Divine Space and The Space of The Divin

Divine Space and the Space of the Divine:
On the Scholastic Rejection of Arab Cosmology

Yossef Schwartz (Tel Aviv)
i. Two introductory remarks
i.1 The interreligious dimension of medieval angelology

The ‘international’ character of medieval philosophy and science is a fact that
today does not need much further clarification. Needless to say this intercul-
tural global character does not apply homogeneously and cannot suppress
strong local commitments. Yet, in spite of substantial efforts since the late
19th century to establish autonomous realms such as Christian, Moslem, or
Jewish philosophy, there is no necessary corollary between cultural identity
and specific philosophic attitude. Time and again one confronts the reality
in which rival philosophical parties ignore religious borders and arrange
themselves according to purely philosophical considerations.
Medieval thinkers themselves are the first to acknowledge this cultural
interdependence and have no problem whatsoever admitting their great
intellectual debt to their predecessors, be it pagans or adherents of rival
monotheistic beliefs. While doing so they normally concentrate on the
neutral scientific realms of astronomy, medicine, logic etc. The antagonistic
intercultural polemics were preserved for theological discourse, mostly for
religious doctrines and scriptural interpretation.
This general state of affairs is crucial for any analysis of my present subject
matter, one that presents us with an interesting hybrid case. Every medieval
encounter with angels, be it of Christian, Moslem or Jewish origin, involves
two different source-traditions, first of which derives its language directly
from the particular mythical imagination of the culture involved while the
second belongs to a common language of universal scientific knowledge.
Indeed, every monotheistic scriptural cannon includes a mythical descrip-
tion of the spiritual creatures that inhabit the celestial and divine realm and
that, being defined as mediating entities, move back and forth between it and
the earthly human realm. At the same time, any rationalistic thinker would
90 Yossef Schwartz
assume that such spiritual creatures must be considered part of the reality
analyzed in the Hellenistic sciences of physics, metaphysics and astronomy:
or put differently, since spiritual creatures were conceived as a part of physi-
cal reality, any medieval description of them must have been rooted in some
1
of the principles of the Hellenistic scientific heritage.
Such interdependence of the two realms works in both directions: not
only must one consider scientific explanatory mechanisms when trying to
explain biblical narrative but one cannot ignore that same biblical narrative
when formulating his overall cosmological paradigm.
It is precisely the case that a significant number of intellectuals in all
three religions share an almost common mythology of divine heavenly enti-
ties, based on divine revelation and canonical writings, while at the same
time sharing a basically similar scientific worldview, that makes medieval
angelology into a transcultural phenomenon. Hence medieval angelology
is extremely interreligious in its basic constitution, and it is on the basis
of this primordial identity that each medieval thinker arrived at his own
unique solution. Hence it is my conviction that the uniqueness of these
solutions can be never fully exposed without paying attention to the rich
2
cultural interchange that took place from the beginning. But the case study
1 Cf. Piron, Sylvain, Deplatonising the Celestial Hierarchy: Peter John Olivi’s
Interpretation of the Pseudo-Dionysius, in: Angels in Medieval Philosophical
Inquiry: Their Function and Significance, Eds. Isabel Irribarren and Martin
Lenz (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), Aldershot 2008, pp. 29–44,
here 29: “The encounter of biblical and Neoplatonist angels produced one
of the most crucial questions that theologians had to face in the second half
of the thirteenth century: could they, or indeed, should they be identified?”
This particularistic assertion must be universalized in order to reconstruct the
general multicultural context of medieval philosophy.
2 This problematic can be seen in the clearest way in the above mentioned re-
cently published collection of essays dedicated to this topic, and see Irribaren
and Lenz (note 1). In the introduction to this volume the editors declare that
they have confined their discussion “to the Western Latin world, being com-
pelled by space and thematic coherence to exclude the very rich angelological
contribution coming from the Arabic and the Jewish tradition.” Indeed, nei-
ther the editors in their introduction, nor any of the other contributors of this
rich and illuminating volume mention any of the examples which I examine
in the following. I leave it to the reader to judge to what extent the following
western attitudes make sense, without giving any account of the polemical
context toward the Moslem and Jewish doctrines to which they developed in
parallel.
Divine Space and the Space of the Divine 91
of angelology in its cosmological aspects is not only an example of medi-

eval transmission of knowledge. As I shall claim in this article, it provides
us with one of the most striking examples of the development of an inde-
pendent Latin European position, one that bears great significance for the
further development of European thought.
i.2 Theories of space in an Aristotelian Ptolemaic voidless universe
The problem of space, as a most general category that strives to include all
physical entities, from the creator himself to the last element in the chain of
being and from the void that exists or does not exist beyond the universe
to the middle of the universe is one of the most central topics of medieval
3
cosmology.
The voidless Aristotelian Ptolemaic universe of Greek science (to exclude
atomist theories) is a perfectly concentric system made, from its very center
up to the outer sphere, of physical bodies that contain each other without
distance and that move each other through direct contact. It is a closed and
limited space, in which all parts, from the all-encompassing outer celestial
sphere to the center of the earth are both contained and containers. None of
these parts except its two extremes is motionless, and all motion, from the
eternal constant movement of the celestial bodies to the contingent move-
ment of physical bodies in the sublunar world of elements is both spatial
and local. On the physical level it is a universe built of places, in which
spatial language has only limited function, mostly as part of mathematical
order (especially important for the development of optics and mathematical
4
astronomy). Unlike the infinitude attributed to time in the ‘Physics’ (book
8, 250b–253a), the universe’s space is defined as finite (‘De caelo’ 271b18–
273a6). This definition would change only with early modern formulations
3 For some classic studies of the topic see Jammer, Max, Das Problem des
Raumes. Die Entwicklung der Raumtheorien, Darmstadt 1960; Sorabji, Ri-
chard, Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel,
Ithaca, New York 1988.
4 See Zekl, Hans Günter, Raum, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie,
Eds. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, Vol. 8, Basel 1992, c. 75: “Der
All-Körper ist gleichzeitig All-Ort”; Suarez-Nani, Tiziana, Les anges et la
philosophie. Subjectivitè et function cosmologique des substances séparées à
la fin du xiiie siècle (Étude de philosophie medieval 82), Paris 2002, p. 93.
92 Yossef Schwartz
of the infinity of cosmic space, which is identified with God and the divine
5
attributes, hence Henry More, Spinoza and Newton.
Aristotle’s discussion of place (xora, topos) in ‘Physics’, book iv
(208a27–212a31), defines the framework for any philosophical discussion
of these topics among medieval philosophers. In general medieval thinkers
adopt the Aristotelian dichotomy of the sublunar/translunar parts of the
universe. This dichotomy between earthly and heavenly realms raises the
question as to the exact way in which the spatial relations between them, the
6
one contained within the other, can be transformed into causal relations.
This discussion immediately involves the examination of the precise rela-
tion between space, motion and physical causality.
But it is only with the Arabs, especially Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazali
in his influential scientific philosophical encyclopedia ‘The Intention of
the Philosophers’ (Latin ‘Metaphysica’) and Maimonides’ ‘Guide of the
Perplexed’ – I limit my discussion here to works that later on became wide-
spread among European Scholastics – that this principle became part of
a systematic cosmology, one that combines Aristotelian and Ptolemaic
teaching within a strong Neoplatonic framework. The process of emana-
tion as described in Avicenna’s ‘Metaphysics’ creates a unified universe in
which the cognitive, the mental and the physical are closely related, creating
a cosmological picture which is completely parallel to the human triad of
7
body – soul – intellect. In a voidless universe body is a defined extension
and its local definition derives from the surface of the matter in which it is
contained. Soul is an organic part of body, either unseparated in a completely
hylemorphic definition or a separate substance from elsewhere which is
8
mysteriously united with its body. In both cases however this location
differs from the material location of bodies in that the soul has no defined
5 Cf. Funkenstein, Amos, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the
Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, Princeton, New Jersey 1986, pp.
23–116; Grant, Edward, The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle
Ages: Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts, Cambridge
1996, p. 125.
6 Grant, Edward, Planets, Stars and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos 1200–1687,
Cambridge 1996, pp. 569–617.
7 Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, tract 1, cap.
5, tract 10, cap. 1, Ed. S. Van Riet, Louvain/Leiden 1977, i, 31–42, ii, 522–530.
8 On the western reception of Avicennian psychological doctrines see Hasse,
Dag Nikolaus, Avicenna’s ‘De Anima’ in the Latin West: The Formation of a
Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300, London/Torino 2000.
and essential single place in the body. Human intellect adds a further element
that does not exist in other sublunar species and that in all the Arab systems
mentioned above is linked to the agent intellect as a natural place outside
the particular human body and outside the sublunar realm.
The description of angels in their holy scriptures provided Moslems and
Jews with an important part of their cosmology. In their mythical appearances
in human shape they provide an example of an accidental relationship between
spiritual substance and material body. In their essential form they could be
integrated into the heavenly system, where they took their place as the mani-
festation of the spiritual forces active in the otherwise fully material Aristo-
telian universe that normally knows only material efficient causality. Their
natural place is the place of their orbs to which they relate in a way similar to
the way human intellect relates to human body and soul. This ‘divine space’
9
– rooted in late Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle – mediates between
10
the theological concepts of divine omnipresence and the physical-cosmolog-
ical reality. Early modern scientific deism would either further develop this
11
mediated pleroma as the workplace of magical powers or give it up altogether
12
in favor of divine omnipotent and omnipresent power.
ii. Arabic and Jewish-Arabic thought:

Mediated substances and divine power
It is not the development of Arab (Moslem and Jewish) theories that I would
like to describe here in detail but its reception in Latin scholastic litera-
ture of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. I shall therefore now
9 Sambursky, Shmuel, Die Raumvorstellungen der Antike, in: Eranos 44 (1975),

pp. 167–198; id., The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism, Jerusalem 1982.
10 Funkenstein (note 5), pp. 89–97.
11 Schmidt-Biggemann, Wilhelm, Philosophia perennis. Historische Umrisse
abendländischer Spiritualität in Antike, Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit, Frank-
furt am Main 1998, pp. 428–520, esp. 503–507; Blanco, Arturo, The Influence
of Faith in Angels on the Medieval Vision of Nature and Man, in: Mensch und
Natur im Mittelalter, Eds. Albert Zimmermann and Andreas Speer (Miscel-
lanea Mediaevalia 21/1), Berlin/New York 1991, pp. 456–467, here 461f.
12 Copenhaver, Brian P., Jewish Theologies of Space in the Scientific Revolution:
Henry More, Joseph Raphson, Isaac Newton and their Predecessors, in: An-
nals of Science 37 (1980), pp. 489–548; Funkenstein (note 5), pp. 117–201.
94 Yossef Schwartz
try and provide a few short remarks on the most essential and common
elements of Arab cosmology as it is known in the West. Although I could
easily bring the examples from Avicenna or Algazali I shall focus instead on
Maimonides. In his philosophical work ‘The Guide of the Perplexed’ (arab.
‘Dalālat al-Hā’irīn’, hebr. ‘Moreh Nevukhim’, lat. ‘Dux Neutrorum’), the
general tendency of Arab falsafa toward rationalization and demythologi-
zation of angelic figures reached its most extreme form. Once it was trans-
lated into Latin during the 1230’s–1240’s it became one of the most repre-
sentative pieces of Arab speculation on that matter, mostly because as a
Jewish thinker Maimonides used biblical authorities that were familiar to
his Christian reader, different from Moslem philosophers who, if at all, use
the mythical figures of Koranic tradition.
In the opening chapter of ‘Guide’ ii Maimonides offers his well known
13
summary of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics in 26 prepositions.
Based on these premises he can move on in chapter 1 (chapter 2 in the Latin
translation) to demonstrate God’s existence (ready to pay the price that
such an apodictic knowledge of God requires from him, i.e. to accept ad hoc
proposition 26 concerning the eternal movement of the heavenly sphere).
After doing all this, and before moving to his well known discussion of
14
creation, Maimonides dedicates the next chapters, 2–12, to the translunar
13 This introductory part of the second book has occasionally been perceived as an
independent unit and as such was indeed copied separately in different traditions
and languages. The Moslem (Persian) philosopher Muhammad al-Tabrizi wrote
a commentary on it, as did some European Jews, and see Schwartz, Yossef, Ein-
leitung, in: Hillel von Verona, Über die Vollendung der Seele [Sefer tagmule
ha-nefesh], übersetzt und eingeleitet von Yossef Schwartz (Herders Bibliothek
der Philosophie des Mittelaters 17), Freiburg i.Br. 2009, pp. 11, 285, n. 21. It was
translated separately into Latin and circulated among the scholastics under the
title ‘De uno deo benedicto’ before the full translation became widespread, and
see Kluxen, Wolfgang, Die Geschichte des Maimonides im lateinischen Abend-
land als Beispiel einer Christlich-Jüdischen Begegnung, in: Judentum im Mit-
telalter. Beiträge zum Christlich-Jüdischen Gespräch, Ed. Paul Wilpert (Miscel-
lanea mediaevalia 4), Berlin 1966, pp. 146–182; For a critical edition of ‘De uno
deo benedicto’ see Kluxen, op. cit. pp. 167–182; Hasselhoff, Görge K., Dicit
Rabbi Moyses. Studien zum Bild von Moss Maimonides im lateinischen Westen
vom 13. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert, Würzburg 2004, pp.88–122.
14 For the discussion and its reception among the scholastics see Rohner, Anselm,
Das Schöpfungsproblem bei Moses Maimonides, Albertus Magnus und Tho-
mas von Aquin (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters
11/5), Münster 1913; Davidson, Herbert A., Proofs for Eternity, Creation and
heavenly realm. Unlike in his discussion of God’s existence, where Maimo-

nides was apparently willing to accept an heretical philosophical assertion
(eternity of the world) in order to justify a central religious doctrine (exist-
ence of God), here in the following discussions Maimonides declares that
he intends to do the opposite: he shall adopt some biblical and especially
rabbinical assertions in order to justify the scientific discourse that loses
its apodictic certainty in the move to discussing translunar physical reality.
The first cosmological claim, formulated in chapters 4–5, is that the heav-
enly spheres shall be understood as living creatures, animated and intelligent.
It is only then that Maimonides makes the bold assertion (chapter 6) that
“there is [only] a difference in the terms; for he [Aristotle] speaks of sepa-
rate intellects [arab: ‫ ;עקול מפארקה‬lat.: intellectus abstractos], and we speak of
15
angels [arab: ‫ ;מלאכים‬lat.: angelos].” In the following chapters Maimonides
draws the consequences of this identity in the realm of Bible exegesis as well
as in the realm of cosmology and metaphysics.
The hermeneutic principle implemented by Maimonides in this discus-
sion seems to be rather clear: wherever the biblical narrative provides us
with a concrete (mostly human) shape of an angel this description must
be explained (away) either as the result of a prophetic vision or else as the
equivocal usage of the term ‘angel’ for any creature who functions as media-
tor of divine providence. The only accurate description of angels is in the
16
form of natural powers.
the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, New York
1987; Burrell, David B., Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions, Notre
Dame, Indiana 1993.
15 Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed ii, 6, translated with Intro-
duction and notes by Shlomo Pines, Chicago/London 1963, p. 262; Rabbi
Mossei Aegyptii, Dux seu Director dubitantium aut perplexorum, ii, 7, Ed.
Augustini Iustiniani, Paris 1520, Fol. 43r.
16 Maimonides’ demythologized enlightenment reaches its peak in the present
context in the following claim (Guide [note 15], ii, 6; Pines, 263): “If you told
a man who is one of those who deem themselves the sages of Israel that the
deity sends an angel, who enters the womb of a woman and forms the fetus
there, he would be pleased with this assertion and would accept it and would
regard it as a manifestation of greatness and power on the part of the deity, and
also of His wisdom, may He be exalted. Nevertheless he would also believe at
the same time that the angel is a body formed of burning fire and that his size
is equal to that of a third part of the whole world. He would regard all this as
possible with respect to God. But if you tell him that God has placed in the
sperm a formative force shaping the limbs and giving them their configuration
96 Yossef Schwartz
As I said, Maimonides draws out some important conclusions from this

equivalence in the cosmological realm as well. This seems to be the case
especially where he is unconvinced by the power of the scientific argumen-
tation, and manipulates Rabbinic sources in order to justify his position in
a discussion which is both philosophical and religious.
One way to introduce Maimonides’ synthesis of scientific and biblical
discourse is to follow his interpretation of Gen 28, 12–13, i.e. his inter-
pretation of the appearance of the angels in Jacob’s dream. Maimonides
comments on this biblical verse in several places, each time suggesting a
17
different hermeneutic approach: the first is rather static and describes the
seven stages architecture of the universe from the element of earth in its
very middle point up until the Creator God who stands “on top of the
18
ladder”. The second is dynamic and relates to sublunar physical reality,
constructed according to the theory of the four elements qua natural places.
The two descending angels represent the two heavy elements, earth and
water, while the two ascending angels are the two light elements, air and
fire. All of them stand together on one step of the ladder, i.e. in the sublunar
19
world of elements. The third description is dynamic and epistemological
in nature. Here the descending and ascending angels are the intelligences of
the prophets that ascend to the higher stages of cosmic hierarchy in order
20
to meet there with the intelligences descending from above. The arche-
typal description of such an event of meeting can be seen in another exeget-
ical metaphor of place: the Sinai revelation. Moses is described as the one
who climbed the mountain while God is described as the one descending
the mountain. The mountain itself is an abstract place that represents the
highest stage in the hierarchy of knowledge. Hence ‫ – הנה מקום אתי‬ecce est
locus apud me, to be understood neither geographically nor cosmolog-
and that this force is the angel, or that all the forms derive from the act of the
Active Intellect and that the latter is the angel and the prince of the world
constantly mentioned by the sages, the man would shrink from this opinion.”
17 Cf. Klein-Braslavi, Sara, Maimonides’ Commentary on Jacob’s Dream of the
Ladder, in: Bar- Ilan: Annual of Bar-Ilan University Studies in Judaica and the
Humanities 22–23 (Moshe Schwartz Memorial Volume), Ramat-Gan 1987,
pp. 329–350.
18 Guide (note 15), i, Introduction, pp. 12f.
19 Guide (note 15), ii, 10, pp. 272f.
20 Guide (note 15), i, 15, p. 41.
21
ically in the physical sense but epistemologically. We shall see below what
role such allegoric interpretation plays within the cosmological discussion.
In Chapter 9 Maimonides developed his well known hypothesis
22
concerning the four orbs/globes. Against Ptolemy and with some ‘ancient
23
astronomers’ and Andalusian contemporaries he suggest that Mercury
24
and Venus shall be located with the three other planets above the sun.
Therefore the number of elementary celestial primal movements might be
reduced to four: the movement of the moon, sun, five planets, and the sphere
21 Cf. Schwartz, Yossef, Ecce est locus apud me. Eckharts’ und Maimonides’
Raumvorstellung als Begriff des Göttlichen, in: Raum und Raumvorstellun-
gen im Mittelalter, Eds. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Miscellanea Medi-
aevalia 25), Berlin 1997, pp. 348–364.
22 By using the term ‘globe’ to translate the Arabic Kura (instead of Pines’
‘sphere’) I accept the terminological suggestion of Gad Freudenthal; see
Freudenthal, Gad, Maimonides on the Scope of Metaphysics alias Ma’aseh
Merkavah: The Evolution of his Views, in: Maimónides y su época, Eds. Car-
los del Valle, Santiago Garcia-Jalón and Juan Pedro Monferrer, Madrid 2007,
pp. 221–230, here 225.
23 Among these Andalusians Maimonides refers mainly to Jabir ibn Aflah and
his followers, see Guide (note 15) ii, 9, pp. 268f.
24 Guide (note 15), ii, 9, p. 268, Dux (note 15), ii, 10, fol. 44r: “Know that re-
garding the spheres of Venus and Mercury there exists a difference of opinion
among the early mathematicians about whether they are above the sun or be-
low the sun. For there is no demonstration proving to us what the position
of these two spheres is. The doctrine of all the ancients was that the sphere of
Venus and Mercury are above the sun. […] Then Ptolemy came and decided in
favor of the opinion that they were both below the sun […]. Then came latter-
day groups of people in Andalusia who became very proficient in mathemat-
ics and explained, conforming to Ptolemy’s premises, that Venus and Mercury
were above the sun.” The difficulty in reaching an agreement in this matter
derives from the main method of argumentation used here. Ptolemy based
his calculation of the order of the planets on their relative velocity in relation
to the fixed stars. Venus and Mercury however are equal in that matter to the
sun. All three complete their circle in one year. Therefore Ptolemy could only
adopt the common order of his time. For a detailed description of Greek and
Arabic attitudes on the matter see Albertus Magnus, De caelo et mundo, lib.
2, tract. 3, cap. 2, Ed. Paul Hossfeld (Ed. colon. v,1), Aschendorff 1971, pp. 168,
13–169, 52. Without mentioning the discussion of Maimonides Albert accepts
the same opinion concerning the location of Mercury and Venus.
98 Yossef Schwartz
25
of the fixed stars. Hence the basic cosmological movements that Aris-
totle, according to medieval diverse traditions, estimated with 47 or 55 can
be further reduced not only to ten but even to four. These four basic move-
ments stand in direct relation to a series of fourfold cosmological structures
26
in the trans and sublunar realms. As mentioned above, Maimonides does
not believe that the debate concerning the exact location of Mercury and
Venus can be definitely settled through scientific arguments, and therefore
he is more than happy to call on in his support a series of rabbinic assertions
27
that seems to support his opinion.
Maimonides uses this cosmological hypothesis in order to formulate a
strong metaphysical claim, one that establishes a firm continuity between the
two separate realms of the sublunar and translunar universe, reducing every
28
movement in the elemental world to a concrete heavenly remote cause.
25 Guide (note 15), ii, 9, p. 269: “Accordingly, the number of informed spheres
[…] is four; namely the sphere of the fixed stars, that of the five planets, that
of the sun, and that of the moon.”
26 Guide (note 15) ii, 10, p. 271, Dux (note 15), ii, 11, fol. 44v: “The spheres are
four; the elements moved by the spheres are four; and the forces proceeding
from the spheres into that which exists in general are four […]. Similarly the
causes of every motion belonging to the sphere are four: namely, the shape
of the sphere – I mean to say its sphericity; its soul; and its intellect through
which it has conceptions […]; and the separate intellect, which is its beloved.
[…] There are thus four causes of the motion of spheres and four sorts of gen-
eral forces proceeding from it toward us. These are, as we have explained, the
force causing the generation of the minerals, the force of the vegetative soul,
the force of the animal soul, and the force of the rational soul.”
27 Ibid., p. 272, Dux (note 15), fol. 45r: “They said in Midrash Rabbi Tanhuma:
How many steps were in the ladder? Four – which refers to the dictum: And
behold a ladder set up on the earth.’ […] that the angels of God, whom [Jacob]
saw ascending and descending were only four […] – two ascending and two
descending – and that the four gathered together upon one step of the ladder,
all four being in one row”.
28 Guide (note 15), ii, 10, pp. 270f.: “[I]t occurred to me that while the four
spheres having stars have forces that overflow from them as a whole toward
all the things subject to generation – these spheres being the causes of the later
– each spheres is also specially assigned to one of the four elements […]. Thus
the sphere of the moon moves the water, the sphere of the sun the fire, while
the sphere of the other planets move the air. It is because of the multiplicity of
the motions of these planets – their differences, their retrogressions, their di-
In his thorough examination of this Maimonidean hypothesis Gad Freu-

denthal reconstructs an inner shift within Maimonides’ thought from an
early metaphysical oriented interpretation to a later maturer cosmological
speculation. The metaphysical element of the early speculation is connected
by Freudenthal with the identification of angels with separate substances/
intellects, an identification that seems to be lost in the later cosmolog-
ical theory that identifies Ezekiel’s figures with ‘material substances’ (the
29
globes). No doubt there is an evolution in Maimonides’ understanding of
this matter and Freudenthal’s assertions are certainly correct. Yet they do
not necessarily correspond to the simple way in which Maimonides himself
understands and uses his terminology. Planets, spheres and orbs, none of
them can be defined as an ‘angel’. Who then are the four angels on Jacob’s
ladder? They are neither the four celestial orbs nor the four earthly elements,
but rather the forces that emanate from the orbs on the elements, who are
called ‘angels’. And what is the relation of the intelligences to the orbs?
Maimonides asserts very clearly “the equivocality of the term ‘angel’ and
that it includes the intellects, the spheres and the elements, in as much as all
30
of them carry out orders.” But more than that he directly relates all those
subdivisions into a total understanding of the heavenly organism. As he
himself puts it, the four causes of every spherical motion are the shape of the
sphere, its soul, its intellect and the “separate intellect, which is its beloved”.
Finally I would like to mention Freudenthal’s claim that the sole reason
for Maimonides to develop his innovative cosmology in part two of the
‘Guide’ is in order to prepare his interpretation of Ezekiel’s vision in part
31
three. I for my part would rather assume the opposite, i.e. that Maimo-
nides manipulates the biblical verses, just as he has done with the Rabbinic
midrash, in order to promote his philosophical agenda: metaphysics
becomes cosmology as God’s transcendence merges into a Spinozistic
understanding of the universe as divine attribute, an attitude developed
mostly in the second part of the ‘Guide’ and most clearly stated in ‘Guide’
32
ii, chapter 30.
rect progressions, and their stations – that the shape of the air, its differences,
and its rapid contractions and expansions are multiple. The sphere of the fixed
stars moves the earth.”
29 Freudenthal (note 22), pp. 228–230.
30 Guide (note 15), ii, 7, p. 266, Dux (note 15), ii, 8, fol. 43v.
31 Ibid., p. 227.
32 Guide (note 15) ii, 30, pp. 348–359.
100 Yossef Schwartz
iii. What exactly did the Latins reject

in Arabic celestial cosmology?
Whatever the final judgment relating to the role played by Arab thought
in Western intellectual history since the 12th century might be, one surely
cannot write such a history of Europe without understanding precisely the
position taken by the Christian authors toward their Arab predecessors.
This is true for most realms of Scholastic thought but it is even more crucial
here precisely because a large part of Arab speculation on these matters was
rejected or avoided by the Christian theologians, and because these rejec-
tions seem to function as a strong emotive force toward new formulations
and definitions.
As Marcia Colish argues, angelology as part not only of devotional and
exegetical literature but also of systematic cosmology and natural philoso-
phy is developed among Latin theologians not before the first half of the
33
13th century.
Once Aristotelian physics and metaphysics becomes an integral part of
the theological imagination, then the existence of purely spiritual entities,
such as angels, enables medieval thinkers to break through the limitations
of classical Aristotelian discourse. Among the Latins, the breakthrough was
neatly related to the encounter with Arab cosmology.
Following these general assertions I would like to emphasize the fact that
it is well nigh impossible to suggest any definitive description of the high
scholastic attitude toward Arabic cosmology. The vast corpus of Albertus
Magnus’ writings alone is full of different claims that seem to reflect
changing attitudes or different rhetorical strategies. In this short paper I
shall try and give a synthesis of main attitudes with very limited historical
contextual remarks.
During the formative period of scholastic encounter with Arab philoso-
phy, one shall not be surprised by the fact that the two most systematic-
critical texts to come out of this polemic, i.e. the well known ‘reactionary’
texts of the 1270’s, especially the condemnation of 1277 and ‘De errores
33 Colish, Marcia L., Early Scholastic Angelology, in: Recherches de Théologie

ancienne et medieval 62 (1995), pp. 80–109, esp. 80f., 91, 98f. Colish limits her
discussion of the later period to two representative figures of the first quarter
of the 13th century: William of Auxere and Alexander of Hales. Her survey
is brief and many details could be added, but they do not seem to change the
overall picture.
philosophorum’, so intensively discuss angelological matters. In this discus-

sion they seem to present the hegemonic opinion of scholastic theology, which
is not strongly contradicted by any other scholastic author known to me.
Before moving into the details of this critique I would like to generalize
what seems to be its most basic features:
1.The division between the philosophical and theological discourse
realms leads in some cases to a systematic division between the natural
philosophical language concerning Aristotelian intelligences and the theo-
logical biblical language concerning angels. Here Albert and Thomas are
34
usually taken to represent two different options.
2.The bottom line is that the scholastic discussion represents a united
front against Arabic theo-cosmology in its entirety. The difficulty of tracing
a coherent and exact attitude of Latin philosophers toward the questions
under discussion might be described through the notions suggested by
Robert J. Henle, SJ in his monographon ‘Saint Thomas and Platonism’,
35
differentiating between ratio, positio and via. None of the Latin philoso-
phers totally reject all three elements. But all of them, each in his own way,
rejects the via, i.e. the overall naturalistic framework, with its possible deter-
minist implications. Hence one cannot deduce or expect the logical/analog-
ical ‘implicit’ assertion of a given theory. Instead we must carefully follow
the concrete line of argumentation and only afterwards try and understand
36
the possible motivations lying underneath. In the following I shall provide
such an analysis in relation to some major points of criticism.
iii.1 The heavenly location of angels: between theology and cosmology
I have tried to show that the theo-ontological cosmic hierarchy of physi-

cal and spiritual substances has a clear spatial manifestation. One of its
clearest components is the location of an angels’ hierarchy parallel to the
cosmic hierarchy of the nine/ten celestial spheres. This contradicts the well
known Catholic doctrine, generally accepted by all scholastic theologians,
that locates the angels in the empyreum. Hence the refusal to adopt the
34 Cf. Suarez-Nani (note 4), pp. 122–125.

35 Henle, Robert J., SJ, Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study of the Plato and
Platonici texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas, Den Haag 1956, pp. 294–312.
36 Cf. Suarez-Nani, Tiziana, Les anges et la cosmologie au Moyen Âge, in: Con-
naissance des religions 71–72 (Anges et esprit mèdiateurs), Paris 2004, pp.
103–115, here 108: “Ces deux aspects posent une analogie ou une parenté de
statut entre les anges et les sphères célestes […]”
102 Yossef Schwartz
cosmological hierarchy of intelligences, celestial spheres and orbs as an

adequate description of the angelic realm. On different occasions angels
would be defined as the ministers of these celestial bodies, hence identified
with Aristotelian intelligences. Such a solution solves the local problem, in
that each celestial sphere is directly connected with an angel, yet the Latins
clearly reject two possible implications of such a hypothesis: first, the iden-
tity cannot be complete, as there are angels who do not minister to the orbs,
as Bonaventure claims in Hexaemeron; second the total number of angels
37
cannot be reduced to the number of the heavenly spheres.
Recently, Sylvain Piron argued, relating to the angelological doctrines of
Thomas Aquinas, that “(N)o other attempt at reconcilling both traditions
[i.e. biblical and Hellenistic] was pursued as conscientiously and exhaus-
38
tively in the thirteenth century.” As true as such a general assertion might
be we shall see that Thomas does not radically differ from his contempo-
raries in his attitude toward the questions discussed here. Concerning the
number of angels, Thomas mentions Maimonides’ name as one who (unsuc-
cessfully) tried to accomplish precisely the achievement assigned to Thomas
39
himself by Piron (Rabbi Moyses, Iudaeus, volens utrumque concordare).
37 Bonaventura, In Hexaemeron, sermo v, Ed. Adolph C. Peltier, S. Bonaven-

turae Opera Omnia, 9, Paris 1867, p. 59: Alii posuerunt, quod Angeli essent
numerate secundum numerum motuum, propter inclinationem naturalem
ad motum. Alii posuerunt decem intelligentias, solum considerantes earum
influentias, et fecerunt insanias et contentions. Angelus bene potest esse sine
motu.
38 Piron, Sylvain, Deplatonising the Celestial Hierarchy: Peter John Olivi’s In-
terpretation of the Pseudo-Dionysius, in: Angels in Medieval Philosophical
Inquiry (note 1), pp. 29–44, here 30.
39 Thomas Aquinas, Summae theologiae, i, q. 50, art. 3, in: Opera omnia, iussu
Leonis xiii, edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. v, Roma 1889, p.
8: Posuit tamen Aristoteles quod illae naturae perfectiores habent ordinem
ad sensibilia ista, secundum rationem moventis et finis. Et ideo secundum
numerum primorum motuum, conatus est adinvenire numerum substantiarum
separatarum. Sed quia hoc videtur repugnare documentis sacrae Scripturae,
Rabbi Moyses, Iudaeus, volens utrumque concordare, posuit quod Angeli,
secundum quod dicuntur substantiae immateriales, multiplicantur secundum
numerum motuum vel corporum caelestium, secundum Aristotelem. Sed posuit
quod Angeli in Scriptura dicuntur etiam homines divina annuntiantes; et
iterum virtutes rerum naturalium, quae Dei omnipotentiam manifestant. Sed
hoc est alienum a consuetudine Scripturae, quod virtutes rerum irrationabilium
Angeli nominentur.
In his commentary on the second book of the ‘Sentences’ Thomas

expounds on the different attitudes toward these classifications in Greek,
Jewish and Moslem traditions, related to the exegetical question concerning
the identification of the nature of biblical angels with the cosmological
discussion of their total numbering:
Respondeo dicendum, quod ratio humana deficit a cognitione substantiarum
separatarum, quae tamen sunt notissima naturae, ad quae intellectus noster se
habet sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis, ut dicitur in 2 Metaphys. […] Et ideo
philosophi de illis nihil quasi demonstrative, et pauca probabiliter dixerunt:
et hoc ostendit eorum diversitas in ponendo numerum Angelorum. Quidam
enim posuerunt numerum substantiarum separatarum secundum numerum
motuum caeli, sicut Aristoteles in 12 Metaphys. Quidam secundum numerum
sphaerarum, ut Avicenna in sua Metaphysic. […] Quidam vero posuit Angelos
non in determinato numero nobis; sed tantum per Angelos significari dicit
in Scripturis omnem virtutem vel corporalem vel spiritualem per quam Deus
ordinem suae providentiae explet, quasi divinae voluntatis nuntium; adeo
quod vim concupiscibilem nominat Angelum concupiscentiae: sed substantias
separatas dicit esse secundum numerum quem philosophi posuerunt; et iste
est Rabbi Moyses. Fides autem Catholica tenet numerum substantiarum
separatarum, quas Angelos dicimus, esse numerum Deo finitum, sed nobis
40
infinitum.
The biblical angel cannot be completely identified with heavenly intelli-

gences according to Aristotle in the ‘Metaphysics’ and ‘De caelo’ because
there is an agreement among the commentators that Aristotelian intelli-
gences are unmoved movers, immovable in themselves, while the biblical
angel is clearly a moving entity.
The Latins reject the systematic identification of the hierarchy of angels
with the hierarchy of celestial spheres, not to mention the assumption that
each sphere is ruled by one single angel (hence that plurality is an attribute
only of the sublunar world).
Once rejecting the simple elegant solution of Alfarabi, Avicenna and
Maimonides, the problem remains how one can define the location of angels.
It is mostly here that the well known scholastic theological differentia-
tion between locus circumscriptivus and definitivus becomes highly relevant
40 Thomas Aquinas, In ii Sententiarum, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 3, Solutio, in: Commen-

tum in quatuor libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, vol. i., Parma
1856, p. 414.
104 Yossef Schwartz
41
and suggest a crucial subdivision within the cosmic notion of place. It is
mostly through such analytic precision that the scholastics try to resolve
the paradox pointed out by Tiziana Suarez-Nani, i.e. that angels according
to the Catholic truth as presented by Thomas Aquinas are deprived of any
42
locality, that they do not have place.
A most systematic integration of these different definitions of place in
their cosmological context is to be found in the ‘Summa philosophiae’. Its
English author, writing in the early 1270s’, first states the problematic of
spiritual substances that cannot be located, neither in place nor in space,
43
since they have no physical dimensional existence. Hence the author
provides a series of definitions for locality, such as locus circumscriptivus and
definitivus, then implementing them on a series of entities, from the highest
sphere, to the inferior orbs, spirits and souls. The first heaven, since it is not
contained by any physical entity, has only a corporeal but not a circum-
scriptive definitive place, while the inferior spheres have both circumscrip-
tive and corporeal. Spiritual substances have neither circumscriptive nor
corporeal spatial definition. Instead the author adopt the Thomistic solu-
tion: their place is defined by their operations. The soul finally is defined
as having essentially solely a definitive place and only accidentally having a
44
circumscriptive place, which is the body animated by it. The beginnings of
41 For Abelard as an early source for the description of angelic location as ‘cir-
cumscribable’ see Marenbon, John, Abelard on Angels, in: Angels in Medieval
Philosophical Inquiry (note 1), pp. 63–72, esp. pp. 69–71. Abelard might be
considered as a direct source for the Lombard who further develops this dif-
ferentiation in a manner that would become crucial for later authors and who
relates it to a whole index of authorities and topics, cf. Magistri Petri Lom-
bardi Sententiae in iv libris distinctae, Lib. 1, Dist. 37, Cap. 5–8; Roma 1971,
pp. 270, 1–273, 10.
42 Suarez-Nani (note 4), pp. 87–90; eadem (note 36), p. 106.
43 [Pseudo] Grosseteste, Summa philosophiae v, 26, in: Die philosophischen
Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, Ed. Ludwig Baur, Mün-
ster 1912, pp. 275–643, here 365: Rei enim spiritualis nullus est contactus.
44 Ibid., Cap. 23, p. 452: (Qualiter intelligentiae possint esse in loco, et quot modis,
et de earum localitate): In loco aliquid esse potest vel per se vel per accidens;
vel circumscriptive, ut corpora omnia citra corpus caeli primi cetera omnia
continens; vel definitive, et hoc dupliciter, id est per modum corporalem, quo
omne corpus necessario terminatum sit et finitum ac situatum, vel per modum
spiritualem, quo omnis creatura corporea et incorporeal virtute et actio, sicut
et forma, terminate sit et infinita esse non possit. […] Caelum ergo primum
cetera omnia concludens alicubi est per modum non circumscriptum ab aliquot
such a Dominican doctrine can be seen already in the writings of Guerric of

Saint-Quentin in his ‘Quaestiones de quolibet’, composed during the 1230s.
Guerric’s unsystematic discussion of angels is found throughout the whole
text. While rather undeveloped in his sources, heavily relying on Augus-
tine, Lombard and other early scholastic authorities, Guerric does show
interest in some of the acute questions of the second half of the century. His
angels, located in the empyreum, have no power to move corporeal objects
at a distance and have no connection whatsoever to heavenly bodies. I shall
come back to this in the following, in discussing the question of physically
distant causality.
iii.2 Angels and Intelligences
The identification, even on the strictly semiotic level, between Aristotelian

intelligences and biblical angels creates one of the most misleading formu-
lations of scholastic literature, as the two notions have all too often been
used synonymously. This ambiguity is elaborated by Thomas, claiming in
the ‘Summa theologica’:
quod hoc nomen intelligentia proprie significat ipsum actum intellectus qui
est intelligere. In quibusdam tamen libris de Arabico translatis, substantiae
separatae quas nos Angelos dicimus, intelligentiae vocantur; forte propter hoc,
quod huiusmodi substantiae semper actu intelligunt. In libris tamen de Graeco
45
translatis, dicuntur intellectus seu mentes.
A more systematic effort at clarification of the notions involved and of the

exact context in which each of them shall be used is to be found again in
Albert throughout his academic career. In his commentary on ‘De causis’,
written in the second half of the 1260s Albert strives for a clear separation
of the Aristotelian cosmological discourse of the separated intelligences and
the theological discourse on angels. At the same time he refers to the ‘Jewish
philosophers’, who trespass this differentiation:
alio corpora, sed corporaliter tantum definitum. Sphaerae vero inferiores cum
omnibus infra contentis in loco sunt et circumscriptive atque etiam corporaliter
definitive. Spiritus autem creati in loco sunt quidem definitive per modum
tamen non corporalem, cum non sint dimensionalia, sed spiritualem, […]. Ibi
ergo est, ubi operator, omnisque locus, in quo operator unicus est ei locus, […].
Anima itaque, cum corpus vivificat, vere et per se in loco definitive est, sed per
accidens in loco circumscriptivo.
45 Thomas Aquinas, Summae Theologiae (note 39), i, q. 79, art. 10, solutio.
106 Yossef Schwartz
Ordines autem intelligentiarum, quas nos determinavìmus, Quidam dicunt

esse ordines angelorum et intelligentias vocant angelos. Et hoc quidem dicunt
Isaac et Rabbi Moyses et ceteri philosophi Iudaeorum. Sed nos hoc verum esse
non credimus. Ordines enim angelorum distinguuntur secundum differentias
illuminationum et theophaniarum, quae revelatione accipiuntur et fide
creduntur et ad perfectionem regni caelestis ordinantur in gratia et beatitudine.
46
De quibus philosophìa nihil potest per rationem philosophicam determinare.
The individuation of angels and their hierarchy has nothing to do with

their local position in space but with their spiritual grade of illumination
and grace, which do not belong to the discursive realm of philosophy and
science. Peripatetic intelligences are motionless, unlike the spheres and their
souls. Every intelligence is an unmoved mover, and therefore the hierarchy
of the intelligences is deprived of the dynamic moment characteristic of the
47
elemental realm. For Albert, the spheres mediate cosmic powers, angels
mediate divine power. Identification of the two leads to radical naturaliza-
48
tion of the divine as Deus sive natura.
‘De errores philosophorum’ and the condemnation of 1277 are two texts
of the 1270s aiming at organizing and disciplining the Christian encounter
with classical and Arabic ideas. Aegidius Romanus or pseudo Aegidius
49
Romanus ‘De errores philosophorum’ is directed toward the original
teachings of Aristotle and the Arabic peripatetic tradition, the condemnation
of 1277 against their scholastic reception, including some of the teaching of
Thomas. In the condemnation, the articles that have to do with angels, intel-
ligences, separated substances and celestial influence on the sublunar world
46 Albertus Magnus, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, i, 4, 8, Ed.

Winfrid Fauser SJ, Münster 1993, 17,2, 58, 19–29.
47 Ibid, ii, 5, 24; 191, 30–192, 6: Scimus etiam, quod quidam contendunt spiritus,
qui vulgariter angeli vocantur, intelligentias esse. Sed hoc certum est, quod
angeli inellectuales substantiae sunt secundum ministeria gratiae distributae.
Sed quod hoc modo intelligentiae sint, qua intelligentiae a Peripateticis
ponuntur, scilicet quod immobiles sint loco et opratione, penitus absurdum
est et non convenit cum dictis eorum qui de motibus et apparitionibus et
operationibus angelorum locuti sunt.
48 For a radical interpretation of Maimonides in this naturalistic direction in
Jewish tradition see Idel, Moshe, Maïmonide et la mystique juive, Paris 1991,
pp. 105–134.
49 For the authenticity of the work see Koch’s introduction in [Ps.] Aegidius
Romanus, Errores Philosophorum, Ed. Josef Koch, English trans. by John
O. Riedl, Milwaukee 1944, xxxiv–xxxvi; for the opposite claim see Hasselhoff
(note 13), pp. 189–191. Hasselhoff suggests a Spanish origin for the author.
are approximately 60 out of 219 articles (without taking into consideration

topics related to the possible and agent intellect which are also relevant to
50
our discussion). Also a large part of ‘De errores philosophorum’ is dedi-
cated to this topic. In the first chapter, dealing with the errors of Aristotle
himself, the author mentions an identification of angels with intelligences
51
and celestial orbs, reading anachronistically angelos into Aristotle’s termi-
nology. When it comes to Averroes our author again takes for granted the
identity between angels and celestial intelligences, while blaming Averroes
for defining angels as actio pura, hence eliminating the inner distinction in
52
the celestial realm between God and the other spiritual substances.
iii.3 Angels as mediators of divine creation and providence
According to the author of ‘De errores philosophorum’ Averroes is also

mistaken in assuming that the angel cannot act on physical entities immedi-
53
ately without the mediation of the celestial bodies. The location of angels
within the cosmic realm of heavenly spheres implies their mediatory role
in the origin of the universe (creation) as well as in its maintenance (provi-
dence). The possibility of mediated creation in its mature neo-Aristote-
lian formulation was most systematically transmitted to Latin philosophy
through a series of translations produced in Toledo during the mid 12th
century. Neoplatonic works such as Isaac Israeli’s ‘Liber definitionibus’,
Avicebron’s ‘Fons vitae’, the ‘Liber de Causis’ and Avicenna’s (as well
50 It seems worth noting that already in the early attempt at controlling heretical
philosophical-theological opinions in Paris 1241 the short list of ten articles
included four that were directly related to angels, and see Chartularium uni-
versitatis Parisiensis, Ed. Heinrich Denifle, i, Paris 1889, p. 171: art. 4: quod
anime glorificate non sunt in cello empireo cum angelis; Art. 6: quod angelus in
eodem instanti potest esse in diversis locis et esse ubique si voluerit.
51 Errores Philosophorum (note 49), i, 14, 10: [Aristotles] dixit tot esse angelos
vel tot intelligentias quot sunt orbes.
52 Ibid., v, 3; Koch (note 49), 24: Quod angelus est actio pura. A permanent mix-
ture of both terminologies can be found by the author of the ‘Summa philos-
ophiae’, for example in Tractatus x; Baur (note 43), 421ff. The titles of the
chapters speak about intelligentiae while the text moves easily back and forth
between the natural terminology of intelligences and the theological ‘angels’.
See chapter 1, p. 421: substantias intellectuales incorporeas, quas theologi a min-
isterio angelos dicunt. Chapter 2, p. 422: Est autem intelligentia vel angelus […].
53 Ibid., v, 2; Koch (note 49), 24: Quod angelus nihil potest movere immediate
nisi caeleste corpus.
108 Yossef Schwartz
as Algazali’s) ‘Metaphysics’ provided a full synthesis of Aristotelian and

Neoplatonic cosmologies. This cosmology was accepted by early scho-
lastic authors such as Dominicus Gundissalinus, the author of the ‘Liber de
causis primis et secundis’ and partially also by Alan of Lille and William of
Auvergne in his ‘De universo’. From the mid 13th century however it would
be systematically rejected by theologians, who did not accept the existence
of secondary causes as mediated forces between God and the creatures.
According to Caterina Rigo’s analysis of Albertus Magnus’ encounter
54
with Maimonides one can trace a turning point within Albert’s early intel-
lectual development around the writing of the second part of his commen-
tary on the Sentences and the second redaction of his ‘De iv coaequaevis’
around 1246. From now on Albert the theologian, in contrast to the former
scholar of artes, is not willing to accept the identification between angels
and intelligences, rejects the concept of animated spheres and rejects the
55
concept of secondary causes.
As shown by Alexander Fidora, it is already in the ‘Summa de creaturis’,
composed in the early 1240s, that Albert formulates his new Christian Meta-
physics, systematically rejecting the doctrines of creatio mediante intelli-
56
gentis. This is clearly shown in Albert’s refutation of the doctrines devel-
oped by Dominicus Gundisalinus in his treatises ‘Tractatus de anima’ and
57
‘De processione mundi’. Gundisalinus’ teaching is in its turn a synthesis
54 Rigo, Caterina, Zur Rezeption des Moses Maimonides im Werk des Alber-
tus Magnus, in: Albertus Magnus. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: Neue
Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven, Eds. Walter Senner et alii, Berlin 2001,
pp. 29–66, here 48f., 52f.
55 Winkler, Norbert, Seele – Engel – Intelligenzen. Ein philosophiegeschicht-
licher Einblick, in: Fragmenta Melanchthoniana 3: Melanchthons Wirkung in
der europäischen Bildungsgeschichte, Eds. Günter Frank and Sebastian Lalla,
Heidelberg 2007, pp. 239–264, here 255–261, esp. 258f.
56 Fidora, Alexander, From Arabic into Latin into Hebrew: Aristotelian Psy-
chology and its Contribution to the Rationalisation of Theological Traditions,
in: Philosophical Psychology in Medieval Arabic and Latin Aristotelianism,
Eds. Jörg A. Tellkamp and Luis Xavier López Farjeat, Leiden (in print). I
would like to thank Professor Fidora for letting me use his manuscript.
57 Each of these treatises has two critical editions; only the second was also
translated into English: Joseph T. Muckle, The Treatise ‘De anima’ of Do-
minicus Gundissalinus, in: Medieval Studies 2 (1940), pp. 23–103; El Tractatus
‘De Anima’ atribuido a Dominicus Gundi[s]salinus. Estudio, Edición Critica
y traducción Castellana, Eds. Concepción Alonso del Real and María Jesús
Soto Bruna, Pamplona 2009; Des Dominicus Gundisalinus Schrift von dem
of a series of Arab texts translated in Toledo, mostly by him, such as ‘Liber

58 59
de causis’ and Avicenna’s ‘Metaphysics’. Albert discuss Gundissalinus
in ‘De homine’ [second part of ‘Summa de creaturis’] i,3 (Utrum animae
60
rationales immediate creentur a deo an ab intelligentiis angelicis) quoting,
beside Gundissalinus, also the third proposition of the ‘Liber de causis’ (quia
cusa prima creavit esse animae mediante intelligentia), and a passage from
Isaac Israeli’s ‘Liber de definitionibus’, another text translated by Gundis-
salinus. Against these claims Albert asserts that one has to maintain that the
angels were not involved in the creation of the human soul at all and do not
61
even create as God’s ministers.
Later on, in Albert’s commentary on Dionysius’ ‘Celestial hierarchy’,
written in 1248, Albert clearly connected the problem of mediated causa-
62
tion to the cosmic order of angels. The philosophers cannot accept that the
intelligences can act upon the sublunar world in any way other than through
the mediation of the spheres, “but we do not assume that angels act through
63
mediation.” As with many other scholastics and as definitely formulated in
the refutation of 1277 the rejection of intermediary agents functions here on
a double level: first it is the rejection of any mediation between God’s direct
actions and our world of contingent substances. Secondly it rejects any such
mediation between the angel as a celestial entity and his mundane actions.
Hervorgang der Welt (De processione mundi), Ed. Georg Bülow, in: Beiträge
zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 29.3, Münster 1925; De Pro-
cessione Mundi. Studio y edición critica del tratado de Domingo Gundisalvo,
Eds. Concepción Alonso del Real and María Jesús Soto Bruna, Pamplona
1999; Dominicus Gundissalinus, the Procession of the World (De processione
mundi), translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John A.
Laumakis, Marquette 2002.
58 See especially propositions 3, 8–9 and 18. Cf. also D’Ancona Costa, Cristina,
La doctrine de la création ‘mediante intelligentia’ dans le ‘Liber de causis’ et
dans ses sources, in: Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 76
(1992), pp. 209–233.
59 Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, Ed. Simone
van Riet, 2 vols., Louvain/Leiden 1977–1980, vol. i, pp. 486f., 522–530.
60 Albertus Magnus, De homine i, 3, Ed. Henryk Anzulewicz and Joachim
Söder (Opera Omnia, Ed. Colon. 27,2), Münster 2008, pp. 75, 10–77, 12.
61 Ibid., p. 76, 13–33.
62 Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium De caelestis hierarchia, Ed. Paulus Simon
and Wilhelmus Kübel (Opera Omnia, Ed. Colon. 36,1), Münster 1993, c. 13,
p. 207, 31–41.
63 Ibid., p. 212, 17–26.
110 Yossef Schwartz
These are precisely the two facets of Arab cosmology where the celestial
entities mediate between the divine and the created universe and the orbs
mediate between the separate intellects (angels) and the sublunar elements.
A most detailed description of the different attitudes toward the problem
of mediated creation is given by Thomas in his ‘Quaestiones disputatae de
potentia’. His final judgment of such attitudes, including the one to be found
in the ‘Liber de causis’, is that it leads directly to idolatry, since it leads the
believer into the false conclusion that he should worship the direct ‘proxi-
64
mate’ causes, instead of the one true creator.
Although Thomas’ statement in his commentary on ‘De causis’ itself is
rather ambiguous, he reject this position clearly and systematically in his late
‘De substantiis separatis’, talking generally about those (aliqui) who derived
from the spiritual substances their origin in a first and highest author (Ch.
9). In chapter 10 he identifies this position explicitly with Avicenna and the
‘Liber de causis’, hence referring to the very same Toledean Arab tradition
as Albert. The spatial aspects of this claim follow immediately in Chapter
17, modifying Augustine’s famous response to the question concerning the
exact place in which the universe has been created. As incorporeal entities
angels have no place within the order of the created cosmos, unless one
64 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de potentia, q. 3, a. 4, solutio,

in: Opera omnia, t. viii, Parma 1856, S. 31: Respondeo. Dicendum, quod
quorumdam philosophorum fuit positio, quod Deus creavit creaturas inferiores
mediantibus superioribus, ut patet in Lib. de causis; et in Metaphys. Avicennae,
et Algazelis, et movebantur ad hoc opinandum propter quod credebant quod
ab uno simplici non posset immediate nisi unum provenire, et illo mediante ex
uno primo multitudo procedebat. […] Et ideo secundum fidem Catholicam
ponimus, quod omnes substantias spirituales et materiam corporalium Deus
immediate creavit, haereticum reputantes si dicatur per Angelum vel aliquam
creaturam aliquid esse creatum; unde Damascenus dicit: quicumque dixerit
Angelum aliquid creare, anathema sit […] Et per hunc modum posuerunt
quidam philosophi, quod intelligentiae primae sunt creatrices secundarum,
in quantum dant eis esse per virtutem causae primae in eis existentem. Nam
esse per creationem, bonum vero et vita et huiusmodi, per informationem, ut
in libro de causis habetur. Et hoc fuit idolatriae principium, dum ipsis creatis
substantiis quasi creatricibus aliarum, latriae cultus exhibebatur. One finds
the same explanation of the historic mechanism and cosmologic rationaliza-
tion of idolatry in Maimonides, esp. in Guide (note 15), iii, chapter 29, and
cf. Stroumsa, Sarah, Maimonides in his World. Portrait of a Mediterranean
Thinker, Princeton/Oxford 2009, pp. 84–124, esp. 93–97.
uses the notion of place in a spiritual sense to designate a degree of divine

65
illumination.
Many articles in the condemnation of 1277 are dedicated to the issue of
mediatory causes. The different articles refer to great variety of mistaken
and heretical assumptions, all derived from the same cosmological prin-
ciple. It limits the power of God, who cannot create without the mediation
66
of secondary causes; limits the ontological role of the separated substances
67
to their function as mediatory causes and ministers of the sublunar world;
limits the power of the intelligences, who cannot practice any influence on
68
the inferior corporeal entities without the mediation of the physical orbs.
Finally, it opens a set of problems regarding human free will under the role
69
of the heavenly powers. None of these points of criticism were new for the
theologians of the three decades previous to the condemnation.
65 Thomas Aquinas, De substantiis separatis, C. 18 (De origine substantiarum

spiritualium secundum ), in: Opera omnia, iussu Leonis xiii, edita cura et stu-
dio Fratrum Praedicatorum, t. 40, Roma 1968, 73, 203–208: Si vero quaeratur
ubi creati sunt Angeli, manifestum est quod quaestio ista locum non habet si
sunt creati ante omnem corpoream creaturam, cum locus sit aliquid corporale,
nisi forte pro loco accipiamus spiritualem claritatem qua illustrantur a Deo; cf.
Blanchette, Oliva, The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A
Teleological Cosmology, Pennsylvania 1992, pp. 164, 281.
66 Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, i, art. 38, Ed. Heinrich Denifle and
Emile Chatelain, Paris 1889, p. 545: Quod Deus non potuit fecisse primam
materiam, nisi mediante corpore celesti; art. 73, p. 547: Quod substantie sepa-
rate per suum intellectum creant res; ibid., art. 61: Quod Deus possit agere
contraria, hoc est, mediante corpore celesti, quod est diversum in ubi; art. 198,
p. 554: Quod in causis efficientibus cessante habet actionem, quam non accepit
a causa prima.
67 Ibid., art. 77, p. 548: Quod si esset aliqua substantia separata, que non moveret
aliquod corpus in hoc mundo sensibili, non cluderetur in universo; art. 195,
p. 554: Quod fatum, quod est dispositio universi, procedit ex providentia
divina non inmediate, sed mediante motu corporum superiorum; et quod istud
fatum non imponit necessitate inferioribus, quia habent contrarietatem, sed
superioribus.
68 Ibid., art. 30, p. 545: Quod intelligentie superiores creant animas rationales
sine motu celi; intelligentie autem inferiores creant vegetativam et sensitivam
motu celi mediante; art. 75, p. 547: Quod angelus non potest in actus oppositos
inmediate, sed in actus mediatos mediante alio, ut orbe.
69 Ibid., art. 161, 162, 167 et alii; This point was already discussed by Albert as
the fourth question dealt with in his ‘De quindecim problematibus’, and see
Albert der Grosse, De quindecim problematibus / Über die fünfzehn Streit-
112 Yossef Schwartz
iii.4 Heaven inanimate
In its most extreme formulation this rejection would not be limited anymore
to the pure theological discourse of angels but would be formulated as a
strong assertion of natural philosophy, i.e. that the heavens are inanimate.
A possible turning point here is to be found in the early writings of Albert,
70
during the 1240s’.
But even earlier one can trace some interesting assertions in favour of
such an Arab doctrine, or against it. A clear evidence for the reception of
Avicennian cosmology and metaphysics is to be found in the ‘Liber de causis
primis et secundis’, most probably composed in the first quarter of the 13th
71
century. Its author treats intelligentiae as synonym with angelos, relating
72
it to the process of creation and emanation and to the soul of the heavens.
A relatively early refutation of these doctrines might be found in the writ-
ings of William of Auvergne, especially in his ‘De universo’, written during
the early 1230s. Here William sharply refuted both the concept of animated
73
heaven as well as the idea of mediatory causes.
One can see the ambiguity most clearly in Aquinas’ ‘De causis’ commen-
74
tary, written in 1272, and shortly afterwards in the unambiguous denial
formulated by Bishop Tempier and in the ‘Errores philosophorum’.
The most detailed Arabic teaching as reflected in ‘De erorres philos-
ophorum’ belongs to Avicenna’s and to Algazali’s metaphysical works.
Articles 6–9 in the chapters dedicated to the errors of Avicenna relate to
75
his theory of emanation. Article 10 (repeated in Algazali, Art. 5) is dedi-
fragen, übersetzt von Henryk Anzulewicz, eingeleitet und kommentiert von

Norbert Winkler (Herders Bibliothek der Philosophie des Mittelalters 23),
Freiburg/Basel/Wien 2010, pp. 68–70; Cf. Winkler (note 55), p. 253.
70 See the discussion in chapter iii, 2 above, n. 54, 55.
71 De Vaux, Roland, Notes et Textes sur l’Avicennisme Latin aux confins des
xiie–iiie siècles, Paris 1934, pp. 69f.
72 Liber de causis primis et secundis, Ed. Roland de Vaux (Bibliothèque Thom-
iste 20), Paris 1934, c. 4, pp. 97, 12–102, 22.
73 See the sources quoted by de Vaux, ibid., pp. 24f. For a parallel Dominican
assertion see Guerric of Saint Quentin, bellow (note 84).
74 Thomas Aquinas, In librum de causis 3, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super
librum de causis expositio, Ed. Henri Dominique Saffrey (Textus Philosophici
Friburgenses 4/5), Fribourg/Louvain 1954, pp. 22, 4–7, 25, 9–14.
75 See especially Errores Philosophorum, v, 7, Koch (note 49), 28: [quod] animas
caelestes produci ab intelligentiis sive ab angelis, et unam intelligentiam
produci ab alia.
cated to the false conception of the celestial spheres as animated living enti-
ties, being analogous to the human body – mind system. Against such an
assumption the author quotes as Catholic authority Damascenus, claiming
76
that the heavens are inanimate and insensible. The same mistake is attrib-
uted to Maimonides as well. In his case however, the author emphasized that
the heavens are not only animated but also must be regarded as rational souls
Ulterius erravit circa supercaelestias corpora, ponens ea esse animata et dicens
ipsa esse animalia rationalis, adducens pro se illud Psalmi [Ps 18, 2]: ‘Caeli
enarrant gloriam Dei’, et illud Iob [Job 38, 7]: ‘Cum me laudarent simul astra
77
matutina’, quae omnia patent IIo libro De expositione legis, cap. Vo.
Finally the condemnation of 1277 clearly states the fallacies of the doctrines
of animated heaven, especially in Articles 102 and 110:
Art. 102: Quod anima celi est intelligentia, et orbes celestes non sunt instrumenta
intelligentiarum sed organa, sicut auris et oculus sunt organa virtutis sensitive.
Art. 110: Quod motus celi sunt propter animam intellectivam; et anima
intellectiva sive intellectus non potest educi, nisi mediante corpore.
iv. Some receptions of Maimonidean theory of space:

Albert, Ps. Grosseteste and Meister Eckhart
The general rejection of Arab theo-philosophical cosmology included as we

have just seen, the rejection of Maimonides’ angelology. This general atti-
tude did however have its exceptions, related in large part to Maimonides’
above mentioned hypothesis of the four globes. As we have seen, if Maimo-
nides’ Aristotelian cosmology adds very little to that of his Arab predeces-
sors then it is in his theory concerning the fourfold division of the universe
76 Errores Philosophorum, vi, 10; Koch (note 49), 30: Ulterius erravit circa
animationem caeli. Posuit enim caelum animatum. Cuius animam non solum
dicit motorem appropriatum, secundum quod Philosophus et Commentator
nisi sunt dicere, sed quod fieret unum ex anima caeli et caelo sicut et anima
nostra et corpore nostro. Quod est contra Damascenum, qui dicit IIo libro [De
fide orthodoxa] capitulo VIo caelos esse inanimatos et insensibiles; in relation to
Algazali cf. ibid, viii, 5; Koch (note 49), 38.
77 Cf. ibid, xii [Maimonides], 5; Koch (note 49), 60.
114 Yossef Schwartz
78
that Maimonides himself claims originality. The four orbs/globes theory
– according to Gad Freudenthal, at least in its precise formulation truly an
79
independent theory of Maimonides – creates a multifaceted system that
connects all ontological realms and cosmological levels. One can find some
traces of it in Albert’s ‘De caelo et mundo’, but they are not more than
isolated pieces, without any connection whatsoever to the original context
80
and content, and without mentioning Maimonides’ name even once.
A relatively lawful description of it is found in the ‘Summa philosophiae’.
Here as well the reference to Maimonides’ hypothesis does not mean a
81
general acceptance of its theoretical framework.
As usual the situation radically changes whan we move to the writings of
Meister Eckhart. In a previous work I dealt with Maimonides’ and Eckhart’s
82
concept of place as divine attribute. In the following I would like to relate
it to the question about the various possible levels of immaterial physical
causality. Maimonides relates his hypothesis of the four globes directly to
83
the question of physical influence at a distance.
As we have seen above, this dynamic moment cannot be understood
without taking into account the overall architecture of the Maimonidean
universe. The opposite motivation can be seen among the Dominicans as
78 Guide (note 15), ii, 9, p. 269: “Now this number is for me a very important
basis for a notion that has occurred to me and that I have not seen explicitly
stated by any philosopher”.
79 Freudentahl (note 22), p. 226.
80 For the full list see Rigo (note 54), p. 51, n. 122.
81 Summa philosophiae xv, 28, Baur (note 43), 584: Aestimavit tamen Rabbi
Moyses solem dominari fundamento ignis, cuius est et actio inter cetera elementa
praecipua, lunam vero fundamento aquae, cuius est inter cetera elementa
fluxibilitas maxima; cetrosque quinque fundamento aeris, qui una cum terra
in via generationis et mixtionis radicale principium est, licet reliqua duo, id est
ignis et aqua, quandoque concurrant. – Supradictum est etiam orbem stellarum
fixarum dominari fundamento terrae. Quattuor itaque qualitates elementares
singulis singillatim elementis a praedictis octo orbibus immediatius, et ab orbe
none mediate imprimi omnino supponimus.
82 Schwartz (note 21).
83 Cf. Guide (note 15), ii, 12, 277–280; For a general description of the problem
in its Arab – Latin context see Wood, Rega, The Influence of Arabic Aristote-
lianism on Scholastic Natural Philosophy: Projectile Motion, the Place of the
Universe, and Elemental Composition, in: The Cambridge History of Medi-
eval Philosophy, Ed. Robert Pasnau, Volume 1, Cambridge 2010, pp. 247–266,
here 249f.
early as in Guerric of Saint-Quentin’s ‘Quaestiones de quolibet’, composed

during the 1230s. Here Guerric repeatedly asserts that an angel non potest
84
movere corpus distans […] cum omnis actio sit per contactum. Against
his Dominican predecessors, Meister Eckhart, in the different places in
his writings where he chooses to quote this Maimonidean doctrine, indeed
reveals a far reaching reception of his ontological structure.
As I claimed in my previous research, Eckhart is probably the only pre-
Renaissance Latin writer who seriously adopts (through Maimonides) the
Jewish divine attribute of place. Trying to explain in what sense locus should
be defined as an appropriate divine attribute Eckhart asserts: Propter quod
85
in deo sunt omnia, et ipse est locus propriisime omnium entium. In order to
explicate the cosmological meaning of such a definition Eckhart explains
that:
Sic ergo locus naturaliter ambit et includit undique sphaerice et aequaliter
sphaerice ex omni parte suum locatum, si vere et proprie est locus formalis
et naturalis. Et istae sunt universaliter condiciones primi. Unde et primum in
unoquoque ordine essentiali includit et locat omnia quae sunt post in illo ordine.
Hinc est quod primum corpus, puta caelum, est locus omnium corporum et
est sphaericum, ut illa aequaliter ambiat, circumdet et includat, utpote finis.
Quantum ergo unumquodque recedit a natura primi, superioris et perfecti,
tantum cadit a natura ambientis spherice aequaliter omnia quae sunt post, et per
86
consequens cadit a natura loci.
87
Hence it is no coincidence that next to Dante and in a much more accu-
rate manner Eckhart is one of the very few medieval scholars who, after the
Parisian condemnations of the 1270’s, has no difficulties accepting Arab
84 Guerric of Saint-Quentin, Quaestiones de quolibet, q. 1, art. 2, 37, in: Quaes-

tiones de quolibet. A critical edition by Walter H. Principe and Jonathan
Black, Toronto 2002, p. 188, 192–201; see also q. 9, art. 2, 36; pp. 379–382.
85 Magistri Echardi, Prologi Expositio libri Genesis 49, Ed. Konrad Weiss
(Meister Eckhart, Die Lateinischen Werke i), Stuttgart 1964, p. 220, 1–8.
86 Ibid., pp. 220, 8–221, 6.
87 A chapter dedicated to Dante would lead me far beyond my space limits in
this article. In the second book of the ‘Convivio’ (ii, 5; ii, 13) Dante identi-
fies the hierarchy of the heavenly spheres with the hierarchy of angels. This
identification is repeated in ‘Paradiso’ 28. To this Dante adds an adoption of
the theory of mediated causality and developed theory of astral influence. Cf.
Bemrose, Stephen, Dante’s Angelic Intelligences, Roma 1983.
116 Yossef Schwartz
88
angelology. He argues for the animation of heavenly spheres and, like
Dante, for mediated creation through angels that are identified with the
Aristotelian intelligences. This he does most clearly in his commentary on
89
Genesis 1, 26: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostrum.
In this part Eckhart concentrates on the plural faciamus which in the Chris-
tian-Jewish debate was usually interpreted by the Christians as referring
to the trinity. Eckhart quotes at length Maimonides who understands the
plural as referring to God and the secondary causes.
All these metaphysical speculations culminate in a spatial cosmological
formulation in Eckhart’s encounter with Maimonides’ interpretation of
Jacob’s ladder dream (Gen. 28, 12–13) in the ‘Liber parabolarum Gene-
90
sis’. As usual in Eckhart’s encounter with Maimonides, the length, depth
and eagerness with which he accepts the doctrine involved has no parallel
in scholastic literature. At the same time the final result is quite far from
the original tendency of Maimonides and reflects the fact that this enthusi-
astic adoption is produced by an independent and critical mind. The whole
universe, thus Eckhart following Maimonides, is built of hierarchical onto-
logical degrees, each of them representing a fourfold division: the four heav-
enly sphaeras, four elements that are influenced by them, four causes of the
heavenly movement of the sphere (quatuor causae motus sphaerici), the four
virtues descending from the translunal to the elemental world, and the four
91
directions of the earth. To this Eckhart adds the four Aristotelian causes
(efficiens, formalis, finalis et materialis) and the fourfold division of the
92
universe according to Macrobius.
The dynamic movement of the angels up and down the ladder represent
the descending of the cause to its effects and the ascending of the effects to
their causes (quia causa descendit in effectum et e converso effectus quasi
88 Magistri Echardi, Expositio Libri Sapientiae 12, Ed. Heribert Fischer et alii,
(Meister Eckhart, Die Lateinischen Werke ii), Stuttgart 1992, p. 333, 1–4: Cae-
los enim animatos habentes intelectum probat Rabbi Moyses l. ii c. 6 per illud
quod scriptum est: ‘caeli enarrant gloriam dei’. This claim stands in direct con-
tradiction with ‘De erorres philosophorum’ quoted above, see above (note 77).
89 Magistri Echardi, Prologi Expositio libri Genesis 116, Ed. Konrad Weiss
(Meister Eckhart, Die Lateinischen Werke i), Stuttgart 1964, pp. 273, 1–274, 3.
90 Magistri Echardi, Liber parabolarum Genesis 204–213, Ed. Konrad Weiss
91 Ibid. 204, 210–211, p. 678, 13–16, pp. 687, 1–688, 15.
92 Ibid. 212, p. 689, 1–5.
ascendens in sua causa) within the totality of a universe that is conceived as

93
an organic unity, where each element is functioning as pars propter totum.
v. Concluding remarks
So what is the motivation for rejecting Arab cosmology? It certainly derives

much of its basic inspiration from the simple fact that this description
contradicts the literal interpretation of the biblical angel. The result however
is very interesting. While Maimonides’ solution is highly rational it adds
very little to the basic Aristotelian Ptolemaic worldview. In the scholastic
discussion on the other hand we find a very serious attempt to reconcile
Aristotelian physics and cosmology with a whole set of new data originating
in revelation. Hence the serious attempt to solve the problem of individua-
tion, location and locomotion of immaterial entities. The case becomes even
stronger after 1277, for instance in Ockham’s arguments concerning the
place and motion of angels. The inanimate spheres demand a different expla-
nation for their movement. Already Kilwardby would suggest therefore, in
Lindberg’s words an “innate tendency to move spherically” and Buridan
would connect the question of heavenly spherical movement directly to his
94
impetus theory. In this connection I would like to disagree with David
Kack’s conclusion to the second part of his book ‘Angels & Angelology in
the Middle Ages’ dedicated to the discussion concerning the nature of angels
93 Magistri Echardi, Liber parabolarum Genesis 205–206, Ed. Konrad Weiss

Such a description does not truly coincide with the regular description of
Eckhart’s ontology that seems to leave no space for any mediating entities
between God and man. See for example the assertion of Winkler (note 55),
pp. 263f. This difference is surely true of the majority of Eckhart’s writings
but a full account of his thought cannot ignore the systematic discussion de-
scribed here. A similar case, again depending on Maimonides’ theory com-
bined with Ptolemaic cosmology is Eckhart’s metaphysics of language, and
see Gottschall, Dagmar, ‘Man möhte wunder tuon mit worten’ (Predigt 18).
Zum Umgang Meister Eckharts mit Wörtern in seinen deutschen Predigten,
in: Meister Eckhart in Erfurt, Eds. Andreas Speer and Lydia Wegener (Miscel-
lanea Mediaevalia 32), Berlin/New York 2005, pp. 427–449.
94 Lindberg, David C., The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scien-
tific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, Prehis-
tory to A.D. 1450, Chicago/London 2007, p. 260.
118 Yossef Schwartz
in the 13th century. There he claims that there was no significant advance
in late scholastic thought after 1277, i.e. beyond the teaching of Bonaven-
ture and Aquinas. “The science of angels became complete in the thirteenth
95
century.” I believe that Keck concludes here his important study with a
mistaken claim, ignoring the revolutionary elements in 14th century thought
96
concerning angels. What I have tried to show in the examples quoted in
this paper is that the turning point of 1277 – precisely in the context of our
present topic – was not a reactionary turn against the common metaphysical
synthesis but a conclusive formulation of the general attitude.
The intercultural encounter described here has immediate cosmological
implications. There exists no space, at least in the modern meaning of the
term, in an Aristotelian voidless ‘closed universe’, made of physical bodies,
97
materially containing each other. In such a cosmos the only possible spatial
discourse is provided by scientiae mediae such as mathematical astronomy
and optics. However, besides the mathematization of cosmic hierarchy there
is the possibility of its theologization. Here the mythical figure of angels
plays important role. None of our scholastic thinkers believes in any kind of
void space, neither within nor beyond the universe. In spite of this, imma-
terial creatures like angels and other forms of separate substances, and the
immaterial causality they produce, present the opportunity to discuss the
hypothetical and realistic possibilities of divine, immaterial, hence ‘empty’
spaces. Ockham’s discussion of the movement of angels in space and their
location, in comparison with Thomas discussion of the same questions
shortly before the condemnations of the 1270’s demonstrate the potential of
98
such theological ideas. Scholars such as Alexander Koyré, Anneliese Maier
and Amos Funkenstein who pointed out the significance of these discussions
for the development of early modern science emphasizing the definition of
95 Keck, David, Angels & Angelology in the Middle Ages, New York/Oxford
1998, pp. 112–114, here 114.
96 Ockham’s most radical assertion concerning the nature of place and of loco-
motion takes place within his discussion of angels, and see William of Ock-
ham, Quodlibetal Questions, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis
E. Kelley, New Haven/London 1991, i, 4–5, pp. 23–33 (Is an angel in a place
through his substance? Can an angel move locally?); i, 8, pp. 42–46 (Can an
angel move through a vacuum?).
97 Here the well known description of Koyré, Alexander, From the Closed
World to the Infinite Universe, Baltimore/London 1957.
98 Maier, Anneliese, Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Natur-
philosophie, Roma 1955, pp. 227–269.
space and of spatial motion on the borderline between physics, metaphysics

and astronomy, were perhaps not fully aware of the significant contribution
of the rejection of Arab Aristotelianism to these matters. Alfarabi, Avicenna
and Maimonides rationalized biblical myth into an Aristotelian Ptolemaic
model, not less but also not more. The Latins, while rejecting the full iden-
tification of angels with Aristotelian intellects made space for new elements
in their own cosmology. In this specific example, the overcoming of Arab
Aristotelianism was not less meaningful for the further development of
European thought than its eager reception.

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Divine Space and the Space of the Divine:

On the Scholastic Rejection of Arab Cosmology

i. Two introductory remarks

i.1 The interreligious dimension of medieval angelology

of angelology in its cosmological aspects is not only an example of medi-

i.2 Theories of space in an Aristotelian Ptolemaic voidless universe

ii. Arabic and Jewish-Arabic thought:

9 Sambursky, Shmuel, Die Raumvorstellungen der Antike, in: Eranos 44 (1975),

heavenly realm. Unlike in his discussion of God’s existence, where Maimo-

As I said, Maimonides draws out some important conclusions from this

In his thorough examination of this Maimonidean hypothesis Gad Freu-

iii. What exactly did the Latins reject

33 Colish, Marcia L., Early Scholastic Angelology, in: Recherches de Théologie

philosophorum’, so intensively discuss angelological matters. In this discus-

iii.1 The heavenly location of angels: between theology and cosmology

I have tried to show that the theo-ontological cosmic hierarchy of physi-

34 Cf. Suarez-Nani (note 4), pp. 122–125.

cosmological hierarchy of intelligences, celestial spheres and orbs as an

37 Bonaventura, In Hexaemeron, sermo v, Ed. Adolph C. Peltier, S. Bonaven-

In his commentary on the second book of the ‘Sentences’ Thomas

The biblical angel cannot be completely identified with heavenly intelli-

40 Thomas Aquinas, In ii Sententiarum, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 3, Solutio, in: Commen-

such a Dominican doctrine can be seen already in the writings of Guerric of

iii.2 Angels and Intelligences

The identification, even on the strictly semiotic level, between Aristotelian

A more systematic effort at clarification of the notions involved and of the

Ordines autem intelligentiarum, quas nos determinavìmus, Quidam dicunt

The individuation of angels and their hierarchy has nothing to do with

46 Albertus Magnus, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, i, 4, 8, Ed.

are approximately 60 out of 219 articles (without taking into consideration

iii.3 Angels as mediators of divine creation and providence

According to the author of ‘De errores philosophorum’ Averroes is also

as Algazali’s) ‘Metaphysics’ provided a full synthesis of Aristotelian and

of a series of Arab texts translated in Toledo, mostly by him, such as ‘Liber

64 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de potentia, q. 3, a. 4, solutio,

uses the notion of place in a spiritual sense to designate a degree of divine

65 Thomas Aquinas, De substantiis separatis, C. 18 (De origine substantiarum

iii.4 Heaven inanimate

fragen, übersetzt von Henryk Anzulewicz, eingeleitet und kommentiert von

iv. Some receptions of Maimonidean theory of space:

The general rejection of Arab theo-philosophical cosmology included as we

early as in Guerric of Saint-Quentin’s ‘Quaestiones de quolibet’, composed

84 Guerric of Saint-Quentin, Quaestiones de quolibet, q. 1, art. 2, 37, in: Quaes-

ascendens in sua causa) within the totality of a universe that is conceived as

So what is the motivation for rejecting Arab cosmology? It certainly derives

93 Magistri Echardi, Liber parabolarum Genesis 205–206, Ed. Konrad Weiss

space and of spatial motion on the borderline between physics, metaphysics

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