Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 69–78

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Energy Research & Social Science

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Original research article

The political ecology of hydropower: Social justice and conflict in

Colombian hydroelectricity development
Viviana Martínez, O.L. Castillo ∗
Department of Rural and Regional Development, Faculty of Environmental and Rural Studies, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Transversal 4 No. 42-00
(Piso 8), Bogotá, Colombia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This paper offers the identification of the hydropower energy systems events that have led to eco-
Received 26 February 2016 distributive conflicts in the Colombian case and other countries of the region supported by the
Received in revised form 24 August 2016 socio-energy systems framework and political ecology concepts.
Accepted 30 August 2016
The analysis of secondary information about the building and installation of thirteen hydroelectric
Available online 9 September 2016
plants between 1980 and 2010 in Colombia led to the identification of three consecutive time peri-
ods in which the conflicts generated by the installation of the mentioned plants exhibited distinctive
Keywords:
characteristics.
Eco-distributive conflicts
Socio-energy systems
The social and political effects of chosen energy systems on individuals, organizations and communi-
Risk of hydropower projects ties can be diverse and vast, but are usually neglected by decision makers and national policy designers
implementation to focus instead on economical and technological aspects. The lessons from past Colombian energy tran-
sitions could be integrated not only into the current national policy debates, but also into those of other
countries in the region undergoing similar transitions. Doing so could help to avoid or minimize the social
and political costs of energy policies, obtaining reliable energy systems which hopefully will remain in
the longer term.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The group of thirteen dams studied as part of this investiga-

The identification and analysis of the facts that have led to con-
flicts in the implementation of the Colombian hydropower energy
system were supported by the socio-energy systems framework
and the eco-distributive conflicts and energy justice concepts.
We understand hydroelectric expansion conflicts as ecologi-
cal and distributive and hence, the offered analysis is focused on
the power relationships of different actors around the appropria-
tion and transformation of nature. Therefore, the eco-distributive
conflicts analysis is focused on the identification of the main par-
ticipating actors, their rationales and the legal or illegal tools used
to enforce those rationales.
With regard to the conceptual framework, socio-energy systems
design represents an opportunity to overcome obstacles such as
the disconnection between energy policies with social and cultural
sectors given the recognition that energy systems are embedded in
these socio-political and cultural contexts.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: martinezviviana@javeriana.edu.co (V. Martínez),
olga.castillo@javeriana.edu.co (O.L. Castillo).
tion, all comprise of hydropower plants installed between 1980
and 2010. All are categorized as ‘generators’, due to their installed
capacity being equal or greater than 20 MW, which allows them
to participate in the wholesale national electricity market. Table 1
shows both the opening year and the generating capacity of the
thirteen dams – including the improvement phases of four of them:
Chivor, Guatapé, San Carlos and Porce. This particular time period
is justified as Colombia questioned its energy planning following
the 1973 oil crisis and offered the first comprehensive energy stud-
ies and diagnostics of the sector in the early 1980s. In follow-on
it has since adopted number of changes and policies in the sec-
tor that have had environmental, social, political and economical
consequences until today.
The significance of the thirteen analyzed projects lies in the
economic investment that they represented, in the engineering
innovation, landscape transformation, social impacts and techno-
logical development, among other facts. In addition, they represent
55% of the current power capacity of the country and 83% of the
hydroelectric production, adding to the wholesale national mar-
ket 7455 MW (to the remaining 6100 MW) as installed capacity
(calculations based on XM S.A. E.S.P. [95]).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.08.023
2214-6296/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
70 V. Martínez, O.L. Castillo / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 69–78

Table 1
Analyzed hydropower plants.

Identified Periods Name Opening Year Generating Capacity (MW)

The National Electricity Guatapé I 1972 280

Expansion Chivor I 1977 500
(1970–1989) Guatapé II 1978 280
Chivor II 1983 500
San Carlos I 1984 620
Salvajina 1985 285
Guatrón 1985 202
Betania 1987 540
San Carlos II 1987 620
Playas 1988 201
Jaguas 1988 170

Privatization and Guavio 1990 1150

Decentralization Tasajera 1993 306
(1990–1999)

Intensification of Urrá I 2000 340

Violence (2000–2015) Porce II 2001 405
La Miel 2002 396
Porce III 2010 660

Source: Based on XM S.A. E.S.P. [95].

This analysis has revealed two main drivers of the eco-
distributive conflicts: the first one is the political and economic
context where electricity sector was formed in Colombia. The sec-
ond highlights the fact that the construction of mega dams has also
been aligned with the interests of political elites and their expec-
tations of a development model supported by economic growth,
not only in Colombia, but also in other countries within the region.
These conflicts display different characteristics across three dis-
tinct periods: the national electricity expansion (1970–1989), the
privatization and decentralization period (1990–1999) and the
intensification of violence period (2000–2015).
As is usual in analysis based on a timeline, in practice the nar-
ratives, policies and practices around energy expansion are not
trapped in time capsules conveniently organized in decades. Ideas
that first appear in one decade often gain strength in the follow-
ing decade, having effects in a widespread line that goes from the
immediate term to years after they were first put forward [21].
With that in mind, these three periods have served as temporal
guidance for describing some facts that are part of the evolution of
the Colombian electricity system, for explaining the energy poli-
cies adopted, and also for analyzing distinctive characteristics of
the eco-distributive conflicts generated by them.
Notably while the establishment and evolution of the elec-
tricity sector in other countries of the region have their own
characteristics, some of them show important similarities with the
eco-distributive conflicts and energy justice issues that have arisen
in Colombia. This suggests that similar dynamics to these conflicts
may also be present in other countries of the world.
Hence, the remainder of this paper is organized around four sec-
tions of discussion: in the next, the evolution of the Colombian
electricity sector is described. It serves as context to the estab-
lishment of energy infrastructure and energy policy since 1970.
The following section exposes the conceptual framework used for
this analysis, comprising of the principles of socio-energy systems
and the concept of eco-distributive conflicts. Section four offers the
identification of the ecological and distributive conflicts and justice
energy issues that have arisen from the construction of these dams.
The analysis here focuses on the sides in the conflicts, why they are
confronted, and what their tools are to enforce their rationales. The
last section sums up and concludes.
2. The evolution of the colombian electricity system since
1970
The Colombian panorama of energy production and consump-
tion has been dramatically transformed over the past four decades.
Table 2 offers data on the primary energy production, the pri-
mary energy supply available for internal consumption and the
ratio between production and domestic supply that exposes the
extractive character of the Colombian energy sector.
Table 2 data supports that the energy production model in
Colombia has been export-oriented, neglecting attention to ade-
quacy and internal energy efficiency issues in the last twenty years.
While the destination of energy surplus is exports, involving eco-
nomical dynamics, the establishment of the electricity sector to
obtain those surpluses has resulted in significant territorial and

Table 2
Colombia Energy Production and Primary Energy Supply (1970–2013).

Time period Production (Ktoe.) (*) Total Primary Energy Supply (Ktoe.) Production/TPES (**)

1970 (***) 18.984 5.937 3,20

1980 (***) 25.244 6.511 3,88
1990 48.179 24.223 1,99
2000 72.329 25.814 2,80
2010 105.931 31.203 3,39
2013 125.551 31.649 3,97

Source: (***) Calculations based on Garzón et al. [35] Annex 1 and IEA [44] Energy Balances Statistics.
(*) Kilo ton of equivalent oil.
(**) TPES corresponds to what is available within the country for the energy production and consumption (production + imports − exports − stock variations).
 V. Martínez, O.L. Castillo / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 69–78
Table 3
Number of National Interconnected System Generation Plants per Source in 2015.
Before 1970
National Electricity Expansion period (1970–1989)
Privatization and decentralization period (1990–1999)
Intensification of violence period (2000–2015)
Source: Calculations based on XM S.A. E.S.P. [96].
ecological transformations that have also involved political and
institutional changes.
2.1. The national electricity expansion between 1970 and 1989
Since its inception in 1889, the electricity service in Colombia
was concentrated in major cities and in the hands of private
investors; it was only in 1928 that the State intervened in power
generation, declaring waterfalls public property through law No.
113. In addition, during the crisis of the 1930s and due to the
lack of funds from private investors, the government intervened.
Declaring existing companies as public utilities, the intention was
the whole electricity sector in Colombia to pass into hands of the
State [62]. Since then, the importance of hydroelectric power in
the Colombian electric system has increased thanks to the hydro-
logical characteristics of the country and supportive economic and
political decisions.
Even so, it was only in 1967 that the National Interconnected
System (SIN), consisting of a set of major power plants and power
distribution systems, was created. SIN currently covers 48% of the
national territory, but provides 97% of the country’s total energy
consumption. The remaining 52% of the territory, where the elec-
tricity demand comes from about 1.5 million citizens, derives
power from isolated local systems, which are referred to as Non-
Interconnected Zones (ZNI) [96].
Despite the expectations of the State leadership, the Colom-
bian energy sector has been characterized by the disconnection
of their subsectors (electricity, coal, oil, and gas), the absence of
comprehensive planning, the tensions between the central and
regional levels for the resources management, and the energy
policy-making process that works from top-down [93]. In conse-
quence, the energy resources exploitation are crossed by claims
about autonomy, independence, and local justice.
Another crucial element in this evolution was law 56 of 1981,
Article 16th of which ‘declared public utility and social interest
plans, projects and execution of works for the generation, trans-
mission and distribution of electricity, as well as areas affected
therein’ [11: 10]. Supported by this legal tool, the energy transi-
tion governmental declaration came in 1982, using the country’s
great hydrological potential to extend the coverage of the national
electrification network, whilst simultaneously achieving surpluses
to allow the country to take part in the international energy mar-
ket. However, this initiative also resulted in the establishment of an
unreliable electricity sector, which paradoxically wavered between
important energy provision failures and a superavit of its installed
capacity. The initiative was plagued with major technical inconsis-
tencies, corruption situations and an increasing external debt. All
of these aforementioned factors contributed to settle an oligopolis-
tic electricity market and hide the critical environmental and social
costs of these operations.
Facing this reality, and also because a significant growth in
demand was expected, an extensive program of investment in the
sector was undertaken. However, this also in turn led to a predica-
ment: between 1970 and 1990, a quarter of public investment was
allocated to this sector and the scarcity of government funds was
financed with foreign credit, especially from the World Bank, IBRD
71
Hydropower Thermalpower Other sources Total
44 12 0 56
14 38 0 52
19 33 3 55
56 16 12 84
and IDB, to the point that ‘the electricity sector debt rose from US
$ 860 million in 1980 to US $ 5200 million in 1990, a figure which
amounted to one third of the Colombian external public debt’ [24:
45].
The volume of these investments led to an over-installed capac-
ity of the sector: ‘by the end of 1987 the sector had an installed
capacity of 8000 MW to meet a demand of only 5000 MW’ [17:
77]. Paradoxically, in this short period, the electric sector passed
from a situation of electricity insufficiency, to one of over-installed
capacity, joined with a financial crisis. Its macroeconomic impacts
resulted in the interference of the World Bank, who first routed out
institutional changes to warrant then the granting of those credits
[93].
Statistical data (Table 3) also backs this analysis, as it shows that
the preponderance of hydropower within the Colombian national
energy system before 1970 – that is, in hands of private foreign
investors – was three and half times larger than the second-largest
source, thermal power. This table also shows that the hydropower
subsector has strongly decreased and increased its role in energy
infrastructure over time.
During the national expansion period, the creation of civic
movements related to the electrification of both urban and rural
areas, and to the guaranteeing of access to electricity in terms of
pricing were swift; between 1971 and 1980, 128 local and regional
strikes and public demonstrations, symbolic public offices occupa-
tions, and non-payment of bills for utilities were carried out in the
country, which involved about four million people [68].
2.2. Privatization and decentralization between 1990 and 1999
This period began with the abandonment of the Industrializa-
tion and Import Substitution development model, arguably among
other reasons to the inability of the State as an economic agent.
Under the presidential administration between 1990 and 1994, the
implementation of neoliberal premises, took place. Therefore, three
major development strategies were implemented: a) the elimina-
tion of restrictions on international trade and international capital
movement, through the integration of the domestic market in for-
eign competition and the process of economic liberalization; b) the
creation of conditions for the efficient functioning of markets of
primary factors (labor, land and capital), with the aim of raising
their productivity; and c) the redefinition of natural areas for eco-
nomic action of the State, excluding from them activities where its
intervention was costly, inefficient and distorting [18]. This paved
the way to the emergence of the market as an indisputable tool to
induce competitive pressures.
Hence, in 1994 new regulatory conditions for the energy sec-
tor were established (e.g. Public Utilities Act 142 of Utilities Act
142 of 1994 and Electricity Act 143 of 1994). Activities for gener-
ation, transmission, distribution and energy marketing processes
were separated. Then, the role of the State within the sector was
redefined, promoting the competitiveness of the industry. Also,
the non-interconnected users, as a segment of the market, were
deregulated, and an institutional framework for assigning policies,
planning, regulation and energy control functions to different enti-
ties was created [86].
72 V. Martínez, O.L. Castillo / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 69–78
Fig. 1. Electricity market agents.
Source: Calculations based on (2011b; XM S.A. E.S.P. [96]).
Nevertheless, and even with the privatization process in
Colombia, the new Colombian Constitution (1991) became an
important legal framework. Its articles 365–370 recognized that
public services are inherent to the purpose of the social rule of
law, although they are supplied by private companies. However, the
public utility legal tool remained in the 1991 Constitution through
Art.58 and the laws 142 and 143 of 1994, with electric power
gradually being redefined as an exportable commodity. Indeed,
the Colombian export of electricity began modestly in 1999 with
32 Tcal., but has grown rapidly, to the point that in 2009 1168
Tcal. were exported [87: 61]. Hence, the National Constitution of
1991, signified a milestone because the adopted decentralization
process was considered a suitable mechanism for genuine citi-
zen empowerment through participatory planning and building of
social capital, leading to their participation in the energy sector
decisions [7].
However, access to electricity – still regarded as a consumer
good, marketable and exportable, rather than a right – has not
always meant an improved quality of life for the local communi-
ties, especially where dams have been built. On the contrary, it has
created favorable conditions for private and foreign investment,
most of the time at the expense of the welfare and safety of these
communities, and the integrity of the existing ecosystems in these
territories. Both have lead to eco-distributive conflicts.
2.3. The violence intensification period between 2000 and 2015
The implementation of neoliberal reforms and the creation of
incentives for private investment in the electricity sector radi-
cally transformed it. The number of agents in the market (Fig. 1),
particularly of private companies, increased while the role of the
State interventionism has been reduced. Additionally, the State
institutional discourse has encouraged its ideal of “sustainable
development” for the electricity sector, which set no limits to the
exploitation of primary sources. Rather, the Colombian National
Energy Plan 2006–2025 is clear in its central objective to back
energy production as a commodity: ‘to strengthen the contribu-
tion of the energy sector to environmentally sustainable economic
growth and development, but not limited to maximizing produc-
tion and export of energy resources . . . it is necessary: to change the
paradigm of self-sufficiency for the full supply, through processes
of energy integration with neighboring countries; to focus on the
location of all available resources in the Colombian subsoil; and to
develop mechanisms to promote the export of petroleum products
Fig. 2. Ratio between Primary Energy Production and Total Primary Energy Supply
(Selected countries, 1990–2013).
Source: based on IEA [44] Energy Balances Statistics.
and coal with added value, complementary to traditional exports
of raw materials or primary energy resources’ [85: 140].
In this context the Colombian government again issued hydro-
electric dams as projects of national priority. This was done mainly
to serve the extractive industries that have been reactivated in the
country and in Latin America. Also was with the aim of generating
commodities for exchange, with the difference that infrastructure
that before was state-owned now is mostly privately owned.
Currently, Colombia is ranked no. 11 within the world’s largest
producers of hydroelectricity [45]. Within the regional context
Colombia, after Brazil and Venezuela, is the South American coun-
try with the highest hydroelectric potential [45]. Currently Ecuador
and Venezuela are export destinations of Colombian electricity, but
feasibility studies are being performed to expand this trade with
Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, and the U.S.A. In the national con-
text, hydropower provides about 70% of the electricity consumed
in the country [45] and while the export of Colombian electricity
began modestly in 1999 with 32 Tcal., 10 years later it exported
1168 Tcal. [88: 61].
In addition, although Colombian production and consumption
values are modest when compared to equivalent average figures
of developed countries and even to other countries in the region,
global statistics show the rising role of Colombia as a net energy
exporter. Its ratio between primary energy production and total
primary energy source, particularly since 2000, surpasses with
increasingly higher values large net exporters of energy in the
world, such as Saudi Arabia (Fig. 2).
On the other hand, some Latin American governments, particu-
larly Brazilian, Mexican, Peruvian and Chilean and Colombian, have
designed significant incentives to attract foreign investment to the
 V. Martínez, O.L. Castillo / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 69–78
Fig. 3. Attack and destruction of energy transmission towers in Colombia.
Source: Defence Ministry, 2016.
sector. This includes modifying the free zone regime to benefit from
customs, tax and special trade regimes, in exchange for certain
ranges investment and job creation, which are feasible for such
projects [10].
Another significant incentive has included legal stability con-
tracts offered to investors. With them the State guarantees to
investors that in the case of legislation being approved during the
life of the contract affecting any element of the prior agreement
that is identified as “crucial for investment factor”, this contract is
allowed to continue operating under the previous regulation, dur-
ing the term of the contract. The period of these agreements can
vary between 3 and 20 years and can cover new investments or
increases in existing investments.
Although this incentive model has been successful in terms of
flows of foreign investment in the energy sector, it has also led
to the intensification of social conflicts (and armed conflict in the
Colombian case), particularly in areas where these projects have
been implemented. In fact, in addition to the civil resistance move-
ments, one of the armed groups that are part of the Colombian
conflict has had the nationalization of energy resources as one of
its main issues of struggle. This unfortunately has been expressed
through attacks on electrical infrastructure at national level, with
historical numbers in this particular period shown in the figure
below (Fig. 3).
The State answer to these attacks has been the strengthen-
ing of the military presence across the country. In parallel, from
the investors’ side there has been the recruitment of paramilitary
groups as custodians of mining and energy infrastructure, in order
to safeguard energy mining assets exacerbating warlike acts of the
social and armed conflict [42,67,71].
Hence, in this paper we argue that in order to accomplish the
Electricity 2010–20241 plan, it is required that policy designers
and decision-makers re-visit past lessons to avoid social and polit-
ical costs of energy policies which have led to conflicts and energy
justice concerns.
The following section exposes the main principles of socio-
energy systems that, in conjunction with the eco-distributive
conflicts and energy justice concepts, have served as a conceptual
framework to explain why and how the above described events
have derived into different types of conflicts.
1
There are four more versions of this plan, due to the additional projects that
have been integrated: 2011–2025; 2012–2025; 2013–2027; and 2014–2028.
73
3. Socio-energy systems, eco-distributive conflicts and
energy justice conceptual framework
Disconnection between energy policies and social and cultural
sectors has already been documented [82,40,83]. In Latin Amer-
ica this situation is more critical because: a) academic studies on
energy policy are scarce, and environmental and energy conflicts
are analyzed as economic and/or technological problems [81]; b)
the academic and research institutes dedicated to the subject are
few and they do not enter into dialogue [30]; and c) statistical
information on energy is limited [28]. This disconnection is more
acute due to both the difficulty of having dialogues among energy,
environment and society academic disciplines to define complex
categories, and analytical tools to comprehend interdisciplinary
phenomena.
Socio-energy systems design is an opportunity to overcome
these obstacles, given the recognition that energy systems are
imbued in social, cultural and political contexts. Under this lens,
energy policy must be a simultaneous exercise of conceptualiza-
tion and design of various social arrangements, transforming its
conventional analyses scenario, and inviting a redefining of its core
objectives and the concepts of transition and energy justice [60:
31].
These redefinitions are largely being driven by conflicts, social
mobilization and protests regarding the contemporary energy pol-
icy. Therefore an understanding of the reasons and the core of
social discontent involved with energy systems is a cornerstone
of the structure design of socio-energy systems. But this is not a
simple task, and again, depending on the analytical view, whether
a conflict can be identified as such or not, which will define its
solution [50,6,22]. For example, there are invisible actors in the
system, which do not have the political power to ensure access to
justice and a healthy environment. Due to this their protests are
not justified or taken into account [69,38]. It is therefore necessary
to define a framework of conflict comprehension that leads to the
identification and analysis of those rationales and dynamics that
are articulated with the socio-energy systems.
Political ecology has been a field of reflection which gathers
several disciplines with the aim of studying: ‘the complex and
contradictory articulations between multiple practices and rep-
resentations through which different political actors, acting on
different scales, are present with relevant effects and with vary-
ing degrees of legitimacy, collaboration and/or conflict, in the
constitution of territories and management of its endowment of
natural resources’ [2: 51]. So political ecology, especially in the
74 V. Martínez, O.L. Castillo / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 69–78
Fig. 4. Conceptual framework to systematize the ecological distributive conflicts.
Latin American current [23,65,84,48], gives priority to the political
and historical dimension of disputes over natural resources, nam-
ing them ‘distributive ecological conflicts’. The dynamics of power
incorporation in the socio-energy systems is a key element to fully
illustrate who are the winners and losers of the energy transitions
over multiple scales [41]. Making explicit this balance is the first
step to achieving a more just socio-energy system.
We understand hydroelectric expansion conflicts as ecologi-
cal and distributive. Hence, our analysis is focused on the power
relationships of different actors around the appropriation and
transformation of nature [38,52–55]: ‘ecologic distribution refers
to the social, spatial and temporal patterns of inter-access to the
benefits obtainable from the natural resources and from the envi-
ronment as a life-support system (. . .) The determinants of ecologic
distribution are in some respects natural (climate, topography, land
quality, minerals and rainfall patterns), but in other respects social,
political and technological’ [25: 76].
The inequitable distribution and social injustice of these impacts
is sometimes the product of environmental racism or what has been
called by social movements from the global South ‘environmen-
talism of the poor’: ‘the environmental movements of the poor
and indigenous are place-based struggles for their own material
livelihoods’ [55: 13].
Hence, the disputes analyzed in this paper are not about eco-
nomic demands for compensation or mitigation of impacts, but
are about the confrontation of divergent development visions,
expressed in control and territory management [19,43,80].
Fig. 4 shows conceptual categories used to organize and ana-
lyze the ecological distributive conflicts data: (1) in the core of the
conflict are the multiple social actors involved and their different
valuation of the conflictive situations; (2) the second category is
focused on the social, economic and environmental rationales of
each actor, either for emptying the territories for energy use or for
preserving diverse livelihoods; and (3) the third conceptual cate-
gory corresponds to those tools (legal or illegal) used to enforce
different rationales on the territory.
Within this framework, territory is a key element because it is
the arena of struggle of ecological distributive conflicts. The terri-
tory is ‘space appropriated and symbolically and instrumentally
valued by human groups’ [36: 90]. Due to the fact that differ-
ent social agents concur and overlap in the same space, there
are multiple practices of appropriation and permanence (mate-
rial and symbolic) in the same territory; these practices are called
territorialities [77]. The ecological distribution conflicts are a com-
plex power game within which the struggle for recognition and
legitimization of certain ‘territoriality’ is essential. Territoriality
is understood as the ‘set of practices and materials and symbolic
expressions able to ensure ownership and permanence of a given
territory by a particular social agent, the State, social groups and
businesses’ [49: 252].
The ultimate aim of analyzing these conflicts is to promote
transformation processes or their overcoming as a step towards
contributing to a more socially and environmentally just socio-
energy system.
4. Hydropower and eco-distributive conflicts
The analysis offered below does not ignore those conflicts aris-
ing from the implementation of hydropower projects with impacts
on nature and with social effects. In fact, it is found that usually
the studies on conflicts in the hydropower sector are related to
socio-environmental impacts associated with its construction and
operation. These include: a) the loss of agricultural land, forests and
grasslands, as well as fragmentation and transformation of aquatic
and terrestrial ecosystems due to flooding of the reservoir area
and the other requirements of land in its total area of influence
[92,57]; b) alteration of traditional resource management practices
[12,4,26]; and c) the displacement and impoverishment of people
in the flooded area [46,14,27].
However, at the core of this analysis are the disputes between
social actors that have different perspectives and expectations of a
development model supported by economic growth versus the pos-
sibility of other ways of life and different ways of exercising political
power. This leads to there being winners or losers in a long-winded
conflict; in practical terms, the battlefield of these conflicts are the
territories where large hydroelectric plants are present. Hence, this
analysis identifies the main actors of these eco-distributive con-
flicts since 1970, their rationalities for taking part in this conflict,
and their tools to enforce them.
4.1. Who faces the ecological distributive conflicts?
In administrative terms and for historical reasons, the territorial
structure of Latin American countries is clearly divided between
urban areas and rural areas. While the former are usually organized
around medium and large cities with population groups that have
access to the living conditions of modern societies, surrounded by
shantytowns, the latter have traditionally been in the background
and their population’s access to basic living conditions ranges from
acceptable to nil.
 V. Martínez, O.L. Castillo / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 69–78 75

Table 4
Number of hectares flooded and people displaced by Mw produced.

Dam Name Installed Capacity (Mw) Flooded Hectares Flooded Hectares/Mw Population displacement

Three Gorges (China) 18.200 110.000 6 >1300000

Yacreta(Argentina/Paraguay) 3.100 165.000 53 50.000

Colombia analyzed dams

Guatapé I and II 560 6.240 11 N/D
Chivor I and II 1.000 3.000 3 5.000
San Carlos I and II 1.240 360 0,3 N/D
Salvajina 285 2.031 7 4.500
Guatrón 202 6.400 32 N/D
Betania 540 8.500 16 544
Playas 201 3.200 16 N/D
Jaguas 170 3.100 18 N/D
Guavio 1.150 15.000 13 4.959
Tasajera 306 1.100 4 N/D
Urrá I 340 7.400 22 6.200
Porce II and III 1065 1465 1 3.700
La Miel II 396 1.220 3 N/D

Source: author’s calculations based on Palacios [66], Álvarez [3], Rojas et al. [74], Soler & Urrea [80] and Ledec & Quintero [47].

Hence, an identified eco-distributive conflict is the one that
arises between rural and urban populations due to the confronta-
tion of different prospects for development and the struggle for
the management and control of the territory by some players to
the exclusion of others. Large dams installed in rural areas stripped
their inhabitants of their social relations networks which form the
basis of their survival strategy as families and as a part of a collective
group. On the other hand, urban residents enjoy good quality elec-
tricity service at competitive prices, thus reproducing the logic of
progress while ignoring the social and environmental costs of their
electricity consumption. In addition to the studied case in Cambo-
dia [78] and the Three Gorges Dam in China [94] other cases have
been documented in several countries in Latin America [51,75].
One of the most evident and well-documented expressions of
exertion of unequal political power is the displacement of rural
communities due to the establishment of hydroelectric projects.
In the Colombian case this situation has proved to be even more
controversial due to the long term armed conflict. A popular saying
that summarizes the main point of this controversy is: there are not
displaced people because of the war, but there is a war to displace
people.
Table 4 shows the number of displaced people per MW installed,
though these numbers are problematic mainly for two reasons:
first, because the environmental impact studies for these projects
considers only properties located in the reservoir area of the dam,
which leaves out all activities directly affected by the project out-
side the flooded area, but strongly dependant on it. Secondly, this
information is scarce and it was only possible to obtain the data
of seven of the thirteen projects here studied. Despite all of this,
and doing calculations with the minimum and maximum of dis-
placed people per flooded area, it was possible to infer an average
that indicates that 30% of the power capacity installed in the coun-
try has meant the displacement of 23,675 people, all belonging to
peasant, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian rural communities.
In addition, and also responding to the unequal division between
urban and rural areas in countries of the region, 92% of a total
population of about 1.5 million Colombians without access to elec-
tricity service live in rural areas (calculations based on UPME [89]).
A similar pattern in terms of the unfair access to electricity of rural
communities in comparison to urban centers have been studied in
other countries of the region including Peru [61], Guatemala [39],
El Salvador [9], Chile [13] and Ecuador [58].
Therefore, rural residents are permanent actors in these con-
flicts. As their forms of organization and mobilization have varied
over time, so too have changed those of the actors that promote the
use of their territories as sources of energy. For each of the three
identified periods in the Colombian case it was found that there is
a distinctive main reason for these variations: (1) the nature of the
institutions involved in the electricity market; (2) the enactment of
the 1991 Constitution which recognizes the multiethnic and mul-
ticultural character of Colombia and guarantees the territorial and
cultural rights of indigenous people, and (3) the intensification of
armed violence, during the last fifteen years.
The social actors involved in these conflicts are synergistically
linked to the characteristics of the electricity market’s regulation
system. Thus, the conflicts arising from the dams built in the elec-
tricity expansion period saw civic actors, such as social movements,
neighborhood associations, and other affected citizens unions,
confronting the State, represented by public utilities companies
and multilateral financial institutions financing the hydroelectric
projects.
Later, privatization processes related to historical conflicts
around energy led to the emergence of new social actors; hence,
eco-distributive conflicts not only escalated, but also were reconfig-
ured due to the involvement of transnational corporations (TNCs).
Conflicts with TNCs often have been caused by their appropriat-
ing national assets, not recognizing the environmental and social
liabilities that the commercial transaction brought, and/or not
acknowledging neither the environmental and social liabilities of
privatized businesses nor the previous commitments reached with
the communities in the negotiation process. In addition to Colombia
[70] similar cases have been identified in Argentina, Bolivia and
Chile [34]. However, in the midst of the privatization stage, and
thanks to the issuance of the Colombian Constitution of 1991,
recent hydroelectric projects in indigenous territories found strong
resistance supported by the recognition of their rights over the
territory and its ethnic integrity.
The escalation of the violence period resulted in the emergence
of paramilitary groups who, besides intensifying the armed conflict
against the guerrillas, have acted as custodians of dam-building
company facilities and intimidated communities to accept com-
pensation and/or to abandon their territories by force [63,72,97].
La Salvajina dam is one of the studied cases of this situation [90]. In
addition, the relationship that British Petroleum has had for several
years with paramilitary groups, is another example of the contro-
versial relation between some TNCs with armed groups and the
impact these have had on the escalation of the armed conflict [8].
76 V. Martínez, O.L. Castillo / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 69–78
4.2. Confronted sides’ rationales and tools to enforce them
Studied data also showed that the central issue in the eco-
distributive conflicts caused by installing hydropower is over
ownership, use and management of the required territories. This
is underlined by at least two different and mutually exclusive
rationales: clearing territories in order to use them as an energy
source for supporting development through economic growth
versus defending the formal or non formal territory ownership,
remaining in it, and preserving other ways of life.
Under the first rationale, and in order to overcome the condition
of underdeveloped countries through economic growth in Latin
American countries, the expansion of the hydropower sector was
seen as a reaffirmation of the authority of the State, accompanied
by legal tools as the declaration of national priority and the declara-
tion of public utility. All territories required for the installation and
implementation of a hydropower can be declared as public utility.
This including those required for civil works, those which are in the
reservoir area, and even those required for reforestation and reset-
tlement of population. The residents of the territories allocated
by the State as destined to public utility projects (public, private
or mixed) are forced – on pain of expropriation – to sell, and in
some cases, the communities agree to be resettled elsewhere. In the
meantime, the land appears on the project company’s name, mean-
ing not only the real owner cannot sell it to anyone else, but neither
can they apply for a loan with this property as financial support. The
declaration of public utility has been the social and economic death
for communities which will then be displaced [15,62]. Argentina,
during the 60 s decade, Peru, and recently Costa Rica are some of
the countries in the region which also have declared hydropower
projects as national priority with similar effects [5,56,32].
Such policies, among other facts explained above, have led
not only to internal eco-distributive conflicts but also to interna-
tional disputes. As an example of the national internal conflicts,
the predicament of wavering between significant energy provision
resources and even surpluses of the installed capacity on one hand,
and important electricity provision failures on the other, has not
only been part of the energy sector dynamics in Colombia but also
of other neighbor countries, such as Peru [59]. The international dis-
pute between Paraguay with Brazil and Argentina since the 1970s
is a variation of this predicament, this time between surpluses
of the installed capacity versus low consumption. In this regard,
a Paraguay presidential statement expressed: “We are punishing
our more productive sector and consequently while Sao Paulo and
Buenos Aires shine with our electricity, we have to walk in the dark
in Paraguay’ [16: 9]. A further agreement was reached in 2013 to
minimize Paraguay energy price losses.
During the electricity expansion period, the response from
affected rural communities was not immediate. This was mainly
due to strong State centralism, the support of local oligarchies,
and misinformation campaigns; not in all cases were communi-
ties able to get organized on time. Also, companies negotiated with
affected people on a one-by-one basis, fragmenting the community
and precluding collective agreements. In addition to the Colombian
case, similar cases have been analyzed in Guatemala, particularly
for hydroelectric Chixoy, and in the Chilean Patagonia [64,76,79].
Thus, in this way, the claims ended up focused on relocation pos-
sibilities or compensation, in most cases, when the flooding was
already a fact.
However, since the period of implementation of neoliberal poli-
cies, arguments promoting hydroelectric projects have changed to
endorse three main purposes in line with the economic growth
State development vision: making the energy sector an attractive
investment for foreign capital; making it an export-oriented sec-
tor, and contributing to sustainable development through ‘clean’
energy [85].
Among the tools for promoting the installation of large dams
in Latin American countries are: disinformation campaigns among
affected communities; the process of valuation of land – which has
often been biased as it is usually made by experts from the cities; the
prioritization of negotiations on a particular case basis, thus avoid-
ing collective agreements; the criminalization of social protest as a
usual State practice, while other ways of life within the territories
are undervalued. In Colombia, difficulties accessing the land and
formal ownership titles, exacerbated by the armed conflict, have
become a major obstacle in the negotiation processes.
However, and as a main tool in proof of the interests of affected
rural populations’, hydropower eco-distributive conflicts reveal the
paradox between the privatizing neoliberal model and the 1991
Constitution enactment, in the case of Colombia. The Constitution
recognized ethnic, cultural and ecological protection for indige-
nous communities and designed legal tools to guarantee them,
such as the right to advocate popular actions in cases of violations
of the right to a healthy environment and the writ for protection
against violations of any fundamental right. Convention 169 of the
International Labor Organization (ILO), also ‘protects the rights of
territories for indigenous communities, not only formally entitled,
but those which have been traditionally used, with the autonomy
to define their priorities in relation to their own development also
affirmed. The Convention ordered prior consultations with these
communities whenever there are legislative or administrative mea-
sures that may affect them directly, before authorizing exploration
or exploitation of natural resources in their territories’ [72: 55].
This legal and political framework has contributed to the
empowerment of communities to defend their rights over the land
and territories and a healthy environment, while at the same time
stoking conflicts; for example, at La Salvajina dam, the conflict arose
between the right to private land titling and the right to land by tra-
dition [70]. Likewise, the Urrá I conflict detonated after the failure
of the authorities to conduct prior consultation with the Embera
Katio people before the construction of the dam [3,72]. Other simi-
lar cases are the Xaxalá dam in Guatemala [91] and others analyzed
in Brazil, Argentina, México, Chile, Guatemala and Panamá [37].
In recent years, the role that the resurgence of violence has had
among the tools used for expulsion is relevant, especially in the
territories of mining and energy expansion. In 2013 it was esti-
mated that 80% of human rights violations occurring in Colombia
happened in energy and mining towns; 87% of forced displacement
was out of the municipalities that receive royalties for mining and
energy production; 78% of crimes against trade unionists, and 90%
against people of indigenous and African descent, were committed
in mining and energy areas [33].
In the meanwhile, rural residents have also expanded the scale
of their advocacy by building local and national networks to defend
their territory (e.g. ‘Patagonia without Dams’ in Chile, ‘Guatemala
National Front Against Dams’, the Commission for the International
Rights over Water in México). They have addressed their demands
to international organizations such as the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, foreign governments where building companies
have their head quarters, and the OECD, among others. They have
also radicalized their demands urging structural solutions, such as
autonomy or self-determination over land use.
In the case of the Urrá dam, the Embera indigenous community
have made specific requests to Sweden, Russia and Canada, ask-
ing for the suspension of hydropower implementation projects’ by
those enterprises originated in these countries, while indigenous
demands are resolved [72]; the Guatapé plant is a similar case [31].
One of the recent arguments to stand out from social organizations
is claiming their lifestyles as part of sustainable development; not
only environmental, but also in social terms. One of their practical
tools is the creation of Nature Reserves of Civil Society as an attempt
to protect their territories.
 V. Martínez, O.L. Castillo / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 69–78
5. Conclusions
Conflicts due to installing hydropower were analyzed focused
on energy justice, understood as the unequal distribution of the
negative impacts of this energy system, endorsed by the socio-
energy systems framework and also as eco-distributive conflicts,
based on the political ecology concept. Accordingly, the analysis
focused on identifying the actors taking part in these disputes, their
rationales, and the tools to enforce their own interests. This inter-
pretive framework allowed us to recognize the main roots of these
conflicts without losing sight of the historical and political pro-
cesses involved. In this regard we consider it as a structure that can
be applied to analyze similar cases.
Studied data also showed that the central issue in the eco-
distributive conflicts due to installing hydropower is over the
ownership, use and management of the required territories. This
dispute is underlined by two different and mutually exclusive
rationales: clearing needed territories to use them as an energy
source, versus remaining on them and preserving other ways of
life.
It could also be inferred that the promotion of hydroelectric
dams has become a central tool of the modernizing project of the
countries of the region. More recently this energy system has also
been justified in attracting foreign capital, as export-oriented com-
modity and for improving environmental sustainability through
“clean” energy.
To the extent that the rationale of hydroelectric projects
promotion has changed, so too has the responses from the
affected communities. Over the years, the communities have
learned from resistance experiences and have built interaction net-
works to defend the territory, expanding and radicalizing their
demands.
Some of the historical and political processes that have been
decisive in the expansion of hydroelectricity conflicts are the
neoliberal model principles and incentives for foreign investment
in Latin America; also, in the case of Colombia, and paradoxically,
the issue of a decentralized and pluralistic legal framework sup-
ported by the Constitution of 1991. In this context, new players
have emerged as part of these conflicts, leading to new claims, and
also to new legal instruments for the territories’ defense.
Hence, this analysis also provides the identification of those new
tools used to serve the interests of each side in the conflict. It is
in the practice, through a process of material and symbolic dis-
possession, where they have caused economic, social and higher
environmental damages. A revision of those tools and the ways of
acting by social actors is an essential step in the establishment of
fairer socio-energy systems.
The permanent conflict processes that have arisen from these
projects and the inequity in the distribution of costs and bene-
fits, whereby rural communities have always been worst affected,
has resulted in a radical questioning of the discourse of economic
development based on the increasing appropriation of energy as a
commodity.
Finally, regarding the role of conflicts in the design of fairer
socio-energy systems, the response should not focus merely on the
need to incorporate social aspects into energy planning; rather it
calls for communities historically affected by development energy
to have active participation in energy planning.
Funding
This article was written as part of the Deutscher Akademischer
Austausch Dienst (DAAD) financial support to the research project
“Land, culture and energy” [ID PRY No. 004910] – This organization
had no involvement in the activities of the research project.
77
Acknowledgement
Comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Adelaida Cubides
are gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveats apply.
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