the bus
driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the
road before the collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove
on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road,
showing that the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the
passenger jeep.

Li vs. Soliman, GR. 165279

Medical Malpractice; Medical malpractice, or more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of
claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional
which has caused bodily harm.-

—The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical
negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed
by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a
patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something
which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that
a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the
patient.

2. Same; Same; Respondents accepted the risks that chemotherapy offered with full knowledge of its
effects on their daughter.-

—The Solimans accepted the risks that chemotherapy offered with full knowledge of its effects on their
daughter. It is not fair that they should blame Dr. Li for Angelica’s suffering and death brought about by
a decease that she did not wish upon her. Indeed, it was not Dr. Li, according to Reynaldo, who
convinced him to agree to submit his daughter to chemotherapy but Dr. Tamayo. The latter explained to
him the need for her daughter to undergo chemotherapy to increase the chance of containing her
cancer. This consultation took place even before the Solimans met Dr. Li.

3. Same; Same; Respondents are arguing from hindsight. The fact is that they were willing to assume
huge risks on the chance that their daughter could cheat death.-

—The Solimans are arguing from hindsight. The fact is that they were willing to assume huge risks on the
chance that their daughter could cheat death. They did not mind that their young daughter’s left leg
would be amputated from above the knee for a 50% chance of preventing the spread of the cancer.
There is probably no person on this planet whose family members, relatives, or close friends have not
been touched by cancer. Every one knows of the travails and agonies of chemotherapy, yet it is rare
indeed for a cancer patient or his relatives not to take a chance with this treatment, which had proved
successful in extending the lives of some. Unfortunately for the Solimans, their daughter did not number
among the successful cases.

4. Medical Malpractice; Doctrine of Informed Consent; The claim that Dr. Li gave assurance that Angelica
had 95% chance of recovery after chemotherapy cannot be believed-

—it would be most unlikely for someone of Dr. Li’s expertise to make such a grossly reckless claim to a
patient who actually had only a 20% chance of surviving the first year. She would literally be inviting a
malpractice suit.—The claim that Dr. Li gave assurance that Angelica had a 95% chance of recovery after
chemotherapy cannot be believed. The Solimans knew that their daughter had bone cancer. Having
consulted with other doctors from four medical institutions, the Ago Medical and Educational Center in
Bicol, the UERM Medical Center in Manila, the National Children’s Hospital in Quezon City, and finally
the St. Luke’s hospital, all of whom gave the same dire opinion, it would be quite unlikely for the
Solimans to accept Dr. Li’s supposed assurance that their daughter had 95% chance of returning to
normal health after chemotherapy. In fact, it would be most unlikely for someone of Dr. Li’s expertise to
make such a grossly reckless claim to a patient who actually had only a 20% chance of surviving the first
year. She would literary be inviting a malpractice suit.

5. Same; Specific disclosures such as life expectancy probabilities are not legally necessary or required to
be disclosed in informed consent situations.-
—A third consideration is that specific disclosures such as life expectancy probabilities are not legally
necessary or “required to be disclosed in informed consent situations,” thus the respondent Lina
Soliman’s testimony on this point cannot be given any probative value. Thus, in the landmark case of
Arato v. Avedon, —where family members of a patient who died of pancreatic cancer brought an
informed consent action against defendant physicians who failed to provide the patient material
information (statistical life expectancy) necessary for his informed consent to undergo chemotherapy
and radiation treatment—the Supreme Court of California “rejected the mandatory disclosure of life
expectancy probabilities” on account “of the variations among doctor-patient interactions and the
intimacy of the relationship itself.”

6. Same; Sufficiency of disclosure can be made only after determination and assessment of risks have
been made.-

—The ponencia concludes that “there was adequate disclosure of material risks of the [chemotherapy
administered] with the consent of Angelica’s parents” in view of the fact that the petitioner informed
the respondents of the side effects of chemotherapy, such as low white and red blood cell and platelet
count, kidney or heart damage and skin darkening. I cannot agree with this conclusion because it was
made without the requisite premises. As heretofore discussed, sufficiency of disclosure can be made
only after a determination and assessment of risks have been made. As discussed above, no evidence
exists showing that these premises have been properly laid and proven. Hence, for lack of basis, no
conclusion can be made on whether sufficient disclosure followed. In other words, the disclosure cannot
be said to be sufficient in the absence of evidence of what, in the first place, should be disclosed.

7. Same; Dr. Balmaceda’s testimony failed to establish the existence of the risks or side-effects the
petitioner should have disclosed to them in the use of chemotherapy in the treatment of
osteosarcoma.-

—Unfortunately for the respondents, Dr. Balmaceda’s testimony failed to establish the existence of the
risks or side-effects the petitioner should have disclosed to them in the use of chemotherapy in the
treatment of osteosarcoma; the witness, although a medical doctor, could not have testified as an
expert on these points for the simple reason that she is not an oncologist nor a qualified expert on the
diagnosis and treatment of cancers. Neither is she a pharmacologist who can properly advance an
opinion on the toxic side effects of chemotherapy, particularly the effects of Cisplatin, Doxorubicin and
Cosmegen—the drugs administered to Angelica. As a doctor whose specialty encompasses hospital
management and administration, she is no different from a layperson for purposes of testifying on the
risks and probabilities that arise from chemotherapy.

8. Same; In the present case, expert testimony is required in determining the risks and or side effects of
chemotherapy that the attending physician should have considered and disclosed as these are clearly
beyond the knowledge of a layperson to testify on.-

—In the present case, expert testimony is required in determining the risks and or side effects of
chemotherapy that the attending physician should have considered and disclosed as these are clearly
beyond the knowledge of a layperson to testify on. In other words, to prevail in their claim of lack of
informed consent, the respondents must present expert supporting testimony to establish the scope of
what should be disclosed and the significant risks attendant to chemotherapy that the petitioner should
have considered and disclosed; the determination of the scope of disclosure, and the risks and their
probability are matters a medical expert must determine and testify on since these are beyond the
knowledge of laypersons.

9. Medical Malpractice; Philippine jurisprudence tells us that expert testimony is crucial, if not
determinative of a physician’s liability in a medical negligence case; Expert testimony is, therefore,
essential since the factual issue of whether a physician or surgeon exercised the requisite degree of skill
and care in the treatment of his patient is generally a matter of expert opinion.-

—Philippine jurisprudence tells us that expert testimony is crucial, if not determinative of a physician’s
liability in a medical negligence case. In litigations involving medical negligence as in any civil action, we
have consistently ruled that the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence the essential
elements—i.e., duty, breach, injury and proximate causation—rests with the plaintiff. Expert testimony
is, therefore, essential since the factual issue of whether a physician or surgeon exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is generally a matter of expert opinion.

10. Same; Same; Infection, sepsis and death are material risks and side effects of chemotherapy.-

—Clearly, infection, sepsis and death are material risks and side effects of chemotherapy. To any
reasonable person, the risk of death is one of the most important, if not the most important,
consideration in deciding whether to undergo a proposed treatment. Thus, Dr. Li should have disclosed
to Reynaldo and Lina that there was a chance that their 11-year old daughter could die as a result of
chemotherapy as, in fact, she did after only 13 days of treatment.

11. Same; Same; Dr. Li impliedly admits that she failed to disclose to Reynaldo and Lina many of the
other associated risks and side effects of chemotherapy, including the most material-

—infection, sepsis and death.—Dr. Li impliedly admits that she failed to disclose to Reynaldo and Lina
many of the other associated risks and side effects of chemotherapy, including the most material—
infection, sepsis and death. She impliedly admits that she failed to disclose as risks and side effects (1)
rashes; (2) difficulty in breathing; (3) fever; (4) excretion of blood in the mouth; (5) excretion of blood in
the anus; (6) development of ulcers in the mouth; (7) sloughing off of skin; (8) systemic lupus
erythematosus; (9) carpo-pedal spasm; (10) loose bowel movement; (11) infection; (12) gum bleeding;
(13) hypovolemic shock; (14) sepsis; and (15) death in 13 days.

12. Same; Same; Under the patient standard of materiality, a doctor obligated to disclose that
information which a reasonable patient would deem material in deciding whether to proceed with a
proposed treatment.-

—Again, under the patient standard of materiality, a doctor is obligated to disclose that information
which a reasonable patient would deem material in deciding whether to proceed with a proposed
treatment. Stated differently, what should be disclosed depends on what a reasonable person, in the
same or similar situation as the patient, would deem material in deciding whether to proceed with the
proposed treatment.

13. Same; Same; In order to determine what the associated risks and side effects of proposed treatment
are, testimony by an expert witness is necessary because these are beyond the common knowledge of
ordinary people.-

—In order to determine what the associated risks and side effects of a proposed treatment are,
testimony by an expert witness is necessary because these are beyond the common knowledge of
ordinary people. In Canterbury, the Court held that, “There are obviously important roles for medical
testimony in [nondisclosure] cases, and some roles which only medical evidence can fill. Experts are
ordinarily indispensable to identify and elucidate for the fact-finder the risks of therapy.” The Court also
held that, “medical facts are for medical experts.”

14. Same; Same; Two standards by which courts determine what constitutes adequate disclosure of
associated risks and side effects of a proposed treatment: the physician standard, and the patient
standard of materiality.-

—There are two standards by which courts determine what constitutes adequate disclosure of
associated risks and side effects of a proposed treatment: the physician standard, and the patient
standard of materiality. Under the physician standard, a doctor is obligated to disclose that information
which a reasonable doctor in the same field of expertise would have disclosed to his or her patient. x x x
Under the patient standard of materiality, a doctor is obligated to disclose that information which a
reasonable patient would deem material in deciding whether to proceed with a proposed treatment.

15. Medical Malpractice; Doctrine of Informed Consent; The doctrine of informed consent requires
doctors, before administering treatment to their patients, to disclose adequately the material risks and
side effects of the proposed treatment; it is distinct from the doctor’s duty to skillfully diagnose and
treat the patient.-

—The doctrine of informed consent requires doctors, before administering treatment to their patients,
to disclose adequately the material risks and side effects of the proposed treatment. The duty to obtain
the patient’s informed consent is distinct from the doctor’s duty to skillfully diagnose and treat the
patient.

16. Same; Same; Four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the
doctrine of informed consent.-

—There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the
doctrine of informed consent: “(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to
disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to
disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4)
plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.” The gravamen in an informed consent case requires
the plaintiff to “point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have
altered her decision to undergo it.

17. Same; Same; Proficiency in diagnosis and therapy is not the full measure of a physician’s
responsibility; The physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical education, the disclosure
rule only requires of him a reasonable explanation, which means generally informing the patient in
nontechnical terms as to what is at stake, the therapy alternatives open to him, the goals expectably to
be achieved, and the risks that may ensure from particular treatment or no treatment.-

—The scope of disclosure is premised on the fact that patients ordinarily are persons unlearned in the
medical sciences. Proficiency in diagnosis and therapy is not the full measure of a physician’s
responsibility. It is also his duty to warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed treatment and to impart
information which the patient has every right to expect. Indeed, the patient’s reliance upon the
physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with
armslength transactions. The physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical education, the
disclosure rule only requires of him a reasonable explanation, which means generally informing the
patient in nontechnical terms as to what is at stake; the therapy alternatives open to him, the goals
expectably to be achieved, and the risks that may ensue from particular treatment or no treatment. As
to the issue of demonstrating what risks are considered material necessitating disclosure, it was held
that experts are unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient’s decision on
treatment, or to the reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision. Such unrevealed
risk that should have been made known must further materialize, for otherwise the omission, however
unpardonable, is without legal consequence. And, as in malpractice actions generally, there must be a
causal relationship between the physician’s failure to divulge and damage to the patient.

18. Same; Doctrine of Informed Consent; Informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the
exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be
incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own
welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or
none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against
the probable benefits.-

—The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes far back
into English common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of “battery” (i.e., an
unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if they had not gained the consent of their patients prior
to performing a surgery or procedure. In the United States, the seminal case was Schoendorff v. Society
of New York Hospital which involved unwanted treatment performed by a doctor. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo’s oft-quoted opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any medical
procedure or treatment: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” From a purely ethical norm, informed
consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his
patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so
that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the
proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by
reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.

19. Same; Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert
witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as
defendant physician or surgeon.-

—This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert
witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as
defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians
stems from the former’s realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most
instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert testimonies.

Calvo vs UCPB General, GR. 148496

Common Carriers; Customs Brokers; A customs broker is a common carrier—the concept of “common
carrier” under Article 1732 of the Civil Code may be seen to coincide nearly with the notion of “public
service,” under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416) which at least partially
supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.-

Petitioner contends that contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, she is not a
common carrier but a private carrier because, as a customs broker and warehouseman, she does not
indiscriminately hold her services out to the public but only offers the same to select parties with whom
she may contract in the conduct of her business. The contention has no merit. In De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals, the Court dismissed a similar contention and held the party to be a common carrier, thus—The
Civil Code defines “common carriers” in the following terms: “Article 1732. Common carriers are
persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the
public.” The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity . . .
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services
or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732
deliberately refrained from making such distinctions. So understood, the concept of “common carrier”
under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of “public service,” under the Public
Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on
common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.
2. Common Carriers; Customs Brokers; There is greater reason for holding a person who is a customs
broker to be a common carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her business.-

There is greater reason for holding petitioner to be a common carrier because the transportation of
goods is an integral part of her business. To uphold petitioner’s contention would be to deprive those
with whom she contracts the protection which the law affords them notwithstanding the fact that the
obligation to carry goods for her customers, as already noted, is part and parcel of petitioner’s business.

3. Common Carriers; Customs Brokers; Words and Phrases; “Extraordinary Diligence,”

Explained;Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of such case.-

As to petitioner’s liability, Art. 1733 of the Civil Code provides: Common carriers, from the nature of
their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. . . . In Compania Maritima v. Court of Appeals, the meaning of
“extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods” was explained thus: The extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow
the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale,
carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight
and “to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for
shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature
requires.”

4. Common Carriers; Customs Brokers; To prove the exercise of extraordinary diligence, a customs
broker must do more than merely show the possibility that some other party could be responsible for
the damage.-

Anent petitioner’s insistence that the cargo could not have been damaged while in her custody as she
immediately delivered the containers to SMC’s compound, suffice it to say that to prove the exercise of
extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than merely show the possibility that some other party
could be responsible for the damage. It must prove that it used “all reasonable means to ascertain the
nature and characteristic of goods tendered for [transport] and that [it] exercise[d] due care in the
handling [thereof].” Petitioner failed to do this.

5. Common Carriers; Customs Brokers; If the improper packing or the defects in the container are known
to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts the
same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for
damage resulting therefrom.-

The rule is that if the improper packing or, in this case, the defect/s in the container, is/are known to the
carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same
without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for damage
resulting therefrom. In this case, petitioner accepted the cargo without exception despite the apparent
defects in some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of petitioner to prove that she exercised
extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods in this case or that she is exempt from liability, the
presumption of negligence as provided under Art. 1735 holds.

Ridjo Tape vs. CA, GR. 126074

Contracts; Contracts of Adhesion; Contracts of adhesion are binding as ordinary contracts where the
party adhering thereto is free to reject it in its entirety.-

Evidently, the Service Contract between petitioners and MERALCO partakes of the nature of a contract
of adhesion as it was prepared solely by the latter, the only participation of the former being that they
affixed or “adhered” their signature thereto, thus, leaving no room for negotiation and depriving
petitioners of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. Nevertheless, these types of contracts have
been declared to be binding as ordinary contracts because the party adhering thereto is free to reject it
in its entirety.

2. Contracts; In construing a written contract, the reason behind and the circumstances surrounding its
execution are of paramount importance to place the interpreter in the situation occupied by the parties
concerned at the time the writing was executed.+

3. Public Utilities; Manila Electric Company; The production and distribution of electricity is a highly
technical business undertaking, and in conducting its operation, it is only logical for public utilities, such
as MERALCO, to employ mechanical devices and equipment for the orderly pursuit of its business,
devices or equipment which are susceptible to defects and mechanical failure.+

4. Public Utilities; Manila Electric Company; Contracts; Construction of the terms of a contract which
would amount to impairment or loss of right is not favored—conservation and preservation, not waiver,
abandonment or forfeiture of a right, is the rule.+

5. Public Utilities; Manila Electric Company; Negligence; Failure of MERALCO to make a reasonable and
proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction and the due
diligence to discover and repair the defects therein constitutes negligence.-

Corollarily, it must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and
proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due
diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.

6. Public Utilities; Manila Electric Company; Negligence; Constructive Notice; The presence of a
conspicuous defect which has existed for a considerable length of time will create a presumption of
constructive notice thereof; As a public utility, MERALCO has the obligation to discharge its functions
with utmost care and diligence.-
It has been held that notice of a defect need not be direct and express; it is enough that the same had
existed for such a length of time that it is reasonable to presume that it had been detected, and the
presence of a conspicuous defect which has existed for a considerable length of time will create a
presumption of constructive notice thereof. Hence, MERALCO’s failure to discover the defect, if any,
considering the length of time, amounts to inexcusable negligence. Furthermore, we need not belabor
the point that as a public utility, MERALCO has the obligation to discharge its functions with utmost care
and diligence.

7. Public Utilities; Manila Electric Company; Negligence; Public utilities should be put on notice, as a
deterrent, that if they completely disregard their duty of keeping their electric meters in serviceable
condition, they run the risk of forfeiting, by reason of their negligence, amounts originally due from their
customers.-

The rationale behind this ruling is that public utilities should be put on notice, as a deterrent, that if they
completely disregard their duty of keeping their electric meters in serviceable condition, they run the
risk of forfeiting, by reason of their negligence, amounts originally due from their customers. Certainly,
we cannot sanction a situation wherein the defects in the electric meter are allowed to continue
indefinitely until suddenly the public utilities concerned demand payment for the unrecorded electricity
utilized when, in the first place, they should have remedied the situation immediately. If we turn a blind
eye on MERALCO’s omission, it may encourage negligence on the part of public utilities, to the
detriment of the consuming public.

8. Public Utilities; Manila Electric Company; Negligence; Being a public utility vested with vital public
interest, MERALCO is impressed with certain obligations towards its customers and any omission on its
part to perform such duties would be prejudicial to its interest.-

To summarize, it is worth emphasizing that it is not our intention to impede or diminish the business
viability of MERALCO, or any public utility company for that matter. On the contrary, we would like to
stress that, being a public utility vested with vital public interest, MERALCO is impressed with certain
obligations towards its customers and any omission on its part to perform such duties would be
prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the bottom line is that those who do not exercise such
prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear the consequences of such oversight.

The heirs of Redentor Complete vs CA, GR. 172200

Appeals; Conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons, because the trial court is in a better
position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying
in the case.+
2. Damages; Temperate Damages; Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty-

—the damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.—While the amount of actual damages
was not duly established with certainty, the Court recognizes the fact that, indeed, Albayda incurred a
considerable amount for the necessary and reasonable medical expenses, loss of salary and wages, loss
of capacity to earn increased wages, cost of occupational therapy, and harm from conditions caused by
prolonged immobilization. Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Temperate damages must be
reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, the Court finds the award of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as temperate damages reasonable under the circumstances.

3. Same; Same; Same; Same; With respect to the supervision of employees, employers should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof.-

—In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of
employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

4. Same; Same; Same; Same; The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is
also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee.-

—The trial court’s finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with
Albayda at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of Completo,
as driver, and his employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-
delict is solidary. The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary
and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The civil liability of
the employer attaches even if the employer is not inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.

5. Same; Same; Same; Vicarious Liability of Employers; When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent, which presumption
may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.-

—Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall
be liable for the damagescaused by their employees, but the employers’ responsibility shall cease upon
proof that they observed all the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption
instantly arises that the employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal
presumption of negligence, he is relieved of liability. In other words, the burden of proof is on the
employer.

6. Same; Same; Same; Bicycles; Right of Way; The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal
to that of other vehicles lawfully on the highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be
required of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the other because of the physical
advantages the automobile has over the bicycle; While the duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a
motorist and a bicyclist, due to the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is required from
the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist.-

—The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on the
highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be required of a motorist than a bicyclist in
discharging his duty of care to the other because of the physical advantages the automobile has over the
bicycle. At the slow speed of ten miles per hour, a bicyclist travels almost fifteen feet per second, while a
car traveling at only twenty-five miles per hour covers almost thirty-seven feet per second, and split-
second action may be insufficient to avoid an accident. It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater
danger of harm to a bicyclist than vice versa. Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable care falls
alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due to the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is
required from the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist. Simply stated, the physical
advantages that the motor vehicle has over the bicycle make it more dangerous to the bicyclist than vice
versa.

7. Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to
the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered.-

—The instant case involved a collision between a taxicab and a bicycle which resulted in serious physical
injuries to the bicycle rider, Albayda. It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff,
that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the
plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause ofthe injury suffered. Article 2176 of the
Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. In this regard, the question of the
motorist’s negligence is a question of fact.

Hidalgo Enterprises vs Balandan, GR. L- 3422

ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE, WHAT CONSTITUTES; MAINTAINER LIABLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO CHILD.-

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child
is technically a trespasser in the premises.

2. ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE, WHAT CONSTITUTES; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO SWIMMING POOL OR

WATER TANK.-

The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location.

Negligence as Proximate Cause

Honoria Delgado Vda de Gregorio vs Go Chong Bing, 102 Phil. 556

1. DAMAGES; NEGLIGENCE; LIABILITY OF OWNER OF VEHICLE; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ACCIDENT; ACT OF

PERSON NOT RELATED TO DEFENDANT.-

The defendant a truck owner ordered FR his driver's helper and cargador who is not a licensed driver but
had only a student's permit to drive said truck. Some persons boarded the truck and among them was
one policeman by the name of VO. While the truck was on the way, it made a stop and then VO the
policeman took the wheel from FR who gave the wheel for fear of, or out of respect for the uniformed
policeman and because FR believed that the former had both the ability and authority to drive the truck,
especially as he himself had only a student's permit and not a driver's license. While the truck was being
driven by VO, it so happened that they came to a truck that was trying to park on the left side of the
road. But as they approached the parking truck, and in order to avoid colliding with it, VO swerved the
truck towards the right proceeding to hit two pedestrians and instead of applying the brake put his foot
on the gasoline and the truck did not stop but went on and hit and ran over one of the pedestrians.
Because of the accident, the policeman was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence to which
he pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. The heirs of the victim brought the present action for
damages against the defendant, owner of the truck but was dismissed by the trial court on the ground
that the death or accident was caused by an act or omission of a person who is not in any way related to
the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed contending that when defendant permitted his cargador who was not
provided with. driver's license, to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law (Section 28, Act No. 3992), and this constitutes negligence per se. Held: Where the
death or accident is caused by an act or omission of a person who is not in any way related to the
defendant and the said act is the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the victim or
accident which is punishable by law, defendant should be absolved from any civil liability. The reason is
not because one responsible for the accident had already received indemnification therefor, but
because there is no direct and proximate causal connection between the negligence or violation of the
law by the defendant to the death. of the victim.

Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil 181

1. DAMAGES; CARRIER'S LIABILITY; WORDS AND PHRASES; PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED.-

"The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom." (38 Am. Jur. pp. 695-696.)

2. DAMAGES; CARRIER'S LIABILITY; OVERTURNING OF Bus; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH.-

When a vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passenger, but most probably by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was

3. DAMAGES; CARRIER'S LIABILITY; CARRIER'S NEGLIGENCE; BURNING OF THE BUS.-

The burning of the bus wherein some of the passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through the driver and conductor who were on the road walking back and
forth. They should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this
aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected
even from a distance, Held: That the failure of the driver and the conductor to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus, constitutes negligence on the
part of the agents of the carrier under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly, Article 1733, 1759
and 1763 thereof.

Fernando vs. CA, 208 SCRA 714

1. Civil Law; Negligence; Definition of; Under the Law, a person who by his omission causes damage to
another, there being negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done.-

Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, L-21291, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
674 , 680). Under the law, a person who by his omission causes damage to another, there being
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code).

2. Civil Law; Negligence; To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of
another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage; Definition of
Proximate cause.-

To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must
establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the
New Civil Code that the defendant’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and
effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the
defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties, there
exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident.

Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 1

1. Criminal Law; Proximate Cause; Definition of proximate cause in Vda. de Bataclan, et al. vs. Medina
adopted.-

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate
cause: “x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows: “x x x ‘that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.” (at pp. 185-186)

2. Criminal Law; Proximate Cause; Death must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted; Based on Medical findings, the infection was an efficient intervening cause distinct and
foreign to the crime.-

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wound inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra). And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind
beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

3. Criminal Law; Proximate Cause; Tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier’s death with
which petitioner had nothing to do.-

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of
Javier’s death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.

4. Criminal Law; Criminal Liability; Petitioner at the very least is guilty of Slight Physical Injury.-

It strains the judicial mind to allow a dear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least,
the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner’s criminal
liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim’s own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and
Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is
allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3).

5. Criminal Law; Criminal Liability; A person while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable; a well-
settled doctrine.-

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the
criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free
of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly
liable.

Mercury Drug vs. Baking, GR. 156037

Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; Requisites to sustain a claim based on Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code.—To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

Same; Same; Same; Definition and determination of probable cause.—Proximate cause is defined as any
cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.

Same; Same; Same; When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection; Presumption may be
rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.—It is thus clear that the
employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is
caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has
been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the
supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Here, petitioner’s failure to prove that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee
will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter.

Same; Same; Same; Award of moral damages in order.—As regards the award of moral damages, we
hold the same to be in order. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act
or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in
the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s Fees and Expenses of Litigation; It is settled that the reasons or grounds for
the award thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court.—On the matter of attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, it is settled that the reasons or grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in
the decision of the court. Since the trial court’s decision did not give the basis of the award, the same
must be deleted. In Vibram Manufacturing Corporation v. Manila Electric Company, 466 SCRA 178
(2005), we held: Likewise, the award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses should be deleted. Well-
enshrined is that “an award for attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision and not
in the dispositive portion only” (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 [1995] and Keng Hua Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257
[1998]). This is also true with the litigation expenses where the body of the decision discussed nothing
for its basis.

Umali vs. Bacani, GR. L-40570

Civil law; Torts; Quasi-delicts; An electric plant company which fails to use ordinary foresight in taking
necessary precaution to eliminate tall banana plants which when blown by a moderate wind could
trigger danger, vis-a-vis, its electric lines; which after a storm and foresecable damage to its lines that
could endanger life and limb did not cut off electric power from its plant; and which, after being made
aware, thru one of its employees, that a live wire had been cut by the action of the storm, did not take
precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire, is negligent and liable for damages for
death of 3½ year old boy who went to the place where live wire is located and got into contact with it.-

A careful examination of the record convince Us that a series of negligence on the part of defendants’
employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by the
very evidence of the defendant, there were tall and big banana plants at the place of the incident
standing on an elevated ground which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric
post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant, who, with ordinary foresight,
could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be in angered by
banana plants being blown down did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of
danger to the electric line. Second, even after the employees of the Plant were already aware of the
possible damage the storm of May 11, 1972, could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a
possible threat lo life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the
lines, an act they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut.
Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he
was already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same
posed a danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent
anybody from approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left the promises because what was
foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously forgetting that if left unattended to it could
endanger life and property.

2. Civil law; Torts; Quasi-delicts; Where negligence of electric utility plant was proximate cause of death
of child, parental negligence in allowing the child to go to place where fallen live wire was located is
merely contributory.-

It may be true, as the lower Court found out, that the contributory negligence of the victim’s parents in
not properly taking care of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the morning of the
incident and to go a nearby place (cut wire was very near the house where victim was living) where the
fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, might mitigate respondent’s liability, but We cannot agree with
petitioner’s theory that the parents’ negligence constituted the proximate cause of the victim’s death
because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property that
morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above committed by defendants’ employees and
which could have killed any other person who might by accident get into contact with it. Stated
otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended due to the parents’ negligence,
he would not have died that morning were it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.

3. Civil law; Torts; Negligence of employee is presumed to be negligence of his employer who may
escape liability only by proof that it exercised diligence of good father of family to prevent damage not
only in selection of employees but in adequately supervising their work.-

The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer x x x. This liability of
the employer is primary and direct. In fact, the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may
escape liability is to prove that he exercised the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent
damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their
work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We do not find any
sufficient reason to deviate from its finding.

S.D Martinex vs. Buskirk, GR. L-5691

1. MASTER AND SERVANT; DRIVERS OF HORSES; CUSTOM AND USAGE; NEGLIGENCE.-

A coachman or driver, who had driven the horses composing his team for a considerable time, during
which the animals had shown no disposition to become unruly, left his team as usual and was assisting
in unloading the wagon when the horses bolted and running into the plaintiffs' carriage caused personal
injuries to the plaintiff and damage to the vehicle. It was further shown that, to leave teams under like
circumstances and to assist in unloading the wagon, is the custom of drivers in the city and that the
custom is sanctioned by employers. Held: That acts, the performance of which has not proven
destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to
have ripened into a custom, can not be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the
circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading
his wagon.

ISSUE

Whether or Not the defendant be liable for the negligence of his cochero?

HOLDING

No. The Court of appeals ruled in favor of the defendant. This is because the occurrence that transpired
therein was an accident resulted from an ordinary acts of life. The prima facie case was already
destroyed from the start when the defendant presented his evidence to the court by employing all the
diligence of his cochero proving that the latter was not a negligent. Hence, it proves that the defendant
is not liable for any accusations.

RULINGS

It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case. The act of defendant’s driver in leaving the horses in the manner
proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts that the performance of which has not proved
destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that
they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be of themselves unreasonable or imprudent. In fact,
the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they are beneficial rather than
prejudicial.

It is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the
accident. Those conditions showing of themselves that the defendant’s cochero was not negligent in the
management of the horse.

BPI vs. Suarez, GR. 167750

2. Same; Same; Same; Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) must at all times maintain a high level of
meticulousness and should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part.-

—While the erroneous marking of DAIF, which BPI belatedly rectified, was not the proximate cause of
Suarez’s claimed injury, the Court reminds BPI that its business is affected with public interest. Itmust at
all times maintain a high level of meticulousness and should guard against injury attributable to
negligence or bad faith on its part. Suarez had a right to expect such high level of care and diligence
from BPI. Since BPI failed to exercise such diligence, Suarez is entitled to nominal damages to vindicate
Suarez’s right to such high degree of care and diligence. Thus, we award Suarez P75,000.00 nominal
damages.

3. Same; Same; Damages; Conditions for the Award of Moral Damages.-

—The following are the conditions for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury—whether
physical, mental or psychological—clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) the culpable act or omission is
factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

4. Civil Law; Negligence; Definition of Negligence.-

—Negligence is defined as “the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent man and reasonable man could not do.” The question concerning BPI’s
negligence, however, depends on whether BPI indeed confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC
check’s face value to Suarez’s BPI account.

St. Joseph’s College vs. Jayson Miranda, GR. 182353

1. Same; Same; The mishap which happened during the science experiment was foreseeable by the
school, its officials and teachers.-

—In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which happened during
the science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in
preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost degree of
diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause
of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary’s, “for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy]
to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate
cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and conclusive between the
parties; Exceptions.-

—Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the
parties. A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted except for highly meritorious
circumstances when: (1) the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) a lower court’s inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of
fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on
the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. None of the foregoing exceptions
which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance.

3. Civil Law; Negligence; Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.-

—As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of
petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397

Issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to
make it liable for the damages sought? (2) Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in
the case at bench.

Ruling:

The record shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the
employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. Thus, after he was placed at the
edge of the pool, lifeguard Abaño immediately gave him manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter,
nurse Armando Rule arrived, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an
oxygen resuscitator. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector
immediately injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved
ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these
efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however
came late because upon examining the body he found him to be already dead. All of the foregoing
shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor
Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.

With regard to the application of doctrine of last clear chance, since it is not known how minor Ong
came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in
violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that
lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately
after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring
him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by
appellants to impute liability to appellee..

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the
peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party
charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

D. Presumption of Negligence

ii. Res Ipsa Loquitor

Layugan vs. IAC, 167 SCRA 363

1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Evidence; The rule that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed is not inflexible; it is subject to some
established exceptions.+

2. Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Negligence, Defined; The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation; It is the law that determines
what would be reckless or negligent.-

The question before us is who was negligent? Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, or as Judge
Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury." In Picart vs. Smith, decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, we
held: The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.

3. Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Negligence, Defined; Evidence; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Defined.-

At this juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to
examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care. Or as Black's Law Dictionary puts it: Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself.
Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which
ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby
negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided
character accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under
management and control of alleged wrongdoer. Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d
113, 115. Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of negli-
gence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was
such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.

4. Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Negligence, Defined; Evidence; The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstance involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.-

The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is particular to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the
duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the
presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff
has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause
of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and
all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the actual
cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, 110
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have
been so completely elucidated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made,
whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case.

5. Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Negligence, Defined; Presumption of Negligence of Master or
Employer; The presumption of negligence on the part of the master or employer is juris tantum and not
juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted; It may be overcome by proof that the employer
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of his employees.-

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In
the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent
stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's
statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to
be careful in driving.

Maao Central vs. CA,GR. 83491

1. Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Petitioner should have taken more prudent steps to prevent such
accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost; Case at bar.-

There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia of preventing
derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged.
According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train
operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent and there were even times when
such derailments were reported every hour. The petitioner should therefore have taken more prudent
steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence.

2. Civil Law; Damages; Doctrine of the res ipsa loquitur.-

At any rate, the absence of the fish plates—whatever the cause or reason—is by itself—alone proof of
the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, thus: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
3. Civil Law; Damages; Contributory negligence, defined.-

Contributory negligence has been defined as “the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on
the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause
of the injury.” It has been held that “to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body.” There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding
was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending
danger.

4. Civil Law; Damages; Workmen’s Compensation Act; Payment of SSS benefits to the employee would
not wipe out or extinguish the employer’s liability for the injury or illness contracted by his employee.-

As observed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Valencia v. Manila Yacht Club, which is still controlling:
x x x By their nature and purpose, the sickness or disability benefits to which a member of the System
may be entitled under the Social Security law (Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 1792
and 2658) are not the same as the compensation that may be claimed against the employer under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or the Civil Code, so that payment to the member employee of social
security benefits would not wipe out or extinguish the employer’s liability for the injury or illness
contracted by his employee in the course of or during the employment. It must be realized that, under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act (or the Civil Code, in a proper case), the employer is required to
compensate the employee for the sickness or injury arising in the course of the employment because
the industry is supposed to be responsible therefore; whereas, under the Social Security Act, payment is
being made because the hazard specifically covered by the membership, and for which the employee
had put up his own money, had taken place.

Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448

1. Evidence; Requisites for admissibility of entries in official records.-

There are three requisites for admissibility of evidence under Section 35, Rule 123, Rules of Court: (a)
that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b)
that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him slated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, p. 393).

2. Evidence; Hearsay rule; Reports not considered an exception to hearsay rule.-

The reports of the police and fire departments do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. For,
the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not
having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
3. Evidence; Report submitted by a police officer in the performonce of his duties.-

The report submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties, on the basis of his own
personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay
rule.

4. Evidence; Presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.-

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care (45 C.J. 1193).

5. Evidence; Application of principle to the case at bar.-

The gasoline-station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who
knew or could have known how the fire started were the appellees and their employees, but they gave
no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care.

6. Damages; Liability of owner of gasoline station; Case at bar.-

A fire broke out at the Caltex service station. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank into
the underground storage. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses owned by
appellants. Issue: Whether Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants. Held: This
question depends on whether the operator of the gasoline station was an independent contractor or an
agent of Caltex. Under the license agreement the operator would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of
P1.00 for the use of the premises and all equipment therein. The operator could sell only Caltex
products. Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words
control, of Caltex. The operator could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of
Caltex. Termination of the contract was a right granted only to Caltex but not to the operator. These
provisions of the contract show that the operator was virtually an employee of the Caltex, not an
independent contractor. Hence, Caltex should be liable for damages caused to appellants.

7. Torts; Quasi-delicts; Force majeure; Intervention of unforeseen and unexpected cause.-

The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the
independent cause in the resulting injury. (MacAfee v. Traver’s Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)

Cebu Shipyard vs. William Lines, 306 SCRA 762

1. Appeals; Evidence; Factual findings by the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and are not
reviewable by the Supreme Court.+

2. Appeals; Actions; Pleadings and Practice; In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law
may be put into issue—questions of fact cannot be entertained.+

3. Appeals; Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Instances Where Findings of Fact May Be Reviewed by the
Supreme Court.+

4. Torts and Damages; Negligence; Evidence; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; For the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur: (1) the accident was of a
kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2) that the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence.-

The finding by the trial court and the Court of Appeals that M/V Manila City caught fire and sank by
reason of the negligence of the workers of CSEW, when the said vessel was under the exclusive custody
and control of CSEW is accordingly upheld. Under the circumstances of the case, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following
conditions must concur: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent; and (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged with negligence.

5. Torts and Damages; Negligence; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; Courts are not bound by the
testimonies of expert witnesses.-

Courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses. Although they may have probative value,
reception in evidence of expert testimonies is within the discretion of the court.

6. Torts and Damages; Negligence; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; It is never mandatory for
judges to give substantial weight to expert testimonies; Between the testimonies of the fire experts who
merely based their findings and opinions on interviews and the testimonies of those present during the
fire, the latter are of more probative value.-

Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides: SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.—The
opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence. The word “may” signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness as evidence is a prerogative of the courts. It is never mandatory for judges to give
substantial weight to expert testimonies. If from the facts and evidence on record, a conclusion is readily
ascertainable, there is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence. In the case under
consideration, the testimonies of the fire experts were not the only available evidence on the probable
cause and origin of the fire. There were witnesses who were actually on board the vessel when the fire
occurred. Between the testimonies of the fire experts who merely based their findings and opinions on
interviews and the testimonies of those present during the fire, the latter are of more probative value.
Verily, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving more weight to said testimonies.
7. Insurance; Subrogation; When the insurer, after due verification of the merit and validity of the
insurance claim of the assured, pays the latter the total amount covered by its insurance policy, it
becomes subrogated to the right of the latter to recover the insured loss from the liable party.-

When Prudential, after due verification of the merit and validity of the insurance claim of William Lines,
Inc., paid the latter the total amount covered by its insurance policy, it was subrogated to the right of
the latter to recover the insured loss from the liable party, CSEW.

8. Insurance; Co-Insurance; The intention of the parties to make each other a co-assured under an
insurance policy is to be gleaned principally from the insurance contract or policy itself and not from any
other contract or agreement because the insurance policy denominates the assured and the
beneficiaries of the insurance. Thus, when the insurance policy names only one party as the assured
thereunder, the claim of another that it is a co-assured is unfounded.-

This theory of petitioner is devoid of sustainable merit. Clause 20 of the Work Order in question is clear
in the sense that it requires William Lines to maintain insurance on the vessel during the period of dry-
docking or repair. Concededly, such a stipulation works to the benefit of CSEW as the shiprepairer.
However, the fact that CSEW benefits from the said stipulation does not automatically make it as a co-
assured of William Lines. The intention of the parties to make each other a co-assured under an
insurance policy is to be gleaned principally from the insurance contract or policy itself and not from any
other contract or agreement because the insurance policy denominates the assured and the
beneficiaries of the insurance. The hull and machinery insurance procured by William Lines, Inc. from
Prudential named only “William Lines, Inc.” as the assured. There was no manifestation of any intention
of William Lines, Inc. to constitute CSEW as a co-assured under subject policy. It is axiomatic that when
the terms of a contract are clear its stipulations control. Thus, when the insurance policy involved
named only William Lines, Inc. as the assured thereunder, the claim of CSEW that it is a co-assured is
unfounded.

9. Insurance; Contracts; Contracts of Adhesion; Although contracts of adhesion have been consistently
upheld as valid per se; as binding as an ordinary contract, the Court recognizes instances when reliance
on such contracts cannot be favored especially where the facts and circumstances warrant that subject
stipulations be disregarded.-

Although in this jurisdiction, contracts of adhesion have been consistently upheld as valid per se; as
binding as an ordinary contract, the Court recognizes instances when reliance on such contracts cannot
be favored especially where the facts and circumstances warrant that subject stipulations be
disregarded. Thus, in ruling on the validity and applicability of the stipulation limiting the liability of
CSEW for negligence to One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos only, the facts and circumstances vis-a-vis the
nature of the provision sought to be enforced should be considered, bearing in mind the principles of
equity and fair play.

10. Insurance; Contracts; Contracts of Adhesion; To allow a repair entity to limit its liability to One
Million Pesos notwithstanding the fact that the total loss suffered by the assured amounted to Forty-
Five Million Pesos (P45,000,000.00) would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is
ordinarily required because, then, it would not be difficult for the former to escape liability by the
simple expedient of paying an amount very much lower than the actual damage or loss suffered by the
latter.-

Considering the aforestated circumstances, let alone the fact that negligence on the part of petitioner
has been sufficiently proven, it would indeed be unfair and inequitable to limit the liability of petitioner
to One Million Pesos only. As aptly held by the trial court, “it is rather unconscionable if not
overstrained.” To allow CSEW to limit its liability to One Million Pesos notwithstanding the fact that the
total loss suffered by the assured and paid for by Prudential amounted to Forty Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is ordinarily
required because, then, it would not be difficult for petitioner to escape liability by the simple expedient
of paying an amount very much lower than the actual damage or loss suffered by William Lines, Inc.

Perla Compania vs. Sps. Sarangaya, GR. 147746

1. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Words and Phrases; Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin
phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.”-

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It
relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the
occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of
negligence when direct evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant
either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff,
having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such instance, the
plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence.

2. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Test to determine the existence of negligence.-

The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: did the
defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person in the same situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

3. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Fortuitous Event; Exempting Circumstances; In a vehicular accident, a
mechanical defect will not release the defendant from liability if it is shown that the accident could have
been prevented had he properly maintained and taken good care of the vehicle.-

The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen
and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the
event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d)
the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that
aggravated the accident. In fine, human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause or
contributory cause of the injury or loss. In a vehicular accident, for example, a mechanical defect will not
release the defendant from liability if it is shown that the accident could have been prevented had he
properly maintained and taken good care of the vehicle.

4. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Vicarious Liability; In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof.-

In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied
with everything that was incumbent on them. Here, petitioner-corporation’s evidence hardly included
any rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions. It also did not have
any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught fire.
Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties either. Based
on these circumstances, petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of the
condition of Pascual’s car or its serviceability.

Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers, GR. 180440

1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Only errors of law and not
of facts are reviewable by this Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.+

2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Medical Certificates; Private Documents; Since a medical certificate involves
an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit
unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Thus, an unverified and
unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value.-

—Since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert
witness, it cannot be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show
his qualifications. Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative
value. It is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and
opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its
executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the
opportunity to question its contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the
letter renders its contents suspect and of no probative value.

3. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Words and Phrases; Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase
which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself”; The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies where, (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.-

—Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.”
It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the
occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of
negligence when direct evidence is lacking. Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there is
direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the creative reason for the said doctrine
disappears. Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; If the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged
because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence.-

—Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that “burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law.” It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant
to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because
of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence.

5. Same; Quasi-Delicts; Actions; In an action based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove the presence of the following requisites before the defendant can be held liable, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.-

—As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence
of the following requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts
he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi-delict,
the negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof
is upon petitioner.

6. Civil Law; “Quasi-Delicts” and “Breach of Contract,” Distinguished.-

—In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-
delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct,
substantive and independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the
performance of the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation. In quasi-delict,
the defense of “good father of a family” is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians
and employers are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in
the selection and supervision of employees. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it
is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s
complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be
proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there
was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is
followed.

7. Same; Same; Theory of the Case; Actions; When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he
will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair
to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.-

—Petitioner’s belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action cannot be sanctioned by this
Court. Well-settled is the rule that a party is not allowed to change the theory of the case or the cause of
action on appeal. Matters, theories or arguments not submitted before the trial court cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal or certiorari. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal for to permit him to do so would not
only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process. Hence, a party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on
and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt
another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal.

8. Same; Same; Judgments; By reason alone that the judge who penned the trial court’s decision was not
the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence therein would not render the findings in
the said decision erroneous and unreliable.-

—Irrefragably, the fact that the judge who penned the trial court’s decision was not the same judge who
heard the case and received the evidence therein does not render the findings in the said decision
erroneous and unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in
deciding a case, it is not, and should not be, his only consideration. Even more vital for the trial court
judge’s decision are the contents and substance of the witnesses’ testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs,
as well as the object and documentary evidence submitted and made part of the records of the case.

Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, 341 SCRA 760

1. Medical Malpractice; Elements; Words and Phrases; Medical malpractice is a particular form of
negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine
that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar
conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances; There are four elements involved in medical
negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.-

Petitioner’s action is for medical malpractice. This is a particular form of negligence which consists in the
failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is
ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding
circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or
surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have
done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. There are thus four elements involved
in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation.

2. Medical Malpractice; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized
that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.-

In the present case, there is no doubt that a physician-patient relationship existed between respondent
doctors and Jorge Reyes. Respondents were thus duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that
any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is
breach of this duty which constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice,
the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential.
Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light
of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the
conclusion as to causation.

3. Medical Malpractice; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; Res Ipsa Loquitur; There is a case when expert
testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; Where res ipsa
loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to
the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge
can determine the proper standard of care.-

There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. As held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals : Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied
upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from
the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common
knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only
physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has
been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the
statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which
are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa
loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to
the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge
can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and
ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

4. Medical Malpractice; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Requisites for Application of Res
Ipsa Loquitur.-

Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur were present, namely:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in
charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of
the person injured.

5. Medical Malpractice; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or
ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case—the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment; The physician
or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any
particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.-

Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a layman so as to
justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by
respondents of the standard of care required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of the
correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico. As held in
Ramos:. . . . Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be
cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure
results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or
treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be
conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a. suit against a physician or a
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is
not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular
scientific treatment did not produce the desired result .

6. Medical Malpractice; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; The standard contemplated is not what is actually
the average merit among all known practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most to the
least experienced, but the reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good physicians.-

The standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all known practitioners from
the best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the reasonable average merit
among the ordinarily good physicians. Here, Dr. Marlyn Rico did not depart from the reasonable
standard recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the due care required under the
circumstances. Though the Widal test is not conclusive, it remains a standard diagnostic test for typhoid
fever and, in the present case, greater accuracy through repeated testing was rendered unobtainable by
the early death of the patient. The results of the Widal test and the patient’s history of fever with chills
for five days, taken with the fact that typhoid fever was then prevalent as indicated by the fact that the
clinic had been getting about 15 to 20 typhoid cases a month, were sufficient to give upon any doctor of
reasonable skill the impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever.

7. Medical Malpractice; Evidence; Negligence; The medical profession is one which, like the business of a
common carrier, is affected with public interest; The standard of extraordinary diligence is peculiar to
common carriers.-

Petitioners correctly observe that the medical profession is one which, like the business of a common
carrier, is affected with public interest. Moreover, they assert that since the law imposes upon common
carriers the duty of observing extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety
of the passengers, physicians and surgeons should have the same duty toward their patients. They also
contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it allegedly assumed that the level of medical practice is
lower in Iligan City, thereby reducing the standard of care and degree of diligence required from
physicians and surgeons in Iligan City. The standard of extraordinary diligence is peculiar to common
carriers. The Civil Code provides: Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to the circumstances of each case. .
..

8. Medical Malpractice; Evidence; Negligence; Given the safeguards present in the medical profession,
there is no need to expressly require of doctors the observance of “extraordinary” diligence—the
standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good
physicians, that is, the reasonable skill and competence that a physician in the same or similar locality
should apply.-

The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. It is a right earned
through years of education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the state through professional
board examinations. Such license may, at any time and for cause, be revoked by the government. In
addition to state regulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an
ancient code of discipline and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves in recognition
and acceptance of their great responsibility to society. Given these safeguards, there is no need to
expressly require of doctors the observance of “extraordinary” diligence. As it is now, the practice of
medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence. And, as we have already noted,
the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good
physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of Appeals called it, the reasonable
“skill and competence . . . that a physician in the same or similar locality . . . should apply.”

iii. Violation of rules and statuses

a. Traffic rules (NCC: Articles 2184 and 2185)

b. RA No. 10586, Sec. 13 and IRR

Mallari vs. CA, 324 SCRA 147

1. Civil Law; Negligence; Common Carriers; Rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for
the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road
is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.-

The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle
in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do
so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for
keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side
relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into
view.

2. Civil Law; Negligence; Common Carriers; Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap he was violating a traffic regulation.-

In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari, Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery
van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still
dark at 5:00 o’clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in
front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of
Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney,
petitioner Alfredo Mallari, Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking
was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary,
it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he
was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present
satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
3. Civil Law; Negligence; Common Carriers; Liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof
that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees.-

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against petitioner
Mallari, Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier,
considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of
damages sought by the passenger. Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code,
in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art.
1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former’s employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof
that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees. Clearly, by
the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari, Sr. assumed the express obligation to
transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due
regard for all the circumstances, and any injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is right
away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.

PCI Leasing vs. UCPB, 557 SCRA 141

Civil Law; Quasi-delicts; Damages; Negligence; Registered owner of a motor vehicle may be held civilly
liable with the negligent driver either subsidiarily or solidarily.—For damage or injuries arising out of
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, the registered owner may be held civilly liable with the
negligent driver either 1) subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on a delict or crime under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code; or 2) solidarily, if the complainant seeks relief based on
a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. It is the option of the plaintiff whether to
waive completely the filing of the civil action, or institute it with the criminal action, or file it separately
or independently of a criminal action; his only limitation is that he cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In case a separate civil action is filed, the long-standing principle is that the
registered owner of a motor vehicle is primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its
operation, including the negligence of the driver, with respect to the public and all third persons; In
contemplation of law, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver, with the
actual operator and employer, such as a lessee, being considered as merely the owner’s agent.—In case
a separate civil action is filed, the long-standing principle is that the registered owner of a motor vehicle
is primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its operation, including the negligence of
the driver, with respect to the public and all third persons. In contemplation of law, the registered
owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver, with the actual operator and employer, such as a
lessee, being considered as merely the owner’s agent. This being the case, even if a sale has been
executed before a tortious incident, the sale, if unregistered, has no effect as to the right of the public
and third persons to recover from the registered owner. The public has the right to conclusively
presume that the registered owner is the real owner, and may sue accordingly.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Transportation and Traffic Code; RA No. 8556 does not supersede or
repeal the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration.—The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding
developments in foreign jurisdictions, does not supersede or repeal the law on compulsory motor
vehicle registration. No part of the law expressly repeals Section 5(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 4136, as
amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should
not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent victims.—The rule remains the same: a
sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is not registered with the Land Transportation Office,
still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents, for the latter need only to rely
on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. A lease such as the
one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of law, which needs to be
registered in order for it to bind third parties. Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is the
exacerbation of the suffering of victims of tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty
party. A contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or
encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent victims.

Anonueva vs. CA, 441 SCRA 24

1. Civil Law; Torts; Negligence; Extraordinary Diligence; Motor Vehicles; An automobile driver must at all
times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the
circumstances.-

There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle. As far back
as 1912, in U.S. v. Juanillo, the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of great speed,
greater than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, “and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when
used on country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel
on such roads.” In the same case, the Court emphasized: A driver of an automobile, under such
circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that
the machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and
control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an
accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding,
driving, or walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person
get out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and
an accident occurs, that the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An automobile
driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have
exercised under the circumstances.

2. Civil Law; Torts; Negligence; Extraordinary Diligence; Motor Vehicles; While the duty of using ordinary
care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for reasons growing out
of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, that more is required from the former to fully discharge
the duty than from the latter.-

American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship between the motorist and
the cyclist. Motorists are required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision with
bicyclists. While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a
bicycle, it is obvious, for reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, that more
is required from the former to fully discharge the duty than from the latter. The Code Commission was
cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized
vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and
regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of
the Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter,
pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a
motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher
degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of a motor
vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to
recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal
footing with other types of vehicles.

3. Civil Law; Torts; Negligence; It is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent.-

The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
However, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of the
actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent.

4. Civil Law; Torts; Negligence; Violation of Ordinance; If the very injury has happened which was
intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed
the proximate cause of the injury.-

The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the
proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended
to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the
proximate cause of the injury.” (65 C.J.S. 1156) “The generally accepted view is that violation of a
statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or, according to the decisions on
the question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-observance of what the legislature has
prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent man
would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their
absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be
injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure
to conform to such standard is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the
absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been violated,
whether the act or omission constituting such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the
absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate
that injury would result from such violation. x x x.” (65 C.J.S. pp. 623-628) “But the existence of an
ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for
example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough
that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating
the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was
intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such circumstances
the law has no reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent
reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This
court has applied these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the manner of driving.” (Ross
vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15). “x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or
contributing toward an injury intervened between the violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury
does not necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be maintained. The test is to be found
not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character and in the natural and probable
connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. The general principle is that the
violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention
of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very
thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.” (38 Am Jur 841)

5. Civil Law; Torts; Negligence; Violation of Ordinance; The rule on negligence per se must admit
qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap.-

The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of
the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a
judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor
to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered
inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and
the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal
rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of others.

6. Civil Law; Torts; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; To prove contributory negligence, it is still
necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and
the succeeding injury.-

The leading case in contributory negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf clarifies that damages may be
mitigated if the claimant “in conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury.” To hold a
person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought
about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove
contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between
the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only
when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.

c. Statuses and ordinance/ administrative rules

FF Cruz vs. CA, GR. 52732

1. Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Concept of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.-

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the instant case petitioner objects to, may be
stated as follows: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]

2. Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, applicable in the case considering the
presence of combustible materials in the furniture shop, and the failure of petitioner to build a firewall.-

The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal
course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips,
sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon. It must also be
noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely
presumed. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and
the residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have been
caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop;
and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop [CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 33.]

3. Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner’s
failure to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents, in accordance
with city ordinances, supports a findings of negligence.-

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner’s failure to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances would suffice to Support a finding of negligence.

4. Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations
is an act of negligence.-

In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed
to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents’ residence which sufficiently
complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety
regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745,
June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.] The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate basis to find
petitioner liable for the loss sustained by private respondents.

5. Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Finding of fact by the Court of Appeals as to the amount of the loss
sustained by the respondents should not be disturbed.-

Since the amount of the loss sustained by private respondents constitutes a finding of fact, such finding
by the Court of Appeals should not be disturbed by this Court [M.D. Transit Taxi Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-23882, February 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 559], more so when there is no showing of
arbitrariness.

6. Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Finding of fact by the Court of Appeals as to the amount of loss by
private respondents and damages, not arbitrary nor excessive; Appreciation in value of real estate and
diminution of the real value of the peso, considered.-

In the instant case, both the CFI and the Court of Appeals were in agreement as to the value of private
respondents’ furniture and fixtures and personal effects lost in the fire (i.e. P50,000.00). With regard to
the house, the Court of Appeals reduced the award to P70,000.00 from P80,000.00. Such cannot be
categorized as arbitrary considering that the evidence shows that the house was built in 1951 for
P40,000.00 and, according to private respondents, its reconstruction would cost P246,000.00.
Considering the appreciation in value of real estate and the diminution of the real value of the peso, the
valuation of the house at P70,000.00 at the time it was razed cannot be said to be excessive.

7. Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Insurance; Having been indemnified by their insurer for the damage
caused to their house and its contents, private respondents are only entitled to recover the deficiency
from the petitioner.-

While this Court finds that petitioner is liable for damages to private respondents as found by the Court
of Appeals, the fact that private respondents have been indemnified by their insurer in the amount of
P35,000.00 for the damage caused to their house and its contents has not escaped the attention of the
Court. Hence, the Court holds that in accordance with Article 2207 of the Civil Code the amount of
P35,000.00 should be deducted from the amount awarded as damages. x x x The law is clear and needs
no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are only entitled to
recover the deficiency from petitioner.

8. Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Subrogation; Right of insurer to be subrogated to the rights of the
insured and to seek reimbursement from the third party for the amount it paid to the insured, is
recognized; Real party in interest as to the indemnity received by the insured is the insurer.-

On the other hand, the insurer, if it is so minded, may seek reimbursement of the amount it indemnified
private respondents from petitioner. This is the essence of its right to be subrogated to the rights of the
insured, as expressly provided in Article 2207. Upon payment of the loss incurred by the insured, the
insurer is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against
the third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss LFireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v.
Jamila Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-27427, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA 323.] Under Article 2207, the real party in
interest with regard to the indemnity received by the insured is the insurer [Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Heald
Lumber Co., 101 Phil. 1031, (1957).] Whether or not the insurer should exercise the rights of the insured
to which it had been subrogated lies solely within the former’s sound discretion. Since the insurer is not
a party to the case, its identity is not of record and no claim is made on its behalf, the private
respondent’s insurer has to claim his right to reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the insured.

Cipriano vs. CA, 263 SCRA 711

1. Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.-

—We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, we held the owner of a furniture shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiff’s house
in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which
required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we stated that where the very injury
which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the
ordinance was not only an act of negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death.

2. Damages; Attorney’s Fees; The reasons or grounds for an award of attorney’s fees must be set forth in
the decision of the court and cannot be left to inference.-

—We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the award of attorney’s fees by the
lower court. It is now settled that the reasons or grounds for an award of attorney’s fees must be set
forth in the decision of the court. They cannot be left to inference as the appellate court held in this
case. The reason for this is that it is not sound policy to penalize the right to litigate. An award of
attorney’s fees, being an exception to this policy and limited to the grounds enumerated in the law,
must be fully justified in the decision. It can not simply be inserted as an item of recoverable damages in
the judgment of the court. Since in this case there is no justification for the award of attorney’s fees in
the decision of the trial court, it was error for the Court of Appeals to sustain such award.

3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to comply with a statutory duty to secure insurance coverage
constitutes negligence.-

—There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty
that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the fire
in this case may be considered a fortuitous event, this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from
liability for loss.

4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; P.D. 1572; Service and Repair Enterprises; P.D. 1572, §1
requires service and repair enterprises for motor vehicles to register with the Department of Trade and
Industry.-
—Thus, P.D. No. 1572, §1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor vehicles, like that of
petitioner’s, to register with the Department of Trade and Industry. As condition for such registration or
accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage.

5. Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Obligations; The existence of a contract between the parties does not
bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict.-

—Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a finding
of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner’s negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his
contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on
him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a
fortuitous event, since it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the
proximate cause of the loss.

Sanitary Steam Laundry vs. CA, 300 SCRA 20

1. Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Motor Vehicles; A party who asserts that another person, by
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, contributed to the collision of vehicles, has the
burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the alleged violation, i.e., that
the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto; Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.-

It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision
between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the
injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is
without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that “driving an
overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of
accident,” that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was “decreased visibility,” and that
the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded “decreased [its]
maneuverability.” However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of
proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.

2. Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Motor Vehicles; The maximum allowable speed for trucks and buses
on open country roads, such as the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite, is only 50 kilometers per hour.-

Be that as it may, whether the driver meant 60 miles per hour (which could be 96.77 kilometers per
hour) or 60 kilometers per hour, the fact remains that the panel truck was overspeeding because the
maximum allowable speed for trucks and buses on open country roads, such as the Aguinaldo Highway
in Imus, Cavite, is only 50 kilometers per hour.

3. Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Motor Vehicles; Psychological and Physical Tests; Although no law
requires the passing of psychological and physical tests prior to employment, such circumstance would
certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due diligence.-

With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical tests prior to his employment,
although no law requires it, such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of
due diligence.

4. Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Motor Vehicles; Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses,
hence, it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees;
They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law.-

Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra
care in the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go beyond the minimum
requirements fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista, the office manager of petitioner in its Dasmariñas
plant, said that petitioner has a policy of requiring job applicants to submit clearances from the police
and the NBI. In the case of applicants for the position of driver they are required to have at least two (2)
years driving experience and to be holders of a professional driver’s license for at least two years. But
the supposed company policies on employment were not in writing. Nor did Bautista show in what
manner he supervised the drivers to ensure that they drove their vehicles in a safe way.

5. Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Damages; To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof
of the actual amount of loss; Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts.-

With respect to the question of damages, we find no reversible error committed in the award of actual
damages to private respondents. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof
of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.
Here, the actual damages claimed by private respondents were duly supported by receipts and appear
to have been really incurred.

6. Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Damages; Moral damages are awarded to allow the victims to obtain means,
diversion, or amusement to alleviate the moral suffering they had undergone due to the defendant’s
culpable action.-

As to the moral damages awarded, we find them to be reasonable and necessary in view of the
circumstances of this case. Moral damages are awarded to allow the victims to obtain means, diversion,
or amusement to alleviate the moral suffering they had undergone due to the defendant’s culpable
action. In this case, private respondents doubtless suffered some ordeal because some of them lost their
loved ones, while others lost their future. Within the meaning of Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, they
suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. An award of moral
damages in their favor is thus justified.

7. Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Damages; Life Expectancy Formula; The formula for determining life expectancy
is determined by applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased).-

The award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jason Bernabe as death indemnity is likewise in accordance with
law. However, the award of P100,000 to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy, denominated in the decision of
the trial court as “moral damages and unearned income” cannot be upheld. The heirs were already
included among those awarded moral damages. Marilyn Salunoy was ordered to be paid P10,000, Jack
Salunoy, P10,000, and their mother Nenita Salunoy, P20,000, as moral damages. The amount of
P100,000 was presumably awarded primarily for loss of earning capacity but even then the amount
must be modified. In accordance with our cases on this question, the formula for determining the life
expectancy of Dalmacio Salunoy must be determined by applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80
minus the age of the deceased). Since Salunoy was 46 years of age at the time of his death, as stated in
his death certificate, then his life expectancy was 22.6 years, or up to 68 years old.

iv. Dangerous weapons and substances

NCC, Article 2188

Arneta vs. Arreglado, 104 Phil 529

SYLLABUS

1. DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES IN CASE OF PHYSICAL INJURIES; PARTY ENTITLED TO RECOVERY. —

Moral damages in case of physical injuries are only recoverable by the party who suffered them and not
by his next of kin, unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary. (Strebel v. Figueras, 96
Phil., 321)

2. ID.; ID.; NECESSITY AND COST OF PLASTIC OPERATION. — The father’s failure to submit the son to a
plastic operation as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not called for or that its cost,
if actually necessary, should not enter in the assessment of the damages to which the injured party is
entitled.