CASE NO.
1 According to petitioner, the cases decided by the SC show that the Court has
PATES vs COMELEC, GR No. 184915
RULE 64
DOCTRINE: Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least
be accompanied by an explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply
with the rules and by a justification for the requested liberal construction.
Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any
compelling reason to warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his
petition. He failed to explain why his filing was late. Other than his appeal to
history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should adopt
and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.
FACTS: The following are the material antecedents of the case:
Feb. 1, 2008 – The COMELEC first division issued the assailed Resolution.
Feb. 4, 2008 – The counsel for petitioner Nilo Pates received a copy of the
Feb. 1 Resolution.
Feb. 8, 2008 – Petitioner filed his MR of the Feb. 1, 2008 resolution (4 days
from receipt of said Resolution).
September 18, 2008 -– The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution
denying the petitioner’s MR (also assailed in the petition).
September 22, 2008 – Petitioner received the COMELEC en banc resolution
of Sept. 18.
Under the abovementioned facts, the last day of filing the petition for
certiorari is on October 18, 2008 (30 days from notice of the final COMELEC
Resolution), which is a Saturday. As he filed a previous MR, petitioner had
the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition. Effectively, the last day for
filing was October 20, 2008, the following Monday or the first working day
after October 18, 2008.
However, the petitioner filed his petition on October 22, 2008, or two days
late. Hence, the COMELEC’s Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008.
For his part, petitioner asks in his ―Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with
Reiteration for the issuance of a TRO‖ to reverse the dismissal of his petition,
arguing that the petition was seasonably filed under the ―fresh period rule‖
enunciated by the SC in a number of cases decided starting the year 2005.
This fresh period refers to the original period provided under the RoC
counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for reconsideration by the
tribunal below, without deducting the period for the preparation and filing of
motion for reconsideration.
consistently held that the order or resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration or new trial is considered as the final order finally disposing
of the case, and the date of its receipt by a party is the correct reckoning
point for counting the period for appellate review.
For her part, respondent Amirante filed a comment that the Court is
absolutely correct that the petition was filed out of time, and petitioner’s
reliance on Sec. 4, Rule 65 is misplaced as Rule 64, not Rule 65, is the
vehicle for review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
COMELEC. They are different in that Rule 65 provides for a 60-day period
for filing petitions for certiorari, while Rule 64 provides for 30 days.
ISSUE: whether or not the ―fresh period rule‖ applicable to a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is also applicable to petitions for certiorari of
COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64?
HELD: NO. The Court held that Rule 64 cannot be equated to Rule 65 even
if it expressly refers to the latter rule. Procedurally, the most patent difference
between the two is the exception that Sec. 2, Rule 64 refers to (is Section 3)
which is Sec. 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions
for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period
is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that
Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any
motion for reconsideration deducible from the originally-granted 30 days
(instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).
To quote, Sec. 3 of Rule 64 provides that ―The petition shall be filed within
thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought
to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said
judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of
the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial‖.
Thus, the SC’s ruling of November 11, 2008 to dismiss the petition for late
filing cannot but be correct.
While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
 CASE NO. 2
Lokin vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179431-32
DOCTRINE: The mandate of the Section 7 Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution is embodied in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides
that, in seeking the review of judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the
COMELEC or the Commission on Audit, the proper remedy is a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65.
FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption was one of the organized
groups registered under the Party List System of Representation who
manifested their intent to participate in the synchronized national and local
elections to be held on May 14, 2007. CIBAC’s President, Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, along with its manifestation of its intent to participate, submitted a
list of five (5) nominees upon which the representatives would be chosen
from should CIBAC acquire the requisite number of votes.
The nominees are as follows:
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva;
2. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. (The Petitioner);
3. Cinchora C. Cruz-Gonzales;
4. Sherwin Tugna; and
5. Emil L. Galang.
Accordingly, the nominees’ certificate of acceptance were attached to the
very same certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees
were, thereafter, published in The Philippine Star News and The Philippine
Daily Inquirer. Prior to the elections, CIBAC later on filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution, and amendment of the list of nominees.
Villanueva and Cruz Gonzales opposed the motion. This case was docketed
as E.M. No. 07-54. On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC resolved E.M.
No. 07-54, confirming the withdrawal of the Petitioner and confirming the
substitution of Cruz-Gonzales and Borje. Lokin thus assailed the September
14, 2007 COMELEC Resolution through a petition for certiorari. The
COMELEC opposed the petition, contending that a certiorari is not the proper
remedy due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as representative; and
that the proper recourse should have been an election protest.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari was properly resorted to/
HELD:
1. YES. An Election Protest aims to oust a winning candidate from
office on the ground of electoral fraud and irregularities. Quo
Warranto, on the other hand, refers to questions of disloyalty to the
State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. Lokin’s situation is
peculiar. Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee seeks to
unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither
does the instant case involve ineligibility nor disloyalty to the State.
Lokin’s petition for certiorari was properly brought in accordance
with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, as embodied
in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Rule 64 provides that the proper
remedy, in actions seeking the review of judgments, final orders,
and resolutions of the COMELEC, is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65.

This time, the nominees were the following:

1. Villanueva;
2. Cruz-Gonzales;
3. Borje;

On June 20, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC, along with the signed
petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the
withdrawal of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang and the substitution of Borje. 6
Days thereafter, CIBAC, allegedly through counsel, filed a motion with
COMELEC seeking the proclamation of Lokin; asserting in that motion that
they were entitled to a second seat with Lokin as the representative.
 CASE NO. 3
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs.COMMISSION ON
AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN
VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE,
G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.
DOCTRINE: 1) Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the RoC concerns two (2) types of proof
of service, namely: the affidavit AND the registry receipt. The provision
requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall
consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing AND the registry
receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A
compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if
either or both are not submitted.
2) Under Rule 64, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules
of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the
motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event,
reckoned from the notice of denial.
The belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that
the fresh period rule under Neypes should apply, shall be fatal to the
recourse.
3) Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
FACTS: Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the
petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life
insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod,
the former obligating the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique for pre-audit. The latter
office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under R.A. No. 7160
(Local Government Code/LGC). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal
was denied. Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in
the COA; however, the same was denied. COA held that under Sec. 447 and
Sec. 458 of the LGC, only municipal or city governments are expressly
vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay
workers. Further, COA noted the LGU’s failure to comply with the
requirement of publication under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9184 (Government
Procurement Reform Act).
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on 14 December 2012,
and filed its motion for reconsideration (MR) on 14 January 2013. COA
denied the said motion, the denial being received by the petitioner on 14 July
2014. Thereafter, petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on 13 August 2014,
but the same was dismissed on the grounds that: (a) the late filing of the
petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified
declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondents.
Hence, the instant recourse.
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER: 1) Petition for certiorari included an
affidavit of service in compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court; 2) The fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to
a petition for review brought under Rule 42; hence, conformably with the
fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned
from the receipt of the order denying the MR or the motion for new trial.
On the claim of grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA: (1) the
challenged decision was rendered by a divided COA proper; (2) the COA
took almost a year before promulgating its decision, and more than a year in
resolving the MR, in contravention of the express mandate of the
Constitution; (3) the resolution denying the MR was made up of only two
sentences; (4) the matter involved a novel issue that called for an
interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the LGC; and (5) in issuing the
resolution, COA Commissioners made it appear that they knew the LGC
better than former Sen. Pimentel who offered an opinion on the matter.
ISSUE/S:
1) W/N affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari complied with
the requirement on proof of service under Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the RoC;
2) W/N herein petitioner filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 within
the reglementary period, following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes
v. Court of Appeals;

3) W/N petitioner showed and proved grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COA in issuing the assailed decision
RULING:
1) NO. Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the RoC concerns two (2) types of proof of
service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of
Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit AND the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender,
or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy
of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
The provision requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of
service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing AND
the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being
served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof
of service if either or both are not submitted. Here, the petition for certiorari
carried an affidavit of service and cut print-outs of what appeared to be the
registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts
themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their
reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the
rule. Petitioner did not comply with the requirement of proof of service.
2) NO. There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and
the petition for certiorari under Rule 64. Rule 42 governs an appeal from the
judgment or final order rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed
question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie
showing that the RTC committed an error of fact or law warranting the
reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final order. In contrast,
the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the COMELEC, or the
COA. The petition is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment. Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether
the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As to reglementary period: Under Rule 42, aggrieved party has 15 days to
file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order,
or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Under Rule 64, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the
Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice
of denial. In the case at bar, petitioner filed its MR on 14 January 2013, which
was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on 14
December 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, petitioner had only five (5)
days from receipt of the denial of its MR to file the petition for certiorari.
Considering that it received the notice of the denial on 14 July 2014, it had
only until 19 July 2014 to file the petition for certiorari. However, it filed the
petition on 13 August 2014, which was 25 days too late.
The belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that
the fresh period rule under Neypes should apply, was fatal to the recourse.
3) NO. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in
other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Here, the bases cited by the petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of
discretion. First, the supposed delays taken by the COA in deciding the
appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Second, the mere
terseness of the denial of the MR was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse
of discretion. Lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel (even if he had been the
main proponent of the LGC in the Legislature) expressed an opinion on the
issues differently from that of the COA Commissioners’ DID NOT matter, for
it was the latter’s adjudication that had any value and decisiveness on the
issues by virtue of their being the Constitutional officials entrusted with the
authority for that purpose. It is equally relevant to note that COA denied the
money claim of the petitioner for the further reason of lack of sufficient
publication as required by the Government Procurement Reform Act (R.A.
No. 9184). In that light, COA acted well within its authority in denying the
petitioner’s claim.
 CASE NO. 4
G.R. No. 188818
TOMAS OSMEA v COA
Rule 65 CERTIORARI
Doctrine:
Where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the
petition, this Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in
the exercise of its legal jurisdiction.
Facts:
In preparation for the 1994 Palarong Pambansa, the City of Cebu engaged
the services of WT Construction, Inc. (WTCI) and Dakay Construction and
Development Company (DCDC) to construct and renovate the Cebu City
Sports Complex. Tomas Osmea, then city mayor, was authorized by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sanggunian) of Cebu to represent the City and to
execute the construction contracts. While the construction was being
undertaken, Osmea issued a total of 20 Change/Extra Work Orders to WTCI,
amounting to over P35M, and to DCDC, amounting to over P15M.
Thereafter, WTCI & DCDC demanded payment for the extra work they
performed. A Sanggunian member sponsored a resolution authorizing
Osmea to execute the supplemental agreements with WTCI and DCDC to
cover the extra work performed, but the other Sanggunian members did not
approve. Thus, the extra work was not covered by the necessary
appropriation to effect payment, prompting WTCI & DCDC to file two
separate collection cases before the RTC. The RTC found the claims
meritorious, and ordered the City to pay for the extra work performed as well
as damages, litigation expenses and attorneys fees.
During post-audit, the City Auditor issued notices disallowing the payment of
damages and fees to WTCI and DCDC. These amounts, the City Auditor
concluded, were unnecessary expenses for which Osmea, the members of
the Sanggunian, and the City Administrator should be held liable in their
personal capacities. Upon reconsideration, the COA Regional Office
declared that the payment of the amounts awarded as damages and
attorneys fees should solely be Osmea's liability. The decision was sustained
by the COAs National Director for Legal and Adjudication.
On May 6, 2008, the COA issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the
notices of disallowance. Osmea received a copy of the Decision on May 23,
2008 and filed a motion for reconsideration 18 days after or on June 10,
2008. The COA denied Osmeas motion via a Resolution dated June 8, 2009.
The Office of the Mayor of Cebu City received the June 8, 2009 Resolution of
the COA on June 29, 2009. A day before, however, Osmea went to the USA
for his check-up after his cancer surgery in April 2009 and returned to his
office only on July 15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that Osmea
filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to assail the COAs
Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution of June 8, 2009.
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections
and the COA. Section 3 provides for a 30-day period, counted from the
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, to
file the petition for certiorari. The Rule further states that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of the said judgment or final order or resolution interrupts
the 30-day period.
Osmea filed his MR, of the COAs May 6, 2008 Decision, 18 days from his
receipt thereof, leaving him with 12 days to file a Rule 64 petition against the
COA ruling. He argues that the remaining period should be counted not from
the receipt of the COAs June 8, 2009 Resolution by the Office of the Mayor
of Cebu City on June 29, 2009, but from the time he officially reported back
to his office on July 15, 2009, after his trip abroad. Since he is being made
liable in his personal capacity, he reasons that the remaining period should
be counted from his actual knowledge of the denial of his MR. Osmea pleads
that his petition be given due course for the resolution of the important issues
he raised.
Issue:
W/N the period set on the Rules of Court should be relaxed
Held:
Yes
Several times in the past, we emphasized that procedural rules should be
treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay
in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time
to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for
the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would
defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. Where strong considerations of
substantive justice are manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the strict
application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction.

Osmea cites the mandatory medical check-ups he had to undergo in

Houston, Texas after his cancer surgery in April 2009 as reason for the delay
in filing his petition for certiorari. Due to his weakened state of health, he
claims that he could not very well be expected to be bothered by the affairs
of his office and had to focus only on his medical treatment. He could not
require his office to attend to the case as he was being charged in his
personal capacity.

We find Osmea’s reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules.

Although the service of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was validly
made on June 29, 2009 through the notice sent to the Office of the Mayor of
Cebu City, we consider July 15, 2009 the date he reported back to office as
the effective date when he was actually notified of the resolution, and the
reckoning date of the period to appeal. If we were to rule otherwise, we
would be denying Osmea of his right to appeal the Decision of the COA,
despite the merits of his case.

Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days to file his Rule 64
petition should be counted from July 15, 2009, the date Osmea had actual
knowledge of the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision of
the COA and given the opportunity to competently file an appeal thereto
before the Court. The present petition, filed on July 27, 2009, was filed within
the reglementary period.
 CASE NO. 5 herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power
PORMENTO vs. ESTRADA & COMELEC of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely
RULE 64, SEC. 8 lacking in this case.

DOCTRINE: Under the Rules of Court, the filing of the petition for
certiorari would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or
resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed.

FACTS: The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito

Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from "any reelection." Private
respondent was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in
the general elections held on May 10, 2010.

Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent's candidacy

and filed a petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by
the Second Division of public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
COMELEC en banc.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010.

Notwithstanding the petition for certiorari, private respondent was able to
participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010
elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari stays the
execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC.

HELD: NO. Under the Rules of Court, the filing of the petition for certiorari
would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even
pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate
for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered
the second highest number of votes.

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be
premised on a person's second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real
or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties
 Case No. 6
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as
GSIS President and General Manager, vs.
ALBERT M. VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463 February
2, 2011
RULE 65
DOCTRINE: The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a
special civil action which may be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case
may be. It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title
to, or possession of real property, or interest therein.
Facts: On 23 May 2002, petitioners charged respondents administratively
with grave misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90
days. Respondents were charged for their alleged participation in the
demonstration held by some GSIS employees denouncing the alleged
corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general
manager, petitioner Winston F. Garcia
respondent Mario I. Molina (respondent Molina) requested GSIS Senior Vice
President Concepcion L. Madarang (SVP Madarang) for the implementation
of his step increment. On 22 April 2003, SVP Madarang denied the request
citing GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 (Resolution No. 372)9 issued by
petitioner Board of Trustees of the GSIS (petitioner GSIS Board) which
approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and
regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step
increment and promotion which provides that the step increment adjustment
of an employee who is on preventive suspension shall be withheld until such
time that a decision on the case has been rendered. x x x x
Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee
privileges under GSIS Board Resolution No. 306 (Resolution No. 306)
approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees
effective year 2002.11 Respondents’ request was again denied because of
their pending administrative case.
Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents claimed that they were
denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution
No. 306. Respondents also sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from
implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372. Respondents claimed that the
denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending
administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that
they are being punished without hearing. Respondent Molina also added that
he had already earned his right to the step increment before Resolution No.
372 was enacted. Respondents also argued that the three resolutions were
ineffective because they were not registered with the University of the
Philippines (UP) Law Center pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of
1987.
Petitioners filed their comment with motion to dismiss and opposition.
The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and granted respondents’
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petition for prohibition is proper?
Held: On the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court said it can take cognizance of
the petition because the "territorial area" referred to in Section 4, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court "does not necessarily delimit to a particular locality but
rather to the judicial region where the office or agency is situated so that the
prohibitive writ can be enforced."
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. - The petition may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it related to acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and
unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the trial
court declare all acts emanating from Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void
and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the said resolutions. (1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents’ warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any part
petition for prohibition. of their respective regions; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129)25 provides: Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of
SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. - The Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig,
Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela and the
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional
municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of
Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
prohibition issued by the regional trial court sitting in the City of Manila, is
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or enforceable in Pasay City. Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took
criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial cognizance of respondents’ petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction
over the action and the venue was properly laid before it.
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may
exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised
with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of the
different parts of the region and making attendance of litigants and witnesses
as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied)
In line with this, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Order No. 326
defining the territorial jurisdiction of the regional trial courts in the National
Capital Judicial Region, as follows:
a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila – over the City of
Manila only.
b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City – over
Quezon City only.
c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City – over Pasay
City only.
xxxx
The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which
may be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan
or the regional trial court, as the case may be. It is also a personal action
because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or
interest therein.
Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent Velasco,
plaintiff before the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition
could properly be filed in the City of Manila. The choice of venue is
sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides:
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise original jurisdiction:
 CASE NO. 7 In this case, petitioners fail to meet the third requisite for the proper
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION vs. CA invocation of Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, to wit: that there is no
G.R. No. 164561 August 30, 2006 appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
R.65 law. They simply alleged that the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its
discretion which amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the
DOCTRINE: Accordingly, where the issue or question involves or affects the assailed Decision and Resolution. They did not bother to explain why an
wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the appeal cannot possibly cure the errors committed by the appellate court. It
court to render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a petition must be noted that the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals was
for certiorari. It is obvious in this case that the arguments raised by the already a disposition on the merits; this Court has no remaining issues to
petitioners delved into the wisdom or legal soundness of the Decision of the resolve, hence, the proper remedy available to the petitioners is to file
Court of Appeals, therefore, the proper remedy is a Petition for Review on Petition for Review under Rule 45 not under Rule 65.
Certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, it is incumbent upon this Court to Additionally, the general rule is that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the
dismiss this Petition. remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal
in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Facts:Enrique Tamondong III was the Personnel Superintendent of Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
CAPASCO. The supervisory personnel of CAPASCO organized a union, cumulative.
known as CAPASCO Union of Supervisory Employees (CUSE) wherein he
was active and was elected as one of the officers. He was asked to stop his
union activities but he refused to do so. Thus, CAPASCO terminated his
employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Tamondong then filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC, claiming
that there was no just cause for his dismissal, as he was merely exercising
his right to self-organization. On the other hand, CAPASCO claimed that he
was a managerial employee, which means that he was prohibited from
joining a union.
The LA ruled in favor of Tamondong, which the NLRC reversed. Upon MR,
the NLRC affirmed its original decision. Tamondong filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC. The CA granted the petition. The MR was denied.
Hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed. Tamondong
challenged this, asserting that a final decision of the CA is appealable to the
SC by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not Rule 65.

Issue:Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper

remedy.

Ruling:NO. The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
 Case No. 8 Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the decision of the
BANCO FILIPINO vs. CA G.R. No. 132703 June 23, 2000 Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for
RULE 65 certiorari. This Court has often enough reminded members of the bench and
bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there
Doctrine: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in of law. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or of appeal. Banco Filipino's recourse to a special civil action for certiorari was
excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and borne not out of the conviction that grave abuse of discretion attended the
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply because of its
failure to file a timely appeal to this Court.
FACTS: The General Banking Act provides that a bank is allowed to own the
land and the improvements thereon used as branch sites but only up to a
maximum of 50% of the bank’s net worth. In 1979, Banco Filipino had
reached such allowable limit so it sold some of its holdings to Tala Realty.
Banco Filipino leased the branch sites from Tala, which was organized as a
transferee corporation by majority stockholders of Banco Filipino. Banco
Filipino alleged that a trust was created by virtue of the transactions since
Tala was established to warehouse the legal title of the properties for the
beneficial interest of the bank. However, Tala demanded payment of
increased rentals from it, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to pay.
Because of such failure, Tala filed numerous ejectment suits against Banco
Filipino. The bank then filed actions for recovery of real properties in the RTC
of Iloilo, Manila, QC, Malolos, and Lucena where it had its branches. The
motions to dismiss were filed on the ground of forum shopping and litis
pendentia, which were granted. On June 27, 1996, the RTC denied the
bank’s MR. The copy of the order was received on July 5, 1996 but instead
of filing an appeal, Banco Filipino filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the CA on July 24, 1996. The CA dismissed the petition and denied
the MR. The copy was received on January 7, 1998. Banco Filipino filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65 on March 9, 1998.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper
remedy.

HELD: NO. Banco Filipino's proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of
the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for
review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Nothing in the record of this case
supports Banco Filipino's bare assertion that the Court of Appeals rendered
its assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. The availability to
 Case No. 9 of the reglementary period. The CA dismissed the petition and held that the
Navarez v. Abrogar RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 191641, 2 September 2015
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a proper recourse to petition for certiorari
RULE 65 under Rule 65

DOCTRINE: The Court has, on appropriate occasions, treated a petition for
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly when: (1) the
petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period to file a petition
for review on certiorari; (2) the petition avers errors of judgment; and (3)
when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
FACTS: Edmundo Navarez engaged the services of Abrogar Valerio
Maderazo and Associates Law Offices through the respondent, Atty. Manuel
Abrogar III. The firm was to represent Navarez in the case "Apolonia
Quesada, Jr. v. Edmundo Navarez" as collaborating counsel of Atty. Perfecto
Laguio. The case involved the settlement of the estate of Avelina Quesada-
Navarez that was then pending before the Quezon City RTC. Later, Navarez
filed a Manifestation with the RTC that he was terminating the services of
Atty. Abrogar. Navarez also caused the delivery to Atty. Abrogar of a check
in the amount of P220,107.51 – allegedly equivalent to one half of 7.5% of
petitioner’s P11,200,000.00 share in the estate of his deceased wife less
Atty. Abrogar’s cash advances.
HELD: NO. We observe that the petitioner used the wrong remedy to
challenge the CA’s decision and resolution. The petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy of last resort, available only to
raise jurisdictional issues when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy under the law. Nonetheless, in the spirit of liberality
that pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this
Court has, on appropriate occasions, treated a petition for certiorari as a
petition for review on certiorari, particularly when: (1) the petition for certiorari
was filed within the reglementary period to file a petition for review on
certiorari; (2) the petition avers errors of judgment; and (3) when there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
Considering that the present petition was filed within the extension period
granted by this Court and avers errors of law and judgment, this Court deems
it proper to treat the present petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari in order to serve the higher ends of justice.

Atty. Abrogar manifested that with respect to the petitioner’s one-half (1⁄2)
share in the conjugal partnership, the RTC had already resolved the matter
favorably because it had issued a release order for the petitioner to withdraw
the amount. Atty. Abrogar further declared that the Firm was withdrawing as
counsel effective upon the appointment of an Administrator of the estate from
the remaining proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Avelina
Quesada-Navarez. Navarez then wrote to Atty. Abrogar offering to pay his
attorney’s fees in accordance with their Retainer Agreement minus the
latter’s cash advances – an offer that Atty. Abrogar had previously refused.

Atty. Abrogar filed a Motion to Enter into the Records his attorney’s lien
pursuant to Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court. The RTC issued an
order granting the motion and directed the petitioner to pay Atty. Abrogar’s
attorney’s fees. Navarez elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
certiorari. He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
because: (1) the RTC granted Atty. Abrogar’s claim for attorney’s fees
despite non-payment of docket fees; (2) the RTC denied him the opportunity
of a full-blown trial to contradict Atty. Abrogar’s claims and prove advance
payments; and (3) the RTC issued a writ of execution even before the lapse
 CASE NO. 10
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. v. ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL
G.R NOS. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461, OCTOBER
5, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.
RULE 65
FACTS:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and
Protect our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, petitioner Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization,
and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R.
No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and
Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their
respective officers who are also bringing the action in their capacity as
citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, different organizations such as BAYAN,
GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham, represented by their
respective officers, and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations
SELDA, EMJP, and PCPR, which were represented by their respective
officers who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels
for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL), Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S.
Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other
regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog
Region, and individuals followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that
replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto
Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser
Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo
Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the
petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-
Terrorism Council.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the six petitions filed challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9372 shall prosper.
HELD:
NO. The petitions fail.
PETITIONERS RESORT
TO CERTIORARI IS
IMPROPER
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
 alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of
particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the
same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites,
which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous.
PETITIONERS LACK
LOCUS STANDI
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
communist fronts by the government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual
danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of
constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the
proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a
closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
PETITIONERS FAIL TO
PRESENT AN ACTUAL
CASE OR
CONTROVERSY
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC cannot
be more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy
must be justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is,
it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then
again, declaratory actions characterized by double contingency, where both
the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to
it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack
of ripeness.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge

nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited
vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally
impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a
failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 CASE NO. 11
LUNA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 100374-75
RULE 65
DOCTRINE: Considering the broader and primordial interests of justice,
particularly when there is grave abuse of discretion, thus impelling occasional
departure from the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot
substitute for a lost appeal, respondent appellate court may legally entertain
the special civil action for certiorari.
FACTS: Rufino Luna, Rodolfo Alonso and Porfirio Rodriguez, herein
petitioners, boarded Flight 020 of private respondent Northwest Airlines
bound for Seoul, South Korea, to attend the four-day Rotary International
Convention. They checked in 1 piece of luggage each. After boarding, they
were asked to disembark due to engine trouble and transfer to a Korean
Airlines plane scheduled to depart four (4) hours later. They were assured
that their baggage would be with them in the same flight. But they discovered
that their personal belongings were nowhere to be found and were allegedly
flown to Seattle, U.S.A upon arrival. It was not until 4 days later, and only
after repeated representations with Northwest Airlines personnel at the
airport in Korea were petitioners able to retrieve their luggage. By then the
Convention, which they were hardly able to attend, was almost over.
Petitioners Rufino Y. Luna and Rodolfo J. Alfonso assert that 13 days after
they recovered their luggage, they sent a written claim to private
respondent's office. Rodriquez, on his part, asserverates that he filed his
claim on 13 June 1989. However, private respondent disowned any liability
for the delay and averred that it exerted "its best efforts to carry the
passenger and baggage with reasonable dispatch."
Thus, on 14 July 1989, petitioners Luna and Alonso jointly filed a complaint
for breach of contract with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila. Rodriquez filed his own complaint with the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. However, upon motion of private respondent,
both complaints were dismissed for lack of cause of action due to petitioners'
failure to state in their respective complaints that they filed a prior claim with
private respondent within the prescribed period.
Luna and Alonso then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals to set aside the order of respondent judge granting private
respondent's motion to dismiss, while petitioner Rodriquez proceeded
directly to this Court on certiorari for the same purpose. However, the SC
referred his petition to the Court of Appeals.
The Third Division of respondent Court of Appeals, applying the provisions of
the Warsaw Convention and ruling that certiorari was not a substitute for a
lost appeal, dismissed the petition of Luna and Alonso and denied their
motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, on Seventh Division of respondent
Court of Appeals, ruling that the questioned order of the trial court had
already become final, similarly rejected the petition of Rodriquez, and denied
his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present recourse by petitioners
Luna, Alonso and Rodriguez.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari is the proper recourse in this case
HELD: YES. It appears that private respondent Northwest Airlines failed to
deliver petitioners' baggage at the designated time and place. For this, all
that respondent carrier could say was that "[w]e exerted all efforts to comply
with this condition of the contract." Hence, it is evident that petitioners
suffered some injury for which they should rightly be compensated. Private
respondent cannot be allowed to escape liability by seeking refuge in the
argument that the trial courts' orders have attained finality due to petitioners
failure to move for reconsideration or to file a timely appeal therefrom.
Technicalities should be disregarded if only to render to the respective
parties that which is their due. Thus, although We have said that certiorari
cannot be a substitute for a lapsed appeal, We have, time and again,
likewise held that where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed. Hence, considering
the broader and primordial interests of justice, particularly when there is
grave abuse of discretion, thus impelling occasional departure from the
general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost
appeal, respondent appellate court may legally entertain the special civil
action for certiorari.
 CASE NO. 12
RAPPLER INC. vs. ANDRES BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 222702, APRIL 5, 2016
CARPIO, J.
RULE 65
DOCTRINE: In several cases, this Court has acted liberally and set
aside procedural lapses in cases involving transcendental issues of
public interest, especially when time constraint is a factor to be
considered, as in this case.
FACTS:
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was executed by the COMELEC
through its Chairman, respondent Andres Bautista, and the Kapisanan ng
mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), and the various media networks and
petitioner Rappler, Inc. Under the MOA, the KBP was designated as Debate
Coordinator while ABS-CBN, GMA, Nine Media, and TV5, together with their
respective print media partners were designated as Lead Networks.
Bautista called for a meeting with various media outlets to discuss the
"PiliPinas 2016 Debates," for presidential and vice-presidential candidates,
which the COMELEC was organizing. Respondent proposed that petitioner
and Google, Inc. be in charge of online and social media engagement.
Another meeting was held at the COMELEC office to discuss a draft MOA on
the debates. In the draft, petitioner and Google's participation were dropped
in favor of the online outlets owned by the Lead Networks. After the meeting,
the representatives of the Lead Networks drew lots to determine who will
host each leg of the debates. Petitioner alleged that the draft MOA permitted
online streaming, provided proper attribution is given the Lead Network.
Petitioner was informed of the date of the MOA signing. Upon petitioner's
request, the draft MOA was emailed to petitioner. Petitioner communicated
with respondent its concerns regarding certain provisions of the MOA
particularly regarding online streaming and the imposition of a maximum limit
of two minutes of debate excerpts for news reporting. Respondent assured
petitioner that its concerns will be addressed afterwards, but it has to sign the
MOA because time was of the essence.
The MOA was finally executed for the conduct of the 3 presidential debates
and 1 vice-presidential debate. Petitioner alleged that it made several
communications with respondent and the COMELEC Commissioners
regarding its concerns on some of the MOA provisions, but petitioner
received no response.
Thus, Rappler, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
Andres D. Bautista, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). The petition seeks to nullify Part VI (C),
paragraph 19 and Part VI (D), paragraph 20 of the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) on the 2016 presidential and vice-presidential
debates, for being executed without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and for violating the fundamental rights of petitioner protected under
the Constitution.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION BY RAPPLER IS PROPER?
2. W/N RAPPLER HAS THE RIGHT TO LIVE STREAM THE
DEBATES?
HELD:
1. YES
In several cases, this Court has acted liberally and set aside
procedural lapses in cases involving transcendental issues of public interest,
especially when time constraint is a factor to be considered, as in this case.
The urgency to resolve this case is apparent considering that the televised
debates have already started and only two of the scheduled four national
debates remain to be staged. And considering the importance of the debates
in informing the electorate of the positions of the presidential and vice-
presidential candidates on vital issues affecting the nation, this case falls
under the exception laid down in GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections.
"[T]his Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve
petitions despite their being the subject of an improper remedy,
in view of the public importance of the issues raised therein.
2. YES
Petitioner's demand to exercise the right to live stream the debates is
a contractual right of petitioner under the MOA. Under Part VI (C), paragraph
19 of the MOA, the Lead Networks are expressly mandated to "allow the
debates they have produced to be shown or streamed on other
websites," but "subject to copyright conditions or separate
negotiations with the Lead Networks." The use of the word "or" means
that compliance with the "copyright conditions" is sufficient for petitioner to
exercise its right to live stream the debates in its website.

The "copyright conditions" refer to the limitations on copyright as

provided under Section 184.1 (c) of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC).
Under this provision, the debates fall under "addresses and other works of
the same nature." Thus, the copyright conditions for the debates are: (1) the
reproduction or communication to the public by mass media of the debates is
for information purposes; (2) the debates have not been expressly reserved
by the Lead Networks (copyright holders); and (3) the source is clearly
indicated.

Under the MOA, the Lead Networks are mandated to promote the
debates for maximum audience. The MOA recognizes the public function of
the debates and the need for the widest possible dissemination of the
debates. The MOA has not reserved or withheld the reproduction of the
debates to the public but has in fact expressly allowed the reproduction of the
debates "subject to copyright conditions." Once petitioner complies with the
copyright conditions, petitioner can exercise the right to live stream the audio
of the debates as expressly allowed by the MOA.

The presidential and vice-presidential debates are held primarily for

the benefit of the electorate to assist the electorate in making informed
choices on Election Day. The political nature of the national debates and the
public's interest in the wide availability of the information for the voters'
education certainly justify allowing the debates to be shown or streamed in
other websites for wider dissemination, in accordance with the MOA.

Therefore, the debates should be allowed to be live streamed on

other websites, including petitioner's, as expressly mandated in Part VI (C),
paragraph 19 of the MOA.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. Respondent

Andres D. Bautista, as Chairman of the COMELEC, is directed to implement
Part VI (C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, which allows the debates to be shown
or live streamed unaltered on petitioner's and other websites subject to the
copyright condition that the source is clearly indicated. Due to the time
constraint, this Resolution is immediately executory.
 Case No. 13
TANG vs CA, GR No. 117204
RULE 65
DOCTRINE: The "person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65
who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was
a party in the proceedings before the lower court.
FACTS: Respondent Estate of the Spouses Toribio Teodoro and Marta
Teodoro is presently pending settlement before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 120. The court-appointed administrator of the said
estate is respondent Prudencio Teodoro. Included in the inventory of the
properties of the estate is a 1,704 square meter parcel of land designated as
Lot No. 214-A, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (28232)
12039.
The Republic of the Philippines expropriated 337 square meters of the said
lot for its C-3 Circumferential Road Project. Thus, Lot 214-A was subdivided
into Lot 214A-1, covered by TCT No. 237325 and titled under the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, and Lot 214-A-2, covered by TCT No.
237325 and titled under the name of respondent estate.
Since the estate was already in debt due to accruing interests from estate
taxes, respondent administrator petitioned the probate court for an authority
to mortgage or sell Lot 214-A-2. The petition was granted. The lot was further
subdivided into 2 lots – Lot 214-A-2-A and Lot 214-A-2-B.
Respondent Administrator then applied with the Caloocan City Engineer for a
permit to fence the two lots. Petitioners (owners of adjoining lots) opposed
the issuance of the fencing permit on the claim that the subject lots are street
lots and, as such, its fencing would mean the closure of their access to public
roads.
Respondent administrator then filed a petition before the probate court to
order the Caloocan City Engineer to issue the fencing permit for the subject
lots. After hearing, the probate court granted the petition.
When petitioner Magdalita Tang, a neighboring lot owner, noticed that the
subject lots were already being fenced, she filed a special civil action for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals.
After the Court of Appeals granted her a temporary restraining order, the
other petitioners, also neighboring lot owners, joined her cause in opposing
the fencing of the subject lots.
The Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying due course to the said
petition on the ground that certiorari was not the proper remedy for
petitioners to annul and set aside the order of the lower court. Hence, the
present petition. Petitioners contended that respondent Court of Appeals
erred when it ruled that appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not appeal is the proper remedy and not certiorari.
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The circumstances obtaining in this present case are indeed peculiar. The
persons who elevated the questioned order of the probate court to the Court
of Appeals, through the special civil action of certiorari, were not parties in
the proceedings before the probate court. The respondent impleaded in the
petition before the probate court, herein public respondent City Engineer of
Caloocan, did not pursue his appeal and the ones who elevated the
questioned order are merely a group of individuals who, being the owners of
the lots adjoining Lots 214-A-2-A and 214-A-2-B, claim to have an interest in
the fencing of the subject lots.
The term "person aggrieved" is not to be construed to mean that any person
who feels injured by the lower court's order or decision can question the said
court's disposition via certiorari. To sanction a contrary interpretation would
open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would
undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the
harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.
The Court ruled that the "person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of
Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one
who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness
of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action
for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case
failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision
before the lower court.
The Court also ruled that the fact that petitioners are neighboring lot owners
whose access to public roads will allegedly be affected by the fencing of the
subject lots, merely gives them an incidental interest over the questioned
order of the probate court and cannot serve as basis to support their legal
standing to elevate the order of the probate court to the Court of Appeals and
before this Court.
 CASE NO. 14 SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a
LAGUNA METTS CORP v. CA, ARIES CAALAM and GERALDINE motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
ESGUERRA required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
RULE 65 denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
DOCTRINE: As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
motion for reconsideration. by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it
FACTS: This case arose from a labor case filed by private respondents Aries is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra against petitioner Laguna Metts quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules,
Corporation (LMC). The labor arbiter decided in favor of private respondents the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
and found that they were illegally dismissed by LMC. On appeal, however,
the NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. Private respondents No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling
motion for reconsideration was denied. Counsel for private respondents of reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.(emphasis supplied)
the NLRC on May 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008, he filed a motion for extension
of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:
motion alleged that the petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals
within the prescribed 60-day period. Thus, a 15-day extension period was SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not later
prayed for and was granted by the CA. than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
LMC moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from the notice of
extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under the denial of the motion.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC dated December 4, 2007, but the MR was denied. According to the If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a
appellate court, while the amendment of the third paragraph of Section 4, corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional
Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter application to discourage the filing of Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not strip the Court of Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the
Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate
exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice. jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
ISSUE: Whether the CA may grant an extension of time filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or a regional trial
HELD: NO. While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections,
period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day period,[11] the in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of
time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases
previously permitted such extensions. indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion
would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change
Section 4, Rule 65 previously read: in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its
amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant
extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such
authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph
under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply
meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within
which to file a petition for certiorari.

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially
to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to
delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph
allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the
filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be
filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying
a motion for reconsideration.
 CASE NO. 15
Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc.,
vs. Hon. Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr., Mayor And Head Of Procuring Unit
Of The Municipality Of Valladolid, Negros Occidental; Bids And Awards
Committee, Municipality Of Valladolid, Negros Occidental; And Henry L.
Jordan And/Or Hlj Construction And Enterprise
G.R. No. 174202, April 07, 2015
RULE 65
DOCTRINE
Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in
order for a party to avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary
restraining order from this court. Also, this law covers only national
government infrastructure projects. This case involves a local
government infrastructure project.
Facts
Petitioners filed a Petition for prohibition with application for issuance of a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction
The Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its Bids and
Awards Committee, published an invitation to bid for the construction of a
1,050-lineal-meter rubble concrete seawall along the municipality's shoreline
to be called the ―Construction Shoreline Protection Project.‖
Among the 4 remaining bidders, Mig-Wells Const. Corp (highest bidder),
rd
ADP Const. & Supply (3 lowest bidder), Dynamic Builders & Const. (lowest
ND
bidder) and HLJ Const. & Ent.(2 lowest bidder), the Bids and Awards
Committee issued Resolution No. 6 recommending the award in favor of HLJ
Construction and Enterprise. Dynamic Builders requested that it be submitted
the bid documents and relevant resolutions but this was denied because
such is confidential. Dynamic asked for the reconsideration of the April 25,
2006 Decision declaring Dynamic’s bid not substantially responsive but this
was denied. Dynamic filed a formal protest with the Mayor, as head of the
procuring entity, to set aside the Bids and Awards Committee decision but
this was dismissed.
Pursuant to Article XVII, Section 58 of RA No. 9184, otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act, Dynamic Builders filed the Petition for
Certiorari before the RTC assailing Mayor Presbitero's Decision and
Resolution. Simultaneously, Dynamic Builders filed this Petition dated
September 4, 2006 for prohibition with application for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before this court.
Petitioner argues that in Section 58, the "law conferring on the Supreme
Court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders and
injunctions relating to Infrastructure Project of Government" refers to RA No.
8975 in relation to PD No. 1818. Petitioner then submits that "while R.A. No.
8975 appears to apply only to national government infrastructure projects . . .
the resulting amendment to P.D. No. 1818 (by virtue of Sections 3 and 9 of
R.A. No. 8975) removing any restriction upon the Honorable Supreme Court
to issue injunctive relief, would similarly apply to the infrastructure projects . .
. subject of, or covered by, P.D. No. 1818, which would include those
infrastructure projects undertaken for or by local governments.
By Resolution dated September 18, 2006, this court ordered the parties to
"MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO as of September 18, 2006 effective
immediately until further orders from the Court."
Public respondents counter that petitioner committed splitting a single cause
of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping and disregarded the rule
on hierarchy of courts. The project undertaken by HLJ Construction 'and
Enterprise was almost near completion, and prohibition [was] not intended to
provide a remedy for acts already executed or accomplished. Petitioner
should have asked for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. 1459 filed before the
trial court. It also argued that RA 9184 and RA 8975 do not envision
simultaneous resort to remedies but rather provides for alternative remedies.
ISSUES:
1. whether Article XVII, Section 58 of RA No. 9184 contemplates
simultaneous filing of a petition for prohibition seeking injunctive reliefs from
this court and a petition for certiorari before the RTC
2. whether Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, in relation to
Republic Act No. 8975 and Presidential Decree No. 1818, allows Regional
Trial Courts to issue injunctive relief subject to the presence of certain
conditions
3. whether respondents violated this court's September 18, 2006 status quo
Order in relation to the ongoing Construction Shoreline Protection Project
HELD:
1. No. Section 58 could not have envisioned a simultaneous resort to this
court by one that had already filed an action before the Regional Trial Court
without violating the basic rules on proscription against the splitting of a
cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.
This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public respondent's Decision
and Resolution on the protest — the same Decision and Resolution sought to
be set aside in the Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence,
petitioner seeks the same relief through two separate Petitions filed before which had been the existing state of affairs at the time the September 18,
separate courts. This violates the rule against forum shopping. 2006 Resolution was issued.

The second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184
simply means it does not preclude a direct filing before this court in proper
cases. However, parties must adhere to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
2.Yes. When the matter is of "extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue," even Regional Trial Courts may grant injunctive reliefs. Considering
that petitioner alleges that this matter is "of extreme urgency, involving as it
does the . . . constitutional right[s] to due process and equal protection of the
law," it should have prayed for injunctive relief before the trial court where its
Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 was pending, together with a bond fixed by
the court.
This is consistent with Republic Act No. 8975's policy that "the State shall
ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of
government infrastructure projects to avoid unnecessary increase in
construction, maintenance and/or repair costs and to immediately enjoy the
social and economic benefits therefrom."97 This policy declaration does not
distinguish between national and local government infrastructure projects.
Delay in the project will only mean additional costs for the government and
prejudice to the people of the Municipality of Valladolid who will directly
benefit from the Construction Shoreline Protection Project.
PETITION DISMISSED.

This court has set the limit on the prohibition (of lower courts issuing
injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects) found in
Presidential Decree No. 1818 by explaining that lower courts are not
prohibited from enjoining administrative acts when questions of law exist and
the acts do not involve administrative discretion in technical cases

For local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial Courts may issue
provisional injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects only
when (1) there are compelling and substantial constitutional violations; (2)
there clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent grave and
irreparable injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of
the injunctive relief; and (5) when there are public interest at stake in
restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending that far
outweighs (a) the inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is
awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from the completion of the
project. The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining orders
issued by trial courts should be strictly followed. No preliminary injunction
should issue unless the evidence to support the injunctive relief is clear and
convincing.

3. No. The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last
actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual
controversy. The status quo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs
which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court
must not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status.

Relying in good faith on the ordinary meaning of status quo as differentiated

from status quo ante, respondents pushed through with the construction,
 CASE NO. 16
Ocampo et al. v. Enriquez, et al.
G. R. No. 225974
November 18, 2016
DOCTRINE: while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed
under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners
cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law
in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue
restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
FACTS: On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N.
Lorenzana issued a memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding
the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani (LNMB), in compliance with the verbal order of President
Duterte to fulfill his election campaign promise to that effect.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the
corresponding directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, various parties filed several
petitions for certiorari, prohibitions and mandamus essentially arguing
that the decision to have the remains of former President Marcos interred
at the LNMB violated various laws Marcos is not entitled to be interred at
the LNMB; and that the Marcos family has already waived such burial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is proper
HELD: The Court held that defined as a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question, locus standi requires that a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party
has no standing. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens,
human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and
taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they
failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal
injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is
essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the
President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As
taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by
either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or
jurisprudence.
Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, are required to
allege any direct or potential injury which the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a
consequence of the act complained of. Suffice it to state that the
averments in their petition-in-intervention failed to disclose such injury,
and that their interest in this case is too general and shared by other
groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is
inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest. In cases involving
such issues, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. In Marcos v.
Manglapus, the majority opinion observed that the subject controversy
was of grave national importance, and that the Court's decision would
have a profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of
national life. The ponencia explained that the case was in a class by
itself, unique and could not create precedent because it involved a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of
political, economic and social havoc in the country and who, within the
short space of three years (from 1986), sought to return to the Philippines
to die.
At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally
established as a national military cemetery and declared a national shrine
would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other
aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-seven (27)
years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already
passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and
imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.
As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law regime, some of
petitioners decry re-traumatization, historical revisionism, and disregard
of their state recognition as heroes. Petitioners' argument is founded on
the wrong premise that the LNMB is the National Pantheon intended by
law to perpetuate the memory of all Presidents, national heroes and
patriots. The history of the LNMB, as will be discussed further, reveals its
nature and purpose as a national military cemetery and national shrine,
under the administration of the AFP.
Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners Senator
De Lima, and Congressman Lagman, et al. come before the Court as
legislators suing to defend the Constitution and to protect appropriated
public funds from being used unlawfully. In the absence of a clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or the institution to which they
belong, their standing as members of the Congress cannot be upheld.
They do not specifically claim that the official actions complained of, i.e.,
the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the directive
of the AFP Chief of Staff regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB,
encroach on their prerogatives as legislators.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
the court's judicial power can be sought. For reasons of comity and
convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to
give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case. While there are exceptions to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the
presence of any of those exceptions.
Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek
reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the
Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should
be given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP
Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order. Questions on the
implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of his office to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the
Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the
President which has control and supervision over the Department of
National Defense (DND).
Hierarchy of Courts
In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed
under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners
cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law
in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue
restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds
alone. Even if We decide the case based on the merits, the petitions
should still be denied.
 CASE NO. 17
THE CHAIRMAN and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT vs. EJERCITO LIM DOING BUSINESS
AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES,
RULE 65
DOCTRINE: A petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an
administrative order issued in the exercise of a quasi legislative function.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's
or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Its lies against the exercise of judicial or
ministerial functions, not against the exercise of legislative or quasi-
legislative functions.
FACTS:
Petitioners were the public officials tasked with the duty of executing and
implementing A.O. No. 00-05 and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause
Order, while the PCSD was the government agency responsible for the
governance, implementation, and policy direction of the Strategic
Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan. On the other hand, the respondent
was the operator of a domestic air carrier doing business under the name
and style Bonanza Air Services, with authority to engage in nonscheduled air
taxi transportation of passengers and cargo for the public. His business
operation was primarily that of transporting live fish from Palawan to fish
traders.
The PCSD issued A.O. No. 00-05 on February 25, 2002 to ordain that the
transport of live fish from Palawan would be allowed only through traders and
carriers who had sought and secured accreditation from the PCSD. On
September 4, 2002, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) sent to the PCSD its
communication to the effect that A TO-authorized carriers were considered
common carriers, and, as such, should be exempt from the PCSD
accreditation requirement. It attached to the communication a list of its
authorized carriers, which included the respondent's air transport service.
The respondent asserted that he had continued his trade without securing
the PCSD-required accreditation; that the PCSD Chairman had started
harassing his clients by issuing Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series of
2002, which contained a penal clause imposing sanctions on the availment of
transfer services by unaccredited aircraft carriers such as cancellation of the
PCSD accreditation and perpetual disqualification from engaging in live fish
trading in Palawan; that due to the serious effects of the memorandum, the
respondent had sent a grievance letter to the Office of the President; and that
the PCSD Chairman had nonetheless maintained that the respondent's
business was not a common carrier, and should comply with the requirement
for PCSD accreditation.
In disregard of the prohibition, the respondent continued his business
operation in Palawan until a customer showed him the Notice of Violation
and Show Cause Order issued by the PCSD to the effect that he had still
made 19 flights in October 2002 despite his failure to secure accreditation
from the PCSD; and that he should explain his actuations within 15 days,
otherwise, he would be sanctioned with a fine of ₱50,000.00.
According to the respondent, he had not received the Notice of Violation and
Show Cause Order.
The respondent filed a petition for prohibition in the CA, which issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) upon his application after finding that
there were sufficient grounds to issue the TR0. After the petitioners did not
file their comment despite notice, the CA issued the writ of preliminary
injunction upon his posting of the injunction bond.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in declaring A.O. No. 00-05, Series of 2002;
Resolution No. 03-211, and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order
null and void for having been issued in excess of the PCSD’s authority.
HELD:
Yes.
Administrative agencies possess two kinds of powers, the quasi-legislative or
rule-making power, and the quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. The first is the power to make rules and regulations that results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The issuance of the
assailed A.O. No. 00-05, Resolution. No. 03-211 and the other issuances by
the PCSD was in the exercise of the agency's quasi legislative powers. The
second is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
Clearly, what was assailed before the CA was the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the PCSD as an administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function. The question thus presented
was a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, and exclusively and
originally pertained to the proper Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section
19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Indeed, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court expressly states that any person "whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation" may bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court "to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder." The judicial course to raise
the issue against such validity should have adhered to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts except only if the respondent had sufficient justification to
do otherwise. Yet, he utterly failed to show justification to merit the exception
of bypassing the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, by virtue of Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution, the Court's power to evaluate the validity of an
implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature.

A petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an administrative

order issued in the exercise of a quasi legislative function. Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction,
or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Its lies against the exercise of judicial or ministerial functions, not against the
exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative functions.

Nevertheless, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on this case on the
merits if only to facilitate its speedy resolution. R.A. No. No. 7611 has
adopted the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan consistent with
the declared policy of the State to protect, develop, and conserve its natural
resources. The SEP is a comprehensive framework for the sustainable
development of Palawan to protect and enhance the Province's natural
resources and endangered environment.Towards this end, the PCSD was
established as the administrative machinery for the SEP' s implementation.
The creation of the PCSD has been set forth in Section 16 of R.A. No. 7611.
Accordingly, the PCSD had the explicit authority to fill in the details as to how
to carry out the objectives of R.A. No. 7611 in protecting and enhancing
Palawan's natural resources consistent with the SEP. In that task, the PCSD
could establish a methodology for the effective implementation of the SEP.
Moreover, the PCSD was expressly given the authority to impose penalties
and sanctions in relation to the implementation of the SEP and the other
provisions of R.A. No. 7611. As such, the PCSD's issuance of A.O. No. 00-
95 and Resolution No. 03-211 was well within its statutory authority.
 Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
CASE NO. 18 Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
JUDITH YU v. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD and PEOPLE OF THE substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
PHILIPPINES concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for
Rule 65 new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order
denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that
DOCTRINE: While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in
Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period
in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
FACTS: An information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the
RTC. In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
charged. Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to
material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
convicted. In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
petitioners motion for new trial for lack of merot.
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x
petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our
ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a fresh period of 15 days from (b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review
to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. The under Rule 42.
prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late,
arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. x x x x

ISSUE: Whether the Neypes ruling is applicable in criminal cases
HELD: YES. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the
Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court
is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case
and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he
period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law
makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any
distinction.
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised
its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the
same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases
under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section
6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated
differently.

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

 CASE NO. 19
AFP Mutual Benefit Association v. Marikina City, Branch 193
G.R. No. 183906

DOCTRINE: The principle of res judicata holds that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot be raised in any future case between
the same parties.

FACTS: INVESTCO entered into a contract to sell with Solid Homes over
parcels of land in Quezon City and Marikina City. Solid Homes, however,
defaulted in its payments, causing INVESTCO to file a case against Solid
Homes for specific performance and damages. During the pendency of this
case, the very same properties were then sold to AFPMBAI. Upon the
latter’s full payment of the consideration, the Register of Deeds issued new
certificates of of title to AFPMBAI. Solid Homes filed an action for
annotation of lis pendens and damages with the RTC of Marikina
(Respondent). Eventually, the SC ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel
the Solid Homes’ notice of lis pendens and declared AFPMBAI as buyers in
good faith. Eventually, Solid Homes filed a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38, alleging extrinsic fraud on the part of INVESTCO
and AFPMBAI. On July 18, 2008, the Respondent issued an ORDER
granting the petition for relief. Hence this Petition for Prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a TRO against the Respondent.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Relief is barred
by res judicata

HELD:
1. YES. Petition GRANTED. In Petitions for Relief from Judgment
under Rule 38, extrinsic fraud, as a ground, must relate to the a
party’s right to be heard. Simply, the extrinsic fraud must have
prevented or otherwise prejudiced a party’s right to be heard. The
contentions raised by Solid Homes in its petition for relief did not
relate to its right to be heard, but rather contended the need to
redetermine whether or not AFPMBAI was truly a buyer in good
faith. This matter had already been ruled upon and res judicata had
already attached. Hence, the ORDER (July 18, 2008) is SET
ASIDE.

CASE NO. 20
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 193796. July 2, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J:
RULE 65
Doctrine:
The power to administer justice conferred upon judges of the Regional Trial
Courts can only be exercised within the limits of their respective districts,
outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever. If the petition relates
to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a
board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court.
Brief Facts:
Land Bank and IBRD entered into Loan Agreement for the implementation of
the IBRD's "Support for Strategic Local Development and Investment
Project" (S2LDIP). Land Bank entered into an SLA with the City Government
of Iligan to finance the development and expansion of the city's water supply
system. The SLA expressly provided that the goods, works, and services to
be financed out of the proceeds of the loan with Land Bank were to be
"procured in accordance with the provisions of Section I of the 'Guidelines:
Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits' . . ., and with the provisions
of [the] Schedule 4." Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through its
BAC, conducted a public bidding for the supply and delivery of various sizes
of PE 100 HDPE pipes and fittings using the IBRD Procurement Guidelines.
The bidding was declared a failure upon the recommendation of Land Bank
due to the IBRD's non-concurrence with the Bid Evaluation Report.
During the second bidding, Atlanta called the BAC's attention to its use of
Bidding Documents which, as it purported, not only failed to conform with the
Third Edition of the Philippine Bidding Documents for the Procurement of
Goods (PBDs) prescribed by the Government Procurement Policy Board
(GPPB) but also contained numerous provisions that were not in accordance
with RA 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). During the
pre-bid conference, the BAC declared that the project was not covered by RA
9184 or by any of the GPPB's issuances.
Apprehensive of the BAC's use of bidding documents that appeared to be in
contravention of RA 9184 and its IRR, Atlanta filed a Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the re-
bidding of the project against the City Government of Iligan, the BAC, and
Land Bank before the Manila RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-122643
(Petition for Prohibition).
MTC: Manila RTC declared the subject bidding null and void on the ground
that it was done contrary to the rules and procedure prescribed in RA 9184
and its IRR. Consequently, it enjoined the City Government of Iligan and its
BAC from entering into and/or implementing the contract for the supply of
water pipes with Moldex Products, Inc.
RTC: The Manila RTC also ruled that the City Government of Iligan cannot
claim exemption from the application of RA 9184 and its IRR by virtue of
Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH with the IBRD because it was Land Bank, and
not the City Government of Iligan, which was the party to the same.
Issue:
Does Manila RTC have jurisdiction over the instant prohibition case and
eventually issue the writ prayed for?
Arguments of the parties:
Petitioner: Land Bank asserts that the Petition for Prohibition was improperly
filed before the Manila RTC considering that the acts sought to be enjoined,
i.e., the public bidding for the supply of water pipes, are beyond the said
court's territorial jurisdiction.
Respondent: Atlanta, for its part, counter-argues that the acts of Land Bank
are as much to be enjoined for causing the City Government of Iligan and its
BAC to continuously violate the provisions of RA 9184, its IRR, and the PBDs
in the conduct of the public bidding and that the filing of the prohibition case
in the City of Manila was in accordance with the rules on venue given that
Land Bank's main office is in the City of Manila.
Held:
NO, the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition
and mandamus.
A petition for prohibition is a special civil action that seeks for a judgment
ordering the respondent to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
reads:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
 thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
While the Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
if what is assailed relates to "acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person," the petition must be filed "in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
by the Court."
Section 4 of the same Rules provides that:
Sec. 4. When and Where to file the petition. — The petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the
motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial
court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be
filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed
with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the
same is in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves
an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
The foregoing rule corresponds to Section 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980" (BP
129), which gives Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over cases of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and
injunction but lays down the limitation that the writs issued therein are
enforceable only within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The
pertinent provision reads:
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. — Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions;
The Court already ruled in numerous cases, beginning with the very early
case of Castaño v. Lobingier, that the power to administer justice conferred
upon judges of the Regional Trial Courts, formerly Courts of First Instance
(CFI), can only be exercised within the limits of their respective districts,
outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever. Applying previous
legislation similar to the present Section 21 of BP 129 and its complementary
provision, i.e., Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, the Court held in said case
that the CFI of Leyte had no power to issue writs of injunction and certiorari
against the Justice of the Peace of Manila, as the same was outside the
territorial boundaries of the issuing court. Also, in Samar Mining Co., Inc. v.
Arnado, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was
filed in the CFI of Manila to question the authority of the Regional
Administrator and Labor Attorney of the Department of Labor in Cebu City to
hear a complaint for sickness compensation in Catbalogan, Samar and to
enjoin said respondents from conducting further proceedings thereat. The
Court affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue,
holding that the CFI of Manila had no authority to issue writs of injunction,
certiorari, and prohibition affecting persons outside its territorial boundaries.
Further, in both Cudiamat v. Torres (Cudiamat) and National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority v. Reyes (NAWASA), the losing bidders succeeded in
securing an injunctive writ from the CFI of Rizal in order to restrain, in
Cudiamat, the implementation of an award on a public bidding for the supply
of a police call and signal box system for the City of Manila, and, in
NAWASA, the conduct of the public bidding for the supply of steel pipes for
its Manila and Suburbs Waterworks Project. The Court held in both cases
that the injunction issued by the CFI of Rizal purporting to restrain acts
outside the province of Rizal was null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, applying the aforementioned precepts and
pronouncements to the instant case, the writ of prohibition issued by
the Manila RTC in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds of the
territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and void.
In case you want to read the detailed version of the facts:
On October 3, 2006, Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) entered into
Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH for the implementation of the IBRD's "Support
for Strategic Local Development and Investment Project" (S2LDIP). The loan
facility in the amount of JP¥11,710,000,000.00 was fully guaranteed by the
Government of the Philippines and conditioned upon the participation of at
least two (2) local government units by way of a Subsidiary Loan Agreement
(SLA) with Land Bank.
On February 22, 2007, Land Bank entered into an SLA with the City
Government of Iligan to finance the development and expansion of the city's
water supply system, which had two (2) components, namely: (a) the
procurement of civil works; and (b) the procurement of goods for the supply Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with an urgent prayer for the issuance
and delivery of various sizes of PE 100 HDPE pipes and fittings. The SLA of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
expressly provided that the goods, works, and services to be financed out of enjoin the re-bidding of the project against the City Government of Iligan, the
the proceeds of the loan with Land Bank were to be "procured in accordance BAC, and Land Bank before the Manila RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-
with the provisions of Section I of the 'Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD 122643 (Petition for Prohibition).
Loans and IDA Credits' . . ., and with the provisions of [the] Schedule 4." In their separate comments on the said petition, Land Bank and the BAC
Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through its BAC, conducted a asserted that the case was dismissible for improper venue, mootness, non-
public bidding for the supply and delivery of various sizes of PE 100 HDPE exhaustion of administrative remedies, failure to implead an indispensable
pipes and fittings using the IBRD Procurement Guidelines. party, and the inapplicability of RA 9184.
Respondent Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) participated in the said bidding In the meantime, with Atlanta's Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
and came up with the second to the lowest bid in the amount of 72-Hour TRO and Special Raffle having been denied, the re-bidding of the
P193,959,354.34. However, in a letter dated July 27, 2009, the BAC project was conducted (as scheduled on December 14, 2009), with four (4)
informed Atlanta that the bidding was declared a failure upon the bidders participating and submitting the following bids:
recommendation of Land Bank due to the IBRD's non-concurrence with the 1.
Bid Evaluation Report. Moreover, in a letter dated August 28, 2009, the BAC Atlanta Industries, Inc.
informed Atlanta of its disqualification from the bidding because it lacked P141,289,680.50
several documentary requirements. 2.
In response, Atlanta, through a letter dated September 8, 2009, sought to Moldex Products, Inc.
correct the BAC's erroneous assumption that it failed to submit the necessary P172,727,052.49
documents and to have its disqualification reconsidered. It expressed its 3.
objection against the BAC's declaration of a failure of bidding, asserting that Dong Won Plastics, Inc.
had it not been improperly disqualified there would have also been no need P189,184,599.74
to declare the bidding a failure because its tender would be the sole 4.
responsive bid necessary to save the bid process. Thai-Asia/Junnie Industries
However, in a Resolution dated September 25, 2009, the BAC deemed it P191,900,020.00
futile to reconsider Atlanta's disqualification in view of the fact that the Thereupon, the case proceeded with the parties' submission of their
bidding had already been declared a failure because of noted violations of respective memoranda and the denial of Atlanta's prayer for the issuance of
the IBRD Procurement Guidelines and that, unless the BAC conducts a new an injunctive writ.
bidding on the project, it would not be able to obtain a "no objection" from the
World Bank. Atlanta did not pursue the matter further with the BAC and
opted, instead, to participate in the re-bidding of the project, the notice of
which was published anew on October 30, 2009.
This notwithstanding, Atlanta, in a letter dated November 16, 2009, called the
BAC's attention to its use of Bidding Documents which, as it purported, not
only failed to conform with the Third Edition of the Philippine Bidding
Documents for the Procurement of Goods (PBDs) prescribed by the
Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) but also contained
numerous provisions that were not in accordance with RA 9184 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). During the pre-bid conference,
the BAC declared that the project was not covered by RA 9184 or by any of
the GPPB's issuances. It further announced that the bid opening would be
conducted on December 14, 2009.
Apprehensive of the BAC's use of bidding documents that appeared to be in
contravention of RA 9184 and its IRR, Atlanta filed on December 10, 2009 a
 CASE NO. 21
P/S INSP. SAMSON B. BELMONTE, et al. vs. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICES, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 197665, January 13, 2016
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE: 1) For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must
establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b)
the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and, (c) there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The mere fact that the Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of
dismissal from service is immediately executory, alone, does not justify the
issuance of an injunctive writ to stay the implementation thereof.
2) Grave abuse of discretion is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or
hostility. Petitioners, in this case, must prove that public respondent
committed not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough; it must be grave.
FACTS: A certain Sandra Matiao filed a complaint against herein petitioners,
alleging that sometime in 2007, the latter flagged down her vehicle because
the 2007 LTO sticker was not displayed on its windshield. Consequently,
petitioners proceeded to seize and impound the subject vehicle without any
warrant or existing complaint for theft. Thereafter, Sandra alleged that they
asked her if she could shoulder their lodging expenses and treat them for
dinner while an initial macro-etching examination was being conducted on
her vehicle. Sandra acceded. While on their way to dinner, however,
petitioner Belmonte told Sandra to just settle the problem for P300,000. The
next day, the macro-etching examination revealed that the engine, chassis
and production numbers of Sandra’s vehicle were tampered. The vehicle was
then placed under the list of stolen vehicles and was subsequently brought
under the custody of the police.
In a demand letter, Sandra requested the police to release the subject
vehicle. Thereafter, she filed a civil case against herein petitioners for
Recovery of Personal Property with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Replevin
before the RTC. Conversely, petitioners filed criminal charges against
Sandra for violations of Anti-Carnapping Act and Anti-Fencing Law. In
December of 2007, Sandra filed the subject Administrative Complaint for
Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against petitioners before the
Ombudsman. Petitioners were found guilty of Grave Misconduct. The
Ombudsman ruled that Sandra presented substantial evidence, such as hotel
receipts, to support her allegations that petitioners demanded and received
favors from her as consideration for the processing of the macro-etching
examination of the subject vehicle. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration (MR), arguing that the Ombudsman’s decision is not
supported by evidence and that the penalty of dismissal imposed on them is
oppressive. Before the Ombudsman could resolve the said motion,
petitioners elevated the matter to the SC by filing the instant Petition for
Prohibition with a prayer of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE/S:
1) W/N petitioners’ recourse under Rule 65 is proper, considering that the
decision of the Ombudsman is immediately effective and executory;
2) W/N the Ombudsman committed grave abuse in discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing a decision purportedly without proof
that petitioners are indeed guilty of demanding and accepting favors from
Sandra;
RULING:
1) NO. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Petition for
Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action
or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require. For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition,
he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a
tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and, (c) there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In the present case, the second and third requisites are absent. With respect
to the second requisite, the Ombudsman had not acted with grave abuse of
discretion (see No. 2 below). Anent the third requisite, petitioners had some
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or
resolution of the lower court or agency. Under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative
Order (AO) No. 17, the petitioners can still avail of the remedy of motion for
reconsideration, viz:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation: Grounds – Whenever allowable, a
motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be
entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the
decision or order by the party on the basis of any of the
following grounds: a) New evidence had been discovered
which materially affects the order, directive or decision; b)
Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have
been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the instant petition is likewise dismissible
for its violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Petitioners, without
awaiting public respondent’s action on their MR, immediately filed the instant
petition before the SC instead of the appellate court, as required by the said
doctrine.
2) NO. Grave abuse of discretion is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or
hostility. Petitioners, in this case, must prove that public respondent
committed not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough; it must be grave. Here, public respondent ruled that Sandra
submitted substantial evidence, such as hotel receipts, to support her
allegations that petitioners demanded and received favors from her as
consideration for the processing of the macro-etching examination of the
subject vehicle. Thus, that public respondent’s ruling was unfavorable to
petitioners’ interests does not necessarily mean that it was issued with grave
abuse of discretion, especially so when such ruling was aptly corroborated by
evidence submitted by the parties.

Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation

shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall resolve the
same within five (5) days from the date of submission for
resolution.

The mere fact that the Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of
dismissal from service is immediately executory, alone, does not justify the
issuance of an injunctive writ to stay the implementation thereof. As SC
explained in Villasenor v. Ombudsman, the immediate implementation of an
order of dismissal does not violate any vested right for petitioners are
considered preventively suspended during their appeal, viz.: The Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and,
therefore, may be applied retroactively to petitioners’ cases which were
pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No. 17 xxx It is
important to note that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office,
or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office.
 CASE NO. 22
G.R. No. 73155
PATRICIO TAN, et al. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)
Rule 65 PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS
Doctrine: It was prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued,
directing the respondent COMELEC to schedule another plebiscite at which
all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental shall
participate and that this Court the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no
legal effect for being a patent nullity. The Court is prepared to declare the
said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the
Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a
new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so.
Facts:
The enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885- An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte, prompted petitioners (affected residents of Negros Occidental) to file a
case for Prohibition to stop respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite which was scheduled for January
3, 1986. Three cities and eight municipalities from the northern portion of the
Island of Negros, were to be separated from the province and be known as
the new Province of Negros del Norte. Petitioners contend that B.P. Blg. 885
is unconstitutional and not in accord with the Local Government Code.
Art XI, Sec 3 of the Constitution provides that: ―No province, city, municipality
or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected‖
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates these requisites for
creating a new provincial unit:
"..has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a
population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated
annual income.., of not less than ten million pesos for the last three
consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and
income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to
less than the minimum requirements under this section."
The Court was unable to timely consider the petition, and the plebiscite
sought to be stopped was held as scheduled. But the voters of the parent
province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of
the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
Also, petitioners contend that the area which would comprise the new
province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is
lesser than the 3500 sq. km minimum area prescribed by the LGC.
Acknowledging that supervening events rendered moot the prayer in their
initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined,
petitioners filed a supplemental pleading praying that:
-a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent COMELEC to desist
from issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite
-a writ of Mandamus be issued, directed to the Respondent COMELEC to
schedule another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire
Province of Negros Occidental shall participate, at the same time making
pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal
effect
Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the challenged statute should be
accorded the presumption of legality and that it does not infringe the
Constitution because the requisites of the LGC have been complied with.
Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become moot and academic
with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte and the
appointments of the officials of said province.
Issue:
W/N the questioned statute is constitutional and legal
Held:
No.
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had
been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the
case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic.
Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be
inquired into by this Tribunal.

The pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation
and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it
imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in
the plebiscite in the unit or units affected". Plain and simple logic will
demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be
the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those
in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed
province of Negros del Norte. The plebiscite clearly failed to meet this
Constitutional requirement.

It was prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing

the respondent COMELEC to schedule another plebiscite at which all the
qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental shall participate
and that this Court the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect
for being a patent nullity. The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite
held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the Constitution.
The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite,
because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity
attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with
the criteria established in the LGC, the factual and legal basis for the creation
of such new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite
does not exist. The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to
the legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this
created province does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in
Section 197 of the LGC, since the sum of total area is only 2,765.4 square
kilometers using as basis a Report of the National Census and Statistics
Office. Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the
appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.
 CASE NO. 23 of it in the exercise thereof. This is a principle laid down by the courts since
BIRAOGO V. DEL ROSARIO time immemorial.
||BI
G.R. No. 206323 (Notice), April 11, 2013
RULE 65 MANDAMUS

DOCTRINE: The writ of mandamus will not issue to compel an official to do

anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do

FACTS: ||| This is a petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to compel herein respondent Alberto F. Del Rosario, as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to press the Philippine claim to North Borneo
(Sabah) before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or such other fora
authorized under international law.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is available as a remedy in this case

HELD: NO. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of

competent jurisdiction in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to
some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein speci?ed, which duty
results from the of?cial station of the party to whom the writ is directed or
from operation of law. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his
duty not to do. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute.

Before mandamus is issued, the following requisites should be satis?ed: (1)

petitioner must show a clear legal right to the act demanded; (2) respondent
must have the duty to perform the act because the same is mandated by law;
(3) respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by
law; (4) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (5) there
is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
These requisites applied, mandamus will not lie in the case at bar. First,
petitioner has not shown a clear legal right to the act demanded. Second, the
act which petitioner seeks to be performed by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs is clearly not merely ministerial. What is here involved is a
discretionary act on the part of the Executive Department, which act involves
the delicate balance of national and international concerns. Third, there is no
showing that there is no other remedy in the course of law.
FURTHERMORE, the submission to the ICJ of the Philippine claim over
Sabah involves the conduct of our foreign relations. This is primarily an
executive prerogative, and the courts may not inquire into the wisdom or lack
 Case no. 24
UY v. Santiago
G.R. No. 131273, July 31, 2000
RULE 65 MANDAMUS
Doctrine:
Finding the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal a clear duty of
respondent Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie against him.
Indeed, mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public official to
perform a duty specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or
public official has unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.
Facts:
On December 19, 1996, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
43, rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners in four consolidated
ejectment cases. Thereafter, three of the cases involving the private
respondents, Benito Palomado et al., were appealed and raffled to Branch
101, RTC of Quezon City, presided by herein respondent, Judge Santiago.
On July 15, 1997, respondent judge rendered a decision affirming in toto the
decision of the MTC. A week thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution Pending Appeal, to which the private
respondents filed their oppositions. On August 6, 1997, private respondents
filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, questioning the decision
of herein respondent judge in the ejectment cases. Respondent judge issued
an order denying petitioners Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on the
basis of private respondents’ compliance with the requirements to stay
immediate execution of judgement, namely: (1) perfection of appeal; (2) filing
of a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodic deposit of rentals failing due during
the pendency of the appeal. On the other, petitioners argued that RULE 70,
section 10, which enumerated the above mentioned requirements has
already been expressly repealed by Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure and that the execution of appealed ejectment
decisions with the RTC cannot now be stayed. On October 9, 1997,
respondent judge denied the Motion for reconsideration, prompting herein
petitioners to institute a petition for Mandamus for the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not decisions of Regional Trial Courts in Appealed ejectment
cases pending appeal with the Court of Appeals are immediately executory
and cannot be stayed- YES
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative, citing the case of Northcastle Properties &
Estate Corp. V Judge Paras, which differentiated Section 19 of rule 70 and
Section 21 of Rule 70. A careful perusal of the two provisions reveals the
applicability of Section 19 only to ejectment cases pending appeal with the
Regional Trial Court, and Section 21 to those decided by the Regional Trial
Court.
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same.- If judgment
is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon
motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal
Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages,
and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate
court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a
contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value
of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period
at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the
tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall
be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk
of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. XXX
On the other hand, Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
provides:
Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall
be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be
taken therefrom.
From the foregoing, it is clear that it is only execution of the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts judgment pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court
which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided in Rule
70, Section 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand,
once the Regional Trial Court has rendered a decision in its appellate
jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal,
via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court.

Finding the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal a clear duty of
respondent Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie against him.
Indeed, mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public official to
perform a duty specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or
public official has unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.
 RULE 65
Case No. 25
Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy
G.R. No. 211362, 24 February 2015
DOCTRINE
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for
mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may
also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act
or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's]
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to
perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a
discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to
perform the duty.
Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an
official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion
or judgment. For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of
respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.
In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus
petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to
control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do
or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.
FACTS
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a
lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject scheduled
from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their
OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied
and as a result, he was 2 minutes late for his next class (English). Later,
the English teacher reported Cudia for being late.
Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit
late. The tactical officer (TO) concluded that Cudia lied because the OR
teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted
with demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.
In his appeal to the senior tactical officer (STO), Cudia stated that his being
late was out of his control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while
his English class started at 3pm also. The TO replied: that on record, and
based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not
dismiss the class beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm, not
3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his
examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be excused to
leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm;
that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because
again, on that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as they
submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia
was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was
initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia, although there were
at least two students with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three
of them cannot be considered a ―class‖; Cudia could just have stated all that
instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The
STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for
allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written
appeal when he said his class was dismissed late.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior
required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a
cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is
composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings
and after the parties involved were heard and with their witnesses presented,
the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-
1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor
System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also
have a practice of chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter,
are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the ―tyranny of the minority‖.
After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial ―not guilty
vote‖ was improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became
9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually,
the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the
PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military
officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were
irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas,
the case of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board
of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation
violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy of
communication.
The CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief
of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme
Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not
proper as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering
with military matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
HELD:
I.
Mandamus is not proper
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be
compelled to reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed academic
awards is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel
PMA to do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s rights and entitlements as
a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be
availed against an official or government agency, in this case PMA,
whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further,
such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMA’s
academic freedom as an educational institution – and such performance is
beyond the jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or
not PMA and its responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the
courts to decide actual controversies and to determine whether or not a
government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military
affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-
interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
The PMA argues that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have
surrendered parts of their civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are
disciplined and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same,
much less, question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
The SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by
enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for
the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is
with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a
cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at stake which
includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due process. No
one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA, even
as a military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia
questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed from the PMA,
such controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.
II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not
a cadet is still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was
accorded due process. The investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation
followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was
notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his
options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary
investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written
report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case
was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct
the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the
charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance
to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence
in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was
found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level – from the OIC of the
HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and
to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by
the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-
GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was
conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had
the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings
of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, Commonwealth Act No. 1
authorizes the President to dismiss cadets. Such power may be delegated to
the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control
over the cadets.
Such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom. Academic
freedom or the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as
follows; the right to determine who may teach; what may be taught; how it
shall be taught;who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic
freedom. If it determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to
dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a
violation of the Honor Code.
Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really
warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie.
It punishes any form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In
fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed.
When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the
Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless
reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -
also considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.
 CASE NO. 26
MBTC vs. REYNADO & ADRANDEA
RULE 65
DOCTRINE: Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall
issue when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station." The writ of mandamus is not
available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise
of discretion.
Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine
which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However,
the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to
charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation,
the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory.
FACTS: On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company charged respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that the special audit conducted on the
cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered
anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance
with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal).
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a
Debt Settlement Agreement whereby the latter acknowledged its
indebtedness to the former in the total amount of P50,990,976.27 as of
February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations
in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by postdated
checks, "plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance and
interest and other charges, if any, on December 31."
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor
Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution dated July 10, 1997
found petitioner's evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa.
According to Prosecutor Edad, ―The execution of the Debt Settlement
Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue that the liability is
criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case,
the relations between the parties have changed, novation has set in and
prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents.‖
On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor
Edad to the Department of Justice (DOJ) by means of a Petition for Review.
On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on March
1, 2000 by then Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero. Aggrieved,
petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari & mandamus is
proper.
HELD: YES. Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall
issue when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station." The writ of mandamus is not
available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise
of discretion.
Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine
which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However,
the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to
charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation,
the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory.
Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence before
the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information against the
person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a
deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Criminal liability for
estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public
offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its
own motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the
damage suffered by the offended party.
The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his discretion
when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa as
acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the
latter's finding and proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on
purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause
as pointed out in Balangauan.
To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review
unless shown to have been made with grave abuse. The present case calls
for the application of the exception. Given the facts of this case, petitioner
has clearly established that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.
Case No. 27
Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
G.R. No. 211010; March 7, 2017 (RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have
Rules of Procedure on Environmental Cases the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather
amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or injury.
Facts: Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and
To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the decision in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in any event, legal standing is a
Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.
This body was reorganized through EO 774. EO 774 expressed what is now
referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle" which Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
contemplates: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For petitioners failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning
this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective that since a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan must be filed with
transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train). the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals, then
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is applicable. Petitioners, on the other
Later in 2009, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the hand, cite the same provision and argue that direct recourse to this Court is
Climate Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC available, and that the provision shows that the remedy to environmental
and became the lead policy-making body of the government which shall be damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the lower courts.
tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of
the government relating to climate change. Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ of
kalikasan because they failed to show that the public respondents are guilty
The Petition of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental law/s violated; show
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
children, who in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non-
would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental damage.
convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are
entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs of kalikasan and continuing Issue:
mandamus due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform
an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should
resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, issue.
health and property of all Filipinos.
Ruling:
In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the No. The petition must be dismissed.
applicable laws and executive issuances, namely applicable constitutional
provisions, the Road Sharing Principle, and other related mandates of Procedural issues:
concerned government agencies under EO 774 resulted in the continued Legal Standing
degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the
petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and may requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the
even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. However, it
and air" by the government without due process of law. bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and
seeking the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only
adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
 Similarly, petitioners were not able to show with sufficient evidence that
Jurisdiction of Courts respondents failed to execute any of the laws petitioners cited. In fact, apart
Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on
environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public
a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for respondents that have a causal link or reasonable connection to the actual or
environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as required of
right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and petitions of this nature.
territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of
large-scale ecological threats. At the very least, the magnitude of the On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not
ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect the laws, executive and
the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects and programs
allowed where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows that seek to improve air quality were undertaken by the respondents, jointly
direct resort to this Court, it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether and in coordination with stakeholders.
or not to accept petitions brought directly before it.
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS
Substantive issue: Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for
A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to continuing mandamus as follows:
show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.
Petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or
prayed for. instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully
a balanced and healthful ecology; excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence,
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation,
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an
act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages
In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the
health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition
right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the
petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology. First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts
attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ.1âwphi1 While the
Although the petitioners established the correlation of air quality and public requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the
health, petitioners have not been able to show that respondents are guilty of general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing
violation or neglect of environmental laws that causes or contributes to bad mandamus.
air quality.
Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a
principle. It cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon
the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this
principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to
compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not
those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed by
mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. Thus, the recognized
rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion,
the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not
to act one way or the other.

In this case, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the
performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of
implementation of the Road Sharing Principle.

The determination of the means to be taken by the executive in implementing

or actualizing any stated legislative or executive policy relating to the
environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the
executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable
excess of authority," the general rule applies that discretion cannot be
checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing
mandamus cannot issue.
 CASE NO. 28
LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS, INC., petitioner, vs. AGHAM PARTY
LIST (represented by its President Rep. Angelo B. Palmones),
respondent
Doctrine: The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, covers environmental damage of
such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two (2) or more cities or provinces. The Rules are clear that in a Writ of
Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule
or regulation violated or threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission
complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two (2) or more cities or
provinces. It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance
of a Writ of Kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated
or would be violated.
Facts: Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a
mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI’s mining area is covered
by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement dated 26 August 2008 by virtue of
an Operating Agreement dated 5 June 2007 with Filipinas Mining
Corporation. LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, noncommercial
port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. A port is a vital infrastructure to
the operations of a mining company to ship out ores and other minerals
extracted from the mines and make the venture economically feasible. Brgy.
Bolitoc, about 25 kilometers away from the mine site, makes it an ideal
location to build a port facility. LAMI secured permits and compliance
certificates for the port project. The Zambales Alliance, a group of other
mining companies operating in Sta. Cruz, Zambales which do not have their
own port supported the port project of LAMI and issued Letters of Intent to
use the port facilities of LAMI upon completion. The Bolitoc community — the
barangay, its officials and residents — gave several endorsements
supporting the project. Even the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz gave its
consent to the construction of the port.
However, LAMI allegedly encountered problems from the local government
of Sta. Cruz, headed by Mayor Luisito E. Marty (Mayor Marty). LAMI stated
that Mayor Marty unduly favored some mining companies in the municipality
and allegedly refused to issue business and mayor’s permits and to receive
payment of occupation fees from other mining companies despite the
necessary national permits and licenses secured by the other mining
companies. Mayor Marty issued an orderdirecting LAMI to refrain from
continuing with its clearing works and directed the Sta. Cruz Municipal Police
Chief Generico Biñan to implement his order. LAMI responded through a
letter explaining that Mayor Marty’s order was illegal and baseless. Chief
Biñan, together with two of his deputies, went to LAMI’s port site to demand
that LAMI cease its clearing works. LAMI’s supervisor showed Chief Biñan all
of LAMI’s permits. In a Memorandum, Chief Biñan made a report to his
supervisor, that there was no leveling of a mountain on the port site.
Thereafter, Rep. Dan Fernandez, a member of the Committee on Ecology of
the House of Representatives, passed House Resolution No. 117 (HR 117)
entitled ―Resolution Directing the Committee on Ecology to Conduct an
Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Implementation of Republic Act No.
7942, Otherwise Known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, Particularly on
the Adverse Effects of Mining on the Environment.‖ HR 117 was issued in
order to conduct an alleged ocular inspection of the port site in aid of
legislation. The Committee on Ecology conducted an ocular inspection of the
LAMI port site, as well as the other ports adjacent to LAMI’s. Representatives
from the DENR Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) in Zambales and the local government of Sta. Cruz conducted an
ECC compliance monitoring of LAMI’s property. The DENR PENRO team
found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the ECC. The DENR
PENRO team found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the ECC.
Accordingly, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued against LAMI for
violation of certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist order from
further constructing and developing until such time that the ECC conditions
were fully complied.
Accordingly, a Notice of Violation (NOV) dated 1 June 2012 was issued
against LAMI for violation of certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and
desist order from further constructing and developing until such time that the
ECC conditions were fully complied.
A technical conference was held where LAMI presented its reply to the NOV.
The DENR-EMB R3 ascertained that LAMI’s violations of the four conditions
of its ECC constitute minor violations since they only pertain to non-
submission of documents. However, the leveling of the elevated portion of
the area was a major violation. A penalty was consequently imposed on
LAMI, and the DENR-EMB R3 directed LAMI to (1) immediately cause the
installation of mitigating measures to prevent soil erosion and siltation of the
waterbody, and (2) submit a rehabilitation plan. LAMI wrote a letter to the
DENR-EMB R3 regarding the commitments agreed upon during the technical
conference. LAMI signified compliance with the conditions of DENR-EMB R3.
The DENR-EMB R3 lifted the cease and desist order after LAMI was found to
have complied with the requirements.
Respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its President, former
Representative Angelo B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan against LAMI, DENR, PPA, and the
Zambales Police Provincial Office (ZPPO).
No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277, or the Revised Forestry
Code; and (2) Sections 572 and 69 of Republic Act No. 7942, or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Philippine Mining Act). Agham added that
LAMI cut mountain trees and flattened a mountain which serves as a natural
protective barrier from typhoons and floods not only of the residents of
Zambales but also the residents of some nearby towns located in
Pangasinan.
The SC remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception
of evidence and rendition of judgment.
LAMI filed its Verified Return dated 21 June 2012, controverting Agham’s
allegations. LAMI stated that it did not and was not violating any
environmental law, rule or regulation.
The Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of petitioner. The appellate
court found that the government, through the CENRO, authorized LAMI to
cut trees and LAMI strictly followed the proper guidelines stated in the permit.
The appellate court also stated that there can be no flattening of a mountain
when there is no mountain to speak of. Thus, for failing to comply with the
requisites the Court of Appeals declared that Agham’s Motion for
Reconsideration was submitted for resolution. Subsequently, Agham filed a
Supplemental Reply dated 29 April 2013 reiterating the same arguments.
Agham filed an MR
In a Resolution dated 31 May 2013, the Court of Appeals set Agham’s
Motion for Reconsideration for hearing on 13 June 2013. At the hearing, all
parties were given time to argue their case. Thereafter, the Motion for
Reconsideration was submitted for resolution. In an Amended Decision dated
13 September 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its original
Decision dated 23 November 2012
Issue: The issues for our resolution are (1) whether LAMI violated the
environmental laws as alleged by Agham, and (2) whether LAMI flattened
any mountain and caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
Held:
Petitioner contends that it has the necessary permits and authorization to cut
trees on the port site, controverting the allegation of Agham that it violated
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Petitioner also insists
that it did not violate nor is it violating the Mining Act as alleged by Agham.
Petitioner argues that it is not conducting any mining activity on the port site
since the mine site is about 25 kilometers away from the port site. Further,
petitioner adds that after filing its Verified Return dated 21 June 2012, Agham
never mentioned again the alleged violation of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended, and the Philippine Mining Act. Instead, Agham changed its
position and later claimed that LAMI was flattening a mountain on the port
site which was allegedly illegal per se. Petitioner insists that Agham did not
even present evidence to establish any environmental damage which is
required for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that even if the subject land
formation is not a mound, hill or mountain, the fact remains that the scraping
and leveling done by petitioner caused serious environmental damage which
affects not only the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales but also the nearby
towns of Zambales and Pangasinan.
1) The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan
which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.— Section 1,
Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules provides: Section 1. Nature of the writ.—The
writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by
law, people’s organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
2) The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, covers environmental damage of
such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two (2) or more cities or provinces.— The writ is available against an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual
or entity. The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1)
there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises
from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

3) The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to
prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to
be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two (2) or more cities or provinces.— Even the Annotation to
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that the magnitude of
environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition.

4) It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a

Writ of Kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or
would be violated. In the present case, the allegation by Agham that two laws
— the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act —
were violated by LAMI was not adequately substantiated by Agham. Even
the facts submitted by Agham to establish environmental damage were mere
general allegations.
 CASE NO. 29
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS, INC.,
vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES)
G.R. No. 209271, G.R. No. 209276, G.R. No. 209301, G.R. No. 209430
December 8, 2015
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
In April 2002, the DA issued DA-AO No. 08 providing rules and regulations
for the importation and release into the environment of plants and plant
products derived from the use of modem biotechnology.
The country's biosafety regulatory system was further strengthened with the
issuance of EO 514 "Establishing the National Biosafety Framework (NBF),
Prescribing Guidelines for its Implementation, and Strengthening the NCBP."
It expressly provides that, unless amended by the issuing departments or
agencies, DAO 08-2002, the NCBP Guidelines on the Contained Use of
Genetically Modified Organisms, except for provisions on potentially harmful
exotic species which were repealed, and all issuances of the FDA on
products of modem biotechnology, shall continue to be in force and effect.
On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) was
executed between UPLBFI, ISAAA and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc.
(UPMFI), in pursuance of a collaborative research and development project
on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer.
As indicated in the Field Trial Proposal submitted by the implementing
institution (UPLB), the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was
described as a "bioengineered eggplant." The crystal toxin genes from the
soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant
(talong) genome to produce the protein CrylAc which is toxic to the target
insect pests. CrylAc protein is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae
such as the fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of
eggplant.
Under the regulatory supervision of NCBP, a contained experiment was
started in 2007 and officially completed on March 3, 2009. The NCBP thus
issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment stating that
"During the conduct of the experiment, all the biosafety measures have been
complied with and no untoward incident has occurred."BPI issued Biosafety
Permits to UPLB. Thereafter, field testing of Bt talong commenced on various
dates in the following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North Cotabato; Sta.
Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay,
Laguna.
On April 26, 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents filed a
petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with prayer for
the issuance of a TEPO. They alleged that the Bt talong field trials violate
their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering that (1)
the required environmental compliance certificate under PD 1151 was not
secured prior to the project implementation; (2) as a regulated article under
DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is presumed harmful to human health and the
environment, and there is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety
of Bt talong for human consumption and the environment; among others.
The following reliefs are thus prayed for:(among others)
a. Upon the filing [of this petition], a TEPO should be issued: (i) enjoining
public respondents BPI and FPA of the DA from processing for field testing,
and registering as herbicidal product, Bt talong in the Philippines; (ii) stopping
all pending field testing of Bt talong anywhere in the Philippines; and (in)
ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong for field trials as their very
presence pose significant and irreparable risks to human health and the
environment.
b. Upon the filing [of this petition], issue a writ of continuing mandamus
commanding:
(i) Respondents to submit to and undergo the process of environmental
impact statement system under the Environmental Management Bureau;
(among others)
c. Upon filing [of this petition], issue a writ of kalikasan commanding
Respondents to file their respective returns and explain why they should not
be judicially sanctioned for violating or threatening to violate or allowing the
violation of the above-enumerated laws, principles, and international principle
and standards, or committing acts, which would result into an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of
petitioners in particular and of the Filipino people in general.
d. After hearing and judicial determination, to cancel all Bt talong field
experiments that are found to be violating the above mentioned laws,
principles, and international standards; and recommend to Congress curative
legislations to effectuate such order.
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA,
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)/BPI/Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA) and UPLB, ordering them to make a verified return within a
non-extendible period often (10) days, as provided in Sec. 8, Rule 7 of the
19
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLBFI and UPMFI filed their respective verified
returns. They all argued that the issuance of writ of kalikasan is not proper
because in the implementation of the Bt talong project, all environmental
laws were complied with, including public consultations in the affected
communities, to ensure that the people's right to a balanced and healthful
ecology was protected and respected.
On the procedural aspect, ISAAA sought the dismissal of the petition for writ
of kalikasan for non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts and the
allegations therein being mere assertions and baseless conclusions of law.
EMB, BPI and FPA questioned the legal standing of Greenpeace, et al. in
filing the petition for writ of kalikasan as they do not stand to suffer any direct
injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests. They likewise prayed for the
denial of the petition for continuing mandamus for failure to state a cause of
action and for utter lack of merit.
UPMFI also questioned the legal standing of Greenpeace, et al. for failing to
allege that they have been prejudiced or damaged, or their constitutional
rights to health and a balanced ecology were violated or threatened to be
violated by the conduct of Bt talong field trials. Insofar as the field trials in
Davao City, the actual field trials at Bago Oshiro started on November 25,
2010 but the plants were uprooted by Davao City officials on December 17-
18, 2010. There were no further field trials conducted and hence no violation
of constitutional rights of persons or damage to the environment, with respect
to Davao City, occurred which will justify the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
UPMFI emphasized that under the MOU, its responsibility was only to handle
the funds for the project in their trial site. It pointed out that in the Field Trial
Proposal, Public Information Sheet, Biosafety Permit for Field Testing, and
Terminal Report (Davao City Government) by respondent Leonardo R. Avila
III, nowhere does UPMFI appear either as project proponent, partner or
implementing arm. Since UPMFI, which is separate and distinct from UP,
undertook only the fund management of Bt talong field test project the
duration of which expired on July 1, 2011, it had nothing to do with any field
trials conducted in other parts of the country.
Finally, it is argued that the precautionary principle is not applicable
considering that the field testing is only a part of a continuing study being
done to ensure that the field trials have no significant and negative impact on
the environment. There is thus no resulting environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces. Moreover, the issues raised by Greenpeace, et al.
largely involve technical matters which pertain to the special competence of
BPI whose determination thereon is entitled to great respect and even
finality.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Greenpeace, et al. has legal standing.
2. Whether or not the case is moot and academic. (by the
termination of all field trials on August 10, 2012. In fact, the validity of
all Biosafety permits issued to UPLB expired in June 2012)
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RULING:
1. YES. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in
44
environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses
the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature," and aims to "further encourage the
protection of the environment. There is therefore no dispute on the standing
of respondents to file before this Court their petition for writ of kalikasan and
42
writ of continuing mandamus. Oposa v. Factor an, Jr. signaled an even
more liberalized policy on locus standi in public suits. In said case, we
recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law." We held that such right need not be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it
is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
2. NO. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of
the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
48
repetition yet evading review. We find that the presence of the second and
fourth exceptions justified the CA in not dismissing the case despite the
termination of Bt talong field trials. While it may be that the project
proponents of Bt talong have terminated the subject field trials, it is not
certain if they have actually completed the field trial stage for the purpose of
data gathering. At any rate, it is on record that the proponents expect to
proceed to the next phase of the project, the preparation for commercial intensely debated global issue, and despite the entry of GMO crops (Bt corn)
propagation of the Bt eggplants. Biosafety permits will still be issued by the into the Philippines in the last decade, it is only now that such controversy
BPI for Bt talong or other GM crops. Hence, not only does this case fall under involving alleged damage or threat to human health and the environment
the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness from GMOs has reached the courts.
principle, the human and environmental health hazards posed by the
introduction of a genetically modified plant, a very popular staple vegetable
among Filipinos, is an issue of paramount public interest.

3. NO. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of
the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court
without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of
the same after due deliberation. However, there are many accepted
exceptions, such as: xxx (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (1) in quo
warranto proceedings. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents sought relief under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental

Cases, claiming serious health and environmental adverse effects of the Bt
talong field trials due to "inherent risks" associated with genetically modified
crops and herbicides. They sought the immediate issuance of a TEPO to
enjoin the processing for field testing and registering Bt talong as herbicidal
product in the Philippines, stopping all pending field trials of Bt
talonganywhere in the country, and ordering the uprooting of planted Bt
talong in the field trial sites.

In addition to the TEPO and writ of kalikasan, respondents also sought the
issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the respondents to:
(1) comply with the requirement of environmental impact statement; (2)
submit comprehensive risk assessments, field test reports, regulatory
compliance reports and other material documents on Bt talong including
issued certifications on public consultation with LGUs; (3) work with other
agencies to submit a draft amendment to biosafety regulations; and (4) BPI,
in coordination with relevant government agencies, conduct balanced
nationwide public information on the nature of Bt talong field trial, and a
survey of its social acceptability.

Clearly, the provisions of DAO 08-2002 do not provide a speedy, or adequate

remedy for the respondents "to determine the questions of unique national
and local importance raised here that pertain to laws and rules for
50
environmental protection, thus [they were] justified in coming to this Court."
We take judicial notice of the fact that genetically modified food is an
 Case 30
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, on behalf of the
Residents of West Tower Condominium and in representation of
Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and generations yet
unborn vs. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FIRST GEN
CORPORATION and their RESPECTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS, JOHN DOES, and RICHARD DOES,. G.R. No. 194239 June
16, 2015
Doctrine: It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower
signed their acquiescence to the filing of the petition for the issuance
of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put
by the CA, not measured by the number of persons who signified their
assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive
environmental disaster.
Facts: Respondent FPI C operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: ( 1) the
White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which covers a 117-kilometer stretch
from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel,
gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL)
System which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from
Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Parañaque.
The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double
the standard safety allowance against leakage, considering that they are
made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand more than twice the current
operating pressure and are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which
is deeper than the US Department of Transportation standard of 0.9 meters.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected
after the residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started to
smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within
the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of
its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the flow, West Tower's
management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City,
which in turn called the city's Bureau of Fire Protection.
Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the
City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the
drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the
residents of West Tower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010
and the condo's power was shut down.
Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. On October
28, 2010, the University of the Philippines-National Institute of Geological
Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of Makati invited to determine the
source of the fuel, found a leak in FPIC's WOPL about 86 meters from West
Tower.
A day after, or on October 29, 2010, FPIC admitted that indeed the source of
the fuel leak is the WOPL, which was already closed since October 24, 2010,
but denied liability by placing blame on the construction activities on the
roads surrounding West Tower.
West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the
present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the
residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding
communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also
alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several people's organizations,
non-governmental organizations and public interest groups who have
expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the
environmental issues involved.
petitioners prayed that respondents FPIC and its board of directors and
officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its board of directors and
officers be directed to: (1) permanently cease and desist from committing
acts of negligence in the performance of their functions as a common carrier;
(2) continue to check the structural integrity of the whole 117-kilometer
pipeline and to replace the same; (3) make periodic reports on their findings
with regard to the 117-kilometer pipeline and their replacement of the same;
(4) rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Barangay Bangkal
and West Tower, at least to what it was before the signs of the leak became
manifest; and (5) to open a special trust fund to answer for similar and future
contingencies in the future.
petitioners argued that FPIC's omission or failure to timely replace. its
pipelines and to observe extraordinary diligence caused the petroleum spill in
the City of Makati. Thus, for petitioners, the continued use of the now 4 7-
year old pipeline would not only be a hazard or a threat to the lives, health,
and property of those who live or sojourn in all the municipalities in which the
pipeline is laid, but would also affect the rights of the generations yet unborn
to live in a balanced and "healthful ecology," guaranteed under Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan2 with a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the
members of their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified returns
TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to cease and desist from operating the WOPL
until further orders
FPIC directors Edgar Chua, Dennis Javier, Dennis Gamab and Willie
Sarmiento submitted a Joint Return3 praying for the dismissal of the petition
and the denial of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan. They alleged that:
petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition; there is no allegation
that the environmental damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more
cities or provinces; and the continued operation of the pipeline should be
allowed in the interest of maintaining adequate petroleum supply to the
public.
FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and Officers filed a Joint
Compliance5 submitting the report required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO.
They contended that they neither own nor operate the pipelines, adding that
it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity of the pipelines,
much less to cease and desist from operating them as they have no
capability, power, control or responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus,
prayed that the directives of the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as
sufficiently performed, as to them.
Petitioners filed, and the Court eventually granted, their Motion to Set the
Case for Preliminary Conference and Hearing7 pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 7
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
Court conducted an ocular inspection of the WOPL in the vicinity of West
Tower to determine the veracity of the claim that there were two (2)
additional leaks on FPIC's pipeline. Results of the ocular inspection belied
the claim.
Since after the Court's issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on
November 19, 2010, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and the
BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of the DOE,
clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of Kalikasan and
TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume operation
of its BOPL System.
petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion10 assailing the Court's May 31, 2011
Resolution, praying for the conduct of oral argument on the issue of
reopening the BOPL System. This was followed, on September 9, 2011, by a
Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion11 wherein
petitioners invoked the precautionary principle12 and asserted that the
possibility of a leak in the BOPL System leading to catastrophic
environmental damage is enough reason to order the closure of its operation.
They likewise alleged that the entities contracted by FPIC to clean and
remediate the environment are illegally discharging waste water, which had
not undergone proper treatment, into the Parañaque River.
To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA). By this Court's Resolution, the appellate court
was required to conduct hearings and, thereafter, submit a report and
recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the parties' memoranda.
CA submitted the following recommendations:
a) That the people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
public interest groups that indicated their intention to join the petition and
submitted proof of juridical personality (namely: the Catholic Bishop's
Conference of the Philippines; Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc.;
Women's Business Council of the Philippines, Inc.; Junior Chambers
International Philippines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter; Zonta Club of Makati
Ayala Foundations; and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium
Corporation) be allowed to be formally impleaded as petitioners.
(b) That respondent FPIC be ordered to submit a certification from the DOE
Secretary that the WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. The
certification should take into consideration the adoption by FPIC of the
appropriate leak detection system to be used in monitoring the entire
pipeline's mass input versus mass output. The certification must also
consider the necessity of replacing the pipes with existing patches and
sleeves. In case of failure of respondent FPIC to submit the required
certification from the DOE Secretary within sixty (60) days from notice of the
Honorable Supreme Court's approval of this recommendation, the TEPO
must be made permanent.
(c) That petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund to answer
for similar contingencies in the future be denied for lack of sufficient basis.
d) That respondent FGC be not held solidarily liable under the TEPO.
the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in its
Report and Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification
from the DOE Secretary before the WOPL may resume its operations
petitioners, in a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification,
emphasized that the CA found FPIC's tests and maintenance program to be
insufficient and inconclusive to establish the WOPL' s structural integrity for
continued commercial operation. Furthermore, petitioners point out that the
DOE is biased and incapable of determining the WOPL's structural integrity.
Respondents, for their part, maintain that the DOE has the technical
competence and expertise to assess the structural integrity of the WOPL and
to certify the system's safety for commercial operation. Respondents further
allege that the DOE is the agency empowered to regulate the transportation
and distribution of petroleum products, and to regulate and monitor
downstream oil industry activities, including "product distribution" through
pipelines.
Issue:
1. Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent
the other petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the
residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
2. Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to
direct the respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to
protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;
3. Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer
for future similar contingencies; and
4. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and
FGC may be held liable under the environmental protection order.
Held
1 2. The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as to the WOPL's
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL
affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in
fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July
23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical power was shut down. Until
now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to
their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of
West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their
acquiescence to the filing of the petition for the issuance of the Writ of
Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not
measured by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto, but
on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental disaster.
2 on speculations, justified by the application of said principle. This, however,
Justice Leonen, in his dissent, is of the view that the petition should be
denied and the TEPO immediately lifted in light of the DOE's issuance of a
certification attesting to the safety of the WOPL for continued commercial
operations, thereby rendering the instant petition moot and academic,
seeking, as it does, the checking of the pipeline's structural integrity.
According to his dissent, the writ of kalikasan issued by the Court has
already served its functions and, therefore, is functus officio. Moreover, he
argues that directing the DOE and FPIC to repeat their previous procedures
is tantamount to doubting the agency's performance of its statutorily-
mandated tasks, over which they have the necessary expertise, and implies
that said DOE certification is improper, a breach, allegedly, of the principle of
separation of powers.
He also contends that the majority ordered the repetition of the procedures
and tests already conducted on the WOPL because of the fear and
uncertainty on its safeness despite the finding of the DOE in favor of its
reopening, taking into consideration the occurrence of numerous pipeline
incidents worldwide. The dissent argues that the precautionary principle
should not be so strictly applied as to unjustifiably deprive the public of the
benefits of the activity to be inhibited, and to unduly create other risks.
The dissent's contentions that the case is already moot and academic, that
the writ of kalikasan has already served its function, and that the delay in the
lifting of the TEPO may do more harm than good are anchored on the
mistaken premise that the precautionary principle was applied in order to
justify the order to the DOE and the FPIC for the conduct of the various tests
anew. The following reasons easily debunk these arguments:
1. The precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant case;
structural integrity and in fact imposes several conditions for FPIC's
compliance;
3. The DOE itself, in consultation with FPIC and the other concerned
agencies, proposed the activities to be conducted preparatory to the
reopening of the pipeline; and
4 . There are no conclusive findings yet on the WOPL's structural integrity.
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle, provides that "[ w ]hen
there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it."
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is based
is not the case. Nowhere did We apply the precautionary principle in deciding
the issue on the WOPL's structural integrity.
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause,
that is the human activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the
damage to the environment, cannot be established with full scientific
certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting
the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the WOPL, which is the
issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage of
hazardous materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage
or will harm human health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the
petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to the
residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.
3
Anent petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that
under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a
trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for
environment. Said proviso pertinently provides: Environmental Cases.
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by
plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and
rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of determine the individual liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of
suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products stemming from
shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
purpose subject to the control of the court. (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Sec. 15( e ), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of damages to petitioners
in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying
the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
xxxx
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual
petitioners.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily
reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future
contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust
fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to
rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already suffered.
Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate
court that the prayer is but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the
considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The
present ruling on petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in
the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that
may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising
from the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.
4
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual
directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule
in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ
of kalikasan, the Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual
 Case No. 31
Paje v. Casiño
G.R. Nos. 207257, 207276, 207282 & 207366
DOCTRINE:A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged
defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and
prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at
least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed
outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Facts: In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a
government agency organized and established under Republic Act No. (RA)
7227, and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a
power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to
Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).
On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC
undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant.
On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International
Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the construction, installation,
and operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.
On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU
dated July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy). RP
Energy then contracted GHD Pty., Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS)
for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying
for the issuance of an ECC from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued
Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing the city government’s
objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and urging the
proponent to consider safer alternative sources ofenergy for Subic Bay.
On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power
plant. Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional
components in its proposed coal-fired power plant. On July 8, 2010, the
DENR-EMB issued an amended ECC (first amendment) allowing the
inclusion of additional components, among others. Several months later, RP
Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC. Instead of
constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now
sought to construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power plant.
On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended
the ECC (second amendment). The Sangguniang Panglalawiganof
Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the establishment of a
coal-fired thermal power plant. The Liga ng mga Barangayof Olongapo City
issued Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011, expressing its strong objection to
the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.
Hon. Casino’s group filed for a writ of kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA,
DENR. The Casiño Group alleged, among others, that the power plant
project would cause environmental damage, that it would adversely affect the
health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong,
Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo. While the case was pending in the CA,
RP Energy applied for another amendment to its ECC proposing the
construction and operation of a 2x300-MW coal fired power plant
CA:
Denied the writ of kalikasan due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove
that its constitutional right to la balanced and healthful ecology was violated
or threatened; no reason also to nullify sec 8.3 of DAO 2003-30, which allows
amendments of ECCs. Not ultra vires, as the express power of the Secretary
of DENR, director and regional directors of the EMB to issue an ECC
impliedly includes the incidental power to amend the same.
The validity of the said section cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for
a writ of kalikasan
** But ECC was invalidated for non-compliance with the IPRA law and LGC
and failure to affix the signature in the sworn statement of full responsibility
- Non-compliance with sec 59 of IPRA Law (enjoins all departments and
other governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior
certification that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral
domain)
- The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as
it was issued without the prior consultation and approval of all the
sanggunians concerned as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC
- For failure of Luis Miguel Abolitz, director of RP Energy to affix his signature
in the sworn statement of full responsibility (integral part of the ECC)
- The first and second amendment for failure to comply with the restrictions in
the ECC which requires that any expansion of the project beyond the project
description or any change in the activity shall be subject to a new administrative remedies.
environmental impact assessment
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown
**Invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy or even
- Issued without prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere
concerned as under secs 26 and 27 of the LGC listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.
- In violation of sec 59 chapter VIII of the IPRA Law which enjoins all The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casino group FAILED to
departments and other governmental agencies from granting any lease substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant
without a prior certification that the area affected does not overlap with any will cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the
ancestral domain writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to
- no CNO was secured from the NCIP prior to the execution of the LDA and establish that the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage
that the CNO dated October 31, 2012 was secured during the pendency of through its environmental management plan which will ensure that the
the case and was issued in connection with RP Energy’s application for a project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and
2x300 MW Coal fired plant standars.

Issue: OTHER ISSUES:

1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance
of a writ of Kalikasan; and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
Ruling:
1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section
16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases) allow the parties to
raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the
circumstances surrounding
the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
because such writ is principally predicated on an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which
involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and
territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such
defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a
reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance
of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the
Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-
filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
CA erred in invalidating the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr.
Abolitz in the ECC’s statement of accountability relative to the copy of the
ECC submitted by RP Energy to the CA. The circumstance of the case show
that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue of lack
of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and
arguments on this point, as the issue only arose during the course of the
proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the CA.
CA erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to the ECC
were invalid for failure to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-
30 and the Revised Manual. DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in
requiring an ERMP and a PDR for the first and second amendment
respectively. Through these documents which the DENR reviewed, a new
EIA was conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. No
showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
CA erred when it invalidated ECC for failure to comply with sec 59 of the
IPRA Law. The ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under sec 59.
There is no necessity to secure the Certificate of Non Overlap (CNO) under
sec 59 before and ECC may be issued and the issuance of the subject ECC
without first securing the aforesaid certification does not render it invalid.
CA erred when it ruled that compliance with sec 27 in relation to sec 26 of
the LGC (approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary
prior to issuance of the subject ECC) issuance of the ECC does not, by itself,
result in the implementation of the project. Hence, there is no necessity to
secure prior compliance with the approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement and the issuance of the subject ECC without first complying with
the aforesaid requirement does not render it invalid.
 CASE NO. 32
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN,
REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE
PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY, AND THE DENR-EMB
(REGION VI)
G.R. No. 196870 June 26, 2012
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. N6-8-SC
Doctrine: The writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain
jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation
of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision and, in order to do this, the
court may compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent
government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance
with its decision.
Boracay Island (Boracay), a tropical paradise located in the Western Visayas
region of the Philippines and one of the countrys most popular tourist
destinations, was declared a tourist zone and marine reserve in 1973 under
Presidential Proclamation No. 1801. The island comprises the barangays of
Manoc-manoc, Balabag, and Yapak, all within the municipality of Malay, in
the province of Aklan.
More than a decade ago, respondent Province built the Caticlan Jetty Port
and Passenger Terminal at Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to
Boracay.It also built the corresponding Cagban Jetty Port and Passenger
Terminal to be the receiving end for tourists in Boracay. Respondent
Province operates both ports to provide structural facilities suited for locals,
tourists and guests and to provide safety and security measures.
Governor Marquez sent a letter to respondent Philippine Reclamation
Authority (PRA) on March 12, 2009 expressing the interest of respondent
Province to reclaim about 2.64 hectares of land along the foreshores of
Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan, pursuant to
Resolution No. 13, s. 2008 issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan.
Sometime in April 2009, respondent Province entered into an agreement
with the Financial Advisor/Consultant that won in the bidding process held a
month before, to conduct the necessary feasibility study of the proposed
project for the Renovation/Rehabilitation of the Caticlan Passenger Terminal
Building and Jetty Port, Enhancement and Recovery of Old Caticlan
Coastline, and Reclamation of a Portion of Foreshore for Commercial
Purposes (the Marina Project), in Malay, Aklan.
Subsequently, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
respondent Province issued Resolution No. 2009110, which authorized
Governor Marquez to file an application to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of
foreshore area in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan with respondent PRA.
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay expressed
its strong opposition to the intended foreshore lease application, through
Resolution No. 044, approved on July 22, 2009, manifesting therein that
respondent Provinces foreshore lease application was for business
enterprise purposes for its benefit, at the expense of the local government of
Malay, which by statutory provisions was the rightful entity to develop, utilize
and reap benefits from the natural resources found within its jurisdiction.
In August 2009, a Preliminary Geohazard Assessmentfor the
enhancement/expansion of the existing Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger
Terminal through beach zone restoration and Protective Marina
Developments in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan was completed.
Thereafter, Governor Marquez submitted an Environmental Performance
Report and Monitoring Program (EPRMP) to DENR-EMB RVI, which he had
attached to his letter dated September 19, 2009, as an initial step for
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). The letter reads in
part:
With the project expected to start its construction implementation next month,
the province hereby assures your good office that it will give preferential
attention to and shall comply with whatever comments that you may have on
this EPRMP.
Within the same month of October 2009, respondent Province deliberated on
the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64
hectares to forty (40) hectares.
Respondent PRA approved the reclamation project on April 20, 2010 in its
Resolution No. 4094and authorized its General Manager/Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) to enter into a MOA with respondent Province for the
implementation of the reclamation project.
On April 27, 2010, DENR-EMB RVI issued to respondent Province ECC-R6-
1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project
to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the
existing jetty port.
On May 17, 2010, respondent Province entered into a MOA with respondent
PRA.
In Resolution No. 046, Series of 2010, adopted on June 23, 2010, the Malay
Municipality reiterated its strong opposition to respondent Provinces project
and denied its request for afavorableendorsement of the Marina Project.
The Malay Municipality subsequently issued Resolution No. 016, Series of
2010, adopted on August 3, 2010, to request respondent PRA not to grant
reclamation permit and notice to proceed to the Marina Project of the
respondent Provincial Government of Aklan located at Caticlan, Malay,
Aklan.
In a letter dated October 12, 2010, petitioner informed respondent PRA of its
opposition to the reclamation project.
Petitioner likewise transmitted its Resolution No. 001, Series of 2010,
registering its opposition to the reclamation project to respondent Province,
respondent PRA, respondent DENR-EMB, the National Economic
Development Authority Region VI, the Malay Municipality, and other
concerned entities.
Petitioner alleges that despite the Malay Municipalitys denial of respondent
Provinces request for afavorableendorsement, as well as the strong
opposition manifested both by Barangay Caticlan and petitioner as an NGO,
respondent Province still continued with the implementation of the
Reclamation Project.
On June 1, 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Environmental
Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. On June 7,
2011, this Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.
After receiving a copy of the TEPO on June 9, 2011, respondent Province
immediately issued an order to the Provincial Engineering Office and the
concerned contractor to cease and desist from conducting any construction
activities until further orders from this Court.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered
moot and academic;
[2] Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies before filing this case;
[3] Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as
required by laws and regulations based on the scope and classification of the
project;
[4] Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements
under the pertinent laws and regulations; and
[5] Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation
for the project
HELD:
1. No. A close reading of the two LGUs respective resolutions would reveal
that they are not sufficient to render the petition moot and academic, as there
are explicit conditions imposed that must be complied with by respondent
Province. In Resolution No. 003, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang
Barangay of Caticlan it is stated that any vertical structures to be constructed
shall be subject for barangay endorsement. Clearly, what the barangay
endorsed was the reclamation only, and not the entire project that includes
the construction of a commercial building and wellness center, and other
tourism-related facilities.Petitioners objections, as may be recalled, pertain
not only to the reclamation per se, but also to the building to be constructed
and the entire projects perceived ill effects to the surrounding environment.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Malay obviously imposed explicit conditions for
respondent Province to comply with on pain of revocation of its endorsement
of the project, including the need to conduct a comprehensive study on the
environmental impact of the reclamation project, which is the heart of the
petition before us. Therefore, the contents of the two resolutions submitted
by respondent Province do not support its conclusion that the subsequent
favorable endorsement of the LGUs had already addressed all the issues
raised and rendered the instant petition moot and academic.
2. No. We do not agree with respondents appreciation of the applicability of
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case. We are
reminded of our ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals, which summarized our
earlier decisions on the procedural requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, to wit:
***
The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and
fast rule. It is not applicable: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the
respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually
disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention.

Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, when there is no due process observed, or
where the protestant has no other recourse.
Although petitioner was not a party to the proceedings where the decision to
issue an ECC was rendered, it stands to be aggrieved by the decision,
because it claims that the reclamation of land on the Caticlan side would
unavoidably adversely affect the Boracay side, where petitioners members
own establishments engaged in the tourism trade. As noted earlier, petitioner
contends that the declared objective of the reclamation project is to exploit
Boracays tourism trade because the project is intended to enhance support
services thereto; however, this objective would not be achieved since the
white-sand beaches for which Boracay is famous might be negatively
affected by the project. Petitioners conclusion is that respondent Province,
aided and abetted by respondents PRA and DENR-EMB RVI, ignored the
spirit and letter of our environmental laws, and should thus be compelled to
perform their duties under said laws.
***
The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC,
provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which
is a special civil action that may be availed of to compel the performance of
an act specifically enjoined by law and which provides for the issuance of a
TEPO as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself. The
Rationale of the said Rules explains the writ in this wise:
Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of
regulation by Congress to the implementation of regulatory programs by the
appropriate government agencies.
Thus, a government agency’s inaction, if any, has serious implications on the
future of environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent
that they seek to change the scope of the regulatory process, will have to rely
on such agencies to take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial
component. Accordingly, questions regarding the propriety of an agency’s
action or inaction will need to be analyzed.
This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of
mandamus, which allows for the enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to
which the writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty.
The writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the courts decision and, in order to do this, the court may
compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent
government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance
with its decision.
Petitioner had three options where to file this case under the rule: the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or this Court.
Petitioner had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to determine the questions of unique national and local
importance raised here that pertain to laws and rules for environmental
protection, thus it was justified in coming to this Court.
3) Being the administrator of the EIS System, respondent DENR-EMB RVIs
submissions bear great weight in this case.However, the following are the
issues that put in question the wisdom of respondent DENR-EMB RVI in
issuing the ECC:
[1] Its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project as a
mere expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it
as a new project;
[2] Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-
located project;
[3] The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government
agencies; and
[4] The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the
reclamation project to the environment.
As may be gleaned from the breakdown of the 2.64 hectares as described by
respondent Province above, a significant portion of the reclaimed area would
be devoted to the construction of a commercial building, and the area to be
utilized for the expansion of the jetty port consists of a mere 3,000 square
meters (sq. m). To be true to its definition, the EIA report submitted by
respondent Province should at the very least predict the impact that the
construction of the new buildings on the reclaimed land would have on the
surrounding environment. These new constructions and their environmental
effects were not covered by the old studies that respondent Province
previously submitted for the construction of the original jetty port in 1999, and
which it re-submitted in its application for ECC in this alleged expansion,
instead of conducting updated and more comprehensive studies.
Any impact on the Boracay side cannot be totally ignored, as Caticlan and
Boracay are separated only by a narrow strait. This becomes more
imperative because of the significant contributions of Boracays white-sand
beach to the countrys tourism trade, which requires respondent Province to
proceed with utmost caution in implementing projects within its vicinity.
***
The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government
agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to
secure prior public consultation and approval of local government units for
the projects described therein.
4. No. In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent
PRA. Even if the project proponent is the local government of Aklan, it is
respondent PRA which authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive
agency of the government to undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it
was necessary for respondent Province to go through respondent PRA and
to execute a MOA, wherein respondent PRAs authority to reclaim was
delegated to respondent Province. Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional
office of the DENR, is also a national government institution which is tasked
with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered by
environmental laws such as the one at bar.
This project can be classified as a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities, and is covered
by the requirements found in the Local Government Code provisions.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met
before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological
balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultationwith the
affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
projects implementation is illegal.
5. No. Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval
are required by law to have been conducted and secured by the respondent
Province. Accordingly, the information dissemination conducted months after
the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with this
requirement under the Local Government Code. Had they been conducted
properly, the prior public consultation should have considered the ecological
or environmental concerns of the stakeholders and studied measures
alternative to the project, to avoid or minimize adverse environmental impact
or damage. In fact, respondent Province once tried to obtain the favorable
endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was denied by the
latter.
Moreover, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides:
5.3. Public Hearing / Consultation Requirements
For projects under Category A-1, the conduct of public hearing as part of the
EIS review is mandatory unless otherwise determined by EMB. For all other
undertakings, a public hearing is not mandatory unless specifically required
by EMB.
Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that
environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into
consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan.
All public consultations and public hearings conducted during the EIA
process are to be documented. The public hearing/consultation Process
reportshall be validated by the EMB/EMB RD and shall constitute part of the
records of the EIA process.
In essence, the above-quoted rule shows that in cases requiring public
consultations, the same should be initiated early so that concerns of
stakeholders could be taken into consideration in the EIA study. In this case,
respondent Province had already filed its ECC application before it met with
the local government units of Malay and Caticlan.
The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the
subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang
Barangay of Caticlan on February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of Malay onFebruary 28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly
achieved at the urging and insistence of respondent Province. As we have
established above, the respective resolutions issued by the LGUs concerned
did not render this petition moot and academic.
It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the
promotion of tourism in Boracay and the protection of the environment, lest
they kill the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. At the beginning of this
decision, we mentioned that there are common goals of national significance
that are very apparent from both the petitioners and the respondents
respective pleadings and memoranda.
As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and
smooth resolution of these issues would benefit all the parties. Thus,
respondent Provinces cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the
Court-mandated review of the proper classification and environmental impact
of the reclamation project is of utmost importance.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The TEPO issued by this Court is hereby converted into a writ of
continuing mandamus specifically as follows:
1. Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
Environmental Management Bureau Regional Office VI shall revisit and
review the following matters:
In the meantime, the respondents, their concerned contractor/s, and/or their
agents, representatives or persons acting in their place or stead, shall
immediately cease and desist from continuing the implementation of the
project covered by ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 until further orders from this
Court. For this purpose, the respondents shall report within five (5) days to
this Court the status of the project as of their receipt of this Decision, copy
furnished the petitioner.

a. its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of

a co-located project;

b. its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project

as a mere expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead
of classifying it as a new project; and

c. the impact of the reclamation project to the environment based on

new, updated, and comprehensive studies, which should forthwith be
ordered by respondent DENR-EMB RVI.

2. Respondent Province of Aklan shall perform the following:

a. fully cooperate with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in its review of the
reclamation project proposal and submit to the latter the appropriate report
and study; and
b. secure approvals from local government units and hold proper
consultations with non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders
and sectors concerned as required by Section 27 in relation to Section 26 of
the Local Government Code.

Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority shall closely monitor the

submission by respondent Province of the requirements to be issued by
respondent DENR-EMB RVI in connection to the environmental concerns
raised by petitioner, and shall coordinate with respondent Province in
modifying the MOA, if necessary, based on the findings of respondent
DENR-EMB RVI.

The petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. and the respondents The Province of
Aklan, represented by Governor Carlito S. Marquez, The Philippine
Reclamation Authority, and The DENR-EMB (Region VI) are mandated to
submit their respective reports to this Court regarding their compliance with
the requirements set forth in this Decision no later than three (3) months from
the date of promulgation of this Decision.
 Case No. 33
Dolot v. Paje
G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
DOCTRINE: A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain
jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation
of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision.
FACTS: Maricris D. Dolot, together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant
Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog, filed a
petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC
of Sorsogon. The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1)
sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being
conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in
the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern
tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the
geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to
flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of
flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and
landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining
operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor
Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-
scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the
representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do
anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog; and (7) the
respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-
Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
and the Local Government Code. Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs:
(1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop
the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a
temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-
agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of
damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. The case was
summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution. Aside from sustaining the
dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC further ruled that: (1)
there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of
continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners
therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also
failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the case is proper
HELD: NO.
On Jurisdiction and Venue
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power
and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law.
It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over
the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. By
virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides
that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction –in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC
of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases specifically states that a special civil
action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising
jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission
occurred x x x." In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or
omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition
should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin. But even then, it does not
warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be
waived. Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature
where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction. What the RTC should
have done under the circumstances was to transfer the case to the proper
branch.
On the Writ of Continuing Mandamus
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed
of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.‖ The
petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a
final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the
writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit: (c)
Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case
directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to
perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain
effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC
actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually
render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which
judgment or decree shall subsequently become final. Under the Rules, after
the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and
such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction
over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing
its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of
said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or
decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of
judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing mandamus
is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as
it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision."

On the Infirmity of the Petition

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for
failure to attach judicial affidavits. Rule 8 requires that the petition should be
verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels
the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the
evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it
would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the
question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.
Failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect
such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required
the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents.

CASE NO. 34
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. OLONGAPO
MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC.
G.R. NO. 146184-85, 161117, 167827, JANUARY 31, 2008
VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS:
The rationale behind the requirement of a public bidding, as a mode of
awarding government contracts, is to ensure that the people get maximum
benefits and quality services from the contracts. More significantly, the strict
compliance with the requirements of a public bidding echoes the call for
transparency in government transactions and accountability of public officers.
Public biddings are intended to minimize occasions for corruption and
temptations to abuse of discretion on the part of government authorities in
awarding contracts.
Before us are three separate petitions from service contractors that
question the legality of awarding government contracts without public
bidding.
FACTS:
Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc (OMSI) and Triple Crown Services,
Inc. (TCSI) were among the five contractors of MIAA which had janitorial and
maintenance service contracts covering various areas in the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport. Before their service contracts expired on October 31,
1998, the MIAA Board of Directors, through Antonio P. Gana, then General
Manager (GM) of MIAA, wrote OMSI and TCSI informing them that their
contracts would no longer be renewed after October 31, 1998.
On September 28, 1998, TCSI, in a letter to Gana, expressed its concern
over the award of its concession area to a new service contractor through a
negotiated contract. It said that to award TCSI’s contract by mere negotiation
would violate its right to equal protection of the law. TCSI thus suggested that
a public bidding be conducted and that the effectivity of its service contract
be meanwhile extended until a winning bid is declared.
A similar letter from OMSI to MIAA followed.
In reply, MIAA wrote TCSI and OMSI reiterating its disinclination to renew the
latter’s contracts, adding that it was to the government’s advantage to
instead just negotiate with other contractors.
Civil Case Nos. 98-1875 and 98-1885
On October 26, 1998, OMSI filed with the Pasay City RTC a Complaint for
Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MIAA
(OMSI case). The case was raffled to Branch 119 of the court.
Two days after, TCSI filed Civil Case No. 98-1885 (first TCSI case) for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Injunction against Gana and Goodline
Staffers & Allied Services, Inc. (Goodline), a service contractor that was
awarded the contract heretofore pertaining to TCSI. This was raffled to the
RTC, Branch 113, Pasay City.
Both Branches 113 and 119 granted TROs to OMSI and TCSI.
Subsequently, on November 18, 1998, Branch 119 granted a preliminary
injunctive writ in favor of OMSI. A day after, Branch 113 also granted a
similar writ in favor of TCSI.
Without filing any motion for reconsideration, MIAA assailed as void
the issuance of the injunctive writs before the CA through petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Meanwhile, even as the cases were pending before the CA, Branch 113
continued to hear the first TCSI case.
TRIAL COURT DECISION:
On February 1, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring as null
and void the negotiated contract award to Goodline and the Resolution of
the MIAA Board dated October 2, 1998, which authorized Gana to negotiate
the award of the service contract, and ordered the holding of a public bidding
on the janitorial service contract. Branch 113 also ordered the writ of
preliminary injunction in the case enforced until after a qualified bidder is
determined.
Following the denial of Gana’s motion for reconsideration, MIAA and Gana
appealed before the CA, their recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67092.
Civil Case Nos. 02-0517 and 03-0025
During the pendency of the appeal of the first TCSI case before the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 67092, MIAA and TCSI engaged in several exchanges
regarding payment of TCSI employees’ salaries. On October 30, 2002,
MIAA informed TCSI that it was terminating the latter’s contract effective 10
days from receipt of the notice or on November 14, 2002.
TCSI protested the termination which it viewed as violative of the injunctive
writ issued by Branch 113. In its letter-reply of November 13, 2002, MIAA
asserted that the termination of TCSI’s service contract did not violate the
injunctive writ as the writ covered only the extension of the contract period
until such time that a new awardee was chosen through public bidding.On
the eve of November 18, 2002, MIAA refused entry to TCSI employees and
took over the janitorial services in the area serviced by TCSI.
Subsequently, on November 25, 2002, TCSI filed a Petition for Contempt
with Motion to Consolidate, impleading Edgardo Manda who took over as
GM of MIAA. The petition, entitled Triple Crown Services, Inc. v. Edgardo
Manda, in his capacity as General Manager of the Manila International
Airport Authority and docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0517 (second TCSI
case for contempt), was raffled to the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City. In it,
TCSI mainly alleged that the unilateral termination by MIAA of their
service contract on alleged contract violation brought about by MIAA’s
refusal to pay TCSI was a blatant and contumacious violation of the
injunctive writ issued by Branch 113. TCSI also prayed that the petition for
contempt be consolidated with the first TCSI case.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the second TCSI case for contempt, TCSI
filed on January 24, 2003 a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against
MIAA entitled Triple Crown Services, Inc. v. Manila International Airport
Authority, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0025 (third TCSI case for
mandamus) and again raffled to Branch 115, wherein TCSI sought to
maintain the status quo order issued by Branch 113 in the first TCSI case
and to compel MIAA to pay PhP 18 million to TCSI.
In its Comment, MIAA denied all of TCSI’s allegations and accused
TCSI of forum shopping.
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE CONSOLIDATED
CASES DOCKETED
CA-G.R. SP NOS. 50087 AND 50131 INVOLVING THE INJUNCTIVE
WRITS
ISSUED IN THE OMSI CASE AND FIRST TCSI CASE
Recall that MIAA assailed the injunctive writs issued by the trial court thru
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 50087 and 50131. On November 24, 2000, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision, denying due course to and dismissing the petitions. The
CA stated that respondents-judges did not gravely abuse their discretion in
issuing the injunctive writs enjoining MIAA from terminating the service
contracts of OMSI and TCSI. Relying on Manila International Airport
Authority v. Mabunay (Mabunay) and National Food Authority, the CA said
that MIAA and Gana failed to satisfactorily show why the aforementioned
cases should not apply. Moreover, the appellate court explained that
notwithstanding the expiration of the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI,
they both have extant interests as possible applicants. Aggrieved by the CA
Decision, MIAA and Gana filed the instant petition docketed as G.R. Nos.
146184-85.
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 67092
Recall likewise that the RTC in the first TCSI case granted an injunctive writ
in favor of TCSI. On appeal, on November 28, 2003, the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 67092 rendered the assailed Decision, affirming that of the RTC and
reasoning that Sec. 1(e) of EO 301, series of 1987, entitled Decentralizing
Actions on Government Negotiated Contracts, Lease Contracts and Records
Disposal, relied upon by Gana and MIAA, does not apply to service contracts
but only to requisitions of needed supplies. The CA applied our ruling in
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato (Kilosbayan), where we held that the
"supplies" mentioned as exceptions in EO 301 refer only to contracts for the
purchase of supplies, materials, and equipment, and do not refer to other
contracts, such as lease of equipment, and that in the same vein, "supplies"
in Sec. 1(e) of EO 301 only include materials and equipment and not service
contracts, which are included in the general rule of Sec. 1. The CA, relying
on Mabunay and National Food Authority, explained that Sec. 9 of EO 903,
Sec. 82 of RA 8522, and Sec. 417 of the GAAM must be harmonized with the
provisions of EO 301 on public biddings in all government contracted
services. The rationale for public bidding, the CA said, is to give the public
the best possible advantages through open competition.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Gana and MIAA now question the
above Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 67092 through a
Petition for Review on Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 161117 before us.
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 76138
On September 9, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting
MIAA’s petition for certiorari. It annulled and set aside the March 4, 2003
Order and March 19, 2003 Writ of Mandamus and dismissed the third TCSI
case for mandamus with prejudice. The CA found TCSI guilty of forum
shopping when it filed the third TCSI case for mandamus while the second
TCSI case for contempt was pending. Further, the CA observed that the two
cases have identical parties, prayed for the same reliefs, and were anchored
on the same writ of preliminary injunction issued in the first TCSI case. Citing
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, the CA
concluded that elements of litis pendentia were present and TCSI was guilty
of forum shopping.
TCSI’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the April 13, 2005
CA Resolution. TCSI now assails the above Decision and Resolution before
us in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 docketed as G.R. No.
167827.
ISSUES:
In G.R. No. 167827, TCSI raises the following issues for our consideration:
I. Whether or not the respondent can be compelled by Mandamus to
maintain the status quo ante, as earlier ordered by this Honorable Court and
be held liable for damages for unilaterally terminating the service contract of
the petitioner in violation of said status quo order.
II. Whether or not the herein petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.
III. Whether or not the herein private respondent complied with the requisites
for the institution of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals.
HELD:
PROPRIETY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE INJUNCTIONS
The Court will jointly tackle G.R. Nos. 146184-85 and 161117 since the
issues raised are closely interwoven. The incidents in the two assailed
decisions not only arose from the first TCSI case, but also involved the same
issue of the propriety of preliminary and permanent injunctions.
MIAA and Gana strongly assert that OMSI and TCSI have no right to be
protected by the injunctive writs as the term of their service contracts had
already expired on October 31, 1998. Petitioners rely on National Food
Authority, where we held that no court can compel a party to agree to a
contract or its extension through an injunctive writ since an extension of a
contract is only upon mutual consent of the parties.
MIAA and Gana also argue that OMSI and TCSI are estopped from
questioning the validity of a contract acquired through negotiations
since the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI with MIAA were also
negotiated contracts and did not undergo public bidding. These
negotiated contracts are among the exceptions in Sec. 1 of EO 301. MIAA
and Gana posit that the exceptions in Sec. 1 cover both contracts for public
services and contracts for supplies, materials, and equipment. And, since
TCSI’s contract expired on October 31, 1998, and MIAA refused to extend
the contracts, OMSI and TCSI have no right of renewal or extension of their
service contract.
We agree with MIAA and Gana.
It is undisputed that the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI expired on
October 31, 1998 and were not extended by MIAA. Hence, all the rights and
obligations arising from said contracts were extinguished on the last day of
the term. As a result, OMSI and TCSI had already lost their rights to render
janitorial and maintenance services for MIAA starting November 1, 1998.
Such being the case, the Court rules that the TROs and writs of preliminary
injunction issued in favor of OMSI and TCSI are irregular and without legal
basis. The November 18, 1998 injunctive writ in favor of OMSI in the OMSI
case and the November 19, 1998 injunctive writ in favor of TCSI in the first
TCSI case were in the nature of writs of mandatory preliminary
injunction. In Bautista v. Barcelona, we made clear that a mandatory
injunction is an extreme remedy and will be granted only on a showing that
(a) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. It is apparent
that OMSI and TCSI have no more legal rights under the service contracts
and, therefore, they have not met the vital procedural requirement that they
must have material and substantial rights that have to be protected by courts.
It is undisputed that the service contracts were to terminate on October 31,
1998. Thus, by the lapse of such date, where no contract extension had been
mutually agreed upon by the parties, the trial court cannot force the
parties nor substitute their mutual consent to a contract extension
through an injunction.
Indeed, MIAA’s decision not to extend the service contracts of OMSI
and TCSI is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Certainly, there
is no law that prohibits management discretion, even if it be a governmental
agency or instrumentality or a government-owned or controlled corporation,
from extending or not extending a service contract. Certainly, MIAA’s
management can determine, in the exercise of its sound discretion and the
options available, given the factual and economic milieu prevailing, whether
or not it is to its interest to extend a service contract for janitorial and
maintenance services.
From the foregoing premises, the RTCs in Civil Case Nos. 98-1875 and
98-1885 have erred in issuing the assailed writs of mandatory
injunction. Hence, these writs must be nullified.
The next issue to be resolved is whether MIAA, in the context of this case,
can be barred from entering into negotiated contracts after the
expiration of the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI on October 31,
1998.
The answer is in the affirmative.
CERTIORARI IS A PROPER REMEDY FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER
GRANTING MANDAMUS (THIRD TCSI CASE FOR MANDAMUS)
The March 4, 2003 and March 19, 2003 Orders granting mandamus and
denying MIAA’s motion for reconsideration, respectively, are clearly
interlocutory orders. What we held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v.
Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
It has been held that "[a]n interlocutory order does not terminate or
finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to
be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits."
It "refers to something between the commencement and end of the
suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision
on the whole controversy." Conversely, a final order is one which
leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case. The test
to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is: "Does it
leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is
final."
TCSI argues that since the trial court still has to hear the issue on damages
in Civil Case No. 03-0025 for mandamus and no final decision has yet been
rendered, the mandamus writ is an interlocutory one, and cannot be subject
of an appeal. However, Rule 41 clearly states that while an interlocutory
order cannot be subject of an appeal and the aggrieved party has to await
the decision of the court, still it allows the filing of a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the order. Moreover, under the circumstances of the case,
MIAA had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
MIAA RAISED ISSUES ALLEGING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
ON THE PART OF THE RTC
TCSI argues that MIAA only raised factual matters before the CA which the
trial court has ruled upon in the exercise of its jurisdiction and thus are not
reviewable by certiorari but only by appeal.
Contrary to TCSI’s contention, a close perusal of the issues raised by MIAA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76138 shows that not all the issues the latter raised were
factual issues. MIAA assailed the lack or excess of jurisdiction of the RTC
resulting from grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned
orders. Abuse of discretion is precisely the thrust in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
FORUM SHOPPING EXISTS
TCSI contends that the CA committed reversible error when it held TCSI
resorted to forum shopping. TCSI argues it was not guilty of forum shopping
when it filed the second TCSI case for contempt and the third TCSI case for
mandamus. According to TSCI, as these are two distinct and separate cases,
the elements of litis pendentia amounting to res judicata do not exist.
TCSI’s contention is devoid of merit.
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of
the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both
actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is
founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.
We uphold the CA’s finding that TCSI was guilty of forum shopping.
If the first TCSI case for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Damages with Prayer
for TRO and Injunction would not be considered in determining whether
forum shopping was resorted to by TCSI when it subsequently filed the
second TCSI case for contempt and the third TCSI case for mandamus, then
there could have been merit in TCSI’s claim of non-forum shopping. The fact,
however, is the second and third TCSI cases stemmed from the first TCSI
case, anchored as they were on the alleged breach by MIAA of the
November 19, 1998 writ of preliminary injunction. Such being the case, the
court a quo did not err when it ruled that the reliefs in the second and third
TCSI cases in effect prayed for the enforcement of the November 19, 1998
injunctive writ. Moreover, the causes of action in the second and third cases
are substantially identical because the basis is the disobedience or breach of
the writ of injunction. Hence, forum shopping is present.

WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered, ordering as follows:

1. The negotiated contract by and between the respondents and the
resolution of the MIAA Board, dated October 2, 1998, authorizing
MIAA management and/or respondent GM Gana to negotiate and
award service contracts upon the expiration of the present service
contract, on October 31, 1998 are hereby declared NULL and VOID;

2. The hiring of employees to render janitorial and maintenance

services by GM Gana and/or the MIAA management is declared
VALID and LEGAL. However, should said petitioners decide to
procure the services of a contractor for janitorial and
maintenance services, then they are ordered to hold a public
bidding for said services, subject to certain exceptions, set
forth in RA 9184 or the Government Procurement Act, if
applicable;

3. The writ of preliminary injunction is RECALLED and

NULLIFIED; and

4. No pronouncement as to costs and attorney’s fees.

The petition in G.R. No. 167827 is DENIED for lack of merit and the
September 9, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76138 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Case No. 35
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
Rule 65
DOCTRINE: The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one that requires neither official discretion
nor judgment.
FACTS: Some concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before
the RTC Imus, Cavite against several government agencies for the clean-up,
rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that
the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards
set by law such as those set out by the Philippine Environment Code or PD
1152.
HELD: YES. The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by
mandamus. Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law,
on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two
different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks
may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very
act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set
forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its
charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system
cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated; discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources testified for the

petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the beaches around
Manila Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the DENR.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System testified also about its
efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports Authority presented
as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the study on ship-generated
waste treatment and disposal as its Linis Dagat project.

RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to
the cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds appropriated for cleaning, and
asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act which can be
compelled by mandamus.

CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do
tasks outside of their usual basic functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not
ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus