Imbong vs COMELEC G.R. No.

L-32432 September 11, 1970

Facts:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No.
6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and
interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as
such candidates.

On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution,
passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose
constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who
shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of
November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting
as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March
16, 1967 by providing that the convention “shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the
existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a
representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications
as those required of members of the House of Representatives,” 1 “and that any other details relating to
the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent
with the provisions of this Resolution.” 2

On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions
embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the
constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds
advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

Issue:

1. Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention;

2. Whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

Decision:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly.
Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

Ratio:

– Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for
convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
– Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for
such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted
more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to
the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.

– Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof.
Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political
figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional
Convention.

– Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of
political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it
applies to all organizations.

Executive Secretary v CA G.R. No. 131719. May 25, 2004.

7/6/2010

0 Comments

Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila
Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine
Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule
63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as
unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7,
paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents
therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.

Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or
suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are
unjust and unconstitutional.

On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period
of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the
ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the
caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it
represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16
thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No.
8042.
 The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section
1, Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i)
discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal
protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the
Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only
overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also
have the right to seek employment abroad.

According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated
because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be
argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are
merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are
subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of
unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.

According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning
agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid
classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and
due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit
illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is
unconstitutional.

The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional
because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal
recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are
holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042
does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid
classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive;
hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also
pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are
found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is
life imprisonment.

The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9
and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10 prohibiting
ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a licensed
and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage,
upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials,
employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic
sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of the said prohibited acts.

The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within
which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed
and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the summons and
the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to
the complaint would take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local licensed and
authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers.

The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional:
SEC. 9. Venue. — A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall
be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed
or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to
those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this
Act.

In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent has
no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules
implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do
not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the
exercise of the police power of the State.

In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As
earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of
petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the
defect and impropriety of the petition.

On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the
petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
said decision.

Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ
of preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000; and

Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by it.

Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued by it in the said case on August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in
issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a
writ of certiorari and prohibition.
 The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an
injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith,
harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on its
face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be

unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in
its favor.

Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them
unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of
certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out
the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that
the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.

One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond
reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56). This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments
(Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]).

er necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount
to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.

LACSON vs. PEREZ

FACTS:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob assaulting and attempting to
break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in NCR.
She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" followed. Aggrieved, 4
related petitions were filed before the Court. The case at bar is for prohibition, injunction, mandamus,
and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law .On
May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila.
Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that
the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests,
the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in
connection with the "rebellion."

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.

HELD:

No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of
being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus
and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in
the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and mandamus is improper at this time. As
regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void
ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold
departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the
near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that
purpose. Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to
relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

Ople vs. Torres

FACTS:

This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to invalidate the Administrative Order No. 308 or the
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos.

The petitioner contends that the implementation of the said A.O. will violate the rights of the citizens of
privacy as guaranteed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy.

HELD:

Yes.

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.

The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens
and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308.

But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The possibilities of abuse
and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of
the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

The petition is granted and declared the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" null and void for being unconstitutional.

IBP vs Zamora
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.

Anti-Graft League of the Philippines v. San Juan

FACTS:

Marcos issued a decree establishing the Technological Colleges of Rizal. It directed the Board to provide
funds for the purchase of 4 parcels of land which belonged to Ortigas &Co. For 12 yrs, the land was idle
and construction did not materialize so the Board authorized the selling of the lot. This was sold to
Valley View Realty. Ortigas filed for rescission of contract contending that it violated the terms of the
contract by selling such lot to Valley View. The Board made a Resolution providing for the rescission of
the deed of sale to Valley View.

Valley View filed a case against the Province of Rizal for specific performance but was dismissed.
Thereafter, a compromise agreement was executed between Province and Ortigas to reconvey the lots
to Ortigas. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines is a non-government organization, constituted to
protect the interest of the Republic and its instrumentalities and political subdivisions against abuses its
public official and employees, claims the instant petition for certiorari is a taxpayer’s suit because the
Provincial Board of Rizal allegedly illegally disbursed public funds in transactions involving the land.

ISSUE:

W/N this is a case of taxpayer’s suit.

HELD:

To constitute a taxpayer’s suit, two requisites: (1) that public funds are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and (2) in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed,
and that the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s standing should not even be made an issue here since standing is a
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The disbursement
of public funds was only made when the Province bought the lands from Ortigas. Petitioner never
referred to such purchase as an illegal disbursement of public funds but focused on the alleged
fraudulent reconveyance of said property to Ortigas because the price paid was lower than the
prevailing market value of neighboring lots.

As a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely affected by an illegal use of public money. But
when no such unlawful spending has been shown petitioner, even as a taxpayer, cannot question the
transaction executed by the Province and Ortigas for the reason that it is not privy to said contract.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
Facts:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No.
1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others,
are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law.

 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.

 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
Discussions:

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty
would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise
of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw
no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.”

Francisco vs. Fernando

FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and
Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando,
Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development

Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its “wet flag scheme”
(“Flag Scheme”). Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s
governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause
because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against
cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and

(4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was valid.

HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he
can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a
favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must
specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category. Nor is there merit to
petitioner’s claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of the “transcendental
importance” of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the
transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party
invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition. Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation. On the Flag

Scheme’s alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities within the
MMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic
management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for
respondents’ implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances
and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation
of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in
Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented
the Flag Scheme in that city.

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints
were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca
bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal
council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of
the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood.
Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public
nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal
officials, petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952,
prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios
without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of
lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is
unconstitutional.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code

(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and
void.

Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal
ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive,
3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general
and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is
to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of
government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

NPC vs Pobre
FACTS:

Antonio Pobre owns a land which he developed into a resort subdivision, beneath which is thermal
mineral water and steam. For one year, Pobre leased to NPC eleven lots from the approved
subdivision plan. To own the land for industrial purposes, NPC filed an expropriation case against Pobre,
during the pendency of which the former dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by the
parties. Then NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional area of the
property. In his motion to dismiss the complaint, Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots
affected by NPC’s actions and for the payment of damages. But NPC itself filed a motion to dismiss the
second expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had
already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre’s opposition.

The trial court ruled that because of the pollution generated by NPC’s geothermal plants NPC had
rendered Pobre’s entire Property useless as a resort

-subdivision. The Property has become useful only to

NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre’s entire Property and pay for it.

But NPC insists that it has the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint, relying on
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court (the Rules in effect at that time).

ISSUE:

Whether or not NPC has the right to automatically dismiss complaint for eminent domain

HELD:

In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s matter of right to automatically dismiss
the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the
taking. If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial
scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may have
suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot
be made arbitrarily. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer makes the
dismissal of the complaint automatic. The right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action before the defendant
has filed his answer or asked for summary judgment must be first confirmed by the court in an order
issued by it.

(It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case but Rule 67 of the
same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal of civil actions
in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain cases.)
NPC VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the
construction of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land
traversed by the transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way.

Issue: Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will be
entitled just compensation.

Held: The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their
proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines. Because of
high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs cannot be
discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation.

REPUBLIC, as represented by the NIA vs. CA and FRANCISCO DIAZ

G.R. No. 147245

Facts:

Manuel Diaz owned approximately 172 hectares of property devoted to the planting of palay. The
property was located in La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and allegedly yielded between 132 to 200
cavans of palay per hectare every year. After Manuel Diaz’s death, his son, Franciso Diaz, was appointed
administrator of the property.

In 1972, the National Irrigation Administration bulldozed ten (10) hectares of the Property to build two
irrigation canals. Although the canals when finished occupied only a portion of the 10 hectares, the
entire area became prone to flooding two months out of every year because of the side-burrow method
NIA used in the construction of the canals. NIA completed the canals without instituting expropriation
proceedings or indemnifying the property’s owners. Respondent then sought compensation from NIA
for the land affected by the canals, as well as for losses due to unrealized profits. In 1980, NIA belatedly
offered to buy the portions of the Property occupied by the canals pursuant to NIA’s expansion
program. The 1980 deeds of sale were never implemented. Respondent did not receive any
consideration pursuant to these deeds. On 20 August 1993, respondent, as administrator of the
Property, filed an action for damages and just compensation against NIA. NIA countered that
respondent’s right to bring the action had prescribed in accordance with RA 3601, as amended by PD
552. NIA also argued that respondent’s failure to pursue the implementation of the 1980 deeds of sale
amounted to laches.

Issue:

Whether or not prescription or laches bars the respondent’s right to just compensation.

Held:
The principle of laches finds no application in the present case. There is nothing inequitable in giving due
course to respondent’s claim for compensation. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner
should be compensated if his property is taken for public use.

Eminent domain is the inherent power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular
uses to promote public welfare. No one questions NIA’s authority to exercise the delegated power of
eminent domain. However, the power of eminent domain is not limitless. NIA cannot exercise the power
with wanton disregard for property rights. One basic limitation on the State’s power of eminent domain
is the constitutional directive that, “private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.”

The thirteen-year interval between the execution of the 1980 deeds of sale and the 1993 filing of the
complaint does not bar the claim for compensation. This Court reiterated the long-standing rule “that
where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto
either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value
thereof does not prescribe.”

LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14 SCRA 292]

Facts:

Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz,
the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a
new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic
Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.

Issue:

Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the
time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the
constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.

Held:

Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates
exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra
distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose
is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the
donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.
MIAA vs CA GR No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 591

Facts:

Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International Airport located
at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax
delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the
officers of Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA,
which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed to do so within
the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with the
Supreme Court a day before the public auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately the
TRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction. MIAA claims that
although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are with MIAA still the ownership is
with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the government
and as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of public dominion
therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque
City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporation therefore not exempted to real
estate tax.

ISSUE:

The issue raised in this petition is whether the NAIA Pasay properties of MIAA are exempt from real
property tax.

RULING:

The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec.133(o) of the LGC,
which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of local governments shall not extend to the
levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities.

These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national
government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. The rule is
that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. This rule
applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in favor of national government instrumentalities.
MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government. The Republic remains the beneficial
owner of the properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can
transfer back to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings without the Republic paying MIAA
any consideration. As long as the airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their
ownership remains with the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing these
properties from public use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable,
hence, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt from real
estate tax. However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to private entities
are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such
portions for a consideration to a taxable person