Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Copy, flo.
INTELLIGENCE CIRCULAR )
No. 13
\
doctrine nor is it intended to be used as instructional matter
ty classification is to be maintained.
/L
Colonel, C.A.C.*
Chief of Staff
1447
1st Ltiaf ^
as
Ass't tSiJJtodiAn
f
TABLES OF
I - ORGANIZATION
Fage 5
II - PERSONNEL • • . . .
Page 26
Ammunition
P. 30
Antitank •
P. 72
Miscellaneous Items
P. 79
Developments . . . . . . . . . . . P,
86
3) Antitank. . . . • • . . . . . . • • F* 162
V - TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 185
1 1 W 4 n » 1 Pi % V g ? j$ f» I
VII OPERATIONS
1 1 ..'9 r i r \ 4.i I
<y i g ^ ^ tfc* * • ^
-2
LIST HF INTE3
li >6 ^
Subject Date
Miscellaneous 9 April119^1
Subject Date
29 April
i9*a.
\
yf •\
1939-19^2. a
Operational Prdcf ~
8 July 19^2
- 3
•r
- k
4 \
I - O R G A N I Z A T I
Editorial Note:
below. ' Under his Command the area mentioned is divided into
the Royal Air Force. ' That is to say the Fighter Command is
Command of the Royal Air . Force . The only oral command con-'
-5
* **
I - ORGANIZi^M||j%
same time, should permit the Royal Air Force to have such
Command.
Great Britain and abroad, and there is both mobile and stat
ic Antiaircraft Artillery in the Harbor Defenses.
is assumed that the sector controls are used not only as com
munication centres, but'also as operational headquarters as,
1942. ' • . . ».
-7
^ - - ( o n l y ) — - real units of command (among the British
Air Force, but does, not command the Navy, Advisory to the
;
the artillery resources, except that where antiaircraft de
fenses are spread over a large area or are required in con
junction with-a large air component a special antiaircraft
MtA,R,48365-London-llJune 1942
Establishments. . . . .
Editorial Note;
ers have been authorized to arrange at any time for any Anti
aircraft guns in their Group areas to withhold fire on enemy
-10
It functions somewhat as follows:
fully considered. * •
*
V
I - ORGANIZ^¥o:
2|,|
(8) (cont'd)
the Royal Air Force and Gun Operations Rooms. -—(These offi
c e r s ) - T - are under the control of Commanders, Antiaircraft Div
isions.
the Sector.
4.5" static, 3.7" static, 3.7" mobile or 3" guns. Full es
tablishments or tables of organization for all these types of
.Bofors guns. Each .gun detachment is/an entity and guns' are .*
-• • •
" % —
f f
I - ORGANIZATION
get this density (for more than an) extremely short time.
w M ' J H
V * I• .>_
n (cont'd)
• 10,000 yds.
11,000 yds, • .; •
10,000 yds.
AUC-33-Lortdon.-February 1942
- ORGANIZATION
"Z" Units, where Home Guard are also employed. It is not con
sidered that Home Guards will be employed in Light Antiaircraft
or searchlight units,
3) Airdrome Defense
• » '
most vehement in his contention that the only way to get the
the- jj&tfr- Wing — - under the change • whereby -t— the Royal Air
Force has its own defense force, called the Royal Air- Force
Regiment« -This absolves the Army from Airdrome defense ex
cept for counter-attacking or support missions. It also places
- ORGANIZATION
rcraft Regifttenl
• r ^
picture and works hand in glove with the Division. Our method
;/ % V
it A
-lfe-'
I - ORGANIZATION
This regiment had the best, record of any like regiment in the
from splitting the four gun Troop into two sections of two guns>
to the North and the base to the South so that two guns can
May 1942-AA/64/8-AUC-76
giments (cont'd)
training center,
Cooker has been provided and food taken around in hot con
tainers, (It is believed that) centralized cooking by
5) Communications
-IS
/ 7& *
I - ORGANIZATION L * t ) & «J
MB ITS :
— M •, J M rr
stations.
issued for use when conditions become static, but are rarely
6) Airborne Antiaircraft ..
If I|Pf ji fl sty'
I - ORGANIZATION
_ 1LS %.;r *
division consider that this gun should not be used by the Air
borne Division but that it shguld be replaced by more 20 ram.
Hispano-Suizas»
7) Concepts
light antiaircraft, or ^ ^ ^ h i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t e r i e s . ,
ift directorate—
-.20
It is the opinion of an Army Commander (Great Britain) that:
Divisions
General DeGaul
M.a.R,42326-London-8 February 1941
8) Miscellaneous Items
armies.
tr® a
IS a m H l
II i 1
ff f'J, % m f
i f '- I P I f
-21
Middle East ' 324 ^ 10 70S
Great Britain is provided with one light machine gun and one
-22
I - ORGANIZATION
r, %
workshops depot,
.The new Royal Air Force Command is now being brought into ex
istence ' (within the Royal lir Force) . The primary func
tion of the command is to foster the development of all forms
in February, 1941, 600 men with 300 ..rmy and 300 Naval light
the number of light machine guns was increased so that the arm
ament became one man per light machine gun instead of two men.
T
M.A.R.45242-London-4 November 1941
integral part of the Air "Force and is under the control of the
Brigades and Brigades into Corps. The sub unit of the Abteil
ung is the TBatterieT (roughly equivalent to two British Troops).
Three heavy Batterien each of four -88 mm.,guns and two -20
mm. guns.
(105 mm. guns may in some cases replace 88 mm. guns), and
searchlights.
f; f- ^ |4
i M p i
i % a t J
I - ORGANIZATION l l i l i l
at all times. ,
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Sections.
ERSONNSL
- •• M.A.R,47635-London-29 April-1942,
-26
II - PERSONNEL (cont
a total of 229 women and 176 men per battery, There are
-27
II - PEESO
insignia can also' be awarded to- those who have, already been
to German Antiaircraft units which have taken' part' in' the di
rect attack against the enemy on three separate occasions, no
two of which can occur-on the same day. This Use of the
ments,; .. -'
M.A.R.18636-Berlin~l6 September 1941
-28
fied pilot. He is a graduate of the Gunnery Staff^cJbrise
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
are as follows:
December )
• • --
average capital reserve is 2000 rounds per gun both heavy and
the figure is 1,100 high explosive per heavy and 1*500 per
light gun and in Malta it is 3000 rounds per gun both heavy
and per light gun per day of 8 rounds* These figures are based
* ft
shell for the period 11 September 1940 to 21 May 1941 for the
-30
Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIP!
l) Ammunition (cont'd)
in Great Britain during the- past year have been less than 10/b
of the expenditures for the previous year, even though the to
tal number of guns.has decidedly increased*
fSBp!^
n _i£ - "r>.i/.!ie±. _ »X
enses of G: iitab ... j
j static • _ .
conditions is:
-31
Ill - MATERIEL AND ECUIPk
Mft'd) '
EAD IAD
Shrap 40' 40 70
40 mm HIE* 352 500 600
A.T. 48
Echelon Echelon
Shrap 22)
• ' • - • Shrap 40
40 mm H.E. 400 176 176
A.T. 48 (x) 24 24
. M.A,R,44938-London-15' October
is now used only for the engagement.of close and diving tar
gets,
-32
Question: V«hat appears to be the relative effectiveness of
ammunition*
when the shell explodes the resin is blown out and causes
against tanks.
ates armor and then explodes. The other type is a high ex
plosive shell for use against personnel and other targets.
about one (l) armor piercing shell in three (3) in their small
-34
III - MATERIEL AND
tons per square inch, and he understood that there was a pos
sibility of abnormally high pressures being realized if it
less than that given off • by the' full,; mocti, The -color given
. y i t p j L l i v v I t i C U .
-35
H I - MATEHIEL ,.ND EQU;
1) A
bombers,
Question: The British get a smoke puff from their high ex
plosive burst, '.hat is used for smoke producing element?
A pilot officer, Royal Air - For qo, ^wlk has been on 15 bombing
-36
Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPA l i i •. 8 ? | M
1) Ammunition (cont'd) ®
The pilot, at night, can see the bursts behind him in a mir
ror and keeps on his course until the bursts begin to be close
Within the pa^t six weeks, the Germans have begun to use a
fuze, apd so enable us to use the full, range of our guns (sub
ject to predictor limitations): and the mean error of fuze
time is .08 second, as against ,.2 second with the powder fuze.
fuze. - wem
- - 5 - 11 i 1 *
-37
Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT
1) Ammunition (cont'd)
that sand had accumulated in the bore when the gun was fired
muzzle so that sand could not get into bore and to fire the
cases have occurred in which the barrel was bulged and fir
ing was stopped. No one has been injured. Many other cases
have been reported after firing has ceased and in some cases
when the gun was in for repairs and it was found that the
firing lands were flat, . This type has occurred both in Great
JNFIS-4T ^
• •fJr*t
* # rf ct a
r
4
* # f? Y
* d Oi
l) Ammunition (cont'd)
Canada,
the recesses were also damaged by the blast which tore off
both the steel doors of the gun pits, and in addition either
in No, 4 gun pit was spattered with clay, but was otherwise
blast blowing out the complete front wall and also — dam
aging the other walls. The stocks inside were moved out of
IliffLi 1 3 v 2
(cont'd)
-41- *
(rounds per
equipment)
(present ammunition)
Height (ft)
(present ammunition)
ward Area
Sight
AUC-33-February 1942
-42
III - M'TERIEL AND EQUIPMENT " ^ &
h
A'i i 9 ^
% ij^
2) Light Antiaircraft Weapons (contrd)* i J ^ l , # r*'
vfcfM • '
the weapon and stressed the number of dive bombers shot down
longer and has only 7" clearance while the Mark I has 18" clear
ance. The Mk I is "sprung" and has a better "tow" rod making
very rough ground. All Mark ^ Bofors are earmarked for as
sault brigades in combined operations. Mark I Bofors can
are two vehicles,"one for the gun and one for the predictor".
The Morris predictor vehicle engine will furnish the power for
the predictor.
was put forward by the Polish Design Group working with the
-43
Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIPMENT
units.
British are developing two mobile mounts for 20 mm. guns, the
as it fits all 20 mm. guns and can be used for terrestial and
antiaircraft targets.
M.A,R,48524-London-22 June 1942
armament although the 3.7 cm. (1.45 in.) is also met with
(1.57 in.) and the 4.7 cm. (1*85 in.). A 5 cm. (1.97 in^h)
as yet available, • :
fired with its mounting on the ground and with the trailer re
moved. It can, however,-be fired from the trailer. A trav
erse of only 10° at top elevation is possible in this posi
tion. —' Two foot-levers operate the trigger mechanism. Each
guns (i.e. the top left and bottom right and top right and
other two can be changed. When both levers are operated all
gun of calibre between their 3.7 cm. (l.45-in) and 8.8 cm.
1 M
SJ
cm. antitank jjuj jfcym. Pak 38), which is an antitank gun pure
as an antiaircraft equipment. .
the fire control methods, accuracy falls off at the end of the
wK ' . . . . . .. _
-46
Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT
P r m
that at least two 20 mm. guns to one BOFORS 40 mm. are re
quired to defend locality. The 20 mm. is more comparable
than the 40 ram gun the maximum vertical range is about 7,000
(4.45 ins.)
4 " * •
Rate of Fire 16 8 10 16
(yards)
Maximum height
(feet) .
Powder fuze not used not used' 28000 21000
Clockwork fuze 45000 40000 36060 not used
Maximum quadrant
; 319.13/AUC-33-February 1942
; ' t
The British 3.7 inch gun has - — been under test by the
United -States Army. Cables indicate that the tests were suc
cessful, but tnat the 90 'mm. was already tooled up for pro-^
equipment's are:
zczmmzm.
in training the guns onto the road. Guns had been "winched"
1 o X S I ^ I t I I
The British Navy has recently turned over to. the Army three
fj B J|jf f ® af Ji 5 r'T7 m
The 8.8 cm. (3.46 in.) is the main German heavy antiair
craft weapon; the 10.5 cm. (4,14 in) is also in use and is
the ability of the equipment to- fire .one r^und at the heights
in question — - .
in the Tiergarten, Berlin, near the zoo, and the guns (88 mm)
The hard wearing qualities of the metal in the gun barrels are
in enemy hands and then were left derelict for a long period
over 60 d f ^ ^ s , ^ *
r. ss a m Sk sin si
vertically,
1 C r I t ? I*
J S J a 1
Ul • *
2620 f/s
16000 yds
mg
25000 ft.
rate of fire
20 r.p.m.
75-mm. model 33 J
Muzzle velocity
2460 f/s
Maximum horizontal range
15200 yds.
Effective ceiling
22000 ft.
Practical rate of fire
20 r.p.m.
Muzzle velocity
2675 f/s
Effective ceiling
27000 ft. :
A.A.C.#319•13/AUC-33
-54
(without pre
that the layer having picked up the target with both eyes open,
can bring the window with the luminous laying mark up on to the
target without having to take his eyes off the latter and can
still keep both eyes open when completing his lay. A further
advantage is that the layer- sees both target ojid laying mark
-55
Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT
(
• A
s ; % orr^^at^ie thinks is the correct number
time).
(4) Having set too fast a speed, the Vector Sight operator
England) ,
"The Stiffkey Stick and How to Use It." This pamphlet gives
4) Light Antiaircraft
Magnification x 11
guns and rifles, the range-taker merely observes when the tar
get comes into effective range' and when it goes out again.
The range .-scale is first set at 1200 metres (4036 ft.). t The
When the two images are one above the other, the target is
crossing point it-meves back from left to right, and when the
fire.
-57
Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT
and 40 on the 2 cm. (0.79-inch) Flak 30, 2 cm. Flak 38 and 2 cm.
the sighting line running from the. backsight through the appro
priate speed graduation on an adjustable foresight, to the
-58
M t §
and 3.7"
Maximum Time of 33 25 33
Flight (sees)
to "predictor Steady"
" 7 feK? M f*
w/? & M
® Ff *
Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT
co-urdinates,
calculates the
coordinates of
v
. the future posi
tion and provides
319.13AuC-33-February 1942
Equipment GL I' GL II
(yds)
to 50,000 yds
Sight
Sight i
Bearings obtainable
bMffII ft j I A l
0
j w Ir i^ '
U &fc>Et»
JSL J& M
Average Error #
site.
319.13/AUC^3-February 1942
(2) The English GL III (10.7 cm.) has been designed and un
dergone trials. Range of.the order of 30,000 yds. Accuracy
319.13/AUC-33-February 1942
-61
I
III - MATERIEL
and slant range was fed in through the height computer, i,e,
slant range were fed into the gun layer receiver through a
during the first few series of runs, as the team became more
of flight,
319.13/AUC-33-February 1942
Eft
FV 1% ^tek
-62
Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIPMENT
£ id' jk W jM
correct target speed was set in, the future position is only
A.A.C.No.319.13/AUC-53
at the gun. The fuze to the future position as' taken from
the predictor is not the fuze to the future position when th'e
1
li.A.R.46728-London-25 February 1942
. . • \y}n .
"i ' . •• • i ' " .
&i
this correction before the fuze data reaches the fuze setter.
left and up and down deflections of 2g° and 5°. For the an
titank role a clicker is provided on the lateral J-jind sight
-64
£j £ . ' Jjf
£? /
f j
5) Heavy Antiaircraft Fire Control^ ^
and breakdowns. • •
some time past that the Germans have been experimenting with
location methods.
. A •• ' • • - , •
71 > 6 "
lit"
, v „ . .. * Art
' #
- ' , . , .
-r- There is now available a provisional description of
the German Carl Zeiss Jena Fredict&r^ -type KDO - Ger, 35 for
A J Control (cont1 d)
two side com; artments are of equal dimension, one houses the
are as follows:
Range operator
raised and secured to the front and rear carriages when trav
elling, — It is estimated that eleven operators are requir
ed,
> 6 "
0 & ff
III - MTERIEL AND EQUIPMENT i y , j f /f f | .
When the Reflection? and rjmge drums are at zero the aim
ing line of the sig^ht both vertically and horizontally are par
allel to the axis of fe,|b^rrelJu '^pcef/however, the tele*
-67
y D EQUIFMT^T ' .
tjy • •\ ^
(2) A similar rocket with a time fuze on its nose and which
ground.
w MM J*
i L AJ?
800 feet sides and the lateral effect inside the .cube Is
M.A,R.43380-London-24 June
- . 1941
which was. dived, at the battery projector. One salvo was wide
receive.d from the burst on the target from the last salvo,
> 6 "
in the case a^the 4,5 in. gun; and that' the' rocket "battery
War Office jHf lygQ^-i ^.'s use of the weapon was in
itiated. — 5 - On tftr%sls; of. thesf ,%fr*$>retical calculations,
the condenser pistol and the radio prdximity fuze. The form
er will be of particular value for multi-barrel projectors as
f u z e s .
veloped: - •
(1) A 4-barrelled Projector mounted on a 40 mm. Mk.II •
platform.
lP^
these r ckets' at one time. Two duds and about three tftc ^
for use on the ground and for use on ships. -—(U.S. Ord
nance Officer) • • •
v? m
v 1 rn
A • i. a
C ' /
> 6 "
P^JjjeCtors (cont'd)
the writer was able to get data, the results were — - ex-.:
> 6 "
7) Antitank • _ • oi
7) .ntitank (c-
The 2-pdr. is the standard British tank .and antitank gun. Its
-73
Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIFMENTV'
around the back of the other guns and shot them up. Again
—-(If a maximum of 600 yards was taken with the two pounder,
nearly always stopped the tank, but one or two more rounds
survivors of the crew came out with grenades and tommy guns
-74
Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT
7) Antitank (cont'd)
caliber .303, will not penetrate the German tank but they
type of target.
be taken under fire .by that method without delay, the predic
tor should be used. But if the predictor is'not warmed up .
and in action the forward area sight -with the "Stiffkey Stick"
hind sight, is being adopted Sajfc the 40 mm.' The existing For
ward Area Sights are to be modfiiet^. sh ^jh^tAtlfe lateral hind
> 6 "
300- yards and 9o0 yards inclusive in steps of 200 yards, re
taining the existing ''line upM and antiaircraft "far" posi
tions o
Tanks appear like bushes, bushes like tanks, and so oh, and '
0k \
-76
Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT
M _
m <1%
7) Antitank (cont'd)
'(7.62 mm. caliber) which is now being adopted by. the Ger
mans. The barrel is reported to have a length of 1,^00 mm.
carried- out by the Finns have been hampered by. the shortage
^•mM-^jfif x J ; & t f
rjri ^ * % t ' yy
-a
ti^ink. (^ont'td^H
and penetrated the far side. Six shots - — fired against the
far side of the hull. -The other three struck the gun or the
gun mounting inside the turret and broke up. The gun crew .
all shots penetrated the 20 mm. plate on both sides of the hull.
the 20 and 40 mm, plate but did not all go through the far side
of the tank, Two tests were made firing at the tank head-on at
through it. Three shots were fired at the thick single plate
The armour and armaments of the German Mk. Ill tank are as
follows:
The armour (all welded) is 30 mm, all round, except the top
'» vA V t 4
-78
III - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT
7) Antitank (cont'd)
sorry exhibition.
8) Miscellaneous Items
stopped. Lately there has been quite a number put up. The
towers*. .
M.A•R.45048-London-22 October 1941
^ ** w FAS $ $ * i£ $ ]P 1 1
> 6 "
building yard and then to. tow it out and ground it at the
so that when they float out from the building yard they are
munition
Concrete
Gravel 23"
Earth 45"
30"'
> 6 "
' ft
8) Miscellaneous Items (cont'd) 4 -V « -i •: '
' A? j^ft*
> 6 "
and the J" thick bomb casing. The casing is said to give
from any height and will not detonate until the aircraft is
\ v- , 4 '
> 6 "
cord should be cut and the cap replaced to protect the fric
tion wire. The cap should not be unscrewed/ as the safety
30 June 1941-Cairo,Egypt
may have been intended to explode when the current was ap
plied as in normal iise. The charge was' sufficient to blow
Italian origin, . :
For convoy driving the British have adopted and are instal
ling — a small standard. Light similar .^ota^^i^iht,
* - 11
-83
Ill - MATERIEL AND^-^J]
a ffk Q-'-} « i v ..
Milqel%Lrieou.3 Itemj^'
vk f*. r.sit *
^ ' -84r
t Xi 'if up g.
irig:
Total. Remarks
and there are four forward speeds and one reverse gear, CON
TINENTAL tyres are fitted, the dimensions being 8.00 x 12.
> 6 "
8) Miscellaneous Itemsffa'r
protect such men from the effect which may arise from the
with'perforated ear-drums,
9) Developments
The Air Staff are of the opinion that by the end of 1941 a
v .<;' ® pP*
& & ft
> 6 "
je^^Jfcpifi&nts (cont'd)
est to note that the shield for the German gun is composed
mm, — —
London-October 1941-AUC-13/ARP-21
S PI\ " £*
1
9) Developments (cont' d) " " * * ll I
— . >
M. A . R.45271-London-6 November 1941
•• ' : A, A• C..£319,13/AUC-33
: 4 ;
band (and cartridge-case)—- designs f ; • ' . '•"
,
\ N,A. R,979-London-21 April 1942
-89
Earn
1
% S ) feiUiPMENT
« « ft W
i^p&ents (cont'd)
trials have taken place with two types of (3*7 inch anti
aircraft) gun; one (Mk V) with an orthodox banded pro
jectile, the other (Mk VI) with a projectile having an addi
tional forward band (Probert design) • The Mark V
which the gun would be useless for the high ceiling require
ment. With the Hark VI gun, the wear at the commencement of
rifling was very much less, with no trace at the muzzle after
80 rounds.
band) following the success of this type with the 3.7 in.
\r • ••- ..
r ,
• . f• • * " -
• -90
Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIFMENT V '
f $ OFSk „
ft J 8 Mm*
has been completed. Tests, have been in progress since July ,:v
completed. •• •
-91
I*1 Developments (cont'd)
on the rear wheels which may be' operated from the towing ve
hicle. The wheels are eccentrically mounted with re-»
and rear axles, "Coil springs' ihsirie the main frame members
the main frame and the outriggers, and which are operated
at-each end of the main frame and one pin at the end of each
design.
r
'5) Electrical predictor that will accept changihg height .
and can cop>e with diving targets, the equations being based
A.A.C.//319.13/AUC-33
-93
9) Developments (cont'd)
flight. '
divebombing•attack•at night;
at intermediate heights.
• <« y.
Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT
9) Developments (cont'd)
24°/sec0
more than J of the volume of the; No. '3> isince the trans
mitters, 'telescopes and drives, aided-tracking mechanisms,
• ' -.95- ^ if K
9) Developments (cont'd)
two 7.93 Besas to the light tank Mark VI at home and 0.5"
Middle East,
seems suitable for tank use. ^.11 are large, require sev
eral men to- operate .would be..difficult to protect with arm-
^ -96
• ••
£ i m f i
$ Si
III - MATERIEL \ND EQUIPMENT
9) Developments (cont'd)
B I B L I-O.G.R A P H Y
I B®I M "$» §f
1 Li
y
af 1 :siM S % w jj ml j* a •
. ^ • ' • M y g i i r f f
8 1 SJ. jfl
I I p t l r ^ T g E E V ^ fjpqpKl
i l l l k s L o i J i l i 1T t u
bibliography (Oont d)
Antiaircraft Guns.
ing,4
Weapons,
M.A.R.45996-London-19 December 10
December 1941
M.A*L.44863-London-101October 1941-131/ZW
- -
•r^x^YY^ m ** *
i l M L V p W T .. . »A.A.'C.#319 • 131/AVJP
-98
> 6 "
Bibliography (cont'd)
1•
L
ILP
craft resources during the apy roach march. This can be done'
available for its many tasks within the Divisional Area, The
8 m
i? & h '•
f#V # '
'V
" tical gaps between units in order to move from one task to
tiftUlar task and " then withdraw 25 percent for a new task.
mind and see that withdrawal does not cause a.cap causing a
-101
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
(or his staff should list them for him) all such vulnerable
among those that were left. The problem of how vital cer
tain targets are, is a matter for the Divisional Colander
r
y as to intensity of fire and kind
- 102
IV TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
.M.A.R.43672-London-lB July
morale• • '.
> 6 "
. / -Balft(^ofc^|UC-49-March 1942
IV- T A C T I O S ^ t t t s l c ^ N I I • "
* iftfaM
l) Concepts (re - tacticar®employment) (cont'd)
> 6 "
during the second period and part of the third period, the
were often spread over ground four miles square and whilst
than six guns, .On the other hand,, aalls were made on the
J u r t f c H fjj
IV - TACTICS ,'iND TECHBIRRA
-105- x / y
BiMf| *
i# J ^ #
*I pf $
If
IV
unit as they have to man the guns during the day and move
should be) provid'ed for any one point. — - nhen the vul
nerable point is large or very important at least 6 should
The real |rM?l |Bi fthe dive bomber is. th^lfighter airplane
• El 8? % t ;.. % *i • •
f i J? •'<> - • i | !
S&a k ii A^Q^, i. u
f fA K a
l) p ^ ^ k ^ f ^ o y m e n t ) ( cont'd )
importance,
done if every man in the unit is imbued with the urge to "get
M
yg J P
ki 8
...
l) Concepts (re - technical emprovpent) J(j^riteki)
England and abroad, had been confined to' the use of sights
was finally decided that hosepipe firing was the most effec
tive form of control for automatic weapons of .303" or .5" .
short ranges and demands to the full extent the high rate of
the speed being about 100 miles per hour, and the minimum
.One of the reasons for this failure was the difficulty the
:<JT|% ^^JpleHNiQUE
ffyyi ®
more. By that time the layer had reacted with the result
sky,- The latter line of approach was adopted, --- The Admir
alty Research Laboratory system of remote control used in
combination,
to control, .
During firing trials, the fact emerged that though the gun
does not seem to react quickly enough to deal with each sep
arate shot, and the feeling that shots are crowding in quick
er than one can deal with them tends to produce.flurry and un
steadiness . At 60 rounds per minute the brain can deal com
fortably with individual shots, and the whole procedure'- Is
-111
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
Itl A 5 & -— ^ _
more accurate but did not have the same effect of shaking
"not trying" when single shot was used. Bursts of auto were
at the same time, shake the morale of the pilots whilst main
taining that of our troops, is a combination -of auto and sin
gle shot. It is considered that fire should be opened on ap
proaching bombers at 3 >000 yards slant range at auto , and at
The Bofors equipment was designed .to deal with low flying
and close targets, hence its sights are constructed and lined
reached 1500 yards with Forward Area Sights and 2000 yards
- 112
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
they Stukas or any other type. With sights set at .15.00 yds.
stressed.
' M M. I B ^
r t f"i ® • '*mffiBk•
i ** * § , ••
planes came over.and merely filled the air with noises with
troops guarding one of his air fields with Bren guns on an
tiaircraft mounts shot down 8 out of 14 German dive bombers
after his men were convinced that, all they had to do was to
U -114
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
has some deterrent effect, ana might well be the best meth
od for a troop moving with an armored brigade,
- 5
&.MD TECHNIQUE '
J f j ®
Concept^"'.(rtl'S technical employment) (cor.t1 d)
and 700 for the 4.5" gun under certain target conditions
bombing attack,
slit trenches had been dug; entirely due to their use there
about two feet wide, six long and three deep* Except for
four killed and two wounded. There is not time to get into
camouflaged but once you open fire the enemy knows where
of fire? " :
Great Britain)
- 117
1) Cone eptl 1 (.eontr d>* >?/]t
' ^ . r if F a
occupied,
2) Yes.
of position.
g ;ined.
least 180 degrees field of fire except the dead area nec
essary over the predictor. Bofors can then be sited in
question.
i f 3-1 • -118
IV - TaCTICS m TECHNIQUE
• * f?
fj GJ
.'1 v v JJ ^
.. - ^ ^ /
The primary role of Light Antiaircraft Guns is defar$®j
so that they can carry out this role. Ideally, this demands
J& t-W w
-119- ' ' * VfejWJb
three guns.
and out of position the better able the gun crew will be
or all but one oh the perimeter, and one close in to deal with
guns for both low level bombing and dive bombing. It will
I s
-121
(cont'd)
not all oiit of action at the same time and that gaps are
their self-preservation.
M M W *
- 122 - _ .. ...
AAC No.319.132l/F
attack was put on they had nothing to hit back with. Self-
> 6 "
& sr
* " « *
where the slight extra weight would be more than amply re
paid by the moral effect produced. Alternatively, it might
-125
IV - TACTICS AND^I^KIgllE^
echelon, •
lessons from Greece, Crete, and the Middle East indicate that
if practicable,
an antitank role.
- 127
m tAcllCS''^JfetPiNIQUE
- 128..- ; .
1 u: £ f| ^ £ • 1 |
tanks.
such time as these instruments are less bulky and are built
up a non-defiladed site.
- 129
IV - TACTICS *ND TECHNIQUE
i €% I f f
^ A a t s L r C x ^ltic4s|(4fl|G#BO (cont'd)
U
r 'l^^jfela^ (jyF\>pirationSr 'Rooms are to give early warning and
gun sites from gun operations rooms* With seen targets the
taken and set into the predictor and fire is opened when
was generated the other side* This was the method used to
- 130
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQ
iism m #
# f* A #
f
2) Operational Practices (A.D.G.B,; (T&nt d) * '
were equipped with gun layer and the sites in.every gun
range from the site,, all points on this arc requiring the
the single, site only, but.Is has a few great advantages over
•'-131
2) Operational Practices (AfD,G,B.) (cont'd) .:
that the' predictor did not measure the rates, plotting sep
arately on a semi-automatic plotter for rates and setting
method and the rates generated by the gun layer are sub
ject to errors that prodijce gross errors in the predicted
, I iml^Jli
- 132
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
from gun operations room will be fired, the data being ob
tained from whatever source is. available.-(a particular gun
rounds per gun, but "Mass" fire may be repeated should c i i "
133 ^
I--. Tg,
IV - TACTION, M D '^.CMintfe
T< *
Practices (A.D.0,3.) (cont'd)
and 3" guns, provided the angle of sight is not less than
upon any unseen target unless gun operations room has' pre
viously given permission to do so.
Predictor
Predictor
Plotter ...
*V >
^ "^antiaircraft.. guns:
- 134
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
® M,
AI
EF of GL II.
EF or GL II.
(3) .Concentrations:
a; Zone B
b) Anti-Minelaying Barrages
the
b)fitting of amputation
Flotting Control:
clutches.
Antiaircraft Command.
Corps .area. • . :
- 135
• v v. i
P I ? ® f fe^f'i1^*
Incl.-M.A.R.47006-London-January 1942-131/APE
v. - 136
>, V «<v .a?1
,
X
•„ V . a W'J*
ti * a m «
around and through the Gun Defended Area, and when the en
emy is plotted as flying towards one of these sectors fire
to it. .
signal for the last plot -of the time base, as notified by
- 137
IV - ThCTICS,INDTECHNIQUE
V 1 W i U y Q * " 'W
M • ^,47006-LondOn-January 1942
• . ' • * • -' * •• •
then to bomb the area, defined by the fires with hi^h explo
sive bombs. The intention in instituting what is sometimes
Ipf I
September 8 19,200
October 6i 16,700
November 17i 7,270
December 11 16,900
January 16 4,090
--— The fire control methods that gave these results were
however, much has been learned about the merits and demer
its of the present methods of fire control against unseen
enemy aircraft jink after the first salve the errors with
fire from sites "are justified is -when gun layers break down
aircraft equipment:
- 139
Practices (A,D.G,B.) (cont'd)
Predictor Control. ,
1
v; is.to be supplemented and improved b- the use of the.
- 140
fV-TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
gun layer to obtain data for plotting and firing, the remain
ing 35 receiving data from a gun layer on an adjacent heavy
A. A. C. #319 •13/AUC-33
Plotter, the Plotter is fed with gun laying data from the Z
-la- 'uli^Uiiw
IV - TACTICS AND
A P l f e
M.A.R.47006-London-January 1942
subtended by. the dead arc (of the gun) will norr
defense pcffta.
V A u
- 142
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE ^
4.5" — . • .
(1) All round defense against both level and dive attacks,
periodically, ••=-,-.
The gun density is obv-rously, the maximum available.
- 143
TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
are selected Ind then some natural cover and minimum provi
sion for accesshare all that are required, A11 arrangements
all will —r- are the main gun sites with dummy guns install
ed, after alternative positions have been occupied, •—
MAIN POSITIONS must rely on protection as opposed to
;
Executive Order , Circumstances . Acti.on
Predictors to be
started.
-144
IV - TACTICS >IND TECHNIQUE
Vi.tal Point.
Post shelters.
equipment is available^
-145
IV TiXTI&^Jm TaCHNIQUP*„
.? k
land during April and May was 180/190 m.p.h. on the way in
and 230/240 m.p.h. on the' way out", the average heights be
ing 15,000 - 16,000 feet and 13,000/14,000 feet respective
ly.
-146
A
*•;••• -T."!
to the bitter end and are then prevented (at all costs)
9 d$ £j;
3 jYl ,St
RK . '
IBM t ' V
area and the forward troops has been stressed. For the
guns.- The enemy has appreciated the fact that the light
released his bombs and then change onto another diver com
ing down to attack. The result is that when a formation of
machine gun as they dive and ammunition in the pits has fre
quently been hit. To prevent charges being ignited either
f
A|ej| &|ent operations in CY^.JC.'i. The fact that there
(4) Headquarters
• . .M.A.R.43845-Ajondon-
-149
f'"My <? n/•« #id
tm
$ f jp ^ •
&(&i&S/AND TECHNIQUE
J;: ^ . • • > •:
for direction, and on the neck and waist of the layer for
elevation,; • :
gun-site. • . .
A, A • C. t£319 • 1321/F
iS * kI -150
LMIE-'
IV - ThCTICS ,IND TECHNIQUE
Breda 20 mm was used at each Heavy gun site for local pro*
tection.' 1 '
being put into the predictor and thelfcjjp're. -slows up the rate
of fire.
predictor,'
(4) Fly at staggered heights — This makes
a 'height. . *
dropped their bombs but three aircraft which glided in, one
from 21,000 ft. down to 13,000 ft., one from 20,000 ft.
down to 16,000 ft., and one from 17,000 ft. down to 14,000
i u L i | 4 vv..*i,
when attacked heavily from all angles; all guns point out
wards and fire over 65 degrees,
volume of fire at long range. The guns on the far side then
-153
:cs AND TECHNIQUE
I I oJfra&oll^ (cont'd)
Irfel
i' •
yards apart?
were from 100 to 20o yards apart ana the earth from the in
terior excavated to a depth so that personnel could sleep be
*low ground level. The efficiency of this method where cover
IV - TACTIC
»»
2) Operational Practices ( (Enemy)
the lower formation under fire, but that they were having
-156r
a
•4k
/.:•, n Af
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE ^ ^
M;A.R.4'6l30-London-9 January 19
guns have- not hesitated to open fire at random over the '
the beams themselves, and* then only when the target' has
" ** ft
v * t, 'h
& ff
Iliirsi is
fcS-*' S I
i .. ; R rs A: .-4%Hft.% : rT F
•' 'f J
IV
come in view and in range; they rely for their effect large
ly- on rate and volume of fire, but against low-flying tar
gets, i,e., at heights below about 1,500 ft., they have
.
H^ Hi. VTIV
• -158
iy'' • y
<
its cover.
- TACTICS M D
light gray under the fuselage, with yellow wing tips and
between 14,000 - 17,000 feet and dive out of the sun. The
T
u"hen antiaircraft .'ire is intense, aircraft maintain a good
interval and very few dive through the barrage, but release
their bombs from about 500 feet above it, with consequent
has been less intense, attack has been made by four air
craft at a time in single line. After pulling out, the air
craft generally fly away very low, sometimes at an altitude
S.
a wide sweep and .then, with a shallow dive 'and boost down
action and the fact that they take advantage of dust storms.
-161
w
TaCTJCS ;VND; -TECH:TIQUE
five to ten minutes before the new dive, so that the gyro
scope can recover itself. In the event of antiaircraft
first dive. The BZA-1 sight has so far only been found
3) Antitank
muzzle),
-162
- ••••-•
against air raids and tank attacks, but has often quickly
Mk, IV tanks with 7*5 mm, guns firing high explosives and
-163
IV - T VCTICS AND TECHNIQUE
3) Antitank (contldX-- ^ gf
amsi^i i t ,
i out ^of "the -sun, this has the added advantage of giving
|J5I equipment .
is all important.
-164
IV - TaCTICS -.ND TECHNIQUE
3) .antitank (cont'd)
(1) The assembly point should not be more than 200 metres
following considerations:
a) Angle of impa'ct should be between 30 degrees and nor
mal.
b)' The range should not be more than 1,000 metres (1,100
yards).
let down till all narrow points on the road from assembly
the enemy,
this angle, the crew have to hold on. tightly to the carriage.
M.A.L.4719.1-Lo'
- -165
IV - TACTICS AN£ Tffi&feQUE
(cu^-M)
spade, 30$ with field glasses, only 10$ with the gun,
were from mines, 75$ were from guns. Until British learn
ivW*
h, :
^ -166
: - 4 8 £% 1 i p n -i ? ' 3 i
3) Antitank (cont'd)
which attempt to open the way for. the tanks. "In the sec
ond phase, after enemy tanks have broken into the initial
'•.Tien the guns go into position they must .be ready to open
IV - T . C m | N M ! M Q ! i E
3)|l^titank ^oorit * d)
'' ^ .
-168
IV - ThCTICS,INDTECHNIQUE
3) antitank (cont'd)
East) .
(1) ihen one section was given the task of covering the
on Damascus,
On both occasions the use of the guns in this role met with
and flanks. The top edge of the armor plate of the 6-pdr,
M. ..A.454^7-10^0:^19 I^vs
-1.69
• TACTICS AND TEC HI
ivntitank * u;
gun),
matter of seconds.
antitank mines, but all troops of the combat arms and appro
priate services should be thoroughly trained in this phase
-170
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
3) Antitank (cont'd)
rSmwEr soi- |
: attack wherp
^_ I O w J
to play, where the other guns are located, how they are coor
dinated and has confid.ence that his gun will destroy tanks,
M . A . R . ^ R ^ L
in a mass (and head on) rapid fire with high explosive proves
attack)
the target,
M. A. R.48227-London-4 June'1942
. t Antiaircraft ijatitank
-172
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
benefit.
A shell may exude TNT and also get stuck in the bore, pos
sibly causing damage when the gun is again fired. This is
.. R.41810-Lond op
* f\
-173
IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
-OF
have proved more useful than those in open with all round
k
B,A.C. Technical Services memorandum No,8
-174
IV - TACTICS . iJD TECHNIQUE
the cartridge cases do.not blow off the shells am6ng the
detachment.
drums thick at the bottom and. one at the top. — - All walls
(3) Counterbattery
,ir *
IV - T.£TIC£ TSCHNIQTJB*
trends ^(cont'd)
bomb strikes any objects before ^entering the ground, and. (c)
made by the bamb usually starts slanting away from the ver*
*
r
•The Director Antiaircraft has stated that — — a good
-176
IV - ThCTICS,INDTECHNIQUE
A)
' Lessons and'Trends (ccnt'd)
v
I . \ h p :, i f,1
existed'
(1) Fluid condition in front, where Corps and Divisions
and the 20 mm, Oerlikon was being developed for this purpose,
gun) .
It has been found that our loss of planes from small arms
open fire on our p3_anes with rifles and other infantry weap
ons, The probability of hits on'a- small target from fire
Ik 1 6 V* ® I
IV - TACT:
Trends (cont'd)
use all weapons ,found with ground troops to' fire on aircraft.
January 24, 1942 with the 24th Tank Corps, when a Soviet
trated fire."
/s/ FIEBIG
-178
I? - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE
— » - |i _
above:
(1) Pxtensive use was made, of dummy gun positions; these
-179
IV - TACTICS AND TE 3H
4) Lessons ja^cbnt1 d)
from the map, the range tables and estimated heights based
are :
(1) The "Stiffkey" Stick (a mechanical sight corrector)
is in production. — —
Home Forces,
-180
IV - TACTICS AMD TECHNIQUE J <<? ^ ^ ^ I P f f
,p • Jf *
fled from the trenches where they had been safe, and as a
doubtful whether they have developed the use .of Light Anti
aircraft guns fired in an intermediate role for lethal ef
fect.
«* n * V 1 i?*
-181
IV - TACTICS AND TEC
W %
it has usually (not always) been found that the round will
fire the second time. This procedure not only saves the
aircraft, arriving over the area about one hour after the
Hq Ji.A,Command"Glenthorn",3tanmore,Middx.
B I B I I O G R A P H Y
Signals
teries,
j) No.31 - Ammunition,
Stations'.
- Operational Command
A,A.C•319•131/VG
Incl.#1-AAC. 319.131/APE
November 1941-13l/XU
Incl.6-M.A,L.46140-131/VG
V - TRAINING
than two days in travel plus the time actually spent with a
master his own job better and to bccome a better teacher for
duty.
V I V O L
-185
ichools and Courses (cont'd)
are discussed.
of class 20 officers. *
Antiaircraft
-186
V - TRAINING
to which the units and staffs were assigned for the solution
-187
JBELJSSEL.
V - TRAINING
\ w
JchpolC^an^ Qpura|'|^UIt1 d)
groups:
v
the course, t \%>
T.
to their organizations.
following instructions:
absolutely essential.
Wireless Course.
V - TRAILING
i
l) Schools -and courses&(cont'd)
the units at the school are for basic training and one
All candidates for commision come from the ranks and regu
lations lay down certain necessary qualifications such as
•V - TRAINING
fifth month. During the first four months the cadets eat
while others send in poor ones. The school can turn them
back at any time but recently has not turned back over 5%
u •>«* *
i U
-191
ffi" .I
V - TRAINING a m 4 Is*
V*
fj-kih) v Coarse
Camouflage Course
School of Administration
U ) staff Duties
( 2 ) Recognition of Aircraft
(3) Mreless
(4) Dive-bombing
and usual administrat ive pers onnel, the school being a self-
the school,
V - TRAINING
"wfcJ'lvtSSj i
T
""or .ing.
students
" M.A.R.46958-Incl.#l-London-319.131/APN
-193
T' i , ,; m.
iff
V - TRAINING "" - ,
the target, this being due to the relatively high muzzle veloc
ity of this gun. The results appeared to be very good, in
dicating that the gun at this range was extremely accurate.
the second run the crew engaged the target with forward area
the gun crew engaged the target with automatic fire, again
demonstration.
- 194
V - TRAINING
2) Individual Training
4
establishment.
senior in rank. •
M.A.d.46958-Incl.#l-London-319.131/APN
of course, be even more fit than their men, and this is,
tion, -*•
M. A . R. 48014-London-22 May 1942,'
battle depends above all else upon the will to win. There
- 195
-41M
V U1M
in the move North to cut the fortress line and in the bat
tles around Tobruk, wherever we used our pace of 40 miles
AAG #319.131/AZN
cunning on our part. Let the men know all the time what
- 196
M. A. R.2008-Cairo,Egypt-10 October 1941
they feel that this should be done until the ground soldier
Air Defense of Great Britain, are sent for one week's duty
V - TRAINING
2) Individual Trkining^.cont1 d)
of personnel:
should be dimmed.
place,
of night vision:
desiring them,
above,' %% V |
, •
the , be afti" is,W*
,.ofe ac&ii^ cf.
... '
-198
V - TRAINING
Ss>
for objects, since these are best seen when the eye is
3) Unit Training $%
' / 'r;
V « TRAIN,
in p w % fv ;A S% w,
r
I a)
v ,;>
IS n & "U
*
is the responsibility of the Commanding Officer. Methods
done a better day's work than a man who has hung about for
times before.
Incl.#1-M.A.R.469 58-London-319.13l/APN
in Great Britain,
V - TRAINING
noise too much sounding off. The British quote Lt. Gen.
-201
• Unit Train,ir% (cont'd)
\t '
\\ &
t o w S Vehicles to the mile. The columns travelled about
This has been due to lack of motor vehicles and guns and
;*
^iSBsefctiit
- 202
V - TRAINING
'week. The air sentry, however, will not wear his respirator
The gas masks of the men are stored in a recess at the gun
will have their gas masks at the site and not left in the
bunk house,
V - TRAILING
3) li^g
Unit Train:;
\cron0i)
lining up have been removed. The fact that an ^rror for line
seen.by No. 3 and Fig. 2 the same target receding. The con
tinuous line snows the tracer resulting, from a correct line
up, and the dotted line the tracer from a bad line up for
y r \
HiCh
(2)
-204
•V - TRAINING
- A a a ! p i p
first for low aind then for high rounds on the same target.
Incl.#3-M.A.R.46598-London-AAC 319.131/APN
It has been noted that units 'equipped with the No. 3 Predic
tor tend to neglect, the use of forward area sights in their
beui taught:
(2) Deflections
sights)
position and there are three watches. One man per watch can
men on watch can fire the gun with the Stiffkey Stick where
as normally only one man per detachment is qualified- to make
?.a hws vt
V - TRAINING
%— •
a m ^
3) U n % gaining (cont'd)
4) Training Films
1942, all training film production was placed under the con
trol of the Directorate of Army Kinematography• This
ANTIAIRCRAFT
Part 2. Defiants.
</, -206
V - TRAINING
4) Training M ^ l * ^ f **
CQNCEALME!
T^'XS
Fart 2. » » »» » » »
screen, -—
Description
German.
security-minded.
E f f ^ b ^ c f lice as regards
«
.#t j.
Antiaircraft Gunner,
Light Antiai
Aided Laying,
-208
1
V - TRAINING
Gunnery
Ground Locators
equipment•
5) Training Devices
crew being trained. Sound effects for plane and gun are
Antiaircraft Trainir
Ser.IV-C anadiaf
V - TRAD ING „ V
5) Training
V i \ Devices
'A ^4 cent' d)
to two pounders.
the gun-pointer. The dot and the cross wire of light are
filter.
V - TRAINING
are not strictly correct for the 40 mm, guns, the errors
below. "
V - TRAINING
The time during which the gun pointer can fire is about lj
Answeri (l) Queen Bee aircraft can fly on any course within
targets.
of fire.
V - TRAINING
Tracer.
- 213
•.. v r
* f
* VA %
V * . % V
V - TRAINING 1
is most important.
neared its objective the Royal Air Force came over in what
myself were loud in its praise until after the action when
t\
•-V
L4
V - TRAINING
the aerodrome*
low level ground straffing attacks they would have been missed
- TRAINING , . JW
V a C i ^
Other arms arc prone to fire not o.ly at absurdly long ranges,
Bofors are present, small arms .fire should be held until the
be much appreciated.".
the week they see nearly every operational British type and are
.#319.13/AUC-39
7
>
-•WK .1 . . .. ,»_ W
V - TRAINING
£
.* j! i N•a —L- & fa
4'
6) Antiaircraft Recognition Training (cont'd)
produced,
combat or reconnaissance.
r
achieving this is b repeated instruction. Training films
in his subject, or who does not have all the facts at his
once. • .
- 217
%V %
% f V' %
f- Q N & *%
V - TX-JNIK
that they could tell them on sight. This held good (sim
ilarly) for motorists who are able to spot.cars on the
types, which may have very far reaching effects on the con
clusions reached at the analysis. And since the a
nalysis consists of dividing aircr ft into t^pes by means of
sheet in the pocket and this may leave the person concerned
time being wasted on -that feature, wji^n tn'^L ' plane could be
V - TRAINING
complete set of all our own aircraft types in one place, the
Royal Air Force has been helpful, but has very definite lim
itations in view of the organization involved to give a com
paratively small section of the people concerned a view of
of the unit for time, since it is under its own control, and
%J>I j
ft% •
V - TRAINING P ^ H* ,
journals, etc.
do the spotting and give advice that the officer .or non-com
missioned officer in charge ^of an antiaircraft "gun or guns
will be able to make his decision quicker and with more con
fidence, thereby increasing the effectiveness of our anti
aircraft artillery.
'BIBLIOGRAPHY
T
ar Department Circular (Trainma^ Ntt.
- 221
V - TRAINING
Woolwich). •
M
* , ,R.47022-London-March 1942
model)•
M.A.R.48427-London-June 1942
M.A.R.46726-London-131/AOZ
February 1942
of Antiaircraft weapons).
k.ii.R.46008-London-December 1941
A. A.C.#319.131/XU
<
A.A.C.#319.131/XU-30-1941
A.A.C.#319.131/XU-34-May 1941
A. A. C. #319*131/ ARL
v. A'.R^503-Sa^^"May 1942.
< .
^ ^^4.R.47742-London-May 1942
V - TRAINING
*
v
(17) List of draining Films for Identification of Ai
craft.
IV - Canadian reprint.
A.A.C.#319.13l/X-May 1942
Single 1941.
Antiaircraft organizations".
Antiaircraft Teachers".
gun.
and III. —
j| V, -! Nfc, i:;,
V - TRAINING
1 1% t 3
Bibliography (cont'i)
(25) (contM)
aircraft and crews of the Royal Air Force the Balloon Bar
rage units of the Royal Air Force, the; Royal Artillery's '
of which was the Royal Air Force and that in order properly
k v " -225
^MW
- AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (cont'd)
«, « .• . ti \Ll
when the "flash" from the Fighter Command stated that the
: " Incl.#l-A.A.C.#319.131/IE
friendly bombers must fly. Around the map board sit plot-
looks the large map and all the other maps or charts. He
— There are two operations rooms, one large room for the
also one woman tracer who makes a record of the courses flown
Plotters use head and breast telephone sets. The gun layer
Control Officer, uses a head and breast set with ono earpiece
-227
- AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (cop&Vd). " """ >,
organized the lines were all routed into the city or main
attacks..
one for receiving the plots from-the site, the other for
W d J
"be necossary.
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Qp,ftrati oris Tahl a
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Plotter ¥
To R.A.F *
Sector Plotter n*
•* To R.A.F,
Group
I To
Plotter
Exchange Warning Line * To 2 R.A,
T-
F.Sectorg
Sector
Aerodrome
To
Gun :
Stations
( Operators
.Microphone
Table
To Sen-
( X
v . x i
ior Naval
Gun Control Naval Lia- !• Officer,
Recorder
Officer I§on Office* G.H.Q.
To Other
DAIS
Exchange 4 1 0.0, Rs.
\ rea
Arec-
Ufeftitw^
VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (Cont'd)
3-inch - 30 feet
k.5-inch - 90 feet
have been received and readily broken down for use. Those
cases the Germane havo v.ory foolishly sent out the weather
have been easier to break down than the German. At the de
coding desk a secret Italian code book was seen which may
that the Italians havo not been changing their code at the ,
break.
"232"
After Dunkerque the army was unable to defend all the air
dromes. The Royal Air Force contemplated its own defense
The Air Ministry has formed the Royal Air Force Regiment
who. are now to "be armed. A Major General — has "been loaned
upon the distance the field is from the front and the effi
ciency of the warning system. A standard defense system
combat area will require more, and those further behind the
- 233
VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British). (egnVd)
(5) Rockets. ••
take off. This will dopond upon the tine element and effi
ciency of the warning system. - —
two hours after, and from two hours before sunset to one half
by observers in England,
-234- - <-'
-works plaiined
and that the smaller the force in relation to its task, the
kv"-235
VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (cont'd.)
least 3 feet wide and 2 deep, but this — has been out
with the result that the gun and searchlight densities cah
i %V
• - A,
•a%
Mkjjs Wi ' I *
VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (German) (cont'd)
the perimeter.
Guns Guns
1 12 42
2 8 30
3 8 27
In addition, there are several antiaircraft searchlights
and the other from 2:30 - 4:30 a.m. ---. The most important
observation that was made during the air raids was that the
post. Ono piano flew over the entire city from southeast
fired until the plane reached the critical zone around the
- 237
— ' . IP —
During the British and Russian air raids during the month
six. —
a w , . *
• i *
125 Searchlights.
dam.
For the past year Flak towers have been erected. The two
'i
\
In Berlin, in the Tiergarten and in the Friedrichshain,
and more than 100 feet high, each with a slightly smaller
I
In Eierlin, in the Tiergarten and in the Fr iedrichshain,
and more than 100 feet high, each with a slightly smaller •
^ - > >
k v " -242
VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (German) (cont'd)
line which runs through the city and which can so readily
measures in and about tho city. Work along tho Axis indi
cates that the entire section of the avenue which runs east
- 243
f f1 • _
"be the Oerlickon type, which are "by gun crews twenty-
as they say, all the guns are Italian, all the officers
are Italian, all.the men are Italian, all the shells are
I jR O C ^ ' g i T f
8 l | 'ii V fe I
it
M.A.R.#16-China-September 19UI
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Device.
A.A.C.#319.13/AUF-11
-245
w
The concept
- 246
VII - OPERATIONS (cont'd)
/;
the western group joined those in the wadi. The wadi troops
J
the island, '
troops were dive bombed and machine gunned off the airdrome,
if
-247
VII - OPERATIONS (cont'd) **
%
dn
^ i % \
only two planes shot down Q.Sy cable No. 1950 B.F.F.); our
saw only seven shot down (Appendix 1, page 5J• In some cases
was not a man to man battle. Air support gave the German
drove off thirty 109's from Mai e •.. e airdrome- and snoi
•I-heir defense against air and land attacks and that, at. air
dromes of importance, defenses must be prepared as thoroughly
unt.il all bases within effective Air Force range .can be' denied
the enemy,
workshop (R.A.O.C.) ;
cover. - — The first dive bomber may be above the gun sec
tion — - at 4000 feet. A ferocious burst of fire at this
moment from the guns will make hi71 release his bombs prema
turely and make his successors pause in their attack. Com
plete silence at this moment if the section goes to ground
feet. Then, and only then, will guns and command, posts be
at once.
The light Antiaircraft in Tobruk has been singled cut for iso
lated attacks on their gun positions by individual aircraft.
The reason for this is that guns in the perimeter are well
camouflaged and often moved, and planes dare not fly low over
> ~ V
In more tJ^i^.onV ca^j Bofors were used to cover the rear sub
-25O
VII - OPERATIONS (contM) f ^ M l I
I M
„ k
formations of withdrawing columns, They ha
drivers and other personnel ran from their vehicles and lay
flat on the ground. Two men were killed and eight wounded
as we were not in a camp area and fire was not, on this oc
casion, returned from the ground. After this the Brigade was
Slit trenches uug at least, ten yards, from the vehicles pro
vided almost perfect protection. A dive bombing attack
deep, just enough that the body of the man is below the sur
face of the ground. After the first attack, all low eleva
tion and dive bombing attacks were replied to be Bren guns .
gun attack. Low flying planes and dive bombers can be shot
-251
VII - OPERATIONS
and, hac^ duels with no less that 7B'0 aircraft in 187 engage
ment^, -Tfle attacks were malnlr delivered on motor trans
port concentrations but division Headquarters was a partic
ular objective of the Ju 87* One of the most noticeable
ifeom the gun, pulled the gun onto the target with
- 252
VII - OPERATIONS (cont'd) " •"
109s, flew over the column and wore engaged "by the Bofors.
hit and crashed 3 miles to the South, the latter "being con
firmed "by the Battery Command 'of 31 Forward Battery Royal
21-May 194l-OCjA#|§3j,13l/OG
- 253
BSUs&ign CAT. 1. CAT. 2. CAT. 3.
has --- "been largely taken over "by rockets (80 to 100
planes at night.
cloud "banks have "been seen to form and "blanket whole areas.
grew denser and after a half hour tho cloud bank was quite
means exists.
With the result that the Royal Air Force was able to de
stroy its target with unhurried and devastating accuracy.
- 254
VII - OPERATIONS (contld)
ing at 27,000 foet when i,t was fired on "by ant i aircraft^
Tho "bursts we're correct for altitude "but fell about 700
yards short. —
feet below.
-255
VII - OPERATIONS (cont
>e of silencer.
were filled with sand and engines run until they seized. All
down. — . .
..Wal*iwri^ht-31
T
~ %
March 1942-1321/K
* '
-256
VII - OPERATIONS (cont'd)
No.
they had been bombed it would have added greatly to our op
erational difficulties.
picked the biggest Japanese carrier and headed for it. : The
minute our bomb-bays opened, the ack ack started coming up.
It was fine shooting, and the Japs must have good range,
: :
remained behind at 16,000 to 20,000 foot. These dived at
At.
VII * OPERATIONS (cont'd)*/^
s
' v%JnformatIonal Intelligence Summary No.35
leg of the wharf. Ei'om this time until 1220 Light bombs
Dive Bombers 30
23 February 1942-AAC#319.13l/APM
B I B L I 0. G E A P H Y ^
V.
1
^
VII - OPERATIONS ,
Bibliography (cont'd)
AAC#319.132l/Z
D I S T R I B U T I
Chief of Engineers
3^
Chief of Ordnance
35
President, AA Board
92-93
File
101-150
- 260
teT;
«V
U
#021075